摩根大通 (JPM) 2024 Q1 法說會逐字稿

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to JPMorgan Chase's First Quarter 2024 Earnings Call. This call is being recorded. (Operator Instructions) We will now go live to the presentation. Please stand by.

早安，女士們，先生們。歡迎參加摩根大通 2024 年第一季財報電話會議。此通話正在錄音。 （操作員說明）我們現在將進行演示。請稍候。

At this time, I would like to turn the call over to JPMorgan Chase's Chairman and CEO, Jamie Dimon; and Chief Financial Officer, Jeremy Barnum. Mr. Barnum, please go ahead.

現在，我想把電話轉給摩根大通董事長兼執行長傑米戴蒙（Jamie Dimon）；和財務長傑里米·巴納姆。巴納姆先生，請繼續。

Thank you very much, and good morning, everyone. The presentation is available on our website, and please refer to the disclaimer in the back.

非常感謝大家，大家早安。該演示文稿可在我們的網站上獲取，請參閱後面的免責聲明。

Starting on Page 1. The firm reported net income of $13.4 billion, EPS of $4.44 on revenue of $42.5 billion and delivered an ROTCE of 21%. These results included a $725 million increase to the special assessment resulting from the FDIC's updated estimate of expected losses from the closures of Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank.

從第 1 頁開始。該公司報告淨利潤為 134 億美元，每股收益為 4.44 美元，收入為 425 億美元，ROTCE 為 21%。這些結果包括由於 FDIC 對矽谷銀行和 Signature 銀行關閉造成的預期損失的最新估計，特別評估增加了 7.25 億美元。

Touching on a couple of highlights. Firm-wide IB fees were up 18% year-on-year, reflecting particular strength in underwriting fees. And we have seen strong net inflows across AWM as well as in the CCB and Wealth Management business.

談到幾個亮點。全公司的 IB 費用年增 18%，反映出承銷費用的強勁成長。我們看到 AWM 以及建行和財富管理業務都有強勁的淨流入。

On Page 2, we have some more detail. This is the last quarter we'll discuss results excluding First Republic, given that going forward, First Republic results will naturally be included in the prior period, making year-on-year results comparable. For this quarter, First Republic contributed $1.7 billion of revenue, $806 million of expense and $668 million of net income.

在第 2 頁上，我們有更多詳細資訊。這是我們將討論不包括 First Republic 的結果的最後一個季度，考慮到未來，First Republic 的結果自然會包含在上一季中，從而使同比結果具有可比性。本季度，First Republic 貢獻了 17 億美元的收入、8.06 億美元的支出和 6.68 億美元的淨利潤。

Now focusing on the firm-wide results excluding First Republic. Revenue of $40.9 billion was up $1.5 billion or 4% year-on-year. NII ex Markets was up $736 million or 4% driven by the impact of balance sheet mix and higher rates as well as higher revolving balances in card, largely offset by deposit margin compression and lower deposit balances in CCB. NIR ex Markets was up $1.2 billion or 12% driven by higher firm-wide asset management and Investment Banking fees as well as lower net investment securities losses. And Markets revenue was down $400 million or 5% year-on-year.

現在關注公司範圍內的業績，不包括第一共和國。營收為 409 億美元，年增 15 億美元，即 4%。受資產負債表組合、利率上升以及銀行卡循環餘額增加的影響，除市場外的NII增長了7.36億美元，即4%，但很大程度上被存款保證金壓縮和建行存款餘額下降所抵消。由於全公司資產管理和投資銀行費用增加以及淨投資證券損失減少，NIR 除市場上漲 12 億美元，即 12%。市場收入較去年同期下降 4 億美元，即 5%。

Expenses of $22 billion were up $1.8 billion or 9% year-on-year driven by higher compensation, including growth in employees and the increase to the FDIC special assessment. And credit costs were $1.9 billion, reflecting net charge-offs of $2 billion and a net reserve release of $38 million. Net charge-offs were up $116 million predominantly driven by Card.

由於薪資上漲（包括員工人數成長和 FDIC 特別評估增加），支出 220 億美元，較去年同期增加 18 億美元，即 9%。信貸成本為 19 億美元，反映出淨沖銷 20 億美元和淨準備金釋放 3,800 萬美元。淨沖銷增加 1.16 億美元，主要由信用卡推動。

On to balance sheet and capital on Page 3. We ended the quarter with a CET1 ratio of 15%, relatively flat versus the prior quarter, reflecting net income which was predominantly offset by higher RWA and capital distribution. This quarter's higher RWA is largely due to seasonal effects, including higher client activity in Markets and higher risk weights on deferred tax assets, partially offset by lower Card loans.

關於第 3 頁的資產負債表和資本。本季結束時，我們的 CET1 比率為 15%，與上一季相比相對持平，反映出淨利潤主要被較高的 RWA 和資本分配所抵銷。本季較高的 RWA 主要是由於季節性影響，包括市場中客戶活動的增加以及遞延稅資產風險權重的增加，但卡片貸款的減少部分抵消了這一影響。

Now let's go to our businesses, starting with CCB on Page 4. Consumers remain financially healthy, supported by a resilient labor market. While cash buffers have largely normalized, balances were still above pre-pandemic levels, and wages are keeping pace with inflation. When looking at a stable cohort of customers, overall spend is in line with the prior year.

現在讓我們來談談我們的業務，從第 4 頁的 CCB 開始。在富有彈性的勞動力市場的支持下，消費者的財務狀況保持健康。儘管現金緩衝已基本正常化，但餘額仍高於疫情前的水平，且薪資與通貨膨脹保持同步。從穩定的客戶群來看，整體支出與前一年持平。

Turning now to the financial results excluding First Republic. CCB reported net income of $4.4 billion on revenue of $16.6 billion, which was up 1% year-on-year. In Banking & Wealth Management, revenue was down 4% year-on-year, reflecting lower NII on lower deposits with average balances down 7% as our CD mix increased. Client investment assets were up 25% year-on-year driven by market performance and strong net inflows.

現在轉向不包括第一共和國的財務表現。建行報告淨利為44億美元，營收為166億美元，年增1%。在銀行和財富管理領域，收入年減 4%，反映出存款減少導致 NII 下降，隨著我們的 CD 組合增加，平均餘額下降 7%。在市場表現和強勁淨流入的推動下，客戶投資資產年增25%。

In Home Lending, revenue was up 10% year-on-year, predominantly driven by higher NII and production revenue. Originations, while still modest, were up 10%.

在房屋貸款方面，營收年增 10%，主要是由於NII 和生產收入增加。起源雖然仍然溫和，但卻成長了 10%。

Moving to Card Services & Auto. Revenue was up 8% year-on-year driven by higher Card Services NII on higher revolving balances, partially offset by higher card acquisition costs from new account growth and lower auto lease income. Card outstandings were up 13% due to strong account acquisition and the continued normalization of revolve. And in auto, originations were $8.9 billion, down 3%, while we maintained healthy margins and market share. Expenses of $8.8 billion were up 9% year-on-year, largely driven by field compensation and continued growth in technology and marketing.

轉向卡服務和汽車。由於循環餘額增加，卡片服務NII增加，營收年增8%，但部分被新帳戶成長帶來的卡片購置成本增加和汽車租賃收入減少所抵銷。由於強勁的客戶獲取和 Revolve 的持續正常化，信用卡未償餘額增加了 13%。在汽車領域，原產地為 89 億美元，下降 3%，同時我們維持了健康的利潤率和市場份額。費用為 88 億美元，年增 9%，這主要是由現場補償以及技術和行銷的持續成長所推動的。

In terms of credit performance this quarter, credit costs were $1.9 billion, driven by net charge-offs, which were up $825 million year-on-year predominantly due to continued normalization in Card. The net reserve build was $45 million, reflecting the build in Card largely offset by a release in Home Lending.

就本季信貸表現而言，信貸成本為 19 億美元，主要由淨沖銷推動，淨沖銷年增 8.25 億美元，主要是由於信用卡業務的持續正常化。淨準備金建設為 4500 萬美元，反映出 Card 的建設很大程度上被房屋貸款的釋放所抵消。

Next, the Corporate & Investment Bank on Page 5. Before reporting CIB's results, I want to note that this will also be the last quarter we will be -- we will report earnings for the CIB and CB as standalone segments. Between now and Investor Day, we will furnish an 8-K with historical results, including 5 quarters and 2 full years of history consistent with the structure of the new Commercial and Investment Bank segment, in line with the reorganization that was announced in January.

接下來是第 5 頁的企業與投資銀行。在報告 CIB 業績之前，我想指出，這也將是我們的最後一個季度——我們將作為獨立部門報告 CIB 和 CB 的收益。從現在到投資者日，我們將提供 8-K 歷史業績，包括與新商業和投資銀行部門的結構一致的 5 個季度和 2 個整年的歷史記錄，與 1 月份宣布的重組保持一致。

Turning back to this quarter. CIB reported net income of $4.8 billion on revenue of $13.6 billion. Investment Banking revenue of $2 billion was up 27% year-on-year. IB fees were up 21% year-on-year, and we ranked #1 with year-to-date wallet share of 9.1%. In Advisory, fees were down 21% driven by fewer large completed deals. Underwriting fees were up significantly, benefiting from improved market conditions with debt up 58% and equity up 51%.

回到本季。 CIB 報告淨利潤為 48 億美元，營收為 136 億美元。投資銀行業務收入20億美元，較去年成長27%。 IB 費用年增 21%，我們以 9.1% 的錢包份額排名第一。在諮詢方面，由於已完成的大型交易減少，費用下降了 21%。受惠於市場狀況改善，承銷費用大幅上漲，負債成長 58%，股本成長 51%。

In terms of the outlook. While we are encouraged by the level of capital markets activity we saw this quarter, we need to be mindful that some meaningful portion of that is likely pulling forward from later in the year. Similarly, while it was encouraging to see some positive momentum in announced M&A in the quarter, it remains to be seen whether that will continue, and the Advisory business still faces structural headwinds from the regulatory environment. Payments revenue was $2.4 billion, down 1% year-on-year, as deposit margin normalization and deposit-related client credits were largely offset by higher fee-based revenue and deposit balances.

從前景來看。雖然我們對本季資本市場活動的水平感到鼓舞，但我們需要注意，其中一些有意義的部分可能會從今年稍後開始。同樣，雖然本季宣布的併購出現一些積極勢頭令人鼓舞，但這種情況是否會持續還有待觀察，而且諮詢業務仍面臨監管環境帶來的結構性阻力。支付收入為 24 億美元，年減 1%，原因是存款保證金正常化和與存款相關的客戶信貸在很大程度上被較高的收費收入和存款餘額所抵消。

Moving to Markets. Total revenue was $8 billion, down 5% year-on-year. Fixed income was down 7% driven by lower activity in rates and commodities compared to a strong prior year quarter, partially offset by strong results in Securitized Products. Equity Markets was flat. Securities Services revenue of $1.2 billion was up 3% year-on-year. Expenses of $7.2 billion were down 4% year-on-year predominantly driven by lower legal expense.

轉向市場。總收入為80億美元，較去年同期下降5%。與去年同期相比，利率和大宗商品活動減少，導致固定收益下降 7%，但部分被證券化產品的強勁業績所抵銷。股票市場持平。證券服務收入為12億美元，年增3%。費用為 72 億美元，年減 4%，主要是由於法律費用減少。

Moving to the Commercial Bank on Page 6. Commercial Banking reported net income of $1.6 billion. Revenue of $3.6 billion was up 3% year-on-year driven by higher noninterest revenue. Gross Investment Banking and Markets revenue of $913 million was up 4% year-on-year with increased IB fees, largely offset by lower Markets revenue compared to a strong prior year quarter. Payments revenue of $1.9 billion was down 2% year-on-year driven by lower deposit margins and balances, largely offset by fee growth, net of higher deposit-related client credits. Expenses of $1.5 billion were up 13% year-on-year predominantly driven by higher compensation, reflecting an increase in employees, including for office and technology investments, as well as higher volume-related expenses.

轉向第 6 頁的商業銀行。商業銀行報告淨利潤為 16 億美元。由於非利息收入增加，收入達到 36 億美元，年增 3%。投資銀行和市場總收入為 9.13 億美元，年增 4%，其中 IB 費用增加，但與去年同期強勁的市場收入相比，這在很大程度上被市場收入的下降所抵消。由於存款保證金和餘額下降，支付收入為 19 億美元，年減 2%，但很大程度上被費用增長（扣除與存款相關的客戶信貸增加）所抵消。費用為 15 億美元，年增 13%，主要是由於薪資上漲，反映出員工數量的增加，包括辦公室和技術投資，以及與銷售量相關的費用增加。

Average deposits were down 3% year-on-year, primarily driven by lower nonoperating deposits and down 1% quarter-on-quarter, reflecting seasonally lower balances. Loans were flat quarter-on-quarter. C&I loans were down 1%, reflecting muted demand for new loans as clients remain cautious. And CRE loans were flat as higher rates continue to have an impact on originations and sales activity. Finally, credit costs were a net benefit of $35 million, including a net reserve release of $101 million and net charge-offs of $66 million.

平均存款年減 3%，主要是由於非經營性存款減少，較上季下降 1%，反映出季節性餘額下降。貸款環比持平。工商業貸款下降 1%，反映出由於客戶保持謹慎態度，新貸款需求疲軟。由於利率上升繼續對貸款發放和銷售活動產生影響，商業房地產貸款持平。最後，信貸成本為 3,500 萬美元的淨收益，其中包括 1.01 億美元的淨準備金釋放和 6,600 萬美元的淨沖銷。

Then to complete our lines of business, AWM on Page 7. Asset & Wealth Management reported net income of $1 billion with pretax margin of 28%. Revenue of $4.7 billion was down 1% year-on-year. Excluding net investment valuation gains in the prior year, revenue was up 5% driven by higher management fees on strong net inflows and higher average market levels, partially offset by lower NII due to deposit margin compression.

然後，為了完成我們的業務線，第 7 頁的 AWM。資產與財富管理報告淨利潤為 10 億美元，稅前利潤率為 28%。營收為47億美元，年減1%。不包括上一年的淨投資估值收益，收入增長了 5%，原因是強勁的淨流入和較高的平均市場水平導致管理費上漲，但部分被存款保證金壓縮導致的NII下降所抵消。

Expenses of $3.4 billion were up 11% year-on-year largely driven by higher compensation, including revenue-related compensation; continued growth in our private banking advisor teams; and the impact of the JPMorgan Asset Management China acquisition; as well as higher distribution fees.

費用為 34 億美元，年增 11%，這主要是由於薪酬上漲，包括與收入相關的薪酬；我們的私人銀行顧問團隊持續壯大；以及摩根大通資產管理中國收購的影響；以及更高的分銷費。

For the quarter, long-term net inflows were $34 billion, led by equities and fixed income. AUM of $3.6 trillion was up 19% year-on-year. And client assets of $5.2 trillion were up 20% year-on-year driven by higher market levels and continued net inflow. And finally, loans were down 1% quarter-on-quarter and deposits were flat.

本季長期淨流入為 340 億美元，其中股票和固定收益流入最多。資產管理規模達 3.6 兆美元，年增 19%。在市場水準較高且持續淨流入的推動下，客戶資產達 5.2 兆美元，年增 20%。最後，貸款季減 1%，存款持平。

Turning to Corporate on Page 8. Corporate reported net income of $918 million. Revenue was $2.3 billion, up $1.3 billion year-on-year. NII was $2.5 billion, up $737 million year-on-year driven by the impact of the balance sheet mix and higher rates. NIR was a net loss of $188 million. The current quarter included net investment securities losses of $366 million compared with net securities losses of $868 million in the prior year quarter. Expenses of $1 billion were up $889 million year-on-year predominantly driven by the increase to the FDIC special assessment.

轉向第 8 頁的企業。企業報告的淨利潤為 9.18 億美元。營收為23億美元，年增13億美元。受資產負債表組合和利率上升的影響，NII 為 25 億美元，年增 7.37 億美元。 NIR 淨虧損 1.88 億美元。本季包括淨投資證券損失 3.66 億美元，去年同期淨證券損失為 8.68 億美元。 10 億美元的支出較去年同期增加 8.89 億美元，主要是由於 FDIC 特別評估增加。

To finish up, we have the outlook on Page 9. We now expect NII ex Markets to be approximately $89 billion based on a forward curve that contained 3 rate cuts at quarter end. Our total NII guidance remains approximately $90 billion, which implies a decrease in our Markets NII guidance from around $2 billion to around $1 billion. The primary driver of that reduction is balance sheet growth and mix shift in the Markets business. And as a reminder, changes in Markets NII are generally revenue-neutral. Our outlook for adjusted expense is now about $91 billion, reflecting the increase to the FDIC special assessment I mentioned upfront. And on credit, we continue to expect the 2024 Card net charge-off rate to be below 3.5%.

最後，我們對第 9 頁的前景進行了展望。根據包含季度末 3 次降息的遠期曲線，我們現在預計除市場外的 NII 約為 890 億美元。我們的 NII 指導總額仍約為 900 億美元，這意味著我們的市場 NII 指引從約 20 億美元減少到約 10 億美元。這一減少的主要驅動力是資產負債表成長和市場業務的組合轉變。需要提醒的是，市場 NII 的變化通常與收入無關。我們調整後支出的前景目前約為 910 億美元，反映了我前面提到的 FDIC 特別評估的增加。在信貸方面，我們繼續預期 2024 年信用卡淨沖銷率將低於 3.5%。

Finally, you may have noticed that our effective tax rate has increased this quarter, and it will likely stay around 23% this year, absent discrete items, which can vary quite a bit. The driver of this change is the firm's adoption of the proportional amortization method for certain tax equity investments.

最後，您可能已經注意到，本季度我們的有效稅率有所提高，如果不考慮離散項目，今年的有效稅率可能會保持在 23% 左右，離散項目可能會有很大差異。這項變化的驅動因素是公司對某些稅收股權投資採用比例攤銷法。

Our managed rate is unchanged, and it should average about 3.5% above the effective tax rate. This is a smaller gap than we've previously observed, and we expect this approximate relationship to persist going forward, although the difference will continue to fluctuate as it has in the past. For the avoidance of doubt, these changes have no meaningful impact on expected annual net income. We're just mentioning this to help with your models.

我們的管理稅率維持不變，平均應比有效稅率高出約3.5%。這個差距比我們之前觀察到的要小，我們預計這種近似關係將持續下去，儘管差異將像過去一樣繼續波動。為避免疑義，這些變動對預期年度淨利沒有重大影響。我們提到這一點只是為了幫助您的模型。

So to wrap up. We're pleased with another quarter of strong operating results even as the journey towards NII normalization begins. While we remain confident in our ability to produce strong returns and manage risk across a range of scenarios, the economic, geopolitical and regulatory uncertainties that we have been talking about for some time remain prominent, and we are focused on being prepared to navigate those challenges as well as any others that may come our way.

所以總結一下。儘管國家資訊基礎設施正常化之旅已經開始，但我們對另一個季度強勁的營運業績感到高興。雖然我們對在各種情況下產生強勁回報和管理風險的能力仍然充滿信心，但我們一段時間以來一直在談論的經濟、地緣政治和監管不確定性仍然很突出，我們專注於做好應對這些挑戰的準備以及任何其他可能出現的情況。

And with that, let's open up the line for Q&A.

接下來，讓我們打開問答熱線。

The first question is coming from the line of Betsy Graseck from Morgan Stanley.

第一個問題來自摩根士丹利的 Betsy Graseck。

So a couple of questions here. Just one, Jamie, could you talk through the decision to raise the dividend kind of mid-cycle, it felt like, pre-CCAR? And also help us understand how you're thinking about where that payout ratio, that dividend payout ratio range should be. Because over the past several years, it's been somewhere between 24% and 32%. And so is this suggesting we could be towards the higher end of that range or even expanding above that?

這裡有幾個問題。傑米，您能談談在周期中期提高股息的決定嗎？感覺就像是在 CCAR 之前？也可以幫助我們了解您如何考慮派息率、股息派息率範圍應該在哪裡。因為在過去的幾年裡，這個比例一直在 24% 到 32% 之間。那麼這是否表明我們可能會接近該範圍的高端，甚至超出該範圍？

And then I also just wanted to understand the buyback and the keeping of the CET1 at 15% here. The minimum is 11.9%. I know it's -- we have to wait for Basel III endgame reproposal to come through and all that. But are we -- should we be expecting that, hey, we're going to hold 15% CET1 until we know all these rules?

然後我也只想了解這裡的回購和CET1維持在15%。最低為 11.9%。我知道，我們必須等待巴塞爾協議 III 終局提案的通過等等。但是，我們是否應該期待，嘿，在我們了解所有這些規則之前，我們將持有 15% 的 CET1？

Yes. So Betsy, before I answer the question, I want to say something on behalf of all of us at JPMorgan and me personally. I'm thrilled to have you on this call.

是的。所以，貝特西，在回答這個問題之前，我想代表摩根大通的所有人和我個人說幾句話。我很高興您能參加這次通話。

For those who don't know, Betsy has been through a terrible medical episode. And to remind all of us how lucky we are to be here, but Betsy in particular, the amount of respect we have, not just in your work, but in your character over the last 20-plus years have been exceptional. So on behalf of all of us, I just want to welcome you back. I'm thrilled to have you here.

對於那些不知道的人來說，貝特西經歷了一段可怕的醫療經歷。並提醒我們所有人，我們是多麼幸運能夠來到這裡，尤其是貝特西，我們不僅對您的工作，而且對您過去 20 多年來的性格都非常尊重。因此，我謹代表我們所有人歡迎您回來。我很高興你能來到這裡。

And so you're asking a pertinent question. So we're earning a lot of money. Our capital cup runneth over, and that's why we increased the dividend. And if you ask me what we'd like to do is to pay out something like 1/3 of normalized earnings. Of course, it's hard to calculate always what normalized earnings are, but we don't mind being a little bit ahead of that sometimes, a little bit behind that sometimes. If I could give people kind of consistent dividend guidance, et cetera.

所以你問了一個相關的問題。所以我們賺了很多錢。我們的資本杯已經用完了，這就是我們增加股息的原因。如果你問我我們想做的就是支付正常化收入的 1/3 之類的東西。當然，很難總是計算正常化收益是多少，但我們不介意有時超前一點，有時落後一點。如果我能給人們一致的股息指導，等等。

I think the far more important question is the 15%. So look at the 15%, I'm going to oversimplify it. That basically will prepare us for the total Basel endgame today roughly. The specifics don't matter that much.

我認為更重要的問題是15%。所以看看 15%，我會把它過度簡化。這基本上將為我們今天的巴塞爾殘局做準備。具體細節並不那麼重要。

Remember, we can do a lot of things to change that in the short run or the long run. But -- and it looks like Basel III endgame may not be the worst case, it will be something less than that. So obviously, when and if that happens, it would free up a lot of capital, and I'm going to say on the order of $20 billion or something like that.

請記住，我們可以做很多事情來改變短期或長期的情況。但是——看起來巴塞爾協議III的最終結果可能不是最壞的情況，它會比最壞的情況要少一些。顯然，當這種情況發生時，如果發生的話，它將釋放大量資本，我想說的是大約 200 億美元或類似的資金。

And yes, we're -- we've always had the capital hierarchy the same way, which is we're going to use capital to build our business first. And we pay the dividend, the steady dividend. Build the business. And if we think it's appropriate, to buy back stock. We're continuing to buy back stock at $2 billion a year. I personally do not want to buy back a lot more than that at these current prices.

是的，我們一直以同樣的方式擁有資本層次結構，即我們將首先使用資本來建立我們的業務。我們支付股息，穩定的股息。建立業務。如果我們認為合適，就回購股票。我們將繼續以每年 20 億美元的價格回購股票。我個人不想以目前的價格回購更多的東西。

I think you've all heard me talk about the world and things like that. So waiting in preparation for Basel. Hopefully, we'll know something later, and then we can be much more specific with you all.

我想你們都聽過我談論世界之類的事情。所以等待為巴塞爾做準備。希望我們稍後能了解一些情況，然後我們可以向大家提供更具體的資訊。

But in the meantime, there's also -- it's very important to put in mind, there are short-term uses for capital that are good for shareholders that could reduce our CET1, too. So you may see us do things in the short run that will increase earnings, increase capital -- that are using up that capital. Jeremy mentioned on the -- on one of the things that we know, the balance sheet and how we use the balance sheet for credit and trading, we could do things now.

但同時，還有一點非常重要的是要記住，資本的短期用途對股東有利，這也可能減少我們的 CET1。所以你可能會看到我們在短期內做一些會增加收入、增加資本的事情——這些事情正在耗盡這些資本。傑里米提到——關於我們所知道的一件事，資產負債表以及我們如何使用資產負債表進行信貸和交易，我們現在就可以採取行動。

So it's a great position to be in. We're going to be very, very patient. I urge all the analysts to keep in mind, excess capital is not wasted capital, it's earnings in store. We will deploy it in a very good way for our shareholders in due course.

所以這是一個很好的位置。我們將非常非常有耐心。我敦促所有分析師記住，過剩資本並不是浪費資本，而是儲存的收益。我們將在適當的時候為我們的股東以非常好的方式部署它。

Betsy, I just wanted to add my welcome back thoughts as well. And just a very minor edit to Jamie's answer. I think he just misspoke when he said $2 billion a year in buybacks, the trajectory. It's $2 billion a quarter.

貝特西，我也想補充我歡迎回來的想法。只是對傑米的答案做了很小的修改。當他說每年回購 20 億美元時，我認為他只是說錯了。每季 20 億美元。

I'm sorry, $2 billion a quarter.

抱歉，每季 20 億美元。

Otherwise, I have nothing to add to Jamie's very complete answer. But welcome back, Betsy.

否則，我對傑米非常完整的答案沒有什麼好補充的。但歡迎回來，貝特西。

Okay. Thank you so much, and I appreciate it. Looking forward to seeing you at Investor Day on May 20.

好的。非常感謝你，我很感激。期待在 5 月 20 日的投資者日見到您。

Excellent. Us too.

出色的。我們也是。

Our next question comes from Jim Mitchell with Seaport Global.

我們的下一個問題來自 Seaport Global 的 Jim Mitchell。

Jeremy, can you speak to the trends you're seeing with respect to deposit migration in the quarter, if there's been any change? Have you seen that migration start to slow or not?

傑里米（Jeremy），您能否談談您在本季度看到的存款遷移趨勢（如果有任何變化）？您是否看到遷移開始放緩或沒有放緩？

Yes, a good question, Jim. I think the simplest and best answer to that is not really. So as we've been saying for a while, migration from checking and savings to CDs is sort of the dominant trend that is driving the increase in weighted average rate paid in the consumer deposit franchise. That continues. We continue to capture that money in motion at a very high rate. So we're very happy about what that means about the consumer franchise and the level of engagement that we're seeing.

是的，這是個好問題，吉姆。我認為最簡單、最好的答案並不是真的。因此，正如我們一段時間以來所說的那樣，從支票和儲蓄轉向定期存單是推動消費者存款業務加權平均利率成長的主導趨勢。這樣的情況還在繼續。我們繼續以非常高的速度獲取流動資金。因此，我們對這對消費者特許經營權和我們所看到的參與度意味著什麼感到非常高興。

I'm aware that there's a little bit of a narrative out there about are we seeing the end of what people sometimes refer to as cash-sorting? We've looked at that data. We see some evidence that maybe it's slowing a little bit. We're quite cautious on that. We really sort of don't think it makes sense to assume they're in a world where checking and savings is paying effectively 0 and the policy rate is above 5%, that you're not going to see ongoing migration.

我知道有一些說法是關於我們是否看到人們有時所說的現金分類的終結？我們已經查看了該數據。我們看到一些證據表明它可能正在放緩。我們對此非常謹慎。我們確實認為假設他們生活在一個支票和儲蓄有效支付為 0 並且政策利率高於 5% 的世界中，你不會看到持續的移民，這是沒有意義的。

And frankly, we expect to see that even in a world where -- even if the current yield curve environment were to change and meaningful cuts were to get reintroduced and we would actually start to see those, we would still expect to see ongoing migration and yield-seeking behavior. So it's quite conceivable.

坦白說，我們期望看到，即使當前的殖利率曲線環境發生變化，並且重新實行有意義的削減，而且我們實際上會開始看到這些，我們仍然期望看到持續的移民和追求收益的行為。所以這是完全可以想像的。

And this is actually on the yield curve that we had in the fourth quarter that had 6 cuts in it, we were still nonetheless expecting an increase in weighted average rate paid as that migration continues. So I would say no meaningful change in the trends, and the expectation for ongoing migration is very much still there.

這實際上是在我們第四季度的殖利率曲線上進行了 6 次削減，儘管如此，我們仍然預計隨著遷移的持續，加權平均利率會增加。因此，我想說趨勢沒有發生有意義的變化，並且對持續遷移的期望仍然存在。

Okay. And just a follow-up on that and just sort of bigger picture on NII. Is that sort of the biggest driver of your outlook? Is it migration? Is it the forward curve? Is it balances? It sounds like it's migration, but just be curious to hear your thoughts on the biggest drivers of upside or downside.

好的。這只是 NII 的後續行動和更大的圖像。這是你的觀點的最大驅動力嗎？是移民嗎？是遠期曲線嗎？是餘額嗎？這聽起來像是遷移，但只是想聽聽您對最大的上行或下行驅動因素的想法。

Yes. So I mean, I think the drivers of, let's say, what's embedded in the current guidance is actually not meaningfully different from what it was in the fourth quarter, meaning it's the current yield curve, which is a little bit stale now, but the snap from quarter end had roughly 3 cuts in it.

是的。所以我的意思是，我認為當前指導中包含的驅動因素實際上與第四季度的驅動因素沒有太大不同，這意味著當前的收益率曲線現在有點陳舊，但四分之一端的折斷處大約有3 個切口。

So it's the current yield curve. It's what I just said, the expectation of ongoing internal migration. There is some meaningful offset from card revolve growth, which, while it's a little bit less than it was in prior years, is still a tailwind there. We expect deposit balances to be sort of flat to modestly down. So that's a little bit of a headwind at the margin.

這就是當前的殖利率曲線。這就是我剛才所說的，對持續的內部遷移的期望。卡牌循環的成長出現了一些有意義的抵消，雖然比前幾年有所減少，但仍然是一個推動因素。我們預計存款餘額將持平或小幅下降。所以這在邊緣是有點逆風。

And then there's obviously the wildcard of potential product-level reprice, which we always say we're going to make those decisions situationally as a function of competitive conditions in the marketplace.

然後，顯然存在潛在的產品級重新定價的通配符，我們總是說我們將根據市場競爭條件的情況做出這些決定。

And you know this, obviously. But in a world where we've got something like $900 billion of deposits paying effectively 0, relatively small changes in the product-level reprice can change the NII run rate by a lot. So the error bands here are pretty wide. And we're always going to stick with our mantra, which has been not losing primary bank relationships and thinking about the long-term health of the franchise when we think about deposit pricing.

顯然你知道這一點。但在一個 9000 億美元的存款實際上支付為零的世界中，產品層級重新定價相對較小的變化可能會極大地改變 NII 運行率。所以這裡的誤差帶相當寬。我們將始終堅持我們的口號，即不要失去主要銀行關係，並在考慮存款定價時考慮特許經營的長期健康狀況。

Our next question comes from John McDonald with Autonomous Research.

我們的下一個問題來自自治研究中心的約翰·麥克唐納。

Jeremy, you had mentioned at a conference earlier this year that The Street might need to build in more reserve growth for the Card growth. You've had more reserve build. We didn't see that this quarter. Is that just kind of seasonal? And would you still expect the kind of growth math to play out in terms of Card growth and reserve build needs?

傑里米，您在今年稍早的一次會議上曾提到，華爾街可能需要為信用卡的成長增加更多的儲備金。你已經建立了更多的儲備。本季我們沒有看到這一點。這只是季節性的嗎？您是否仍期望這種成長數學能夠在卡牌成長和儲備建設需求方面發揮作用？

Yes, John. So in short, yes to both questions. So yes, the relative lack of build this quarter is a function of the normal seasonal patterns of Card. Yes, we still expect 12% card loan growth for the full year. And yes, that still means that all else equal, we think the consensus for the allowance build for the back 3 quarters is still a little too low if you map it to that expected card loan growth.

是的，約翰。簡而言之，這兩個問題都是肯定的。所以，是的，本季建設相對缺乏是卡牌正常季節性模式的結果。是的，我們仍然預計全年卡貸款將成長 12%。是的，這仍然意味著在其他條件相同的情況下，如果將其映射到預期的信用卡貸款增長，我們認為對後三個季度準備金建設的共識仍然有點太低。

Obviously, there's the wildcard of what happens with our probabilities and our parameters and the output of our internal process of assessing the SKU and the CECL distribution and so on. And we're not speaking to that one way or the other. So if you guys have your own opinions about that, that's fine. But we're narrowly just saying that, based on the card loan growth, that we expect and normal coverage ratios for that, we do expect build in the back half of the year.

顯然，我們的機率、參數以及評估 SKU 和 CECL 分佈等的內部流程的輸出都存在通配符。我們並不是以某種方式談論這一點。所以如果你們對此有自己的看法，那就很好。但我們只是狹隘地說，根據我們預期的卡片貸款成長和正常覆蓋率，我們確實預計會在今年下半年有所成長。

Okay. Got it. And then just a follow-up to make it super clear on the idea of the Markets NII, that outlook being revised down by $1 billion, but revenue-neutral. I guess the obvious thing is there, there's typically an offset in fee income, and you don't guide to that. But the idea would be, the way you're structuring trades, the way the balance sheet is evolving, there's some offset that you'd expect in Markets fees from the lower Markets NII, correct?

好的。知道了。然後是一個後續行動，以非常明確地闡明 Markets NII 的想法，該前景被下調 10 億美元，但收入中性。我想顯而易見的事情是存在的，費用收入通常會被抵消，而你卻沒有引導到這一點。但想法是，你建立交易的方式，資產負債表的演變方式，你期望較低的市場 NII 會在市場費用中產生一些抵消，對嗎？

That is exactly right. And specifically, what's going on here is this shift between the on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet in the financing businesses and prime and so on within Markets. And you can actually see a little bit of a pop of the Markets balance sheet in the supplement, and these things are all related.

這是完全正確的。具體來說，這裡發生的是市場內融資業務和主要業務等資產負債表內和表外之間的轉變。實際上，您可以在補充中看到市場資產負債表的一些流行數據，這些東西都是相關的。

So fundamentally, you can think of it as like we either hold equities on the balance sheet, non-interest bearing, high funding expense, negative for NII; or we receive that in total return form through derivatives, exactly the same economics, no impact on NII.

所以從根本上來說，你可以把它想像成我們要么在資產負債表上持有股票，不計息，融資費用高，NII 為負；要么我們在資產負債表上持有股票，不計息，融資費用高，NII 為負數；或者我們透過衍生性商品以總回報形式獲得，完全相同的經濟學，對NII沒有影響。

So that shifts as a function of the sort of borrower relationships in the marketplace in ways that are bottom line effectively neutral. It's second order effects, but they change the geography quite a bit, and that's what happened this quarter. And that's why we've been emphasizing for some time that the NII ex Markets is the better number to focus on in terms of an indicator of how the core banking franchise is performing.

因此，這種變化會隨著市場上借款人關係的變化而變化，而底線實際上是中立的。這是二階效應，但它們極大地改變了地理格局，這就是本季發生的情況。這就是為什麼我們一段時間以來一直強調，從核心銀行業務表現的指標來看，除市場外的國家資訊基礎設施（NII）是更值得關注的數字。

Our next question comes from Ebrahim Poonawala with Bank of America.

我們的下一個問題來自美國銀行的 Ebrahim Poonawala。

I guess just in terms of, Jamie, when you think about the outlook for the economy, would appreciate your thoughts on the health of the customer base, both commercial and consumer.

我想傑米，當你考慮經濟前景時，會欣賞你對商業和消費者客戶群健康狀況的想法。

And when we think about higher for longer, maybe the economy is too strong so don't get any rate cuts. Are you seeing that when you talk to your customers and the feedback you're getting from your bankers, where the momentum is picking up?

當我們更長時間地考慮更高的利率時，也許經濟太強勁了，所以不會有任何降息。當您與客戶交談以及從銀行家那裡得到的回饋時，您是否發現這種勢頭正在增強？

And I appreciate all the macro risks Jamie's pointed out, but I'm just getting -- trying to get to a sense of what your view is in terms of the most likely outcome based on what you're seeing today from the customers.

我很欣賞傑米指出的所有宏觀風險，但我只是想根據您今天從客戶那裡看到的情況來了解您對最可能結果的看法。

So I would say consumer customers are fine. The unemployment is very low. Home price dropped, stock price dropped. The amount of income they need to service their debt is still kind of low. But the extra money of the lower-income folks is running out -- not running out, but normalizing. And you see credit normalizing a little bit.

所以我想說消費者客戶很好。失業率非常低。房價下跌，股價下跌。他們償還債務所需的收入仍然很低。但低收入者的額外資金正在耗盡——不是耗盡，而是正常化。你會看到信用稍微正常化。

And of course, higher-income folks still have more money. They're still spending it. So whatever happens, the customer's in pretty good shape. And they're -- if you go into a recession, they'd be in pretty good shape. Businesses are in good shape. If you look at it today, their confidence is up, their order books drop, their profits are up.

當然，收入較高的人仍然擁有更多的錢。他們還在花錢。所以無論發生什麼，客戶的狀態都很好。如果經濟衰退，他們的狀況會相當好。企業狀況良好。如果你今天看看，他們的信心增強了，訂單減少了，利潤增加了。

But what I caution people, these are all the same results of a lot of fiscal spending, a lot of QE, et cetera. And so we don't really know what's going to happen. And I also want to look at the year, look at 2 years or 3 years, all the geopolitical effects and oil and gas and how much fiscal spending will actually take place, our elections, et cetera.

但我警告人們，這些都是大量財政支出、大量量化寬鬆等的相同結果。所以我們真的不知道會發生什麼事。我還想看看這一年，看看兩年或三年，所有的地緣政治影響以及石油和天然氣，以及實際將發生多少財政支出，我們的選舉等等。

So we're in good -- we're okay right now. It does not mean we're okay down the road. And if you look at any inflection point, being okay in the current time is always true. That was true in '72, it was true in any time you've had it. So I'm just on the more cautious side that how people feel, the confidence levels and all that, that doesn't necessarily stop you from having an inflection point. And so everything is okay today, but you've got to be prepared for a range of outcomes, which we are.

所以我們的情況很好——我們現在還好。這並不意味著我們一路走好。如果你觀察任何拐點，你會發現目前一切正常都是事實。這在 72 年是正確的，在你經歷過的任何時候都是如此。所以我只是持更謹慎的態度，人們的感受、信心程度等等，不一定會阻止你出現轉折點。所以今天一切都很好，但你必須為一系列結果做好準備，我們就是這樣。

And the other thing I want to point out because all of these questions about interest rates and yield curves and NII and credit losses, one thing you projected today based on what -- not what we think in economic scenarios, but the generally accepted economic scenario, which is the generally accepted rate cuts of the Fed. But these numbers have always been wrong. You have to ask the question, what if other things happen? Like higher rates with this modest recession, et cetera, then all these numbers change. I just don't think any of us should be surprised if and when that happens.

我想指出的另一件事是，因為所有這些關於利率、殖利率曲線、NII 和信貸損失的問題，你今天預測的一件事是基於——不是我們在經濟情景中的想法，而是普遍接受的經濟情景，這是聯準會普遍接受的降息。但這些數字一直都是錯的。你必須問一個問題，如果發生其他事情怎麼辦？就像這次溫和的衰退帶來的更高利率等一樣，所有這些數字都會改變。我只是認為如果這種情況發生，我們任何人都不應該感到驚訝。

And I just think the chance of that happen is higher than other people. I don't know the outcome. We don't want to guess the outcome. I've never seen anyone actually positively predict a big inflection point in the economy literally in my life or in history.

我只是認為這種情況發生的可能性比其他人更高。我不知道結果。我們不想猜測結果。在我的一生或歷史上，我從未見過有人真正積極地預測經濟的重大轉折點。

That's helpful. And just tied to that, as we look at commercial real estate, both for JP and for the economy overall, is higher rates alone enough to create more vulnerabilities and issues beyond office CRE? How would you characterize the health of the CRE market?

這很有幫助。與此相關的是，當我們審視商業房地產時，無論是對日本還是對整個經濟來說，僅僅提高利率就足以在辦公室商業房地產之外造成更多的脆弱性和問題嗎？您如何評估商業房地產市場的健康狀況？

Yes. So I'll put it into 2 buckets. First of all, we're fine. We've got good reserves against office. We think the multifamily is fine. Jeremy can give you more detail on that if you want.

是的。所以我會把它分成2個桶子。首先，我們很好。我們有充足的儲備來應付辦公室。我們認為多戶住宅很好。如果您願意，傑里米可以為您提供更多詳細資訊。

But if you think of real estate, there's 2 pieces. If rates go up, think of the yield curve, the whole yield curve, not Fed funds, but the 10-year bond rate, it goes up 2%. All assets, all assets, every asset on the planet, including real estate, is worth 20% less. Well obviously, that creates a little bit of stress and strain, and people have to roll those over and finance it more. But it's not just true for real estate, it's true for everybody. And that happens, leveraged loans, real estate will have some effect.

但如果你想到房地產，就有兩塊。如果利率上升，想想殖利率曲線，整個殖利率曲線，不是聯邦基金利率，而是 10 年期公債利率，它會上漲 2%。所有資產，所有資產，地球上的每一種資產，包括房地產，價值都減少了 20%。顯然，這會造成一點壓力和緊張，人們必須將其延期並提供更多資金。但這不僅適用於房地產，也適用於每個人。而這種情況的發生，對房地產槓桿貸款就會產生一定的影響。

The second thing is the why does that happen? If that happens because we have a strong economy, well, that's not so bad for real estate because people will be hiring and filling things out. And other financial assets.

第二件事是為什麼會發生這種情況？如果這種情況發生是因為我們有強勁的經濟，那麼，這對房地產來說並不是那麼糟糕，因為人們會招募並填補空缺。及其他金融資產。

If that happens because we have stagflation, well, that's the worst case. All of a sudden, you are going to have more vacancies. You are going to have more companies cutting back. You are going to have less leases. It will affect -- including multifamily, that will filter through the whole economy in a way that people haven't really experienced since 2010.

如果因為滯脹而發生這種情況，那麼，這是最壞的情況。突然之間，你就會有更多的職缺。將會有更多的公司削減開支。你的租約將會減少。它將影響——包括多戶家庭，這將以一種人們自 2010 年以來從未真正經歷過的方式滲透到整個經濟。

So I'd just put in the back of your mind, the why is important, the interest rates are important, the recession is important. If things stay where they are today, we have kind of the soft landing that seems to be embedded in the marketplace, everyone -- the real estate will muddle through.

所以我只想讓你們記住，為什麼很重要，利率很重要，經濟衰退也很重要。如果事情保持在今天的樣子，我們就會有一種軟著陸，這似乎已經融入市場，每個人——房地產都會蒙混過關。

Obviously, it'd be idiosyncratic if you're in different cities and different types and B versus A buildings and all that, but people will muddle through. They won't muddle through under higher rates with the recession. That would be tougher on a lot of folks, and not just real estate, if in fact that happens.

顯然，如果你在不同的城市、不同的類型、B 型建築與 A 型建築等等，那會很奇怪，但人們會蒙混過關。他們不會在經濟衰退期間在更高的利率下蒙混過關。如果這種情況真的發生的話，這對許多人來說都將更加困難，而不僅僅是房地產。

Our next question comes from Erika Najarian with UBS.

我們的下一個問題來自瑞銀集團的艾莉卡·納賈里安。

Given that your response to Betsy's question is that 15% CET1 today prepares you for Basel III endgame as written. You earn 22% on -- without the FDIC assessment. Ahead of Investor Day, I guess, 6 weeks from now or 5 weeks from now, as we think about that 17% through-the-cycle target, if you're at the right capital level per you guys, where are you overearning today?

鑑於您對 Betsy 問題的回答是，今天 15% CET1 可以讓您為巴塞爾 III 的最終階段做好準備。無需 FDIC 評估，您即可賺取 22%。我想，在投資者日之前，從現在起 6 週或從現在起 5 週後，當我們考慮 17% 的整個週期目標時，如果你們的資本水平合適，你們今天的超額收益在哪裡？

Right. So interesting framing of the question, Erika. So I think we've been pretty consistent about where we're overearning, right? So obviously, one major area is that we're overearning in deposit margins, especially in consumer. And that's sort of why we're expecting sequential declines in NII, why we've talked about compressing deposit margins and increases in weighted average rate paid.

正確的。這個問題的框架很有趣，艾莉卡。所以我認為我們在超額收入方面一直非常一致，對吧？顯然，一個主要領域是我們的存款利潤率超額獲利，尤其是在消費者方面。這就是為什麼我們預計NII將連續下降，為什麼我們談論壓縮存款保證金和增加加權平均支付利率。

So I think that's probably the single biggest source of, let's call it, excess earnings currently. You also heard Jamie say that we're overearning in credit. I mean, wholesale charge-offs have been particularly low, but we have built for that. So in the current run rate, a bit less clear, the extent of what we're earning.

所以我認為這可能是目前超額報酬的最大來源。你還聽到傑米說我們的信貸收入超額。我的意思是，批發沖銷特別低，但我們已經為此做好了準備。因此，在目前的運行速度下，我們的獲利程度不太清楚。

And in Card, of course, while charge-offs are now close to normalized, essentially, we did go through an extended period of charge-offs being very low by historical standards, although that was coupled with NII also being low by historical standards. So from a bottom line perspective, it's not entirely clear what the net of that was. But broadly, it's really deposit margin that's the biggest single factor in the overearning narrative.

當然，在 Card 中，雖然沖銷現在已接近正常化，但從本質上講，我們確實經歷了很長一段時間，沖銷以歷史標準來看非常低，儘管按歷史標準來看，NII 也很低。因此，從底線的角度來看，尚不完全清楚其網路是什麼。但從廣義上講，存款保證金確實是超額報酬敘述中最大的單一因素。

Embedded in your question, I think, is a little bit of the what are you thinking about the 17% CET1 in light of the current level of capital and so on. And you did talk about Investor Day. I was hoping that we would have interesting things to say about that at Investor Day in light of potential updates of the Basel III endgame, given that the single most important factor for that 17% is how much denominator expansion do we see through the Basel III endgame.

我認為，您的問題中包含了一些關於您根據當前資本水平等對 17% CET1 有何看法。您確實談到了投資者日。我希望我們能在投資者日根據巴塞爾協議 III 結局的潛在更新來談論這一點，因為這 17% 的最重要因素是我們透過巴塞爾協議 III 看到了多少分母擴張結束遊戲。

At the rate we're going, we won't actually know that much more about that by Investor Day. So we might not have that much more to say, except to reiterate what I've said in the past, which is that whatever it is, it's going to be very good, our returns in absolute terms, very good in relative terms. We will optimize. We will seek to reprice. We will adjust in various ways as to the best of our ability.

按照我們目前的速度，到投資者日我們實際上不會知道更多。因此，我們可能沒有太多要說的，除了重申我過去說過的話，那就是無論它是什麼，它都將非常好，我們的回報從絕對值來看，從相對值來看都非常好。我們會優化。我們將尋求重新定價。我們將盡最大努力透過各種方式進行調整。

But given the structure of the rule, as proposed at least, there -- a lot of this cannot be optimized away. And so in the base case, you have to think of it as a headwind.

但考慮到規則的結構，至少正如所提議的那樣，其中很多內容都無法被優化掉。因此，在基本情況下，你必須將其視為逆風。

Got it. And just as a follow-up question. You mentioned that the current curve that you set your NII outlook upon is stale. I guess, does it matter? That it seems like the market down-pricing; and obviously no June cut; no September cut; and a toss-up in December, which shouldn't matter for this year. As we think about that $90 billion, does the -- if we price rate cuts out totally, does that matter much? Given that it seems like June is the only one that...

知道了。只是作為後續問題。您提到您設定的 NII 前景當前曲線已經過時。我想，這有關係嗎？市場似乎在降價；顯然六月沒有削減；九月不減產； 12 月還有一個難以抉擇的問題，這對今年來說應該不重要。當我們考慮這 900 億美元時，如果我們完全削減利率，這有那麼重要嗎？鑑於六月似乎是唯一...

Yes. Sorry, Erika. So just quick things on this. One, let's focus on NII ex, not on total NII. So I'd anchor you to the $89 billion. Number two, if you want to do math for like the changes of the average funds rate for the rest of the year and multiply that times the EAR, like be my guest. Looks like as good as an approach as any.

是的。對不起，埃里卡。所以只是快速的事情。第一，讓我們專注於 NII ex，而不是總 NII。所以我會把你鎖在 890 億美元上。第二，如果你想計算一年中剩餘時間平均基金利率的變化，然後乘以 EAR，請拜託。看起來和任何方法一樣好。

But I would just once again remind you, of the $900 billion of deposits paying practically 0, that very small changes there can make a big difference. And we've got other factors, we've got the impact of QT on deposit balances, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. So we want to make sure that we don't get too precise here. We're giving you our best guess based on a series of assumptions. And it's going to be what it's going to be.

但我想再次提醒大家，9000 億美元的存款幾乎為零，非常小的變化可以產生很大的影響。我們還有其他因素，我們有 QT 對存款餘額的影響，等等。所以我們要確保我們不會在這裡變得太精確。我們根據一系列假設為您提供最佳猜測。事情將會是這樣的。

Which we know are going to be wrong.

我們知道這是錯誤的。

Our next question comes from Ken Usdin with Jefferies.

我們的下一個問題來自 Jefferies 的 Ken Usdin。

Jeremy, I was wondering if you could expand a little bit on one of your prepared comments. When you talked about -- we will have hopes and expectations for the Investment Banking pipeline to continue to move along. We obviously saw the good movement in ECM and DCM and the lag in Advisory. Can you just talk about that?

傑里米，我想知道您是否可以擴展一下您準備好的評論。當您談到時，我們將對投資銀行業務繼續發展抱有希望和期望。我們顯然看到了 ECM 和 DCM 的良好發展以及諮詢業務的滯後。能簡單談談嗎？

You mentioned like potential cautiousness around the election. Just what are you hearing from both the corporate side and the sponsor side with -- when it relates to M&A on like go, no-go type of feel and conversation levels? And then what are you thinking we need to have to kick start just another good level of IPO activity in the ECM markets?

您提到了圍繞選舉的潛在謹慎態度。您從公司方和贊助方那裡聽到了什麼——當涉及到併購時的「進行」、「不進行」類型的感覺和對話水平？那麼您認為我們需要怎樣才能在 ECM 市場上啟動又一個良好水準的 IPO 活動？

Sure. Yes. Let me take the IPO first. So we had been a little bit cautious there. Some cohorts and vintages of IPOs had performed somewhat disappointingly. And I think that narrative has changed to a meaningful degree this quarter. So I think we're seeing better IPO performance. Obviously, equity markets have been under a little bit of pressure the last few days. But in general, we have a lot of support there, and that always helps.

當然。是的。我先來說說IPO。所以我們在那裡有點謹慎。一些IPO批次和年份的表現有些令人失望。我認為這個季度這種說法已經發生了有意義的變化。所以我認為我們看到了更好的 IPO 表現。顯然，過去幾天股市承受了一些壓力。但總的來說，我們在那裡得到了很多支持，這總是有幫助的。

Dialogue is quite good. A lot of interesting different types of conversations happening with global firms, multinationals, carve-out type things. So dialogue is good. Valuation environment is better, like sort of decent reasons for optimism there.

對話相當不錯。與跨國公司、跨國公司、分拆型企業進行了許多有趣的不同類型的對話。所以對話是好的。估值環境更好，就像有一些樂觀的理由。

But of course, with ECM, there's always a pipeline dynamic, and conditions were particularly good this quarter. And so we caution a little bit there about pull-forward, which is even more acute, I think, on the DCM side, given that quite a high percentage of the total amount of debt that needed to be refinanced this year has gotten done in the first quarter. So that's a factor.

但當然，對於 ECM，總是存在管道動態，並且本季的情況特別好。因此，我們對前移持謹慎態度，我認為，在 DCM 方面，這種情況更為嚴重，因為今年需要再融資的債務總額中有相當高的比例已經在 2019 年完成。第一季。所以這是一個因素。

And then the question of M&A, I think, is probably the single most important question, not only because of its impact on M&A but also because of its knock-on impact on DCM through acquisition financing and so on. And there's the well-known kind of regulatory headwinds there, and that's definitely having a bit of a chilling effect.

我認為，併購問題可能是最重要的問題，不僅因為它對併購的影響，還因為它透過收購融資等方式對 DCM 產生連鎖反應。那裡存在著眾所周知的監管阻力，這肯定會產生一些寒蟬效應。

I don't know. I've heard some narratives that maybe there's like some pent-up deal demand. Who knows how important politics are in all this. So I don't know. We're fundamentally, as I said I think on the press call, happy to see momentum this quarter, happy to see momentum in announced M&A. Little bit cautious about the pull-forward dynamic, a little bit cautious about the regulatory headwinds. And in the end, we're just going to fight really hard for our share of the wallet here.

我不知道。我聽過一些說法，可能存在一些被壓抑的交易需求。誰知道政治在這一切中有多重要。所以我不知道。正如我在新聞發布會上所說，我們從根本上很高興看到本季的勢頭，很高興看到已宣布的併購勢頭。對拉動動力有點謹慎，對監管阻力有點謹慎。最後，我們將竭盡全力爭奪我們的錢包份額。

Got it. And I guess I'll just stick on the theme of capital markets. And not surprising at all to see a little bit tougher comp in FICC. I think you guys have kind of indicated that maybe a flattish fee pool is a reasonable place, and I know that's impossible to guide on.

知道了。我想我會繼續討論資本市場的主題。在 FICC 中看到更艱難的比賽一點也不奇怪。我認為你們已經表示，也許固定的費用池是一個合理的地方，我知道這是不可能指導的。

But just maybe just talk through some of the dynamics in terms of activity across the fixed income and equities business. And do you feel like this is the type of environment where, given that lingering uncertainty about rates, clients are either more engaged or less engaged in terms of how they're positioning portfolios?

但也許只是談談固定收益和股票業務活動的一些動態。您是否認為在這種環境下，考慮到利率揮之不去的不確定性，客戶在如何配置投資組合方面要么更多參與，要么更少參與？

Yes, a really good question. I would say, in general, that the sort of volatility and uncertainty in the rate environment overall on balance is actually supportive for the Markets revenue pool. And I think that, together with generally more balance sheet deployment as well as sort of some level of natural background growth, is one of the reasons that the overall level of Markets revenue has stabilized at meaningfully above what was normal in the pre-pandemic period.

是的，這是一個非常好的問題。我想說，總的來說，總體而言，利率環境的波動性和不確定性實際上有利於市場收入池。我認為，加上普遍更多的資產負債表部署以及一定程度的自然背景增長，是市場收入總體水平穩定在明顯高於大流行前正常水平的原因之一。

And while that does occasionally make us a little bit anxious like, oh, is this sustainable? Might there be downside here? For now, that does seem to be the new normal. And I do think that having rates off the lower 0 bound and a sort of more normal dynamic in global rates, that not only affects the rates business, but it affects the foreign exchange business. It generally just makes asset allocation decisions more important and more interesting.

雖然這偶爾會讓我們有點焦慮，例如，哦，這是可持續的嗎？這裡可能有缺點嗎？目前，這似乎已成為新常態。我確實認為，利率低於 0 下限以及全球利率的一種更正常的動態，不僅會影響利率業務，還會影響外匯業務。它通常只會讓資產配置決策變得更重要、更有趣。

And so all of that creates risk management needs, and active managers need to grapple with it and so on and so forth. So I think that those are some of the themes on the Markets side at the margin. And yes, we'll see how the rest of the year goes. But it sort of seems to be behaving relatively normally, I would say.

因此，所有這些都產生了風險管理需求，而主動型管理者需要應對它等等。所以我認為這些是市場方面的一些邊緣主題。是的，我們將看看今年剩餘時間的情況如何。但我想說，它的表現似乎相對正常。

Our next question comes from Mike Mayo with Wells Fargo.

我們的下一個問題來自富國銀行的麥克梅奧。

Jamie, I'm just trying to reconcile some of your concerns in your CEO letter. I'm sure the 60 pages, I can see you put a lot of effort into that and it's appreciated. But you talked about scenarios, tail risk, macro risk, geopolitical risk and all that over several years, it's not weeks or months, I get it.

傑米，我只是想解決您在執行長信中提出的一些擔憂。我相信這 60 頁，我可以看到您為此付出了很多努力，我們對此表示讚賞。但你談到了情景、尾部風險、宏觀風險、地緣政治風險以及所有這些幾年的時間，這不是幾週或幾個月，我明白了。

On the other hand, the firm is investing so much more outside the U.S., whether it's commercial or some digital banking, Consumer or Wholesale Payments. So I'm just trying to reconcile kind of your actions with your words. And specifically, how is global Wholesale Payments going? You mentioned you're in 60 countries. You do business a lot more. How is that business in particular doing?

另一方面，該公司在美國境外的投資大幅增加，無論是商業銀行或某些數位銀行、消費者或批發支付領域。所以我只是試著將你的行為與你的言論協調。具體來說，全球批發支付進度如何？您提到您在 60 個國家。你做的生意多了。該業務具體表現如何？

Right, Mike. So I'm sorry to tell you that Jamie actually left us because he's at a leadership offsite. That's why he was here remote. So I think he left the call in my hands for better or for worse. So -- but let me try to address some of your points and without sort of speaking for Jamie here.

對了，麥克。所以我很遺憾地告訴你，傑米實際上離開了我們，因為他在異地的領導階層。這就是他遠程來到這裡的原因。所以我認為無論好壞，他都把跟注權交給我了。所以——但讓我嘗試解決你的一些觀點，而不是在這裡代表傑米說話。

I think that when we talk about the impact of the geopolitical uncertainty on the outlook, part of the point there is to note that the U.S. is not isolated from that, right? If we have global macroeconomic problems as a result of geopolitical situations, that's not only a problem outside the U.S. That affects the global economy and therefore the U.S. and therefore our corporate customers, et cetera, et cetera.

我認為，當我們談論地緣政治不確定性對前景的影響時，有一點需要指出的是，美國並不是孤立的，對嗎？如果我們因地緣政治局勢而出現全球宏觀經濟問題，那麼這不僅是美國以外的問題，也會影響全球經濟，進而影響美國，進而影響我們的企業客戶等等。

So -- and in that context, keeping in mind what we always say, that we invest through the cycle, that we sort of go -- we don't go into countries and then leave countries, et cetera. Obviously, we adjust around the edges. We manage risks. We do make choices as a function of the overall geopolitical environment.

因此，在這種情況下，請記住我們總是說的，我們在整個週期中進行投資，我們不會進入某個國家然後離開某個國家，等等。顯然，我們會在邊緣進行調整。我們管理風險。我們確實根據整體地緣政治環境做出選擇。

But broadly, the notion that we would pull back meaningfully from one of the key competitive strengths that this company has always had, which is its sort of global character because of a particular moment geopolitically would just be inconsistent with how we've always operated.

但從廣義上講，我們將有意義地從這家公司一直擁有的關鍵競爭優勢之一（即由於地緣政治上的特定時刻而具有的全球性特徵）中撤出，這種想法與我們一直以來的營運方式不一致。

And in terms of the Wholesale Payments business, it's going great. It's -- we're taking share. There's been a lot of innovation there, a lot of investment in technology, a lot of connectivity to payment systems in different countries around the world. And yes, I'm sure we'll give you more color and other settings on that, but it's a good story. It's a nice thing to see.

就批發支付業務而言，進展順利。這是——我們正在分享。那裡有許多創新，對科技進行了大量投資，與世界各地不同國家的支付系統有許多連結。是的，我相信我們會給你更多的色彩和其他設置，但這是一個好故事。很高興看到這一點。

Just as a follow-up to that, then. Why is it doing great in terms of Wholesale Payments, given such the dislocations in the world from wars to supply chain changes, everything else, why is Wholesale Payments doing great?

那麼，就作為後續行動。為什麼它在批發支付方面表現出色，考慮到世界上從戰爭到供應鏈變化以及其他一切的混亂，為什麼批發支付表現出色？

Well, I think one of the things about payments businesses is that, in some sense, they're -- I mean, recession-proof is probably the wrong word. And in any case, we're not dealing with a recession, but we're talking fundamentally about moving money through pipes around the world. And that's a thing that people need to do more or less no matter what. So that's one piece.

嗯，我認為支付業務的一件事是，從某種意義上說，它們——我的意思是，「抵禦衰退」可能是錯誤的詞。無論如何，我們並不是在應對經濟衰退，而是從根本上討論如何透過世界各地的管道轉移資金。無論如何，這是人們或多或少需要做的事情。所以這是一件。

But I think the other piece is that our willingness to invest, which has always been a focus of yours, is one of the key things separating us in this business right now. And so we are seeing the benefits of that.

但我認為另一件事是，我們的投資意願一直是你們關注的焦點，這是我們目前在這個行業中區分的關鍵因素之一。所以我們看到了這樣做的好處。

Our next question comes from Glenn Schorr with Evercore.

我們的下一個問題來自 Evercore 的 Glenn Schorr。

Your commentary with Ken's questions were great and clear on Investment Banking for the near term and this year. I have a bigger-picture question in terms of you're so good in spelling out where you're overearning. Do you feel like you're underearning on the Investment Banking side?

您對肯的問題的評論對近期和今年的投資銀行業非常清晰。我有一個更宏觀的問題，你很擅長闡明自己在哪些方面收入超額。您是否覺得自己在投資銀行業務方面收入不足？

And I just use some of your own numbers from the past of like, look, the market has added like $40 trillion of equity market cap and $40 trillion of fixed income market cap last 10 years, yes the wallet is like 20% plus below the 10-year average. So is that -- is there just a bigger upside, and it's just a matter of when, not if?

我只是使用你們過去的一些數據，例如，看，過去10 年市場增加了40 兆美元的股票市值和40 兆美元的固定收益市值，是的，錢包的價值比實際市值低了20% 以上。10 年 平均值。那麼，是否存在更大的好處，這只是時間問題，而不是是否有問題？

Yes, Glenn, in short, yes. I mean, I think we're not shy about saying that we're underearning in Investment Banking now. Clearly, we're below cycle averages, as you point out. We've been talking about when do we get back to the pre-pandemic wallet. But as you know, at this point, it was like March 2020, right, it was the beginning of the pandemic. So it's like 4 years ago at this point. So there's been GDP growth, especially in nominal terms during that period, and you would expect the wallet to grow with that.

是的，格倫，簡而言之，是的。我的意思是，我認為我們並不羞於說我們現在的投資銀行業務收入不足。顯然，正如您所指出的，我們低於週期平均。我們一直在討論什麼時候才能回到大流行前的錢包。但大家知道，此時就像2020年3月一樣，是大流行的開始。所以現在就像是4年前。因此，GDP 成長了，尤其是在那段時期的名目價值，你會期望錢包會隨之成長。

So I do think there's meaningful upside in the Investment Banking fee wallet. As I've noted, there are some headwinds, I think, particularly in M&A. But over time, you would hope that the amount of M&A is a function of the underlying industrial logic rather than the regulatory environment. So you could see some mean reversion there.

所以我確實認為投資銀行費用錢包有很大的上升空間。正如我所指出的，我認為存在一些阻力，特別是在併購領域。但隨著時間的推移，你會希望併購的數量是底層產業邏輯的函數，而不是監管環境的函數。所以你可以在那裡看到一些均值回歸。

And yes, so that's why we're sort of leaning in. We're engaging with clients. We're making sure that we're appropriately resourced for a more robust level of the wallet and fighting for every dollar of share.

是的，這就是我們正在努力的原因。我們正在與客戶互動。我們確保我們擁有適當的資源，以實現更強大的錢包水平，並為每一美元的份額而奮鬥。

Maybe one other follow-up. You're always investing. You clearly get paid in growth across the franchise as you do. But relative to a lot of other banks that have been keeping the expenses a lot closer to flat, do you envision an environment -- or maybe I should rephrase that. What type of environment would have JPMorgan pull back on this tremendous investment spending wave that you've been going through?

也許還有其他後續行動。你總是在投資。顯然，你會因為整個特許經營權的增長而獲得報酬。但相對於許多其他銀行一直將支出保持在接近持平的水平，你是否設想了一個環境——或者也許我應該重新表達一下。在什麼樣的環境下，摩根大通會收回您所經歷的巨大投資支出浪潮？

Sure. So I think the first thing to say, which is somewhat obvious, but I'm going to say it anyway, is that there are some like auto-governors in this, right? Like some portion of the expense base is directly related to revenue, whether it's volume-related commissions, whether it's incentive compensation, whether it's other things. So there are some auto-correcting elements of the expense base that would happen automatically as part of the normal discipline. So that's point one.

當然。所以我認為首先要說的是，這有點明顯，但無論如何我還是要說，這裡面有一些類似自動調速器的東西，對嗎？就像費用基礎的某些部分與收入直接相關一樣，無論是與數量相關的佣金，是否是激勵性薪酬，是否是其他事情。因此，作為正常紀律的一部分，費用基礎中有一些自動更正元素會自動發生。這就是第一點。

Point two is that, independently of the environment, we are always looking for efficiencies. And it's a little bit hard to see it. And in our world, where we're guiding to, I guess now with the special assessment added, $91 billion of expenses, it's hard to tell a story about all the efficiencies that are being generated underneath. But that is part of the DNA in the company. That does happen in BAU all the time as we grind things out, get the benefits of scale and try to extract that efficiency.

第二點是，無論環境如何，我們始終追求效率。而且看到它有點困難。在我們的世界裡，我想現在加上特別評估後，我們將支出 910 億美元，很難講述在背後產生的所有效率的故事。但這是公司 DNA 的一部分。在 BAU 中，當我們不斷努力、獲得規模效益並嘗試提取效率時，這種情況確實經常發生。

And I think, to get to the heart of your question, which is, okay, in what type of environment would we make different strategic questions? And in the end, I think that's a little bit about what that environment is really like. So if you talk about like a normal recession with visibility on the cycle, would we change our long-term strategic investment plans, which are always built up from a financial modeling perspective, assuming resilience through the cycle? No, we wouldn't.

我認為，要觸及您問題的核心，那就是，在什麼類型的環境下我們會提出不同的策略問題？最後，我認為這只是關於環境的真實情況。因此，如果您談論的是具有週期可見性的正常衰退，我們是否會改變我們的長期策略投資計劃，這些計劃始終是從金融模型的角度建立的，假設整個週期具有彈性？不，我們不會。

Could there be some environments that, for whatever reason, change the business case for certain investments or even certain businesses that lead us to make meaningfully different strategic choices? Yes, but that would be because the through-the-cycle analysis has changed for some reason. I just don't see us fundamentally making strategically different decisions if the strategic outlook is unchanged, simply because of the business cycle in the short term.

是否存在一些環境，無論出於何種原因，改變了某些投資甚至某些業務的商業案例，導致我們做出有意義的不同策略選擇？是的，但那是因為整個週期的分析由於某種原因發生了變化。我只是認為，如果策略前景不變，我們不會因為短期的商業週期而做出根本上不同的策略決策。

Our next question comes from Matt O'Connor with Deutsche Bank.

我們的下一個問題來自德意志銀行的馬特·奧康納。

You mentioned one use of capital is to lean into the trading businesses with your balance sheet. And we did see the trading assets going up Q2, which is probably seasonal, but also up a lot year-over-year, but not necessarily translate into higher revenues. And I know they don't like match up necessarily each quarter. But maybe just elaborate like how you're leaning into the trading with the balance sheet and how you expect that to benefit you over time.

您提到資本的一種用途是透過資產負債表投入貿易業務。我們確實看到第二季的交易資產增加，這可能是季節性的，但同比也增加了很多，但不一定轉化為更高的收入。我知道他們並不喜歡每季都進行比賽。但也許只是詳細說明一下您如何利用資產負債表進行交易以及您期望隨著時間的推移這將如何使您受益。

Yes, sure. So let me break this question down into a couple of different parts. So I think what Jamie was sort of suggesting is that you can think of a concept that's kind of like strategic capital versus tactical capital, for lack of a better term.

是的，當然。讓我把這個問題分成幾個不同的部分。所以我認為傑米的建議是，你可以想到一個類似於戰略資本與戰術資本的概念，因為缺乏更好的術語。

And what he's kind of saying is that, in a moment where you're carrying a lot of excess capital sort of for strategic reasons, you have the ability, at least in theory, to deploy portions of that with kind of like -- into relatively short-duration assets or strategies or client opportunities in whatever moment for whatever reason in what might be thought of as a tactical sense.

他的意思是，當你出於戰略原因持有大量過剩資本時，至少在理論上，你有能力將其中的一部分部署到——相對短期的資產或策略或客戶機會，無論何時、出於何種原因，都可能被認為是戰術意義上的。

So he's just pointing out that, that's an option that you have. And the extent to which this quarter's increase in Markets RWA is a reflection of that, maybe a little bit, but probably not. I agree with you that it's hard in any given quarter to specifically link the change in capital and RWA to a change in revenue. There's just too many moving parts there.

所以他只是指出，這是你的一個選擇。本季市場 RWA 的成長在多大程度上反映了這一點，也許有一點，但可能不是。我同意您的觀點，即在任何特定季度都很難將資本和 RWA 的變化與收入的變化明確聯繫起來。那裡有太多的活動部件。

But for sure, one thing that's true is that higher run rate of the Markets businesses as a whole that we talked about a second ago is linked also to a higher deployment of balance sheet into those businesses. So as you well know, we pride ourselves on being extremely analytical and extremely disciplined in how we analyze capital liquidity, balance sheet deployment, G-SIB capacity utilization, et cetera, in the Markets business.

但可以肯定的是，確實的一件事是，我們剛才談到的整個市場業務的較高運行率也與資產負債表在這些業務中的更高部署有關。如您所知，我們在分析市場業務的資本流動性、資產負債表部署、G-SIB 產能利用率等方面具有極其出色的分析能力和嚴格的紀律性，對此我們深感自豪。

And we don't just chase revenue. We go after returns fully measured. And that's part of the DNA, and we continue to do it, and we will. So we still are operating under multiple binding constraints, and obviously, the environment is complex. So the ability to sort of throw a ton of capital at opportunities is not quite that simple always.

我們不只是追逐收入。我們追求充分衡量的回報。這是我們 DNA 的一部分，我們會繼續這樣做，而且會這樣做。所以我們仍然在多重綁定約束下運行，顯然，環境是複雜的。因此，在機會上投入大量資金的能力並不總是那麼簡單。

But big picture, we are clearly in a very, very strong capital position, which is in no small part in anticipation of all of the uncertainty. But it does also mean that, if opportunities arise between now and when the Basel III endgame is final, we are very well positioned to take advantage of those opportunities.

但從大局來看，我們顯然處於非常非常強大的資本狀況，這在很大程度上是對所有不確定性的預期。但這也意味著，如果從現在到巴塞爾協議 III 終局階段出現機會，我們完全有能力利用這些機會。

Got it. And then just separately, within the consumer card businesses, you highlighted volumes are up 9% year-over-year. Obviously, still a very strong piece. Any trends within that, that are worth noting in terms of changes in spend category -- either overall or among certain segments?

知道了。另外，在消費卡業務中，您強調銷量年增了 9%。顯然，這仍然是一個非常強大的作品。其中就支出類別的變化而言，有什麼值得注意的趨勢——無論是總體還是某些細分市場？

Maybe a little bit. Jamie already alluded somewhat to this. So I do think spend is fine but not boomy, broadly speaking, I would say. You can look at it a lot of different ways, inflation cohorts, et cetera. But when you kind of triangulate that, you get back to this kind of flattish picture.

也許一點點。傑米已經提到過這一點。因此，我認為，從廣義上講，支出確實不錯，但並不繁榮。你可以用很多不同的方式來看待它，例如通貨膨脹群體等等。但當你對其進行三角測量時，你就會回到這種扁平的畫面。

There is a little bit of evidence of substituting out of discretionary into nondiscretionary. And I think the single most notable thing is just this effect where in the -- while it is true that real incomes have gone up in the lowest-income cohorts, within that, there's obviously a probability of distribution, and there's some -- or rather just a distribution of outcomes. And there are some such people whose real incomes are not up, they're down, and who are therefore struggling a little bit, unfortunately. And what you observe in the spending patterns of those people is some meaningful slowing rather than what you might have feared, which is sort of aggressive levering up.

有一些證據表明可以將自由裁量權替換為非自由裁量權。我認為最值得注意的是這種效應，雖然最低收入群體的實際收入確實有所上升，但在這種情況下，顯然存在分配的可能性，而且有一些——或者而只是結果的分佈。不幸的是，有些人的實際收入不但沒有增加，反而下降了，因此陷入了困境。你在這些人的支出模式中觀察到的是一些有意義的放緩，而不是你可能擔心的，這是一種積極的槓桿化。

So I think that's maybe an economic indicator of sorts, although this portion of the population is small enough that I'm not sure the read-across is that big. But it is encouraging from a credit perspective because it just means that people are behaving kind of rationally and in a sort of normal post-pandemic type of way as they manage their own balance sheets. And that's sort of at the margin good news from a credit perspective.

所以我認為這可能是某種經濟指標，儘管這部分人口足夠小，我不確定閱讀量是否有那麼大。但從信貸角度來看，這是令人鼓舞的，因為這只是意味著人們在管理自己的資產負債表時表現得理性，以一種正常的疫情後類型方式行事。從信貸角度來看，這算是個好消息。

Our next question comes from Gerard Cassidy with RBC Capital Markets.

我們的下一個問題來自加拿大皇家銀行資本市場的傑拉德·卡西迪。

Notwithstanding your guys' outlook for uncertainty, and of course, Jamie talked about it in the shareholder letter and addressed it also on this call when he was here earlier. Can you guys share -- or can you share with us the color on what's going on in the corporate lending market in terms of spreads seem to be getting tighter? It's not reflecting, I don't think, a real fear out there in the global geopolitical world. And any color just on what you guys are seeing in the leveraged loan market as well.

儘管你們的員工對不確定性的前景抱有不確定性，當然，傑米在股東信中談到了這一點，並在他早些時候來時的電話會議上也談到了這一點。你們能否分享一下——或者您能否與我們分享一下企業貸款市場上利差似乎變得越來越緊的情況？我不認為這反映了全球地緣政治世界的真正恐懼。還有你們在槓桿貸款市場上看到的任何顏色。

Right. So I think what's true about spreads in general, just broadly credit spreads, including secondary markets, and to some extent the leverage lending space, is that they're exceptionally tight.

正確的。因此，我認為，整體利差，包括二級市場在內的廣泛信用利差，以及某種程度上的槓桿貸款空間，其真實情況是它們異常緊張。

So I'm sure that's reversed a little bit in the last few days. But broadly throughout the quarter, we've really seen credit spreads tighten quite a bit. You even see that a little bit in our OCI this quarter, where losses in OCI that we would have had from higher rates have been meaningfully offset by tighter credit spreads in the portfolio. So broadly sort of in keeping with the big run-up that we saw in equity markets and the general sort of bullish tone, you saw quite a bit of credit spread tightening that -- in secondary markets.

所以我確信過去幾天情況有所逆轉。但從整個季度來看，我們確實看到信貸利差大幅收緊。您甚至可以在本季的 OCI 中看到一點，我們因利率上升而造成的 OCI 損失已被投資組合中信用利差收緊所抵消。與我們在股票市場看到的大幅上漲和普遍的看漲基調大致一致，你會在二級市場看到相當多的信貸利差收緊。

That, I think, has manifested itself a little bit in the leveraged lending space in the normal way that it does in that there's a lot of competition among providers for the revenue pool. And you start to see a little bit of loosening of terms, which always makes us a little bit concerned. And as we have in the past, we are going to be very well prepared to lose share in that space if we don't like the terms. We never compromise on structure there. So you are seeing a little bit of that.

我認為，這已經以正常方式在槓桿貸款領域有所體現，因為提供者之間對收入池存在著激烈的競爭。你開始看到條款放鬆，這總是讓我們有點擔心。正如我們過去所做的那樣，如果我們不喜歡這些條款，我們將做好失去該領域份額的充分準備。我們從不在那裡的結構上妥協。所以你看到了一點點。

I think that away from the leveraged lending space, in the broader C&I space, there was a moment a few months ago where I think in no small part as a result of banks generally anticipating this more challenging capital environment and sort of disciplining a little bit their lending, we were seeing a little bit of widening actually in those corporate lending spreads. I don't know if that trend has like survived the last few weeks, and it's always a little bit hard to observe in any case.

我認為，除了槓桿貸款領域之外，在更廣泛的工商業領域，幾個月前我認為這在很大程度上是因為銀行普遍預期這種更具挑戰性的資本環境，並採取了一些紀律措施。他們的貸款，我們看到這些企業貸款利差實際上有一點擴大。我不知道這種趨勢是否在過去幾週中持續存在，而且無論如何，觀察起來總是有點困難。

But I would say broadly the dynamics or the tension between people trying to be careful with their balance sheets and the fact that overall asset prices and conditions are quite supportive, and secondary market credit spreads have rallied a lot.

但我想說的是，人們試圖謹慎對待自己的資產負債表，而整體資產價格和狀況相當有利，而且二級市場信用利差大幅上漲，這一事實之間存在動態或緊張關係。

And I guess as a tie-in to that question and answer. We've read and seen so much about the private credit growth in this country by private credit companies. Can you give us some color on what you're seeing there as both as a competitor but also as a client of JPMorgan, how you balance the 2 out? Where you may see them bidding on business that you'd like, but at the same time, you're supporting their business.

我想這是與這個問題和答案的結合。我們已經閱讀並看到了很多關於私人信貸公司在這個國家的私人信貸成長的資訊。您能否向我們介紹一下您作為摩根大通的競爭對手和客戶所看到的情況，您如何平衡兩者？您可能會看到他們對您想要的業務進行競標，但同時您也在支持他們的業務。

Right. Yes. I mean, I think that tension between us as a provider of secured financing to some portions of the private credit, private equity community, now you're talking about different parts of the capital structure. But we do recognize that, that we compete in some areas and we are clients of each other in other areas. And that's part of the franchise, and it's all good at some level.

正確的。是的。我的意思是，我認為我們作為私人信貸、私募股權界某些部分的擔保融資提供者之間的緊張關係，現在你正在談論資本結構的不同部分。但我們確實認識到，我們在某些​​領域存在競爭，而在其他領域我們是彼此的客戶。這是該系列的一部分，從某種程度上來說這一切都很好。

But narrowly on private credit, it is interesting to observe what's going on there. So I would say for us, the strategy there is very much to be product-agnostic, actually. It's not so much like, oh, is it private credit or is it syndicated lending? What does it take to be good at this stuff? And what it takes is stuff that we have and have always had and that we're very good at in each individual silos. So you have -- you need underwriting skills, structuring skill, origination, distribution, secondary trading, risk appetite, credit analysis capabilities. And this is what we do, and we're really good at it.

但就私人信貸而言，觀察那裡發生的事情很有趣。所以我想說，對我們來說，實際上，策略在很大程度上與產品無關。這並不像，哦，是私人信貸還是銀團貸款？擅長這件事需要什麼？所需要的是我們擁有並且一直擁有的東西，並且我們在每個單獨的筒倉中都非常擅長。所以你需要承銷技能、結構技能、發起、分銷、二級交易、風險偏好、信用分析能力。這就是我們所做的，而且我們非常擅長。

And increasingly, what you see actually is that as you see us doing a little bit, as the private credit space gets bigger, it starts to make sense to actually bring in some co-lenders so that you can sort of do big enough deals without having undue concentration risks. I mean, even if you have the capital, you just may not want the concentration risk.

越來越多地，你實際上看到的是，當你看到我們做了一點點，隨著私人信貸空間變得越來越大，引入一些聯合貸款人開始變得有意義，這樣你就可以在沒有資金的情況下進行足夠大的交易。有過度集中風險。我的意思是，即使你有資本，你也可能不想要集中風險。

And so in a funny way, the private credit space becomes a little bit more like the syndicated lending space. At the same time, the syndicated lending space, being influenced a little bit by these private credit unitranche structures, gets pushed a little bit in the private credit direction in terms of like speed of execution, other aspects of how that business works.

因此，以一種有趣的方式，私人信貸空間變得有點像銀團貸款空間。同時，銀團貸款空間受到這些私人信貸統一結構的影響，在執行速度和業務運作的其他方面都在私人信貸方向上得到了一些推動。

So we're watching it. The competitive dynamics are interesting. Certainly, there's some pressure in some areas. But we really do think that our overall value proposition and competitive position here is second to none. And so we're looking forward to the future here.

所以我們正在關注它。競爭動態很有趣。當然，某些領域也存在一定的壓力。但我們確實認為我們的整體價值主張和競爭地位是首屈一指的。因此，我們對這裡的未來充滿期待。

Our last question comes from Charles Peabody with Portales.

我們的最後一個問題來自查爾斯·皮博迪和波塔萊斯。

A couple of questions on the First Republic acquisition. Some of us obviously thought that would be a home run, and I'm glad to see that Jamie Dimon validated that in his annual letter.

關於第一共和國收購的幾個問題。我們中的一些人顯然認為這將是一個全壘打，我很高興看到傑米戴蒙在他的年度信件中證實了這一點。

When you look at the first quarter, it annualizes out to $2.7 billion, $2.8 billion, above the $2 billion that Jamie published in the letter. Now I know you don't want to extrapolate that. But can you remind us what sort of cost savings you still have in that? Because this quarter did see expenses come down to $800 million, down from $900 million.

當你看第一季時，你會發現它的年化價值為 27 億美元、28 億美元，高於傑米在信中公佈的 20 億美元。現在我知道你不想推斷這一點。但您能否提醒我們，您還可以節省哪些成本？因為本季的支出確實從 9 億美元降至 8 億美元。

And then secondly, is there an offset to that where the accretion becomes less and less, and that's why you don't want to extrapolate the $2.7 billion, $2.8 billion? So that's my first question.

其次，是否存在一種抵消，即成長變得越來越少，這就是為什麼你不想推斷 27 億美元、28 億美元？這是我的第一個問題。

Okay. Thanks, Charlie. And I'm going to do my best to answer your question while sticking to my sort of guns on not giving too much First Republic-specific guidance. But I do think that kind of framework you're articulating is broadly correct. So let me go through the pieces.

好的。謝謝，查理。我將盡力回答你的問題，同時堅持我的立場，不提供太多針對第一共和國的指導。但我確實認為你所闡述的那種框架大致上是正確的。讓我來回顧一下這些片段。

So yes, the current quarter's results annualize to more than the $2 billion Jamie talked about. Yes, a big part of that reason is discount accretion, which was very front-loaded as a result of short-dated assets. So that's part of the reason that you see that converge. Yes, it's also true that we expect the expense run rate to decline later in the year as we continue making progress on integration. Obviously, as I think as I mentioned to you last quarter, from a full year perspective, you just have the offset of the full year calendarization effect.

所以，是的，本季的年化業績超過 Jamie 所說的 20 億美元。是的，其中很大一部分原因是折扣增加，由於短期資產的影響，折扣增加非常嚴重。這就是你看到這種趨同的部分原因。是的，隨著我們在整合方面繼續取得進展，我們預計今年稍後的費用運行率將會下降，這也是事實。顯然，正如我上個季度向您提到的那樣，從全年的角度來看，您只是抵消了全年日曆化效應。

There was maybe an embedded question then there, too, about we had talked about $2.5 billion of integration expense. And the integration is real, the expenses are real, and also the time spent on that is quite real. It's a lot of work for a lot of people. It's going well, but we're not done yet, and it takes a lot of effort. But broadly, I think that our expectation for integration expense are probably coming in a bit lower than we originally assumed on the morning of the deal for a couple of reasons.

也許還有一個潛在的問題，我們曾討論過 25 億美元的整合費用。整合是真實的，費用是真實的，花費的時間也是真實的。對很多人來說，這是一項繁重的工作。進展順利，但我們還沒完成，還需要付出很多努力。但總的來說，我認為我們對整合費用的預期可能會比我們在交易當天早上的最初假設要低一些，原因有幾個。

One is that the framework around the time was understandably quite conservative and sort of assumed that we would kind of lose a meaningful portion of the franchise and would sort of need to size the expense base accordingly. And of course, it's worked out, to your point, quite a bit better than that. And therefore, the amount of expenses that is necessary to keep this bigger franchise is higher. And that means less integration expense associated with taking down those numbers.

一是，當時的框架是可以理解的相當保守，並且有點假設我們會失去特許經營權的有意義的一部分，並且需要相應地調整費用基礎。當然，就你的觀點而言，結果比這好得多。因此，維持這個更大的特許經營權所需的費用更高。這意味著與減少這些數字相關的整合費用會減少。

It's probably also true that the integration assumptions were conservative. They were based on kind of more typical type of bank M&A assumptions as opposed to the particular nature of this deal, including the FDIC and so on and so forth.

整合假設也可能是保守的。它們基於一種更典型的銀行併購假設，而不是該交易的特殊性質，包括 FDIC 等。

So yes, I think that probably is a pretty complete answer to your question. Thanks, Charlie.

所以是的，我認為這可能是對你的問題的一個相當完整的答案。謝謝，查理。

As a quick follow-up, where are the next home runs going to come from? And this is more strategic beyond just JPMorgan. But there's probably going to be more regional bank failures, whether it's this year or next year, and opportunities to pick those up.

作為快速跟進，下一個本壘打將來自哪裡？這比摩根大通更具戰略意義。但無論是今年還是明年，可能會有更多的地區性銀行倒閉，並且有機會重新振作起來。

But what you're seeing is that private equity and family offices are setting up to participate in this next round of bank failures. Mnuchin's buying of NYCB is clearly to create a platform for roll-ups of failed banks. And then there are other family offices that have filed shelf registrations for bank holding companies whose specific purpose is to buy failed banks.

但你看到的是，私募股權和家族辦公室正在準備參與下一輪銀行倒閉。努欽收購 NYCB 顯然是為了為破產銀行的整合創建一個平台。還有其他家族辦公室為銀行控股公司進行了擱置登記，其具體目的是收購倒閉的銀行。

So where -- do you think that these opportunities are going to be competed away by private credit? And as part of that, do you think the regulators are going to view private credit as a different party and less attractive party versus bank takeovers of failed banks? So that's my question.

那麼，您認為這些機會會在哪裡被私人信貸競爭呢？作為其中的一部分，您認為監管機構是否會將私人信貸視為與銀行收購破產銀行相比不同的一方和吸引力較小的一方？這就是我的問題。

Right. Okay, Charlie, there's a lot in there. And to be honest, I just don't love the idea of spending a lot of time on this call speculating about bank failures. Like you obviously have a particular view about the next wave in the landscape. I'm not going to bother debating that with you. But I guess let me just try to say a couple of things, doing my best to answer your question.

正確的。好吧，查理，裡面有很多東西。說實話，我只是不喜歡在這次電話會議上花大量時間猜測銀行倒閉的想法。就像您顯然對風景中的下一波浪潮有特定的看法一樣。我不會費心和你爭論這個問題。但我想讓我試著說幾句話，盡力回答你的問題。

Like as we talked about earlier, we have a lot of capital. And as Jamie says, the capital is earnings in store. And right now, we don't see a lot of really compelling opportunities to deploy the capital. But if opportunities arise, despite the uncertainty about the Basel III endgame, we will be well positioned to deploy it.

就像我們之前談到的，我們有很多資本。正如傑米所說，資本就是儲存的收益。目前，我們沒有看到很多真正令人信服的部署資本的機會。但如果機會出現，儘管巴塞爾協議 III 的最終結果存在不確定性，我們仍將處於有利位置來部署它。

I think embedded there is also sort of a question about the FDIC and the FDIC's attitude towards different types of bidders. And obviously, there's a lot of thinking and analysis happening about the entire process and some recent forums and speeches on bank resolution and so on and so forth.

我認為其中還存在一個關於 FDIC 以及 FDIC 對不同類型投標人的態度的問題。顯然，對整個過程以及最近的一些關於銀行決議等的論壇和演講進行了許多思考和分析。

And I think probably we can all agree that it's better, all else equal, for the system to have as much capital available and as many different types of capital available to ensure that things are stabilized if anything ever goes wrong. But the mechanics of how you do that when you're talking about banks are not trivial and not to be underestimated. So I guess that's probably as much as I have on that.

我想我們可能都會同意，在其他條件相同的情況下，系統擁有盡可能多的可用資本和盡可能多的不同類型的可用資本，以確保在出現任何問題時保持穩定，這是更好的做法。但當你談論銀行時，如何做到這一點的機制並非微不足道，不可小覷。所以我想這可能就是我的全部內容了。

We have no further questions at this time.

目前我們沒有進一步的問題。

Thank you, everyone.

謝謝大家。

Thank you all for participating in today's conference. You may disconnect at this time, and have a great rest of your day.

感謝大家參加今天的會議。此時您可以斷開連接，並好好休息一天。