摩根大通 (JPM) 2023 Q3 法說會逐字稿

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to JPMorgan Chase's Third Quarter 2023 Earnings Call. This call is being recorded. (Operator Instructions) We will now go live to the presentation. Please stand by.

早安，女士們，先生們。歡迎參加摩根大通 2023 年第三季財報電話會議。此通話正在錄音。 （操作員說明）我們現在將進行演示。請稍候。

At this time, I would like to turn the call over to JPMorgan Chase's Chief Financial Officer, Jeremy Barnum; and their Chairman and CEO, Jamie Dimon. Mr. Dimon, please go ahead.

現在，我想把電話轉給摩根大通的財務長傑里米·巴納姆（Jeremy Barnum）；以及他們的董事長兼執行長傑米戴蒙。戴蒙先生，請繼續。

Good morning, everybody. Before we start the actual call, I want to repeat something we just said on the press call. So before we get into discussions about third quarter earnings, I just want to say how deeply saddened that we all are about the recent horrific attacks on Israel and the resulting bloodshed and more. Terrorism and hatred have no place in our civilized world, and all of our hearts here at JPMorgan Chase go out to all who are suffering.

大家早安。在我們開始實際通話之前，我想重複一下我們剛剛在新聞發布會上所說的話。因此，在我們討論第三季收益之前，我只想說，我們所有人對最近對以色列的可怕襲擊以及由此造成的流血事件等深感悲痛。恐怖主義和仇恨在我們的文明世界中沒有容身之所，摩根大通全體員工心繫所有受苦受難的人。

Thanks, Jamie. And of course, I very much echo the sentiment. Now let's turn to our third quarter earnings results. The presentation is available on our website, and please refer to the disclaimer in the back.

謝謝，傑米。當然，我非常贊同這種觀點。現在讓我們來看看第三季的獲利結果。該演示文稿可在我們的網站上獲取，請參閱後面的免責聲明。

Starting on Page 1. The firm reported net income of $13.2 billion, EPS of $4.33 on revenue of $40.7 billion and delivered an ROTCE of 22%. These results included $669 million of net investment securities losses in Corporate and $665 million of firm-wide legal expense.

從第 1 頁開始。該公司報告淨利潤為 132 億美元，每股收益為 4.33 美元，收入為 407 億美元，ROTCE 為 22%。這些結果包括該公司 6.69 億美元的淨投資證券損失和 6.65 億美元的全公司法律費用。

On Page 2, we have some more detail. Similar to last quarter, we have called out the impact of First Republic where relevant. For this quarter, First Republic contributed $2.2 billion of revenue, $858 million of expense and $1.1 billion of net income.

在第 2 頁上，我們有更多詳細資訊。與上季類似，我們已經指出了第一共和國的相關影響。本季度，First Republic 貢獻了 22 億美元的收入、8.58 億美元的支出和 11 億美元的淨利潤。

Now focusing on the firm-wide results, excluding First Republic. Revenue of $38.5 billion was up $5 billion or 15% year-on-year. NII ex Markets was up $4.8 billion or 28% driven by higher rates and higher revolving balance at Card, partially offset by lower deposit balances. NIR ex Markets was up $374 million or 4%, which included lower net investment securities losses than the prior year. And Markets revenue was down $190 million or 3% year-on-year.

現在關注公司範圍內的業績，不包括第一共和國。營收為 385 億美元，年增 50 億美元，即 15%。由於利率上升和信用卡循環餘額增加，除市場外的 NII 增長了 48 億美元，即 28%，但部分被存款餘額下降所抵消。 NIR 除市場成長 3.74 億美元，或 4%，其中淨投資證券損失低於去年。市場收入較去年同期下降 1.9 億美元，即 3%。

Expenses of $20.9 billion were up $1.7 billion or 9% year-on-year, primarily driven by ongoing growth in front office and technology staffing as well as wage inflation and higher legal expense. And credit costs were $1.4 billion, predominantly driven by net charge-offs in Card and included a $102 million net reserve release driven by changes in the central scenario, primarily offset by Card loan growth.

費用為 209 億美元，年增 17 億美元，即 9%，主要是由於前台和技術人員配置的持續增長以及工資上漲和法律費用的增加。信貸成本為 14 億美元，主要由 Card 的淨沖銷推動，其中包括由中央情境變化推動的 1.02 億美元淨準備金釋放，主要被 Card 貸款成長所抵銷。

On to balance sheet and capital on Page 3. We ended the quarter with a CET1 ratio of 14.3%, up about 50 basis points versus the prior quarter, as the benefit of net income less capital distributions was partially offset by AOCI. We had $2 billion of net share repurchases this quarter, and the pace of buybacks will likely remain modest in light of the Basel III endgame proposal. In line with our capital hierarchy, we'll continue to reassess the buyback trajectory as circumstances evolve or opportunities emerge.

關於第 3 頁的資產負債表和資本。本季末，我們的 CET1 比率為 14.3%，比上一季上升約 50 個基點，因為淨利潤減去資本分配的收益被 AOCI 部分抵銷。本季我們進行了 20 億美元的淨股票回購，鑑於巴塞爾 III 的最終提案，回購的步伐可能會保持溫和。根據我們的資本等級，隨著情況的發展或機會的出現，我們將繼續重新評估回購軌跡。

And on the topic of the Basel III endgame, you'll see that we added a couple of pages on it. So let's cover that now, starting on Page 4. Given the significance of this proposal for us, the broader industry as well as households and businesses as end users, we thought it was important to spend time discussing it.

關於巴塞爾協議 III 殘局的主題，您會看到我們添加了幾頁內容。現在讓我們從第 4 頁開始討論這一點。考慮到該提案對我們、更廣泛的行業以及作為最終用戶的家庭和企業的重要性，我們認為花時間討論它很重要。

And while we know there's interest in having us quantify the expected impact of this proposal in a lot of granular detail, it's important to start by asking why the proposed increase is so large, given the repeated statement over time by policymakers that banks are well capitalized and well positioned to deal with stress. Given that context, the absence of detailed analysis supporting a capital increase of this magnitude is disconcerting, and there's a lot that does not make sense to us.

雖然我們知道人們有興趣讓我們詳細量化該提案的預期影響，但考慮到政策制定者長期以來反复聲明銀行資本充足，因此首先要問為什麼擬議的增長幅度如此之大，這一點很重要並且能夠很好地應對壓力。鑑於這種背景，缺乏支持如此大規模的增資的詳細分析令人不安，而且有很多東西對我們來說沒有意義。

Starting with RWA. We've already said we expect the firm's RWA to increase by around 30% or $500 billion, which results in capital requirements increasing by about 25% or $50 billion. One immediate thing to point out is that at 4.5% GSIB, a $500 billion increase in RWA requires $22.5 billion of additional capital with no change in our systemic risk footprint.

從 RWA 開始。我們已經說過，我們預計公司的 RWA 將增加約 30% 或 5000 億美元，這將導致資本要求增加約 25% 或 500 億美元。需要立即指出的一件事是，以 4.5% 的 GSIB 計算，RWA 增加 5000 億美元需要 225 億美元的額外資本，而我們的系統性風險足跡沒有變化。

We've been on the record for a long time that GSIB was conceptually flawed and miscalibrated originally. Since implementation, the failure to address economic growth, despite the Fed themselves acknowledging this problem at the outset, has made matters worse. And now all of those problems are being applied to an additional $500 billion of RWA. Our view is that the combined proposals could have adjusted the surcharge levels to keep dollars of capital associated with the GSIB buffer constant rather than simply multiplying the RWA increase by the existing surcharges.

很長一段時間以來，我們一直公開指出 GSIB 在概念上有缺陷，而最初的校準是錯誤的。自實施以來，儘管聯準會自己一開始就承認這個問題，但未能解決經濟成長問題，使情況變得更糟。現在，所有這些問題都被應用到了額外 5000 億美元的 RWA 上。我們的觀點是，合併後的提案可以調整附加費水平，以保持與 GSIB 緩衝相關的美元資本不變，而不是簡單地將 RWA 增加量乘以現有附加費。

Another lens on the proposed increases is the introduction of RWA for operational risk and its clear overlap with op risk losses already capitalized through the stress capital buffer. Although there is limited disclosure from the Fed on this point, we have estimated that we have about $15 billion of operational risk capital embedded in the SCB based on the information the Fed does disclose. Once we capitalize for this new op risk RWA, our required capital will go up by around $30 billion without any change to our portfolio.

另一個建議增加的視角是針對操作風險引入 RWA，及其與已透過壓力資本緩衝資本化的營運風險損失的明顯重疊。儘管聯準會在這一點上的披露有限，但根據聯準會披露的信息，我們估計 SCB 中嵌入了約 150 億美元的操作風險資本。一旦我們利用這項新的營運風險 RWA，我們所需的資本將增加約 300 億美元，而我們的投資組合不會有任何變化。

Now let's turn to Page 5, which shows the impact of the actual and proposed capital rules over the last few years. Zooming out from the details of this most recent proposal, this page reminds us of what's happened since 2017. Since then, SA-CCR and the stress capital buffer have been adopted and our GSIB surcharge will increase to 4.5%. So assuming the Basel III endgame and GSIB proposals are finalized in their current form, we would see a 45% increase in our capital requirements relative to that 2017 starting point.

現在讓我們翻到第 5 頁，其中顯示了過去幾年實際和擬議資本規則的影響。從這個最新提案的細節來看，本頁提醒我們自 2017 年以來發生的事情。從那時起，SA-CCR 和壓力資本緩衝已被採用，我們的 GSIB 附加費將增加至 4.5%。因此，假設巴塞爾協議 III 的最後階段和 GSIB 提案以目前的形式最終確定，我們的資本要求相對於 2017 年的起點將增加 45%。

This illustrates again how overcalibrated these proposals are, and it's not done yet. We still expect the Fed to incorporate CECL into CCAR, which will likely increase the SCB. And of course, given the absence of a fix to the GSIB flaws, it continues to present a headwind into the indefinite future. And aside from those dynamics, there remains the long-standing issue of pro-cyclicality in the overall capital requirement.

這再次說明了這些提案是多麼過度校準，而且還沒有完成。我們仍然預計聯準會將 CECL 納入 CCAR，這可能會增加 SCB。當然，由於 GSIB 缺陷沒有修復，它在不確定的未來將繼續帶來阻力。除了這些動態之外，整體資本要求中仍存在長期存在的順週期性問題。

We think it's also important to point out that the agencies did actually have a choice here. While it may technically be true that the proposal is Basel-compliant, Basel compliance does not mandate a 25% increase in capital requirements. Implementing the Basel III endgame consistently with how the Europeans have, by retaining credit risk modeling and also addressing the compounding effects of GSIB and SCB, would have achieved Basel compliance without creating this unnecessary increase in capital requirements.

我們認為指出這些機構確實有選擇也很重要。雖然從技術上講該提案可能確實符合巴塞爾協議，但巴塞爾協議並未強制要求資本要求增加 25%。以歐洲人的方式實施巴塞爾協議 III 的最後階段，透過保留信用風險模型並解決 GSIB 和 SCB 的複合效應，可以實現巴塞爾協議的合規性，而不會造成不必要的資本要求增加。

As you would expect, we will continue to engage and forcefully advocate during the comment period and beyond in a great deal of technical detail. For the purposes of this call, we wanted to make the equally important broader points about both the level of capital increase and the flaws in the construct of the framework itself since coherent design is critical to the framework's durability over time.

正如您所期望的，我們將在徵求意見期間及之後繼續參與並大力倡導大量技術細節。出於本次電話會議的目的，我們希望就資本增加水準和框架本身構建的缺陷提出同樣重要的更廣泛的觀點，因為連貫的設計對於框架隨著時間的推移的耐久性至關重要。

The current proposal exacerbates existing features to discourage beneficial scale and diversification. If it goes through as written, there will likely be significant impacts on pricing and availability of credit for businesses and consumers. In addition, the ongoing and persistent increase in the regulatory cost of market-making for banks suggest that the regulators want dramatic changes to the current operation of the U.S. capital markets. We believe that well-regulated market makers that are committed to deploying capital to clients on a principal basis are a critical building block supporting the breadth, depth and resilience of the American capital markets, which is vital to the U.S. economy. So caution is warranted when proposing changes of this magnitude.

目前的提案加劇了現有的特徵，阻礙了有益的規模和多樣化。如果它按照書面規定進行，可能會對企業和消費者的定價和信貸可用性產生重大影響。此外，銀行做市監管成本的持續增加表明監管機構希望美國資本市場當前的運作方式發生巨大變化。我們相信，監管良好、致力於在主要基礎上向客戶配置資本的做市商是支持美國資本市場廣度、深度和彈性的關鍵基石，這對美國經濟至關重要。因此，在提出如此大規模的改變時需要謹慎。

With that, we go to our businesses, starting with CCB on Page 6. Consumer spend growth has now reverted to pre-pandemic trends with nominal spend for customer stable and relatively flat year-on-year. Cash buffers continue to normalize to pre-pandemic levels with lower income groups normalizing faster.

接下來，我們開始討論我們的業務，從第 6 頁的 CCB 開始。消費者支出成長現已恢復到疫情前的趨勢，客戶名目支出穩定且較去年同期相對持平。現金緩衝繼續正常化至大流行前的水平，較低收入群體的正常化速度更快。

Turning now to the financial results excluding First Republic. CCB reported net income of $5.3 billion on revenue of $17 billion, which was up 19% year-on-year.

現在轉向不包括第一共和國的財務表現。建行公佈淨利53億美元，營收170億美元，年增19%。

In Banking & Wealth Management, revenue was up 30% year-on-year driven by higher NII on higher rates. End-of-period deposits were down 3% quarter-on-quarter. We ranked #1 in retail deposit share based on FDIC data and continue to solidify our leadership position in key markets. Client investment assets were up 21% year-on-year driven by market performance and strong net inflows as we continue to capture yield-seeking flows from our Consumer Banking customers.

在銀行和財富管理領域，由於利率提高導致NII增加，營收年增30%。期末存款季減3%。根據 FDIC 數據，我們在零售存款份額方面排名第一，並繼續鞏固我們在關鍵市場的領導地位。在市場表現和強勁淨流入的推動下，客戶投資資產年增 21%，因為我們持續吸引消費銀行客戶追求收益的資金流。

In Home Lending, revenue was down 2% year-on-year, given a smaller market. Originations of $10.3 billion were up slightly quarter-on-quarter, but they remained down 15% year-on-year.

由於市場規模較小，房屋貸款收入較去年同期下降 2%。發起資金 103 億美元，較上季略有成長，但年比仍下降 15%。

Moving to Card Services & Auto. Revenue was up 7% year-on-year driven by higher Card Services NII on higher revolving balances, partially offset by lower auto lease income. Auto outstandings were up 16% year-on-year due to strong account acquisition and continued normalization for both. And in Auto, originations were $10.2 billion, up 36% year-on-year as we saw competitors pull back and we gained market share.

轉向卡服務和汽車。由於循環餘額增加，卡片服務 NII 增加，營收年增 7%，但部分被汽車租賃收入減少所抵銷。由於客戶收購強勁以及兩者持續正常化，汽車未償餘額年增 16%。在汽車領域，由於我們看到競爭對手撤退並且我們獲得了市場份額，因此發起額為 102 億美元，同比增長 36%。

Expenses of $8.5 billion were up 7% year-on-year, largely driven by continued investments in staffing, primarily in front office and technology.

費用為 85 億美元，年增 7%，這主要是由於對人員配置（主要是前台和技術）的持續投資所推動的。

In terms of credit performance this quarter. Credit costs were $1.4 billion driven by net charge-offs which were up $720 million year-on-year predominantly due to continued normalization of Card. The net reserve build of $49 million reflected a $301 million build in Card Services, primarily offset by a $250 million release in Home Lending.

從本季的信貸表現來看。信貸成本為 14 億美元，由淨沖銷推動，淨沖銷年增 7.2 億美元，主要是由於信用卡的持續正常化。淨準備金增加 4,900 萬美元，反映了卡片服務增加了 3.01 億美元，主要被房屋貸款釋放的 2.5 億美元所抵消。

Next, the CIB on Page 7. CIB reported net income of $3.1 billion on revenue of $11.7 billion. Investment Banking revenue of $1.6 billion was down 6% year-on-year. IB fees were down 3% year-on-year, and we ranked #1 with a year-to-date wallet share of 8.6%. In Advisory, fees were down 10%. Underwriting fees were up 8% for debt and down 6% for equity.

接下來是第 7 頁的 CIB。CIB 報告淨利潤為 31 億美元，營收為 117 億美元。投資銀行業務收入為16億美元，較去年同期下降6%。 IB 費用較去年同期下降 3%，我們以年初至今的錢包份額 8.6% 排名第一。在諮詢方面，費用下降了 10%。債務承銷費用上漲 8%，股權承銷費用下降 6%。

In terms of the outlook, we're encouraged by the level of capital markets activity in September, and we have a healthy pipeline going into the fourth quarter. Advisory has also picked up compared to the first half, but year-to-date announced M&A remains down significantly, which will continue to be a headwind. Payments revenue was $2.1 billion, up 3% year-on-year. Excluding equity investments, it was up 12% driven by higher rates, partially offset by lower deposit balances.

就前景而言，我們對 9 月份資本市場活動水準感到鼓舞，並且我們有一個健康的管道進入第四季度。與上半年相比，諮詢也有所回升，但今年迄今宣布的併購仍大幅下降，這將繼續成為不利因素。支付收入為21億美元，年增3%。不包括股權投資，利率上升帶動了 12% 的成長，但部分被存款餘額下降所抵消。

Moving to Markets. Total revenue was $6.6 billion, down 3% year-on-year against a very strong third quarter last year. Fixed income was up 1% driven by an increase in financing and trade activity in Securitized Products as well as improved performance in credit. This was predominantly offset by Currencies & Emerging Markets coming off a very strong quarter last year. Equity Markets was down 10%, reflecting lower revenues across products compared to a strong prior year quarter as activity was challenged by lower volatility. Securities Services revenue of $1.2 billion was up 9% year-on-year driven by higher rates, partially offset by lower deposit balances.

轉向市場。總營收為 66 億美元，與去年第三季的強勁表現相比，年減 3%。由於證券化產品融資和貿易活動的增加以及信貸績效的改善，固定收益增加了 1%。這主要被去年強勁季度的貨幣和新興市場所抵銷。股票市場下跌 10%，反映出由於活動受到波動性下降的挑戰，與去年同期相比，各產品收入有所下降。由於利率上升，證券服務收入達到 12 億美元，年增 9%，但部分被存款餘額下降所抵銷。

Expenses of $7.4 billion were up 11% year-on-year predominantly driven by higher legal expense and wage inflation. Credit costs were a net benefit of $185 million driven by a net reserve release of $230 million, reflecting the impact of net lending activity and net charge-offs of $45 million.

費用為 74 億美元，年增 11%，主要是由於法律費用增加和工資上漲。信貸成本是淨收益 1.85 億美元，由 2.3 億美元的淨準備金釋放推動，反映了淨借貸活動和 4,500 萬美元淨沖銷的影響。

Moving to the Commercial Bank on Page 8. Commercial Banking reported net income of $1.7 billion. Revenue of $3.7 billion was up 20% year-on-year with Payments revenue of $2 billion, up 30% year-on-year driven by higher rates. And gross Investment Banking and Markets revenue of $821 million was up 8% year-on-year, reflecting increased M&A volume.

轉向第 8 頁的商業銀行。商業銀行報告淨利潤為 17 億美元。營收為 37 億美元，年增 20%，其中支付收入為 20 億美元，在費率上漲的推動下，年增 30%。投資銀行和市場總收入為 8.21 億美元，年增 8%，反映出併購數量的增加。

Expenses of $1.4 billion were up 15% year-on-year, largely driven by an increase in headcount, including front office and technology investments as well as higher volume-related expense, including the impact of new client acquisition. Average deposits were down 7% year-on-year and 5% quarter-on-quarter primarily driven by lower nonoperating deposits as clients opt for higher-yielding alternatives.

費用為 14 億美元，年增 15%，主要是由於人員數量的增加（包括前台和技術投資）以及與業務量相關的費用增加（包括新客戶獲取的影響）。平均存款年減 7%，季減 5%，主要是因為客戶選擇收益更高的替代方案，非經營性存款減少。

Loans were up 1% quarter-on-quarter. C&I loans were flat, reflecting continued stabilization in new loan demand and revolver utilization. And CRE loans were up 1%, reflecting funding of prior year originations in real estate banking as well as lower payoff activity. Finally, credit costs were $64 million, including net charge-offs of $50 million and a net reserve build of $14 million.

貸款較上季成長1%。工商業貸款持平，反映新增貸款需求和循環利用持續穩定。 CRE 貸款增加了 1%，反映出去年房地產銀行業務的資金來源以及較低的回報活動。最後，信貸成本為 6,400 萬美元，其中包括 5,000 萬美元的淨沖銷和 1,400 萬美元的淨準備金建設。

Then to complete our lines of business, AWM on Page 9. Asset & Wealth Management reported net income of $1.1 billion with a pretax margin of 31%. Revenue of $4.6 billion was relatively flat year-on-year as higher management fees on strong net inflows and higher average market levels were offset by lower performance fees and lower NII from deposits.

然後，為了完成我們的業務線，第 9 頁的 AWM。資產與財富管理報告淨利潤為 11 億美元，稅前利潤率為 31%。 46 億美元的營收與去年同期相對持平，因為強勁的淨流入和較高的平均市場水準導致管理費增加，但績效費用和存款NII 的降低抵消了管理費的增加。

Expenses of $3.1 billion were up 3% year-on-year driven by continued growth in our private banking adviser teams and the impact of closing the JPMorgan Asset Management China and Global Shares acquisitions. For the quarter, net long-term inflows were $20 billion, positive across all asset classes, led by equities. And in liquidity, we saw net inflows of $40 billion. AUM of $3.2 trillion was up 22% year-on-year, and client assets of $4.6 trillion were up 21% year-on-year driven by continued net inflows and higher market levels. Finally, loans were flat quarter-on-quarter while deposits were down 5% driven by migration to investments, partially offset by client inflows.

由於我們私人銀行顧問團隊的持續成長以及完成摩根資產管理中國和全球股票收購的影響，費用為 31 億美元，較去年同期成長 3%。本季度，長期淨流入為 200 億美元，所有資產類別均為正值，其中以股票為首。在流動性方面，我們看到淨流入 400 億美元。在持續的淨流入和較高的市場水準的推動下，管理規模達 3.2 兆美元，年增 22%，客戶資產達 4.6 兆美元，年增 21%。最後，由於投資轉向，貸款環比持平，存款下降 5%，但部分被客戶流入所抵消。

Turning to Corporate on Page 10. Corporate reported net income of $911 million. Revenue was $1.5 billion, up $1.8 billion compared to last year. NII was $2 billion, up $1.2 billion year-on-year due to the impact of higher rates. And NIR was a net loss of $506 million and included the net investment securities losses I mentioned upfront. Expenses of $456 million were up $151 million year-on-year.

轉向第 10 頁的企業。企業報告的淨利潤為 9.11 億美元。營收為 15 億美元，比去年增加 18 億美元。由於利率上升的影響，NII 為 20 億美元，年增 12 億美元。 NIR 淨虧損 5.06 億美元，其中包括我前面提到的淨投資證券虧損。費用為 4.56 億美元，年增 1.51 億美元。

To finish, we have the outlook on Page 11. We now expect 2023 NII and NII ex Markets to be approximately $88.5 billion and $89 billion, respectively, with the increase driven by slower reprice than previously assumed. Consistent with what we've been saying throughout the year, while we don't know when it will normalize, we do not consider this level of NII to be sustainable.

最後，我們對第11 頁的展望進行了展望。我們現在預計2023 年NII 和除市場外的NII 分別約為885 億美元和890 億美元，這一增長是由於重新定價速度慢於之前的假設而推動的。與我們全年所說的一致，雖然我們不知道何時會正常化，但我們認為這種 NII 水平是不可持續的。

Our outlook for 2023 adjusted expense is now approximately $84 billion. And as a reminder, this is on an adjusted basis, which excludes legal expense. Also, remember this outlook excludes the pending FDIC special assessment. On credit, we now expect the 2023 Card net charge-off rate to be approximately 2.5%, mostly driven by denominator effects due to recent balance growth.

我們對 2023 年調整後費用的展望目前約為 840 億美元。提醒一下，這是經過調整的，不包括法律費用。另外，請記住，這一前景不包括懸而未決的 FDIC 特別評估。在信貸方面，我們目前預期 2023 年信用卡淨沖銷率約為 2.5%，這主要是由於近期餘額成長帶來的分母效應所致。

So to wrap up, we're pleased with another quarter of strong operating results. Throughout the year, we've been pointing out the various sources of significant uncertainty. And all of those, including the geopolitical situation, economic outlook, rate environment, deposit reprice and the impact of the Basel III endgame proposal, are as prominent now as they have been in the recent past. But as always, we continue to prepare for a range of scenarios and are focused on being there for our clients and customers when they need us most.

總而言之，我們對又一個季度的強勁營運業績感到滿意。一年來，我們一直在指出重大不確定性的各種來源。所有這些，包括地緣政治局勢、經濟前景、利率環境、存款重新定價以及巴塞爾協議III最終提案的影響，現在和最近一樣突出。但與往常一樣，我們繼續為各種情況做好準備，並專注於在我們的客戶和消費者最需要我們的時候為他們提供幫助。

And with that, let's open the line for Q&A.

接下來，讓我們打開問答熱線。

(Operator Instructions) Our first question comes from John McDonald with Autonomous Research.

（操作員說明）我們的第一個問題來自自治研究中心的約翰·麥克唐納。

Jeremy, I was wondering if you could give us a little more color on what you're seeing so far on deposit reprice and migration. What's been better than expected so far on that front? And how do you see higher for longer rates potentially impacting deposit reprice pressure?

傑里米（Jeremy），我想知道您是否可以向我們介紹一下您迄今為止在存款重新定價和遷移方面所看到的情況。到目前為止，這方面有什麼比預期更好的情況？您如何看待長期利率上升可能會影響存款重定價壓力？

Sure. Thanks, John. I think the themes are pretty much the same as we've seen in prior quarters. So as we talked a little bit about on the press call, we've been trying to be a little bit cautious about recognizing that we don't think the current levels are sustainable, and we do think that we'll have to reprice in some pockets to some degree, maybe tiering or whatever at some point in the future. And of course, that hasn't happened yet this year. So that's one factor.

當然。謝謝，約翰。我認為主題與我們在前幾個季度看到的幾乎相同。因此，正如我們在新聞發布會上談到的那樣，我們一直在努力謹慎地認識到，我們認為當前的水平是不可持續的，而且我們確實認為我們必須重新定價一些口袋在某種程度上，也許是分層的，或在未來的某個時候。當然，今年還沒有發生這種情況。這是一個因素。

In the meantime, the CD strategy is working well. We're getting -- continue to get very good feedback from the field, and we're capturing money in motion. And so we're seeing the sort of internal migration and the associated slow increase in deposit rate paid as a result of CD migration, but that's sort of working as we would have hoped. And so everything is kind of playing out according to plan, I would say.

同時，CD策略運作良好。我們正在繼續從該領域獲得非常好的反饋，並且我們正在籌集資金。因此，我們看到了由於 CD 遷移而導致的內部遷移以及相關的存款利率緩慢上升，但這正如我們所希望的那樣發揮作用。所以我想說，一切都在按計劃進行。

In terms of higher for longer, I think it just means that there will continue to be upward pressure on deposit pricing, both from internal migration and possibly from other effects. And at the end, as we always say, we're going to price products as a function of the competitive market environment.

就長期走高而言，我認為這只是意味著存款定價將繼續面臨上行​​壓力，這既來自內部移民，也可能來自其他影響。最後，正如我們常說的，我們將根據競爭的市場環境對產品進行定價。

And just as a follow-up, it seems like you've done some securities repositioning in the last couple of quarters. How are you positioning the balance sheet in terms of cash in the securities portfolio, given your outlook for rates?

作為後續行動，您似乎在過去幾季中進行了一些證券重新定位。鑑於您對利率的展望，您如何以證券投資組合中的現金來定位資產負債表？

Yes. I think I would say that, while we're not predicting higher rates, and I'm sure Jamie will have something to say here, we believe in being prepared for it. And that's been our position for some time, and of course, that's produced good results. And we continue to try to position ourselves so neither significantly higher rates nor significant lower rates present a particularly large challenge to the company.

是的。我想我會說，雖然我們不會預測更高的利率，而且我相信傑米會在這裡說些什麼，但我們相信要為此做好準備。我們的立場已經有一段時間了，當然，這也產生了良好的結果。我們繼續努力定位自己，因此無論是顯著提高的利率還是顯著降低的利率都不會給公司帶來特別大的挑戰。

So probably at the margin, we're still a little bit biased for slightly higher rates. But do keep in mind that, when modeling the duration of the balance sheet, higher rates do extend the duration -- or rather, shorten the duration on the deposit side. So that can be a factor as well.

因此，可能在邊際上，我們仍然對略高的利率有一點偏見。但請記住，在對資產負債表的久期進行建模時，較高的利率確實會延長久期，或者更確切地說，會縮短存款方面的久期。所以這也可能是個因素。

Our next question comes from Steven Chubak with Wolfe Research.

我們的下一個問題來自 Wolfe Research 的 Steven Chubak。

Jeremy, I was hoping to just inquire about capital markets outlook. You cited improved activity levels in September. But given persistently higher rates, geopolitical tensions and just poor performance of recent IPOs, how are you thinking about the outlook over the near to medium term? And how are you thinking about just the timing of an inflection in activity?

傑里米，我只是想詢問一下資本市場的前景。您提到了 9 月份活動水準的改善。但鑑於利率持續走高、地緣政治緊張局勢以及近期 IPO 表現不佳，您如何看待中短期前景？您如何考慮活動拐點的時機？

Yes, good question. I mean, as you know, obviously, the current levels in Investment Banking remain quite depressed, certainly relative to the very elevated levels that we saw during the pandemic, but even relative to sort of 2019, which is what you might consider the last normal year.

是的，好問題。我的意思是，正如您所知，顯然，投資銀行業目前的水平仍然相當低迷，當然是相對於我們在大流行期間看到的非常高的水平而言，但甚至相對於2019 年（您可能認為這是最後一個正常情況）而言也是如此。年。

We do eventually think we'll recover to those levels and hopefully recover to above those levels, recognizing that, by the time it happens, that's many years of economic growth in the meantime. And to be fair, while the current environment is a little bit complicated and mixed and there are some headwinds, as you pointed out, things have improved a little bit. And I think I would say our banking team is a little bit more optimistic than they were last quarter.

我們確實認為最終我們會恢復到這些水平，並希望恢復到這些水平之上，因為我們認識到，到這種情況發生時，經濟已經經歷了多年的增長。公平地說，雖然目前的環境有點複雜、魚龍混雜，也存在一些阻力，但正如你所指出的，情況已經有所改善。我認為我們的銀行團隊比上個季度更樂觀。

So it feels to me like a little bit of a slow grind with some positive momentum, but obviously, significant uncertainty in the outlook and some structural headwinds, given lower levels of announced M&A and some regulatory headwinds on that side.

因此，在我看來，這有點緩慢，但有一些積極的勢頭，但顯然，鑑於已宣布的併購水平較低以及這方面的一些監管阻力，前景存在很大的不確定性，並且存在一些結構性阻力。

And just for my follow-up on some of the regulatory commentary you provided. Certainly, a lot of helpful color on the slides, so thank you for that. If the proposal were to go through as written, what proportion of the inflation do you believe can be mitigated over time?

我只是對您提供的一些監管評論進行跟進。當然，幻燈片上有很多有用的顏色，所以謝謝你。如果該提案按照書面規定獲得通過，您認為隨著時間的推移可以減輕多少比例的通貨膨脹？

And I was also hoping you could provide some context as to the quantum of how you think CECL inclusion could potentially impact the SCB and CCAR.

我還希望您能提供一些背景信息，說明您認為納入 CECL 可能對 SCB 和 CCAR 產生多大的潛在影響。

Yes. Those are all good questions, Steve. I think it's probably too early to try to provide that level of quantification on either front. If I start first with the Basel III endgame proposal, from our perspective, we're currently focused on advocating as aggressively as possible for the necessary changes, some of which are what you might call philosophical in nature or some of the things I highlighted in my prepared remarks. But some of them are sort of very technical in nature, including things that we think might actually be mistakes on the proposal.

是的。這些都是好問題，史蒂夫。我認為現在嘗試在任一方面提供這種程度的量化可能還為時過早。如果我先從巴塞爾協議 III 的最終提案開始，從我們的角度來看，我們目前專注於盡可能積極地倡導必要的變革，其中一些本質上是哲學性的，或者是我在我準備好的發言。但其中一些本質上是非常技術性的，包括我們認為提案中實際上可能存在錯誤的內容。

And so talking a lot about optimizing away stuff that might change just feels like a bit premature at this point. I would point out that given how significant operational risk RWA is as part of the proposal, that is -- you can think of that sort of as a generic tax across the entire spectrum. And it's therefore, in some sense, non-optimizable. So we feel that it's important to manage expectations about the level of optimization that's possible once the rule is finalized and hopefully some of these technical items are addressed.

因此，現在談論很多關於優化可能改變的東西感覺有點為時過早。我想指出的是，鑑於 RWA 作為提案的一部分有多麼重大的營運風險，也就是說，您可以將其視為整個範圍內的通用稅。因此，從某種意義上說，它是不可優化的。因此，我們認為，一旦規則最終確定，管理對可能的最佳化程度的期望非常重要，並希望其中一些技術項目得到解決。

Also, it depends on your definition of optimization. There's what I -- sometimes I use the term costless optimization, where it's just technical fixes that don't affect revenue and don't require you to exit businesses. I think that type of optimization will be harder to find than it has been in the past.

此外，這取決於您對最佳化的定義。這就是我有時使用“無成本優化”這個術語，它只是不影響收入並且不需要您退出業務的技術修復。我認為這種類型的優化將比過去更難找到。

But as we pointed out, we may simply need to exit things. And that will be because it is better than the alternative, which would be to do activity that's shareholder value destructive, but it won't be costless.

但正如我們所指出的，我們可能只是需要退出。這是因為它比另一種選擇更好，另一種選擇是進行破壞股東價值的活動，但它不會是沒有成本的。

A good example of that is the renewable energy tax credit investment business, which as a result of the quadrupling of the risk weight, may no longer make sense. Now that's one that we hope will be changed but is tricky because those are very long-duration assets. So between now and the rule is finalized, it raises some questions about whether we want to put that stuff on the balance sheet.

一個很好的例子是再生能源稅收抵免投資業務，由於風險權重翻兩番，可能不再有意義。現在，我們希望改變這一點，但很棘手，因為這些是非常長期的資產。因此，從現在到規則最終確定，這引發了一些問題，即我們是否要將這些內容納入資產負債表。

So sorry, a bit of a long answer. But then, yes, on quantifying CECL and CCAR, I think we've got to wait for that one because given the relative lack of transparency that we have into the Fed's exact modeling in terms of which quarter is the peak and so on and so forth, it's a little bit hard to predict what the exact impact of putting CECL and CCAR is going to be. We just know probabilistically that it will, like everything else these days, tend to push capital higher.

很抱歉，答案有點長。但是，是的，在量化 CECL 和 CCAR 方面，我認為我們必須等待這一點，因為鑑於我們對美聯儲在哪個季度是峰值等方面的精確模型相對缺乏透明度，等等第四，很難預測放置CECL 和CCAR 的確切影響。我們只是從機率上知道，就像當今的其他一切一樣，它往往會推高資本。

Our next question comes from Ebrahim Poonawala with Bank of America.

我們的下一個問題來自美國銀行的 Ebrahim Poonawala。

Just first question, Jeremy, on credit. I think you mentioned some of the reserve release was tied to the change in the central scenario. Could you just talk to us, remind us what the central scenario is today? What changed?

傑瑞米，我只是第一個問題，賒帳。我想你提到了一些儲備金的釋放與中心場景的變化有關。您能和我們談談，提醒我們今天的中心情況是什麼嗎？發生了什麼變化？

And then in terms of fundamentally on credit, like where are you seeing softness, either on the consumer or the commercial side?

然後就信貸的基本面而言，您在哪裡看到了疲軟，無論是在消費者方面還是在商業方面？

Yes. So on the central scenario, you should read the research that gets put out by our competitors and our excellent research team. No, but in all seriousness, I think our U.S. economists had their central case outlook to include a very mild recession with, I think, 2 quarters of negative 0.5% of GDP growth in the fourth quarter and first quarter of this year. And that then got revised out early this quarter to now have sort of modest growth, I think around 1% for a few quarters into 2024.

是的。因此，在中心場景中，您應該閱讀我們的競爭對手和我們優秀的研究團隊所發表的研究。不，但嚴肅地說，我認為我們的美國經濟學家的中心案例前景包括非常溫和的衰退，我認為今年第四季和第一季的 GDP 成長率將有兩個季度負 0.5%。然後在本季度初進行了修正，現在出現了適度的增長，我認為到 2024 年的幾個季度將增長 1% 左右。

So just flowing that through our process while acknowledging that we're still skewed to the downside, we're still reserved to a significantly higher unemployment rate on a weighted average basis than is in the central case outlook. So that number, which we've sometimes given you, is 5.5% this quarter. So it's really not much more complicated than that. We're just kind of following the process.

因此，只要將其貫穿我們的流程，同時承認我們仍然傾向於下行，我們仍然保留加權平均失業率顯著高於中心案例前景的預期。因此，我們有時會向您提供的數字是本季的 5.5%。所以它實際上並沒有比這更複雜。我們只是遵循這個流程。

And I think your other question was, where am I seeing softness in credit? And I think the answer to that is actually nowhere, roughly, or certainly nowhere that's not expected. Meaning we continue to see the normalization story play out in consumer more or less exactly as expected. And then, of course, we are seeing a trickle of charge-offs coming through the office space. You see that in the charge-off number of the Commercial Bank. But the numbers are very small and more or less just the realization of the allowance that we've already built there.

我認為你的另一個問題是，我在哪裡看到信貸疲軟？我認為這個問題的答案實際上無處不在，大致上，或者肯定沒有任何地方不是預期的。這意味著我們繼續看到消費者的正常化故事或多或少與預期完全一致。當然，我們也看到辦公室裡出現了少量的沖銷行為。您可以在商業銀行的沖銷號碼中看到這一點。但這個數字非常小，或多或少只是我們已經在那裡建立的津貼的實現。

That's helpful. And just going back to the details you laid out on Basel endgame. Maybe on the philosophical side, I think Jamie was speaking last month, said doesn't -- we don't expect any changes. But at the same time, you make everything that makes sense in terms of the pushback.

這很有幫助。回到你在巴塞爾殘局中闡述的細節。也許在哲學方面，我認為傑米上個月說過，沒有——我們預計不會有任何變化。但同時，你會做出一切在抵制方面有意義的事情。

Is it all falling on deaf ears from a shareholder perspective? Are we resigned to the fact that we are going to see it more towards the worst case outcome play out? Or is there some level of sort of meeting in the middle of the road as this thing gets finalized?

從股東的角度來看，這一切都充耳不聞嗎？我們是否會接受這樣一個事實：我們將看到最糟糕的結果發生？或者在這件事最終確定時是否會召開某種程度的會議？

Yes. So I'll let Jamie speak for himself on that point. But our job is to advocate. We're not going to guess what the sentiment is in Washington. It's a 1,000-page rule proposal, as you know. We've got a big team of very smart people studying it very closely.

是的。所以我會讓傑米自己就這一點發言。但我們的工作是倡議。我們不會猜測華盛頓的情緒如何。如您所知，這是一個 1,000 頁的規則提案。我們有一個由非常聰明的人組成的大團隊正在仔細研究它。

Interestingly, we noted recently that in some of the analysis that they did about the impact on lending, they sort of forgot about like $1 billion of -- the Fed, in their preamble, they forgot about $1 billion of operational risk RWA. So it just highlights that there is a possibility -- or seem to have forgotten. They simply omitted the impact of the operational risk RWA on fees.

有趣的是，我們最近注意到，在他們對貸款影響進行的一些分析中，他們忘記了大約 10 億美元——美聯儲在序言中忘記了大約 10 億美元的操作風險 RWA。所以它只是強調存在一種可能性——或者似乎已經忘記了。他們只是忽略了操作風險 RWA 對費用的影響。

So anyway, the point is it's long, it's complicated, it's technical. We do think there are probably some technical mistakes and there, and we're going to forcefully advocate on all of those. And while we disagree with a lot of this stuff, these are technical issues that should be, in some sense, resolved technically. And hopefully, they'll listen.

所以無論如何，重點是它很長，很複雜，而且很技術性。我們確實認為可能存在一些技術錯誤，我們將大力倡導所有這些錯誤。雖然我們不同意很多這樣的事情，但從某種意義上來說，這些都是技術問題，應該透過科技來解決。希望他們會傾聽。

Sorry, I'm just getting a correction from the room. I meant to say $1 trillion...

抱歉，我剛剛收到會議室的更正。我的意思是說 1 兆美元...

Yes. No, I got that. I got the $1 trillion, yes.

是的。不，我明白了。我得到了 1 兆美元，是的。

[That was what we were talking about actually.]

[這就是我們實際上正在談論的。]

[BPI put something out on it.]

[BPI 發布了一些內容。]

BPI did, yes.

BPI 做到了，是的。

Our next question comes from Ryan Kenny with Morgan Stanley.

我們的下一個問題來自摩根士丹利的瑞安·肯尼。

I want to dig in on the NII side. So you raised the 2023 NII ex Markets guidance by $2 billion for this year. So I know your comments in the press release suggests JPMorgan's over-earning, so I just want to triangulate there. What does normalized NII look like? And do we get to normalize next year or earlier on?

我想深入研究 NII 方面。因此，您將今年 2023 年 NII 除市場指引上調了 20 億美元。所以我知道你在新聞稿中的評論表明摩根大通的盈利過高，所以我只想對此進行三角測量。標準化 NII 是什麼樣的？我們能在明年或更早的時候實現正常化嗎？

Yes, a couple of things. So let me do the timing question first. So we're being very clear that we are not predicting when. When is going to be a function of the marketplace and the rate environment and competitive dynamics and so on and so forth. So we're just really just trying to remind everyone to not bank on the current run rate, which we just don't fundamentally think are sustainable.

是的，有幾件事。那麼就讓我先做一下時間問題。因此，我們非常清楚，我們不會預測具體時間。什麼時候會是市場、費率環境和競爭動態等的函數。因此，我們只是想提醒大家不要依賴目前的運行速度，我們從根本上認為這是不可持續的。

You'll be aware that before Investor Day last -- earlier this year, we tried to quantify what we thought that kind of normalized range might look like, and we put a sort of mid-70s type number out there. And at Investor Day, we talked about how the acquisition of First Republic was going to push that number up a little bit, although there were some overlaps and so on and so forth.

你會知道，在今年早些時候的投資者日之前，我們試圖量化我們認為的正常化範圍可能會是什麼樣子，並且我們放了一個 70 年代中期的數字。在投資者日，我們討論了收購第一共和將如何將這一數字推高一點，儘管存在一些重疊等等。

So anyway, with the benefit of time and having everything settled in a little bit, if you sort of push us for that kind of what does that number now look like, we think it's probably closer to about $80 billion with all the obvious caveats that this is a guess and we don't know when. But we're just trying to point out that it's quite a bit lower than the current run rate.

所以無論如何，隨著時間的推移，一切都得到了一點解決，如果你推動我們了解這個數字現在的樣子，我們認為它可能接近 800 億美元，並考慮到所有明顯的警告這是一個猜測，我們不知道什麼時候。但我們只是想指出它比目前的運行率低很多。

Inside the company, some people think it will happen sooner, i.e., me. Some people think it will happen later, i.e., Jenn and Marianne and Jeremy.

在公司內部，有些人認為這會發生得更快，像我。有些人認為這會在以後發生，即 Jenn、Marianne 和 Jeremy。

I wasn't aware I was in that camp, actually. But I don't know. I don't know everyone's opinion over here.

事實上，我並不知道我在那個營地。但我不知道。不知道這裡大家的看法。

And then on the loan growth side, industry loan growth has slowed significantly this year. What demand are you seeing for loan growth across the different categories? And I know it might be too early to talk about next year, but directionally, how should we think about loan growth, given where we are in the cycle and the higher capital requirements coming?

然後在貸款增速方面，今年以來工業貸款成長率明顯放緩。您認為不同類別的貸款成長有何需求？我知道現在談論明年可能還為時過早，但從方向上來說，考慮到我們所處的周期和更高的資本要求，我們應該如何考慮貸款成長？

Yes, sure. So on loan growth, the story is pretty consistent with what we've been saying all year. So we were seeing very robust loan growth in Card, and that's coming from both spending growth and the normalization of revolving balances. As we look forward, we're still optimistic about that, but it will probably be a little bit more muted than it has been during this normalization period.

是的，當然。因此，就貸款成長而言，這個故事與我們全年所說的非常一致。因此，我們看到信用卡貸款成長非常強勁，這來自支出成長和循環餘額正常化。展望未來，我們仍然對此感到樂觀，但它可能會比正常化期間更平靜。

In Auto, we've also seen pretty robust loan growth recently, both as a function sort of slightly more competitive pricing on our side as the industry was a little bit slow to raise rates. And so we lost some share previously, and that's come back now. And generally, the supply chain situation is better, so that's been supported. As we look forward there, it should be a little bit more muted.

在汽車領域，我們最近也看到了相當強勁的貸款成長，這既是我們這邊定價稍微更具競爭力的一個原因，因為該行業升息的速度有點慢。所以我們之前失去了一些份額，現在又回來了。總體而言，供應鏈狀況較好，因此得到了支持。當我們期待那裡時，它應該更加安靜一些。

And I think generally in Wholesale, the loan growth story is going to be driven just by the economic environment. So depending on what you believe about soft landing, mild recession, no lending, we have slightly lower or slightly higher loan growth. But in any case, I would expect it to be relatively muted.

我認為一般來說，在批發業，貸款成長將僅由經濟環境驅動。因此，取決於您對軟著陸、溫和衰退、無貸款的看法，我們的貸款成長會略低或略高。但無論如何，我預期它會相對平靜。

And of course, Home Lending remains fairly constrained both by rates and market conditions. But also, and I think this is true across the board, we will be managing things actively, as mentioned in light of Basel III, which may not change originations, but it will change what we retain.

當然，房屋貸款仍然受到利率和市場條件的相當程度的限制。而且，我認為這在整體上都是正確的，我們將積極管理事物，正如巴塞爾協議 III 中提到的那樣，這可能不會改變起源，但會改變我們保留的內容。

Our next question comes from Gerard Cassidy with RBC.

我們的下一個問題來自加拿大皇家銀行的傑拉德·卡西迪。

Jeremy, you guys have put up a really strong ROTCE number of 22% for the quarter. When you dive into your different segments, what really jumps out at us is the 40% ex First Republic ROE in Consumer & Community Banking. I know you and Jamie have talked about your over-earning on credit, we get that.

Jeremy，你們這個季度的 ROTCE 數字非常強勁，達到了 22%。當您深入研究不同的細分市場時，真正讓我們印象深刻的是消費者和社區銀行業務 40% 的前第一共和國 ROE。我知道你和傑米談論過你的信用超額收入，我們明白了。

But in view of all of these fintechs and all these other nonbank competitors that were all supposed to pick away at everybody's market share, you guys have put up great numbers here. What's the drivers behind an ROE, even when you take that credit over-earning out, what's driving this business profitability at such a high level?

但考慮到所有這些金融科技公司和所有其他非銀行競爭對手都應該奪走每個人的市場份額，你們在這裡提出了很大的數字。股本回報率背後的驅動因素是什麼？即使您將超額收益剔除，是什麼推動該企業的盈利能力達到如此高的水平？

Yes, Gerard, I'd say a couple of things there. So first, it's not just credit, it's also deposit margin, right? So when we talk about overearning on NII, a disproportionate amount of that is coming out of the consumer franchise for all the reasons that we've talked about.

是的，傑拉德，我想說幾句話。首先，這不僅僅是信貸，還有存款保證金，對吧？因此，當我們談論 NII 的超額收益時，由於我們已經討論過的所有原因，其中很大一部分來自消費者特許經營權。

But I would also point out, sometimes, we don't like the word over-earning because right now, customers are happy and they're doing CDs. And the broader answer to your question about why we're able to compete effectively really comes back to a decade, 2-decade long history of investing for the future and recognizing that there's a holistic value proposition here that includes branches and the app and all the online services and the entire suite of products and services that is around this enterprise, which drives engagement and customer loyalty. And we're seeing some of the benefits of that now, although we're not complacent.

但我也想指出，有時，我們不喜歡超額獲利這個詞，因為現在顧客很高興，他們正在製作 CD。對於您關於為什麼我們能夠有效競爭的問題，更廣泛的答案實際上可以追溯到十年、二十年的未來投資歷史，並認識到這裡存在一個整體價值主張，包括分支機構和應用程序以及所有圍繞該企業的線上服務以及整套產品和服務，可提高參與度和客戶忠誠度。儘管我們並不自滿，但我們現在已經看到了其中的一些好處。

The competition is still there, the fintechs are still there, and we know we need to continue investing to preserve the value. And it's also true that the particular circumstances of the current rate and credit environment means that the earnings are a little bit above normal, but that core franchise is extremely robust.

競爭仍然存在，金融科技仍然存在，我們知道我們需要繼續投資以保持價值。確實，當前利率和信貸環境的特殊情況意味著收益略高於正常水平，但核心特許經營權非常強勁。

Very good. And then as a follow-up, which ties into your answer on the deposit margin and consumer and your earlier comments, you and Jamie, about the internal debate inside JPMorgan about the migration of rates going higher on the funding side.

非常好。然後作為後續行動，這與您對存款保證金和消費者的回答以及您和傑米之前關於摩根大通內部關於融資方面利率上升的內部辯論的評論有關。

Your noninterest-bearing deposits, I think, are around 28% of total deposits, which is slightly above the 26% you guys had back in 2018 or '19, or pre-pandemic. Is this expectation that you're going to see more of the noninterest-bearing deposits going to interest-bearing? Or is it just the repricing of interest-bearing deposits that have some of your folks inside JPMorgan a little more cautious on that net interest income number?

我認為，你們的無利息存款約佔總存款的 28%，略高於你們在 2018 年或 19 年或大流行前的 26%。您是否期望看到更多的無利息存款轉為有息存款？或者只是生息存款的重新定價讓摩根大通內部的一些人對淨利息收入數字更加謹慎？

Yes, it's a good question, Gerard. I think it's a little bit bigger picture than that. And I'm not sure -- I get your question. It's a good question, but I'm not sure that the reported interest-bearing, noninterest-bearing split is the best one to look at this through for a couple of reasons.

是的，這是個好問題，傑拉德。我認為情況比這要大一些。我不確定——我明白你的問題。這是一個很好的問題，但出於以下幾個原因，我不確定所報告的計息和無息分割是否是最好的解決方案。

So first, like between wholesale and retail, we've got some amount of noninterest-bearing in wholesale that's part of the ECR product, and so you see some dynamics there that play out. And in consumer, in a world where savings is paying a relatively low rate paid, across checking and savings, the migration dynamics are probably not that different right now. But then, of course, even within consumer, across both consumers and small businesses, you've got slightly different dynamics in terms of how people manage their operating balances.

首先，就像批發和零售之間一樣，我們在批發領域有一定數量的無息，這是 ECR 產品的一部分，所以你會看到一些動態正在發揮作用。在消費者方面，在儲蓄支付相對較低的利率的世界裡，無論是支票還是儲蓄，目前的遷移動態可能並沒有那麼不同。但是，當然，即使在消費者內部，無論是消費者還是小型企業，人們在管理營運平衡方面的動態也略有不同。

So I would tend to zoom out a little bit and see this as a holistic answer that's driven by internal migration from checking and savings to CDs, from ECR to interest-bearing and wholesale. And then our potential response to the rate environment, the competitive environment, the overall level of system-wide deposits in terms of product-level reprice that may or may not happen at moments in the future.

因此，我傾向於縮小一點範圍，將其視為一個整體答案，這是由從支票和儲蓄到 CD、從 ECR 到計息和批發的內部遷移所驅動的。然後，我們對利率環境、競爭環境、全系統存款的整體水準（在產品層面的重新定價方面）的潛在反應，這些反應在未來可能會發生，也可能不會發生。

Our next question comes from Erika Najarian with UBS.

我們的下一個問題來自瑞銀集團的艾莉卡·納賈里安。

Jeremy, my first question is for you. Again, sort of maybe reasking the question a different way. Your new guide for net interest income for this year would imply an exit run rate of $22.9 billion in the fourth quarter.

傑里米，我的第一個問題是問你的。再一次，也許可以用不同的方式重新提出這個問題。今年新的淨利息收入指南將意味著第四季的退出運行率為 229 億美元。

As we think about the dynamics in higher for longer, on one hand, your fixed rate assets will continue to reprice. On the other, you've been asked a lot about the deposit dynamics that could continue to creep higher. How do we think about those puts and takes as we think about that relative to that exit rate of $22.9 billion in the fourth quarter?

當我們考慮更長期的動態時，一方面，您的固定利率資產將繼續重新定價。另一方面，人們向您詢問了很多有關可能繼續攀升的存款動態的問題。當我們考慮第四季 229 億美元的退出率時，我們如何看待這些看跌期權和看跌期權？

Yes. So Erika, I think the simple answer to your question is those -- I believe that fourth quarter exit number equates to a $90 billion run rate, ex Markets. And we're kind of saying that...

是的。艾莉卡，我認為你的問題的簡單答案是——我相信第四季度的退出數量相當於 900 億美元的運行率（扣除市場）。我們是說…

$22.5 billion.

225億美元。

Yes, that's not what I meant to say.

是的，我不是這個意思。

She said $22 billion...

她說220億美元...

I didn't hear that. Okay. Anyway, [model it that way]. Anyway, so call it $90 billion run rate on an exit rate basis, and we're saying that we think something a bit more normal is closer to $80 billion. So that's one building block.

我沒聽到。好的。無論如何，[以這種方式建模]。無論如何，以退出率為基礎，將其稱為 900 億美元的運行率，我們認為更正常的情況是接近 800 億美元。這就是一個組成部分。

Underneath that, I think one thing that's interesting, actually, is that as the percentage of the deposits which our CDs increases, the sort of balance between internal migration and betas and rate and volume, it's a little bit less binary and a little bit smoother. So when we look at this type of stuff and we model migration, balances, product-level reprice, as you get out of that lower-0 bound with 0% CD mix world, things get a little bit smoother, I would say, overall.

在此之下，我認為實際上有趣的一件事是，隨著我們的CD 存款的百分比增加，內部遷移和貝塔以及利率和數量之間的平衡，它的二元性減少了一點，並且更加平滑了一點。因此，當我們研究此類內容並對遷移、平衡、產品級重新定價進行建模時，當您擺脫 0% CD 混合世界的 0 下限時，我想說，總體而言，事情會變得更加順利。

So it will be interesting to watch that, but it's obviously one of the most important things for us as a company right now. And we do everything we can to manage it, but it's also worth remembering that the big picture point is just the client franchise. And we've often said, we're very focused on primary bank relationships, and we didn't lose any of those in the last cycle, we're not planning to lose any in this cycle, and that's what sort of the long-term focus means for us.

因此，觀看這一點將會很有趣，但這顯然是我們作為一家公司目前最重要的事情之一。我們盡一切努力來管理它，但同樣值得記住的是，大局點只是客戶特許經營權。我們經常說，我們非常關注主要銀行關係，在上一個週期我們沒有失去任何這些關係，我們也不打算在這個週期中失去任何關係，這就是長期的關係。- 術語“焦點”對我們來說意味著。

And I would just say quantitative tightening in there. That will be a large number, and we don't exactly know the effect, where wholesale, consumer as -- remember also, the Fed has the RRP program which is also sucking money into the Fed directly, reducing deposits. That's still [$1.2 trillion.]

我只想說量化緊縮。這將是一個很大的數字，我們並不確切知道其影響，批發、消費者——還要記住，聯準會有 RRP 計劃，該計劃也直接向聯準會吸收資金，減少存款。這仍然是 [1.2 兆美元。 ]

And my second question is on maybe zooming out on the Basel III endgame impacts. It's clearly complex, overly complex. And I completely agree with you that it is unnecessary at this point and very backward-looking.

我的第二個問題是可能會縮小巴塞爾協議 III 的最終影響。這顯然很複雜，過於複雜。我完全同意你的觀點，在這一點上這是不必要的，而且非常向後看。

I guess what is not complex is the fact that you generated 75 basis points of CET1 this quarter while your RWAs are down. And I guess my question here is, is that I understand that we're in the public advocacy process. I hear you loud and clear in terms of how this could have harm in terms of pricing for Main Street and dislocating the pipes in American capital markets.

我想並不複雜的是，本季您的 CET1 成長了 75 個基點，而您的 RWA 卻下降了。我想我的問題是，我知道我們正處於公共倡議過程中。我清楚地聽到你們的聲音，這可能會對主街的定價造成損害，並擾亂美國資本市場的管道。

But for JPMorgan, this change your natural return profile of 17%. Jamie, I know you lingered a little bit on 14% when you were at Barclays in September. But at the end of the day, it feels like for your -- for the portfolio managers that own JPMorgan through the cycle, does Basel III endgame really harm your natural earnings power and returns?

但對於摩根大通來說，這會改變 17% 的自然回報率。 Jamie，我知道你九月在巴克萊銀行時在 14% 上徘徊了一會兒。但歸根結底，對於在整個週期中擁有摩根大通的投資組合經理來說，巴塞爾協議 III 的結局真的會損害你的自然盈利能力和回報嗎？

Yes. Okay. That's a good question, Erika. I think there's a couple of pieces in there. So let me take the most important piece first, which is the 17% through the cycle target. Are we keeping that or not in light of the Basel III endgame proposal?

是的。好的。這是個好問題，艾莉卡。我認為裡面有幾塊。因此，讓我先談談最重要的部分，也就是 17% 的周期目標。根據巴塞爾協議 III 的最終提案，我們是否保留這一點？

So short answer is we're not going to change that number today. But when you look at what we've disclosed about a 25% increase in capital, it's not -- you have to start by acknowledging that, that is a major headwind to returns. In simple terms, you talk about earnings power and returns, but they're 2 different things, right? We have to be a little bit pedantic and do numerator-denominator here.

簡而言之，我們今天不會改變這個數字。但當你看看我們揭露的關於資本增加 25% 的消息時，你必須先承認這一點，這並不是回報的主要阻力。簡單來說，你談論的是獲利能力和回報，但它們是兩個不同的東西，對嗎？我們必須有點迂腐，在這裡當分子分母。

Okay. So say the numerator doesn't change, if you just dilute down the numerator by the increased capital, that's a significantly lower return number. I would say that, that's probably the lower bound in terms of the impact of the Basel III endgame for a couple of reasons.

好的。因此，假設分子沒有改變，如果你只是透過增加的資本來稀釋分子，那麼回報率就會顯著降低。我想說，這可能是巴塞爾協議 III 殘局影響的下限，原因有幾個。

One is we are hoping for changes. Two is, once the rule is final, we will seek to reprice in the places where we can. And that will be different in consumer and in wholesale. Some of it will be product level, some of it will be relationship level. But that hopefully can mitigate some of it.

一是我們希望有所改變。二是，一旦規則最終確定，我們將尋求在可以的地方重新定價。這對於消費者和批發來說是不同的。有些是產品層面的，有些是關係層面的。但這有望減輕一些影響。

But of course, the flip side of that is that's cost getting passed into the real economy, and that's part of the point that we've made about lowering availability of products and services and lending. There may be some opportunities for costless optimization. I'm personally a little bit more pessimistic about those, but we surprised ourselves on those points in the past. So we'll see.

但當然，另一方面是成本轉移到實體經濟中，這也是我們關於降低產品和服務以及貸款的可用性的部分觀點。可能會有一些無成本優化的機會。我個人對這些有點悲觀，但我們過去對這些觀點感到驚訝。所以我們拭目以待。

And then finally, yes, we may stop doing certain things and we may exit things. But I wouldn't necessarily assume that, that's going to do a lot to preserve returns at the 17%. That's going to be about exiting things that are shareholder-destructive but not necessarily producing much higher returns, if you know what I mean. So that's that.

最後，是的，我們可能會停止做某些事情，我們可能會退出一些事情。但我不一定認為這會對保持 17% 的回報率起到很大作用。如果你明白我的意思的話，這將是關於退出那些對股東有破壞性的事情，但不一定會產生更高的回報。就是這樣。

And then the other part of your question implicitly was talking about organic capital generation. And I think it's just very important to separate impacts on the economy and impacts on long-term returns from our ability to meet the requirements. Of course, as Jamie always says, JPMorgan is going to be fine. And we're building a lot of capital and we were managing capital conservatively, and we'll be able to build the necessary capital in order to achieve on time or early compliance, which is always what we strive to do. But that doesn't really have any particular bearing on the question of what the long-term return target is, or the impacts on the real economy.

然後你問題的另一部分隱含地談論了有機資本的產生。我認為將對經濟的影響和對長期回報的影響與我們滿足要求的能力分開是非常重要的。當然，正如傑米常說的那樣，摩根大通不會有事的。我們正在累積大量資本，我們對資本進行保守管理，我們將能夠累積必要的資本，以便按時或儘早實現合規，這始終是我們努力做的事情。但這實際上與長期回報目標是什麼或對實體經濟的影響的問題沒有任何特別的關係。

Our next question comes from Glenn Schorr with Evercore ISI.

我們的下一個問題來自 Evercore ISI 的 Glenn Schorr。

So I very much appreciate the comments in the release on the big picture things of what's going on in the world and the potential impact on markets, on crude market, global trade, everything that you mentioned. And sadly agree about the most dangerous time in decades.

因此，我非常感謝新聞稿中對世界正在發生的大局以及對市場、原油市場、全球貿易以及您提到的一切的潛在影響的評論。可悲的是，我們一致認為這是幾十年來最危險的時期。

The question I have is, does it surprise you that markets are hanging in, that you yourself have a green shoots are still green shoots type of mindset about banking while that's going on? And then maybe more importantly, if you believe what -- obviously, what you wrote, what are you doing about it? How do you manage yourself conservatively? How do you prepare for tougher times?

我的問題是，市場的停滯不前，您自己對銀行業抱持著一種萌芽仍是萌芽的心態，這是否令您感到驚訝？然後也許更重要的是，如果你相信什麼——顯然，你寫了什麼，你會做什麼？你如何保守地管理自己？您如何為困難時期做好準備？

Yes. Go ahead, Jeremy. Do you want to start?

是的。繼續吧，傑瑞米。你想開始？

Okay. So I mean, on green shoots, you'll just note that our comments are cautious. I mean, there is momentum. I do think we are a little bit more optimistic than we were. But obviously, markets have been bumpy, both equity markets and rate markets have been very whippy recently. So we don't want to get too carried away with optimism here.

好的。所以我的意思是，關於新芽，你會注意到我們的評論是謹慎的。我的意思是，有動力。我確實認為我們比以前更樂觀了。但顯然，市場一直很坎坷，最近股市和利率市場都非常波動。因此，我們不想在這裡過於樂觀。

We are coming off a very low base, and so there's a hope and an expectation that we are on the path to normalization and improvement. And of course, the overall economic picture, at least currently, looks solid. The sort of immaculate disinflation trade is actually happening. So those are all reasons to be a little bit optimistic in the near term, but it's tempered with quite a bit of caution.

我們的基礎非常低，因此人們對我們走上正常化和改進的道路抱有希望和期望。當然，至少目前來看，整體經濟情勢看起來很穩健。這種完美的通貨緊縮貿易實際上正在發生。因此，這些都是短期內保持樂觀的理由，但也需要相當謹慎。

I would add caution. There has been an extraordinary amount of fiscal monetary stimulus still in the system. And you can't look at -- and of course, it can drive markets and sentiment and sales and profits and all that, but it can't stay like this forever.

我要補充一點謹慎。系統中仍存在大量的財政貨幣刺激措施。你不能看到——當然，它可以推動市場、情緒、銷售和利潤等等，但它不可能永遠保持這樣。

Between Q2, which you've never had -- and how much the fiscal stimulus can continue at this rate, before you have kind of the clearing out kind of factor. So I just -- I think you have to be very cautious.

在你從未經歷過的第二季度之間，以及在你擁有某種清理因素之前，財政刺激可以以這種速度持續多少。所以我只是——我認為你必須非常謹慎。

And of course, the geopolitics, I think, is just an extraordinary issue we have to deal with. How do you prepare the company for that? We do 100 stress tests a week. And we do multiple views of it, including geopolitical problems or interest rate problems. But usually, geopolitics presents itself as usually as a deep recession or a mild recession, a recession in part of the world or markets going down a lot.

當然，我認為地緣政治只是我們必須處理的一個非同尋常的問題。您如何讓公司為此做好準備？我們每週進行 100 次壓力測試。我們對此有多種看法，包括地緣政治問題或利率問題。但通常情況下，地緣政治通常表現為深度衰退或輕度衰退、世界部分地區的衰退或市場大幅下跌。

And because markets do well is not a reason ever to say they're going to continue to do well. If you don't believe me, remember 1987, 1990, 1994, the year 2000, the year 2009. And people don't predict those inflection points. I just -- but my caution is that we are facing so many uncertainties out there. You just got to be very cautious with your pacing.

市場表現良好並不能成為說其會繼續表現良好的理由。如果你不相信我，請記得 1987 年、1990 年、1994 年、2000 年、2009 年。人們不會預測這些拐點。我只是——但我要謹慎的是，我們面臨著如此多的不確定性。你只需要非常小心你的節奏。

And like I said, the other thing about the green shoots, regardless of that, we try to run the company so that we serve the clients day in and day out. Better products and better services, securely, safely and all of those things. And that's the ultimate goal.

就像我說的，關於萌芽的另一件事，無論如何，我們都會努力經營公司，以便日復一日地為客戶服務。更好的產品和更好的服務，安全可靠等等。這就是最終目標。

We know there are going to be bad times. That's not a surprise that there could be bad times. We don't always know how they're coming and where they're coming from, but we can keep on serving clients, do a good job for clients, you can build a good business kind of separate from what it does to your returns. That's a slightly different issue at this point, but we'll deal with that, too. We're going to figure out what to do.

我們知道會有一段糟糕的時光。出現困難時期並不奇怪。我們並不總是知道他們是如何來的以及他們來自哪裡，但我們可以繼續為客戶服務，為客戶做好工作，你可以建立一個良好的業務，與它對你的回報的影響分開。目前這是一個稍微不同的問題，但我們也會處理這個問題。我們要弄清楚該怎麼做。

Our next question comes from Mike Mayo with Wells Fargo Securities.

我們的下一個問題來自富國銀行證券公司的麥克梅奧。

I understand the NII strategy benefited from First Republic, asset sensitivity, CD strategy, money in motion. And I'm curious to how much is the NII increase? And the deposit benefit function of the 67 million digital banking customers. Do you have more digital banking customers and branch customers now? If you can just refresh that?

我理解NII策略受益於First Republic、資產敏感度、CD策略、流動資金。我很好奇NII增加了多少？以及6700萬數位銀行客戶的存款福利功能。你們現在有更多的數位銀行客戶和分行客戶嗎？如果你能刷新一下嗎？

And then a more general question, I guess, the first's one for Jeremy, and the second one for Jamie. You have record tech spend. What's the benefit of having record tech spend? If you can kind of mark to market your thoughts there as it relates to AI, as it relates to maybe wasted spending, your outlook for next year? And does it really help to be the biggest tech spender in the banking industry?

然後是一個更普遍的問題，我想，第一個是傑瑞米的問題，第二個是傑米的問題。您的科技支出創歷史新高。創紀錄的技術支出有什麼好處？如果你能在那裡標記你的想法，因為它與人工智慧有關，因為它與可能浪費的支出有關，你對明年的展望是什麼？成為銀行業最大的科技支出者真的有幫助嗎？

Yes. Let me do digital banking, Mike. I spent some time on this actually a couple of weeks ago. And it's interesting to note this sort of extent to which the growth in digitally engaged consumers is higher than the overall growth in consumer accounts, meaning that we're continuing to increase the percentage of our consumers that are digitally engaged. And it sort of goes back to my prior point about...

是的。讓我來做數位銀行業務吧，麥克。實際上幾週前我花了一些時間在這上面。有趣的是，參與數位化的消費者的成長高於消費者帳戶的整體成長，這意味著我們正在繼續增加參與數位化的消費者的百分比。這有點回到我之前的觀點…

But the percent who are digital-only is much lower than that, right?

但只使用數位技術的人的比例遠低於這個數字，對吧？

For sure, for sure. Which actually links to the broader point that what -- in terms of your question about how much is this helping the current NII story, it goes to the larger point of it holistic, through the cycle, multichannel, fully engaged customer strategy, which requires a lot of investment in branches, obviously, but also in digital services of all sorts.

肯定的，肯定的。這實際上與更廣泛的一點相關——就你的問題而言，這對當前的NII 故事有多大幫助，它涉及到整體的更大點，通過週期、多渠道、充分參與的客戶策略，這需要顯然，對分支機構的大量投資，以及對各種數位服務的投資。

So in many ways, you can see the current environment as a little bit of a payoff of that investment, but that's not like, therefore, we stop investing, obviously. So I guess that's part of the answer.

因此，在很多方面，你可以將當前的環境視為該投資的一點回報，但這顯然並不意味著我們會停止投資。所以我想這就是答案的一部分。

And I guess, your other question is the benefits of being the biggest tech spender. I just think like it's sort of mandatory, right? I mean, we're big and it's a very technology-centric business, and the world is competitive and everything is changing. Younger generations have different expectations, and we have to be nimble, and we have to be on our front foot. And otherwise, we risk getting severely disrupted.

我想，你的另一個問題是成為最大的科技支出者的好處。我只是覺得這是強制性的，對吧？我的意思是，我們很大，這是一個非常以技術為中心的企業，世界競爭激烈，一切都在變化。年輕一代有不同的期望，我們必須靈活，我們必須搶先一步。否則，我們就有遭受嚴重干擾的風險。

So I don't know if Jamie wants to add anything.

所以我不知道傑米是否想補充什麼。

Just the competition, when we look at it, is it's Wells, who is coming back, which I'm happy for you guys. It's obviously Marcus, it's Apple. It's Chime, it's Dave. It's -- a lot of people coming up with these businesses in different ways. Some have been quite successful. It's Stripe in payments. And so we want to be very good and very competitive.

只是競爭，當我們看到它時，威爾斯回來了，我為你們感到高興。很明顯是馬庫斯，是蘋果。這是奇姆，這是戴夫。很多人以不同的方式開展這些業務。有些已經相當成功。這是支付領域的 Stripe。所以我們希望變得非常優秀並且非常有競爭力。

Some of that tech spending is things which are almost a sine qua non, which is cybersecurity, data center resiliency, regulatory requirements and things like that, which we simply are going to do and be very, very good at to protect the company.

其中一些技術支出幾乎是必要條件，即網路安全、資料中心彈性、監管要求以及類似的事情，我們將要做並且非常非常擅長保護公司。

As it relates to AI specifically, which is the talk of the town, I guess the consensus among people outside the banking industry is that banks will not win that battle, including JPMorgan. You won't control the front end. What are you doing with AI to make a difference now? Or is this simply a moonshot?

由於它與人工智慧相關，這是人們談論的話題，我想銀行業以外的人的共識是，銀行不會贏得這場戰鬥，包括摩根大通。您將無法控制前端。您現在正在利用人工智慧做什麼來改變現狀？或者這只是一個登月計劃？

Well, I don't agree with that statement. Banks have an extraordinary amount of proprietary data, in addition to when you do like a large language model that's public data. It's looking at everything in the Internet or everything that's ever been published or something like that.

嗯，我不同意這個說法。除了您確實喜歡公共資料的大型語言模型之外，銀行還擁有大量的專有資料。它著眼於網路上的所有內容或曾經發布的所有內容或類似內容。

But AI is an extraordinarily good tool to use. We just put a woman who is running it at our table. So it's data analytics, AI, et cetera. And there are multiple types of AI. So we use AI for risk, fraud, marketing, prospecting.

但人工智慧是一個非常好用的工具。我們只是安排了一位負責營運的女士坐在我們的桌子旁。這就是數據分析、人工智慧等等。人工智慧有多種類型。因此，我們將人工智慧用於風險、詐欺、行銷、勘探。

And the management team is getting better and better at saying, how can we use data to do a better job to reduce errors? To serve clients better? To have a salesperson have copilots, that they know why even the client's calling or something like that. And so we simply have to do it. Does it create opportunity for disruptors to come in? Yes, of course. That's always the truth of technology and -- but we'll be quite good at it.

管理團隊越來越擅長說，我們如何利用數據來更好地減少錯誤？為了更好的服務客戶？讓銷售人員有副駕駛，他們知道為什麼甚至客戶打電話或類似的事情。所以我們必須這麼做。它是否為顛覆者的介入創造了機會？是的當然。這始終是科技的真理——但我們會非常擅長。

And then lastly, I think you had made a mention at a conference about investment spend or tech spend over the next year. Where do you stand on that?

最後，我認為您在一次會議上提到了明年的投資支出或技術支出。你對此持什麼立場？

Yes. No, because you did ask a little bit about the expense outlook for next year. So I think at the conference, we said I think the consensus was $88 billion, but we're still going through budget process, et cetera, et cetera. So that's still true. I think we're still kind of in the ballpark, but I would say, at the margin, there's going to be a little bit of upward pressure...

是的。不，因為您確實詢問了明年的費用前景。所以我認為在會議上，我們說我認為共識是 880 億美元，但我們仍在經歷預算流程等等。所以這仍然是事實。我認為我們仍然處於大致水平，但我想說，在邊際上，將會有一點上行壓力...

That First Republic, too, or no?

第一共和國也是如此，還是沒有？

Yes, this is all now including First Republic. And I think there will be a little bit of upward pressure on that as we sort of do our usual thing and look at all the opportunities that we see and the investments that we want to make. So no surprise in that sense, that we're going to invest prudently. Nothing dramatic, but probably a little bit of upward pressure on the margin.

是的，這就是現在的一切，包括第一共和國。我認為，當我們做我們平常的事情並審視我們看到的所有機會和我們想要進行的投資時，將會有一點上行壓力。因此，從這個意義上說，我們將謹慎投資也就不足為奇了。沒什麼戲劇性的，但利潤率可能有一點上行壓力。

Our next question comes from Jim Mitchell with Seaport Global.

我們的下一個問題來自 Seaport Global 的 Jim Mitchell。

Jeremy, do you think there's any receptivity among regulators regarding the double-counting, not only of operational risk, but I think you alluded to this earlier in the Markets business, but there's clearly double-counting in market risk in the trading book. Is there any receptivity?

傑里米，您認為監管機構是否願意接受重複計算，不僅是操作風險，但我認為您早些時候在市場業務中提到過這一點，但交易帳簿中的市場風險顯然存在重複計算。有接受能力嗎？

Can I just answer real quickly? We don't really know. It's a one-sided the conversation generally. They say put in your comments, so everyone's going to put in extensive comments kind of like you heard from Jeremy, and we don't really know. We don't really know what's going on inside the Fed, how many people get involved. In my view, it's become a very politicized process as opposed to the technical analysis, I think, that's required to do it exactly right. So we'll see.

我可以快速回答嗎？我們真的不知道。一般來說，這是一種片面的談話。他們說發表你的評論，所以每個人都會發表廣泛的評論，就像你從傑里米那裡聽到的那樣，我們真的不知道。我們真的不知道聯準會內部發生了什麼，有多少人參與其中。在我看來，這已經成為一個非常政治化的過程，而不是技術分析，我認為，這是正確完成任務所必需的。所以我們拭目以待。

Okay. And then if it weren't to change, and you talked about the potential negative impact on liquidity in the Markets business specifically. Is that a JPM pulling out of certain business type of event? Or is that -- is it more a comment that there will be fewer providers of liquidity as less scaled players exit? And maybe that's, all else equal, a market share gain opportunity for JPMorgan in a smaller business?

好的。然後，如果不改變，您特別談到了對市場業務流動性的潛在負面影響。這是摩根大通退出某些業務類型的活動嗎？或者說，這更像是一種評論，即隨著規模較小的參與者退出，流動性提供者將會減少？在其他條件相同的情況下，也許這就是摩根大通在規模較小的企業中獲得市場份額的機會？

I think -- so if you look at Markets alone, it's a huge, I think, 60% increase in capital. And if you look at it, you can do that by product. For some products, it's worth it than for others. But generally, it spans across all products.

我認為，如果你單獨看市場，我認為資本增加了 60%。如果你看一下，你可以透過產品來做到這一點。對於某些產品來說，這比其他產品更值得。但一般來說，它涵蓋所有產品。

And market make -- but the really important thing is market-making is a critical function. And if you look at the world, there's only so many large market makers who can make markets for governments, hospitals, cities, schools, states, IMF, World Bank, BlackRock, Blackstone and all those various things who buy and sell for their clients in size. And market makers have a different function than hedge funds.

還有做市商——但真正重要的是做市商是一項關鍵職能。如果你看看世界，只有這麼多的大型做市商可以為政府、醫院、城市、學校、州、國際貨幣基金組織、世界銀行、貝萊德、黑石以及所有為客戶買賣的各種東西做市。在尺寸方面。做市商的職能與避險基金不同。

And I don't know what the real intent was with this. But this is another one, I think, that needs to be really thought through. What are you trying to accomplish? We do market making quite safe. We've never lost the kind of money that people talk about in market making in the global market shock or something like that.

我不知道這樣做的真正意圖是什麼。但我認為，這是另一個需要認真思考的問題。你想達到什麼目的？我們做市是相當安全的。我們從未損失過人們在全球市場衝擊或類似情況下做市時談論的那種資金。

But the other thing about market making, I do agree, it could actually force some people out. It will force lower positions, which is why I think it's a little risky, but it may also force more consolidation. And so clients, since they need it so much, there may be consolidation in an unintended way in market making. And obviously more volatile markets because with all the constraints, with the LCR, SLR, capital, et cetera, you will constantly be up against limitations on what you can do.

但我確實同意關於做市的另一件事，它實際上可能會迫使一些人退出。它將迫使頭寸降低，這就是為什麼我認為它有點風險，但它也可能迫使更多的整合。因此，由於客戶非常需要它，做市可能會以意想不到的方式進行整合。顯然，市場波動性更大，因為在 LCR、SLR、資本等方面存在所有限制，您將持續面臨自己能做的事情的限制。

Yes. And I think that last point of Jamie's is particularly important because, sure, if you want, you can construct is what I would consider a very optimistic argument, that the higher cost of doing business will lead smaller-scale players to exit, and that's a share gain opportunity for us. But I refer back to the comments about the disincentives to beneficial diversification and scale.

是的。我認為傑米的最後一點特別重要，因為當然，如果你願意，你可以建立我認為非常樂觀的論點，即更高的經營成本將導致規模較小的參與者退出，這就是為我們帶來了分享收益的機會。但我回顧一下有關阻礙有益的多元化和規模化的評論。

Getting bigger, especially in Markets, it's quite expensive from, for example, a GSIB perspective. And so you wind up kind of hemmed in on all sides, which is one of the reasons why we're sort of highlighting that it does seem like the only way out sometimes, when you look at the cumulative effect of everything that's happened in Markets over the last 15 years, is a fundamentally very different system. And well, obviously...

變得更大，尤其是在市場上，從 GSIB 的角度來看，這是相當昂貴的。因此，你最終會陷入四面受敵的境地，這就是為什麼我們要強調，當你看到市場中發生的一切的累積效應時，有時這似乎是唯一的出路。在過去15 年裡，這是一個根本上非常不同的系統。嗯，顯然...

Great opportunity for European market makers. I mean, a great opportunity. Like they can do repo and FX and swaps and credit and stuff with 30% less capital. That is a big difference in that kind of business.

對於歐洲做市商來說這是一個絕佳的機會。我的意思是，一個很好的機會。就像他們可以用少 30% 的資本進行回購、外匯、掉期、信貸等業務。這對於此類業務來說是一個很大的區別。

Our last question comes from Matt O'Connor with Deutsche Bank.

我們的最後一個問題來自德意志銀行的馬特·奧康納。

You talked about increased investment spend in some areas in response to an earlier question. But just how do you think about cost control overall looking at the medium term? The outlook for revenue is obviously pressured at least on net interest income, fee might help.

您在回答先前的問題時談到了某些領域投資支出的增加。但從中期來看，您如何看待整體成本控制？收入前景顯然受到至少淨利息收入的壓力，費用可能會有所幫助。

But the backdrop is for potentially declining revenue or at least flattish revenue for a couple or few years. So I know you always say you want to invest through the cycle, and it's really paid off over time. But how are you thinking about cost control in the next few years?

但背景是收入可能會下降，或至少在幾年或幾年內收入持平。所以我知道你總是說你想在整個週期中進行投資，隨著時間的推移，它確實得到了回報。但您如何看待未來幾年的成本控制？

Yes. I mean, I wish I had sort of an answer that fit better into your framework, but in some fundamental sense, we just kind of don't agree with the framework. In the sense that -- and we've been through this over the last couple of years, right? In a world where rates drop very suddenly and recover like quite dramatically and credit becomes abnormally good and then rebounds, and you see these very significant fluctuations in capital markets.

是的。我的意思是，我希望我有一個更適合您的框架的答案，但從某種基本意義上講，我們只是不同意該框架。從某種意義上來說——過去幾年我們已經經歷過這個，對吧？在利率突然下降然後又急劇恢復、信貸變得異常良好然後反彈的世界裡，你會看到資本市場出現非常顯著的波動。

We saw that 2021 going into 2022, where the revenue environment can change a lot in the short term for reasons that can be largely out of your control. And while, of course, there are parts of our expense base, which are in the short term, directly sensitive to the revenue environment, and some of those adjust naturally and some of them we adjust more forcefully as a function of volumes. But other things are more structural. And the goal is to make sure that those other things are sized appropriately to what we believe sustainable through the cycle returns are.

我們看到，從 2021 年到 2022 年，收入環境可能會在短期內發生很大變化，原因很大程度上是您無法控制的。當然，我們的支出基礎部分在短期內對收入環境直接敏感，其中一些會自然調整，而另一些我們會根據銷售進行更有力的調整。但其他事情更具結構性。我們的目標是確保其他事情的規模與我們認為可持續的周期回報相符。

So we're always very focused on cost. You can be rest assured of that. That discipline internally is as aggressive as ever as we go through the budget cycle, but they're long-term plays. And you really shouldn't expect us to see trying to generate cosmetically lower cost in response to a lower revenue environment, where we didn't balloon the cost when the revenue became, as we've argued, unsustainably high.

所以我們總是非常關注成本。對此您可以放心。當我們經歷預算週期時，這種內在紀律與以往一樣嚴格，但它們是長期的。你真的不應該指望我們會試圖降低表面上的成本來應對收入較低的環境，當收入變得如我們所說的不可持續的高位時，我們並沒有增加成本。

Yes. Fair enough. And then if I could just squeeze in on First Republic. Obviously, the contribution there is coming in at multiples higher than expected. How do you think about the puts and takes in terms of -- I think there's probably some runoff of loans still to come, but also opportunities to deepen relationships there?

是的。很公平。然後如果我能擠進第一共和國就好了。顯然，那裡的貢獻比預期高出好幾倍。您如何看待看跌期權和賣出期權——我認為可能還會有一些貸款流失，但也有機會加深那裡的關係？

Yes. So you're right about the contribution and about the runoff in loans, and it is notable the net income, the First Republic-related net income that we printed this quarter.

是的。因此，您對捐款和貸款徑流的看法是正確的，值得注意的是我們本季公佈的淨收入，即與第一共和國相關的淨收入。

So the first thing to say is that we don't think that, that First Republic-related net income number from this quarter is a sustainable indicator of the future run rate. Some of the same dynamics that we just talked about, in particular, over-earning on deposits or sort of above-normal deposit margins, also apply to the First Republic franchise to some degree. So we would expect that to normalize.

因此，首先要說的是，我們認為本季與第一共和國相關的淨利潤數據並不是未來運行率的可持續指標。我們剛才談到的一些相同的動態，特別是存款的超額收益或高於正常水平的存款保證金，在某種程度上也適用於第一共和國的特許經營權。所以我們預計這種情況會正常化。

And probably more significantly, as I think you alluded to, we do have some accelerated pull to par on some of the commitments that we took on at a fair value discount as part of the acquisition. And so that's a short-term tailwind in the revenue that will come out of that over the next few quarters.

也許更重要的是，正如我認為你提到的那樣，作為收購的一部分，我們確實以公允價值折扣做出了一些承諾，從而加速實現了這些承諾。因此，這將是未來幾季收入的短期推動力。

And yes, in terms of how it's going overall and deepening the relationships, that remains a focus. And I think more of that will happen as we continue the integration and we continue stabilizing. And yes, I think, as I said, I think, on the press call, things are going well, arguably a little bit better than we had sort of modeled as part of the acquisition, and we're happy to see that.

是的，就整體進展和加深關係而言，這仍然是一個焦點。我認為，隨著我們繼續整合和繼續穩定，更多這樣的事情將會發生。是的，我認為，正如我所說，我認為，在新聞發布會上，事情進展順利，可以說比我們在收購過程中所模擬的要好一些，我們很高興看到這一點。

Thank you. There are no further questions.

謝謝。沒有其他問題了。

Folks, thank you very much.

各位，非常感謝你們。

Thank you for participating in today's conference. You may disconnect at this time.

感謝您參加今天的會議。此時您可以斷開連線。