摩根大通 (JPM) 2023 Q1 法說會逐字稿

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to the [JPMorgan Chase's] First Quarter 2023 Earnings Call. This call is being recorded. (Operator Instructions) We will now go live to the presentation. Please stand by. At this time, I would like to turn the call over to JPMorgan Chase's Chairman and CEO, Jamie Dimon; and Chief Financial Officer, Jeremy Barnum. Mr. Barnum, please go ahead.

早上好，女士們，先生們。歡迎來到 [摩根大通] 2023 年第一季度財報電話會議。此通話正在錄音中。 （操作員說明）我們現在將開始演示。請待命。在這個時候，我想把電話轉給摩根大通的董事長兼首席執行官傑米戴蒙；和首席財務官傑里米·巴納姆 (Jeremy Barnum)。巴納姆先生，請繼續。

Thanks, and good morning, everyone. The presentation is available on our website, and please refer to the disclaimer on the back.

謝謝，大家早上好。該演示文稿可在我們的網站上找到，請參閱背面的免責聲明。

Starting on Page 1. The firm reported net income of $12.6 billion, EPS of $4.10 on revenue of $39.3 billion and delivered an ROTCE of 23%. These results included $868 million of net investment securities losses in corporate.

從第 1 頁開始。該公司公佈的淨收入為 126 億美元，每股收益為 4.10 美元，收入為 393 億美元，ROTCE 為 23%。這些結果包括 8.68 億美元的公司證券投資淨損失。

Before reviewing our results for the quarter, let's talk about the recent bank failures. Jamie has addressed a number of the important themes in his shareholder letter and the recent televised interview. So I will go straight to the specific impacts on the firm.

在回顧我們本季度的業績之前，讓我們談談最近的銀行倒閉。傑米在他的股東信和最近的電視採訪中談到了一些重要的主題。因此，我將直接討論對公司的具體影響。

As you would expect, we saw significant new account opening activity and meaningful deposit and money market fund inflows, most significantly in the Commercial Bank, Business Banking and AWM. Regarding the deposit inflows, at the firm-wide level, average deposits were down 3% quarter-on-quarter, while end-of-period deposits were up 2% quarter-on-quarter, implying an intra-quarter reversal of the recent outflow trend as a consequence of the March events. We estimate that we have retained approximately $50 billion of these deposit inflows at quarter end.

如您所料，我們看到大量新開戶活動以及大量存款和貨幣市場資金流入，其中商業銀行、商業銀行和 AWM 最為顯著。存款流入方面，全行平均存款環比下降 3%，期末存款環比上升 2%，季度內逆轉近期3 月事件導致的流出趨勢。我們估計，我們在季度末保留了大約 500 億美元的存款流入。

It's important to note that while the sequential period end deposit increase is higher than we would have otherwise expected, our current full year NII outlook, which I will address at the end still assumes modest deposit outflows from here. We expect these outflows to be driven by the same factors as last quarter as well as the expectation that we will not retain all of this quarter's inflows.

重要的是要注意，雖然連續期末存款增長高於我們的預期，但我將在最後討論的當前全年 NII 展望仍然假設存款從這裡適度流出。我們預計這些資金流出將受到與上一季度相同的因素的驅動，以及我們不會保留本季度所有資金流入的預期。

Now back to the quarter touching on a few highlights. We grew our IB fee wallet share. Consumer spending remained solid with combined debit and credit card spend, up 10% year-on-year. And credit continues to normalize, but actual performance remains strong across the company.

現在回到本季度，談談幾個亮點。我們增加了 IB 費用錢包份額。消費者支出保持穩健，借記卡和信用卡支出合計同比增長 10%。信貸繼續正常化，但整個公司的實際業績仍然強勁。

On Page 2, we have some more detail. Revenue of $39.3 billion was up $7.7 billion or 25% year-on-year. NII ex-markets was up $9.2 billion or 78%, driven by higher rates, partially offset by lower deposit balances. NIR ex-markets was down $1.1 billion or 10% driven by the securities losses previously mentioned as well as lower IB fees and lower Auto lease income on lower volume. And market revenue was down $371 million or 4% year-on-year.

在第 2 頁，我們有更多細節。收入為 393 億美元，同比增長 77 億美元或 25%。 NII ex-markets 增長 92 億美元或 78%，受利率上升的推動，部分被較低的存款餘額所抵消。 NIR ex-markets 下降了 11 億美元或 10%，這是由於前面提到的證券損失以及較低的 IB 費用和較低的汽車租賃收入導致的。市場收入同比下降 3.71 億美元或 4%。

Expenses of $20.1 billion were up $916 million or 5% year-on-year driven by compensation-related costs, reflecting the annualization of last year's headcount growth and wage inflation. These results include the impact of the higher FDIC assessment I mentioned last quarter, which, of course, is unrelated to recent events. And credit costs of $2.3 billion included net charge-offs of $1.1 billion, predominantly in Card. The net reserve build of $1.1 billion was largely driven by deterioration in our weighted average economic outlook.

受薪酬相關成本的推動，支出 201 億美元，同比增長 9.16 億美元或 5%，反映了去年員工人數增長和工資通脹的年化結果。這些結果包括我上個季度提到的更高 FDIC 評估的影響，這當然與最近的事件無關。 23 億美元的信貸成本包括 11 億美元的淨沖銷，主要是信用卡。 11 億美元的淨儲備增加主要是由於我們的加權平均經濟前景惡化所致。

Onto balance sheet and capital on Page 3. We ended the quarter with a CET1 ratio of 13.8%, up about 60 basis points, which was primarily driven by the benefit of net income less distributions and AOCI gains. And in line with what we previously said, we resumed stock buybacks this quarter and distributed a total of $1.9 billion in net repurchases back to shareholders.

關於第 3 頁的資產負債表和資本。本季度末，我們的 CET1 比率為 13.8%，上升了約 60 個基點，這主要是受淨收入減去分配和 AOCI 收益的推動。正如我們之前所說，我們在本季度恢復了股票回購，並向股東分配了總計 19 億美元的淨回購。

Now let's go to our businesses, starting with CCB on Page 4. Touching quickly on the health of U.S. consumers and small businesses based on our data. Both continue to show resilience and remain on the path to normalization as expected, but we continue to monitor their activity closely. Spend remains solid, and we have not observed any notable pullback throughout the quarter.

現在讓我們來看看我們的業務，從第 4 頁的 CCB 開始。根據我們的數據快速了解美國消費者和小型企業的健康狀況。兩者都繼續表現出韌性，並如預期的那樣走上正常化的道路，但我們繼續密切關注他們的活動。支出保持穩定，我們在整個季度沒有觀察到任何明顯的回落。

Moving to financial results. CCB reported net income of $5.2 billion on revenue of $16.5 billion, which was up 35% year-on-year. In Banking & Wealth Management, revenue was up 67% year-on-year, driven by higher NII on higher rates. Average deposits were down 2% quarter-on-quarter, in line with recent trends. Throughout the quarter, we continued to see customer flows to higher-yielding products, as you would expect, but we're encouraged by what we are capturing in CDs and our Wealth Management offerings.

轉到財務結果。建行公佈的淨收入為 52 億美元，收入為 165 億美元，同比增長 35%。在銀行和財富管理方面，收入同比增長 67%，這主要是受更高利率帶來的更高 NII 的推動。平均存款環比下降 2%，與近期趨勢一致。在整個季度中，正如您所期望的那樣，我們繼續看到客戶流向收益更高的產品，但我們對我們在 CD 和我們的財富管理產品中捕獲的內容感到鼓舞。

Client investment assets were down 1% year-on-year, but up 7% quarter-on-quarter, driven by market performance as well as strong net inflows. In Home Lending, revenue was down 38% year-on-year largely driven by lower net interest income from tighter loan spreads and lower production revenue.

受市場表現和強勁的淨流入推動，客戶投資資產同比下降 1%，但環比增長 7%。在房屋貸款方面，收入同比下降 38%，這主要是由於貸款利差收緊和生產收入下降導致淨利息收入下降。

Moving to Card Services & Auto. Revenue was up 14% year-on-year, largely driven by higher Card Services NII on higher revolving balances, partially offset by lower Auto lease income. Credit card spend was up 13% year-on-year. Card outstandings were up 21%, driven by strong new account growth and revolve normalization. And in Auto, originations were $9.2 billion, up 10% year-on-year. Expenses of $8.1 billion were up 5% year-on-year, reflecting the impact of wage inflation and higher headcount.

轉向卡服務和汽車。收入同比增長 14%，主要是由於循環餘額增加導致卡服務 NII 增加，部分被汽車租賃收入減少所抵消。信用卡支出同比增長 13%。在強勁的新賬戶增長和循環正常化的推動下，未償信用卡增長了 21%。在汽車領域，發起金額為 92 億美元，同比增長 10%。支出 81 億美元，同比增長 5%，反映了工資上漲和員工人數增加的影響。

In terms of credit performance this quarter, credit costs were $1.4 billion, reflecting reserve builds of $300 million in Card and $50 million in Home Lending. Net charge-offs were $1.1 billion, up about $500 million year-on-year in line with expectations as delinquency levels continue to normalize across portfolios.

就本季度的信貸表現而言，信貸成本為 14 億美元，反映出 3 億美元的信用卡準備金和 5000 萬美元的家庭貸款準備金。淨註銷為 11 億美元，同比增長約 5 億美元，符合預期，因為整個投資組合的拖欠水平繼續正常化。

Next, the CIB on Page 5. CIB reported net income of $4.4 billion on revenue of $13.6 billion. Investment Banking revenue of $1.6 billion was down 24% year-on-year. IB fees were down 19%. We ranked #1 with first quarter wallet share of 8.7%. In advisory, fees were down 6% compared to a strong first quarter last year. Our underwriting businesses continued to be affected by market conditions with fees down 34% for debt and 6% for equity.

接下來是第 5 頁的 CIB。CIB 報告的淨收入為 44 億美元，收入為 136 億美元。投資銀行業務收入為 16 億美元，同比下降 24%。 IB 費用下降了 19%。我們以 8.7% 的第一季度錢包份額排名第一。在諮詢方面，與去年第一季度的強勁表現相比，費用下降了 6%。我們的承銷業務繼續受到市場狀況的影響，債務費用下降 34%，股權費用下降 6%。

In terms of the outlook, the dynamics remain the same. Our pipeline is relatively robust, but conversion is sensitive to market conditions and the economic outlook. We expect the second quarter and the rest of the year to remain challenging.

就前景而言，動態保持不變。我們的管道相對穩健，但轉換對市場狀況和經濟前景很敏感。我們預計第二季度和今年餘下時間仍將充滿挑戰。

Moving to Markets. Total revenue was $8.4 billion, down 4% year-on-year. Fixed income was flat. Rates was strong during the rally early in the quarter as well as through the elevated volatility in March. Credit was up on the back of higher client flows. And currencies in emerging markets was down relative to a very strong first quarter in the prior year.

轉向市場。總收入為 84 億美元，同比下降 4%。固定收益持平。在本季度初的反彈以及 3 月份的波動加劇期間，利率表現強勁。由於客戶流量增加，信貸上升。與去年第一季度非常強勁的表現相比，新興市場的貨幣有所下跌。

Equity Markets was down 12%, driven by lower revenues in derivatives relative to a strong first quarter in the prior year and lower client activity in cash. Payments revenue was $2.4 billion, up 26% year-on-year. Excluding the net impact of equity investments, primarily a gain in the prior year, it was up 55%, with the growth driven by higher rates, partially offset by lower deposit balances.

股票市場下跌 12%，原因是衍生品收入低於去年第一季度的強勁表現，以及現金客戶活動減少。支付收入為 24 億美元，同比增長 26%。剔除股權投資的淨影響（主要是前一年的收益）後，增長了 55%，增長受到利率上升的推動，部分被較低的存款餘額所抵消。

Securities Services revenue of $1.1 billion was up 7% year-on-year, driven by higher rates, partially offset by lower deposit balances and market levels. Expenses of $7.5 billion were up 2% year-on-year as higher headcount and wage inflation were largely offset by lower revenue-related compensation.

受利率上升推動，證券服務收入為 11 億美元，同比增長 7%，部分被較低的存款餘額和市場水平所抵消。 75 億美元的支出同比增長 2%，原因是員工人數增加和工資上漲在很大程度上被與收入相關的薪酬減少所抵消。

Moving to the Commercial Bank on Page 6. Commercial Banking reported net income of $1.3 billion. Revenue of $3.5 billion was up 46% year-on-year, driven by higher deposit margins. Payments revenue of $2 billion was up 98% year-on-year driven by higher rates. And gross Investment Banking revenue of $881 million was up 21% year-on-year on increased M&A and bond underwriting from large deal activity.

轉到第 6 頁的商業銀行。商業銀行報告的淨收入為 13 億美元。收入為 35 億美元，同比增長 46%，這得益於更高的存款利潤率。在利率上升的推動下，支付收入達到 20 億美元，同比增長 98%。投資銀行業務總收入為 8.81 億美元，同比增長 21%，原因是大型交易活動增加了併購和債券承銷。

Expenses of $1.3 billion were up 16% year-on-year largely driven by higher compensation expense, including front-office hiring and technology investments as well as higher volume-related expense. Average deposits were down 16% year-on-year and 5% quarter-on-quarter, predominantly driven by continued attrition and nonoperating deposits as well as seasonally lower balances.

支出 13 億美元，同比增長 16%，這主要是由於薪酬支出增加，包括前台招聘和技術投資以及與數量相關的支出增加。平均存款同比下降 16%，環比下降 5%，這主要是由於持續減員和非經營性存款以及季節性較低的餘額。

Loans were up 13% year-on-year and 1% sequentially. C&I loans were up 1% quarter-on-quarter with somewhat different dynamics based on client size. In middle market banking, higher rates and recession concerns have decreased new loan demand and utilization, which is also leading to weakness in CapEx spending. In Corporate Client Banking, utilization rates increased modestly quarter-on-quarter as capital market conditions led more clients to opt for bank debt.

貸款同比增長 13%，環比增長 1%。 C&I 貸款環比增長 1%，但根據客戶規模有所不同。在中間市場銀行業務中，較高的利率和經濟衰退擔憂降低了新貸款需求和利用率，這也導致資本支出疲軟。在企業客戶銀行業務方面，由於資本市場狀況導致更多客戶選擇銀行債務，利用率環比略有上升。

CRE loans were also up 1% sequentially with higher rates creating headwinds for both originations and prepayments. And given the recent focus on Commercial Real Estate, let me remind you that our office sector exposure is less than 10% of our portfolio and is focused in urban dense markets. And nearly 2/3 of our loans are multifamily, primarily in supply-constrained markets. Finally, credit costs of $417 million included a net reserve build of $379 million, predominantly driven by what I mentioned upfront.

CRE 貸款也環比增長 1%，較高的利率對發放和預付款造成不利影響。考慮到最近對商業房地產的關注，讓我提醒您，我們的寫字樓行業風險敞口不到我們投資組合的 10%，並且主要集中在城市密集市場。我們近 2/3 的貸款是多戶家庭貸款，主要是在供應受限的市場。最後，4.17 億美元的信貸成本包括 3.79 億美元的淨準備金增加，主要由我前面提到的驅動。

Then to complete our lines of business, AWM on Page 7. Asset & Wealth Management reported net income of $1.4 billion, pretax margin of 35%. Revenue of $4.8 billion was up 11% year-on-year driven by higher deposit margins on lower balances and a valuation gain on our initial investment triggered by taking full ownership of our Asset Management joint venture in China, partially offset by the impact of lower average market levels on management fees and lower performance fees. Expenses of $3.1 billion were up 8% year-on-year, predominantly driven by compensation, reflecting growth in our Private Banking advisory teams, higher revenue-related compensation and the run rate impact of acquisitions.

然後完成我們的業務線，第 7 頁的 AWM。資產與財富管理報告的淨收入為 14 億美元，稅前利潤率為 35%。 48 億美元的收入同比增長 11%，這是由於餘額減少導致存款利潤率提高，以及我們在中國的資產管理合資企業的全部所有權引發的初始投資估值收益，部分被較低的影響所抵消管理費的平均市場水平和較低的績效費用。支出 31 億美元，同比增長 8%，主要受薪酬推動，反映了我們私人銀行顧問團隊的增長、與收入相關的薪酬增加以及收購對運行率的影響。

For the quarter, net long-term inflows were $47 billion, led by fixed income and equities. And then liquidity, we saw net inflows of $93 billion, inclusive of our ongoing deposit migration. AUM of $3 trillion was up 2% year-on-year and overall client assets of $4.3 trillion were up 6%, driven by continued net inflows into liquidity and long-term products. And finally, loans were down 1% quarter-on-quarter, driven by lower securities-based lending, while average deposits were down 5%.

本季度，在固定收益和股票的帶動下，長期淨流入為 470 億美元。然後是流動性，我們看到 930 億美元的淨流入，包括我們正在進行的存款遷移。資產管理規模達 3 萬億美元，同比增長 2%，客戶總資產達 4.3 萬億美元，增長 6%，這主要得益於流動性和長期產品的持續淨流入。最後，由於證券貸款減少，貸款環比下降 1%，而平均存款下降 5%。

Turning to Corporate on Page 8. Corporate reported net income of $244 million. Revenue was $985 million compared to a net loss of $881 million last year. NII was $1.7 billion, up $2.3 billion year-on-year due to the impact of higher rates. NIR was a loss of $755 million compared with a loss of $345 million in the prior year and included the net investment securities losses I mentioned earlier. Expenses of $160 million were down $24 million year-on-year. And credit costs of $370 million were driven by reserve builds on a couple of single name exposures.

轉到第 8 頁的公司。公司報告的淨收入為 2.44 億美元。收入為 9.85 億美元，而去年淨虧損為 8.81 億美元。由於較高利率的影響，NII 為 17 億美元，同比增加 23 億美元。 NIR 虧損 7.55 億美元，而上一年虧損 3.45 億美元，其中包括我之前提到的淨投資證券虧損。支出 1.6 億美元，同比減少 2400 萬美元。 3.7 億美元的信貸成本是由建立在幾個單一名稱風險敞口上的準備金推動的。

Next, the outlook on Page 9. We now expect 2023 NII and NII ex-markets to be approximately $81 billion. This increase in guidance is primarily driven by lower rate paid assumptions across both Consumer and Wholesale in light of the expectation of Fed [cuts] later in the year as well as slightly higher Card revolving balances. Note that in line with my comments at the outset, recent deposit balance increases are not a meaningful contributor to the upward revision in the NII outlook, given that we expect a meaningful portion of the recent inflows to reverse later in the year.

接下來是第 9 頁的展望。我們現在預計 2023 年 NII 和 NII 前市場約為 810 億美元。鑑於美聯儲在今年晚些時候[削減]的預期以及信用卡循環餘額略高，這一指導的增加主要是由於消費者和批發商的支付利率假設較低。請注意，與我一開始的評論一致，鑑於我們預計近期流入的很大一部分將在今年晚些時候逆轉，近期存款餘額的增加對 NII 前景的上調沒有有意義的貢獻。

I would point out that this outlook still embeds significant reprice lags. We think a more sustainable NII ex-markets run rate in the medium term is well below this quarter's $84 billion as well as below the $80 billion that is implied for the rest of the year by our full year guidance. And while we don't know exactly when this lower run rate will be reached, when it happens, we believe it will be around the mid-70s.

我要指出的是，這種前景仍然存在顯著的重新定價滯後。我們認為中期更可持續的 NII 前市場運行率遠低於本季度的 840 億美元，也低於我們全年指導所暗示的今年剩餘時間的 800 億美元。雖然我們不確切知道何時會達到這個較低的運行率，但我們相信它會在 70 年代中期左右發生。

And of course, as we mentioned last quarter, this NII outlook remains highly sensitive to the uncertainty associated with the timing and the extent of deposit reprice, investment portfolio decisions, the dynamics of QT and RRP, the trajectory of Fed funds as well as the broader macroeconomic environment, including its impact on loan growth. Separately, it's worth noting that markets NII may start to trend slightly positive towards the end of the year as a function of mix and rate effects.

當然，正如我們上個季度提到的那樣，NII 前景仍然對與存款重新定價的時間和程度、投資組合決策、QT 和 RRP 的動態、聯邦基金的軌跡以及更廣泛的宏觀經濟環境，包括其對貸款增長的影響。另外，值得注意的是，由於混合和利率效應，市場 NII 可能會在年底開始略微呈正趨勢。

Moving to expenses. Our outlook for 2023 continues to be about $81 billion. Importantly, this does not currently include the impact of the pending FDIC special assessment. And on credit, we continue to expect the 2023 Card net charge-off rate to be approximately 2.6%.

轉向開支。我們對 2023 年的展望仍然是 810 億美元左右。重要的是，這目前不包括未決的 FDIC 特別評估的影響。在信貸方面，我們繼續預計 2023 年卡的淨註銷率約為 2.6%。

So to wrap up, our strong results this quarter once again highlight the earnings power of this diversified franchise. We have benefited from our fortress principles and commitment to invest, which we will continue to do as we head into an increasingly uncertain environment.

總而言之，我們本季度的強勁業績再次凸顯了這個多元化特許經營權的盈利能力。我們受益於我們的堡壘原則和投資承諾，在我們進入越來越不確定的環境時，我們將繼續這樣做。

With that, operator, please open the line for Q&A.

有了這個，接線員，請打開問答線。

From the line of Steve Chubak with Wolfe Research.

來自 Steve Chubak 與 Wolfe Research 的合作。

Jamie, I was actually hoping to get your perspective on how you see the recent developments with SVB impacting the regulatory landscape for the big banks. In your letter, you spent a fair amount of time highlighting the consequences of overly stringent capital requirements, the risk of steering more activities to the less regulated nonbanks.

傑米，我實際上是希望了解您對 SVB 的近期發展如何影響大銀行監管環境的看法。在您的信中，您花了相當多的時間強調了過於嚴格的資本要求的後果，以及將更多活動轉向監管較少的非銀行機構的風險。

What are some of the changes that your scenario planning for, whether it's higher capital, increase in FDIC assessment fees? And along those same lines, how you're thinking about the buyback given continued strong capital build, but a lot of macro uncertainty at the moment?

您的情景規劃有哪些變化，無論是更高的資本，還是 FDIC 評估費用的增加？沿著同樣的思路，鑑於持續強勁的資本積累，但目前存在很多宏觀不確定性，您如何考慮回購？

Well, I think you already kind of complete with answering your own question there. Look, we're hoping that everyone just takes a deep breath and looks at what happened, and the breadth and depth of regulations already in place. Obviously, when something happens like this, you should adjust, think about it. So I think down the road, there may be some limitations on held to maturity, maybe more TLAC for certain type size banks and more scrutiny and history exposure, stuff like that.

嗯，我認為你已經完成了在那裡回答你自己的問題。看，我們希望每個人都深吸一口氣，看看發生了什麼，以及已經實施的法規的廣度和深度。很顯然，遇到這樣的事情，你應該去調整，想一想。所以我認為在未來，持有至到期可能會有一些限制，對於某些類型規模的銀行可能會有更多的 TLAC，更多的審查和歷史風險，諸如此類。

But it doesn't have to be a revamp of the whole system. It's just recalibrating things the right way. I think it should be done knowing what you want the outcome to be. The outcome you should want is very strong community and regional banks. And certain actions are taking, which are drastic, it could actually make them weaker. So that's all it is. We do expect higher capital from Basel IV effectively. And obviously, there's going to be an FDIC assessment, that will be what it is.

但這不一定是整個系統的改造。它只是以正確的方式重新校準事物。我認為應該知道你想要的結果是什麼。你應該想要的結果是非常強大的社區和區域銀行。某些行動正在採取，這些行動非常激烈，實際上可能會讓他們變得更弱。所以就是這樣。我們確實期望巴塞爾協議 IV 有效地提供更高的資本。顯然，將會有 FDIC 評估，就是這樣。

And just in terms of appetite for the buyback, just given some of the elevated macro uncertainty.

就回購的興趣而言，只是考慮到一些較高的宏觀不確定性。

Well, we've told you -- I think we've told you that we're kind of penciled in $12 billion for this year. Obviously, capital is more than that, but -- and we did a little bit of buyback this quarter. We're going to wait and see. We don't mind keeping our powder dry. And you've seen us do that with investment portfolios, and we're also willing to do with capital.

好吧，我們已經告訴過你——我想我們已經告訴過你，我們今年的預算是 120 億美元。顯然，資本不止於此，但是——我們在本季度進行了一些回購。我們將拭目以待。我們不介意保持粉末乾燥。你已經看到我們用投資組合來做這件事，我們也願意用資本來做。

The next question comes from the line of Ken Usdin with Jefferies.

下一個問題來自 Ken Usdin 與 Jefferies 的對話。

Jeremy, I was just wondering if you can just give us a little bit more detail on those lower funding expectation point that you made. Just in terms of -- is it because of like what you can offer the client that might allow you to kind of keep that beta lower? And maybe you can just kind of wrap it into what your overall beta expectations are in that revised update.

傑里米，我只是想知道你是否可以就你提出的那些較低的資金期望點向我們提供更多細節。就 — 是因為您可以為客戶提供的東西可能會讓您保持較低的 Beta 值嗎？也許您可以將其包裝到您對該修訂更新的總體 Beta 期望值中。

Yes, sure. So let me just summarize the drivers of the change in the outlook. So the primary driver really is lower deposit rate paid expectations across both Consumer and Wholesale which, as you mentioned, is driven by a couple of factors. So the change in the rate environment with cuts coming sooner in the outlook, all else equal, does take some pressure off the reprice. And as you said, we're getting a lot of positive feedback from field on our product offerings. The short-term CD, in particular, is really getting a lot of positive feedback from our folks in the branches. It's been very attractive to yield-seeking customers. So that's kind of working well.

是的，當然。因此，讓我總結一下前景變化的驅動因素。因此，主要驅動因素實際上是消費者和批發商支付較低存款利率的預期，正如您提到的，這是由幾個因素驅動的。因此，在其他條件相同的情況下，利率環境的變化以及前景中更快的降息確實減輕了重新定價的壓力。正如您所說，我們從現場獲得了很多關於我們產品的積極反饋。特別是短期 CD，確實從我們分支機構的人員那裡得到了很多積極的反饋。它對追求收益的客戶非常有吸引力。所以這很好用。

And then on the asset side, we are seeing a little bit higher Card revolve, which is helping. And I'll just remind you that at a conference in February, I suggested that we were already starting to feel like some of the uncertainties we mentioned when giving the guidance had started all moving in the same direction. And that was one of the things that contributed to the upward revision, like all the uncertainty kind of went through the same way. But as Jamie has pointed out, like those uncertainties are all still there. We highlight them on the page. And as we look forward to this year and into next year in the medium term, we remain very focused on those.

然後在資產方面，我們看到 Card 循環有所提高，這有所幫助。我只想提醒你，在二月份的一次會議上，我建議我們已經開始覺得我們在提供指導時提到的一些不確定性已經開始朝著同一個方向發展。這是導致向上修正的因素之一，就像所有的不確定性都以同樣的方式經歷一樣。但正如傑米所指出的那樣，那些不確定性仍然存在。我們在頁面上突出顯示它們。在我們展望今年和明年的中期時，我們仍然非常關注這些。

Yes. And as a follow-up on the point about rate expectations coming now in and potentially getting cut sooner, how do you take a look at what that might mean just for the broader economy? Is that -- do you think it's more just because inflation is coming down? Do you think it's because the Fed has just got to react to an even tougher economy and still some of those storm clouds that might be out there? Just kind of -- just your general thinking about the other read-throughs of what lower rates quicker will mean for the broader economy.

是的。作為關於利率預期即將到來並可能更早下調這一點的後續行動，你如何看待這對更廣泛的經濟可能意味著什麼？那是——你認為這更僅僅是因為通貨膨脹正在下降嗎？你認為這是因為美聯儲剛剛不得不對更加艱難的經濟做出反應，並且仍然存在一些可能存在的風暴雲嗎？只是有點 - 只是你對其他通讀的一般想法，即更快地降低利率對更廣泛的經濟意味著什麼。

Well, I would -- first of all, I don't quite believe it. So the rate curve -- the Fed has the rate curve -- forward short-term rate curve, almost 1% higher than what the market has. So one of the things you got to always prepare for is it could be anything. We don't know what the rate curve is going to be in the year. And so we're quite cautious in that and quite thoughtful about that.

嗯，我會——首先，我不太相信。所以利率曲線——美聯儲有利率曲線——遠期短期利率曲線，比市場高出近 1%。因此，您必須始終準備的一件事就是它可以是任何東西。我們不知道今年的利率曲線會怎樣。因此，我們對此非常謹慎，並且對此深思熟慮。

Obviously, the short-term read is higher recessionary risk. But -- and then inflation coming down. So I think inflation will come down a little bit. It could either be stickier than people think, and therefore, the rate curve will have to go up a little bit.

顯然，短期讀數是更高的衰退風險。但是——然後通貨膨脹率下降。所以我認為通貨膨脹會有所下降。它可能比人們想像的更粘，因此，利率曲線將不得不上升一點。

The next question comes from the line of John McDonald with Autonomous Research.

下一個問題來自 John McDonald with Autonomous Research。

Jeremy, I wanted to follow up again on the drivers of the NII revision and the lower rates paid assumption. You mentioned the Fed cuts coming sooner and positive feedback on the customer offers. What about the March events? Do the bank failures there that happened in March, in your view, do they slow the reprice intensity because folks are moving other than price reasons? Or they intensify it, industry-wide, because smaller banks have to reprice to keep their deposits? How do those events influence your view of the reprice?

傑里米，我想再次跟進 NII 修訂的驅動因素和較低的支付率假設。你提到美聯儲降息的時間會更快，並且對客戶報價有積極的反饋。三月份的活動怎麼樣？在你看來，3 月份發生的銀行倒閉是否會減緩重新定價的強度，因為人們正在移動而不是價格原因？或者他們在整個行業範圍內加強它，因為較小的銀行必須重新定價以保留存款？這些事件如何影響您對重新定價的看法？

Yes. John, it's a really good question, and we've obviously thought about that. But as we sit here today, I guess I have two answers to that. One is, it doesn't -- it's not meaningfully affecting our current outlook. We don't see it as a major driver. And I think in terms of the larger dynamics that you lay out, it's just a little too early to tell. But from where we are right now, the base case is no real impact.

是的。約翰，這是一個非常好的問題，我們顯然已經考慮過了。但當我們今天坐在這裡時，我想我對此有兩個答案。一是，它不會——它不會對我們當前的前景產生有意義的影響。我們不認為它是一個主要的驅動因素。而且我認為就您提出的更大動態而言，現在下結論還為時過早。但從我們目前的情況來看，基本情況並沒有真正的影響。

Okay. And then I wanted to ask Jamie, there's a narrative out there that the industry could see a credit crunch. Banks are going to stop lending. Even Jay Powell mentioned that as a risk. Do you see that in terms of anything you look at in terms of lending that -- and is that a reaction that makes sense that banks might be retrenching a lot here? Do you worry about that for the economy in terms of credit crunch?

好的。然後我想問傑米，有一種說法是該行業可能會出現信貸緊縮。銀行將停止放貸。甚至傑伊鮑威爾也提到這是一種風險。從貸款的角度來看，你是否看到了這一點——銀行可能會在這里大幅縮減開支，這是一種合理的反應嗎？就信貸緊縮而言，您是否擔心經濟會受到影響？

I wouldn't use the word credit crunch, if I were you. Obviously, there's going to be a little bit of tightening. And most of that will be around certain real estate things. You've heard it from real estate investors already. So I just look at that as a kind of a thumb on the scale. It just makes the finance conditions will be a little bit tighter increases the odds of a recession. That's what that is. It's not like a credit crunch.

如果我是你，我不會使用信貸緊縮這個詞。顯然，會有一點收緊。其中大部分將圍繞某些房地產問題。您已經從房地產投資者那裡聽說過。所以我只是把它看作是一種規模上的拇指。它只會使金融條件收緊一點，從而增加經濟衰退的可能性。就是這樣。這不像信貸緊縮。

Our next question comes from Erika Najarian with UBS.

我們的下一個問題來自瑞銀的 Erika Najarian。

My first question is you mentioned that your reserve build was driven mostly by worse economic assumptions. I'm wondering if you could update us on what unemployment rate you're assuming in your reserves.

我的第一個問題是你提到你的儲備增加主要是由更糟糕的經濟假設驅動的。我想知道你是否可以向我們更新你在儲備金中假設的失業率。

Yes. So Erika, as you know, we take -- I can't go into a lot of detail here. But we take the outlook from our economist. We run a bunch of different scenarios and we probably weigh those. The central outlook from our research team hasn't actually changed. But we felt that in line with what Jamie just said in terms of a little bit of tightening as a result of the event of March, it made sense to add a little bit of weight to our relative adverse case. So we did that, which changed the weighted average expectation. And I think the weighted average peak unemployment that we're using now is something like 5.8%.

是的。所以 Erika，正如你所知，我們採取 - 我不能在這裡詳細介紹。但我們從我們的經濟學家那裡得到了展望。我們運行了一堆不同的場景，我們可能會權衡這些場景。我們研究團隊的核心觀點實際上並沒有改變。但我們認為，根據 Jamie 剛才所說的由於 3 月份的事件而導致的一點點緊縮，在我們相對不利的情況下增加一點權重是有道理的。所以我們這樣做了，這改變了加權平均預期。我認為我們現在使用的加權平均失業率峰值約為 5.8%。

So as we think about all of what you've just told us, so $81 billion of NII this year, and who knows when medium term is going to happen is mid-70s, the clear strength of the franchise producing 23% ROTCE in a quarter where your CET1 was 13.8% and a reserve that already reflects 5.8% unemployment. As we think about recession and what JPMorgan can earn in a recession, do you think you can hit 17% ROTCE even in 2024, assuming we do have a recession, in 2024 everybody is expecting, given all these revenue dynamics and how prepared you are on the reserve?

因此，當我們考慮您剛剛告訴我們的所有內容時，今年的 NII 為 810 億美元，誰知道中期何時會發生是在 70 年代中期，特許經營權的明顯實力在您的 CET1 為 13.8% 的季度，儲備金已經反映了 5.8% 的失業率。當我們考慮經濟衰退以及摩根大通在經濟衰退中可以賺取什麼時，你認為即使在 2024 年你也可以達到 17% 的 ROTCE，假設我們確實有經濟衰退，2024 年每個人都在期待，考慮到所有這些收入動態以及你的準備情況在保護區？

Yes. I mean, that's an interesting question, Erika. I guess I'll say a couple of things.

是的。我的意思是，這是一個有趣的問題，Erika。我想我會說幾件事。

It's a great question. So I hope so Jeremy answers it.

這是一個很好的問題。所以我希望傑里米能回答這個問題。

Okay. Let's take a crack. Let's see what the boss thinks. I think, number one, we believe have said and continue to believe that this is fundamentally a 17% through the cycle ROTCE franchise. So number one. Number two, as Jamie always says, we run this company for all different scenarios and to have it be as resilient as possible across all different scenarios.

好的。讓我們試一試。看看老闆是怎麼想的。我認為，第一，我們相信已經說過並將繼續相信這基本上是一個 17% 的周期 ROTCE 特許經營權。所以排名第一。第二，正如 Jamie 常說的那樣，我們針對所有不同的場景運營這家公司，並讓它在所有不同的場景中盡可能具有彈性。

On the particular question of ROTCE expectations in 2024, contingent on the particular economic outlook, obviously, it depends a lot on the nature of the recession. I think we feel really good about how the company is positioned for a recession, but we're a bank. A very serious recession is, of course, going to be a headline -- a headwind for returns. But we think even in a fairly severe recession, we'll deliver very good returns, whether that's 17% or not is too much detail for now.

關於 2024 年 ROTCE 預期的特定問題，取決於特定的經濟前景，顯然，這在很大程度上取決於經濟衰退的性質。我認為我們對公司如何為經濟衰退做好準備感覺很好，但我們是一家銀行。當然，一場非常嚴重的衰退將成為頭條新聞——回報的逆風。但我們認為，即使在相當嚴重的衰退中，我們也會提供非常好的回報，無論是 17% 還是現在都不是太多細節。

The next question comes from the line of Jim Mitchell with Seaport Global Securities.

下一個問題來自 Jim Mitchell 與 Seaport Global Securities 的對話。

Maybe just a little bit on the deposit, your thought process there. You've seen some inflows. What's your -- why do you think they -- you lose them going forward? And just maybe talk a little bit about the dynamic in pricing. Do you feel like given the inflows, do you see some pricing power for the larger banks?

也許只是一點點存款，你在那裡的思考過程。你已經看到了一些流入。你的 - 為什麼你認為他們 - 你會失去他們？也許只是談談定價的動態。你覺得考慮到資金流入，你是否看到大銀行有一定的定價權？

Yes. A couple of things there. So first of all, we don't know, right? The deposits just came in. We don't know. We're guessing. Number two, the deposits just came in. So by definition, these are somewhat flighty deposits because they just came into us. So it's prudent and appropriate for us to assume that they won't be particularly stable. Number three, there's a natural amount of internal migration of deposits to money funds. So you have to overweigh that, and that's embedded in our assumptions.

是的。那裡有幾件事。所以首先，我們不知道，對吧？存款剛進來，我們不知道。我們在猜測。第二，存款剛剛進入。所以根據定義，這些存款有點不穩定，因為它們剛剛進入我們。因此，我們假設它們不會特別穩定是謹慎和適當的。第三，存款自然會向貨幣基金內部遷移。所以你必須超重這一點，而這已經包含在我們的假設中。

And number four, it's a competitive market. And it's entirely possible that people temporarily come to us and then over time, decide to go elsewhere. So for all of those reasons, we're just being realistic about the stickiness of those...

第四，這是一個競爭激烈的市場。人們完全有可能暫時來找我們，然後隨著時間的推移，決定去其他地方。因此，出於所有這些原因，我們只是對那些粘性保持現實......

Probably add, I wouldn't -- there is -- I would say, categorically, there's no pricing power that the bigger banks have. Because if you look at the pricing, and we look at pricing sheets all the time, every bank is in a slightly different position, and every bank is competing in 3 months, 6 months, 9 months savings rates. And then you have the online banks, you got treasury bill, you got money market funds. There's no pricing power for the bank, but obviously, we'll have different franchises [we're all in] a slightly different position.

可能會補充說，我不會 - 有 - 我會斷然地說，大銀行沒有定價權。因為如果你看定價，我們一直在看定價表，每家銀行的位置都略有不同，每家銀行都在 3 個月、6 個月、9 個月的儲蓄率上競爭。然後你有網上銀行，你有國庫券，你有貨幣市場基金。銀行沒有定價權，但顯然，我們將擁有不同的特許經營權 [我們都處於] 略有不同的位置。

All fair points. And maybe just a follow-up on John's question on the lending environment. You talked about the industry likely pulling back. Are you changing your underwriting standards in any way? Just trying to think through, is there a potential for some market share gains given your strength of capital and liquidity? Or how are you thinking about the loan environment?

所有公平點。也許只是約翰關於借貸環境的問題的後續行動。您談到該行業可能會撤退。您是否以任何方式改變承保標準？試想一下，考慮到你的資本實力和流動性，是否有可能獲得一些市場份額？或者您如何看待貸款環境？

We say very modestly, but we look at that all the time.

我們說得很謙虛，但我們一直在看。

Yes. And we always say, right, we underwrite through the cycle. And I think notably, we don't loosen our underwriting standards when all the numbers looked crazy good during the pandemic. And we're not going to like overreact now and tighten unreasonably. Some of that correction happens naturally. Credit metrics deteriorate for borrowers, whether in consumer or Wholesale and that might make them leave our pre-existing risk appetite. But we're not running around aggressively tightening standards right now.

是的。我們總是說，對，我們承保了整個週期。而且我認為值得注意的是，當大流行期間所有數字看起來都非常好時，我們不會放鬆我們的承保標準。我們現在不會喜歡反應過度和不合理地收緊政策。其中一些修正是自然發生的。借款人的信用指標惡化，無論是消費者還是批發，這可能會使他們離開我們先前存在的風險偏好。但我們現在並沒有四處奔走積極收緊標準。

The next question comes from the line of Gerard Cassidy with RBC Capital Markets.

下一個問題來自 RBC Capital Markets 的 Gerard Cassidy。

Jeremy, in your comments about your CET1 ratio, obviously, came in strong at 13.8%. You've got the G-SIB buffers obviously going up next year. And we have the stress test coming this summer or in June, the results, which maybe will lead to banks including yours having a higher stress capital buffer. Where should we think about that CET1 ratio being by the end of the year, do you think?

傑里米，在你對你的 CET1 比率的評論中，很明顯，13.8% 表現強勁。明年 G-SIB 緩衝區明顯上升。我們將在今年夏天或 6 月進行壓力測試，結果可能會導致包括你們在內的銀行擁有更高的壓力資本緩衝。您認為到年底我們應該在哪裡考慮 CET1 比率？

Yes. So a few things on there, Gerard. So we have previously said that we were targeting 13.5% in the first quarter of '24 as a function of assuming an unchanged SCB, the increased G-SIB step and operating with a 50 basis point buffer. So the point that Jamie made a second ago, in light of the environment, Basel IV, dry powder, who knows how we'll tweak that going forward. But that's still our base case assumption.

是的。杰拉德，這裡有幾件事。因此，我們之前曾說過，我們的目標是在 24 年第一季度實現 13.5% 的目標，這是假設 SCB 不變、G-SIB 步幅增加並以 50 個基點的緩衝運行。因此，傑米在一秒鐘前提出的觀點是，鑑於環境、巴塞爾協議 IV、幹火藥，誰知道我們將如何調整這一點。但這仍然是我們的基本情況假設。

Specifically, on the stress test, I'll -- contrary to what I've heard some people argue, our ability to predict the SCB ahead of time from running our own process is actually quite limited. And you'll remember last year that even though we did predict an increase, we were off by almost a factor of 2 in terms of how big it wound up being and that was a big surprise for the whole industry. So we want to be quite humble about our ability to predict the SCB.

具體來說，在壓力測試中，我會 - 與我聽到一些人爭論的相反，我們通過運行我們自己的流程提前預測 SCB 的能力實際上非常有限。你會記得去年，儘管我們確實預測了增長，但就最終增長的規模而言，我們幾乎差了 2 倍，這對整個行業來說是一個巨大的驚喜。因此，我們希望對我們預測 SCB 的能力保持謙虛。

But having said that, for right now, we are assuming it will be unchanged. There are some tailwinds in there through the OCI, but we believe there will likely be some offsets in harsher credit shocks in the numbers. So for planning purposes right now, we're assuming flat for SCB and we'll know soon enough what the actual number is.

但話雖如此，就目前而言，我們假設它將保持不變。通過 OCI 有一些順風，但我們認為這些數字可能會抵消更嚴重的信貸衝擊。因此，出於現在的計劃目的，我們假設 SCB 持平，我們很快就會知道實際數字是多少。

Sure. And then just as a follow-up, if I heard you correctly, can you give us a little more color. I think you mentioned in building the loan loss reserve this quarter, you identified some one-off credits. I don't know if that's how you said it. There's some larger credits. Were they commercial real estate orientated? Were they commercial? Any more color there?

當然。然後作為後續行動，如果我沒聽錯，你能給我們多一點顏色嗎？我想你在本季度建立貸款損失準備金時提到，你確定了一些一次性信貸。不知道是不是你說的有一些更大的學分。他們是以商業地產為導向的嗎？他們是商業的嗎？還有顏色嗎？

No, it wasn't commercial real estate. It was just a couple of single name items in the Corporate segment.

不，這不是商業地產。這只是公司部門中的幾個單一名稱項目。

Leveraged loan type items or just regular corporate credits?

槓桿貸款類型的項目或只是普通的公司信貸？

Regular corporate credits. I'd rather not get into too much as you know. (inaudible). Sorry. Thanks.

定期企業信貸。如你所知，我寧願不要深入。 （聽不清）。對不起。謝謝。

The next question comes from the line of Ebrahim Poonawala with Bank of America Merrill Lynch.

下一個問題來自 Ebrahim Poonawala 與美銀美林的對話。

I guess maybe one question, Jeremy, you reminded us of relatively low office exposure for JPM, but obviously, you're big players in the CRE market. So give us a sense of when you look at the two pressure points on, CRE, one, how much is oversupply, and that probably goes beyond office into apartments, how much of an issue is oversupply in the market as we think about the next few years going into a weakening economy? And how much of a risk is higher for long gates in that if the central banks can't cut rates in the next year or 2, we will see a ton of more pain because of the refi wall that's coming up?

我想也許有一個問題，傑里米，你提醒我們 JPM 的辦公室曝光率相對較低，但顯然，你是 CRE 市場的大玩家。因此，當您查看 CRE 的兩個壓力點時，讓我們了解一下，一個，供應過剩有多少，這可能超出辦公室到公寓，我們考慮下一個問題時，市場上有多少問題是供過於求幾年進入疲軟的經濟？如果中央銀行不能在未來一兩年內降息，那麼長門的風險有多大，因為即將出現的再融資牆，我們將看到更多的痛苦？

Yes. So Ebrahim, let me sort of respond narrowly in connection with our portfolio and our exposure, right? So really, the large majority of our commercial real estate exposure is multifamily lending in supply-constrained markets. And I think it's quite important to recognize the difference between that and sort of higher-end, higher price point, non-rent-controlled, not supply-constrained markets.

是的。所以易卜拉欣，讓我對我們的投資組合和我們的風險敞口做出一些狹隘的回應，對吧？因此，實際上，我們的商業房地產風險敞口中的絕大部分是供應受限市場中的多戶貸款。我認為認識到這與更高端、更高價位、不受租金控制、不受供應限制的市場之間的區別非常重要。

So our space is really quite different in that respect. And I think that's a big part of the reason the performance has been so good for so long. So of course, we watch it very carefully, and we don't assume that past performance predicts future results here. But I think our multifamily lending portfolio is quite low risk in the scheme of things.

所以我們的空間在這方面真的很不一樣。而且我認為這是長期以來表現如此出色的重要原因。所以當然，我們非常仔細地觀察它，我們不假設過去的表現可以預測未來的結果。但我認為我們的多戶貸款組合在整個計劃中風險很低。

Just to add also housing is in short supply in America. So it's not massively oversupplied like you saw in 2008.

還要補充一點，美國的住房也供不應求。所以它並沒有像你在 2008 年看到的那樣大量供過於求。

Yes. And then in terms of the office space, as you know, our exposure is quite small. Yes, Jamie has also mentioned all the refi dynamics that you mentioned too, are something that the office space is processing one way or the other. Our office exposure is quite modest, very concentrated in Class A buildings and sort of dense urban locations where the return to the office narrative is one of the drivers is generally in favor of high occupancy. So again, launching it. They're obviously specific things here and there to pay attention to, but in the scheme of things, for us, not a big issue.

是的。然後就辦公空間而言，如您所知，我們的曝光率非常小。是的，Jamie 也提到了你提到的所有 refi 動態，是辦公空間正在以一種或另一種方式處理的東西。我們的辦公室曝光度相當適中，非常集中在甲級建築和人口密集的城市地點，在這些地方，重返辦公室的故事是通常有利於高入住率的驅動因素之一。再次啟動它。它們顯然是一些需要注意的具體事情，但在事情的計劃中，對我們來說，這不是什麼大問題。

And just as a follow-up, I think the other risk from higher for longer rates, I think, is just the ability of the economy, the financial markets to sustain a 5% plus Fed fund for a long period of time. Like what are the other areas you're watching, if duration mismatch and bank balance sheet, being one. CRE market being one. Are you worrying -- worried about nonbanks that have grown exponentially over the last decade in terms of risks at the nonbanks if rates don't get cut? And if you can talk to the transmission mechanism of that coming back and hitting banks given the leverage that banks provide to the nonbanks?

作為後續行動，我認為長期利率上升帶來的另一個風險只是經濟能力，金融市場在很長一段時間內維持 5% 以上的聯邦基金利率。就像您正在關注的其他領域一樣，如果持續時間不匹配和銀行資產負債表是一個。 CRE市場就是其中之一。你是否擔心 - 如果利率不降低，非銀行機構的風險在過去十年中呈指數級增長？鑑於銀行向非銀行機構提供的槓桿作用，您是否可以談談這種回流並打擊銀行的傳導機制？

Yes. So I'd like to answer that. So there is a risk of higher rates for longer. And don't just think of just the Fed funds rate because I think you should -- for our planning, I'd be thinking more about, it could be 6 and don't -- and then think about the 5- and 10-year rate, which could be 5. And I think if those things happen, I'm not saying they're going to happen. I just think people should prepare for them. They saw what just happened when rates went up beyond people's expectations. You had the guilt problem in London. You had some of the banks here. People need to be prepared for the potential of higher rates for longer.

是的。所以我想回答這個問題。因此，利率可能會持續更長的時間。不要只考慮聯邦基金利率，因為我認為你應該——為了我們的計劃，我會更多地考慮，它可能是 6，也可能不是——然後考慮 5 和 10 -年率，可能是 5。我認為如果這些事情發生，我並不是說它們會發生。我只是認為人們應該為他們做好準備。當利率超出人們的預期時，他們看到了剛剛發生的事情。你在倫敦有罪惡感。你在這裡有一些銀行。人們需要為更高利率可能持續更長的時間做好準備。

If and when that happens, it will address problems in the economy for those who are too exposed to floating rates or those who are too exposed to refi risk. That -- those exposures will be in multiple parts of the economy. So now that I say to all of our clients, now would be the time to fix it. Do not put yourself in a position where that risk is excessive for your company, your business, your investment pools, et cetera. That's answer number one.

如果發生這種情況，它將解決那些過於暴露於浮動利率或過於暴露於再融資風險的人的經濟問題。那 - 這些風險將涉及經濟的多個部分。所以現在我對我們所有的客戶說，現在是解決它的時候了。不要讓自己處於對公司、業務、投資池等風險過大的境地。這是第一個答案。

Number two is, it will not come back to JPMorgan, okay? While we do provide credit to what you call shadow banks, it is very -- we think it's very, very secure. That does not mean it won't come back to other credit providers.

第二，它不會回到摩根大通，好嗎？雖然我們確實向你所說的影子銀行提供信貸，但它非常——我們認為它非常、非常安全。這並不意味著它不會返回給其他信貸提供者。

The next question comes from the line of Mike Mayo with Wells Fargo Securities.

下一個問題來自 Mike Mayo 與 Wells Fargo Securities 的對話。

Jeremy, you mentioned a degree of reintermediation to the lending markets. You said capital markets activity has gone to bank lending. And I'm just wondering, as part of your $7 billion increased NII guide, are you assuming better loan spreads? And on the topic of the loan pricing, why aren't your credit card yields going higher than where they are today?

傑里米，你提到了對借貸市場的一定程度的再中介化。你說資本市場活動已經轉向銀行貸款。我只是想知道，作為你增加 70 億美元的 NII 指南的一部分，你是否假設更好的貸款利差？關於貸款定價的話題，為什麼您的信用卡收益率沒有比現在高？

Yes, Mike. So on the -- so I think, yes, you're referring to my comments that I made in the Commercial Bank about the fact that the larger corporate segment within the Commercial Bank that would generally have access to capital markets, but also access to bank lending that the margin is choosing to draw down on revolvers right now rather than access to capital markets.

是的，邁克。所以關於 - 所以我認為，是的，你指的是我在商業銀行所做的評論，即商業銀行內較大的公司部門通常可以進入資本市場，但也可以進入保證金選擇立即提取循環貸款而不是進入資本市場的銀行貸款。

That is not a particularly meaningful driver of the increase in NII guidance. There's a lot of odds and ends in there, but the major drivers are the ones that I called out. And to be honest, I haven't actually, specifically, checked what's happening with Card yields. I would imagine that they've gone up a little bit in line with rates. But I don't know. We should follow up.

這並不是 NII 指南增加的特別有意義的驅動因素。那裡有很多零碎的東西，但主要的驅動因素是我提到的那些。老實說，我實際上並沒有具體檢查卡片收益的情況。我想他們會隨著利率上漲一點點。但我不知道。我們應該跟進。

All right. And then one for you, Jamie. I guess taking the 10,000-foot level, I guess, when you look at asset liability management or AUM, you could call this nightmare on Elm Street, and you've seen some big problems at banks. And I guess, how would you evaluate yourself, I guess, with this $7 billion higher NII guide [which is] probably is good. But to what degree are you willing to sacrifice JPM shareholder money to help rescue problem banks that do not get their asset liability management correctly?

好的。然後給你一個，傑米。我想在 10,000 英尺的水平上，我想，當您查看資產負債管理或 AUM 時，您可以將這稱為榆樹街上的噩夢，並且您已經在銀行看到了一些大問題。我猜，你會如何評價自己，我想，有了這份價值更高的 70 億美元的 NII 指南，[這] 可能是好的。但是，您願意在多大程度上犧牲 JPM 股東的資金來幫助拯救資產負債管理不當的問題銀行？

Well, there's 2 really different questions. So we've been quite cautious on interest rates for quite a while, and how we invest in our portfolio, what our expectations are, our stress testing. The stress test -- the CCAR stress test as you know, had rates going down. I always looked at rates going up and being prepared to whether or not anything is going to happen. So we've been quite conservative ourselves. And we don't mind continuing to do that because I remind people that having excess capital, you haven't lost it. It's kind of earnings in store. You get to deploy it later and maybe at a more opportune time when the time comes.

好吧，有兩個完全不同的問題。因此，很長一段時間以來，我們對利率、我們如何投資我們的投資組合、我們的期望是什麼、我們的壓力測試都非常謹慎。壓力測試——正如你所知的 CCAR 壓力測試，利率下降了。我總是看著利率上升，並為是否會發生任何事情做好準備。所以我們自己一直很保守。我們不介意繼續這樣做，因為我提醒人們擁有過剩資本，你並沒有失去它。這是商店裡的收入。您可以稍後部署它，也許在適當的時候部署它。

And we're not -- look, we're -- we'd like to help the system when it needs to help if we can reasonably. And we're not the only ones. You saw a lot of banks do that. And I was proud of them. I was proud of them. I think all of us did the right thing, whether ultimately, it works out or not, you could second guess that when it happens. But the fact is I think people want to help the system. And this whole banking theme is bad for banks.

而且我們不是 - 看，我們 - 如果我們可以合理地提供幫助，我們希望在系統需要幫助時提供幫助。而且我們不是唯一的。你看到很多銀行都這樣做。我為他們感到驕傲。我為他們感到驕傲。我認為我們所有人都做了正確的事情，無論最終是否成功，你都可以在它發生時再猜測。但事實是我認為人們想要幫助這個系統。整個銀行業主題對銀行不利。

And I knew that the second I saw the headline. And then you have Credit Suisse. We want healthy community banks. We want healthy regional banks. We want to help them get through this. We have -- remember, Mike, as you pointed out, we have the best financial system the world has ever seen. That does not mean it won't have problems. It doesn't mean there shouldn't be changes made, but I think it's reasonable for people to help each other in times of need. And we all did that during -- all of us did that during COVID. All of us did that -- if you could, those you could did it during the great financial crisis, and I would expect people do that going forward.

我一看到標題就知道了。然後你有瑞士信貸。我們想要健康的社區銀行。我們需要健康的區域性銀行。我們想幫助他們度過難關。正如您所指出的，邁克，請記住，我們擁有世界上最好的金融體系。這並不意味著它不會有問題。這並不意味著不應該做出改變，但我認為人們在需要時互相幫助是合理的。我們都這樣做了——我們所有人都在 COVID 期間這樣做了。我們所有人都這樣做了——如果可以的話，那些在金融危機期間可以做到的人，我希望人們在未來這樣做。

Jamie, your CEO letter said the banking crisis isn't over. So what do you mean by that? Or was that dated 2 weeks later or you talking contagion or what?

傑米，你在首席執行官的信中說銀行業危機還沒有結束。那你是什麼意思？或者那是 2 週後的日期還是你在說傳染病之類的？

So it's just -- the number of banks off-site, you can count in your hands in terms of like too much intra exposure, too much ATM, too much uninsured deposits. And so there may be additional bank deposits -- I mean, bank failure, something like that, which we don't know. But you're going to see next week, regional banks have pretty good numbers. A lot of people are going to have -- can take actions to remediate some of the issues they may have going forward.

所以這只是 - 異地銀行的數量，您可以根據太多的內部風險，太多的 ATM，太多的未保險存款來計算。因此可能會有額外的銀行存款——我的意思是，銀行倒閉之類的，我們不知道。但下週你會看到，地區性銀行的數據相當不錯。很多人將會 - 可以採取行動來解決他們可能會遇到的一些問題。

You've already seen things calm down quite a bit, particularly in deposit flows. Warren Buffett was on TV talking about that he would bet $1 million, I don't know if you saw that, that no depositor will lose money in America. That he's going to bids all money, of course, is a very bright man. So this crisis is not '08. It will pass. And the one thing I pointed out is that when I answered the question just before about interest rates, people need to be prepared. They shouldn't pray that they don't go up. They should prepare for them going up. And if it doesn't happen, serendipity.

你已經看到事情平靜了很多，尤其是在存款流動方面。沃倫巴菲特在電視上說他會下注 100 萬美元，我不知道你是否看到了，在美國沒有儲戶會虧錢。他要競標所有的錢，當然，這是一個非常聰明的人。所以這場危機不是'08'。會過去的。我指出的一件事是，當我之前回答有關利率的問題時，人們需要做好準備。他們不應該祈禱他們不上去。他們應該為他們上去做準備。如果它沒有發生，那就是意外發現。

The next question comes from the line of Betsy Graseck with Morgan Stanley.

下一個問題來自 Betsy Graseck 與摩根士丹利的對話。

I do want to unpack the question here on the possibility of higher for longer rates and how that impacts you in your nonmarkets NII...

我確實想在這裡解決這個問題，即更高利率的可能性以及這對您的非市場 NII 有何影響……

Betsy, did we just lose you? I feel like you just dropped.

貝琪，我們剛剛失去你了嗎？我覺得你剛剛掉線了。

Can you now hear me? Hello?

你現在能聽到我說話嗎？你好？

Yes, you're back now. You're back.

是的，你現在回來了。你回來了。

Okay. So I just wanted to unpack the higher for longer rate possibility as to how it impacts your NII because your NII guide is assuming the forward curve, if I understand correctly. So in the event that you get that higher for longer, just how much does that impact the NII ex-markets? Because I'm trying to triangulate here about maybe you lose some deposits, but if we have higher for longer, shouldn't we expect the trajectory goes up from this quarter as opposed to down? Is that -- that's the question.

好的。因此，如果我理解正確的話，我只是想了解它如何影響您的 NII 的更高利率可能性，因為您的 NII 指南假設了前向曲線。因此，如果您在更長時間內獲得更高的價格，那麼這對 NII 前市場的影響有多大？因為我試圖在這裡進行三角測量，也許你會損失一些存款，但如果我們的存款持續時間更長，我們不應該期望軌跡從本季度開始上升而不是下降嗎？那是——這就是問題所在。

You can go ahead, Jeremy. And I'll...

你可以繼續，傑里米。而我會...

Sure. So Betsy, your question is very good. And I would say that as the -- like if you look at the evolution of our outlook last year, it was pretty clear that we were very asset-sensitive certainly in terms of sort of 1-year forward EIR-type measure. You also obviously know that our current EIR actually shows a slight negative number, so it tiny bit liability sensitive, and I won't get into all the nuances about why that may or may not be a great predictor in the short term.

當然。所以 Betsy，你的問題很好。我想說的是——如果你看看我們去年前景的演變，很明顯我們對資產非常敏感，當然就某種 1 年遠期 EIR 類型的衡量標準而言。您顯然也知道我們當前的 EIR 實際上顯示出一個輕微的負數，因此它對責任敏感度很小，我不會深入探討為什麼這在短期內可能是也可能不是一個很好的預測指標。

But the point is that the level of rates now is, of course, very different from what it was last year. And at this level of rates, the relationship between our short-term NII evolution and the curve is not always going to be clear in any given moment. It's quite tricky and it can behave in somewhat wonky ways as a function of, again, what I've alluded to a couple of times on this call, the competitive environment for deposits, which is not, in fact, a sort of mathematically predictable thing as a function of the rate curve. So that's why we're emphasizing all the different drivers of uncertainty in the NII outlook. Yes.

但關鍵是，現在的利率水平當然與去年大不相同。在這種利率水平下，我們的短期 NII 演變與曲線之間的關係在任何給定時刻並不總是很清楚。這是非常棘手的，它可能會以某種不穩定的方式表現，再次，我在這次電話會議上提到過幾次，存款的競爭環境，事實上，這不是一種數學上可預測的事物作為速率曲線的函數。所以這就是為什麼我們要強調 NII 前景中所有不同的不確定性驅動因素。是的。

So I would just add, so next quarter, we kind of know already. 2 quarters out, we know a little bit less. 3 quarters out, we know a little bit less. And in '24, we know very little. That number, you can imagine, this is a little inside baseball now, the number that we're talking about for 2024 is not based upon an implied curve. It's based upon us looking at multiple potential scenarios, leveling them kind of out and saying this is kind of a range.

所以我只想補充一點，所以下個季度，我們已經知道了。 2 個季度結束，我們知道的少了一點。三個季度後，我們知道的少了一點。而在 24 年，我們知之甚少。那個數字，你可以想像，這現在有點像棒球，我們談論的 2024 年的數字並不是基於隱含的曲線。它基於我們查看多個潛在場景，將它們拉平並說這是一個範圍。

And you're absolutely correct, you could have an environment of higher for longer that might be better than that. But remember, higher for longer comes with a lot of other things attached to it, like maybe a recession, [taxation], lower vibes. So I wouldn't look at that as higher flows a positive. It might be a slight positive in that line. It would probably be negative in other lines.

你是絕對正確的，你可以擁有一個更高更長時間的環境，這可能比那更好。但請記住，更高的持續時間會帶來許多其他相關因素，比如經濟衰退、[稅收]、低迷情緒。因此，我不會將其視為更高的流量是積極的。這可能是該行的一個輕微積極因素。它可能在其他行中是負面的。

Yes. Got it. Okay. That's super helpful to understand how you think through that. And then the follow-up is just on the buybacks. So do I take your comments to mean that you're on pause now? And if that's the case, what would be the driver of restarting?

是的。知道了。好的。這對理解你是如何思考的非常有幫助。然後後續只是回購。那麼我是否認為你的評論意味著你現在暫停了？如果是這樣的話，重啟的驅動因素是什麼？

Yes. No, we're not on pause now. We're doing a little bit now. We obviously have a lot of excess capital. We also like to buy our stock when it's cheap, not just when it's available. And we're also peering ahead, looking at those a little bit of storm cloud, so we're going to be kind of cautious. So we're going to make this decision every day. We also don't like to tell the market we're doing just so you know.

是的。不，我們現在沒有暫停。我們現在正在做一點。我們顯然有很多多餘的資本。我們也喜歡在股票便宜時購買我們的股票，而不僅僅是在有空的時候。而且我們也在凝視前方，看著那些一點點風暴雲，所以我們會有點謹慎。所以我們每天都會做出這個決定。我們也不想告訴市場我們正在做的只是讓你知道。

Yes. And then can you give us any sense of what Basel IV endgame means to you in your RWAs? How much should we be baking in for this?

是的。然後你能告訴我們巴塞爾 IV 殘局對你在 RWAs 中意味著什麼嗎？我們應該為此烘烤多少？

Yes, Betsy, we really don't have any new information there, right? I mean I think, clearly, if you go back like a year, we were maybe a little bit more optimistic that it might be across all the different levers and all the different pieces of it closer to capital neutral. I think now it feels like it's likely to be worse than that. Hopefully, it's not too much worse than that.

是的，貝琪，我們真的沒有任何新信息，對吧？我的意思是，我認為，很明顯，如果你回到一年前，我們可能會更樂觀一點，認為它可能跨越所有不同的槓桿，所有不同的部分都更接近資本中性。我認為現在感覺可能比那更糟。希望它不會比這更糟。

And I would just remind you that there are a lot of different levers. So in any -- when the NPR comes, that's only going to be part of it. There's going to be other pieces, the holistic review, and it's going to take a lot of time to phase in, and we're going to have time to adjust. So we'll know when we know.

我只想提醒你，有很多不同的槓桿。所以在任何情況下——當 NPR 出現時，這只會是其中的一部分。還會有其他部分，整體審查，這將需要很多時間來逐步實施，我們將有時間進行調整。所以我們會知道什麼時候知道。

I just remember -- they were supposed to be positive in there about how they looked at banks relative to the global economy, which are getting smaller and G-SIFI is supposed to be adjusted for that. So it may vary. We're expecting to go up, but there are a lot of reasons why it shouldn't go up. And JPMorgan, it's not -- there's so much capital. I mean, so you can't look at JPMorgan and say, well it's a capital issue.

我只記得——他們應該對他們如何看待銀行相對於全球經濟持積極態度，全球經濟規模越來越小，G-SIFI 應該為此進行調整。所以它可能會有所不同。我們期望上漲，但有很多原因不應該上漲。而摩根大通，它不是——有這麼多資本。我的意思是，所以你不能看著摩根大通說，這是一個資本問題。

And even the banks, by the way, when you look at it -- even though in some of the banks who have plenty of capital. The issue wasn't capital. It was other things. And so I'm just hoping regulators are very thoughtful. And the other thing is they should [APR] decide what they want on the banking at this point. Because I made it clear. I can look at the banking system today and say that no bank should keep a loan, if possible. That's how much capital is now being required for loans. The loans...

順便說一下，即使是銀行，即使在一些擁有充足資本的銀行中也是如此。問題不是資本。這是其他事情。所以我只是希望監管機構非常周到。另一件事是他們應該 [APR] 在這一點上決定他們對銀行業務的需求。因為我說的很清楚。我可以看看今天的銀行系統，如果可能的話，任何銀行都不應該保留貸款。這就是現在貸款所需的資金量。貸款...

Just based on the current rule set.

僅基於當前的規則集。

Yes, because the market is pricing -- it holds -- the market would take loans at much lower capital ratios than banks are being forced to hold for them. I'm talking about just loans only. And so that's why you're seeing a lot of capital go to -- I mean a lot of the credit go to nonbanks and dramatically, by the way, rapidly and dramatically. And so if you're a regulator, we look it and saying, do I want that? Is that a good thing for the system? If you believe it's a good thing for the system, raise the capital, more credit will go out of the system. That's fine. If that's what they want, that's fine. But they should do it with a forethought, not accidentally.

是的，因為市場正在定價——它持有——市場將以比銀行被迫持有的資本比率低得多的資本比率接受貸款。我說的只是貸款。這就是為什麼你看到大量資本流向——我的意思是很多信貸流向了非銀行機構，順便說一句，速度非常快。因此，如果您是監管者，我們會審視並說，我想要嗎？這對系統來說是件好事嗎？如果你相信這對系統來說是一件好事，籌集資金，系統就會有更多的信貸。沒關係。如果那是他們想要的，那很好。但他們應該深思熟慮，而不是偶然地這樣做。

I like the NII from loans better than the gain on sale. So I'll prefer the former not the latter. Appreciate it.

與銷售收益相比，我更喜歡貸款帶來的 NII。所以我更喜歡前者而不是後者。欣賞它。

The next question comes from the line of Glenn Schorr with Evercore ISI.

下一個問題來自 Evercore ISI 的 Glenn Schorr。

So you talked about in your letter about the regulators avoiding the knee-jerk reaction, which you addressed earlier. I'm curious on your thoughts around how customers have reacted and should react. Now -- and my point -- my question is, consumers can move excess cash balances if they want more insurance. They can do that in a lot of different ways. Move it, treasuries, money market, extra accounts, whatever.

所以你在信中談到監管機構避免了你之前提到的下意識反應。我很好奇您對客戶如何反應以及應該如何反應的想法。現在——也是我的觀點——我的問題是，如果消費者想要更多的保險，他們可以轉移多餘的現金餘額。他們可以通過很多不同的方式做到這一點。移動它，國庫券，貨幣市場，額外賬戶，等等。

The issue -- the question I have for you is on the Corporate side. Have you seen big changes in how corporate treasurers or CFOs are adapting their cash balances and working capital? And should they need to? I appreciate your Warren Buffet comments.

這個問題——我要問你的問題是關於公司方面的。您是否看到公司財務主管或首席財務官在調整現金餘額和營運資金方面發生了重大變化？他們應該需要嗎？感謝您對沃倫·巴菲特的評論。

Yes, Glenn, and sure, we really haven't seen big changes to speak of. And I do think it's just worth saying, I think you're sort of hinting at this a little bit when you talk about the behavior of corporates. But when we talk about responses to the recent events through the lens of uninsured deposits, that's obviously very different if you're talking about large balances of nonoperating uninsured deposits from financial institutions or de facto financial institutions versus normal large corporate operating balances, which is, of course, like core banking business for all of us.

是的，格倫，當然，我們真的沒有看到可言的重大變化。我確實認為值得一提的是，我認為您在談論企業行為時有點暗示這一點。但是，當我們通過未受保存款的視角談論對近期事件的反應時，如果你談論的是來自金融機構或事實上的金融機構的大量非經營性未受保存款餘額與正常的大型企業運營餘額，那顯然是非常不同的，這是，當然，就像我們所有人的核心銀行業務一樣。

When you saw it in Commercial Banking, Payments, Investment Banking and custody, you did see money move -- what I would call, excess cash has moved out. So they have options. What I would call more like operational cash. I think even if small companies, middle market companies, et cetera, that tends to be fairly sticky because you have your loans there, you have your money there. You get more and more competitive in rates. And that's why I think you see a lot of regional banks. They've got sticky middle market deposits.

當你在商業銀行、支付、投資銀行和託管業務中看到它時，你確實看到了資金的流動——我稱之為多餘的現金已經轉移。所以他們有選擇。我更願意稱之為運營現金。我認為即使是小公司、中型市場公司等，它們往往也相當粘，因為你在那裡有貸款，你有錢在那裡。您的費率會越來越有競爭力。這就是為什麼我認為你會看到很多地區性銀行。他們有粘性中間市場存款。

If I lend you $30 million and you have $10 million, you're probably going to be leaving in my bank. And they also are more competitive on the rate for that. So I think you shouldn't be looking at deposits like one class. They just -- there's a whole bunch of different types and analytically, you go through each one and try to figure out what the stickiness is and what the stickiness is and et cetera. And so -- but I think they've already -- as the Fed has raised rates, you've already seen -- that's the reason we expected outflows, both from consumers and corporate customers.

如果我借給你 3000 萬美元而你有 1000 萬美元，你可能會離開我的銀行。而且他們在費率上也更具競爭力。所以我認為你不應該像看一堂課一樣看存款。他們只是 - 有一大堆不同的類型和分析，你通過每一個並試圖弄清楚粘性是什麼，粘性是什麼等等。因此 - 但我認為他們已經 - 隨著美聯儲提高利率，你已經看到 - 這就是我們預計消費者和企業客戶資金外流的原因。

Interesting. Just a follow-up. The other thing that caught my eye in the letter is you mentioned that you're exploring new capital optimization strategies, including partnerships and securitizations. What's different than what you've already been doing for the last 30 years?

有趣的。只是一個跟進。信中引起我注意的另一件事是你提到你正在探索新的資本優化策略，包括合作夥伴關係和證券化。與您過去 30 年一直在做的事情有何不同？

We've got our smartest people figure out every angle to reduce capital requirements for JPMorgan. That's the difference. And we've been doing it, but there are securitizations, there are partnerships. You've seen a lot of the private equity do the life insurance companies. And I expect that we're going to come up with a whole bunch of different things over time. And we'll shed certain assets, too.

我們讓最聰明的人想方設法降低摩根大通的資本要求。這就是區別。我們一直在這樣做，但是有證券化，有合作夥伴關係。你已經看到很多私募股權投資人壽保險公司。我希望隨著時間的推移，我們會想出一大堆不同的東西。我們也會放棄某些資產。

Our final question comes from the line of Matt O'Connor with Deutsche Bank.

我們的最後一個問題來自德意志銀行的 Matt O'Connor。

You guys talked about one of the drivers of the higher net interest income guide this year is due to likely higher credit card balances. And I was just wondering if you could flesh out what changed there on the outlook, say, versus 3 months ago? And I guess, is that a good or bad thing that those balances will be higher than you thought?

你們談到了今年更高的淨利息收入指南的驅動因素之一是信用卡餘額可能更高。我只是想知道你是否可以具體說明與 3 個月前相比，前景發生了什麼變化？我想，這些餘額會比你想像的要高是好事還是壞事？

Yes. So the story there is kind of the same story we've been talking about for a while. It's just a matter of degree. So we had revolving balances obviously drop a lot during the pandemic period, and then we talked about having them recover in absolute dollar terms to the same level as we had pre-pandemic. So I think happened last quarter. And then the remaining narrative is just the further normalization of the revolve per account because we also have seen some account growth, and that continues to happen. And so -- and yes, we also to Mike's question earlier, we're seeing higher yield there as well.

是的。所以那裡的故事有點像我們一直在談論的故事。這只是程度的問題。因此，在大流行期間，我們的循環餘額明顯下降了很多，然後我們談到讓它們以絕對美元計算恢復到與大流行前相同的水平。所以我認為發生在上個季度。然後剩下的敘述只是每個賬戶循環的進一步正常化，因為我們也看到了一些賬戶增長，而且這種情況還在繼續發生。所以——是的，我們之前也回答了邁克的問題，我們也看到了更高的收益率。

So -- and on your question of whether it's good or bad, obviously, there is a point at which the consumers have too much leverage. We don't see that yet. So...

所以——關於你的好壞問題，很明顯，消費者有太多的影響力。我們還沒有看到。所以...

It's normalization. That's a good thing for us.

這是常態化。這對我們來說是件好事。

Okay. And then just separately to squeeze in. You guys took some security losses again this quarter. And in the past, you've talked about really just going security by security, looking for kind of pricing opportunities. Is that kind of what drove it again this quarter? Or is there some kind of broader launching....

好的。然後就單獨擠進去。你們本季度再次遭受了一些安全損失。在過去，你談到了真正的安全安全，尋找某種定價機會。這是本季度再次推動它的原因嗎？或者是否有某種更廣泛的發布......

And that will be every quarter for the rest of our lives. So we find rich, and we buy, we think, is dear.

這將是我們餘生的每個季度。所以我們發現有錢，我們買，我們認為，很貴。

We have no further questions.

我們沒有其他問題了。

Excellent. Well, thank you very much.

出色的。好的，謝謝。

That concludes today's conference. Thank you all for your participation. You may disconnect at this time.

今天的會議到此結束。謝謝大家的參與。此時您可以斷開連接。