摩根大通 (JPM) 2022 Q4 法說會逐字稿

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to JPMorgan Chase's Fourth Quarter 2022 Earnings Call. This call is being recorded. (Operator Instructions)

早上好，女士們，先生們。歡迎來到摩根大通 2022 年第四季度財報電話會議。此通話正在錄音中。 （操作員說明）

We will now go live to the presentation. Please stand by. At this time, I would like to turn the call over to JPMorgan Chase's Chairman and CEO, Jamie Dimon; and Chief Financial Officer, Jeremy Barnum. Mr. Barnum, please go ahead.

我們現在將進行演示。請待命。在這個時候，我想把電話轉給摩根大通的董事長兼首席執行官傑米戴蒙；和首席財務官傑里米·巴納姆 (Jeremy Barnum)。巴納姆先生，請繼續。

Thank you very much. Good morning, everyone. The presentation is available on our website, and please refer to the disclaimer on the back.

非常感謝你。大家，早安。該演示文稿可在我們的網站上找到，請參閱背面的免責聲明。

Starting on Page 1. The firm reported net income of $11 billion, EPS of $3.57, on revenue of $35.6 billion and delivered an ROTCE of 20%. This quarter, we had 2 significant items in Corporate, a $914 million gain on the sale of Visa B shares, offset by $874 million of net investment securities loss.

從第 1 頁開始。該公司公佈的淨收入為 110 億美元，每股收益為 3.57 美元，收入為 356 億美元，ROTCE 為 20%。本季度，我們在公司有 2 個重要項目，出售 Visa B 股獲得 9.14 億美元的收益，被 8.74 億美元的淨投資證券損失所抵消。

Touching on a few highlights. Combined credit and debit spend is up 9% year-on-year, with growth in both discretionary and nondiscretionary spending. We ended the year ranked at #1 for global IB fees with a wallet share of 8%, and credit continues to normalize, but actual performance remains strong across the company.

觸及幾個亮點。信貸和借記支出合計同比增長 9%，可自由支配和非自由支配支出均有所增長。我們以 8% 的錢包份額在全球 IB 費用中排名第一，信貸繼續正常化，但整個公司的實際表現仍然強勁。

On Page 2, we have more on our fourth quarter results. Revenue of $35.6 billion was up $5.2 billion or 17% year-on-year. NII ex Markets was up $8.4 billion or 72% driven by higher rates. NIR ex Markets was down $3.5 billion or 26%, predominantly driven by lower IB fees as well as management and performance fees in AWM, lower Auto lease income and Home Lending production revenue. And Markets revenue was up $382 million or 7% year-on-year.

在第 2 頁，我們有更多關於第四季度業績的信息。收入為 356 億美元，按年增加 52 億美元或 17%。 NII ex Markets 在利率上升的推動下上漲了 84 億美元或 72%。 NIR ex Markets 下降了 35 億美元或 26%，這主要是由於 IB 費用以及 AWM 的管理和績效費用下降，汽車租賃收入和房屋貸款生產收入下降。市場收入同比增長 3.82 億美元或 7%。

Expenses of $19 billion were up $1.1 billion or 6% year-on-year, primarily driven by higher structural expense and investments. And credit costs of $2.3 billion included net charge-offs of $887 million. The net reserve build of $1.4 billion was driven by updates to the firm's macroeconomic outlook, which now reflects a mild recession in the central case as well as loan growth in card services, partially offset by a reduction in pandemic-related uncertainty.

支出 190 億美元，同比增長 11 億美元或 6%，這主要是由於結構性支出和投資增加所致。 23 億美元的信貸成本包括 8.87 億美元的淨註銷。 14 億美元的淨儲備金增加是由公司宏觀經濟前景的更新推動的，該前景現在反映了中央案例的溫和衰退以及信用卡服務的貸款增長，部分被與大流行相關的不確定性的減少所抵消。

Looking at the full year results on Page 3. The firm reported net income of $37.7 billion, EPS of $12.09 and record revenue of $132.3 billion, and we delivered an ROTCE of 18%. On the balance sheet and capital on Page 4, we ended the quarter with a CET1 ratio of 13.2%, up 70 basis points, primarily driven by the benefit of net income, including the sale of Visa B shares less distributions, AOCI gains and lower RWA.

查看第 3 頁的全年業績。該公司公佈的淨收入為 377 億美元，每股收益為 12.09 美元，收入創紀錄地達到 1323 億美元，我們的 ROTCE 為 18%。在第 4 頁的資產負債表和資本中，我們以 13.2% 的 CET1 比率結束了本季度，上升了 70 個基點，這主要是受淨收入收益的推動，包括出售 Visa B 股減去分配、AOCI 收益和較低風險加權資產。

RWA declined approximately $20 billion quarter-on-quarter, reflecting lower RWA in the Markets business, which was partially offset by an increase in lending, primarily in card services. Recall that we had a 13% CET1 target for the first quarter of 2023, which we have now reached 1 quarter early. So given that, we expect to resume share repurchases this quarter.

風險加權資產環比下降約 200 億美元，反映出市場業務的風險加權資產較低，但部分被貸款（主要是卡服務）的增加所抵消。回想一下，我們在 2023 年第一季度設定了 13% 的 CET1 目標，現在我們已經提前一個季度實現了這一目標。因此，鑑於此，我們預計本季度將恢復股票回購。

Now let's go to our businesses, starting on Page 5. Starting with a quick update on the health of U.S. consumers and small businesses based on our data. They are generally on solid footing, although sentiment for both reflects recessionary concerns not yet fully reflected in our data.

現在讓我們從第 5 頁開始介紹我們的業務。首先根據我們的數據快速更新美國消費者和小型企業的健康狀況。它們總體上處於穩固的基礎上，儘管兩者的情緒都反映了尚未完全反映在我們的數據中的經濟衰退擔憂。

Combined debit and credit spend is up 9% year-on-year. Both discretionary and nondiscretionary spend are up year-on-year, the strongest growth in discretionary being travel. Retail spend is up 4% on the back of a particularly strong fourth quarter last year. E-commerce spend was up 7%, while in-person spend was roughly flat.

借記和貸記支出合計同比增長 9%。可自由支配和非自由支配支出均同比增長，其中增長最強勁的是旅行。由於去年第四季度表現尤為強勁，零售支出增長了 4%。電子商務支出增長了 7%，而面對面支出大致持平。

Cash buffers for both consumers and small businesses continue to slowly normalize, with lower income segments and smaller businesses normalizing faster. Consumer cash buffers for the lower income segments are expected to be back to pre-pandemic levels by the third quarter of this year.

消費者和小型企業的現金緩衝繼續緩慢正常化，低收入群體和小型企業正常化速度更快。預計到今年第三季度，低收入群體的消費者現金緩衝將恢復到大流行前的水平。

Now moving to financial results. This quarter, CCB reported net income of $4.5 billion on revenue of $15.8 billion, which was up 29% year-on-year. You'll notice in our presentation that we renamed Consumer & Business Banking to Banking & Wealth Management. Starting there, revenue was up 56% year-on-year, driven by higher NII on higher rates.

現在轉向財務結果。本季度，建行報告淨利潤為 45 億美元，營收為 158 億美元，同比增長 29%。您會在我們的演示文稿中註意到，我們將消費者與商業銀行業務重命名為銀行與財富管理。從那裡開始，收入同比增長 56%，這是由於更高的 NII 和更高的利率推動的。

Deposits were down 3% quarter-on-quarter as spend remains strong and the rate cycle plays out, with outflows being partially offset by new relationships. Client investment assets were down 10% year-on-year, driven by market performance, partially offset by net inflows, where we are seeing good momentum, including from our deposit customers. Home Lending revenue was down 46% year-on-year, largely driven by lower production revenue.

由於支出依然強勁且利率週期結束，存款環比下降 3%，新關係部分抵消了資金流出。在市場表現的推動下，客戶投資資產同比下降 10%，部分被淨流入所抵消，我們看到良好的勢頭，包括我們的存款客戶。房屋貸款收入同比下降 46%，這主要是由於生產收入下降所致。

Moving to Card Services & Auto. Revenue was up 12% year-on-year, predominantly driven by higher card services NII on higher revolving balances, partially offset by lower Auto lease income. Card outstandings were up 19%. Total revolving balances were up 20%, and we are now back to pre-pandemic levels. However, revolving balances per account are still below pre-pandemic levels, which should be a tailwind in 2023. And then Auto originations were $7.5 billion, down 12%. Expenses of $8 billion were up 3% year-on-year, primarily driven by investments as well as higher compensation, largely offset by Auto lease depreciation from lower volumes.

轉向卡服務和汽車。收入同比增長 12%，主要是由於循環餘額增加導致卡服務 NII 增加，部分被較低的汽車租賃收入所抵消。信用卡未償還額增長了 19%。循環餘額總額增加了 20%，我們現在回到了大流行前的水平。然而，每個賬戶的循環餘額仍低於大流行前的水平，這在 2023 年應該是有利因素。然後汽車發起為 75 億美元，下降 12%。 80 億美元的費用同比增長 3%，主要受投資和更高薪酬的推動，這在很大程度上被汽車租賃折舊因銷量下降所抵消。

In terms of credit performance this quarter. Credit costs were $1.8 billion, reflecting reserve builds of $800 million in Card and $200 million in Home Lending and net charge-offs of $845 million, up $330 million year-on-year.

在本季度的信用表現方面。信貸成本為 18 億美元，反映出 8 億美元的信用卡儲備金和 2 億美元的房屋貸款儲備金以及 8.45 億美元的淨註銷，同比增加 3.3 億美元。

Next, the CIB on Page 6. CIB reported net income of $3.3 billion on revenue of $10.5 billion for the fourth quarter. Investment Banking revenue of $1.4 billion was down 57% year-on-year. IB fees were down 58%, in line with the market. In Advisory, fees were down 53%, reflecting lower announced activity earlier in the year. Our underwriting businesses were affected by market conditions, resulting in fees down 58% for debt and down 69% for equity.

接下來是第 6 頁的 CIB。CIB 報告第四季度的淨收入為 33 億美元，收入為 105 億美元。投資銀行業務收入為 14 億美元，同比下降 57%。 IB 費用下降了 58%，與市場一致。在諮詢業務中，費用下降了 53%，反映出今年早些時候宣布的活動有所減少。我們的承銷業務受到市場狀況的影響，導致債務費用下降 58%，股權費用下降 69%。

In terms of the outlook, the dynamics remain the same. Pipeline is relatively robust, but conversion is very sensitive to market conditions and sentiment about the economic outlook. Also note that it will be a difficult compare against last year's first quarter.

就前景而言，動態保持不變。管道相對強勁，但轉換對市場狀況和對經濟前景的情緒非常敏感。另請注意，與去年第一季度相比，這將是一個困難。

Moving to Markets. Revenue was $5.7 billion, up 7% year-on-year, driven by the strength in our macro franchise. Fixed Income was up 12% as elevated volatility drove strong client activity, particularly in rates and currencies in emerging markets, while securitized products continue to be challenged by the market environment Equity markets was relatively flat against a strong fourth quarter last year.

轉向市場。收入為 57 億美元，同比增長 7%，這得益於我們宏觀特許經營的實力。固定收益增長 12%，因為波動加劇推動客戶活動強勁，尤其是在新興市場的利率和貨幣方面，而證券化產品繼續受到市場環境的挑戰與去年第四季度的強勁表現相比，股票市場相對平穩。

Payments revenue was $2.1 billion, up 15% year-on-year. Excluding the net impact of equity investments, it was up 56%, and the year-on-year growth was driven by higher rates. Security Services revenue of $1.2 billion was up 9% year-on-year, predominantly driven by higher rates, largely offset by lower deposits and market levels.

支付收入為 21 億美元，同比增長 15%。剔除股權投資的淨影響，增長了 56%，同比增長是由更高的利率推動的。安全服務收入為 12 億美元，同比增長 9%，主要受利率上升的推動，但在很大程度上被較低的存款和市場水平所抵消。

Expenses of $6.4 billion were up 10% year-on-year, predominantly driven by the timing of revenue-related compensation. On a full year basis, expenses of $27.1 billion were up 7% year-on-year, primarily driven by higher structural expense and investments, partially offset by lower revenue-related compensation.

費用為 64 億美元，同比增長 10%，這主要是由於與收入相關的薪酬的時間安排所致。按全年計算，支出為 271 億美元，同比增長 7%，這主要是由於結構性支出和投資增加，部分被與收入相關的薪酬減少所抵消。

Moving to the Commercial Bank on Page 7. Commercial Banking reported net income of $1.4 billion. Record revenue of $3.4 billion was up 30% year-on-year, driven by higher deposit margins, partially offset by lower investment banking revenue and deposit-related fees. Gross Investment Banking revenue of $700 million was down 52% year-on-year, driven by reduced capital markets activity. Expenses of $1.3 billion were up 18% year-on-year. Deposits were down 14% year-on-year and 1% quarter-on-quarter, primarily reflecting attrition of nonoperating deposits. Loans were up 14% year-on-year and 3% sequentially.

轉到第 7 頁的商業銀行。商業銀行報告的淨收入為 14 億美元。創紀錄的收入達到 34 億美元，同比增長 30%，這得益於更高的存款利潤率，但部分被投資銀行收入和存款相關費用的下降所抵消。由於資本市場活動減少，投資銀行業務總收入為 7 億美元，同比下降 52%。支出 13 億美元，同比增長 18%。存款同比下降 14%，環比下降 1%，主要反映非經營性存款的減少。貸款同比增長 14%，環比增長 3%。

C&I loans were up 4% quarter-on-quarter, reflecting continued strength in originations and revolver utilization. CRE loans were up 2% quarter-on-quarter, reflecting a slower pace of growth from earlier in the year due to higher rates, which impacts both originations and prepayment activity.

C&I 貸款環比增長 4%，反映出發放和循環利用的持續強勁。 CRE 貸款環比增長 2%，反映出由於利率上升導致貸款增速較年初有所放緩，這對貸款發放和預付款活動均有影響。

Then to complete our lines of business, AWM on Page 8. Asset & Wealth Management reported net income of $1.1 billion with pretax margin of 33%. Revenue of $4.6 billion was up 3% year-on-year, driven by higher deposit margins and lower balances, predominantly offset by reductions in management and performance and placement fees linked to this year's market declines.

然後完成我們的業務線，第 8 頁的 AWM。資產與財富管理報告的淨收入為 11 億美元，稅前利潤率為 33%。收入為 46 億美元，同比增長 3%，這主要受存款利潤率提高和結餘減少的推動，這主要被與今年市場下滑相關的管理費和績效費以及配售費的減少所抵消。

Expenses of $3 billion were up 1% year-on-year, predominantly driven by growth in our private banking advisor teams, largely offset by lower performance-related compensation. For the quarter, net long-term inflows were $10 billion, positive across equities and Fixed Income, and $47 billion for the full year.

30 億美元的支出同比增長 1%，這主要是由於我們私人銀行顧問團隊的增長，這在很大程度上被較低的績效相關薪酬所抵消。本季度，長期淨流入為 100 億美元，股票和固定收益為正，全年為 470 億美元。

And in liquidity, we saw net inflows of $33 billion for the quarter and net outflows of $55 billion for the full year. AUM of $2.8 trillion and overall client assets of $4 trillion were down 11% and 6% year-on-year, respectively, driven by lower market levels. Finally, loans were down 1% quarter-on-quarter, driven by lower securities-based lending, while deposits were down 6% sequentially, driven by the rising rate environment, resulting in migration to investments and other cash alternatives.

在流動性方面，我們看到本季度淨流入 330 億美元，全年淨流出 550 億美元。受市場水平下降的推動，資產管理規模為 2.8 萬億美元，客戶總資產為 4 萬億美元，分別同比下降 11% 和 6%。最後，在證券貸款減少的推動下，貸款環比下降 1%，而在利率上升環境的推動下，存款環比下降 6%，導致資金轉向投資和其他現金替代品。

Turning to Corporate on Page 9. Corporate reported a net gain of $581 million. Revenue of $1.2 billion was up $1.7 billion year-on-year. NII was $1.3 billion, up $2 billion year-on-year, due to the impact of higher rates. NIR was a loss of $115 million and reflects the 2 significant items I mentioned earlier. And expenses of $339 million were up $88 million year-on-year.

轉到第 9 頁的企業。企業報告淨收益為 5.81 億美元。收入 12 億美元，同比增長 17 億美元。由於較高利率的影響，NII 為 13 億美元，同比增加 20 億美元。 NIR 損失了 1.15 億美元，反映了我之前提到的兩個重要項目。支出 3.39 億美元，同比增加 8800 萬美元。

With that, let's pivot to the outlook for 2023, which I will cover over the next few pages, starting with NII on Page 10, while I take a sip of water. Okay. We expect total NII to be approximately $73 billion and NII ex Markets to be approximately $74 billion. On the page, we show how the significant increases in quarterly NII throughout 2022 culminated in the $81 billion run rate for the fourth quarter and how we expect that to evolve for 2023.

有了這個，讓我們轉向 2023 年的展望，我將在接下來的幾頁中介紹它，從第 10 頁的 NII 開始，同時我喝了一口水。好的。我們預計 NII 總額約為 730 億美元，NII ex Markets 約為 740 億美元。在頁面上，我們展示了整個 2022 年季度 NII 的顯著增長如何最終導致第四季度達到 810 億美元的運行率，以及我們預計 2023 年將如何發展。

Going through the drivers, the outlook assumes that rates follow the forward curve. The combination of the annualization of the hike in late December, the hikes expected early in the year and the cuts expected later in the year should be a net tailwind. Offsetting that tailwind is the impact of deposit repricing, which includes our best guess of rate paid in both wholesale and consumers.

通過驅動因素，前景假設利率遵循遠期曲線。 12 月底加息的年度化、今年年初的加息預期和今年晚些時候的降息預期相結合，應該是一個淨順風。存款重新定價的影響抵消了順風，其中包括我們對批發和消費者支付利率的最佳猜測。

In addition, looking at balance sheet growth and mix, we expect solid overall Card spend growth as well as further normalization of revolving balances per account and modest loan growth across the rest of the company. We expect that this tailwind will be offset by lower deposit balances given modest attrition in both consumer and wholesale.

此外，從資產負債表的增長和組合來看，我們預計整體信用卡支出將穩健增長，每個賬戶的循環餘額將進一步正常化，公司其他部門的貸款將適度增長。考慮到消費者和批發商的適度減員，我們預計這種順風將被較低的存款餘額所抵消。

But it's very important to note that this NII outlook is particularly uncertain. Specifically, Fed funds could deviate from forwards, balance attrition and migration assumptions could be meaningfully different, and deposit product and pricing decisions will be determined by customer behavior and competitive dynamics as we focus on maintaining and growing primary bank relationships and may be quite different from what this outlook assumes.

但值得注意的是，NII 的前景尤其不確定。具體來說，聯邦基金可能會偏離遠期，餘額損耗和遷移假設可能會有很大不同，存款產品和定價決策將取決於客戶行為和競爭動態，因為我們專注於維持和發展主要銀行關係，並且可能與這種前景的假設。

And further, the timing of all these factors could significantly affect the sequential trajectory of NII throughout the year. That said, as we continue executing our strategy of investing to acquire new customers as well as deepen relationships with existing ones and as we see the impact of loan growth, we would expect sequential NII growth to return, all else being equal. And just to finish up on NII. As the guidance indicates, we expect Markets NII for the year to be slightly negative as a result of higher rates. But remember, this is offset in Markets NIR.

此外，所有這些因素的時間安排可能會顯著影響 NII 全年的連續軌跡。也就是說，隨著我們繼續執行我們的投資戰略以獲取新客戶並加深與現有客戶的關係，並且當我們看到貸款增長的影響時，我們預計 NII 的連續增長將回歸，其他條件相同。並且只是為了完成 NII。正如指南所示，我們預計由於利率上升，今年的市場 NII 將略微為負。但請記住，這在 Markets NIR 中被抵消了。

Now turning to expenses on Page 11. We expect 2023 adjusted expense to be about $81 billion, which includes approximately $500 million from the higher FDIC assessment. Going through some of the other drivers. We expect increases from labor inflation, which, while it seems to be abating on a forward-looking basis, is effectively in the run rate for 2023. An additional labor-related driver is the annualization of 2022 headcount growth as well as our plans for a modest headcount increase in the year, all of which are primarily in connection with executing our investments.

現在轉到第 11 頁的費用。我們預計 2023 年調整後的費用約為 810 億美元，其中包括來自更高 FDIC 評估的約 5 億美元。通過其他一些驅動程序。我們預計勞動力通脹會增加，雖然它在前瞻性的基礎上似乎有所緩和，但實際上處於 2023 年的運行率。另一個與勞動力相關的驅動因素是 2022 年員工人數增長的年度化以及我們的計劃今年員工人數略有增加，所有這些都主要與執行我們的投資有關。

And on investments, while we are continuing to invest consistent with what we told you at Investor Day, it's a more modest increase than last year. The themes remain consistent, and we will continue to give you more detail throughout the year, including at Investor Day in May.

在投資方面，雖然我們繼續按照我們在投資者日告訴你的那樣進行投資，但增幅比去年小。主題保持一致，我們將在全年繼續為您提供更多詳細信息，包括在 5 月的投資者日。

Of course, as is always true, this outlook includes continuing to generate efficiencies across the company. And finally, while volume and revenue-related expense was ultimately a tailwind for 2022, we are expecting it to be close to flat in 2023, which will be completely market dependent, as always.

當然，一如既往，這種展望包括繼續提高整個公司的效率。最後，雖然數量和收入相關的費用最終是 2022 年的順風，但我們預計它在 2023 年將接近持平，這將一如既往地完全取決於市場。

Moving to credit on Page 12. On the page, you can see how exceptionally benign the credit environment was in 2022 for the company across wholesale, Card and the rest of consumer. Turning to the 2023 outlook, for Card net charge-off rates specifically, Marianne gave quite a bit of detail about this at our recent conference, and our outlook hasn't really changed. So to recap that story, the entry to delinquency rate is the leading indicator of future charge-offs. And it is currently around 80% of pre-pandemic levels. We expect that to normalize around the middle of the year, with the associated charge-offs following about 6 months later. As a result, loss rates in 2023 will still be normalizing. So while we anticipate exiting the year around normalized levels, we expect the 2023 Card net charge-off rate to be approximately 2.6%, up from the historically low rate of 147 basis points in 2022, but still well below fully normalized levels.

轉到第 12 頁上的信貸。在該頁面上，您可以看到 2022 年的信貸環境對批發、信用卡和其他消費者領域的公司來說是多麼的有利。談到 2023 年的前景，特別是對於卡片淨註銷率，瑪麗安在我們最近的會議上對此提供了相當多的細節，我們的前景並沒有真正改變。因此，回顧一下這個故事，進入拖欠率是未來沖銷的領先指標。目前約為大流行前水平的 80%。我們預計這將在年中左右恢復正常，相關的沖銷將在大約 6 個月後進行。因此，2023 年的損失率仍將正常化。因此，雖然我們預計今年將在正常水平附近退出，但我們預計 2023 年信用卡淨註銷率約為 2.6%，高於 2022 年 147 個基點的歷史低位，但仍遠低於完全正常化的水平。

So let's turn to Page 13 for a brief wrap-up before going to Q&A. We're very proud of the 2022 results, producing an 18% ROTCE and record revenue in what was a quite dynamic environment. Throughout my discussion of the outlook, I've emphasized the uncertainty in many of the key drivers of 2023 results. And while we are ready for a range of scenarios, our expectation is for another strong performance. So as we look forward, we expect to continue to produce strong returns in the near term, and we remain confident in our ability to deliver on our through-the-cycle target of 17% ROTCE.

因此，在進行問答之前，讓我們翻到第 13 頁做一個簡短的總結。我們對 2022 年的結果感到非常自豪，在一個充滿活力的環境中產生了 18% 的 ROTCE 和創紀錄的收入。在我對前景的討論中，我強調了 2023 年業績的許多關鍵驅動因素的不確定性。雖然我們已為一系列情況做好準備，但我們期望再次取得強勁表現。因此，展望未來，我們預計將在短期內繼續產生強勁的回報，並且我們對實現 17% ROTCE 的整個週期目標的能力充滿信心。

And with that, operator, let's open up the line for Q&A.

有了這個，接線員，讓我們打開問答熱線。

[Our first question] is coming from the line of John McDonald from Autonomous Research.

[我們的第一個問題] 來自 Autonomous Research 的 John McDonald。

Jeremy, I wanted to ask about the NII outlook, Slide 10. The range of outcomes on deposit costs is quite wide. As you mentioned, it looks like 1.5% to 2% demonstrated there. Does the $74 billion NII line up with kind of the midpoint of that? Maybe you could give some color about kind of the drivers of the $74 billion and where that lines up on this range of deposit cost outcomes.

傑里米，我想問一下 NII 的前景，幻燈片 10。存款成本的結果範圍很廣。正如你所提到的，看起來那裡展示了 1.5% 到 2%。 740 億美元的 NII 是否符合其中的某種中點？也許你可以給出一些關於 740 億美元的驅動因素的顏色，以及它在這一系列存款成本結果中的位置。

Sure, John. I mean I wouldn't take the chart on the bottom left too literally. That's just supposed to give a stylized indication of the fact that relatively small changes in deposit rate and paid for the company on average, as you well know, can produce quite significant impacts on the NII.

當然，約翰。我的意思是我不會從字面上看左下角的圖表。這只是應該給出一個事實的程式化指示，即眾所周知，存款利率和平均支付給公司的相對較小的變化會對 NII 產生相當大的影響。

And also that there's, as we've already talked about, a meaningful -- the outlook is our best guess, as Jamie says. And the drivers within that are the usual drivers in wholesale. We would expect to see a little bit of continued attrition, especially of the nonoperating type balances. And you're going to see some internal migration there out of noninterest-bearing into interest-bearing over time.

而且，正如我們已經討論過的那樣，正如傑米所說，前景是我們最好的猜測。其中的驅動程序是批發中的常見驅動程序。我們預計會看到一些持續的減員，尤其是非運營類型的餘額。隨著時間的推移，你會看到一些內部遷移從無息到有息。

In Consumer, CDs are flowing right now, and we're seeing good new CD production. We've got a 4% CD in the market as of this morning. And so continued CD production and internal migration there will be a driver. And the rest of it is -- well, of course, as I said in the prepared remarks, we do expect, across the company, modest deposit attrition as we look forward as a function of QT in the rate cycle and so on. So we've got the best guesses for all of those in the outlook. And of course, the actual outcome will be different in one way or another, and we'll just run the business this year.

在 Consumer 中，CD 正在流通，我們看到了不錯的新 CD 製作。截至今天上午，我們在市場上有 4% 的 CD。因此持續的 CD 生產和內部遷移將有一個驅動程序。剩下的就是——好吧，當然，正如我在準備好的發言中所說的那樣，我們確實預計整個公司都會出現適度的存款流失，因為我們期待利率週期中 QT 的函數等。所以我們對前景中的所有這些都有最好的猜測。當然，實際結果會有所不同，我們將在今年繼續經營。

Okay. And on buybacks, how will you think about approaching buybacks and putting it in that mix of capital decisions that you have? And any thoughts on kind of the size or quantifying the potential buybacks?

好的。在回購方面，您將如何考慮進行回購併將其納入您擁有的資本決策組合？關於規模或量化潛在回購的任何想法？

Yes, sure. So sort of in the mode of like helping you guys out to put a number in the model, if you sort of look at the way we're seeing things, obviously, we've got another GSIB start coming next year. So say, 13.5% target. And the sort of using your estimates, organic capital generation, minus dividends, et cetera, and all of the elements of uncertainty there, I think a good number to use is something like $12 billion of buybacks for this year for 2023.

是的，當然。所以有點像幫助你們在模型中輸入數字的模式，如果你看看我們看待事物的方式，很明顯，明年我們將有另一個 GSIB 開始。所以說，13.5% 的目標。以及使用你的估計、有機資本生成、減去股息等等，以及那裡所有的不確定因素，我認為一個很好的數字是 2023 年今年 120 億美元的回購。

But you know, of course, that buybacks are always at the end of our capital hierarchy. So if we have better uses for the money, those will come first, and the timing and the conditions of how much we do when is entirely at our discretion. And also noting that we are potentially going to see a Basel III NPR sometime in the first quarter or maybe in the second quarter. And while that will be an NPR, it will only cover part of the surface area and it won't be final, so it's unlikely that it meaningfully shapes short-term decision-making. There will be some information content of that release that could shape our decisions as well.

但是你當然知道，回購總是在我們資本等級的末端。因此，如果我們有更好的資金用途，那些將首先出現，而我們在什麼時候做多少的時間和條件完全由我們自行決定。還注意到我們可能會在第一季度或第二季度的某個時候看到巴塞爾協議 III NPR。雖然這將是 NPR，但它只會覆蓋部分錶面積並且不會是最終的，因此它不太可能對短期決策產生有意義的影響。該版本的一些信息內容也可以影響我們的決定。

The next question is coming from the line of Erika Najarian from UBS.

下一個問題來自瑞銀的 Erika Najarian。

Jeremy, my first question is just, as you can imagine, following up on the NII line of questioning. Appreciate that there is a significant amount of uncertainty in this year's NII forecast in particular. But to follow up with John's question, I'm wondering if you could give us sort of more specific guardrails with regards to what you're expecting for deposit attrition and deposit beta in terms of the terminal deposit beta.

傑里米，正如你想像的那樣，我的第一個問題只是跟進 NII 的問題。特別是今年的 NII 預測存在很大的不確定性。但是為了跟進約翰的問題，我想知道你是否可以給我們一些更具體的護欄，關於你對終端存款貝塔的存款損耗和存款貝塔的期望。

I think the feedback I'm getting very early from investors is that they appreciate the headwinds that's occurring for NII this year. At the same time, you have been consistently beating what seems like conservative NII expectations for 2022, including printing a giant $20.3 billion number in the fourth quarter. So that's why I think the more specific guardrails could be very helpful as investors try to figure out what their own expectations are versus that.

我認為我很早就從投資者那裡得到的反饋是，他們對今年 NII 遇到的不利因素表示讚賞。與此同時，您一直在超出 NII 對 2022 年的保守預期，包括在第四季度印刷 203 億美元的巨額數字。所以這就是為什麼我認為更具體的護欄可能會非常有幫助，因為投資者試圖弄清楚他們自己的期望是什麼。

Thanks, Erika. So look, I totally appreciate the desire for more specific guardrails. I would want that too, if I were you. I do think that we're trying to be quite helpful by giving you a full year number which, if we're honest, involves a lot of guessing about how things will evolve throughout the year.

謝謝，埃里卡。所以看，我完全理解對更具體的護欄的渴望。如果我是你，我也會想要那個。我確實認為我們試圖通過給你一個全年的數字來提供很大的幫助，如果我們誠實的話，這涉及到很多關於全年事情將如何發展的猜測。

I think once you start giving guardrails, you implicitly assume that outcomes outside of the guardrails are very unlikely. And that's just a level of precision that we're just not prepared to get into, especially because in the end, as I said, a lot of the repricing decisions that we'll be faced with as a company are -- respond to data in the moment at a granular level in connection with the strategy, which is about growing and maintaining primary bank relationships rather than chasing every dollar of balances at any cost. So in that context, we do expect modest balance attrition across the company for deposits, as I said.

我認為一旦你開始設置護欄，你就會隱含地假設護欄之外的結果是不太可能的。這只是我們不准備進入的精確度，特別是因為最終，正如我所說，作為一家公司，我們將面臨的許多重新定價決定都是——對數據做出反應目前在與戰略相關的細粒度層面上，該戰略是關於發展和維護主要銀行關係，而不是不惜一切代價追逐每一美元的餘額。因此，在這種情況下，正如我所說，我們確實預計整個公司的存款餘額會適度減少。

Jamie, on...

傑米，在...

Erika, thank you. I just want to give a big picture about why I do not consider $74 billion conservative. So the Federal Reserve reduced its balance sheet by $400 billion. $1.5 trillion came out of bank deposits. And so investors can invest in e-bills, money market funds. And of course, banks are competing for the cap of money now. And banks are all in different places. So some banks started competing heavily. Some have a lot of excess cash and maybe compete less.

埃里卡，謝謝你。我只是想大致說明一下為什麼我不認為 740 億美元是保守的。因此，美聯儲將其資產負債表縮減了 4000 億美元。 1.5 萬億美元來自銀行存款。因此，投資者可以投資電子票據、貨幣市場基金。當然，銀行現在正在爭奪資金上限。銀行都在不同的地方。於是一些銀行開始激烈競爭。有些人有很多多餘的現金，可能競爭較少。

But if you look at prior -- and forget what happened in 2016. I think people make a huge mistake looking at that. We've never had queued -- these 0 rates. We've never had rates go up this fast. So I expect there will be more migration to CD, more migration to money market funds. A lot of people are competing for it, and we're going to have to change saving rates. Now we can do it at our own pace and look at what other people are doing. We don't know the timing, but it will happen.

但如果你回顧過去——忘記 2016 年發生的事情。我認為人們在看這個問題時會犯一個巨大的錯誤。我們從來沒有排隊 - 這些 0 費率。我們從未有過利率上漲得這麼快。所以我預計會有更多人轉向 CD，更多人轉向貨幣市場基金。很多人都在爭奪它，我們將不得不改變儲蓄率。現在我們可以按照自己的步調去做，看看其他人在做什麼。我們不知道時間，但它會發生。

And I just also want to point out that even at $74 billion, we're earning quite good returns. And that's not -- and we've always pointed out to you that sometimes we're over earning and sometimes are under earning. But I would say, okay, this time we're over earning on NII this quarter. We're maybe over earning on credit. We maybe under earning in something else. So these are still very good numbers, and we're going to wait and see and we'll report to you, but I don't want to give you false notions how secure it is.

而且我還想指出，即使是 740 億美元，我們也獲得了相當不錯的回報。那不是——我們總是向你指出，有時我們的收入過高，有時收入不足。但我會說，好吧，這一次我們本季度在 NII 上的收入超額了。我們可能已經超過了信貸收入。我們可能在其他方面賺不到錢。所以這些仍然是非常好的數字，我們將拭目以待，我們會向您報告，但我不想給您錯誤的概念它有多安全。

And my follow-up is exactly in that line of questioning. Let's zoom out for a second here. To your point, Jamie, the returns are still good. You mentioned that your outlook already captures a mild recession. And I'm going to reask the question I asked in the third quarter. As you think about 2023, do you think JPMorgan can hit that 17% ROTCE that you laid out in Investor Day, even with the headwind in NII and the headwind on the provision?

而我的後續行動正是在那條質疑線上。讓我們在這裡縮小一秒鐘。就你而言，傑米，回報仍然不錯。你提到你的前景已經捕捉到了溫和的衰退。我將重新提出我在第三季度提出的問題。當你想到 2023 年時，你認為摩根大通能否達到你在投資者日設定的 17% ROTCE，即使是在 NII 的逆風和撥備方面的逆風？

Yes, we can. But a lot of factors could turn that, but yes, we can. I think when we do Investor Day in May, we may give you a more interesting number, which is what do we think our ROTCE will be if we have a real recession, which I think even in a real recession, it would probably equal the average industrial company, which is good. So we're going to give you some detail around that, and those are still good returns, and we can still grow.

我們可以。但是有很多因素可以改變這一點，但是是的，我們可以。我想當我們在 5 月舉辦投資者日時，我們可能會給你一個更有趣的數字，如果我們遇到真正的衰退，我們認為我們的 ROTCE 會是多少，我認為即使在真正的衰退中，它也可能等於一般的工業公司，這很好。因此，我們將為您提供一些細節，這些仍然是不錯的回報，我們仍然可以增長。

And 17% is -- remember, 17% is very good if you compound -- some growth is 17%. Those are extraordinary numbers. And I also want to point, we don't know exactly what capital needs to be at this point, and we have to modify that at one point.

17% 是——記住，如果你複利的話，17% 是非常好的——一些增長是 17%。這些都是非凡的數字。我還想指出，我們目前還不確切知道此時需要多少資本，我們必須一次性修改它。

And Erika, let me just add a very minor clarifying point. I just want to be crystal clear about this. So as you know and as we discussed a lot, like through the pandemic in terms of the way we construct and build the allowance, while it's anchored around our economist central case forecast, which is you correctly say is a mild recession, through the way we weighed the different scenarios and a range of other factors, the de facto scenario that's embedded in the forecast is actually more conservative than that from an allowance perspective. So we just want to be clear about.

Erika，讓我補充一個非常小的澄清點。我只想清楚地說明這一點。因此，正如你所知，正如我們討論過的很多，比如在我們構建和建立津貼的方式方面通過大流行，同時它圍繞著我們的經濟學家中心案例預測，你正確地說這是溫和的衰退，通過這種方式我們權衡了不同的情景和一系列其他因素，預測中包含的實際情景實際上比從津貼的角度來看更為保守。所以我們只想弄清楚。

The next question is coming from the line of Ebrahim Poonawala from Bank of America Merrill Lynch.

下一個問題來自美銀美林的 Ebrahim Poonawala。

I guess maybe, Jeremy, just following up on the credit assumptions underlying. If you could give us a sense of what's assumed in that reserve ratio at the end of the year, be it in terms of the unemployment rate and your outlook around, just a lot of chatter around commercial real estate, the struggles to reprice in the current rate backdrop. Are you concerned about that? Are you seeing pain points in CRE customers given what's happening with cap rates? And then just the overall backdrop today.

我想也許，傑里米，只是跟進潛在的信用假設。如果你能告訴我們年底準備金率的假設是什麼，無論是失業率還是你的前景，只是圍繞商業房地產的很多喋喋不休，重新定價的鬥爭當前利率背景。你擔心那個嗎？考慮到資本化率的變化，您是否看到了 CRE 客戶的痛點？然後就是今天的整體背景。

Sure. Let me just do CRE quickly, Ebrahim. As you know, our sort of multifamily commercial term lending business is really quite different from the classic office type business. Our office portfolio is very small, Class A, best developers, best locations. So the vast majority of the loan balances in commercial real estate are that sort of affordable multifamily housing, commercial term lending stuff, which is really quite secure from a credit perspective for a variety of reasons. So we feel quite comfortable with the loss profile of that business.

當然。易卜拉欣，讓我快點做 CRE。如您所知，我們這種多戶商業定期貸款業務與經典的辦公室類型業務確實有很大不同。我們的辦公室組合非常小，A 級，最好的開發商，最好的位置。因此，商業房地產中的絕大多數貸款餘額都是那種負擔得起的多戶住宅，商業期限貸款的東西，出於各種原因，從信貸的角度來看，它確實非常安全。因此，我們對該業務的虧損狀況感到非常滿意。

And so yes, so then you were asking about the assumptions in credit overall. So yes, as I said, like the central case economic forecast has a mild recession, and if I remember correctly, unemployment peaking at something like 4.9%. The adjustments that we make to the scenarios to reflect a slightly more conservative outlook have us imply a peak unemployment that's notably higher than that.

所以是的，所以你問的是整體信貸的假設。所以是的，正如我所說，就像中央案例經濟預測一樣溫和衰退，如果我沒記錯的話，失業率達到 4.9% 左右的峰值。我們為反映稍微保守的前景而對情景所做的調整讓我們暗示失業率峰值明顯高於此水平。

So I think we have appropriately conservative assumptions about the outlook embedded in our current balances. And the trajectory that we've talked about in the presentation, they're definitely -- can capture something more than a very mild soft lending. But of course, it wouldn't be appropriate to reflect a full-blown hard landing in our current numbers since the probability of that is clearly well below 100%.

因此，我認為我們對當前餘額中包含的前景有適當的保守假設。我們在演示文稿中談到的軌跡，他們肯定 - 可以捕捉到比非常溫和的軟貸款更多的東西。但當然，在我們當前的數字中反映全面硬著陸是不合適的，因為這種可能性顯然遠低於 100%。

Noted. And I guess just as a follow-up on you've managed RWA growth pretty well when you look at like loan growth year-over-year versus RWA, stayed relatively flat. As we think about just managing capital, how should we think about the evolution of RWA? Are there still opportunities to optimize that going into whatever the Fed comes out with on Basel?

著名的。而且我想就像你看到貸款同比增長與 RWA 相比保持相對平穩時，你已經很好地管理了 RWA 增長的後續行動。當我們只考慮管理資本時，我們應該如何考慮 RWA 的演變？是否還有機會優化美聯儲在巴塞爾協議上提出的任何建議？

Yes. So there are definitely still opportunities to optimize. We're continuing to work very hard, and it's a big area of focus. Some of that is reflected in this quarter's numbers, but some of the other drivers of this quarter are what you might call more passive items, particularly in market risk RWA. And yes, but we should be clear that although we've said that the effects of capital optimization are not a material economic headwind for the company, they're also not 0. There are real consequences due to the choices that we're making as a result of this capital environment.

是的。所以肯定還有優化的機會。我們將繼續非常努力地工作，這是一個很大的重點領域。其中一些反映在本季度的數字中，但本季度的其他一些驅動因素是您可能稱之為更多被動項目，特別是在市場風險 RWA 方面。是的，但我們應該清楚，儘管我們已經說過資本優化的影響對公司來說並不是一個重大的經濟逆風，但它們也不是零。我們正在做出的選擇會產生真正的後果由於這種資本環境。

And in a Basel III outcome, that is unreasonably punitive from a capital perspective. There will be additional consequences to that. We obviously are hoping that's not the case and believe that it's not appropriate, but we'll see what happens.

在巴塞爾協議 III 的結果中，從資本的角度來看，這是不合理的懲罰。會有額外的後果。我們顯然希望情況並非如此，並且認為這是不合適的，但我們將拭目以待。

The next question is coming from the line of Glenn Schorr from Evercore ISI.

下一個問題來自 Evercore ISI 的 Glenn Schorr。

I'm curious, I want to talk levered loans for a second. You've done a good job avoiding some of these -- put on these loans for the like the better half of the last half year. So good call on your part. Things have gotten a lot cheaper. However, bank balance sheets, not yours, are still kind of mucked up with a lot of the back book. I'm curious to see if things have gotten cheap enough. Do you consider yourself back in? And how important is this in general for activity levels to pick back up to have available funding from the big banks?

我很好奇，我想先談談槓桿貸款。你在避免其中一些方面做得很好——在過去半年的大部分時間裡，你都為這些貸款提供了資金。你的電話真好。東西便宜了很多。然而，銀行的資產負債表，而不是你的資產負債表，仍然被大量的舊書搞得一團糟。我很好奇東西是否已經變得足夠便宜。你認為自己回來了嗎？一般來說，這對於活動水平回升以從大銀行獲得可用資金有多重要？

Yes. A couple of things there, Glenn. So short answer is we're absolutely open for business there. Terms are better, pricing is better. We have the resources needed. We're fully, fully there. No overhang and no issue.

是的。有幾件事，格倫。簡短的回答是我們絕對在那裡開展業務。條款更好，定價更好。我們擁有所需的資源。我們完全，完全在那裡。沒有懸垂也沒有問題。

Also, I think there's a bit of a narrative that like activity in the market needs to overcome overhang. We're not convinced that, that's true. We think that the overhang is in the numbers and people need to look forward and the system has the capacity to handle the risks. So I recognize your point. I think it's an interesting point, but we are wide open for business and not particularly concerned about the overhang from the perspective of bank's ability to finance activity.

此外，我認為有一些說法認為市場活動需要克服懸而未決的問題。我們不相信，那是真的。我們認為懸而未決的是數字，人們需要向前看，系統有能力處理風險。所以我認同你的觀點。我認為這是一個有趣的觀點，但我們對業務持開放態度，並不特別擔心從銀行融資活動能力的角度來看懸而未決的問題。

Interesting. So maybe a bit [lasting], more so. Okay. Maybe, Jamie, while we have you. In the last annual letter, you talked about low competitive moats and intense competition from all angles, not just fintech. And I was just trying to think out loud. Is that better or worse, that competitive landscape in a much higher rate backdrop? Maybe I'll just leave it at that for you to see where you go with it.

有趣的。所以也許有點[持久]，更是如此。好的。也許吧，傑米，趁我們有你的時候。在上一封年度信中，您從各個角度談到了低競爭護城河和激烈的競爭，而不僅僅是金融科技。我只是想大聲思考。在利率高得多的背景下，競爭格局是好是壞？也許我會把它留在那兒讓你看看你會去哪裡。

I think it's the same. You have the Apples, who are basically doing a lot of banking services and Walmart starting theirs. And obviously, higher rates will hurt some of the folks in the fintech world and maybe even help some folks. So we expect tough competition going forward.

我認為是一樣的。你有蘋果公司，他們基本上在做很多銀行服務，而沃爾瑪則開始了他們的業務。顯然，更高的利率會傷害金融科技界的一些人，甚至可能會幫助一些人。因此，我們預計未來會有激烈的競爭。

The next question is coming from the line of Gerard Cassidy from RBC Capital Markets.

下一個問題來自 RBC Capital Markets 的 Gerard Cassidy。

Jeremy, you mentioned in your payments business that if you took out the equity investment write-downs, the growth was over 50%. Can you share with us on the equity write-downs -- obviously, private equity is going through some challenging times. And I'm assuming that...

Jeremy，你在支付業務中提到，如果剔除股權投資減記，增長超過50%。您能否與我們分享一下股權減記——顯然，私募股權正在經歷一些充滿挑戰的時期。我假設...

It was a gain last year. It wasn't a write-down this year.

這是去年的收穫。今年不是減記。

I got it. Okay. I thought there was a write-down there. Okay.

我知道了。好的。我以為那裡有減記。好的。

Let me make that clear. Sorry about that.

讓我說清楚。對於那個很抱歉。

Very good. Thank you, Jamie. Can you -- sticking just with private equity for a moment, can you share with us where the risks are in the private equity markets to JPMorgan? Is there -- when you think about it from your loan book, or is it really just an equity investments? And maybe expand upon that.

非常好。謝謝你，傑米。您能否 - 暫時只關注私募股權，您能否與我們分享私募股權市場對摩根大通的風險？有——當你從你的貸款簿上考慮它時，還是它真的只是一種股權投資？並可能在此基礎上進行擴展。

Sorry, do you want me to take that? Yes, this is a couple of things. So Jamie is right. The headwind year-on-year is primarily a function of the fact that this is an investment that just because of the measurement alternative accounting standard, we were forced to mark up previously. This is an investment that we got payment in kind as part of the sale of some of our internally developed initiatives. So anyway, it's fine.

對不起，你要我拿那個嗎？是的，這是兩件事。所以傑米是對的。同比逆風主要是因為這是一項投資，僅僅因為衡量替代會計準則，我們之前被迫加價。這是一項投資，作為我們出售一些內部開發計劃的一部分，我們得到了實物付款。所以無論如何，沒關係。

The point is there is a small write-down this quarter. And the important point there is that the core business performing exceptionally well, both because of higher rates, but also because of the strategy that Takis talked a lot over at Investor Day paying off across fees and value-added services and so on and so forth. And I guess throughout your question is like private equity in general and how are we feeling about that space? Did I hear that correctly?

關鍵是本季度有小幅減記。重要的一點是，核心業務表現異常出色，這既是因為更高的利率，也是因為 Takis 在投資者日多次討論的戰略在費用和增值服務等方面得到了回報.我想你的整個問題就像一般的私募股權一樣，我們對這個領域有何看法？我沒聽錯嗎？

That's correct, Jeremy. And just in terms of any lending, obviously, so many of these companies have seen their valuations come down considerably. Is there any elevated risk lending to some of these companies considering the struggles they're having?

沒錯，傑里米。就任何貸款而言，很明顯，這些公司中有很多的估值都大幅下降。考慮到這些公司正在經歷的困境，是否會向其中一些公司提供更高的風險貸款？

Yes. I mean I think that's a risk that we manage quite tightly as a company. Our exposures to the sort of non-bank financial sector are probably defined. And of course, as -- we thought a little bit about what normalized wholesale charge-offs could look like through the cycle. They're obviously higher than effectively 0, which is what we have now. But we feel confident with our credit discipline and what we have on the books.

是的。我的意思是我認為這是我們作為一家公司非常嚴格地管理的風險。我們對非銀行金融部門的風險敞口可能已經確定。當然，因為 - 我們稍微考慮了在整個週期中正常化的批發沖銷會是什麼樣子。它們顯然高於有效 0，這就是我們現在所擁有的。但我們對我們的信用紀律和賬簿上的內容充滿信心。

Great. And then as a follow-up question, you guys did a good job building up that loan loss reserve this quarter. Two questions to that. First, the Shared National Credit exam results are always released in February. Does the reserve buildup takes some of that into account? And second, how much of the reserve build was more of a management overlay versus your base case, the quantitative part of the decision-making for building up the reserve.

偉大的。然後作為後續問題，你們本季度在建立貸款損失準備金方面做得很好。有兩個問題。首先，共享國家信用考試成績總是在二月份發布。儲備金的增加是否考慮了其中的一些因素？其次，與您的基本案例相比，儲備建設中有多少更多是管理疊加，即建立儲備決策的定量部分。

Yes. I mean I'll give you that answer, but I'm oversimplifying a lot. I would say that...

是的。我的意思是我會給你那個答案，但我過於簡單化了。我會這樣說...

Over simplify.

過度簡化。

Yes, yes, I know. I got it. The sort of conservatism of the management overlay did not change, for all intents and purposes, quarter-on-quarter. I think that's the best way to think about that, Gerard.

是的，是的，我知道。我知道了。就所有意圖和目的而言，管理層的保守主義並沒有按季度發生變化。我認為這是最好的思考方式，杰拉德。

And then shared national -- yes, go ahead.

然後共享全國——是的，繼續吧。

The National Shared Credit thing will not affect our results materially.

國家共享信用的事情不會對我們的結果產生實質性影響。

The next question is coming from the line of Ken Usdin from Jefferies.

下一個問題來自 Jefferies 的 Ken Usdin。

I'm just wondering if you can help us understand the ongoing efforts on your mitigation for the RWAs in advance of all the points we've made already about the pending capital regime. How do we -- can you help us understand what type of effects that has, if any, on parts of the income statement, whether it's NII or the trading business?

我只是想知道您是否可以幫助我們了解在我們已經就未決資本製度提出的所有觀點之前，您為緩解風險加權資產所做的持續努力。我們如何 - 你能幫助我們了解對損益表的某些部分有什麼類型的影響（如果有的話），無論是 NII 還是貿易業務？

Yes. So if I just take that one. Just assume we're going to have modest growth in RWA. And in every single businesses, mortgages, loans, derivatives, how we hedge CVA and stuff like that, we take access to manage RWA. Do not -- it does not really affect the business that much. It might one day, but it doesn't affect it today. And so we don't build in somehow we lose a little bit of this, a little bit of that.

是的。所以如果我只拿那個。假設我們的 RWA 將適度增長。在每一項業務、抵押貸款、貸款、衍生品中，我們如何對沖 CVA 等等，我們都可以訪問以管理 RWA。不要 - 它並沒有真正影響業務那麼多。可能有一天，但它不會影響今天。因此，我們不會以某種方式建立，我們會失去一點這個，一點那個。

And there -- and the biggest opportunity down the road will be a reopening in the securitization markets. And they're still very tight. And I think one day, they will reopen.

在那裡 - 未來最大的機會將是證券化市場的重新開放。而且它們仍然非常緊。我想有一天，他們會重新開放。

Okay. And then on the -- one follow-up, just coming back to the reserving process. Can you just help us understand relative to the 5% peak in 3Q that you gave for your unemployment rate quarterly average in the 3.9 average baseline, just where does this fourth quarter reserve get you to? And does that rule of thumb that you kind of gave us last quarter still stand in terms of scenario analysis on potential builds ahead of this mild recession?

好的。然後 - 一個跟進，只是回到保留過程。您能否幫助我們了解相對於您在 3.9 平均基線中為季度平均失業率給出的 3 季度 5% 的峰值，這個第四季度儲備金將讓您達到什麼水平？你上個季度給我們的經驗法則在這場溫和衰退之前的潛在建設情景分析中是否仍然有效？

Can I just make it real simple? The base case, okay, is where it hits almost that 5% unemployment. Then you probability weight other scenarios. That's why Jeremy is saying the reserve is higher than the base case. We didn't change the probabilities in our weighting. But of course, it got worse and the base case got worse. That's all it is, which still is a good benchmark, you'll keep in mind, is if we got to a relative adverse case, all that, a 6% unemployment, we -- and then once you get there, you assume the average weighting, you have wins. It could get better or it could get worse. At that case, we would need about $6 billion more.

我可以讓它變得非常簡單嗎？好吧，基本情況是失業率幾乎達到 5%。然後你對其他場景進行概率加權。這就是傑里米說儲備高於基本情況的原因。我們沒有改變權重中的概率。但當然，情況變得更糟，基本情況也變得更糟。就是這樣，這仍然是一個很好的基準，你要記住，如果我們遇到一個相對不利的情況，所有這些，6% 的失業率，我們——然後一旦你到達那裡，你假設平均權重，你贏了。它可能會變得更好，也可能會變得更糟。那樣的話，我們還需要大約 60 億美元。

When the base case itself deteriorates, we're moving closer to relative adverse, that's all it is. These are all probabilities and possibilities and hypothetical numbers. And if I were you, I'd just look at charge-offs, like actual results. And so -- and we break this out, but it's hard to describe, and every bank does it slightly differently, and every bank has a slightly different base case and slightly different weighting of adverse cases, et cetera. And so we're just trying to make it as simple as possible.

當基本情況本身惡化時，我們正在接近相對不利，僅此而已。這些都是概率和可能性以及假設的數字。如果我是你，我只會看沖銷，比如實際結果。所以——我們把它分解了，但很難描述，每家銀行的做法都略有不同，每家銀行的基本情況都略有不同，不利情況的權重也略有不同，等等。所以我們只是想讓它盡可能簡單。

Yes, I hear you. The challenge this time is that we're going to have the income statement effect way ahead of that charge-off. So we're all trying to just fit for that. But I appreciate that. Thanks, Jamie.

是的，我聽到了。這次的挑戰是我們要在沖銷之前使損益表生效。所以我們都在努力適應這一點。但我很感激。謝謝，傑米。

And once the -- any base case gets to where you expect relative adverse, you'd be adding to $6 billion of reserves before you have charge-offs.

一旦 - 任何基本情況達到您預期相對不利的程度，您將在沖銷之前增加 60 億美元的準備金。

Exactly. Right.

確切地。正確的。

Ken, maybe just out of interest. Implied in your question might be a little bit, to what extent does this quarter's build sort of is a down payment on the $6 billion? And the answer to that question is much less than all of it because a lot of it was driven by loan growth, but in some of it, as Jamie says, is driven by the flow-through of the downward provision in the central case. You could say, subject to the caveat that this is a little bit or not science, that there's some down payment on that $6 billion.

肯，也許只是出於興趣。您的問題可能有點暗示，本季度的建設在多大程度上是 60 億美元的首付款？這個問題的答案遠遠少於所有問題，因為其中很多是由貸款增長驅動的，但正如傑米所說，其中一些是由中央案例中向下準備金的流動驅動的。你可以說，這 60 億美元有一些首付，但要注意這是否有點科學。

The next question is coming from the line of Betsy Graseck from Morgan Stanley.

下一個問題來自摩根士丹利的 Betsy Graseck。

I wanted to understand a little bit about how you're thinking about managing the expense line as you go through this year. I know we talked already about how it's hard to predict NII. Obviously, markets has pushes and pulls. Can you help us understand how you're thinking about delivering operating leverage, where the elements of the expense base are needing to be invested in so you really can't touch? And where there are opportunities to potentially peel back such that if you get a weaker rev line, you can still deliver positive operating leverage?

我想了解一下您今年如何考慮管理費用線。我知道我們已經討論過預測 NII 有多麼困難。顯然，市場有推有拉。您能否幫助我們了解您是如何考慮提供運營槓桿的，其中需要投資費用基礎的元素，所以您真的無法觸及？哪裡有機會潛在地剝離，這樣如果你的轉速線變弱，你仍然可以提供積極的經營槓桿？

Sure. So I mean, as we -- as you know, obviously, we tend to break down our expenses across our 3 categories. And in some sense, the category that you're addressing is the volume and revenue-related expense, which we highlight because it should pretty symmetrically respond to a better or worse environment and thereby contribute to operating leverage.

當然。所以我的意思是，正如你所知，顯然，我們傾向於將我們的開支分解為 3 個類別。從某種意義上說，您要解決的類別是數量和與收入相關的費用，我們強調這一點是因為它應該非常對稱地響應更好或更壞的環境，從而有助於運營槓桿。

So for example, in this year's ultimate outcome, and the number that we want on printing for 2022, the year-on-year change in volume and revenue-related expense, still refining the numbers, we'll probably show you more at the Investor Day, but it's probably close to $1 billion. In other words, year-on-year decline. Whereas next year, we're assuming something more like flat. So while the sort of year-on-year dollar change in the outlook, sort of '21 to '22, '22 to '23 is comparable, the mix is quite different actually.

因此，例如，在今年的最終結果中，以及我們希望在 2022 年印刷的數字，數量和收入相關費用的同比變化，仍在完善數字，我們可能會在投資者日，但它可能接近 10 億美元。也就是說，同比下降。而明年，我們假設情況更像是持平。因此，雖然美元前景的年同比變化，從 21 年到 22 年，22 年到 23 年是可比的，但實際上組合是完全不同的。

And so for example, if we wound up being wrong about the type of environment that we're budgeting for, you would expect a significant drop in the volume and [revenue-related] expense number that's in the current outlook, and that would contribute to operating leverage.

因此，例如，如果我們最終對我們預算的環境類型有誤，您會預計當前前景中的數量和 [與收入相關的] 支出數量會大幅下降，這將有助於到經營槓桿。

For the rest of it, we're always generating efficiency. And we've worked just as hard at that, whether the revenue environment is good or bad. And as you know, we invest through the cycle. And so broadly, our investment plans really should be that sensitive to short-term changes in the environment.

對於其餘部分，我們始終在提高效率。無論收入環境是好是壞，我們都為此付出了同樣的努力。如您所知，我們通過週期進行投資。從廣義上講，我們的投資計劃確實應該對環境的短期變化如此敏感。

Of course, certain types of things like marketing investments in the Card business, in particular, the math of what we expect the NPV of those things to be in the cycle may change in a downturn. And that could produce lower investment, all else equal. But the core strategic investments that we're making to secure the future of the company are not going to get modified because of the ups and downs of both the environment in...

當然，某些類型的事情，比如卡業務的營銷投資，特別是我們預期這些事情的 NPV 在周期中的數學可能會在經濟低迷時發生變化。在其他條件相同的情況下，這可能會產生更少的投資。但我們為確保公司未來而進行的核心戰略投資不會因為環境的起伏而改變……

Okay. And part of the reason for asking is one of the debate points on JPMorgan stock has been around the capital charges, the capital march, and will capital be a bigger burden for you to bear as we go through the next couple of years? As you deliver on the positive operating leverage side, it gives you room to absorb some more capital obviously and still hit those IRR and ROTCE targets on incremental investments.

好的。提問的部分原因是關於摩根大通股票的爭論點之一一直圍繞著資本收費、資本進軍，以及在我們接下來的幾年裡，資本是否會成為你承受的更大負擔？當您實現積極的經營槓桿方面時，它顯然為您提供了吸收更多資本的空間，並且仍然可以在增量投資上達到這些 IRR 和 ROTCE 目標。

Maybe you could help us understand what level of capital increase you could absorb given the operating leverage you're expecting to generate? And maybe that's an unfair question today, and it's a better question for Investor Day, but that's kind of the debate that's out there on the stock.

考慮到您期望產生的經營槓桿，也許您可以幫助我們了解您可以吸收多少水平的資本增加？也許今天這是一個不公平的問題，在投資者日這是一個更好的問題，但這是關於股票的辯論。

I got it. I mean it's a fair question. It's a good question. I'm not going to answer it super specifically. And Jamie may have some views there, too. But let me just quickly say, we've kind of said that we feel quite confident about this company's ability to generate 17% in the cycle. And that's incorporating our sense of the current environment, the operating leverage that you talked about and the expectation of higher capital requirements with the 13.5% target in the first quarter of '24.

我知道了。我的意思是這是一個公平的問題。這是個好問題。我不會特別具體地回答它。 Jamie 可能也有一些看法。但是讓我快速地說，我們有點說我們對這家公司在周期中產生 17% 的能力很有信心。這結合了我們對當前環境的認識、您談到的經營槓桿以及對更高資本要求的預期，以及 24 年第一季度 13.5% 的目標。

The question of whether Basel III end game and other factors increase that number and how much of that we can absorb and still produce those returns is, of course, impossible to answer right now. But I would remind you that it's not just denominator expansion, unreasonable capital outcomes will increase costs into the real economy, which goes into the numerator, too. It's not what we want, but that is a possible outcome.

巴塞爾協議 III 的結束和其他因素是否會增加這個數字，以及我們可以吸收多少並仍然產生這些回報的問題，當然，現在無法回答。但我要提醒你，這不僅僅是分母擴張，不合理的資本產出會增加實體經濟的成本，這也會進入分子。這不是我們想要的，但這是一個可能的結果。

The next question is coming from the line of Mike Mayo from Wells Fargo Securities.

下一個問題來自 Wells Fargo Securities 的 Mike Mayo。

I recognize you're evolving your business model and you're spending money to make more money and that your track record last decade was strong there. But as it relates to the Frank acquisition that's been in the news, I'm just wondering what that says about the financial discipline for the 15 deals that you pursued, the $7 billion of investing each year and the 1/5 increase in expenses over 3 years to your guide of $81 billion in 2023.

我認識到你正在發展你的商業模式，你正在花錢賺更多的錢，而且你過去十年的業績記錄在那裡很強勁。但由於它與新聞中報導的 Frank 收購有關，我只是想知道這對你們進行的 15 筆交易的財務紀律、每年 70 億美元的投資以及 1/5 的支出增長有何影響3 年後 2023 年達到 810 億美元。

So it's really a question about financial discipline. And I know you can't go in details on the Frank deal. And look, you earn the purchase price in 2 days, okay? So I get that. And if there's fraud, there's only -- you can't do anything about fraud, but still, it's diverse management resources and attention.

所以這真的是一個關於財務紀律的問題。我知道你不能詳細說明弗蘭克的交易。看，你在 2 天內就賺到了貨款，好嗎？所以我明白了。如果存在欺詐，那隻有——你對欺詐無能為力，但這仍然是多樣化的管理資源和關注。

So maybe just in the specifics as it relates to the acquisition strategy, like who sources them? Who negotiates them? Who does the due diligence? Who runs it? And ultimately, who's accountable for all these 15 different deals? And when you have investments going across business lines, which is a strength of you guys, but who's ultimately accountable when these investments don't go the way you want to?

所以也許只是在與收購戰略相關的細節上，比如誰來採購它們？誰與他們談判？誰做盡職調查？誰經營它？最終，誰對所有這 15 筆不同的交易負責？當你有跨業務線的投資時，這是你們的強項，但當這些投資沒有按照你想要的方式進行時，誰最終要負責？

And Jamie, you recognized, a couple of years ago at Investor Day, you said, "Look, sometimes you're going to waste money as you're innovating and you're growing." But ultimately, who's accountable when investment doesn't go right, like the Frank deal or another deal or some of the other $81 billion that you expect to spend this year?

傑米，你認識到，幾年前在投資者日，你說，“看，有時你會在創新和成長時浪費金錢。”但最終，當投資不順利時，誰來負責，比如弗蘭克交易或另一筆交易，或者您預計今年花費的其他 810 億美元中的一部分？

Obviously, Mike, that's a very good question, which we're always concerned at. We've always talked about complacency and all things like that. So obviously, when you're getting up to bat 300 times a year, you are going to make -- have errors. And we don't want our company to be terrified of errors that we don't do anything and that the complacency is then burdened by bureaucracy, which is stasis and [death]. So you have to be very careful when you make an error like you cripple the firm.

顯然，邁克，這是一個非常好的問題，我們一直都很關心這個問題。我們總是談論自滿之類的事情。所以很明顯，當你每年擊球 300 次時，你就會犯錯誤。我們不希望我們的公司害怕我們什麼都不做的錯誤，而自滿情緒又被官僚主義所拖累，這就是停滯和[死亡]。因此，當您犯下削弱公司的錯誤時，您必須非常小心。

We are very disciplined, and you see that in a lot of different ways. You see it in our leverage lending book, you see it in the success of our investments, you see it in the quality of our products and services, you see it in our -- in all these things. And it's no different for an acquisition.

我們紀律嚴明，您可以通過很多不同的方式看到這一點。你在我們的槓桿貸款書中看到它，你在我們投資的成功中看到它，你在我們的產品和服務質量中看到它，你在我們的所有這些事情中看到它。收購也不例外。

There are -- so the acquisitions are done by the businesses but it's also a centralized team that does extensive due diligence. So the business does it, the centralized team does it. We've been doing it for 20 years, it's not like we just started doing something like that. And obviously, there are always lessons learned.

有 - 所以收購是由企業完成的，但它也是一個進行廣泛盡職調查的集中團隊。所以業務做，中心化團隊做。我們已經做了 20 年了，並不是我們才剛剛開始做那樣的事情。顯然，總有經驗教訓。

And at one point, we'll tell you the lessons learned here when this thing is out of litigation. But we're quite comfortable. And the people who are responsible are the people in the business. So they -- that business did the acquisition, they are responsible, they report back. And we expect people, when they talk to all of us, is the good, the bad, the ugly. We're never looking for how great everything was. And obviously, this thing in one way or another, it was a huge mistake.

有一次，當這件事結束訴訟時，我們會告訴你在這裡吸取的教訓。但是我們很舒服。負責的人是業務人員。所以他們 - 那個企業進行了收購，他們負責，他們報告回來。我們期望人們，當他們與我們所有人交談時，是好的，壞的，醜陋的。我們從不尋找一切有多好。顯然，無論從哪個方面來說，這件事都是一個巨大的錯誤。

Let me follow up on that. So that relates to the inorganic growth. As it relates to the organic growth, such as in the Payments business, which I know is a focus that cuts across a lot of different business lines. So as you invest more in Payments, which is -- can be a 20 or 30 PE business, which could be great if you got there, who is responsible for that sort of organic investment that cuts across? Sometimes, when you aggregate the data, it's consumer, it's the investment bank, it could be asset management, it could be commercial, it could be everything in the Payments. Who's responsible for those?

讓我跟進一下。這與無機增長有關。因為它與有機增長有關，例如在支付業務中，我知道這是一個跨越許多不同業務線的重點。因此，當你在支付上投資更多時，這可能是一個 20 或 30 個 PE 業務，如果你到達那裡可能會很棒，誰負責那種跨越式的有機投資？有時，當你聚合數據時，它是消費者，它是投資銀行，它可能是資產管理，它可能是商業的，它可能是支付中的一切。誰負責這些？

So just to be clarified. So I would say that Marianne and Jen, when it comes to credit, debit, checks and all the consumer-related stuff; and Takis, which I think you saw in the presentation about payments at Investor Day, reporting to Daniel, and that is on the wholesale payments, merchant processing, a whole bunch of stuff. And those are direct responsibilities. It's quite clear, this is an area that cuts across the company. So it's a payments working group that just spends time on that.

所以需要澄清一下。所以我會說瑪麗安和珍，當談到信用卡、借記卡、支票和所有與消費者相關的東西時；和 Takis，我想你在投資者日的有關支付的演示中看到了，向丹尼爾報告，那就是批發支付、商家處理，一大堆東西。這些是直接責任。很明顯，這是一個貫穿整個公司的領域。所以這是一個支付工作組，只是花時間在這上面。

That working group has not done an acquisition, okay? And if they make -- if they want to invest, which there are cases, by the way, which you -- and you'll see more this year, we decided jointly and all the way up to Daniel and me.

那個工作組還沒有進行收購，好嗎？如果他們——如果他們想投資，順便說一下，你有哪些案例——今年你會看到更多，我們共同決定，一直到丹尼爾和我。

And then last follow-up to my first start, the general comment. I mean this is the third year in a row of about $5 billion of expense growth, and you have Slide 11 there. But -- I mean, that's a lot of certain front-loaded expenses for less certain back-ended benefits. How is your comfort level that you're going to see those back-ended benefits relative to the past?

然後是我第一次開始的最後跟進，即一般性評論。我的意思是，這是連續第三年支出增長約 50 億美元，幻燈片 11 在那裡。但是——我的意思是，對於不太確定的後端收益來說，這是很多特定的前期費用。與過去相比，您將看到這些後端收益的舒適度如何？

Totally. And we tried to show you guys at Investor Day, every branch we open, for every bank that we hire, for every tech thing we do, we're pretty comfortable. There are certain things that's more like infrastructure, like getting to the cloud, stuff like that, which you can't identify all of that. But we're pretty comfortable that we -- if they weren't working, we change them.

完全。我們試圖在投資者日向你們展示，我們開設的每個分支機構，我們僱用的每家銀行，我們所做的每項技術工作，我們都非常自在。有些東西更像是基礎設施，比如進入雲端，諸如此類，你無法識別所有這些。但我們很高興我們 - 如果他們不工作，我們會改變他們。

So we ask ourselves that question every day with adding wealth managers or branches or certain things, so -- and marketing is half of that -- not quite half but half that number. That's a very specific -- for the most part, very specific dollar in, how many dollars out. It's not a guess, and we're pretty accurate at that kind of stuff. And again, if we -- if there's $1 billion that we were spending that didn't give us the return, we'd cut the $1 billion.

所以我們每天都會問自己這個問題，增加財富管理機構或分支機構或某些東西，所以 - 營銷是其中的一半 - 不是一半而是一半。這是一個非常具體的——在大多數情況下，非常具體的一美元進出多少美元。這不是猜測，我們在這類事情上非常準確。再一次，如果我們 - 如果我們花費的 10 億美元沒有給我們帶來回報，我們就會削減這 10 億美元。

Next question is coming from the line of Steve Chubak from Wolfe Research.

下一個問題來自 Wolfe Research 的 Steve Chubak。

So I wanted to start off with a question on the outlook for trading in the Investment Banking businesses. Just Jeremy, given the strong pipelines you cited, I was hoping you can provide some additional color just in terms of what you're hearing from corporate clients, especially in the context of the mild recession scenario you outlined, when you would expect to see some inflection in Investment Banking activity. And similar question on the trading side. You're facing difficult comps in the coming year. We still have QT, rate volatility proxy still elevated. Do you anticipate a significant moderation in trading activity or not?

所以我想從一個關於投資銀行業務交易前景的問題開始。傑里米，考慮到你提到的強大管道，我希望你能根據你從企業客戶那裡聽到的內容提供一些額外的顏色，特別是在你概述的溫和衰退情景的背景下，當你期望看到投資銀行活動出現一些變化。以及交易方面的類似問題。來年你將面臨艱難的競爭。我們仍然有 QT，利率波動率指標仍然很高。您預計交易活動是否會顯著放緩？

Sure. Thanks, Steve. So let's do banking first. So I think the thing that's interesting about banking right now is that the declines have been so significant, obviously, from very elevated levels. But even relative to just 2019, 2022 was a relatively weak year.

當然。謝謝，史蒂夫。所以讓我們先做銀行業務。所以我認為現在銀行業有趣的一點是，從非常高的水平明顯下降如此顯著。但即使相對於 2019 年，2022 年也是相對疲軟的一年。

And as we look into 2023, it's possible that the actual economic environment will be worse than it was in [2022]. That could conceivably make you pessimistic about the Investment Banking wallet outlook. And to be sure, it's not as if we're super optimistic. But it's important to note that part of the issue here is how quickly things change in 2022, specifically with respect to rates as that affects the debt business and valuations as it affects M&A and DCM as well.

展望 2023 年，實際經濟環境可能會比 [2022] 年更糟。可以想像，這可能會讓您對投資銀行錢包前景感到悲觀。可以肯定的是，我們並不是超級樂觀。但重要的是要注意，這裡的部分問題是 2022 年事情變化的速度有多快，特別是在影響債務業務的利率和估值方面，因為它也會影響併購和 DCM。

And one of the sort of necessary conditions for people to do deals or decide to raise capital is just getting comfortable with valuations in the open market. So I think there's a chance that, that actually winds up helping in 2023 in the Investment Banking world. Of course, we don't know. But those are some of the things that we're thinking about.

人們進行交易或決定籌集資金的必要條件之一就是對公開市場的估值感到滿意。所以我認為這有可能最終在 2023 年對投資銀行業有所幫助。當然，我們不知道。但這些是我們正在考慮的一些事情。

Similarly, on the Markets side, obviously, markets had another very strong year, better than we'd expected since the numbers were so strong coming out of the pandemic, we were expecting more normalization than what we actually saw. And 2022 had a lot of themes. I think the active management community did well. That always helps us a little bit. And we had volatility with relatively orderly and continuing markets.

同樣，在市場方面，很明顯，市場又迎來了一個非常強勁的一年，好於我們的預期，因為大流行病後的數據如此強勁，我們預計正常化比我們實際看到的要多。 2022 年有很多主題。我認為主動管理社區做得很好。這總是對我們有一點幫助。我們在相對有序和持續的市場中出現了波動。

As we look towards 2023, maybe some of those themes will be a little bit less obvious, and that could be a little bit of a headwind. But on the other hand, it's not like the volatility is going away. And Markets seem to continue to be quite orderly. And 4.5%, 5% rate environment is probably one where there's more trading opportunities than the 0% rate environment.

展望 2023 年，其中一些主題可能會不那麼明顯，這可能會有點不利。但另一方面，波動並沒有消失。市場似乎繼續井然有序。而 4.5%、5% 的利率環境可能比 0% 的利率環境有更多的交易機會。

So of course, we don't know. We'll see. I think you would have to probably expect some normalization there. It's -- the numbers are really very strong in Markets, but we'll see, we'll see what happens.

所以當然，我們不知道。我們拭目以待。我想你可能不得不期待那裡有一些正常化。這是 - 市場上的數字確實非常強勁，但我們會看到，我們會看到會發生什麼。

That's really helpful color. And just for my follow-up on finalization of Basel III. Sorry, Jeremy, I couldn't help myself here. But in [Bar's] December speech, you strongly hinted at capital requirements moving higher for you and peers. You also alluded in your comments or in response to one of the questions that the finalization of Basel III can potentially be very punitive.

那是非常有用的顏色。只是為了我對巴塞爾協議 III 定稿的後續行動。抱歉，傑里米，我在這裡忍不住。但在 [Bar] 12 月的演講中，您強烈暗示您和同行的資本要求會更高。您還在評論中或在回答其中一個問題時提到，巴塞爾協議 III 的最終確定可能非常具有懲罰性。

Given the absence of the proposal, I was really just hoping you could speak to how your scenario planning for the eventual finalization and any additional detail you can offer on the areas of mitigation. I think the one issue or area of confusion is that one of the biggest sources of RWA inflation is op risk, which can't really be mitigated. So what are the actions that you can take to really offset some of those potential headwinds?

鑑於沒有提案，我真的只是希望你能談談你如何為最終定稿進行情景規劃，以及你可以提供有關緩解領域的任何其他細節。我認為一個問題或混亂領域是 RWA 通脹的最大來源之一是操作風險，這無法真正減輕。那麼，您可以採取哪些行動來真正抵消其中一些潛在的不利因素？

Yes. So Steve, I'd love to get into detail here, but I just think that the question of how to mitigate is really hard to discuss in a lot of detail until we see an actual proposal. And the reason that we talk about potentially punitive increases, I mean, you studied this issue closely, it's just to point out that under the version of the world where you get the worst outcome in all of the different moving parts of this thing, it's a very significant increase to the capital requirements of the system as a whole. And given how strong the system is today, that just like doesn't make sense to us.

是的。所以史蒂夫，我很想在這裡詳細介紹一下，但我只是認為在我們看到實際提案之前，很難詳細討論如何緩解問題。我們談論潛在的懲罰性增長的原因，我的意思是，你仔細研究了這個問題，只是為了指出在這個世界的所有不同移動部分中你得到最壞結果的版本，它是對整個系統的資本要求有非常顯著的增加。考慮到今天的系統有多強大，這對我們來說就像沒有意義。

So we just want to say that. But yes, Jamie, please.

所以我們只想說。但是，傑米，請。

Just, look, you guys know that the operators' capital, the trading book, the CCAR, G-SIFI, all those moving parts, let's just see what they are. We'll deal with them when we get there. And then we'll figure out what we have to modify in our business and stuff like that. We don't think it's necessary to increase capital ratio. We're quite clear on that.

看，你們知道運營商的資本、交易賬簿、CCAR、G-SIFI，所有這些活動部件，讓我們看看它們是什麼。當我們到達那裡時，我們會處理它們。然後我們會弄清楚我們必須在我們的業務中修改什麼以及類似的東西。我們認為沒有必要提高資本充足率。這點我們很清楚。

One of the new numbers we put on the top of the press release was our total loss-absorbing capacity. So we have now almost $500 billion. I mean really, like at one point, when is $500 billion of that, $1 trillion liquidity, all those thing's enough. And so -- but let's just see what it is. They're going to work it through their international laws, their international requirements. We're hoping that America is the same as international. That would be nice. G-SIFI is supposed to be corrected. We'll see if that happens. So let's just see. We don't have to guess. And if the number's too high, we're going to tell you what we're going to do about it.

我們放在新聞稿頂部的新數字之一是我們的總損失吸收能力。所以我們現在有近 5000 億美元。我的意思是真的，就像在某一時刻，其中 5000 億美元，1 萬億美元的流動性，所有這些都足夠了。所以 - 但讓我們看看它是什麼。他們將通過他們的國際法和國際要求來解決這個問題。我們希望美國和國際一樣。那樣就好了。 G-SIFI 應該得到糾正。我們會看看是否會發生這種情況。所以讓我們看看。我們不必猜測。如果這個數字太高，我們會告訴你我們要做什麼。

Just a minor expansion on that, just to expand a bit on Jamie's point, that -- it's important to be clear. There will be time to adjust. Like there's a long road from the NPR to -- so to sort of supports Jamie's point, let's see what it is and then we'll...

只是對此稍作擴展，只是為了擴展 Jamie 的觀點，即 - 明確這一點很重要。會有時間調整。就像從 NPR 到 - 所以為了支持 Jamie 的觀點還有很長的路要走，讓我們看看它是什麼，然後我們將......

The next question is coming from the line of Matthew O'Connor from Deutsche Bank.

下一個問題來自德意志銀行的 Matthew O'Connor。

How do you guys think of the managing of the securities book, given the outlook of lower deposit? Obviously, the yield curve is quite inverted depending on what part you're looking at or most part, frankly. And at the same time, the securities book is cash flowing a lot less than it was a couple of years ago just given the rate environment.

鑑於較低的存款前景，你們如何看待證券賬簿的管理？顯然，坦率地說，根據您正在查看的部分或大部分，收益率曲線是完全倒置的。與此同時，考慮到利率環境，證券賬簿的現金流量比幾年前少了很多。

Yes. So remember, the securities book is an outcome of investing, but basically excess deposits. And you have like $2.4 trillion deposits and $1 trillion of loans and things like that. So -- and we manage it to manage interest rate exposure, all these various things. And so -- and then when you say the size of it, we forecast -- which I'm not going to give you the numbers, we forecast every quarter, what we're going to buy, what we're going to sell, how much is coming in, how much we need for liquidity, and we adjust it all the time based upon deposits coming down and loans and stuff like that.

是的。所以請記住，證券賬簿是投資的結果，但基本上是超額存款。你有 2.4 萬億美元的存款和 1 萬億美元的貸款等等。所以 - 我們管理它來管理利率風險，所有這些各種各樣的事情。所以——然後當你說它的規模時，我們預測——我不會給你數字，我們每個季度預測，我們要買什麼，我們要賣什麼，有多少進來，我們需要多少流動性，我們一直根據存款和貸款等的下降來調整它。

Obviously, what you get to invest in is at much higher rates today. And you see JPMorgan's loss in ACM loan book as a percentage is much lower than most other people. We're kind of conservative there, too.

顯然，今天你投資的利率要高得多。你會看到摩根大通在 ACM 貸款賬簿上的損失百分比遠低於大多數其他人。我們在那裡也有點保守。

I guess a bigger picture question. We've seen such a drop in really 5- to 10-year part of the curve and even further out. And banks aren't really buying, as said, they're selling. And I guess I was wondering if you had thoughts on who's buying and what's driving the rates so much lower than most people thought they should be at.

我想這是一個更大的問題。我們已經看到曲線的真正 5 到 10 年部分甚至更遠出現了這種下降。正如所說，銀行並沒有真正購買，而是在出售。而且我想我想知道您是否想過誰在購買以及是什麼導致利率比大多數人認為的低得多。

Yes, we do. But we should really get the answer, of course, to get that. We look at what everybody is doing, pension plans, governments. We look at every part of the curve. We look at what other banks are doing. I think I mentioned earlier in this call, banks are in different positions. Some may have to sell securities to finance their loan books. We obviously don't.

是的，我們有。但我們當然應該真正得到答案才能得到它。我們看看每個人都在做什麼，養老金計劃，政府。我們查看曲線的每個部分。我們看看其他銀行在做什麼。我想我之前在這次電話會議中提到過，銀行處於不同的位置。有些人可能不得不出售證券來為他們的貸款賬簿融資。我們顯然沒有。

So people are in a different position. And as Jeremy pointed out, it's very important. That yield curve will not be the same 6 months from now than is today. While we use that to kind of look forward, it's not actually our forecast. We know it will be wrong. And with the investment portfolio, we'd be invested where there are opportunities. We bought a lot of Ginnie Maes when there was a 60 OAS spread. We sold -- one of the reasons we take securities losses, that gives you $10-plus billion you can reinvest it when you think of more attractive securities.

所以人們處於不同的位置。正如傑里米指出的那樣，這非常重要。 6 個月後的收益率曲線將與今天不同。雖然我們用它來展望未來，但這實際上並不是我們的預測。我們知道這會是錯誤的。通過投資組合，我們將投資於有機會的地方。當有 60 OAS 價差時，我們買了很多 Ginnie Maes。我們賣出了——我們承擔證券損失的原因之一，當你想到更有吸引力的證券時，你可以將其再投資 10 多億美元。

The final question is coming from the line of Andrew Lim from Societe Generale.

最後一個問題來自法國興業銀行的Andrew Lim。

So the first one on credit quality, thanks for giving us commentary on the shape of NCOs, I guess, specifically for credit cards topping out at the end of this year. Could you give us a bit more color on how reserve builds should shape out this year, I guess, with respect to CECL? I'm guessing that it should top out quite soon. That's my first question, Just assuming all your macro assumptions are unchanged and -- all the macro assumptions are unchanged...

所以第一個關於信用質量的問題，感謝您給我們評論 NCO 的形狀，我想，特別是對於今年年底達到頂峰的信用卡。我想，關於 CECL，你能給我們更多關於今年儲備建設應該如何形成的顏色嗎？我猜它應該很快就會達到頂峰。這是我的第一個問題，假設你所有的宏觀假設都沒有改變——所有的宏觀假設都沒有改變……

Andrew, well, I think we've talked about CECL like quite a bit, and I think there's some decent color there in terms of Jamie's $6 billion over a few quarters in a world where the economic outlook is worse than it is today. We're definitely not going to get into the business of giving you an outlook for sequential evolution of the loan loss allowance. But it's appropriate today and it will evolve as a function of the environment.

安德魯，好吧，我認為我們已經談了很多關於 CECL 的事情，而且我認為在經濟前景比今天更糟糕的世界中，傑米在幾個季度內的 60 億美元資產有一些不錯的色彩。我們絕對不會為您提供貸款損失準備金連續演變的前景。但它在今天是合適的，它將隨著環境的變化而發展。

Sure. Okay. Let's drill down into NII then. I just want to square a few comments you made there, Jeremy. So if I heard you correctly, I think you're still talking about sequential increases in NII, so I guess, looking towards like $20 billion plus for 1Q, maybe even 2Q. So I guess we're hitting about $40 billion for 1H and then a sharp drop off as, say, deposit cost increase and maybe we get a few Fed fund rate cuts as well. Is that the way we should be thinking about it?

當然。好的。那麼讓我們深入了解 NII。傑里米，我只是想總結一下你在那裡發表的一些評論。因此，如果我沒聽錯的話，我認為您仍在談論 NII 的連續增長，所以我想，第一季度甚至可能是第二季度有望超過 200 億美元。所以我猜我們 1H 將達到約 400 億美元，然後急劇下降，比如存款成本增加，也許我們也會降低一些聯邦基金利率。這是我們應該考慮的方式嗎？

Yes, no. So let me uncontroversially say no there, Andrew, just really avoid some doubts. So my comments about sequential increases were to address the sort of obvious conclusion, which you are somewhat correctly drawing from the slide, which is that in a world where we're exiting the fourth quarter run rate at [81], and we're telling our ADX markets or whatever, we're telling you 74 for the full year, there are obviously some sequential declines in there somewhere as a function of what plays out. We're simply saying don't project those into the future in perpetuity. Once things adjust, we will return to normal sequential growth. Does that make sense?

是的，不。所以讓我毫無爭議地說不，安德魯，只是真的避免了一些疑慮。因此，我對連續增長的評論是為了解決那種明顯的結論，你從幻燈片中得出的結論有些正確，那就是在我們以 [81] 退出第四季度運行率的世界中，我們是告訴我們的 ADX 市場或其他什麼，我們告訴你全年 74 年，顯然有一些連續下降，作為所發生的事情的函數。我們只是說不要將這些永遠投射到未來。一旦情況調整，我們將恢復正常的連續增長。那有意義嗎？

Right. Got you. Yes. No, no, no, sure. Absolutely, that makes sense. That's great.

正確的。明白了是的。不，不，不，當然。絕對，這是有道理的。那太棒了。

We have no additional questions in queue. I would now like to hand the call back to Mr. Barnum.

隊列中沒有其他問題。我現在想把電話轉回給巴納姆先生。

That's it. Thank you very much.

就是這樣。非常感謝你。

Thank you very much. We'll talk to you all soon.

非常感謝你。我們很快就會和大家談談。

That concludes today's conference. Thank you all for participating. You may disconnect at this time.

今天的會議到此結束。謝謝大家的參與。此時您可以斷開連接。