摩根大通 (JPM) 2023 Q2 法說會逐字稿

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to JPMorgan Chase's Second Quarter 2023 Earnings Call. This call is being recorded. (Operator Instructions) We will now go to the live presentation. Please standby.

早上好，女士們，先生們。歡迎參加摩根大通 2023 年第二季度財報電話會議。此通話正在錄音。 （操作員說明）我們現在進入現場演示。請等待。

At this time, I would like to turn the call over to JPMorgan Chase's Chairman and CEO, Jamie Dimon; and Chief Financial Officer, Jeremy Barnum. Mr. Barnum, please go ahead.

現在，我想把電話轉給摩根大通董事長兼首席執行官傑米·戴蒙（Jamie Dimon）；和首席財務官傑里米·巴納姆。巴納姆先生，請繼續。

Thanks, operator. Good morning, everyone. The presentation is available on our website, and please refer to the disclaimer in the back.

謝謝，接線員。大家，早安。該演示文稿可在我們的網站上獲取，請參閱後面的免責聲明。

Starting on Page 1. The firm reported net income of $14.5 billion, EPS of $4.75 on revenue of $42.4 billion and delivered an ROTCE of 25%. These results included the First Republic bargain purchase gain of $2.7 billion, a credit reserve build for the First Republic lending portfolio of $1.2 billion as well as $900 million of net investment securities losses in Corporate.

從第 1 頁開始。該公司報告淨利潤為 145 億美元，每股收益為 4.75 美元，收入為 424 億美元，ROTCE 為 25%。這些結果包括第一共和國討價還價購買收益 27 億美元、為第一共和國貸款組合建立的 12 億美元信貸準備金以及企業淨投資證券損失 9 億美元。

Touching on a few highlights. TCV client investment assets were up 18% year-on-year, we had record long-term inflows in AWM, and we ranked #1 in IB fee wallet share.

談到一些亮點。 TCV客戶投資資產同比增長18%，AWM長期資金流入創歷史新高，IB費用錢包份額排名第一。

Before giving you more detail on the financials, let me give you a brief update on the status of the First Republic integration on Page 2. The settlement process with the FDIC is on schedule with a number of key milestones being recently completed. Systems integration is also proceeding at pace, and we are targeting being substantially complete by mid-2024.

在向您提供有關財務狀況的更多詳細信息之前，讓我在第 2 頁向您簡要介紹一下第一共和整合的狀態。與 FDIC 的結算流程正在按計劃進行，最近完成了許多關鍵里程碑。系統集成也在快速進行，我們的目標是在 2024 年中期基本完成。

The First Republic employees have formally joined us as of July 2, and we're pleased to have had very high acceptance rates on our offers. And although it's still early days, as we get the sales force back in the market, we are happy to see that client retention is strong with about $6 billion of net deposit inflows since the acquisition.

First Republic 員工已於 7 月 2 日正式加入我們，我們很高興我們的工作機會獲得了很高的接受率。儘管現在還處於早期階段，但隨著我們將銷售隊伍重新帶回市場，我們很高興看到客戶保留率很高，自收購以來淨存款流入約為 60 億美元。

Now turning back to this quarter's results on Page 3. You'll see that in various parts of the presentation, we have specifically called out the impact of First Republic where relevant. To make things easier, I'm going to start by discussing the overall impact of First Republic on this quarter's results at the firm-wide level. Then for the rest of the presentation, I will generally exclude the impact of First Republic in order to improve comparability with prior periods.

現在回到第 3 頁上的本季度業績。您會看到，在演示文稿的各個部分，我們特別指出了第一共和國的相關影響。為了讓事情變得更容易，我將首先討論第一共和國對全公司範圍內本季度業績的總體影響。然後，在接下來的演示中，我通常會排除第一共和國的影響，以提高與之前時期的可比性。

With that in mind, this quarter, First Republic contributed $4 billion of revenue, $599 million of expense and $2.4 billion of net income. As noted on the first page, this includes $2.7 billion of bargain purchase gain, which is reflected in NIR in the Corporate segment, as well as $1.2 billion of allowance build. And remember that the deal happened on May 1, so the First Republic numbers only represent 2 months of results.

考慮到這一點，第一共和國本季度貢獻了 40 億美元的收入、5.99 億美元的費用和 24 億美元的淨利潤。正如第一頁所述，這包括 27 億美元的討價還價購買收益（反映在企業部門的 NIR 中）以及 12 億美元的配額建設。請記住，該交易發生在 5 月 1 日，因此第一共和國的數據僅代表 2 個月的結果。

You'll see in the line of business results that we are showing First Republic revenue and allowance in CCB, CB and AWM. And for the purposes of this quarter's results, all of the deposits are in CCB and substantially all of the expenses are in Corporate. As the integration continues, some of those items will get allocated across the segments.

您將在業務結果中看到，我們以 CCB、CB 和 AWM 顯示第一共和國的收入和津貼。就本季度業績而言，所有存款都在建行，而幾乎所有費用都在公司。隨著整合的繼續，其中一些項目將跨部門分配。

Now turning back to firm line results, excluding First Republic. Revenue of $38.4 billion was up $6.7 billion or 21% year-on-year. NII ex-markets was up $7.8 billion or 57%, driven by higher rates. NIR ex-markets was down $293 million, largely driven by the net investment securities losses I mentioned earlier, partially offset by a number of less notable items, primarily in the prior year. And markets revenue was down $772 million or 10% year-on-year.

現在回到公司業績，不包括第一共和國。收入為 384 億美元，同比增長 67 億美元，即 21%。在利率上升的推動下，NII 離岸市場增長了 78 億美元，即 57%。 NIR 場外交易下跌 2.93 億美元，主要是由於我之前提到的淨投資證券損失，部分被一些不太引人注目的項目（主要是上一年的損失）所抵消。市場收入同比下降 7.72 億美元，即 10%。

Expenses of $20.2 billion were up $1.5 billion or 8% year-on-year primarily driven by higher compensation expense, including wage inflation and higher legal expense. And credit costs of $1.7 billion included net charge-offs of $1.4 billion, predominantly in Card. The net reserve build included a $389 million build in the Commercial Bank, a $200 million build in Card and a $243 million release in Corporate, all of which I will cover in more detail later.

費用為 202 億美元，同比增加 15 億美元，即 8%，主要是由於薪酬費用增加，包括工資上漲和法律費用增加。 17 億美元的信貸成本包括 14 億美元的淨沖銷，主要是信用卡沖銷。淨準備金建設包括商業銀行的 3.89 億美元建設、信用卡的 2 億美元建設和企業的 2.43 億美元的釋放，所有這些我將在稍後更詳細地介紹。

On to balance sheet and capital on Page 4. We ended the quarter with a CET1 ratio of 13.8%, flat versus the prior quarter as the benefit of net income, less distributions, was offset by the impact of First Republic. And as you can see in the two charts on the page, we've given you some information about the impact of the transaction on both RWA and CET1 ratio.

關於第 4 頁的資產負債表和資本。本季度結束時，我們的 CET1 比率為 13.8%，與上一季度持平，因為淨收入（減去分配）的收益被第一共和國的影響所抵消。正如您在頁面上的兩個圖表中看到的，我們為您提供了一些有關交易對 RWA 和 CET1 比率影響的信息。

And as you know, we completed CCAR a couple of weeks ago. Our new indicative SCB is 2.9% versus our current requirement of 4%, and it goes into effect in 4Q '23. The new SCB also reflects the Board's intention to increase the dividend to $1.05 per share in the third quarter.

如您所知，我們幾週前完成了 CCAR。我們新的指示性 SCB 為 2.9%，而當前要求為 4%，將於 23 年第四季度生效。新的SCB還反映出董事會打算將第三季度股息提高至每股1.05美元。

On liquidity. Our bank LCR for the second quarter ended at 129%, in line with what we anticipated at Investor Day. About half of the reduction is associated with the First Republic transaction.

關於流動性。我們的銀行第二季度 LCR 為 129%，與我們在投資者日的預期一致。大約一半的減少與第一共和國交易有關。

And while we're on the balance sheet, as we previewed in the 10-K, we will be updating our earnings and risk model to incorporate the impact of deposit repricing ladders. So when we released this quarter's 10-Q, you will see the up 100 basis point parallel shift scenario will be about positive $2.5 billion, whereas in the absence of the change, it would have been about negative $1.5 billion.

當我們在資產負債表上時，正如我們在 10-K 中預覽的那樣，我們將更新我們的收益和風險模型，以納入存款重新定價階梯的影響。因此，當我們發布本季度的 10-Q 季度報告時，您會看到上調 100 個基點平行移動情景將帶來約 25 億美元的正值，而如果沒有變化，則約為負 15 億美元。

Now let's go to our businesses, starting with CCB on Page 5. Both U.S. consumers and small businesses remain resilient, and we haven't observed any meaningful changes to the trends in our data we discussed at Investor Day. Turning now to the financial results, which I will speak to excluding the impact of First Republic for CCB, CB and AWM.

現在讓我們來看看我們的企業，從第 5 頁的 CCB 開始。美國消費者和小企業都保持彈性，而且我們在投資者日討論的數據趨勢中沒有觀察到任何有意義的變化。現在轉向財務業績，我將排除第一共和國對 CCB、CB 和 AWM 的影響。

CCB reported net income of $5 billion on revenue of $16.4 billion, it was up 31% year-on-year. In Banking & Wealth Management, revenue was up 59% year-on-year, driven by higher NII on higher rates. End of period deposits were down 4% quarter-on-quarter as customers continue to spend down their cash buffers, including for seasonal tax payments and seek higher-yielding products. Client investment assets were up 18% year-on-year, driven by market performance and strong net inflows across our adviser and digital channels.

建行公佈淨利潤50億美元，營收164億美元，同比增長31%。在銀行和財富管理領域，由於利率提高導致NII增加，收入同比增長59%。期末存款環比下降 4%，原因是客戶繼續減少現金緩衝，包括支付季節性稅款和尋求更高收益的產品。受市場表現以及顧問和數字渠道強勁淨流入的推動，客戶投資資產同比增長 18%。

In Home Lending, revenue was down 23% year-on-year, driven by lower NII from tighter loan spreads and lower servicing and production revenue. Originations were up quarter-on-quarter, driven by seasonality, although still down 54% year-on-year.

在住房貸款方面，收入同比下降 23%，原因是貸款利差收窄導致 NII 下降以及服務和生產收入下降。受季節性因素影響，起始量環比增長，但同比仍下降 54%。

Moving to Card Services & Auto. Revenue was up 5%, largely driven by higher card services NII on higher revolving balances, partially offset by lower auto lease income. Card outstandings were up 18% year-on-year, which was the result of revolver normalization and strong new account growth. And in Auto, originations were up $12 billion, up 71% year-on-year, as competitors pulled back and inventories continued to slowly recover.

轉向卡服務和汽車。收入增長了 5%，主要是由於循環餘額增加導致卡服務 NII 增加，部分被汽車租賃收入減少所抵消。卡未償餘額同比增長 18%，這是循環經濟正常化和新賬戶強勁增長的結果。在汽車領域，隨著競爭對手的撤退和庫存繼續緩慢恢復，原產地增長了 120 億美元，同比增長 71%。

Expenses of $8.3 billion were up 8% year-on-year, driven by compensation, predominantly due to wage inflation and headcount growth as we continue to invest in our front office and technology staffing as well as marketing.

在薪酬的推動下，支出為 83 億美元，同比增長 8%，這主要是由於工資上漲和員工人數增長，因為我們繼續投資於前台和技術人員配置以及營銷。

In terms of credit performance this quarter, credit costs were $1.5 billion, reflecting a reserve build of $203 million driven by loan growth in Card Services. Net charge-offs were $1.3 billion, up $640 million year-on-year, predominantly driven by Card as 30-day-plus delinquencies have returned to pre-pandemic levels, in line with our expectations.

就本季度信貸表現而言，信貸成本為 15 億美元，反映出卡服務貸款增長推動的準備金增加達 2.03 億美元。淨沖銷額為 13 億美元，同比增加 6.4 億美元，主要由 Card 推動，因為 30 天以上的拖欠額已恢復到大流行前的水平，符合我們的預期。

Next, the CIB on Page 6. CIB reported net income of $4.1 billion on revenue of $12.5 billion. Investment Banking revenue of $1.5 billion was up 11% year-on-year or down 7% excluding bridge book markdowns in the prior year. IB fees were down 6% year-on-year, and we ranked #1 with a year-to-date wallet share of 8.4%. In Advisory, fees were down 19%. Underwriting fees were down 6% for debt and up 30% for equity with more positive momentum in the last month of the quarter.

接下來是第 6 頁的 CIB。CIB 報告淨利潤為 41 億美元，營收為 125 億美元。投資銀行業務收入為 15 億美元，同比增長 11%，若不包括上一年的過橋帳簿折價，則下降 7%。 IB 費用同比下降 6%，我們以年初至今的錢包份額 8.4% 排名第一。諮詢方面的費用下降了 19%。債務承銷費用下降了 6%，股票承銷費用上升了 30%，本季度最後一個月的勢頭更加積極。

In terms of the second half outlook, we have seen encouraging signs of activity in capital markets, and July should be a good indicator for the remainder of the year. However, year-to-date announced M&A is down significantly, which will be a headwind.

就下半年前景而言，我們已經看到資本市場活動的令人鼓舞的跡象，7 月份應該是今年剩餘時間的一個良好指標。然而，今年迄今宣布的併購大幅下降，這將是一個阻力。

Moving to Markets. Total revenue was $7 billion, down 10% year-on-year. Fixed income was down 3%. As expected, the macro franchise substantially normalized from last year's elevated levels of volatility and client flows. This was largely offset by improved performance in the securitized products group and credit.

轉向市場。總收入為70億美元，同比下降10%。固定收益下降3%。正如預期的那樣，宏觀特許經營業務已從去年波動性和客戶流量的上升水平大幅恢復正常。這在很大程度上被證券化產品組和信貸業績的改善所抵消。

Equity Markets was down 20% against a very strong prior year quarter, particularly in derivatives. Payments revenue was $2.5 billion, up 61% year-on-year. Excluding equity investments, it was up 32%, predominantly driven by higher rates, partially offset by lower deposit balances. Securities Services revenue of $1.2 billion was up 6% year-on-year, driven by higher rates, partially offset by lower fees.

與去年同期非常強勁的情況相比，股票市場下跌了 20%，尤其是衍生品市場。支付收入為25億美元，同比增長61%。不包括股權投資，增長了 32%，主要是由利率上升推動的，但部分被存款餘額下降所抵消。證券服務收入為 12 億美元，同比增長 6%，這得益於較高的費率，但部分被較低的費用所抵消。

Expenses of $6.9 billion were up 1% year-on-year, driven by higher non-compensation expense as well as wage inflation and headcount growth, largely offset by lower revenue-related compensation.

費用為 69 億美元，同比增長 1%，原因是非薪酬費用增加以及工資上漲和員工人數增長，但很大程度上被收入相關薪酬的減少所抵消。

Moving to the Commercial Bank on Page 7. Commercial Banking reported net income of $1.5 billion. Revenue of $3.8 billion was up 42% year-on-year driven by higher deposit margins. Payments revenue of $2.2 billion was up 79% year-on-year, driven by higher rates. Gross investment banking and markets revenue of $767 million was down 3% year-on-year, primarily driven by fewer large M&A deals. Expenses of $1.3 billion were up 12% year-on-year, predominantly driven by higher compensation expense, including front office hiring and technology investments as well as higher volume-related expense.

轉向第 7 頁的商業銀行。商業銀行報告淨利潤為 15 億美元。由於存款利潤率提高，收入同比增長 42%，達 38 億美元。在費率上升的推動下，支付收入同比增長 79%，達 22 億美元。投資銀行和市場總收入為 7.67 億美元，同比下降 3%，主要是由於大型併購交易減少。費用為 13 億美元，同比增長 12%，主要是由於薪酬費用增加，包括前台招聘和技術投資以及與銷量相關的費用增加。

Average deposits were up 3% quarter-on-quarter, driven by inflows related to new client acquisition, partially offset by continued attrition in nonoperating deposits. Loans were up 2% quarter-on-quarter. C&I loans were up 2%, reflecting stabilization in new loan demand and revolver utilization in the current economic environment as well as pockets of growth in areas where we are investing.

受新客戶獲取相關資金流入的推動，平均存款環比增長 3%，但部分被非經營性存款的持續流失所抵消。貸款環比增長 2%。工商業貸款增長 2%，反映出當前經濟環境下新貸款需求和循環利用的穩定以及我們投資領域的部分增長。

CRE loans were also up 1%, reflecting funding on prior year originations for construction loans and real estate banking as well as increased affordable housing activity.

CRE 貸款也增長了 1%，反映了去年為建築貸款和房地產銀行發放的資金以及經濟適用房活動的增加。

Finally, credit costs were $489 million. Net charge-offs were $100 million, including $82 million in the office real estate portfolio. And the net reserve build of $389 million was driven by updates to certain assumptions related to the office real estate market as well as net downgrade activity in middle market banking.

最後，信貸成本為 4.89 億美元。淨沖銷額為 1 億美元，其中包括辦公房地產投資組合中的 8,200 萬美元。 3.89 億美元的淨準備金增長是由與辦公房地產市場相關的某些假設的更新以及中間市場銀行業務的淨評級活動推動的。

Then to complete lines of business, AWM on Page 8. Asset & Wealth Management reported net income of $1.1 billion with a pretax margin of 32%. Revenue of $4.6 billion was up 8% year-on-year, driven by higher deposit margins on lower balances and higher management fees on strong net inflows.

然後，為了完成業務線，第 8 頁上的 AWM。資產與財富管理報告淨利潤為 11 億美元，稅前利潤率為 32%。收入為 46 億美元，同比增長 8%，這得益於餘額減少導致的存款保證金增加以及淨流入強勁導致的管理費增加。

Expenses of $3.2 billion were up 8% year-on-year, driven by higher compensation, including growth in our private banking adviser teams, higher revenue-related compensation and the impact of Global Shares and JPMorgan Asset Management China, both of which closed within the last year.

費用為 32 億美元，同比增長 8%，主要是由於薪酬上漲，包括我們的私人銀行顧問團隊的增長、收入相關薪酬的增加以及環球股份和摩根資產管理中國的影響，這兩家公司均於去年。

For the quarter, record net long-term inflows were $61 billion, positive across all channels, regions and asset classes, led by fixed income and equities. And in liquidity, we saw net inflows of $60 billion. AUM of $3.2 trillion was up 16% year-on-year and overall client assets of $4.6 trillion were up 20% year-on-year, driven by continued net inflows, higher market levels and the impact of the acquisition of Global Shares. And finally, loans were down 1% quarter-on-quarter, driven by lower securities-based lending, and deposits were down 6%.

本季度，長期淨流入達到創紀錄的 610 億美元，所有渠道、地區和資產類別均出現積極增長，其中以固定收益和股票為首。在流動性方面，我們看到淨流入 600 億美元。受持續淨流入、更高的市場水平以及收購全球股票的影響，管理資產規模達 3.2 萬億美元，同比增長 16%，客戶總資產達 4.6 萬億美元，同比增長 20%。最後，由於證券貸款減少，貸款環比下降 1%，存款下降 6%。

Turning to Corporate on Page 9. As I noted upfront, we are reporting the First Republic bargain purchase gain and substantially all of the expenses in Corporate. Excluding those items, Corporate reported net income of $339 million.

轉向第 9 頁的企業。正如我之前指出的，我們正在報告第一共和國討價還價購買收益以及企業中的幾乎所有費用。排除這些項目，Corporate 公佈的淨利潤為 3.39 億美元。

Revenue was $985 million, up $905 million compared to last year. NII was $1.8 billion, up $1.4 billion year-on-year due to the impact of higher rates. NIR was a net loss of $782 million and included the net investment securities losses I mentioned upfront. Expenses of $590 million or up $384 million year-on-year, largely driven by higher legal expense. And credit costs were a net benefit of $243 million, reflecting a reserve release as the deposit placed with First Republic in the first quarter, was eliminated as [part of the transaction].

收入為 9.85 億美元，比去年增加 9.05 億美元。由於利率上升的影響，NII 為 18 億美元，同比增加 14 億美元。 NIR 淨虧損為 7.82 億美元，其中包括我前面提到的淨投資證券虧損。費用為 5.9 億美元，同比增加 3.84 億美元，主要是由於法律費用增加。信貸成本為 2.43 億美元的淨收益，反映了第一季度存放在 First Republic 的存款作為[交易的一部分]被抵消而釋放的準備金。

Next, the outlook on Page 10. We now expect 2023 NII and NII ex-markets to be approximately $87 billion, with the increase driven by higher rates, coupled with slower deposit reprice than previously assumed across both consumer and wholesale. And I should take the opportunity to remind you once again that significant sources of uncertainty remain, and we do expect the NII run rate to be substantially below this quarter's run rate at some point in the future as competition for deposits plays out. Our expense outlook for 2023 remains approximately $84.5 billion. And on credit, we continue to expect the 2023 card net charge-off rate to be approximately 2.6%.

接下來是第 10 頁的展望。我們現在預計 2023 年 NII 和 NII 前市場約為 870 億美元，這一增長是由利率上升以及消費者和批發方面的存款重新定價速度慢於之前的假設推動的。我應該藉此機會再次提醒大家，重要的不確定性來源仍然存在，而且我們確實預計，隨著存款競爭的展開，NII 運行率將在未來某個時候大幅低於本季度的運行率。我們對 2023 年的支出展望仍然約為 845 億美元。在信貸方面，我們繼續預計 2023 年信用卡淨沖銷率約為 2.6%。

So to wrap up. We are proud of the exceptionally strong operating results this quarter. As we look forward, we remain focused on the significant uncertainties relating to the economic outlook, competition for deposits and the impact on capital from the pending finalization of the Basel III rules. Nonetheless, despite the likely headwinds ahead, we remain optimistic about the company's ability to continue delivering excellent performance through a range of scenarios.

所以總結一下。我們對本季度異常強勁的運營業績感到自豪。展望未來，我們仍然關注與經濟前景、存款競爭以及即將敲定的巴塞爾協議 III 規則對資本的影響有關的重大不確定性。儘管如此，儘管未來可能面臨阻力，我們仍然對該公司在一系列情況下繼續提供卓越業績的能力持樂觀態度。

With that, operator, please open the line for Q&A.

那麼，接線員，請開通問答線路。

(Operator Instructions) The first question coming from the line of Jim Mitchell from Seaport Global Securities.

（操作員說明） 第一個問題來自 Seaport Global Securities 的 Jim Mitchell。

Jeremy, you talked about NII guidance up. Clearly, Fed funds futures are up, so it makes some sense. But maybe, I guess, first, could you kind of discuss, I guess comment on, deposit behavior broadly around betas and mix? And what you're seeing there so far seems to be coming in a little better, expected?

Jeremy，您談到了 NII 指導。顯然，聯邦基金期貨上漲，所以這是有道理的。但也許，我想，首先，您能否討論一下，我想評論一下，圍繞貝塔和混合的存款行為？到目前為止，您所看到的情況似乎有所好轉，符合預期嗎？

And then secondly and probably more importantly, can you help us think about the implications of higher for longer rates on the outlook for NII next year and beyond? I guess the intermediate term outlook that you guys have talked about?

其次，也許更重要的是，您能否幫助我們思考長期利率上升對明年及以後 NII 前景的影響？我想你們談論過中期前景？

Yes, sure. Thanks, Jim. So yes, so when we talk about the drivers of the upward revision, as I said, it's higher rates, coupled with lower deposit reprice, hard to untangle the two drivers.

是的，當然。謝謝，吉姆。所以，是的，所以當我們談論向上修正的驅動因素時，正如我所說，利率較高，加上存款重新定價較低，很難理清這兩個驅動因素。

And specifically, I think when you look at consumer, the combination of the passage of time and the positive feedback we're getting from the field, and the CD offerings in particular, has meant that it's quite a stable environment from that perspective. And similarly in wholesale, we're just seeing slower internal migrations.

具體來說，我認為當你關註消費者時，時間的流逝和我們從該領域獲得的積極反饋，特別是 CD 產品，意味著從這個角度來看，這是一個相當穩定的環境。同樣，在批發領域，我們只是看到內部遷移速度較慢。

You asked about mix. I think that, obviously, we're seeing the CD mix increase, and we would continue to expect -- we would continue to -- we would expect that to continue to take place probably even past the peak of the rate cycle into next year as we continue to capture money in motion.

你問的是混合。我認為，顯然，我們看到 CD 組合有所增加，我們將繼續預期——我們將繼續——我們預計這種情況甚至可能在利率週期的峰值過後繼續發生到明年當我們繼續捕捉流動的資金時。

But as you say, the most important point is the fact that, as I said earlier, we don't consider this level of a generation to be sustainable. And we talked previously about a sort of medium-term run rate in the mid-70s. That was before First Republic, and could argue that maybe that number should be a little higher. But whatever it is, it's a lot lower than the current number.

但正如你所說，最重要的一點是，正如我之前所說，我們認為這一代人的水平是不可持續的。我們之前討論過 70 年代中期的中期運行率。那是在第一共和國之前，並且可能會認為這個數字應該更高一點。但不管怎樣，比現在的數字要低很多。

We don't know when that's going to happen. We're not going to predict the exact moment, that's going to be a function of competitive dynamics in the marketplace, but we want to be clear that we do expect it at some point.

我們不知道什麼時候會發生。我們不會預測確切的時刻，這將取決於市場競爭動態，但我們希望明確的是，我們確實期望在某個時刻發生。

Okay. But I guess just one follow-up on that. Just if we don't get rate -- rate cuts, sorry, until middle of next year or later, does that sort of give some confidence to the outlook for next year? Or are you still worried about significant reprice?

好的。但我想這只是一個後續行動。如果我們在明年年中或更晚之前都沒有降息，這是否會給明年的前景帶來一些信心？或者您還在擔心大幅重新定價嗎？

I wouldn't necessarily assume that the evolution from the current run rate into the mid-70s number is that sensitive to the rate outlook in particular. When we put that number out there, we looked at a range of different types of rate environments and the reprice that we think would be associated with that. It was really meant to capture more of what we consider to be a through-the-cycle sustainable number. So I wouldn't think of it as being particularly rate-dependent.

我不一定認為從當前運行利率到 70 年代中期數字的演變對利率前景特別敏感。當我們把這個數字公佈出來時，我們研究了一系列不同類型的費率環境以及我們認為與之相關的重新定價。它的真正目的是捕獲更多我們認為是整個週期可持續的數字。所以我不認為它特別依賴於利率。

Next, we'll go to the line of Erika Najarian from UBS.

接下來，我們將請到瑞銀集團 (UBS) 的埃里卡·納賈里安 (Erika Najarian)。

Jeremy, I'm just laughing to myself because I said to you at Investor Day, "Do you have any more NII rabbits to pull out of the hat?" And I guess you do.

傑里米，我只是在自嘲，因為我在投資者日對你說：“你還有更多的 NII 兔子可以拿出來嗎？”我猜你會的。

So I guess I want to ask a broader question really here. And maybe, Jamie, I'd like to get your thoughts. So you earned 23% ROTCE on 13.8% CET1. And we hear you loud and clear that your more normalized NII generation is not $87 billion. That being said and fully taking into account the potential haircut from Basel III end game, is it possible that your natural ROTCE is maybe above that 17% through the cycle rate when rates aren't zero? Because when you first introduced that ROTCE target, we were in a different world from a rate scenario. And everybody is talking about, even if the Fed cuts, the natural sort of bottom in Fed funds, is not going to be zero. So any input on that would be great.

所以我想我真的想在這裡問一個更廣泛的問題。也許，傑米，我想听聽你的想法。因此，您在 13.8% CET1 上獲得了 23% ROTCE。我們清楚地聽到您的聲音，您更正常化的 NII 一代並不是 870 億美元。話雖這麼說，並充分考慮到巴塞爾 III 最終遊戲的潛在削減，當利率不為零時，您的自然 ROTCE 是否有可能在整個週期利率中高於 17%？因為當您第一次引入 ROTCE 目標時，我們處於與費率場景不同的世界。每個人都在談論，即使美聯儲降息，聯邦基金的自然底部也不會為零。所以任何關於這方面的意見都會很棒。

Yes. Thanks, Erika. I mean, it's a good question. There's a lot in there, obviously. I guess I would start by saying that when we talked about the 17% through-the-cycle ROTCE, even though we may have introduced that in a moment where we were about to [lower the zero bound], it was always premised on a sort of normalized rate environment. And at some level, that remains true today.

是的。謝謝，埃里卡。我的意思是，這是一個好問題。顯然，裡面有很多東西。我想我首先要說的是，當我們談論 17% 的整個週期 ROTCE 時，儘管我們可能已經在我們即將[降低零界限]的時刻引入了這一點，但它始終以某種標準化的利率環境。在某種程度上，今天仍然如此。

Furthermore, you didn't ask this explicitly, but in the context of the proposed Basel III end game, one relevant question might be, if you have a lot more capital in the denominator, what happens to that target?

此外，您沒有明確詢問這一點，但在擬議的巴塞爾協議 III 最終遊戲的背景下，一個相關問題可能是，如果您在分母中擁有更多資本，那麼該目標會發生什麼？

So I think, as I said in my prepared remarks, we feel very confident about the company's ability to produce excellent returns through the cycle. There's a lot of moving parts right now in that. Some of them could be good, some of them could be bad.

因此，我認為，正如我在準備好的發言中所說，我們對公司在整個週期中產生優異回報的能力非常有信心。現在有很多活動部件。其中一些可能是好的，一些可能是壞的。

Narrowing on the capital one, the one thing to point out is that the straight-up math of simply diluting down the ROTCE by expanding the denominator misses the possibility of repricing of products and services, which of course goes back to our point that these capital increases do have impacts on the real economy. So we're not suggesting that we can price our way out of it, but we obviously need to get the right returns on products and services. And where we have pricing power, we will adjust to the higher capital.

縮小資本範圍，需要指出的一件事是，通過擴大分母來簡單地稀釋 ROTCE 的直接數學忽略了產品和服務重新定價的可能性，這當然可以追溯到我們的觀點，即這些資本增長確實對實體經濟產生影響。因此，我們並不是建議我們可以通過定價來擺脫困境，但我們顯然需要在產品和服務上獲得適當的回報。在我們有定價權的地方，我們將適應更高的資本。

So a lot of moving parts in there, but I think the important point is that, through a range of scenarios, we feel good about our ability to deliver good results. And we'll see how the mix of all the various factors plays out, especially after we see the Basel III proposal when it goes through the comment period.

其中有很多活動部件，但我認為重要的一點是，通過一系列場景，我們對自己交付良好結果的能力感到滿意。我們將看到所有各種因素的結合如何發揮作用，特別是在我們看到巴塞爾協議 III 提案經過徵求意見期之後。

And Erika, I would say one thing. First, we have a mix of businesses that earn from like 0% ROTCE to 100%, we have some which are very capital intensive, so we look at kind of all of them. And I think 17% is a good number and a good target.

埃里卡，我想說一件事。首先，我們有各種盈利從 0% ROTCE 到 100% 的企業，我們有一些資本非常密集的企業，所以我們會關注所有這些企業。我認為 17% 是一個很好的數字，也是一個很好的目標。

The other thing we're [over-earning] on is credit. We've been over-earning in credit for a substantial amount of time now. We're quite conscious about it. We know that's going to pick up. Just as it normalizes, it will be considerably more than this now. Like we would consider credit card normalized to be close to 3.5%.

我們[超額收入]的另一件事是信用。現在很長一段時間以來，我們的信貸收入一直處於超額水平。我們對此非常有意識。我們知道情況將會好轉。正如它正常化一樣，它會比現在多得多。就像我們認為信用卡標準化後接近 3.5%。

And so my follow-up question there. Maybe, Jeremy, could you remind us what unemployment rate is embedded in your ACL ratio as of the second quarter?

這是我的後續問題。 Jeremy，您能否提醒我們，截至第二季度，您的 ACL 比率中包含了多少失業率？

Yes, it's still 5.8%.

是的，仍然是5.8%。

Next, we'll go to the line of John McDonald from Autonomous Research.

接下來，我們將討論來自 Autonomous Research 的 John McDonald。

Jeremy, wanted to ask about capital in the wake of the Barr speech. We don't have the details yet, but just kind of want to ask about options that you have and strategies for mitigation, both on RWA and potentially on the G-SIB front as well as you contemplate what you heard recently.

巴爾演講後，傑里米想詢問有關資本的問題。我們還沒有詳細信息，但只是想詢問您在 RWA 和可能的 G-SIB 方面有哪些選擇和緩解策略，以及您最近聽到的情況。

Yes. Thanks, John. So obviously, we're thinking about that a lot. On the other hand, as much as there have been a lot of very detailed rumors out there that might lead you to start to try to do some planning, it does seem like this time it's real, and we are actually going to get a proposal some time this month or something. So soon enough, we'll get to see something actually on paper, and we can stop kind of the guesswork.

是的。謝謝，約翰。顯然，我們對此進行了很多思考。另一方面，儘管有很多非常詳細的謠言可能會導致你開始嘗試做一些計劃，但這次似乎是真的，我們實際上會收到一份提案這個月的某個時候或者什麼的。很快，我們就會在紙上看到一些實際的東西，我們就可以停止猜測。

Having said that, indulging a little bit of guess work, it does seem like the biggest single driver of the increase that people are talking about, including Chair Powell's 20% number, or vice Chair Barr's 2% of RWA, which winds up being roughly the same, is just the way operational risk is getting introduced into the standardized pillar.

話雖如此，進行一點猜測，這似乎確實是人們所談論的增長的最大單一驅動因素，包括主席鮑威爾的 20% 數字，或副主席巴爾的 2% RWA，最終大約為同樣，操作風險也被引入標準化支柱。

And that is a little bit of a straight up across the board tax on everything. It's kind of hard to optimize your way out of that. With the exception, obviously, of the fact that you can simply increase price, assuming you have pricing power. But that's obviously not what we want, and that's what we sort of mean by impacts on the real economy.

這是對所有事物徵收的直接全面稅。優化你的方法來擺脫這種情況有點困難。顯然，例外的是，假設您有定價權，您可以簡單地提高價格。但這顯然不是我們想要的，這就是我們所說的對實體經濟的影響。

So there are details. There's a lot of the FRTB stuff. We can get way into the weeds there within the Markets business. And we do have a good track record of adjusting and optimizing. But this time around, it may be a more fundamental set of questions around business mix as opposed to the ability to sort of optimize in a very technical way.

所以有細節。有很多 FRTB 的東西。我們可以深入了解市場業務中的雜草。我們確實在調整和優化方面有著良好的記錄。但這一次，它可能是圍繞業務組合的一系列更基本的問題，而不是以非常技術性的方式進行優化的能力。

Okay. That's helpful. And with a number of years for this to phase in, and you generating capital at a high level even if the ROTCE comes down a bit, how should we think about your pace of building capital for these new changes versus doing your everyday course of investing and buybacks and things like that over the next couple of years?

好的。這很有幫助。經過數年的時間才能逐步實現，即使 ROTCE 略有下降，您仍能產生高水平的資本，我們應該如何考慮您為這些新變化建立資本的步伐與日常投資過程的比較以及未來幾年的回購之類的事情？

Yes. I mean, I guess I'm sort of tempted to give you our standard capital hierarchy here. I mean, we're not going to [sacrifices] investments, right? That won't come as a surprise to you.

是的。我的意思是，我想我有點想在這裡向您提供我們的標準資本等級制度。我的意思是，我們不會[犧牲]投資，對嗎？這對你來說並不奇怪。

Generally speaking, we're always going to try to comply with new requirements early. So when we know the requirements and when we have visibility, obviously, given how much organic capital we're generating right now, whatever the answer winds up being, it will be pretty easy to comply, narrowly speaking. But that's not the same saying that there won't be consequences to returns or to pricing.

一般來說，我們總是會儘早嘗試遵守新的要求。因此，當我們了解要求並具有可見性時，顯然，考慮到我們現在正在產生多少有機資本，無論答案最終是什麼，狹義上來說，遵守都會很容易。但這並不等同於不會對退貨或定價產生影響。

And if, for whatever reason, things aren't exactly as we're anticipating, I don't see us sacrificing investments that we see as strategically critical in order to comply with higher capital requirements ahead of the formal timing or whatever.

如果出於某種原因，事情與我們預期的不完全一樣，我不認為我們會犧牲我們認為具有戰略重要性的投資，以便在正式​​時間或其他任何事情之前滿足更高的資本要求。

Okay. And there's some room for buybacks?

好的。還有回購的空間嗎？

(inaudible) unlikely, obviously. That would be an unlikely outcome.

（聽不清）顯然不太可能。這將是一個不太可能的結果。

Sorry, John, go ahead. Did you have a follow-up?

抱歉，約翰，請繼續。你有後續行動嗎？

Yes, no. Just do buybacks play a role in the next couple of years strategically? Just episodically, you buy back?

是的，不是。回購會在未來幾年中發揮戰略作用嗎？只是偶爾，你買回來？

I mean, capital hierarchy again, right? In the end, when we have nothing else to do with the money, we'll do buybacks. And we talked about the $12 billion for this year. Obviously, a lot of new moving parts there, although all else equal, given what we've done so far, that's still probably a reasonable number for the full year. But yes, that's always going to be at the end of the list. But yes.

我的意思是，又是資本等級制度，對嗎？最後，當我們用這筆錢沒有其他事可做時，我們就會進行回購。我們談到了今年的 120 億美元。顯然，儘管其他條件相同，但考慮到我們迄今為止所做的事情，那裡有很多新的活動部件，這對於全年來說仍然可能是一個合理的數字。但是，是的，它總是位於列表的末尾。但是，是的。

Next, we'll go to the line of Ken Usdin from Jefferies.

接下來，我們將前往 Jefferies 的 Ken Usdin 線路。

I just wanted to ask a little bit about how you're feeling about the trade-off between like the commercial economy and what might come through in terms of future loan growth versus the kind of green shoots that people are talking about in the investment banking pipeline. And just how it feels in terms of like reopening of markets, and the trade-off between getting some more of those fees in and versus what's happening on the loan demand side.

我只是想問一下您對商業經濟和未來貸款增長可能發生的情況與人們在投資銀行中談論的那種萌芽之間的權衡有何看法管道。以及重新開放市場的感覺，以及在增加更多費用與貸款需求方面發生的情況之間的權衡。

Sure. Good question, Ken. So I think, in terms of Investment Banking & Markets, yes. Slightly better than expected last month. While there's talk about green crews, especially in capital markets, generally still definitely some headwinds in M&A, lower amounts of activity, some regulatory headwinds there. So we'll see. I think it's a little too early to call a trend there based on recent results, but we'll see.

當然。好問題，肯。所以我認為，就投資銀行和市場而言，是的。略好於上個月的預期。雖然人們在談論綠色員工，尤其是在資本市場，但總體上肯定存在併購方面的一些阻力、活動量的減少以及監管方面的一些阻力。所以我們拭目以待。我認為根據最近的結果來判斷趨勢還為時過早，但我們拭目以待。

In terms of the broader economy and loan growth expectations, generally, we do still expect reasonably robust card loan growth. But away from that, for a variety of different reasons and different products, whether it be mortgage or C&I, after revolver normalization, and especially if we see a little bit of a cooling off of the economy, I would expect loan demand to be relatively modest there. So we're not really expecting meaningful growth away from card.

就更廣泛的經濟和貸款增長預期而言，總體而言，我們仍然預計卡貸款增長將相當強勁。但除此之外，由於各種不同的原因和不同的產品，無論是抵押貸款還是商業投資，在左輪手槍正常化之後，特別是如果我們看到經濟稍微降溫，我預計貸款需求將相對下降那裡很謙虛。因此，我們並不真正期望信用卡業務能夠實現有意義的增長。

But of course, we're there for the right deals, right products, right terms. We lend through the cycle. So I see that as more of a demand-driven narrative, which will be a function of the economy rather than any tightening on our side.

當然，我們致力於提供合適的交易、合適的產品和合適的條款。我們通過整個週期提供貸款。因此，我認為這更多是一種需求驅動的敘述，這將是經濟的函數，而不是我們方面的任何緊縮政策。

That makes sense. And as a follow-up to that, on the consumer side, you mentioned that consumers continue to spend, albeit a little more slowly. And you mentioned that consumers are also using their excess deposits a little bit more as well. Can you just elaborate a little bit more on just your feeling about the state of the consumer? And is that card growth continue to be driven by people needing to revolve as opposed to wanting to have more in their deposits? Just kind of what the trade-off on that side, too.

這就說得通了。作為後續行動，在消費者方面，您提到消費者繼續消費，儘管速度較慢。您提到消費者也更多地使用了多餘的存款。您能否詳細說明一下您對消費者狀況的感受？銀行卡的增長是否繼續由人們需要周轉而不是希望擁有更多存款推動？這也是這方面的權衡。

Yes. I mean, to us, I think we still see this as a normalization, not deterioration story, when we talk about consumer credit. Actually, revolve per account has still not gotten to pre-pandemic levels actually. So I would definitely say that it's a wanting rather than needing, at least for our portfolio at this point. And yes, I think the consumer continues to surprise on the upside here.

是的。我的意思是，對我們來說，當我們談論消費者信貸時，我認為我們仍然將其視為正常化而不是惡化的故事。事實上，每個賬戶的循環量實際上還沒有達到大流行前的水平。所以我肯定會說這是一種想要而不是需要，至少對於我們目前的投資組合來說是這樣。是的，我認為消費者繼續對這裡的上漲感到驚訝。

Next, we'll go to the line of Gerard Cassidy from RBC Capital Markets.

接下來，我們將請來加拿大皇家銀行資本市場部的杰拉德·卡西迪 (Gerard Cassidy)。

Can you give us your view on how you're measuring the treasury functions and the asset liability of your balance sheet as we go forward, versus the way you guys were positioning and managing it a year ago? In view of the fact that it looks like maybe we're approaching the terminal rate on Fed funds rates.

您能否向我們介紹一下您對未來如何衡量財務職能和資產負債表資產負債以及一年前的定位和管理方式的看法？鑑於我們看起來可能正在接近聯邦基金利率的最終利率。

Yes. Gerard, I would say, honestly, not much change there, actually. We've been pretty consistently concerned about the risk of higher rates. Of course, we always try to position thanks to produce reasonable outcomes across a broad range of scenarios. But at the margin, we've been biased towards higher rates, and that may be a little less true at these levels that it was before, although a lot of that is just the consequence of deposit come back [certainly] playing out in the modeling.

是的。杰拉德，老實說，實際上並沒有太大變化。我們一直非常擔心利率上升的風險。當然，我們總是嘗試定位，以便在廣泛的場景中產生合理的結果。但在邊際上，我們一直偏向於更高的利率，在目前的水平上，這可能不太真實，儘管其中很大一部分只是存款回流的結果（當然）造型。

But in any case, all else equal, I think we are going to continue to focus on making sure we're fine in a higher rate scenario while staying balanced across a range of scenarios. So not really a lot of change in our positioning. And that's obviously including the fact that we took on First Republic, which even net of some of the liabilities, had a long structural interest rate position that we did not actually want to get longer as part of the deal. And so as a result, we took actions to ensure that net-net, we were still about the same as we were last quarter.

但無論如何，在其他條件相同的情況下，我認為我們將繼續專注於確保我們在較高利率的情況下表現良好，同時在一系列情況下保持平衡。所以我們的定位並沒有太大變化。這顯然包括我們與第一共和公司合作的事實，即使扣除部分負債，該公司也擁有長期的結構性利率頭寸，而我們實際上並不希望將其作為交易的一部分來延長。因此，我們採取了行動，以確保淨淨值仍與上季度相同。

Very good. And then as a follow-up, you mentioned, in giving us the read-through on the Commercial Banking segment of the business, that you had some reserve building tied to some office real estate and also some downgrades in the middle market area. Can you go a little deeper? What are you guys seeing in this area of both commercial real estate? But also the C&I loans, what's happening in that segment as well?

非常好。然後，作為後續行動，您在向我們介紹商業銀行業務部門時提到，您有一些與某些辦公房地產相關的儲備建設，並且在中間市場領域也進行了一些降級。你能再深入一點嗎？你們對這兩個商業地產領域有何看法？還有工商業貸款，該領域也發生了什麼？

Yes. So I would caution you from drawing too-broad conclusion from this. I mean, I think that when we talk about office, for example, our portfolio, as you know, is quite small, and our exposure to sort of so-called urban-dense office is even smaller. The vast majority our overall portfolio is multifamily lending. And so as a result, like our sample size of observed valuations on office properties is quite small.

是的。所以我要提醒你不要由此得出過於寬泛的結論。我的意思是，我認為，例如，當我們談論辦公室時，正如你所知，我們的投資組合相當小，而我們對所謂的城市密集辦公室的接觸甚至更小。我們整體投資組合的絕大多數是多戶家庭貸款。因此，我們觀察到的辦公物業估值的樣本量非常小。

But you know we like to be sort of ahead of the cycle. And based on everything saw this quarter, it just felt reasonable to build a little bit there to get to what felt like a comfortable coverage ratio. Across the rest of the -- in the middle market segment, we saw downgrades in excess of upgrades, but I don't see that as sort of necessarily indicative of anything terribly significant in the broader read-across.

但你知道我們喜歡走在周期的前面。根據本季度所看到的一切，在那裡建立一點點以達到舒適的覆蓋率感覺是合理的。在其餘的中間市場領域，我們看到降級超過升級，但我認為這不一定表明在更廣泛的閱讀中存在任何非常重要的情況。

Next, we'll go to the line of Steve Chubak from Wolfe Research.

接下來，我們將討論來自 Wolfe Research 的 Steve Chubak。

Steve, you there?

史蒂夫，你在嗎？

It looks like his line dropped. Next, we'll go to the line of Ebrahim Poonawala from Bank of America.

看起來他的線掉了。接下來，我們將前往美國銀行的 Ebrahim Poonawala 專線。

I guess just first question, following up on the outlook for the economy. Like we've all been worried about the recession for a year. And there's a debate about the lagged effects of the Fed rate hike cycle. When you think about, Jeremy, I think you mentioned your unemployment outlook relatively similar today versus a quarter ago. How worried should we be in terms of the credit cycle 6 to 12 months from now? Or are you leaning towards concluding that, maybe U.S. businesses, consumers have absorbed the rate cycle a lot better than we expected a year ago?

我想這只是第一個問題，即經濟前景的後續發展。就像我們一年來都在擔心經濟衰退一樣。關於美聯儲加息週期的滯後效應存在爭議。傑里米，當你想到時，我想你提到你今天的失業前景與一個季度前相對相似。對於 6 到 12 個月後的信貸週期，我們應該有多擔心？或者您是否傾向於得出這樣的結論：也許美國企業和消費者對利率週期的吸收比我們一年前的預期要好得多？

Yes. So I'm sure Jamie has some views here. But in my view, I would just caution against jumping to too many super-positive conclusions based on a couple of recent prints. And I think generally, our point is less about trying to predict a particular outcome and more about trying to make sure that we don't get too much euphoria that over-concentrates people on one particular prediction when we know that there's a range of outcomes out there.

是的。所以我確信傑米對此有一些看法。但在我看來，我只是警告不要根據最近的幾張印刷品得出太多超級積極的結論。我認為總的來說，我們的觀點不是試圖預測特定的結果，而是試圖確保當我們知道存在一系列結果時，我們不會過度關注某個特定的預測。在那裡。

So obviously, people are talking a lot about the potential for soft lending right now, no lending, immaculate dis-inflation or whatever. And whether our own views on that have changed meaningfully, I don't know. But the broader point is that we continue to be quite focused on Jamie's prior comment, that loss rates still have time to -- have room to normalize even post-pandemic, so we're probably over-earning on credit a little bit. Obviously, we've talked about the expectation that the NII is going to come down quite a bit.

顯然，人們現在正在談論很多軟貸款的潛力，沒有貸款，完美的通貨緊縮等等。我不知道我們對此的看法是否發生了有意義的改變。但更廣泛的一點是，我們仍然非常關注傑米之前的評論，即即使在大流行後，損失率仍然有時間--有空間正常化，所以我們可能在信貸上獲得了一點超額收益。顯然，我們已經討論過 NII 將大幅下降的預期。

So even forgetting about whether you got some surprisingly negative outcomes on the economy from where we stand today, even in the central case, you just need to recognize that there should be some significant normalization.

因此，即使忘記我們今天的處境是否對經濟產生了一些令人驚訝的負面結果，即使是在核心情況下，你也只需要認識到應該有一些重大的正常化。

Yes. And I would just add, the 5.8% is not our prediction. That is the average of the unemployment under multiple scenarios that we have to use, which are hypothetical, for CECL. So you asked us predictions, [go look] on something different, and we know we don't know the outcome.

是的。我想補充一點，5.8% 不是我們的預測。這是我們必須為 CECL 使用的多種假設情景下的失業率平均值。所以你問我們預測，[去看]一些不同的東西，我們知道我們不知道結果。

We're trying to be really clear here. The consumer is in good shape. They're spending down their excess cash. That's all tailwinds. Even if we go to recession, they're going with rather good condition, low borrowings and good house price value still.

我們試圖在這裡說得非常清楚。消費者的健康狀況良好。他們正在花掉多餘的現金。這都是順風順水。即使我們陷入經濟衰退，他們的狀況仍然相當好，借貸較低，房價也不錯。

But the headwinds are substantial and somewhat unprecedented. This war in Ukraine, oil, gas, [capital] have tightening. Unprecedented fiscal needs of government's QT, which we've never experienced before. I just think people should take a deep breadth of that. And we don't know if those things could put us in a soft landing, a mild recession or a hard recession. And obviously, we still hope for the best.

但阻力是巨大的，而且有些前所未有。烏克蘭這場戰爭，石油、天然氣，[資本]紛紛收緊。政府QT的財政需求是前所未有的，這是我們以前從未經歷過的。我只是認為人們應該深入了解這一點。我們不知道這些事情是否會讓我們陷入軟著陸、輕度衰退或硬衰退。顯然，我們仍然抱有最好的希望。

Got it. And just a follow-up on the upcoming Basel reforms. Two questions. You've talked about the impact of the U.S. economy, like others have said the same. At this point, is that falling on deaf ears?

知道了。這只是即將到來的巴塞爾改革的後續行動。兩個問題。正如其他人也說過的那樣，您談到了美國經濟的影響。事到如今，這句話還被置若罔聞嗎？

And secondly, maybe, Jeremy, if you can touch upon just structural changes that you expect to make in the capital markets business because of FRTB?

其次，Jeremy，您能否談談您期望因 FRTB 而在資本市場業務中做出的結構性變化？

Yes. So on your first point, I mean, I think you can just read Vice Chair Barr's speech, right? He addressed that point fairly directly. He clearly doesn't agree, as is his right. So we'll see what happens. We continue to feel that, all else equal, higher capital requirements definitely increase the cost of credit, which is bad for the economy. So we'll see what happens on that.

是的。關於你的第一點，我認為你可以閱讀巴爾副主席的演講，對吧？他相當直接地談到了這一點。他顯然不同意，這是他的權利。所以我們會看看會發生什麼。我們仍然認為，在其他條件相同的情況下，更高的資本要求肯定會增加信貸成本，這對經濟不利。所以我們會看看會發生什麼。

On FRTB, it's really very nuanced. It's probably like too much detail for this call, to be honest. But just to give you like one immaterial and insignificant but useful example. One product under FRTB is yield curve spread options. And if the FRTB proposal goes through as currently written, that product has become not viable. So obviously, if we need to stop doing that product, no one really cares. But it's just one example of the way, sometimes, when you're really disciplined about allocating capital thoroughly all the way down to [new] products and responding accordingly, you can wind up having to change your business mix.

在 FRTB 上，這確實非常微妙。老實說，這次電話會議的細節可能太多了。但只是給你一個無關緊要、無關緊要但有用的例子。 FRTB 下的一種產品是收益率曲線利差期權。如果 FRTB 提案按照目前的書面形式獲得通過，那麼該產品就變得不可行。顯然，如果我們需要停止生產該產品，沒有人真正關心。但這只是其中一個例子，有時，當你真正嚴格地徹底分配資本到[新]產品並做出相應反應時，你最終可能不得不改變你的業務組合。

There are obviously more significant products that matter much more for the real economy, like mortgage, where the layering on of the operational risk and the way it's being proposed, especially if some of the other beneficial elements of the proposal don't come through, you're once again making the product even harder to offer to homeowners. So we'll see what happens.

顯然有一些更重要的產品對實體經濟更重要，比如抵押貸款，其中操作風險的分層及其提議的方式，特別是如果提案的其他一些有益元素沒有實現的話，您再次讓向房主提供該產品變得更加困難。所以我們會看看會發生什麼。

And I would just add to that -- even if you're a product that doesn't make money, you might do it for clients who are great clients. You're going to manage by product, by client and by effectively business mix and close the adjustments. Roughly, loans don't make sense to put in your balance sheet as a whole, almost any loan. And it's you have to recognize that, and sort of you just have to manage through all the various complications here, and you're going to know what the hell to do.

我想補充一點——即使你的產品不賺錢，你也可以為偉大的客戶做這件事。您將按產品、客戶和有效的業務組合進行管理並完成調整。粗略地說，幾乎所有貸款都沒有意義將貸款作為一個整體納入您的資產負債表中。你必須認識到這一點，你只需要處理好這裡的所有各種複雜情況，你就會知道到底該怎麼做。

Next, we'll go to the line of Mike Mayo from Wells Fargo Securities.

接下來，我們將請來富國銀行證券公司的邁克·梅奧 (Mike Mayo)。

I had another question on Vice Chair Barr's speech from this week. To the extent the capital ratios do go up 20% for you, and perhaps others, to what degree would you think about changing your business model in terms of remixing where you do business, repricing, or simply removing activities that you used to do?

我對巴爾副主席本週的講話還有另一個問題。如果您（也許還有其他人）的資本比率確實上升了 20%，那麼您會考慮在多大程度上改變您的業務模式，包括重新混合您的業務地點、重新定價或乾脆取消您過去從事的活動？

Its kind of ironic or maybe it's not ironic, but Apollo hit an all-time stock price high the same week as the speech. So does that -- how much business leaves JPMorgan or the industry if capital ratios do go up as much as potentially proposed?

這有點諷刺，也許並不諷刺，但阿波羅在演講的同一周股價創下了歷史新高。那麼，如果資本比率確實像提議的那樣上升，那麼摩根大通或整個行業會失去多少業務呢？

Yes, Mike. I mean...

是的，邁克。我是說...

Before -- wait. Before Jeremy answers your question, I think that's what it is, is great news for hedge funds, private equity, private credit, Apollo, Blackstone. And they're dancing in the streets.

之前——等等。在傑里米回答你的問題之前，我認為這對對沖基金、私募股權、私人信貸、阿波羅、黑石來說是個好消息。他們在街上跳舞。

Exactly. And I was going to say, Mike, yes to everything. So we mean, repricing? Yes, definitely. To the extent that we have pricing power and the higher capital requirements mean that we're not generating the right returns for shareholders, we will try to reprice and we'll see how that sticks and how that flows into the economy and how it affects demand for products.

確切地。我想說，邁克，一切都可以。所以我們的意思是，重新定價？當然是。如果我們擁有定價權，而更高的資本要求意味著我們無法為股東創造適當的回報，我們將嘗試重新定價，我們將看看這種情況如何持續，如何流入經濟以及它如何影響對產品的需求。

And if the repricing is not successful, then in some cases, we will have to remix. And that means getting out of certain products and services. And as Jamie points out, that probably means that those products and services leave the regulated perimeter and go into elsewhere. And that's fine.

如果重新定價不成功，那麼在某些情況下，我們將不得不重新混合。這意味著放棄某些產品和服務。正如傑米指出的那樣，這可能意味著這些產品和服務離開受監管的範圍並進入其他地方。那很好。

As Jamie points out, those people are clients, and I think that point was addressed also in Vice Chair Barr's speech. So -- but traditionally, having risky activities leave the regulated perimeter has had some negative consequences. So these are all important things to consider.

正如傑米指出的那樣，這些人是客戶，我認為副主席巴爾的演講也談到了這一點。所以，但傳統上，讓危險活動離開監管範圍會產生一些負面後果。所以這些都是需要考慮的重要事情。

All right. And a separate question. I appreciate the Investor Day, gives a little bit more color on the degree that your investment may or may not pan out. We are still all watching that closely. Having said that, you've just increased revenue guidance by $10 billion for NII between this quarter and the first quarter without changing expense guidance by even $1.

好的。還有一個單獨的問題。我很欣賞投資者日，它為您的投資可能成功或失敗的程度提供了更多的色彩。我們仍在密切關注。話雖如此，您剛剛在本季度和第一季度之間將 NII 的收入指導增加了 100 億美元，而費用指導甚至沒有改變 1 美元。

Are you tempted to spend a little bit more? Why not spend more if you're gaining share? And I'm not saying you should, I'm just wondering like aren't you tempted to do so? You have $10 billion more revenues and you're not spending $1 more of expenses. Like why not?

您是否想多花一點錢？如果你能獲得份額，為什麼不花更多的錢呢？我並不是說你應該這樣做，我只是想知道你難道不想這樣做嗎？您的收入增加了 100 億美元，但支出卻沒有增加 1 美元。喜歡為什麼不呢？

Mike, let me get this right. You're actually complaining that our expenses aren't high enough? Is that right?

邁克，讓我把這件事搞清楚。你居然抱怨我們的開支不夠高？是對的嗎？

Wait, just to be clear, just the flip side of the question I asked for 2 years, going back...

等等，澄清一下，這只是我問了兩年的問題的另一面，回顧一下……

Fair enough, I appreciate the balance. Now in all seriousness, we've always been pretty clear, right, that our spending is through-the-cycle spending based on through-the-cycle investment. Through-the-cycle spending based on our through-the-cycle view of the earnings-generating power of the company and the goal to produce the right returns.

公平地說，我很欣賞這種平衡。嚴肅地說，我們一直很清楚，對吧，我們的支出是基於全週期投資的全週期支出。整個週期支出基於我們對公司創收能力的整個週期觀點以及產生適當回報的目標。

So broadly speaking, NII tends to flow straight through to the bottom line, both when it's going up, and by the way, when it's going down, too. And we've been through those moments as you all remember.

因此，從廣義上講，NII 往往會直接流向底線，無論是在上漲時還是在下跌時。正如你們都記得的那樣，我們經歷過那些時刻。

So whether or not there are opportunities to deploy some more dollars into marketing and stuff like that, we had actually looked at that recently. I don't see that being a meaningful item this year, which is part of why we have not revised the expense guidance so far. But this is about investing through the cycle and being honest and disciplined about which revenue items flow -- carried expense loading and which of them don't.

因此，無論是否有機會在營銷等方面投入更多資金，我們最近實際上已經研究過了。我認為今年這不是一個有意義的項目，這也是我們迄今為止尚未修改費用指南的部分原因。但這是關於整個週期的投資，並對哪些收入項目流動（帶有費用負擔，哪些不帶有費用負擔）保持誠實和紀律。

And then last quick follow-up...

然後最後快速跟進...

I think we're kind of running as fast as we can. So if you actually set down with risk, we have credit compliance, audit, marketing, bankers, recruiter, trainers, they're saying this is it. We're full effort right now. And we want to make sure we get things right and get things thoughtful and careful. So it's not just the money, it's the people and how many things you can change all the once and add to all at once.

我認為我們正在盡可能快地奔跑。因此，如果你真的願意承擔風險，我們有信用合規、審計、營銷、銀行家、招聘人員、培訓師，他們說就是這樣了。我們現在正在全力以赴。我們希望確保我們把事情做對、深思熟慮、小心謹慎。所以這不僅僅是錢的問題，還有人以及你可以一次性改變和添加多少東西。

And then once quick follow-up to that. Your efficiency rate this quarter is the lowest we've seen in a long, long time. And I guess you're saying don't extrapolate this efficiency ratio because NII will come down at some point. But when you just simply look at, you benchmark yourself against the low-cost providers, where do you think you're there now? And where can you still go? Because if you extrapolate this quarter, you're getting closer.

然後快速跟進一次。你們本季度的效率是很長一段時間以來最低的。我猜你是說不要推斷這個效率比，因為 NII 會在某個時候下降。但是，當您簡單地觀察一下，將自己與低成本提供商進行比較時，您認為自己現在處於什麼位置？你還能去哪裡？因為如果你推斷本季度，你就會更接近。

Yes. I mean, you said it yourself, right? You definitely can extrapolate the current numbers. But I think more broadly, on benchmarking ourselves to low-cost providers, it sort of speaks to an area that you've been interested in for a long time, which is all of the investment that we're doing in technology to improve generally scalability and get more of our cost base to be variable versus fixed in terms of how they respond to volumes. That's a big part of the reason that we're doing the investments that we're doing and modernization and cloud and AI and all the type of stuff that we've talked about a lot. So I think we feel really good about our efficiency as a company, but there definitely is room for improvement.

是的。我的意思是，你自己說的，對嗎？您絕對可以推斷出當前的數字。但我認為更廣泛地說，在將我們自己與低成本提供商進行基準比較時，這在某種程度上涉及了您長期以來感興趣的一個領域，這就是我們在技術方面所做的所有投資，以總體改善可擴展性，並讓我們的成本基礎在如何響應數量方面變得可變而不是固定。這是我們正在進行投資、現代化、雲和人工智能以及我們經常談論的所有類型的東西的一個重要原因。因此，我認為我們對公司的效率感到非常滿意，但肯定還有改進的空間。

Next, we'll go to the line of Steven Chubak from Wolfe Research.

接下來，我們將討論來自 Wolfe Research 的 Steven Chubak。

Apologies for the technical issues earlier. Wanted to ask on the deposit outlook. Just with signs that recent liquidity drawdown has come predominantly out of RRP versus industry deposits. Just want to get your thoughts on what expectations you have for deposit growth in the second half, both for you and even the broader industry? Especially as treasury issuance really begins to ramp in earnest.

對之前的技術問題表示歉意。想問一下存款前景。有跡象表明，最近的流動性下降主要來自建議零售價與行業存款。只是想了解一下您對下半年存款增長的預期，無論是對您，還是對更廣泛的行業來說？尤其是當國債發行真正開始認真增加時。

Yes. Good question, Steve. So let me say a couple of things about this. So obviously, our deposit numbers have bounced around a little bit as a function of some of the turmoil that we saw in regional banks as well as obviously the First Republic transaction. But now if you look at our kind of end-of-period deposits this quarter and you project forward, our core view is that we would expect a sort of modest downward trend to reassert itself from this higher starting point, broadly as a function of QT playing through the system, but noting that we do have some hope for offsets by taking share.

是的。好問題，史蒂夫。那麼讓我對此說幾句話。顯然，由於我們在地區銀行看到的一些動盪以及明顯的第一共和國交易，我們的存款數量略有反彈。但現在，如果你看看我們本季度的期末存款並展望未來，我們的核心觀點是，我們預計從這個較高的起點開始，將出現一種溫和的下降趨勢，大致是QT 通過系統進行遊戲，但指出我們確實希望通過佔據份額來抵消。

Just to give a couple of examples. Like in consumer, we've got some of our branch expansion markets seasoning, and so their share [have already increase] there. And in wholesale, we've obviously invested a lot in products and services. And so we think we have compelling offerings that are helping us win mandates, and so there are potentially some share offsets there.

僅舉幾個例子。就像在消費者領域一樣，我們的一些分支機構擴張市場已經成熟，因此它們的份額[已經增加]。在批發方面，我們顯然在產品和服務方面投入了大量資金。因此，我們認為我們擁有引人注目的產品，可以幫助我們贏得授權，因此可能存在一些份額抵消。

But broadly, we -- our core view remains modest deposit declines across the franchise. Within that, you note the same thing we've noted, that as we got through the debt ceiling, and the TGA build has come into effect, and you've seen a lot of bill issuance, a big question in the market about whether that was going to come out of reserves or come out of RRP. And so far, with most of the TGA build, I guess they're targeting $600 billion and they're at $550 billion or something, so they're almost done. More of it, and some people feared, has come out of RRP.

但總的來說，我們的核心觀點仍然是整個特許經營業務的存款適度下降。其中，您注意到我們已經註意到的同樣的事情，即當我們突破債務上限，TGA 建設已經生效，您已經看到大量票據發行，這是市場上的一個大問題：這將來自儲備金或來自建議零售價。到目前為止，對於 TGA 的大部分建設，我猜他們的目標是 6000 億美元，實際上是 5500 億美元左右，所以他們幾乎已經完成了。一些人擔心，其中更多的部分來自建議零售價。

So as you say, I think that's a relatively good sign, and highlights how the system works better when you've got ample supply of short-dated collateral on the front end of the yield curve. So that whole RRP, TGA, bank reserve dynamic is going to continue to be significant, but it is good to see RRP coming down a little bit.

正如你所說，我認為這是一個相對好的跡象，並強調了當收益率曲線前端有充足的短期抵押品供應時，系統如何更好地運作。因此，整個 RRP、TGA、銀行準備金動態將繼續顯著，但很高興看到 RRP 略有下降。

Helpful color. And just a follow-up on card income. Revenues were muted in the quarter. I was hoping you could unpack just the sources of pressure. Maybe more specifically, how much of the drag is associated with FAS 91 versus some other factors?

有用的顏色。這只是卡收入的後續行動。該季度收入低迷。我希望你能解開壓力的來源。也許更具體地說，與其他因素相比，FAS 91 帶來的阻力有多少？

Yes. So actually, that card income number, Steve, is a little bit of a one-off thing. So we had a reward liability adjustment this quarter, kind of a technical thing. So that's just a temporary headwind. And also, the sequential comparison is also getting hurt by a small positive one-off item in the prior period. And obviously, I know you guys look at it, but card income isn't sort of thing that we look at that much ourselves.

是的。所以實際上，史蒂夫，信用卡收入數字有點一次性。因此，我們本季度進行了獎勵責任調整，這是一個技術性的事情。所以這只是暫時的逆風。而且，連續比較也受到前一時期的一個小的積極的一次性項目的影響。顯然，我知道你們會關注這個問題，但信用卡收入並不是我們自己關注的那樣。

Can you size the reward liability impact?

您能衡量獎勵責任的影響嗎？

Why don't you get Michael to give that to you? It's not that significant, but it's enough to just make the sequential number look a little bit wonky.

你為什麼不讓邁克爾把那個給你呢？它並不那麼重要，但足以讓序列號看起來有點奇怪。

Next, we'll go to the line of Glenn Schorr from Evercore ISI.

接下來，我們將前往 Evercore ISI 的 Glenn Schorr 線路。

Just want to follow up on this pricing power conversation. Because you've been consistent over time that you have a limited ability to sustain pricing power due to the competitive landscape. But I guess my question is, if not now, when? Meaning, a lot has changed on the institutional side, the European bank side, the regional bank side. And I would think that there'd be certain businesses that you have a greater ability and willingness to push price on.

只是想跟進這次定價權對話。因為隨著時間的推移，您一直認為，由於競爭格局，您維持定價能力的能力有限。但我想我的問題是，如果不是現在，更待何時？這意味著，機構方面、歐洲銀行方面、區域銀行方面都發生了很多變化。我認為，對於某些企業，你有更大的能力和意願來推動價格。

And then maybe you could tie that to your comments in the press release on what are the material -- what are the real-world consequences for markets and end users that you're referring to when talking about material regulatory changes?

然後，也許您可以將其與您在新聞稿中對實質性監管變化的評論聯繫起來——您在談論實質性監管變化時所指的市場和最終用戶的現實世界後果是什麼？

Sure. So look, on pricing power, you're right. It really depends on the product, and it depends on the competitive landscape across different banks. And so it's very granular, it's very product-specific. And in some cases, we'll have more pricing power than in other cases.

當然。所以看，就定價能力而言，你是對的。這實際上取決於產品，也取決於不同銀行的競爭格局。所以它非常細粒度，非常針對產品。在某些情況下，我們將比其他情況下擁有更多的定價權。

I think the overall point that we're trying to make in connection with Basel III end game is just that like we think the capital increases are excessive. It puts pressure on returns, all else equal. That obviously puts pressure on us to increase price where we can. That is generally a bad thing for the real economy. And how all of that plays out in detail across different products and services remains to be seen, importantly, since we don't actually have the proposal yet. So we need those details.

我認為我們在巴塞爾協議III最終遊戲中試圖表達的總體觀點就是我們認為資本增加過多。在其他條件相同的情況下，它會給回報帶來壓力。這顯然給我們帶來了盡可能提高價格的壓力。這對於實體經濟來說通常是一件壞事。重要的是，所有這些如何在不同的產品和服務中詳細發揮作用還有待觀察，因為我們實際上還沒有提案。所以我們需要這些細節。

I'm sorry, Glenn. I forgot the second half of your question. What was it?

對不起，格倫。我忘記了你問題的後半部分。它以前如何？

Actually, I think you hit on it, so I'll just do a follow-up on a related. So the notion of private credit doing large traditional investment-grade lending activity, it may be part of the competitive landscape that limits the ability to push price. In Jamie's letter, you talked about the downside -- or my question is, what's the downside if more of the mortgage credit asset-backed intermediation business is pushed out of the banking system?

事實上，我認為你已經註意到了這一點，所以我只會對相關內容進行跟進。因此，私人信貸進行大型傳統投資級貸款活動的概念可能是限制推高價格能力的競爭格局的一部分。在傑米的信中，你談到了不利的一面——或者我的問題是，如果更多的抵押貸款信貸資產支持的中介業務被擠出銀行體系，會有什麼不利的一面？

I mean, I guess it depends on what you mean by downside. But I just think, societally speaking, I think we've seen in recent history that when home lending is happening outside the regulated perimeter, and things get bad when you have economic downturns, it produces bad outcomes for individuals and homeowners and society as a whole. So I mean, Jamie has written about this extensively.

我的意思是，我想這取決於你所說的缺點是什麼。但我只是認為，從社會角度來看，我認為我們在最近的歷史中已經看到，當住房貸款發生在監管範圍之外時，當經濟衰退時情況會變得糟糕，它會給個人、房主和社會帶來不良後果。所有的。所以我的意思是，傑米已經寫了很多關於這個的文章。

Beyond that, financially, we've talked about how mortgage lending -- I mean, the profitability swings, obviously, is reasonably cyclical. And in the recent past, it's actually been very profitable, then it was less so. Like the correspondent channel right now is actually picking up a little bit.

除此之外，在金融方面，我們已經討論了抵押貸款——我的意思是，盈利能力的波動顯然具有合理的周期性。在最近的一段時間裡，它實際上非常有利可圖，然後就沒有那麼有利可圖了。就像記者頻道現在實際上正在恢復一點點。

But it's a thin-margin business, it's challenging. And when you increase the Cap requirements, it makes it even harder. So that just becomes one of the areas where you're in that tension between remixing versus pricing power that we talked about a second ago. And it might in fact mean that we do less, less credit available for homeowners and more regulatory risk as the activity moves outside the perimeter.

但這是一項利潤微薄的業務，充滿挑戰。當你提高上限要求時，事情就會變得更加困難。因此，這就成為我們剛才談到的混音與定價能力之間的緊張關係之一。事實上，這可能意味著，隨著活動轉移到外圍，我們為房主提供的信貸會減少，監管風險也會增加。

Next, we'll go to the line of Betsy Graseck from Morgan Stanley.

接下來，我們將轉到摩根士丹利 (Morgan Stanley) 的貝齊·格拉塞克 (Betsy Graseck)。

I just wanted to unpack a little bit more the drivers of the change you outlined that's coming in the 10-Q, Jeremy, regarding the asset sensitivity going from liability-sensitive to asset-sensitive, at least that's the way I read it. I just wanted to understand what the drivers of that is.

Jeremy，我只是想進一步解開您在 10-Q 中概述的變化的驅動因素，關於資產敏感性從負債敏感到資產敏感，至少我是這麼讀的。我只是想了解其驅動因素是什麼。

Yes, sure. No problem, Betsy. I mean, as you know, that's always been a challenging number. It's meant as a risk management measure of sorts, although it's also somewhat limited in that respect. And it has been of uneven usefulness in terms of potential to be able to predict our NII trajectory when rates change.

是的，當然。沒問題，貝琪。我的意思是，正如你所知，這一直是一個具有挑戰性的數字。它是某種風險管理措施，儘管在這方面也有一定的限制。在利率變化時預測我們的 NII 軌蹟的潛力方面，它的用處並不均衡。

But as we've looked at that and tried to improve it and spoken to all of you through this latest rate-hiking cycle, we've come to the conclusion that it would improve the usefulness of the disclosure if we included in the modeling the effect of deposit repricing lags. And so we've done that, and that just has the effect that I talked about, it increases the EAR number by about $4 billion from minus $1.5 billion, which is roughly what it was last quarter and what it would have been this quarter without the change, to something more like $2.5 billion.

但當我們研究了這一點並試圖改進它並通過最近的加息週期與大家交談時，我們得出的結論是，如果我們在建模中包含存款重新定價的影響具有滯後性。所以我們已經這樣做了，這正好產生了我談到的效果，它將 EAR 數字從負 15 億美元增加了約 40 億美元，這大致相當於上個季度的數字，以及如果沒有這個數字，本季度的數字。變化為大約 25 億美元。

But all the usual caveats apply, right? I mean, it's never -- the answer is going to always -- for any given change in rates, the change in our NII is always going to be, for one reason or another, different from what that disclosure shows. But we do our best to...

但所有常見的警告都適用，對吧？我的意思是，對於任何給定的利率變化，我們的國家信息基礎設施的變化永遠不會——答案永遠是——出於某種原因，與披露的內容不同。但我們盡力...

Okay. And so is it fair for me to think about that change as a mark-to-market to where we are today? And when I think about your forward guide here, longer term, you're saying, look, deposit betas are accelerating. So as I go through the 10-Qs over the next 4 or 5 quarters, I should expect that, that $2.5 billion should come down because deposit betas, you're anticipating, are going to be accelerating from here? I'm just trying to put those two things together.

好的。那麼，我認為這種變化是按市值計價以達到我們今天的水平是否公平？當我想到你的前瞻性指南時，從長遠來看，你會說，看，存款貝塔係數正在加速。因此，當我在接下來的 4 或 5 個季度查看 10-Q 時，我應該預計 25 億美元應該會下降，因為您預計存款貝塔值將從這裡開始加速？我只是想把這兩件事放在一起。

Yes, it's a good question. It's quite a technical issue. So I think, in the past, the way this number was constructed was to assume through-the-cycle betas on all the deposits. And so your notion that like the number would include deposit beta acceleration would not have been the case because it would have been using essentially terminal deposit betas for the -- based on the forward curve and then based on a 100% shock to the forward curve.

是的，這是一個好問題。這是一個相當技術性的問題。所以我認為，在過去，這個數字的構建方式是假設所有存款的整個週期貝塔值。因此，您認為這個數字將包括存款貝塔加速的想法不會是這樣，因為它本質上是使用終端存款貝塔——基於遠期曲線，然後基於對遠期曲線的 100% 衝擊。

The nuance that we've introduced now is to recognize that, given the shock, the reprice at the beta predicts will not be instantaneous. And so you get sort of just the mathematical consequences of that. But I think translating that into a statement about our expectation for beta for the next 12 months relative to our NII guide might be a bridge too far. I'm not sure you can actually go...

我們現在引入的細微差別是要認識到，考慮到衝擊，貝塔預測的重新定價不會立即發生。所以你得到的只是數學結果。但我認為將其轉化為我們對未來 12 個月測試版相對於我們的 NII 指南的預期的聲明可能有點太過了。我不確定你是否真的可以去...

Right. But you were saying earlier, deposit betas, you do anticipate are going to be accelerating from here. And that's part of the outlook for NII, longer term, to normalize in the mid-70s. Is that right?

正確的。但您之前說過，您確實預計存款貝塔將從這裡開始加速。這是 NII 長期前景的一部分，將在 70 年代中期實現正常化。是對的嗎？

Yes. But let me emphasize some of that -- go ahead, Jamie.

是的。但讓我強調一些——繼續吧，傑米。

Yes. I mean, basically, yes, is you have -- if the next round is going to be the beta will be 30 to 40 to 50, whatever the product is, yes, that's the ladder. And the $2.5 billion will go down over time as that actually happens if rates actually go up. If rates don't actually go up, the $2.5 billion will be exactly $2.5 billion again.

是的。我的意思是，基本上，是的，如果下一輪測試將是 30 到 40 到 50，無論產品是什麼，是的，這就是階梯。隨著時間的推移，這 25 億美元將會減少，因為如果利率實際上上升，這種情況就會發生。如果利率實際上沒有上升，那麼 25 億美元將再次達到 25 億美元。

And what I was going to say, Betsy, is just that the projection of the $87 billion coming down to a significantly lower number contains both the element of internal migration as well as the potential, which is by no means guaranteed, at product-level reprice. And furthermore, then obviously, the dynamics are a little bit different in the different business segments as we move from large corporate wholesale to consumer.

Betsy，我想說的是，870 億美元的預測將大幅降低，其中既包含內部遷移的因素，也包含產品層面的潛力（這絕不是保證的）重新定價。此外，很明顯，當我們從大型企業批發轉向消費者時，不同業務領域的動態略有不同。

Next, we'll go to the line of Matt O'Connor from Deutsche Bank.

接下來，我們請聽來自德意志銀行的馬特·奧康納 (Matt O'Connor) 的電話。

So I'm in your camp that, eventually, consumers will want more deposit rate sensitivity here. But I guess, what would make you change your rates meaningfully? So the top two banks have about 50% consumer market share; loan-to-deposit ratios are low; your outlook for loan growth, and I think others', is fairly sluggish at least outside of card.

所以我站在你的立場上，最終消費者會希望這裡有更高的存款利率敏感性。但我想，什麼會讓你有意義地改變你的費率呢？因此排名前兩位的銀行擁有約50%的消費市場份額；貸存比率低；你們以及我認為其他人的貸款增長前景相當低迷，至少在信用卡之外是這樣。

So I get that it's common sense, and that's what we've seen historically. But there really is this kind of big divergence among big banks and everybody else, where the big banks just don't need to pay that much for deposits for some of the reasons. So what would make you change that?

所以我知道這是常識，這就是我們歷史上所看到的。但大銀行和其他銀行之間確實存在這種巨大差異，因為某些原因，大銀行不需要為存款支付那麼多費用。那麼什麼會讓你改變這一點呢？

Yes. In the end, Matt, it's just feedback from the field. It's competition and feedback from the field. We -- Jamie, go ahead.

是的。最後，馬特，這只是來自現場的反饋。這是來自現場的競爭和反饋。我們——傑米，繼續吧。

I think every bank is in a different position about what they need, and so you have a whole range of outcomes. But remember, we do this also by city. So you have different competition, Arizona and Phoenix, than you have in Chicago, Illinois. And we do have high interest rate products. So it's a combination of all those things. I wouldn't call it big bank versus small bank.

我認為每家銀行對於他們的需求都處於不同的位置，因此你會得到一系列的結果。但請記住，我們也按城市進行此操作。因此，亞利桑那州和菲尼克斯的競爭與伊利諾伊州芝加哥的競爭不同。我們確實有高利率產品。所以它是所有這些東西的組合。我不會稱其為大銀行與小銀行。

And you're going to see, when everyone reports, who's kind of [payable to more] things and who didn't and things like that.

當每個人都報告時，你會看到誰應該[應付更多]事情，誰沒有，諸如此類的事情。

So look, I would take as a given. I think it's safe to say there is very little pricing power in most of our business, and betas are going to go up. You take it as a given. There is no circumstance that we've ever seen in the history of banking where rates didn't get to a certain point that you had to have competing products, and rates go through migration or direct rate or move into CDs or money market funds and you would have to compete for that. You already see it in parts of our business and not in other parts.

所以看，我認為這是理所當然的。我認為可以肯定地說，我們大部分業務的定價能力都很小，貝塔係數將會上升。你把它視為理所當然。在銀行業的歷史上，我們從未見過利率沒有達到必須有競爭產品的程度的情況，並且利率會通過遷移或直接利率或轉移到 CD 或貨幣市場基金，你必須為此競爭。您已經在我們業務的某些部分看到了這一點，但在其他部分卻沒有。

Okay. And I'll add there, Matt, is just that it's really just about primary bank relationships, and that's the core of the strategy.

好的。馬特，我要補充一點，這實際上只是與主要銀行關係有關，這是該戰略的核心。

Yes. I mean, again, I 100% agree. But we've never seen kind of loan-to-deposit ratios for banks like yours this low. So you could just let deposits run off at a modest amount for quite some time to make the decision not to pay up. I mean, I assume that's the trade-off, that eventually, you'll...

是的。我的意思是，我再次100%同意。但我們從未見過像你們這樣的銀行的貸存比這麼低。因此，您可以讓存款在相當長的一段時間內以適度的金額流失，然後再決定不還款。我的意思是，我認為這是權衡，最終，你會......

That's a little more complicated because that -- a lot of that loan-to-value ratio is lower because of regulatory stuff, LCR, capital ratio, et cetera.

這有點複雜，因為很多貸款價值比由於監管因素、流動性覆蓋率、資本比率等原因而較低。

And for our final question, we'll go to Charles Peabody from Portales Partners.

對於我們的最後一個問題，我們將請來自 Portales Partners 的 Charles Peabody。

Jeremy, on Page 4 of your presentation, you showed some liquidity metrics. And there's been a meaningful deterioration -- or I shouldn't say deterioration, depletion of some of that excess liquidity, obviously for First Republic primarily.

Jeremy，在您的演示文稿的第 4 頁上，您展示了一些流動性指標。而且出現了有意義的惡化——或者我不應該說惡化，部分過剩流動性的耗盡，顯然主要是對第一共和國而言。

So my question is, how quickly do you want to rebuild that liquidity? Because as I look out towards '24, there's probably a half dozen variables that are going to make liquidity a premium event, to have excess liquidity. So that's my first question, is what's your plans for replenishing that liquidity?

所以我的問題是，您希望多快重建流動性？因為當我展望 24 世紀時，可能有六個變量會使流動性成為溢價事件，從而導致流動性過剩。這是我的第一個問題，你們補充流動性的計劃是什麼？

Yes, Charles. So I know we talked about this a little bit at Investor Day, right? So as I said in my prepared remarks, yes, we think about half of the change in the bank LCR number is consequence of First Republic. And the rest of it is just the expected decrease in to some deposits flowing through into our HQLA balances and the bank LCR ratio. So that's all entirely as expected. And therefore, I think that the replenishing notion is not correct. In fact, obviously, we still have ample, ample liquidity.

是的，查爾斯。所以我知道我們在投資者日討論過這個問題，對嗎？正如我在準備好的發言中所說，是的，我們認為銀行 LCR 數字的一半變化是第一共和國的結果。其餘部分只是流入我們的 HQLA 餘額和銀行 LCR 比率的部分存款的預期減少。所以這完全符合預期。因此，我認為補充的觀念是不正確的。事實上，很明顯，我們的流動性仍然充裕、充裕。

Now if you want to project trends forward, that's a different story. But that's sort of the business of banking, we'll adjust accordingly in terms of our asset and liability mix across different products and to ensure compliance of the ratios and fortress balance sheet principles, as you would expect from us.

現在，如果你想預測未來的趨勢，那就是另一回事了。但這是銀行業的業務，我們將根據不同產品的資產和負債組合進行相應調整，並確保遵守比率和堡壘資產負債表原則，正如您對我們的期望一樣。

And I would just add that, just look at the top of the page in the press release, $1.4 trillion of cash and marketable securities. Even we get down to no excess, we're going to have like, I've got the exact number, $1.2 trillion. I think we have excess liquidity. And the liquidity ratio is slightly some different. I think there's plenty of liquidity in the system, and of course, we'd do multiple things to change this overnight if we wanted to.

我想補充一點，看看新聞稿頁面的頂部，1.4 萬億美元的現金和有價證券。即使我們減少到不超額的水平，我們也會得到類似的結果，我已經得到了確切的數字，1.2 萬億美元。我認為我們的流動性過剩。而且流動性比率略有不同。我認為系統中有充足的流動性，當然，如果我們願意的話，我們會做很多事情來在一夜之間改變這種情況。

So sort of wrapped into that as a follow-up. If you take your $87 billion forecast for NII this year, and that implies at least one quarter of maybe $22 billion of NII. And you take your eventual forecast of mid-$70 billion of NII at some point in the future. That would imply at least one quarter of $18 billion of NII. So that's about an 18% drop.

因此，作為後續行動，我們將其納入其中。如果您對今年 NII 的預測為 870 億美元，這意味著大約 220 億美元的 NII 中至少有四分之一。您最終預測 NII 在未來某個時刻將達到 700 億美元左右。這意味著 180 億美元的 NII 中至少有四分之一。所以下降了大約 18%。

And if you hold the balance sheet steady, you're talking about a 30 basis point drop in your margin -- your NIM, in order get to that from $22 billion to $18 billion. I mean, what is driving -- is it really the deposit? Or are you thinking in terms of interest reversals as credit deteriorates? Or is it rebuilding of liquidity? I'm just trying to get a better sense of what the impact is?

如果您保持資產負債表穩定，那麼您的利潤率（NIM）就會下降 30 個基點，以便從 220 億美元降至 180 億美元。我的意思是，驅動因素是什麼——真的是存款嗎？或者您是否正在考慮隨著信用惡化而發生的利息逆轉？還是流動性的重建？我只是想更好地了解影響是什麼？

[On that, I would relate -- about that] Yes. Charlie, I would think about that as being really entirely a deposit story. It's just not that complicated, right? I think we did this, I think it was either in the fourth quarter or in the first quarter. But we put a little chart on the page, just in very simple terms, it shows like what the dollar consequences are of whatever, like a 10 basis point change in deposit rate paid in terms of NII run rate.

[關於這一點，我想說——關於這一點]是的。查理，我認為這完全是一個存款故事。只是沒那麼複雜，對吧？我認為我們做到了這一點，我認為要么是在第四季度，要么是在第一季度。但我們在頁面上放了一個小圖表，用非常簡單的術語來說，它顯示了美元的後果，比如按照 NII 運行利率支付的存款利率變化 10 個基點。

So whether it's as a consequence of migration from lower-yielding to higher-yielding, going from 0% to a 4% CD is obviously a big impact on margin; or whether it's because savings reprices, relatively small changes in rate there are kind of a lot of money when you've got a couple of trillion dollars of deposits. So it's really not any more complicated than that. And that's why we're being so forceful about reminding people about what we expect that trajectory to be.

因此，無論是從低收益向高收益遷移的結果，從 0% 到 4% 的 CD 顯然對利潤率有很大影響；或者是否是因為儲蓄重新定價，利率變化相對較小，當你有幾萬億美元的存款時，就會有很多錢。所以它實際上並不比這更複雜。這就是為什麼我們如此強烈地提醒人們我們對這一軌蹟的期望。

And we have no further questions at this time.

目前我們沒有進一步的問題。

Thank you very much.

非常感謝。

You guys. I'll be back in New York tonight. Let's see you Monday...

你們。今晚我會回到紐約。我們週一見...

Thank you all for participating in today's conference. You may disconnect at this time and have a great rest of your day.

感謝大家參加今天的會議。此時您可以斷開連接並好好休息一天。