摩根大通 (JPM) 2024 Q2 法說會逐字稿

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen, Welcome to JPMorgan Chase's second quarter 2024 earnings call. This call is being recorded. (Operator Instructions) We will now go live to the presentation. The presentation is available on JPMorgan Chase's website and please refer to the disclaimer in the back concerning forward-looking statements. Please standby. At this time, I would like to turn the call over to JPMorgan Chase's Chief Financial Officer, Jeremy Barnum. Mr. Barnum, please go ahead.

早安，女士們、先生們，歡迎參加摩根大通 2024 年第二季財報電話會議。此通話正在錄音。 （操作員說明）我們現在將進行演示。此簡報可在摩根大通網站上查看，請參閱後面有關前瞻性陳述的免責聲明。請等待。現在，我想將電話轉給摩根大通的財務長傑里米·巴納姆。巴納姆先生，請繼續。

Thank you, and good morning, everyone. Starting on page 1, the firm reported net income of $18.1 billion, EPS of $6.12 on revenue of $51 billion with an ROTCE of 28%. These results included the $7.9 billion net gain related to Visa shares and the $1 billion foundation contribution of the appreciated Visa stock. Also included is $546 million of net investment securities losses in corporate. Excluding these items, the firm had net income of $13.1 billion, EPS of $4.40, and an ROTCE of 20%.

謝謝大家，大家早安。從第一頁開始，該公司報告淨利潤為 181 億美元，每股收益為 6.12 美元，收入為 510 億美元，ROTCE 為 28%。這些業績包括與 Visa 股票相關的 79 億美元淨收益以及升值的 Visa 股票的 10 億美元基金會貢獻。還包括 5.46 億美元的企業淨投資證券損失。排除這些項目，該公司的淨利潤為 131 億美元，每股收益為 4.40 美元，ROTCE 為 20%。

Touching on a couple of highlights. In the CIB, IB fees were up 50% year on year and 17% quarter on quarter. And market revenue is up 10% year on year and CCB, we had a record number of first-time investors, strong customer acquisition across checking account and card. And we've continued to see strong net inflows across AWM.

談到幾個亮點。在CIB，IB費用較去年同期上漲50%，較上季上漲17%。市場收入年增 10%，建行的首次投資者數量創歷史新高，支票帳戶和銀行卡的客戶獲取強勁。我們繼續看到 AWM 的強勁淨流入。

Now before I give more detail on the results, I just wanted to mention that starting this quarter, we are no longer explicitly calling out the First Republic contribution in the presentation. Going forward, we'll only specifically call it out if it is a meaningful driver in the year-on-year comparison.

現在，在我提供有關結果的更多詳細資訊之前，我只想提一下，從本季開始，我們不再在簡報中明確提及第一共和國的貢獻。展望未來，只有在同比比較中它是一個有意義的驅動因素時，我們才會特別指出它。

As a reminder, we acquired First Republic in May of last year, so the prior year quarter only has two months of First Republic result compared to the full three months this quarter. Also in the prior year quarter, most of the expenses were corporate, whereas now they are primarily in the relevant line of business.

提醒一下，我們在去年 5 月收購了 First Republic，因此去年季度只有兩個月的 First Republic 業績，而本季則有整整三個月的業績。同樣在去年同期，大部分費用都是公司費用，現在它們主要發生在相關業務領域。

Now turning to page 2 for the firm-wide results. The firm reported revenue of $51 billion, up $8.6 billion or 20% year on year, excluding both the Visa gain that I mentioned earlier, as well as last year's First Republic bargain purchase gain of $2.7 billion.

現在翻到第 2 頁查看全公司的業績。該公司公佈的營收為 510 億美元，年增 86 億美元，即 20%，其中不包括我之前提到的 Visa 收益，以及去年 First Republic 討價還價購買收益 27 億美元。

Revenue of $43.1 billion was up $3.4 billion or 9%. NII ex markets was up $568 million or 3% driven by the impact of balance sheet mix and higher rates, higher revolving balances in card, and the additional month of First Republic related NII, partially offset by deposit margin compression and lower deposit balances.

營收為 431 億美元，成長 34 億美元，即 9%。受資產負債表組合、利率上升、信用卡循環餘額增加以及第一共和國相關NII 額外月份的影響，除市場外的NII 增長了5.68 億美元，即3%，但部分被存款保證金壓縮和存款餘額下降所抵消。

NIR ex markets was up $7.3 billion or 56%. Excluding the items I just mentioned, it was up $2.1 billion or 21%, largely driven by higher investment banking revenue and asset management fees. Both periods included net investment securities losses.

NIR 離岸市場上漲 73 億美元，成長 56%。除去我剛才提到的項目，它增長了 21 億美元，即 21%，主要是由於投資銀行收入和資產管理費用的增加。兩個時期均包括淨投資證券損失。

And markets revenue was up $731 million or 10% year on year. Expenses of $23.7 billion were up $2.9 billion or 14% year on year. Excluding the foundation contribution I previously mentioned, expenses were up 9%, primarily driven by compensation, including revenue related compensation and growth in employees.

市場營收年增 7.31 億美元，即 10%。費用為 237 億美元，年增 29 億美元，或 14%。不包括我之前提到的基金會捐款，費用增加了 9%，主要是由薪酬驅動的，包括與收入相關的薪酬和員工成長。

And credit costs were $3.1 billion, reflecting net charge-offs of $2.2 billion and a net reserve build of $821 million. Net charge-offs were up $820 million year on year, predominantly driven by card. The net reserve build included $609 million in consumer and $189 million in wholesale.

信貸成本為 31 億美元，反映出淨沖銷 22 億美元和淨準備金增加 8.21 億美元。淨沖銷額年增 8.2 億美元，主要由信用卡推動。淨儲備建設包括 6.09 億美元的消費者儲備和 1.89 億美元的批發儲備。

Onto balance sheet and capital on page 3, we ended the quarter with a CET1 ratio of 15.3%, up 30 basis points versus the prior quarter, primarily driven by net income, largely offset by capital distributions and higher RWA. As you know we completed CCAR a couple of weeks ago and have already disclosed a number of the key points, let me summarize them again here.

在第3 頁的資產負債表和資本方面，本季結束時，我們的CET1 比率為15.3%，比上一季上升了30 個基點，這主要是由淨利潤推動的，但在很大程度上被資本分配和更高的RWA 所抵消。如您所知，我們幾週前完成了 CCAR，並且已經披露了一些關鍵點，讓我在這裡再次總結一下。

Our preliminary SCB is 3.3%, although the final SCB could be higher. The preliminary SCB, which is up from the current requirement of 2.9% results in a 12.3% standardized CET1 ratio requirement, which goes into effect in the fourth quarter of 2024. And finally, the firm announced that the Board intends to increase the quarterly common stock dividend from $1.15 to $1.25 per share in the third quarter of 2024.

我們的初步 SCB 為 3.3%，但最終的 SCB 可能會更高。初步的 SCB 比目前 2.9% 的要求提高了 12.3% 的標準化 CET1 比率要求，該要求將於 2024 年第四季度生效。每股1.15 美元增至1.25 美元。

Now let's go to our businesses, starting with CCB on page 4. CCB reported net income of $4.2 billion on revenue of $17.7 billion, which was up 3% year on year. In banking and wealth management, revenue was down 5% year on year, reflecting lower deposits and deposit margin compression, partially offset by growth in wealth management revenue. Average deposits were down 7% year on year and 1% quarter on quarter.

現在讓我們來看看我們的業務，從第4頁的建行開始。銀行及理財業務收入較去年同期下降5%，反映出存款減少和存款利差壓縮，但部分被理財收入成長抵銷。平均存款較去年同期下降7%，季減1%。

Client investment assets were up 14% year on year, predominantly driven by market performance. In home lending, revenue of $1.3 billion was up 31% year on year, predominantly driven by higher NII, including one additional month of the First Republic portfolio.

客戶投資資產年增 14%，主要受到市場表現的推動。在房屋貸款方面，營收為 13 億美元，年增 31%，這主要是由於NII 上升，包括第一共和國投資組合的增加一個月。

Turning to card services and auto, revenue was up 14% year on year, predominantly driven by higher card NII on higher revolving balances. Card outstandings were up 12% due to strong account acquisition and the continued normalization of all. And then auto, originations were $10.8 billion, down 10% coming off strong originations from a year ago, while continuing to maintain healthy margins.

至於卡片服務和汽車，收入年增 14%，主要是由於循環餘額增加導致卡片 NII 增加。由於帳戶獲取強勁以及一切持續正常化，信用卡未償餘額增加了 12%。然後是汽車，原產地為 108 億美元，較一年前的強勁原產地下降 10%，同時繼續保持健康的利潤率。

Expenses of $9.4 billion were up 13% year on year, predominantly driven by First Republic expenses now reflected in the lines of business, as I mentioned earlier, as well as field compensation and continued growth in technology and marketing.

正如我之前提到的，支出為 94 億美元，同比增長 13%，這主要是由第一共和國支出推動的，這些支出現在反映在業務範圍內，以及現場補償以及技術和營銷方面的持續增長。

In terms of credit performance, this quarter, credit costs were $2.6 billion, reflecting net charge-offs of $2.1 billion, up $813 million year on year, predominantly driven by card as newer vintages season and credit normalization continues. The net reserve build was $579 million, also driven by card through loan growth and updates to certain macroeconomic variables.

就信貸表現而言，本季信貸成本為 26 億美元，反映出淨沖銷 21 億美元，年增 8.13 億美元，主要由信用卡推動，因為新年份季節和信貸正常化仍在繼續。淨儲備建設為 5.79 億美元，也是由信用卡貸款成長和某些宏觀經濟變數更新所推動的。

Next, the commercial and investment bank on page 5. Our new commercial and investment bank reported net income of $5.9 billion on revenue of $17.9 billion. You'll note that we are disclosing revenue by business as well as breaking down the banking and payments revenue by client coverage segment in order to best highlight the relevant trends in both important dimensions of the wholesale franchise.

接下來是第 5 頁的商業和投資銀行。您會注意到，我們按業務揭露收入，並按客戶覆蓋範圍細分銀行和支付收入，以便最好地突出批發特許經營兩個重要方面的相關趨勢。

This quarter IB fees were up 50% year on year, and we ranked number one with year-to-date wallet share of 9.5%. In advisory, fees were up 45%, primarily driven by the closing of a few large deals and a weak prior year quarter. Underwriting fees were up meaningfully with equity up 56% and debt up 51%, benefiting from favorable market conditions.

本季 IB 費用年增 50%，我們以年初至今的錢包 9.5% 排名第一。在諮詢方面，費用上漲了 45%，主要是由於幾筆大型交易的完成和去年同期的疲軟所致。受惠於有利的市場條件，承銷費用大幅上漲，股本上漲 56%，負債上漲 51%。

In terms of the outlook, we're pleased with both the year-on-year and sequential improvement in the quarter. We remain cautiously optimistic about the pipeline, although many of the same headwinds are still in effect. It's also worth noting that pull forward refinancing activity was a meaningful contributor to the strong performance in the first half of the year. Payments revenue was $4.5 billion, down 4% year on year as deposit margin compression and higher deposit related client credits were largely offset by fee growth.

就前景而言，我們對本季的年比和季比改善感到滿意。儘管許多相同的不利因素仍然存在，但我們對管道仍持謹慎樂觀態度。另外值得注意的是，提前再融資活動對上半年的強勁業績做出了重要貢獻。支付收入為 45 億美元，年減 4%，因為存款保證金壓縮和存款相關客戶信貸增加在很大程度上被費用成長所抵消。

Moving to markets. Total revenue was $7.8 billion, up 10% year on year. Fixed income was up 5%, with continued strength in securitized products and equity markets was up 21% with equity derivatives up on improved client activity. And we saw record revenue in time and growth in client balances amid supportive equity market levels.

轉向市場。總收入為78億美元，年增10%。固定收益成長 5%，證券化產品持續走強，股票市場成長 21%，股票衍生性商品因客戶活動改善而上漲。在股市水準的支持下，我們及時看到了創紀錄的收入和客戶餘額的成長。

Securities services revenue was $1.3 billion, was up 3% year on year, driven by higher volumes and market levels, largely offset by deposit margin compression. Expenses of $9.2 billion were up 12% year on year, largely driven by higher revenue-related compensation, legal expense, and volume-related non-compensation expense.

證券服務收入為 13 億美元，年增 3%，主要受到交易量和市場水準增加的推動，但很大程度上被存款保證金壓縮所抵消。費用為 92 億美元，年增 12%，主要是由於與收入相關的薪酬、法律費用和與數量相關的非薪酬費用增加。

In banking and payments, average loans were up 2% year on year due to the impact of the First Republic acquisition in flat sequentially. Demand for new loans remains muted as middle market and large corporate clients remained somewhat cautious due to the economic environment and revolver utilization continues to be below pre-pandemic levels.

在銀行和支付領域，由於第一共和國收購的影響，平均貸款年增 2%。由於經濟環境和循環利用繼續低於大流行前的水平，中型市場和大型企業客戶仍持謹慎態度，因此對新貸款的需求仍然疲軟。

Also, capital markets are open and are providing an alternative to traditional bank lending for these clients. In CRE, higher rates continue to suppress both loan origination and payoff activity. Average client deposits were up 2% year on year and relatively flat sequentially.

此外，資本市場是開放的，為這些客戶提供了傳統銀行貸款的替代方案。在商業房地產領域，較高的利率持續抑制貸款發放和還款活動。平均客戶存款年增 2%，月增 2%。

Finally, credit costs were $384 million and that reserve build of $220 million was primarily driven by incorporating the First Republic portfolio in the firm's modeled approach. Net charge-offs were $164 million, of which about half was in office.

最後，信貸成本為 3.84 億美元，準備金增加 2.2 億美元主要是透過將第一共和國投資組合納入公司的建模方法而推動的。淨沖銷額為 1.64 億美元，其中約一半是在任的。

Then to complete our lines of business AWM on page 6, asset and wealth management reported net income of $1.3 billion, with pre-tax margin of 32%. Revenue of $5.3 billion was up 6% year on year, driven by growth in management fees on higher average market levels and strong net inflows as well as higher brokerage activity, largely offset by deposit margin compression.

然後，完成第 6 頁的 AWM 業務線，資產和財富管理報告淨利潤為 13 億美元，稅前利潤率為 32%。營收為 53 億美元，年增 6%，這是由於管理費成長、平均市場水準上升、淨流入強勁以及經紀活動增加所推動的，但大部分被存款保證金壓縮所抵消。

Expenses of $3.5 billion were up 12% year on year, largely driven by higher compensation, primarily revenue related compensation and continued growth in our private banking advisor teams. For the quarter, long-term net inflows were $52 billion, led by equities and fixed income. And in liquidity, we saw net inflows of $16 billion.

費用為 35 億美元，年增 12%，這主要是由於薪酬上漲（主要是與收入相關的薪酬）以及我們私人銀行顧問團隊的持續成長。本季長期淨流入為 520 億美元，其中股票和固定收益流入最多。在流動性方面，我們看到淨流入 160 億美元。

AUM of $3.7 trillion was up 15% year on year. And client assets of $5.4 trillion were up 18% year on year, driven by higher market levels and continued net inflows. And finally, loans and deposits were both flat quarter on quarter.

資產管理規模達 3.7 兆美元，年增 15%。在市場水準提高和持續淨流入的推動下，客戶資產達到 5.4 兆美元，年增 18%。最後，貸款和存款環比持平。

Turning to corporate on page 7, Corporate reported net income of $6.8 billion on revenue of $10.1 billion. Excluding this quarter's Visa-related gain and the First Republic bargain purchase gain in the prior year, NIR was up approximately $450 million year on year, NII was up $626 million year on year, driven by the impact of balance sheet mix and higher rates.

轉向第 7 頁的企業，企業報告淨利潤為 68 億美元，營收為 101 億美元。排除本季與 Visa 相關的收益和上一年第一共和國討價還價購買收益，受資產負債表組合和利率上升的影響，NIR 同比增長約 4.5 億美元，NII 同比增長 6.26 億美元。

Expenses of $1.6 billion were up $427 million year on year. Excluding the foundation contribution, expenses were down $573 million year on year, largely as a result of moving First Republic related expense out of corporate into the relevant segments.

費用為 16 億美元，年增 4.27 億美元。不包括基金會捐款，費用年減 5.73 億美元，主要是由於將第一共和國相關費用從公司轉移到相關部門。

To finish up, we have the outlook on page 8. Our 2024 guidance, including the drivers remains unchanged from what we said at Investor Day. We continue to expect NII and NII ex markets are approximately $91 billion, adjusted expense of about $92 billion, a non-credit card net charge-off rate of approximately 3.4%.

最後，我們在第 8 頁給出了展望。我們繼續預期 NII 和 NII 前市場約為 910 億美元，調整後費用約為 920 億美元，非信用卡淨沖銷率約為 3.4%。

To wrap up, the reported performance for the quarter was exceptional and actually represents record revenue and net income. And more importantly, after excluding the significant items, the underlying performance continues to be quite strong. And as always, we remain focused on continuing to execute with discipline. And with that, let's open the line for Q&A.

總而言之，本季報告的業績非常出色，實際上代表了創紀錄的收入和淨利潤。更重要的是，在排除重要項目後，基本表現仍然相當強勁。一如既往，我們仍然專注於繼續遵守紀律。接下來，讓我們打開問答熱線。

Steven Chubak, Wolfe Research.

史蒂文‧丘巴克，沃爾夫研究中心。

Hi, good morning, Jeremy. So I wanted to start off with a question on capital. Just given some indications that the Fed is considering favorable revisions to both Basel III Endgame and the GSIB surcharge calculations, which I know you've been pushing for, for some time.

嗨，早上好，傑里米。所以我想從一個關於資本的問題開始。剛剛有一些跡象表明，聯準會正在考慮對《巴塞爾協議 III 終局之戰》和 GSIB 附加費計算進行有利的修訂，我知道你們已經推動了一段時間了。

As you evaluate just different capital scenarios, are these revisions material enough for they could support a higher normalized ROTCE at the firm versus the 17% target? And if so, just how that might impact or inform your appetite for buybacks going forward?

當您評估不同的資本情境時，這些修訂是否足夠重要，足以支持公司實現更高的標準化 ROTCE（相對於 17% 的目標）？如果是這樣，這可能會如何影響或影響您未來的回購意願？

Right. And thanks, Steve, actually, before answering the question, I just want to remind everyone that Jamie is not able to join because he has a travel conflict overseas. So it's just going to be me today.

正確的。謝謝，史蒂夫，實際上，在回答問題之前，我只是想提醒大家，傑米無法加入，因為他在海外有旅行衝突。所以今天就只有我了。

Okay, good question on the capital and the ROTCE. So let me start with the ROTCE point first. In short, my answer to that question would be no. It's hard to imagine a scenario coming out of the whole potential range of outcomes on capital that involves an upward revision on ROTCE.

好的，關於資本和 ROTCE 的問題很好。讓我先從 ROTCE 點開始。簡言之，我對這個問題的答案是否定的。很難想像在資本的整個潛在結果範圍中出現涉及 ROTCE 向上修正的情況。

If you think about the way we've been talking about this, we've said that before the Basel III Endgame proposal, we had a [17%] through-cycle target. And that well, you can imagine a range of different outcomes. The vast majority of them involve expansions of the denominator.

如果你想想我們一直在談論這個問題的方式，我們已經說過，在《巴塞爾協議 III 終局之戰》提案之前，我們有一個 [17%] 的整個週期目標。好吧，你可以想像一系列不同的結果。其中絕大多數涉及分母的展開。

And while we had ideas about changing the perimeter and repricing, all of which are still sort of an effect, you know, most of those would be thought of as mitigants rather than things that would actually like increase the ROTCE. And I don't really think that answer has particularly changed.

雖然我們有關於改變範圍和重新定價的想法，但所有這些仍然是一種效果，你知道，其中大多數會被認為是緩解措施，而不是真正想要增加 ROTCE 的東西。我真的不認為這個答案有什麼特別的改變。

So as of now, that's what I would say, which is a good pivot to the next point, which is, yeah, we've been reading the same press coverage you've been reading and you know, it's fun and interesting to speculate about the potential outcomes here.

所以到目前為止，這就是我要說的，這是下一點的一個很好的支點，那就是，是的，我們一直在閱讀你一直在閱讀的相同的新聞報道，你知道，推測是有趣和有趣的關於這裡的潛在結果。

But in reality, we don't know anything. We don't know how reliable the press coverage is. And so in that sense, I feel like on the overall capital return and buyback trajectory, not much has actually changed, relative to what I laid out at Investor Day, the comment that I made, the comment that Jamie made then, as well as the comments that Jamie made subsequent week at an industry conference.

但事實上，我們什麼都不知道。我們不知道媒體報道的可信度如何。因此，從這個意義上說，我覺得總體資本回報和回購軌跡，相對於我在投資者日所闡述的內容、我發表的評論、傑米當時發表的評論以及傑米在接下來的一周的在業界會議上發表的評論。

So maybe I'll just briefly summarize for everyone's benefit, what we think that is, which is one, we do recognize that our current practice on capital return and buybacks does lead to an ever expanding CET1 ratio. But obviously, we're going to run the company over the cycle over time at a reasonable CET1 ratio with a reasonable buffer relative to our requirements.

因此，也許我會為了大家的利益而簡要總結一下，我們的想法是什麼，其中之一是，我們確實認識到我們目前在資本回報和回購方面的做法確實導致了 CET1 比率的不斷擴大。但顯然，隨著時間的推移，我們將以合理的 CET1 比率和相對於我們的要求的合理緩衝來運營公司。

So after all, the uncertainty is sorted out. The question of the deployment of the capital one way or another is a matter of when not if. On the capital hierarchy, it's also worth noting that's another thing that remains unchanged. So to view it quickly, growing the business organically and inorganically, sustainable dividend. And in that context, it's worth noting that the Board's announced intention to increase it to $1.25, it is a 19% increase prior to last year. So that's a testament to our performance and that is a return on capital.

所以說到底，不確定性已經解決了。以某種方式部署資本的問題是何時而不是是否的問題。在資本等級方面，還值得注意的是另一件事保持不變。因此，要快速看待它，有機和無機地增長業務，可持續的股息。在此背景下，值得注意的是，董事會宣布打算將其提高至 1.25 美元，比去年增加了 19%。所以這是我們業績的證明，也是資本報酬。

And then finally, buyback, that hierarchy does not permit us to return 100% of the capital generation in any given quarter. And so as we sit here today, when you look at the relationship between the opportunity cost of not deploying the capital and the opportunities to deploy the capital outside the fund, it's kind of hard to imagine an environment where that relationship argues more strongly for patience.

最後，回購，這種層級結構不允許我們在任何特定季度返還 100% 的資本產生。因此，當我們今天坐在這裡時，當你觀察不部署資本的機會成本與在基金之外部署資本的機會之間的關係時，很難想像這種關係更需要耐心的環境。

So given all that, putting it all together, I'm sorry, for the long answer, we remain comfortable with the current amount of excess capital. And as Jamie has said, we really continue to think about it as earnings in store as much as anything else.

因此，考慮到所有這些，將所有這些放在一起，我很抱歉，對於長篇答案，我們對當前的過剩資本數量仍然感到滿意。正如傑米所說，我們確實繼續將其視為與其他任何事情一樣重要的儲備收入。

Don't need to apologize, Jeremy. That was a really helpful perspective. Maybe just for my follow-up on NII, you've been very consistent just in flagging the risks related to NII over earning, especially in light of potential deposit attrition as well as repricing headwinds. In the second quarter, we did see at least some moderation in repricing pressures.

不需要道歉，傑瑞米。這是一個非常有幫助的觀點。也許只是為了我對 NII 的跟進，您一直非常一致地標記與 NII 超額收益相關的風險，特別是考慮到潛在的存款消耗以及重新定價的不利因素。在第二季度，我們確實看到重新定價壓力至少有所緩解。

Deposit balances were also more resilient in what's a seasonally weak quarter for deposit growth. So just given the evidence that some deposit pressures appear to be abating, do you see the potential for NII normalizing higher? And where do you think that level could ultimately be in terms of stabilization?

在存款成長季節性疲軟的季度，存款餘額也更具彈性。因此，鑑於一些存款壓力似乎正在減弱的證據，您是否認為NII正常化的可能性更高？您認為這個水平最終會達到穩定的程度嗎？

Yeah, interesting question, Steve. So let's talk about deposit balances. So yeah, I see your point about how balanced pressures are slightly abating. You know, when you look at the system as a whole, just to go through it, Q2 is still a bit of a headwind, loan growth is modest and not enough to offset that, and our peers seems to have settled in roughly at its current levels.

是的，有趣的問題，史蒂夫。那我們來談談存款餘額。所以，是的，我明白你關於平衡壓力如何略有減弱的觀點。你知道，當你從整體上看整個系統時，只是為了回顧一下，第二季度仍然有點逆風，貸款增長溫和，不足以抵消這一點，而我們的同行似乎已經大致適應了它的水平。 。

And there are reasons to believe that it might not go down that much more, although that could always change and that could supply extra reserves into the system. But on balance, net across all those various effects, we still think that there are net headwinds to deposit balances. So when we think of our balance outlook, we see it as a flat, slightly down maybe with our sort of market share and growth ambitions offsetting those system-wide headwinds.

有理由相信，它可能不會下降那麼多，儘管這種情況總是可能發生變化，並且可能會為系統提供額外的儲備。但總的來說，綜合所有這些各種影響，我們仍然認為存款餘額存在淨阻力。因此，當我們考慮我們的平衡前景時，我們認為它是持平的，可能略有下降，因為我們的市場份額和成長雄心抵消了這些系統範圍的阻力。

So in terms of normalizing higher, I guess it depends on relative to what. But I think it's definitely too early to be sort of calling the end of the overall earning narrative or the normalization narrative. Clearly, the main difference in our current guidance relative to what we had earlier in the year, which implies a lot more sequential decline, it is just the change in the Fed outlook.

因此，就標準化更高而言，我想這取決於相對於什麼。但我認為現在就宣布整體獲利敘事或正常化敘事的終結絕對為時過早。顯然，我們目前的指導意見與今年早些時候的指導意見的主要區別在於聯準會前景的變化，這意味著連續下跌幅度更大。

So two cuts versus six cuts is the main difference there. But obviously, based on the latest inflation data and so on, you could easily get back to a situation with a lot more cuts in the yield curve. So we'll see how it goes. And in the end, we're kind of focused on just running the place recognizing and trying not to be distracted by what remains some amount of over-earning, whatever it is.

因此，兩次削減與六次削減是主要區別。但顯然，根據最新的通膨數據等，你可以很容易地回到殖利率曲線大幅下調的情況。所以我們會看看事情進展如何。最後，我們專注於經營這個地方，認識到並盡量不被剩餘的超額收入（無論是什麼）分心。

Understood, Jeremy. Thanks so much for taking my questions.

明白了，傑瑞米。非常感謝您回答我的問題。

Saul Martinez, HSBC.

索爾·馬丁內斯，匯豐銀行。

Good morning. Thanks for taking my question. Jeremy, can you give an update on the stress capital buffer? You noted obviously that you think there is an error in the Fed's calculation due to OCI. Can you just give us a sense of what the dialogue with the Fed looks like is there a process to modify the SCB higher? And if you can give us a sense of what that process looks like.

早安.感謝您提出我的問題。傑里米，您能介紹一下壓力資本緩衝的最新情況嗎？您顯然指出，您認為由於 OCI，聯準會的計算存在錯誤。您能給我們介紹一下與聯準會的對話是什麼樣的嗎？如果您能讓我們了解一下這個過程是什麼樣的。

Yeah. So I'm not going to comment about any conversations with the Fed, you know, not to confirm or deny that they even exist, that stuff is private. And then if you could talk about like the timing here, right, so you know that the stress capital buffer that's going to release the 3.3% as a preliminary number, by rule, the Fed has to release that by August 31. It may come sooner.

是的。因此，我不會評論與美聯儲的任何對話，你知道，不會確認或否認它們的存在，這些東西是私人的。然後，如果你能談談這裡的時機，對吧，所以你知道壓力資本緩衝將釋放 3.3% 作為初步數字，按照規則，美聯儲必須在 8 月 31 日之前釋放該數字。

You talked about an error in the calculation. We haven't used that word, you know what we know, what we believe rather is that the amount of OCI gain that came through the first disclosed results looked not intuitively high to us. And you know, if you adjust that in ways that we think are reasonable, you know, you would get a slightly higher stress capital buffer.

您談到了計算中的錯誤。我們沒有使用過這個詞，你知道我們所知道的，我們相信的是，透過第一個披露的結果獲得的 OCI 收益對我們來說直觀上看起來並不高。你知道，如果你以我們認為合理的方式進行調整，你會得到稍微更高的壓力資本緩衝。

Whether the Fed agrees and whether they decide to make that change or not is up to them. And we'll see what happens. I think the larger point is that if you look at the industry as a whole and if you sort of put us into that with some higher pro forma SCB, whatever it might suitably be, you actually see once again, quite a bit of volatility in the year-on-year change in the stress capital buffer for many firms, so sort of reiterating.

聯準會是否同意以及是否決定做出這項改變取決於他們。我們會看看會發生什麼。我認為更重要的一點是，如果你把整個行業看作一個整體，如果你用一些更高的形式SCB 來讓我們進入這個行業，無論它可能是什麼，你實際上會再次看到，相當大的波動性許多公司的壓力資本緩衝的同比變化，所以有點重申。

And another example of what we've said a lot over the years that it's volatile, it's transparent, it makes it very hard to manage the capital of the bank. It leads to excessively high management buffers. And we think that it's really not a great way to do things. So I'll leave it at that.

這是我們多年來多次說過的另一個例子，它是不穩定的、透明的，這使得管理銀行的資本變得非常困難。它導致管理緩衝區過高。我們認為這確實不是一個很好的做事方式。所以我就這樣吧。

Okay, got it. That's helpful. Just following up on capital returns, on Steve's question, I think you highlighted in response, it's a matter of when, not if. And obviously, Jamie is not there, you can't speak for Jamie, but seems to have shown limited enthusiasm for special dividend or buybacks at current valuations? Can you just give us a sense of how you're thinking about the various options?

好，知道了。這很有幫助。關於史蒂夫的問題，我想您在回答時強調了資本回報，這只是時間問題，而不是是否有問題。顯然，傑米不在那裡，你不能代表傑米說話，但似乎對特別股息或以當前估值回購的熱情有限？您能告訴我們您是如何考慮各種選擇的嗎？

Any updated thoughts on a special dividend and you do other things like, for example, have a materially increasing your dividend payout sort of a step function increase where you keep that flat and grow into that, grow your earnings into that over time, can you just maybe give us a sense of how you're thinking about what options you have available to deploy that capital?

關於特別股息的任何最新想法，以及您做其他事情，例如，大幅增加您的股息支付，有點階梯函數增加，您可以保持該水平並增長到該水平，隨著時間的推移將您的收入增加到該水平，您可以嗎？

Sure, yeah, I mean, I would direct you to read. I'm sure you have Jamie's comments at the Industry Conference where you participated that week after Investor Day because you wanted a good amount of detail on this stuff, addressing some of these points. And I think this comment there about the special dividend was that it's not really our preference. We hear from people that many of our investors wouldn't find that particularly appealing.

當然，是的，我的意思是，我會指導你閱讀。我確信您在投資者日之後參加的行業會議上聽到了 Jamie 的評論，因為您希望獲得有關此內容的大量詳細信息，解決其中的一些問題。我認為關於特別股息的評論是，這不是我們真正的偏好。我們從人們那裡得知，我們的許多投資者不會覺得這特別有吸引力。

And he said as much that it wouldn't be sort of our first choice. So I think the larger point assisted to a little bit to your question, there are a number of tools in the toolkit and they're really the same tools that are part of our capital hierarchy. So first and foremost, we're, you know, looking to deploy the capital into organic or inorganic growth. And then the dividend, I think we're always going to want to keep it and that sort of like sustainable and also sustainable in a stressed environment. So that continues to be the way we think about that.

他也說過這不會是我們的第一選擇。所以我認為更重要的一點對你的問題有所幫助，工具包中有很多工具，它們實際上是我們資本層次結構的一部分的相同工具。因此，首先也是最重要的是，我們希望將資本部署到有機或無機成長。然後是股息，我認為我們總是希望保持它，並且在壓力環境下可持續。所以這仍然是我們思考這個問題的方式。

And then at the end of it, it's buybacks and Jamie has been on the record for, you know, over a decade, I think over many shareholder letters talking about how he thinks about price and buybacks and valuation. And price is a factor, so that's sort of the totality of the sort of options, I guess.

最後是回購，你知道，十多年來，傑米一直在記錄，我思考了許多股東信，談論他如何看待價格、回購和估值。價格是一個因素，所以我想這就是所有選項的總和。

Okay, great. Thanks a lot.

好的，太好了。多謝。

Ken Usdin, Jefferies.

肯‧烏斯丁，傑弗里斯。

Thanks a lot. Good morning, Jeremy. Jeremy, great to see the progress on investment banking fees up sequentially and 50% year over year. And I saw you on the tape earlier, just talking about, still regulatory concerns a little bit in the advisory space, and we clearly didn't see the debt portfolio in place, although your DCM was great again.

多謝。早上好，傑里米。 Jeremy，很高興看到投資銀行費用連續上漲且年增 50%。我早些時候在磁帶上看到您，只是談論諮詢領域仍然存在一些監管問題，我們顯然沒有看到債務組合到位，儘管您的 DCM 再次表現出色。

I'm just wondering just where you feel the environment is relative to the potential and just go where the dialogue is across the three main bucket areas in terms of like how does this feel in terms of a current environment versus a potential environment that we could still see ahead? Thanks.

我只是想知道你覺得環境與潛力的關係在哪裡，然後就跨三個主要桶區域進行對話，例如就當前環境與我們可以實現的潛在環境而言，這感覺如何還能看見前方嗎？謝謝。

Yeah, thanks, Ken. It's progress, right. I mean, we're happy to see the progress. People have been talking about the oppressed banking fee wallet for some time, and that's nice to see not only the year-on-year part from a low base, but also a nice sequential improvement. So that's the first thing to say.

是的，謝謝，肯。這是進步，對吧。我的意思是，我們很高興看到進展。一段時間以來，人們一直在談論受壓的銀行費用錢包，很高興看到不僅同比基數較低，而且連續改善。這是首先要說的。

In terms of dialogue and engagement, it's definitely elevated. So the dialogue on ECM is elevated and the dialogue on M&A is quite robust as well. So all of those are good things that encourage us and make us hopeful that we could be seeing sort of a better trend in this space, but there are some important caveats.

在對話和參與方面，它絕對得到了提升。因此，關於 ECM 的對話有所提升，關於併購的對話也相當活躍。因此，所有這些都是鼓勵我們的好事情，讓我們充滿希望，我們可以在這個領域看到更好的趨勢，但也有一些重要的警告。

So on the DCM side, yes, we made pull forward comments in the first quarter, but we still feel that the second quarter still reflects a bunch of pull forward and therefore, we're reasonably cautious about the second half of the year.

因此，在 DCM 方面，是的，我們在第一季做出了前瞻評論，但我們仍然認為第二季仍然反映了一系列前瞻，因此，我們對下半年持相當謹慎的態度。

Importantly, a lot of the activities, refinancing activity as opposed to, for example, acquisition finance, so the fact that M&A remains still relatively muted in terms of actual deals has knock-on effects on DCM as well and when a higher percentage of the wallet is refi and the pull forward risk becomes a little bit higher.

重要的是，許多活動，即再融資活動，而不是收購融資等，因此，就實際交易而言，併購仍然相對較少，這一事實也對DCM 產生了連鎖反應，並且當併購交易的比例較高時，錢包正在重新融資，前拉風險會變得更高一些。

On ECM, if you look at it kind of how to remove, you might ask the question, given the performance of the overall indices, you would think it would be a really booming environment for IPOs, for example. And while it's improving, it's not quite as good as you would otherwise expect.

在 ECM 上，如果你看看如何刪除，你可能會問這樣的問題，考慮到整體指數的表​​現，你會認為這對 IPO 來說將是一個真正蓬勃發展的環境。雖然它正在改進，但它並不像您預期的那麼好。

And that's driven by a variety of factors, including the fact that this has been widely discussed that extent to which the performance of the large indices as proven by like a few stocks, the sort of mid-cap tech growth space and other spaces that would typically be driving IPOs have had much more muted performance.

這是由多種因素驅動的，包括這一點已被廣泛討論，即大型指數的表現在多大程度上由少數股票、中型科技成長空間和其他空間所證明。要溫和得多。

Also, a lot of the private capital that was raised a couple of years ago was raised at pretty high valuations. And so in some cases, people looking at IPOs could be looking at down rounds. That's an issue. And while secondary market performance of IPOs has improved meaningfully, in some cases people still have concerns about that.

此外，幾年前籌集的許多私人資本的估值相當高。因此，在某些情況下，關注 IPO 的人可能會關注折價融資。這是一個問題。儘管IPO的二級市場表現已顯著改善，但在某些情況下人們仍對此感到擔憂。

So those are a little bit of overhang on that space. I think we can hope that over time that fades away and the trend gets a bit more robust. And yeah, on the advisory side, you know the regulatory overhang is there, remains there, and so we'll just have to see how that plays out.

所以這些是那個空間上的一點懸垂。我認為我們可以希望隨著時間的推移，這種情況會逐漸消失，趨勢變得更加強勁。是的，在諮詢方面，你知道監管過剩仍然存在，所以我們只需要看看情況如何。

Great. Thank you for all that, Jeremy. And just one on the consumer side, just anything you're noticing in terms of people just have been waiting for this delinquency stabilization on the credit card side. Obviously, your loss rates are coming in as you expected, and we did see 30 days of pretty flat, 90 days, come down a little bit. Is that seasonal? Is it just a good rate of change trend? Any thoughts there? Thanks.

偉大的。謝謝你所做的一切，傑里米。僅就消費者方面而言，您所注意到的一切，人們都在等待信用卡方面拖欠率的穩定性。顯然，您的損失率正如您所預期的那樣，我們確實看到 30 天相當平穩，90 天略有下降。是季節性的嗎？這只是一個好的變化率趨勢嗎？有什麼想法嗎？謝謝。

Yeah, I still feel like when it comes to card, charge-offs, and delinquencies, there's just not much to see there. It's still -- it's normalization, not deterioration, it's in line with expectations. You know, as I say, we always look quite closely inside the cohort, inside the income cohorts.

是的，我仍然覺得在信用卡、沖銷和拖欠方面，沒有太多可看的。它仍然是正常化，而不是惡化，它符合預期。你知道，正如我所說，我們總是非常仔細地觀察群體內部、收入群體內部。

And, you know, when you look in there, specifically, for example, on spend patterns, you can see a little bit of evidence of behavior that's consistent with a little bit of weakness in the lower income segments where you see a little bit of rotation of the spend out of discretionary and non-discretionary.

而且，你知道，當你觀察那裡時，特別是，例如，在支出模式上，你可以看到一些行為證據，這些行為與低收入群體的一點弱點是一致的，在低收入群體中你會看到一點點將可自由支配支出和非可自由支配支出進行輪換。

But the effects are really quite subtle and in my mind, definitely, entirely consistent with the type of economic environment that we're seeing, which while very strong and certainly a lot stronger than anyone would have thought, given the tightness of monetary conditions, say like they had been predicting a couple of years ago or whatever, you are seeing slightly higher unemployment, you are seeing moderating GDP growth. And so it's not entirely surprising that you're seeing a tiny bit of weakness in some pockets of spend. So it all kind of hangs together in what is sometimes actually not a very interesting story.

但影響確實相當微妙，在我看來，絕對與我們所看到的經濟環境類型完全一致，考慮到貨幣條件的緊張，這種影響雖然非常強大，而且肯定比任何人想像的都要強大得多，就像他們幾年前預測的那樣，你會看到失業率略有上升，你會看到 GDP 成長放緩。因此，看到某些支出出現輕微疲軟也就不足為奇了。因此，這一切都串聯在一起，有時實際上並不是一個非常有趣的故事。

Thank you.

謝謝。

Glenn Schorr, Evercore ISI.

格倫·肖爾，Evercore ISI。

Hi, thanks very much. So Jeremy, the discussions so far around private credit and you all, your recent comments have been the ability to add on balance sheet and compete when you need to compete on the private credit front. I do think that most of the discussion has been about the direct-lending component.

你好，非常感謝。傑里米，到目前為止圍繞私人信貸的討論以及你們所有人，你們最近的評論是在需要在私人信貸方面競爭時增加資產負債表和競爭的能力。我確實認為大多數討論都是關於直接貸款部分的。

So I'm curious if you are showing more progress and activity on that front. And then very importantly, do you see the same trend happening on the asset-backed finance side because that's a bigger part of the world, and it is a bigger part of your business? So I'd appreciate your thoughts there. Thanks.

所以我很好奇你們在這方面是否取得了更多進展和活動。然後非常重要的是，您是否看到資產支持金融方面也發生了同樣的趨勢，因為這是世界的一個更大的部分，也是您業務的一個更大的部分？所以我很感激你的想法。謝謝。

Yeah. Thanks, Glenn. So on private credit, so nothing really new to say there. I think, I guess one way the environment is evolving a little bit is that as you know, a lot of money has been raised in private credit funds looking for deals. And sort of a little bit to my prior comment, in a relatively muted acquisition finance environment, at this point you've got a lot of money chasing kind of like not that many deals. So the space is a little bit quieter than it was at the margin.

是的。謝謝，格倫。關於私人信貸，沒有什麼新鮮可說的。我認為，環境正在發生一些變化的一個方式是，正如你所知，私人信貸基金已經籌集了大量資金來尋找交易。有點像我之前的評論，在相對平靜的收購融資環境中，在這一點上，你有很多錢在追逐，但交易並不多。所以這個空間比邊緣稍微安靜一點。

Another interesting thing to note is some of this discussion about kind of lender protections that were typical in the syndicated lender finance market making their way into the private market as well, is sort of people realize that even in the private market, you probably need some of those protections in some cases, which is sort of supportive of the theme that we've been talking about, about convergence between the direct lending space and the syndicated lending space, which is kind of our core thesis here, which is that we can offer best-in-class service across the entire continuum, including secondary market trading and so on.

另一個值得注意的有趣的事情是，關於銀團貸款融資市場中典型的貸款人保護類型的一些討論也進入了私人市場，人們意識到，即使在私人市場中，您也可能需要一些保護措施。在某些情況下，這些保護措施在某種程度上支持了我們一直在討論的主題，即直接貸款空間和銀團貸款空間之間的融合，這是我們的核心論點，即我們可以在整個連續體中提供一流的服務，包括二級市場交易等。

So we feel optimistic about our offering there. I think the current environment is maybe a little bit quieter than it was. So it's maybe not a great moment to like kind of test whether we are doing a lot more or less in the space, so to speak.

因此，我們對我們在那裡提供的產品感到樂觀。我認為現在的環境可能比以前安靜一​​點。因此，可以這麼說，現在可能不是一個喜歡測試我們在這個領域做得更多還是更少的好時機。

And then on asset-backed financing, you actually asked me that question before. And at the time, my answer was that I haven't heard much about that trend, and that continues to be the case. But clearly, there must be something I'm missing. So I can follow-up on that and maybe we can have a chat about it.

然後關於資產支持融資，你之前確實問過我這個問題。當時，我的回答是，我還沒有聽說過太多關於這種趨勢的消息，而且情況仍然如此。但顯然，我一定缺少一些東西。所以我可以跟進此事，也許我們可以討論一下。

That's great for you if you are not hearing much about it, so we can leave it at that. Maybe just one quick follow-up in terms of your just overall posturing on -- you were patient and smart when rates were low, waited to deploy, worked out great. We know that story. Now it seems like you have tons of excess liquidity and you are being patient and rates are high. And I'm curious on how you think about what kind of triggers, what kind of things you're looking for in the market to know if and when you would extend duration?

如果您對此了解不多，那麼這對您來說非常有用，所以我們可以就此結束。就你的整體姿態而言，也許只是一個快速的後續行動——當利率較低時，你很有耐心，很聰明，等待部署，效果很好。我們知道那個故事。現在看來你有大量過剩的流動性，而且你很有耐心，而且利率很高。我很好奇你如何看待什麼樣的觸發因素，你在市場上尋找什麼樣的東西來知道是否以及何時延長期限？

Right. I mean on duration, in truth we have actually added a little bit of duration over the last couple of quarters. So that's one thing to say, that was more last quarter than this quarter. But I guess I would just caution you from -- a little bit away from looking at kind of our reported cash balances and our balance sheet, and concluding that when you look at the duration concept holistically, that there is a lot to be done differently on the duration front.

正確的。我的意思是關於持續時間，事實上，我們在過去幾個季度實際上增加了一點持續時間。所以可以說的是，上個季度比本季更多。但我想我只是提醒你，不要關注我們報告的現金餘額和資產負債表，並得出結論，當你從整體上看待久期概念時，有很多事情要做。

So clearly, it's true that empirically, we've behaved like very asset sensitively in this rate hiking cycle, and that has resulted in a lot of excess NII generation sort of on the way up in the near-term.

很明顯，從經驗來看，我們在這個升息週期中的表現確實非常敏感，這導致了短期內大量 NII 的產生。

But when we look at the fund's overall sensitivity to rates, we look at it through both like the EAR type lens or short-term NIR sensitivity, but also a variety of other lenses, including various types of scenario analysis, including impacts on capital from higher rates.

但是，當我們審視基金對利率的整體敏感度時，我們不僅透過EAR 型鏡頭或短期NIR 敏感度來看待它，而且還透過各種其他鏡頭來看待它，包括各種類型的情境分析，包括對資本的影響較高的利率。

And as I think Jamie has said a couple of times, we actually aim to be relatively balanced on that front. Also, given like the inverted yield curve, it's not as if extending duration from these levels means that you're walking in 5.5% rate. In fact, the forwards are not sort of that compelling, given our views about some sort of structural upward pressures on inflation and so on. So I think when you put that all together, I don't think that kind of a big change in duration posture is a thing that's front in mind for us.

正如我認為傑米已經說過幾次一樣，我們實際上的目標是在這方面保持相對平衡。此外，考慮到反向殖利率曲線，從這些水平延長久期並不意味著您的利率將達到 5.5%。事實上，考慮到我們對通膨等結構性上行壓力的看法，遠期合約並沒有那麼引人注目。所以我認為，當你把所有這些放在一起時，我認為持續時間姿勢的巨大變化並不是我們首先考慮的事情。

Super, helpful. Thanks so much for that.

超級好，有幫助。非常感謝。

Matt O'Connor, Deutsche Bank.

馬特‧奧康納，德意志銀行。

Good morning. I was just wondering if you can elaborate on essentially the math behind the ROTCE being too high at 20% and more normalized at 17%. Obviously, you've pointed to over-earning NII. And I guess the question is, is that all of it to go from 20% to 17%? And if so, is that all consumer deposit costs? Or are there a few other components that you could help frame for us?

早安.我只是想知道您是否可以詳細說明 ROTCE 過高（20%）和更正常化（17%）背後的數學原理。顯然，您已經指出了 NII 的超額收入。我想問題是，這一切都會從 20% 上升到 17% 嗎？如果是這樣，這就是所有消費者存款成本嗎？或者您可以幫助我們建立一些其他元件嗎？

Sure. Good question, Matt. I mean, I guess the way I think about it is a couple of things. Like our returns tend to be a bit seasonal, right. So if you kind of build yourself out a full year forecast and make reasonable space on your own, or analyst consensus or whatever, and you think about the fourth quarter, better look at this on a full year basis when you think about the returns than the quarterly numbers, and you obviously have to strip out kind of the one-time items. And so if you do that, like whatever you get for this year is still clearly a number that's higher than 17%.

當然。好問題，馬特。我的意思是，我想我思考這個問題的方式有幾件事。就像我們的回報往往有點季節性，對吧。因此，如果你為自己制定了全年預測，並為自己留出了合理的空間，或分析師共識或其他什麼，並且你考慮第四季度，那麼當你考慮回報時，最好以全年為基礎來看待這一點，而不是季度數據，顯然你必須剔除一次性項目。因此，如果你這樣做，無論今年你得到什麼，顯然仍然是一個高於 17% 的數字。

So yeah, one source of headwinds is normalization of the NII, primarily as a result of the expected higher deposit costs, we've talked about that. Part of it is also the yield curve effects. Some cuts will come into the curve at some point.

所以，是的，逆風的一個來源是國家資訊基礎設施的正常化，這主要是由於預期存款成本上升，我們已經討論過這一點。部分原因也是殖利率曲線效應。一些削減將在某個時刻進入曲線。

And in the normal course, if you kind of do a very, very, very supplemental model of the company, you would have like expenses grow -- revenue is growing at some organic GDP like rate, maybe higher, and expenses growing at a similar or slightly lower rate, producing a sort of relatively stable overhead ratio.

在正常情況下，如果你對公司做了一個非常、非常、非常補充的模型，你會看到開支成長——收入以某種有機GDP的速度成長，也許更高，而開支也以類似的速度成長或稍低的利率，產生相對穩定的管理費用比率。

But even if the amount of NII normalization winds up being less than we might have thought at some prior point, you still have some background, you still have some normalization of the overhead ratio that needs to happen.

但即使 NII 標準化的數量最終低於我們在之前某個時刻的預期，您仍然有一些背景，您仍然需要對管理費用比率進行一些標準化。

So as much as our discipline on expense management is, as tight as it always has been, the inflation is still non-zero. There's still investments that we're executing. There is still higher expense to come in a slightly flatter revenue environment as a result of in part, the normalization of NII.

因此，儘管我們對費用管理的紀律一如既往地嚴格，但通貨膨脹仍然不為零。我們仍在執行一些投資。在收入環境稍顯平穩的情況下，由於國家資訊基礎設施的正常化，費用仍然會增加。

And then the final point is that whatever winds up being the answer on Basel III Endgame and all the other pieces, you have to assume some amount of expansion of the denominator, at least based on what we know so far.

最後一點是，無論《巴塞爾協議三終局之戰》和所有其他部分的答案是什麼，你都必須假設分母有一定程度的擴展，至少根據我們目前所知。

So of course, any of those pieces could be wrong, but that's kind of how we get to our 17%. And if you look at the various scenarios that we showed on the last page of my Investor Day presentation, it illustrates those dynamics and also how much the range could actually vary as a function of the economic environment and other factors.

當然，這些部分中的任何一個都可能是錯誤的，但這就是我們達到 17% 的方式。如果你看一下我們在投資者日演講的最後一頁上展示的各種情景，你會發現，它說明了這些動態，以及作為經濟環境和其他因素的函數，範圍實際上可能會發生多大的變化。

Yeah. That was a really helpful chart. Just one follow-up. On the yield curve effects, I guess, what do you mean by that? Because right now, the yield curve is inverted, maybe you're still leaving any impact of that. But kind of longer-term, you'd expect a little bit of steepness of the curve, which I would think would help. But what do you mean by that? Thank you.

是的。那是一個非常有用的圖表。只是一個後續行動。我想，關於殖利率曲線效應，你的意思是什麼？因為現在，殖利率曲線是倒掛的，也許你還是會留下任何影響。但從長遠來看，你會期望曲線有點陡峭，我認為這會有所幫助。但這是什麼意思？謝謝。

Yeah. I mean you're not talking about this before. I guess I don't really agree fundamentally with the notion that the way to think about things is that sort of yield curve steepness above and beyond what's priced in by the forwards is a source of structural NII or NIM for banks, if you know what I mean. Like I mean people have different views about the so-called term premium. And obviously, in a moment of inverted curve and different types of treasury supply dynamics, people thinking on that may be changing.

是的。我的意思是你之前沒有談論過這個。我想我從根本上並不同意這樣一種觀點，即考慮問題的方式是，收益率曲線的陡度高於遠期定價，是銀行結構性NII或NIM的來源，如果你知道的話我是說。我的意思是人們對所謂的期限溢價有不同的看法。顯然，在曲線倒掛和不同類型的國債供應動態的時刻，人們的想法可能正在改變。

But I think we saw, when rates were at zero and the 10-year note was below 2%, everyone sort of -- many people were kind of tempted to try to get extra NIM and extra NII by extending duration a lot. But when the steepness of the curve implies -- it is driven by the expectation of actually aggressive Fed tightening, it's just a timing issue and you can wind up kind of pretty offside from the capital and other perspectives.

但我認為我們看到，當利率為零且 10 年期國債利率低於 2% 時，每個人——許多人都試圖透過大幅延長久期來獲得額外的 NIM 和額外的 NII。但當曲線的陡度意味著——它是由聯準會實際上激進的緊縮政策的預期所驅動時，這只是一個時機問題，從資本和其他角度來看，你可能會發現相當越位。

So there are some interesting questions about whether fiscal dynamics might result in a structurally steeper yield curve down the road and whether that could be sort of earning the term premium, so to speak, could be a source of NII, but that feels a bit speculative to me at this point.

因此，存在一些有趣的問題，即財政動態是否可能導致未來殖利率曲線出現結構性陡峭，以及這是否可以賺取期限溢價，可以說，可能成為NII的來源，但這感覺有點投機對我來說。

Got it. Okay, thank you for the details.

知道了。好的，謝謝您的詳細資料。

Mike Mayo, Wells Fargo Securities.

麥克梅奧，富國銀行證券公司。

Hi. Jeremy, you said it's too early to end the over earning narrative, and you highlighted higher deposit costs and the impact of lower rates and lower NII and DCM pull-forward and credit cost going higher. Anything I'm missing on that list? And what would cause you to end the over earning narrative?

你好。傑里米（Jeremy），您說現在結束超額收益的敘述還為時過早，您強調了更高的存款成本以及更低的利率和更低的NII和DCM前移以及信貸成本上升的影響。這份清單上有什麼我遺漏的嗎？什麼會讓你結束超額收入的敘述？

No. Actually, I think that is the right list Mike. I mean, frankly, I think one thing that would end to be over earning narrative is if our annual returns were closer to 17%. I mean to the extent that, that is the through-the-cycle number that we believe and that we are currently producing more than that, that's one very simple way to look at that.

不，事實上，我認為這是正確的名單，麥克。我的意思是，坦白說，我認為如果我們的年回報率接近 17%，最終就會出現超額盈利的情況。我的意思是，在某種程度上，這是我們相信的整個週期的數字，而且我們目前的產量超過了這個數字，這是一種非常簡單的看待這個問題的方法。

But the pieces of that or the pieces that you talked about and the single most important piece is the deposit margin. Our deposit margins are well above historical norms, and that is a big part of the reason that we still are emphasizing the over-earning narrative.

但其中的各個部分或您談到的各個部分以及最重要的部分是存款保證金。我們的存款利潤率遠高於歷史水平，這也是我們仍然強調超額獲利的一個重要原因。

You're 17% through-the-cycle ROTCE kind of expectation, what is the CET1 ratio that you assumed for that?

您的整個週期 ROTCE 預期為 17%，您為此假設的 CET1 比率是多少？

I mean we would generally assume requirements plus a reasonable buffer, which depending on the shape of rules, could be a little bit smaller or a little bit bigger. And the small part as a function of the volatility of those pools, which goes back to my prior comments on SCB and CCAR.

我的意思是，我們通常會假設要求加上合理的緩衝區，根據規則的形狀，緩衝區可能會小一點或大一點。其中一小部分是這些資金池波動性的函數，這可以追溯到我先前對 SCB 和 CCAR 的評論。

But obviously, as you well know, what actually matters is less the ratio and more of the dollars. And at this point, the dollars are very much a function of where rules land and where the RWA lands, and obviously things like GSIB recalibration and so on.

但顯然，如您所知，真正重要的不是比率，而是美元。在這一點上，美元在很大程度上取決於規則的落地點和 RWA 的落地點，顯然還有 GSIB 重新校準等。

So we've done a bunch of scenario analysis along the lines of what I did at Investor Day that informs those numbers, but that is obviously one big element of uncertainty behind that 17%, which is why at Investor Day, when we talked about it, both Daniel and I were quite specific about saying that we thought 17% was still achievable, assuming a reasonable outcome on the Basel III Endgame.

因此，我們按照我在投資者日所做的一系列情景分析來了解這些數字，但這顯然是 17% 背後的不確定性的一大因素，這就是為什麼在投資者日上，當我們談論丹尼爾和我都非常明確地表示，假設巴塞爾III 殘局有合理的結果，我們認為17% 仍然是可以實現的。

Let me just zoom out for one more question on the return target. I mean when I asked Jamie at the [2013] Investor Day, would it make sense to have 13.5% capital, he was basically telling you take a hike, right? And now you have 15.3% capital and you're saying, well, we might want to have a lot more capital here.

讓我再討論一個關於回報目標的問題。我的意思是，當我在 [2013] 投資者日問傑米時，擁有 13.5% 的資本是否有意義，他基本上是在告訴你升息，對嗎？現在你擁有 15.3% 的資本，你會說，好吧，我們可能希望在這裡擁有更多的資本。

I mean at some point, if you're spending $17 billion a year to improve the company, if you're gaining share with digital banking, if you're automating the back office, if you're moving ahead with AI, if you're doing all these things that I think you say others aren't doing, why wouldn't those returns go higher over time? Or do you just assume you'll be competing those benefits away? Thanks.

我的意思是，在某個時候，如果你每年花費 170 億美元來改善公司，如果你透過數位銀行獲得份額，如果你正在實現後台自動化，如果你正在推進人工智慧，如果你我認為你正在做所有這些其他人沒有做的事情，為什麼這些回報不會隨著時間的推移而更高？還是你只是假設你會競爭這些好處？謝謝。

Yeah, I mean, I think in short, Mike, and we've talked about this a lot and Jamie has talked about this a lot, it's a very, very, very competitive market. And we are very happy with our performance. We are very happy with the share we've taken. And 17% is like an amazing number actually. And like to be able to do that, given how robust the competition is from banks, from non-banks, from US banks, from foreign banks, and all of the different businesses that we compete in, is something that we're really proud of.

是的，我的意思是，我想簡而言之，麥克，我們已經談論了很多，傑米也談論了很多，這是一個非常非常競爭的市場。我們對自己的表現非常滿意。我們對所獲得的份額感到非常滿意。 17% 實際上是一個驚人的數字。考慮到來自銀行、非銀行、美國銀行、外國銀行以及我們參與競爭的所有不同業務的競爭有多激烈，能夠做到這一點是我們真正感到自豪的事情的。

So the number has a range around it, obviously. So it's not a promise, it's not a guarantee and it can fluctuate. But we are very proud to be in the ballpark of being able to think that we can deliver it, again assuming a reasonable outcome on Basel III Endgame. But it's a very, very, very competitive market across all of our products and services and regions and line segments.

所以顯然這個數字有一個範圍。因此，這不是承諾，也不是保證，並且可能會發生變化。但我們非常自豪能夠認為我們能夠實現這一目標，再次假設巴塞爾協議 III 終局之戰取得了合理的結果。但對於我們所有的產品、服務、地區和產品線來說，這是一個競爭非常非常非常激烈的市場。

All right. Thank you.

好的。謝謝。

Betsy Graseck, Morgan Stanley.

貝特西‧格拉塞克，摩根士丹利。

Hi, Jeremy. So I did want to ask one drill-down question on 2Q, and it's related to the dollar amount of buybacks that you did do. I think in the press release, right and the slide deck, it's $4.9 billion common stock net repurchases. So the question here is what's the governor for you on how much to do every quarter?

嗨，傑里米。因此，我確實想在第二季度問一個深入的問題，這與您所做的回購金額有關。我認為在新聞稿（右）和幻燈片中，有 49 億美元的普通股淨回購。所以這裡的問題是，州長對你每季要做多少事情有什麼看法？

And I mean I understand it is a function of okay, how much do we organically grow? But even with that, so you get the organic growth which you had some nice movement there. But you do the organic growth and then is it how much do we earn and we want to buy back our earnings?

我的意思是，我理解這是一個函數，好吧，我們有機成長了多少？但即便如此，你還是會得到有機成長，並在那裡發生了一些不錯的變化。但是你進行了有機成長，那麼我們賺了多少錢並且我們想回購我們的收益？

Or how should we be thinking about what that repurchase volume should be looking like over time? And I remember at Investor Day, the whole debate around I don't want to buy back my stock, but we are, right. So I get this question from investors quite a bit of how should we be thinking about, how you think about what the right amount is to be doing here?

或者我們應該如何考慮隨著時間的推移回購量應該是什麼樣子？我記得在投資者日，整個辯論圍繞著我不想回購我的股票，但我們是，對的。因此，我從投資者那裡得到了很多問題，我們應該如何考慮，您如何考慮在這裡要做的正確金額是多少？

Yeah. That's a very good and fair question, Betsy. So let me try to unpack it to the best of my abilities. So in no particular order. One thing that we've really tried to emphasize in a number of different settings, including in our recent 10-Qs actually, is that we don't want to get into the business of guiding on buybacks.

是的。這是一個非常好的、公平的問題，貝特西。因此，讓我嘗試盡我所能來解開它。所以沒有特定的順序。我們在許多不同的環境中（實際上包括在我們最近的 10-Q 中）確實試圖強調的一件事是，我們不想涉足回購指導業務。

So we're going to buy back whatever we think makes sense in the current moment sort of -- and we prefer the right to sort of change that at any time. So I recognize that not everyone loves that, but that is kind of a philosophical belief. And so I might as well say it explicitly. It was pretty clear in the Q also, but I'm just going to say that again. So that's point one.

因此，我們將回購我們認為當前有意義的任何東西，並且我們更喜歡隨時改變這一點的權利。所以我認識到並不是每個人都喜歡這一點，但這是一種哲學信念。所以我不妨明確地說出來。 Q 中也說得很清楚，但我只想再說一次。這就是第一點。

But having said that, let me nonetheless try to address your point on framework and governors. So generally speaking, we think it doesn't make sense to sort of exit the market entirely unless the conditions are much more unusual than they are right now, let's say.

但話雖如此，讓我試著解決您對框架和管理者的觀點。因此，一般來說，我們認為完全退出市場是沒有意義的，除非情況比現在更不尋常。

Obviously, when for whatever reason, if we ever need to build capital in a hurry, we've done it before and we are always comfortable suspending buybacks entirely. But I think some modest amount of buybacks, is a reasonable thing to do when you are generating your kind of capital. And so we were talking before about this $2 billion pace, we're kind of trying to move away from this notion of a pace, but that's where that idea comes from, let's put it that way.

顯然，無論出於何種原因，如果我們需要匆忙籌集資金，我們以前就這樣做過，而且我們總是樂意完全暫停回購。但我認為，當你產生自己的資本時，適量的回購是合理的事。所以我們之前討論過這個 20 億美元的步伐，我們有點試圖擺脫這種步伐的概念，但這就是這個想法的來源，讓我們這樣說吧。

You talked about the $4.9 billion, which I recognize may seem like a little bit of a random number. But where that actually comes from is the other statement that we made, that we have these significant item gains from Visa. And if you think about what that means, it means that we have, post the acceptance of the exchange offer, a meaningful long position and liquid large cap financial stock, i.e., Visa, which realistically is highly correlated to our own stock. And so in some sense, why carry that instead of just buying back JPMorgan stock.

你談到了 49 億美元，我認為這似乎是一個隨機數字。但這實際上來自我們所做的另一項聲明，即我們從 Visa 中獲得了這些重大專案收益。如果你考慮一下這意味著什麼，這意味著我們在接受交換要約後擁有有意義的多頭部位和流動性大盤金融股票，即 Visa，它實際上與我們自己的股票高度相關。因此，從某種意義上說，為什麼要持有它而不是僅僅回購摩根大通股票。

So we talked about, Jamie talked about as we liquidate the Visa, deploying those proceeds into JPM, and that's what we did this quarter. So that is why the $4.9 billion is a little higher. And it's consistent with my comments at our Investor Day around having slightly increased the amount of buybacks.

所以我們談到，傑米談到，當我們清算 Visa 時，將這些收益部署到摩根大通，這就是我們本季所做的。這就是 49 億美元略高的原因。這與我在投資者日關於略微增加回購金額的評論是一致的。

And beyond that what you are left with is answer to Steve's question, which is that, to your point about buying back earnings or whatever, when we are generating these types of earnings and there is this much organic capital being generated, in the absence of opportunities to deploy it organically or inorganically and while continuing to maintain our healthy but sustainable dividend, if we don't return the capital, we are going to keep growing the CET1 ratio, the levels of which -- if you think about the long strategic outlook of the company, are not reasonable. They're just artificially high and unnecessary.

除此之外，你剩下的就是史蒂夫問題的答案，即，就你關於回購收益或其他什麼的觀點而言，當我們產生這些類型的收益並且在沒有有機或無機地部署它的機會，在繼續保持健康但可持續的股息的同時，如果我們不返還資本，我們將繼續提高CET1 比率，如果您考慮長期戰略，則該比率的水平公司的前景並不合理。它們只是人為地高而且沒有必要。

So one way or the other, that will need to be addressed at some point. It's just that we don't feel now is the right time.

因此，無論怎樣，這個問題都需要在某個時候解決。只是我們覺得現在還不是時候。

Great. Thank you, Jeremy. Appreciate it.

偉大的。謝謝你，傑瑞米。欣賞它。

Gerard Cassidy, RBC Capital Markets.

傑拉德·卡西迪，加拿大皇家銀行資本市場部。

Jeremy, I know you touched on deposits earlier in the call in response to a question. I noticed on the average balances, the non-interest bearing deposits were relatively stable quarter to quarter versus prior quarters when they have steadily declined.

傑里米（Jeremy），我知道您在電話會議早些時候回答問題時談到了存款。我注意到，就平均餘額而言，無息存款與前幾季的穩定下降相比，季度與季度之間相對穩定。

And this is one of the areas, of course investors are focused on in terms of the future of the net interest margin for you and your peers. Can you elaborate if you can, what you're seeing in that non-interest-bearing deposit account? I know this is average and not period end, the period end number may actually be lower. But what are you guys seeing here?

當然，這是投資者關注的領域之一，即您和您的同行的淨利差的未來。如果可以的話，您能詳細說明一下您在無利息存款帳戶中看到的情況嗎？我知道這是平均數，而不是期末數，期末數實際上可能會更低。但你們在這裡看到什麼？

Yeah. Good question, Gerard. I have to be honest, I haven't focused on that particular sequential explain i.e., quarter-on-quarter change and average non-interest-bearing deposits. But I think the more important question is the big picture question, which is what do we expect? I mean how are we thinking about ongoing migration of non-interest-bearing into interest-bearing in the current environment, and how that affects our NII outlook and our expectation for weighted average rate paid on deposits.

是的。好問題，傑拉德。老實說，我並沒有關注特定的連續解釋，即季度環比變化和平均無息存款。但我認為更重要的問題是大局問題，也就是我們期望什麼？我的意思是，在當前環境下，我們如何考慮無息向有息的持續遷移，以及這如何影響我們的NII前景和我們對存款加權平均利率的預期。

And the answer to that question is that we do continue to expect that migration to happen. So if you think about it in the wholesale space, you have a bunch of clients with some balances in non-interest-bearing accounts, and over time for a variety of reasons, we do see them moving those balances into interest-bearing.

這個問題的答案是，我們確實繼續期待這種遷移的發生。因此，如果你在批發領域考慮一下，你有很多客戶在無息帳戶中擁有一些餘額，隨著時間的推移，由於各種原因，我們確實看到他們將這些餘額轉移到有息帳戶中。

So we do continue to expect that migration to happen, and therefore, that will be a source of headwinds. And that migration sometimes happens internally, i.e., out of non-interest-bearing into interest-bearing or into CDs. Sometimes it goes into money markets or into investments, which is what we see happening in our wealth management business.

因此，我們確實繼續預期移民將會發生，因此，這將成為不利因素的一個來源。這種遷移有時會發生在內部，即從無息轉為有息或存單。有時它會進入貨幣市場或投資，這就是我們在財富管理業務中看到的情況。

And some of it does leave the company, but one of the things that we are encouraged by is the extent to which we are actually capturing a large portion of that yield-seeking flow through CDs and money market offerings, et cetera, across our various franchises.

其中一些確實離開了公司，但令我們感到鼓舞的一件事是，我們實際上透過 CD 和貨幣市場產品等在我們的各個領域捕獲了很大一部分尋求收益的資金流。

So big picture, I do think that migration out of non-interest-bearing into interest-bearing will continue to be a thing, and that is a contributor to the modest headwinds that we expect for NII right now. But yeah, I'll leave it at that, I guess.

從大局來看，我確實認為從無息向有息的遷移將繼續成為一個問題，這也是我們目前預期NII面臨適度阻力的一個因素。但是，是的，我想我就這樣吧。

Very good. And as a follow-up, you've been very clear about the consumer credit card charge-offs and delinquency levels. And we all know about the commercial real estate office, and you always talk about over-earning on net interest income of course. One of the great credit quality stories for everyone, including yourselves, is the C&I portfolio, how strong it's been for in this elevated rate environment.

非常好。作為後續行動，您非常清楚消費者信用卡沖銷和拖欠水準。我們都知道商業房地產辦公室，當然，您總是談論淨利息收入的超額收益。對於包括你們自己在內的每個人來說，最偉大的信用品質故事之一就是 C&I 投資組合，它在這種高利率環境下表現得多麼強勁。

And I know your numbers are still quite low, but there in the Corporate and Investment Bank, you had about a $500 million pickup in non-accrual loans. Can you share with us what are you seeing in C&I? Are there any early signs of cracks or anything? And again, I know your numbers are still good, but I'm just trying to look forward to see if there's something here over the next 12 months or so.

我知道你們的數字仍然很低，但在企業和投資銀行，你們的非應計貸款增加了約 5 億美元。能與我們分享一下您對 C&I 的看法嗎？是否有任何早期裂縫或其他跡象？再說一次，我知道你們的數字仍然不錯，但我只是想看看在接下來的 12 個月左右是否會有一些進展。

Yeah, it's a good question. I think the short answer is no, we are not really seeing early signs of cracks in C&I. I mean, yeah, so I agree with you, like the C&I charge-off rate has been very, very low for a long time. I think we emphasized that at last year's Investor Day if I remember correctly. I think the C&I charge-off rate we are seeing 10 years was something like literally zero.

是的，這是一個好問題。我認為簡短的答案是否定的，我們並沒有真正看到商業和工業領域出現裂痕的早期跡象。我的意思是，是的，所以我同意你的觀點，就像 C&I 沖銷率長期以來一直非常非常低。如果我沒記錯的話，我想我們在去年的投資人日就強調了這一點。我認為 10 年來我們看到的 C&I 沖銷率幾乎為零。

So that is clearly very low by historical standards. And while we take a lot of pride in that number, I think it reflects the discipline in our underwriting process and the strength of our credit culture across bankers and the risk team, that's not -- we don't actually run that franchise to like a zero loss expectation.

因此，按照歷史標準來看，這顯然非常低。雖然我們對這個數字感到非常自豪，但我認為它反映了我們承保流程的紀律以及我們銀行家和風險團隊的信用文化的實力，但事實並非如此——我們實際上經營該特許經營權並不是為了喜歡零損失預期。

So you have to assume there will be some upward pressure on that. But in any given quarter, the C&I numbers tend to be quite lumpy and quite idiosyncratic. So I don't think that anything in the current quarter results is indicative of anything broader, and I haven't heard anyone internally talk that way, I would say.

所以你必須假設會有一些上行壓力。但在任何特定季度，C&I 數據往往相當不穩定且非常特殊。因此，我認為當前季度的業績並不代表任何更廣泛的情況，我想說，我沒有聽到任何人在內部這樣談論。

Great, appreciate the insights as always. Thank you.

太棒了，一如既往地欣賞這些見解。謝謝。

Erika Najarian, UBS.

艾莉卡·納賈里安，瑞銀。

Hi, good morning. I just had one cleanup question, Jeremy. The consensus provision for 2024 is $10.7 billion. Could you maybe clarify for once and for all sort of Jamie's comments at an industry conference earlier and try to sort of triangulate if that $10.7 billion provision is appropriate for the growth level that you are planning for in card?

早安.我只有一個清理問題，傑瑞米。 2024 年的共識撥款為 107 億美元。您能否一勞永逸地澄清 Jamie 在早些時候的一次行業會議上的評論，並嘗試進行三角測量，確定 107 億美元的撥款是否適合您計劃的增長水平？

Yeah, happy to clarify that. So Jamie's comments were that the allowance to build and the card allowance, so we are talking about card specifically, we expected something like $2 billion for the full year. As I sit here today, our expectation for that number is actually slightly higher, but it's in the ballpark.

是的，很高興澄清這一點。 Jamie 的評論是建設津貼和信用卡津貼，所以我們具體討論的是信用卡，我們預計全年約為 20 億美元。當我今天坐在這裡時，我們對這個數字的預期實際上略高，但在大概範圍內。

And I think in terms of what that means for the consensus on the overall allowance change for the year, last time I checked, it still looked a little low on that front. So who knows what it will actually wind up being, but that remains our view.

我認為，就這對今年整體津貼變化的共識意味著什麼而言，我上次檢查時，在這方面看起來仍然有點低。所以誰知道它最終會是什麼樣子，但這仍然是我們的觀點。

One question that we've got is how to reconcile that build to the 12% growth in OS that we've talked about because it seems like a little bit high relative to what you would have otherwise assumed if you apply some sort of a standard coverage ratio to that growth.

我們遇到的一個問題是如何使這一構建與我們討論過的操作系統 12% 的增長相協調，因為相對於您應用某種標準時所假設的情況，它似乎有點高該增長的覆蓋率。

But the reason that's the case is essentially a combination of higher revolving mix as we continue to see some normalization revolve in that 12%, as well as seasoning of earlier vintages, which comes with slightly higher allowance per unit of OS growth.

但造成這種情況的原因本質上是更高的循環組合的組合，因為我們繼續看到這12% 中的一些正常化循環，以及早期年份的調味，這帶來了每單位操作系統增長稍高的津貼。

Great. Thank you.

偉大的。謝謝。

Jim Mitchell, Seaport Global Securities.

吉姆·米切爾，海港環球證券公司。

Hey, good morning. Maybe just one last question on sort of deploying excess capital. It seems like the two primary ways to do that organically would be through the trading book or the loan book. So maybe two questions there. One, trading assets were up 20% year over year, is that you leaning into it or just a function of demand? And is there further opportunities to grow that?

嗨，早安。也許只是關於部署過剩資本的最後一個問題。有機地做到這一點的兩種主要方法似乎是透過交易帳戶或貸款帳戶。也許有兩個問題。第一，交易資產年增 20%，這是您的傾向還是只是需求的函數？還有進一步發展的機會嗎？

And then secondly, outside of cards, loan demand has been quite weak. And any thoughts from you on if you're seeing any change in demand or how you're thinking about loan demand going forward? Thanks.

其次，除了信用卡之外，貸款需求一直相當疲軟。如果您看到需求發生任何變化，或您如何看待未來的貸款需求，您有何想法？謝謝。

Thanks, Jim. Good question. So yeah, trading assets have been up. That is basically client activity primarily secured financing related sort of matchbook repo type stuff and similar things that grows up the balance sheet quite a bit, but are quite low risk and therefore quite low RWA intensity.

謝謝，吉姆。好問題。是的，交易資產增加。這基本上是客戶活動，主要是與擔保融資相關的火柴回購類型的東西和類似的東西，這些東西使資產負債表增長了不少，但風險相當低，因此 RWA 強度也相當低。

So while our ability the supply that financing to clients is something that we're happy about and it's very much represents us leaning into the franchise to serve our clients. It's not really particularly RWA, and therefore capital intensive, and therefore doesn't really reflect an aggressive choice on our part to deploy capital, so to speak.

因此，雖然我們有能力為客戶提供融資，但我們對此感到高興，這在很大程度上代表了我們傾向於特許經營來服務我們的客戶。可以這麼說，它並不是真正特別的 RWA，因此是資本密集的，因此並不能真正反映出我們在部署資本方面的積極選擇。

On the loan demand front, yeah, I mean, unfortunately, I just don't have much new to say there on loan demand. Meaning, to your point, loan demand remains quite muted everywhere except card. Our card business is, of course, in no way capital constrained.

在貸款需求方面，是的，我的意思是，不幸的是，我對貸款需求沒有太多新的說法。這意味著，就您而言，除了信用卡之外，其他地方的貸款需求仍然相當低迷。當然，我們的卡業務絕不受資本限制。

So whatever growth makes sense there in terms of our customer franchise and our ability to acquire accounts and retain accounts, and what fits inside our credit risk appetite is growth that's going to make sense. And so we're very happy to deploy capital to that. But it's not constrained by our willingness or ability to deploy capital to that.

因此，就我們的客戶特許經營權以及我們獲得帳戶和保留帳戶的能力而言，無論增長是否有意義，以及符合我們信用風險偏好的增長都是有意義的。因此，我們很高興為此投入資金。但這並不受我們為此部署資本的意願或能力的限制。

And of course, for the rest of the loan space, the last thing that we are going to do is have the excess capital mean that we lean in to lending that is not inside our risk appetite or inside our credit box, especially in a world where spreads are quite compressed and terms are under pressure. So there is always a balance between capital deployment and assessing economic risk rationally.

當然，對於其餘的貸款空間，我們要做的最後一件事是擁有過剩的資本，這意味著我們傾向於不在我們的風險偏好或信用範圍內的貸款，尤其是在這樣的世界中利差相當壓縮，條款也面臨壓力。因此，資本配置與理性評估經濟風險之間始終保持平衡。

And frankly, that is in some sense, a microcosm of the larger challenge that we have right now. When I talked about if there was ever a moment where the opportunity cost of not deploying the capital relative to how attractive the opportunities outside the walls of the company are, now would be it in terms of being patient. That's a little bit one example of what I was referring to.

坦白說，從某種意義上說，這是我們目前面臨的更大挑戰的縮影。當我談到是否有一個時刻，不部署資本的機會成本相對於公司外部機會的吸引力而言，現在就是耐心等待。這只是我所指的一個例子。

All right. Okay, great. Thanks.

好的。好的，太好了。謝謝。

And we have no further questions.

我們沒有其他問題了。

Very good. Thank you, everyone. See you next quarter.

非常好。謝謝大家。下季見。

Thank you all for participating in today's conference. You may disconnect your line and enjoy the rest of your day.

感謝大家參加今天的會議。您可以斷開線路並享受剩下的一天。