特斯拉 (TSLA) 2017 Q3 法說會逐字稿

Good day, ladies and gentlemen, and thank you for your patience. You've joined the Tesla Motors Third Quarter 2017 Financial Results Q&A Conference Call. (Operator Instructions) As a reminder, this conference may be recorded. I would now like to turn the call over to your host, VP of Investor Relations, Mr. Jeff Evanson. Sir, you may begin.

女士們、先生們，大家好，感謝你們的耐心。您已加入特斯拉汽車 2017 年第三季財務業績問答電話會議。（操作員指示）提醒一下，本次會議可能會被錄音。現在我想將電話轉給主持人、投資者關係副總裁傑夫·埃文森先生。先生，您可以開始了。

Thank you, Latif, and good afternoon, everyone. Welcome to Tesla's third quarter 2017 Q&A webcast. I'm joined today by Elon Musk, J.B. Straubel, Deepak Ahuja and Jon McNeill.

謝謝你，拉蒂夫，大家下午好。歡迎收聽特斯拉 2017 年第三季問答網路直播。今天與我一起參加的還有 Elon Musk、J.B. Straubel、Deepak Ahuja 和 Jon McNeill。

Our third quarter results were previously announced in the update letter we published at the same link as this webcast. During this call, we will discuss our business outlook and make forward-looking statements. These comments are based on our predictions and expectations as of today. Actual events or results could differ materially due to a number of risks and uncertainties, including those mentioned in our most recent filings with the SEC.

我們先前已在與本網路廣播相同的連結中發布的更新信中公佈了第三季的業績。在本次電話會議中，我們將討論我們的業務前景並做出前瞻性陳述。這些評論是基於我們今天的預測和期望。由於多種風險和不確定因素，包括我們最近向美國證券交易委員會提交的文件中提到的風險和不確定因素，實際事件或結果可能存在重大差異。

(Operator Instructions)

（操作員指示）

Before we jump in to the Q&A, Elon has some opening remarks. Elon?

在我們進入問答環節之前，伊隆先講了一些開場白。埃隆？

So, pardon me for 1 minute. I have a bit of a cold. So let's see. Actually, we're doing this call from the Gigafactory because that's where the production constraint is for Model 3, from the most important thing for the company. And I always move my desk to wherever -- well, it's not like we have a desk, actually. I move myself to wherever the biggest problem is in Tesla. Somewhat, I really believe that one should lead from the front lines, and that's why I'm here, and I'll go into some of the Gigafactory issues later in the call, but I'd like to start off by acknowledging some, I think, pretty amazing milestones for Tesla.

所以，請原諒我一分鐘。我有點感冒。讓我們看看。實際上，我們是在超級工廠打這通電話，因為那裡是 Model 3 的生產限制地，這對公司來說是最重要的。我總是把我的桌子搬到任何地方——嗯，實際上，我們並沒有桌子。我會前往特斯拉問題最嚴重的地方。某種程度上，我確實相信人們應該從前線領導，這就是我來這裡的原因，稍後我將討論一些超級工廠的問題，但我想首先承認特斯拉的一些非常了不起的里程碑。

One thing that I thought was really profound was that we surpassed cumulative deliveries of vehicles. We surpassed 0.25 million cumulative deliveries since the company's inception and had record Model S and X net orders and deliveries last quarter. So things are really, I think, going quite well.

我認為真正意義深遠的一件事是，我們的汽車累積交付量超過了預期。自公司成立以來，我們的累積交付量已超過 25 萬輛，上個季度 Model S 和 X 的淨訂單和交付量創下了歷史新高。所以我認為事情確實進展得相當順利。

To put that into perspective, 5 years ago, we had only delivered 2,500 cars. So our -- the Tesla fleet has grown by a factor of 100 in 5 years. I would expect, 5 years from now, to be at least an order of magnitude, we're beyond where we are right now and possibly even closer towards magnitude.

換個角度來看，5 年前我們只交付了 2,500 輛汽車。因此，我們的特斯拉車隊在 5 年內成長了 100 倍。我預計，從現在起 5 年後，至少會有一個數量級的提高，我們會超越現在的水平，甚至可能更接近數量級。

But for the skeptics out there, I'd like to say -- ask them, which one of you predicted that Tesla would go from 2,500 units delivered to 250,000 units delivered now? I suspect the answer is 0, right? So consider your assumptions for the future on whether they're valid or perhaps pessimistic.

但對於那些持懷疑態度的人，我想說——問問他們，你們當中誰預測過特斯拉的交付量會從 2,500 輛增加到現在的 25 萬輛？我懷疑答案是 0，對嗎？因此，請考慮一下你對未來的假設是否有效或是否悲觀。

So for Model 3, we continue to make significant progress each week. We see no primary problems with our supply chain or any of our production processes. Obviously, there are bottlenecks, there are thousands of processes in creating the Model 3, and we will move as fast as the slowest and least likely process among those thousands. In fact, there's 10,000 unique parts. Or I could just say, of the tens of thousands of processes necessary to produce the car, we will move as fast as the least competent and least likely elements of that mixture.

因此，對於 Model 3，我們每週都會取得重大進展。我們認為我們的供應鏈或任何生產流程都沒有主要問題。顯然，存在瓶頸，製造 Model 3 需要經過數千道工序，而我們的速度將與這數千道工序中最慢、最不可能的工序一樣快。事實上，它有 10,000 個獨特的部件。或者我可以說，在生產汽車所需的數萬個工序中，我們的行動速度將與其中能力最弱、可能性最小的元素一樣快。

So while the vast majority are going incredibly well, there are some problem areas, and after I give the business overview, I'll do a deep dive into the biggest problem area.

因此，雖然絕大多數業務都進展順利，但仍存在一些問題領域，在我給出業務概述後，我將深入研究最大的問題領域。

So based on where we -- what we know now, as we've gotten really into the details of some of the worst bottlenecks, we expect to achieve approximately 5,000 Model 3 vehicles per week by late Q1 2018, so probably sometime in March. This -- I think, in the vast scheme of things, this is a relatively small shift. The Model 3 is a 10-year program, and so we're talking about a few months out of a 10-year program that's, in the grand scheme of things, as certainly if one is doing net present value calculations, this is immaterial.

因此，根據我們目前所了解的情況，隨著我們真正了解了一些最嚴重的瓶頸問題的細節，我們預計到 2018 年第一季末，每週將生產出約 5,000 輛 Model 3 汽車，也就是大概在三月的某個時候。我認為，從整體來看，這是一個相對較小的轉變。Model 3 是一個 10 年計劃，因此，我們談論的是 10 年計劃中的幾個月，從總體上看，如果進行淨現值計算，這當然並不重要。

The -- and we have a clear path to that. We understand the bottlenecks. It's difficult to fully understand these things as we actually try to do them. And it's worth noting that some of our manufacturing areas, we're actually seeing capabilities that are, we estimate, in the 6,000 to 7,000 unit per week capability, well in excess of the 5,000-unit capability. So -- and we're optimistic with further optimization that many of our production processes will need fairly little, and in some cases, no -- so I'm not saying no, but almost no CapEx to reach something close to 10,000 units per week. It's the amount or how much can be done by just beating up robots, shortening the path, intensifying factory, adding additional robots for choke points and just making lines go really, really fast. Speed is the ultimate weapon. And our -- the design of Tesla Model 3 being that it was designed for manufacturability is turning up to be accurate. It's far easier to build this car than a Model E -- than a Model S and vastly easier than a Model X.

我們有一條明確的路徑來實現這一目標。我們了解其中的瓶頸。當我們真正嘗試去做這些事情時，很難完全理解。值得注意的是，我們實際上看到的一些製造領域的產能估計為每週 6,000 到 7,000 台，遠遠超過 5,000 台的產能。因此 — — 我們對進一步優化持樂觀態度，認為我們的許多生產流程將需要相當少的資本支出，在某些情況下甚至不需要 — — 所以我不是說不需要，而是幾乎不需要資本支出就能達到每週接近 10,000 個單位的產量。這是透過擊敗機器人、縮短路徑、強化工廠、在瓶頸處添加額外的機器人以及使線路運行得非常非常快可以完成的數量或數量。速度是終極武器。而我們的特斯拉 Model 3 的設計是為了可製造性而設計的，事實證明這是準確的。製造這款車比製造 Model E、Model S 和 Model X 容易得多。

The primary production constraints really by far is in battery module assembly. So this is -- so I'll just do a little bit of a deep dive on that. There are 4 zones to module manufacturing. So it goes through 4 major production zones. The zones 3 and 4 are in good shape; zones 1 and 2 are not. Zone 2 in particular, this is -- we had a subcontractor -- a systems integration subcontractor that unfortunately really dropped the ball, and we did not realize the degree to which the ball was dropped until quite recently, and we had to -- this is a very complex manufacturing area. We had to rewrite all of the software from scratch and redo many of the mechanical and electrical elements of zone 2 of module production. We've managed to rewrite what was about 20 to 30 man years of software in 4 weeks, but there's still a long way to go. It's -- because the software work can be fast with the electromechanical elements that need to be fabricated and installed, and that -- getting these items in place and rebuilt is, unfortunately, a lot longer, and that's -- it's probably more external constraints than software. This is what I spent many a late night on the Gigafactory working on. J.B. has been here constantly, and we've -- we allocated many of our best engineers to fundamentally fixing zone 2 of the module line and then most problem behind that it is zone 1.

到目前為止，主要的生產限制實際上是在電池模組組裝方面。所以這是——所以我將對此進行一點深入的探討。模組製造分為 4 個區域。因此它要經過4個主要生產區。區域 3 和 4 狀況良好；區域 1 和 2 狀況不佳。特別是第 2 區，這是——我們有一個分包商——一個系統整合分包商，不幸的是，它真的失誤了，直到最近我們才意識到失誤的程度，我們不得不——這是一個非常複雜的製造領域。我們必須從頭開始重寫所有軟體，並重新製作模組生產第 2 區的許多機械和電氣元素。我們已經成功地在 4 週內重寫了大約 20 到 30 個人年的軟體，但還有很長的路要走。這是因為軟體可以快速處理需要製造和安裝的機電元件，但不幸的是，將這些零件安裝到位並重建需要更長的時間，這可能是外部限製而不是軟體限制。這就是我在 Gigafactory 上度過許多個深夜所做的事情。J.B. 一直在這裡，我們——我們分配了許多最好的工程師來從根本上修復模組線的 2 區，然後背後的大多數問題是 1 區。

On the plus side, we now have a very detailed understanding of what is necessary to fix zone 1 and zone 2. We also have a new design for zone 1 and 2 that is about 3x more effective than the current design. So when we put in -- and there are 3 lines of module production. Lines 1, 2 and 3 are essentially identical. Line 4, which will have the new design, will be at triple the effectiveness of -- will be as good as the other 3 lines combined. So we're very confident about the future path of having incredibly efficient production of modules and that this will not be a constraint in the future, but unfortunately, it just takes some amount of time. This is like moving like lightning compared to the -- while there's no one in the automotive industry, there's still some finer amount of time necessary to fix something that we thought was in good shape. We were told by our supplier it was in good shape, but it was really not. So this has now been typified Tesla’s internal automation group in the U.S. and -- Tesla automation in the U.S. and Tesla Grohmann from Germany. We have a large team on -- from the -- from Tesla Grohmann also working the issue and making very rapid progress. And like I said, I am personally on that line in that machine, trying to solve problems personally where I can. And J.B.'s basically spending his life at the Gigafactory. So that's the sort of deep dive on that front.

從好的方面來看，我們現在對修復區域 1 和區域 2 所需的條件有了非常詳細的了解。我們也對區域 1 和 2 進行了新的設計，其效率比目前設計高出 3 倍。因此，當我們投入時——就有 3 條模組生產線。第 1、2 和 3 行本質上是相同的。採用新設計的 4 號線的效率將是其他 3 條線路總和的三倍。因此，我們對未來高效生產模組的道路非常有信心，而且這不會成為未來的限制因素，但不幸的是，這需要一些時間。這就像閃電一樣移動——雖然汽車行業沒有人，但修復我們認為狀況良好的東西仍然需要更多的時間。我們的供應商告訴我們它狀況良好，但事實並非如此。因此，這現在已經成為特斯拉在美國內部自動化集團的典型代表——美國的特斯拉自動化和德國的特斯拉 Grohmann。我們有一個來自 Tesla Grohmann 的大型團隊也在致力於解決這個問題，並且取得了非常迅速的進展。正如我所說的，我親自在那台機器的生產線上，盡力親自解決問題。J.B. 基本上把他的一生都花在了 Gigafactory 上。這就是對此方面的深入探討。

The other thing I want to mention is that there are a lot of articles about Tesla firing employees and laying off some lines and stuff. These are really ridiculous. And like anyone -- any journalist who'd written articles in this effect should be ashamed of themselves for lacking journalistic integrity. At every company in the world, there's annual performance reviews. In our annual performance review, despite Tesla having an extremely high standard, and a standard far higher than other car companies, which we need to have in order to survive against much larger car companies, you can't be a little guy and have equal levels of skill as the big guy. If you have 2 boxes of equal votes and one's much smaller, the big guy's going to crush the little guy, obviously. So little guy better have a heck of a lot more skill. And that is why both are just going to get hovered. So that is why our standards are high. They're not high because we believe in being mean to people. They're high because if they're not high, we will die.

我想提的另一件事是，有很多關於特斯拉解僱員工、裁減一些生產線等的文章。這些實在太可笑了。和任何人一樣——任何撰寫過這類文章的記者都應該為缺乏新聞誠信而感到羞恥。世界上每家公司都有年度績效評估。在我們的年度績效評估中，儘管特斯拉的標準非常高，遠高於其他汽車公司，這是我們在與規模大得多的汽車公司的競爭中生存下來所必需的，但你不可能是一個小人物，卻擁有與大人物同等的技能水平。如果有兩個票數相等的箱子，其中一個票數小得多，那麼大個子顯然會壓垮小個子。所以小傢伙最好擁有更多的技能。這就是為什麼兩者都將徘徊不前。這就是為什麼我們的標準很高。他們不高，因為我們相信要對人刻薄。它們很高，因為如果它們不高，我們就會死。

Despite that, in our annual performance reviews, only 2% of people didn't make the grade. So that's about 700 people out of 33,000. This is a pretty low percentage. GE, I don't know if they still do, but they certainly have for a long time had a policy of firing 10% of their employees poor performers every year, no matter what. If you were to stack Tesla's performance, late releases compared to industry -- other companies, the number would be low. So the only reason these articles had any play whatsoever is because journalists and editors with low integrity, they'll provide any context for where they stood. Because the actual article would've read, "Tesla fires 2% of its employee base for performance-based reasons. They're remarkably lower number compared to other companies." But of course, that will be a meaningless article, so they forget to include that. Shame.

儘管如此，在我們的年度績效評估中，只有 2% 的人不合格。所以，在 33,000 人中，大約有 700 人。這是一個相當低的百分比。通用電氣，我不知道他們現在是否還這麼做，但他們長期以來確實有一項政策，即無論如何每年解僱 10% 表現不佳的員工。如果將特斯拉的表現與業界其他公司相比，其後期發布情況會比較低。因此，這些文章之所以能發揮作用，是因為記者和編輯的誠信度低，他們會提供任何與自己的立場相關的背景資訊。因為實際文章應該是這樣的，「特斯拉因為績效原因解雇了 2% 的員工。與其他公司相比，他們的數字明顯較低。 」但當然，這將是一篇毫無意義的文章，所以他們忘記把這一點包括在內。恥辱。

And then also, it was not reported that several thousand employees were promoted, and almost half of those promotions were in manufacturing.

而且，沒有報道說有數千名員工獲得了晉升，而且其中近一半的晉升發生在製造業。

Right. I think let's go to questions.

正確的。我想讓我們開始提問吧。

Okay, Latif, let's go to that question queue, please.

好的，拉蒂夫，請讓我們進入提問隊列。

(Operator Instructions) Our first question comes from the line of James Albertine of Consumer Edge.

（操作員指示）我們的第一個問題來自 Consumer Edge 的 James Albertine。

Great. Wanted to ask with respect to -- and Elon, thank you for doing the deeper dive into the zones and the bottlenecks. How does this change the trajectory -- or does it change the trajectory from a margin perspective on the Model 3? And then maybe as an aside, can you tell us where you are today on a production-per-week basis and where you expect to be by the end of 2017, just so we can get an idea of the ramp?

偉大的。想問一下——埃隆，謝謝你對這些區域和瓶頸進行更深入的研究。這會如何改變軌跡——或者從 Model 3 的利潤角度來看，這會改變軌跡嗎？然後也許作為題外話，您能否告訴我們您目前每週的產量是多少，以及您預計到 2017 年底的產量是多少，以便我們了解產量增長的情況？

I don't really like the week-by-week stuff. But the thing -- the reason it's tricky is because people just read too much into it. The ramp curve is a step exponential. So it means like as you alleviate a constraint, the production jumps -- suddenly jumps at a much higher number. And then so although it looks a little staggered, if you sort of zoom out, that production ramp is an exponential with giant week-over-week increases. I'd like to state a number at the end of Q4, but there's too much uncertainty right now to give that with any precision. Now I do feel confident about the end of Q1, maybe sooner, but really, it's like -- we're like in a vertical climb here. So it's really hard to say it. Yes.

我不太喜歡每週都這樣的東西。但問題是──它之所以棘手是因為人們對它解讀過去度。斜坡曲線是階躍指數。所以這意味著當你減輕限制時，產量就會突然躍升到一個更高的數字。儘管看起來有點錯開，但如果你稍微縮小一點，你會發現產量呈指數級增長，每週都在大幅增加。我想在第四季末給出一個數字，但是現在有太多的不確定性，無法給出準確的數字。現在我確實對第一季的結束充滿信心，也許會更快，但實際上，就像——我們就像在垂直攀登。所以這真的很難說。是的。

And also to your earlier point -- Deepak here. It does not change any of our projections in terms of the long-term target gross margin. These are all short-term issues.

還有你之前提到的問題──我是 Deepak。它不會改變我們對長期目標毛利率的任何預測。這些都是短期問題。

Right. I mean, it's -- just let me state, by the end of the year, it will be in the thousands. It's well at the end. Yes. Yes.

正確的。我的意思是——讓我說一下，到今年年底，這個數字將會達到數千。最後一切都很好。是的。是的。

I'm sorry, well into the thousands per week or by...

對不起，每周有數千人或…

In the thousands by the end of the year. But where exactly, it's hard to say. And this way, if you move the calendar by like 2 or 3 weeks, you will see giant changes. So it's like the quarter-to-date will fall somewhat sort of arbitrarily in that exponential curve. So even a matter of a few weeks would show a very different number. As far as like people tend to extrapolate on a linear basis instead of an exponential. First of all, you all know what an exponential is. So if your intuition is -- tends to be a straight-line extrapolation but really on a very steep exponential. So it's really an S-curve. So it starts off really slow, and then it ramps very rapidly on an exponential basis. And this starts to go sort of linear right in the middle and then it sort of asymptotes off at the target production capacity. You really target a whole supply chain or a factory for a given production capacity. And yes, probably get this done as soon as possible. We're also -- we're highly confident of the long-term margin number of 25% or higher for Model 3. Deepak, I mean...

到年底將達到數千人。但具體在哪裡，很難說。這樣，如果你將日曆移動 2 到 3 週，你會看到巨大的變化。因此，本季迄今的數據似乎會以某種方式任意地沿著該指數曲線下降。因此，即使幾週的時間也會顯示出截然不同的數字。人們傾向於以線性而不是指數的方式進行推論。首先，大家知道什麼是指數。因此，如果你的直覺是——傾向於直線外推，但實際上是一個非常陡峭的指數。所以它實際上是一條 S 曲線。因此，它開始時非常緩慢，然後以指數方式迅速上升。這個過程在中間階段開始呈線性，然後在達到目標生產能力時漸近。您實際上針對的是給定生產能力的整個供應鏈或工廠。是的，可能會盡快完成。我們也非常有信心 Model 3 的長期利潤率將達到 25% 或更高。 Deepak，我的意思是…

Yes, none of our projections in terms of our material cost or manufacturing, labor and overhead or depreciation of the other elements have changed as a result of these last few months to modify that target.

是的，由於過去幾個月修改了該目標，我們對材料成本或製造、勞動力和管理費用或其他要素折舊的預測均沒有改變。

Our next question comes from Adam Jonas of Morgan Stanley.

我們的下一個問題來自摩根士丹利的亞當喬納斯。

Just one question and one follow-up. Elon, you described Model 3 -- the Model 3 launch as production hell. How -- I mean, you have a cold, but how hot is it in hell right now? And is it getting hotter or less hot? I mean, are we solving worse problems that are coming up?

僅一個問題和一個後續問題。伊隆，你把 Model 3 的發布描述為生產地獄。怎麼——我的意思是，你感冒了，但是現在地獄有多熱？天氣變熱了還是沒變熱了？我的意思是，我們是否正在解決即將出現的更嚴重的問題？

Yes, I mean, it's sort of imprecise. I'm just shooting at what this level means really, but let's say level 9 is the worst, okay? We were in level 9. We're now in level 8, and I think we're close to exiting level 8. I thought we'd be probably more like in level 7 by now, but it's -- and I have to tell you, I was really depressed about 3 or 4 weeks ago when I realized that we were kind of in level 9. Then we got to level 8. Now I can see sort of a clear path to sunshine. And so I feel really pretty optimistic right now. If you talked to me 3 to 2 weeks ago, I'd be -- I would've been quite pessimistic, and I was for sort of quite down the dumps. But now it's very obvious what we need to do. It's just a matter of work to get there. We're working 7 days a week to do it. And I've personally been here on zone 2 module line at 2 a.m. on a Sunday morning, helping diagnose robot calibration issues. So I'm doing everything I can. J.B. is doing everything he can. The whole team's on it, we're on it. And we are on it, we've got it covered, it's going to take us a few much longer than we expected.

是的，我的意思是，這有點不精確。我只是想知道這個級別的真正含義，但我們可以說第 9 級是最糟糕的，可以嗎？我們之前處於第 9 級。現在我們處於第 8 級，我認為我們快要退出第 8 級了。我以為我們現在可能更像第 7 級，但——我必須告訴你，大約 3 或 4 週前，當我意識到我們處於第 9 級時，我真的很沮喪。然後我們到了第 8 級。現在我可以看到一條通往陽光的清晰道路。所以我現在感到非常樂觀。如果您在三到兩週前與我交談，我會非常悲觀，而且我會感到相當沮喪。但現在我們需要做什麼已經非常明顯了。到達那裡只是一個努力的問題。我們每週工作七天來做這件事。我自己在凌晨 2 點就來到了 2 區模組生產線。在周日早上，幫助診斷機器人校準問題。所以我正在盡我所能。J.B. 正在盡其所能。整個團隊都在努力，我們也在努力。我們正在努力，我們已經做好了準備，但這將比我們預期花費更長的時間。

Got it. Just one follow-up for Deepak. The -- on the secured bonds due 2025, the issuance from last August, was this meant to be a permanent part of the cap structure? Or is it more of a bridge loan to help fund some of the near-term cash absorption issues related to the Model 3 delay and things of that nature?

知道了。這只是對 Deepak 的一次後續行動。去年 8 月發行的 2025 年到期的擔保債券是否意味著成為上限結構的永久組成部分？或者它更像是一筆過橋貸款，用於幫助解決與 Model 3 延遲和類似問題相關的一些短期現金吸收問題？

It is. It's an 8-year tenure on that debt offering and meant to give us that capital for that time frame.

這是。該債券的期限為 8 年，旨在為我們提供該期限內的資金。

The next question comes from Tyler Frank of Baird.

下一個問題來自貝爾德的泰勒·弗蘭克。

It's been Ben Kallo for Baird. Elon, you guys talk a lot about the 3 being easier to manufacture than the S and the X. Could you just give us a sense, though, about the difference of manufacturing the volume of the 3 compared to -- you -- basically 10x the volume that you're trying to get to in the near term? Then I have a follow-up.

貝爾德的繼任者是本·卡洛 (Ben Kallo)。埃隆，你們常說 3 比 S 和 X 更容易製造。不過，您能否跟我們講一下，3 的產量與您近期想要達到的產量相比有什麼不同？基本上是 10 倍？然後我有一個後續問題。

Yes. There's vastly more automation with Model 3. Now the tricky thing is that when one front of this -- of that automation doesn't work, it's way harder to make up for it with manual labor. So with S or X, because a lot less of it was automated, you -- we could scale up labor hours and achieve a high level of production. With Model 3, it's like -- tends to be either the machine works or it doesn't or it's lumping along and we get short quite severely on output. So yes. I mean, J.B., do you want to add?

是的。Model 3 的自動化程度大幅提升。現在棘手的問題是，當其中一個自動化系統不起作用時，用人工來彌補就會困難得多。因此，對於 S 或 X，由於自動化程度較低，我們可以增加勞動時間並實現高水準的生產。對於 Model 3 來說，情況往往是——要么機器運轉正常，要么機器不運轉，要么機器運轉緩慢，導致產量嚴重不足。是的。我的意思是，J.B.，你想補充嗎？

Yes, I think that's spot on. Because the design on a whole is much easier to build...

是的，我認為非常正確。因為整體設計更容易建造…

Yes. By a lot.

是的。很多。

But the -- it's also intensely automated, which is part of what lets us realize the margin in the cost targets. But that does become difficult to bring that automation online. That's really -- that's where we are.

但它也是高度自動化的，這也是我們實現成本目標利潤率的部分原因。但要實現自動化在線確實變得很困難。這確實就是我們所處的位置。

And Doug is on the line. Perhaps he can add some on ease of manufacturability.

道格正在通話中。也許他可以補充一些關於易於製造的內容。

Doug, do you want to maybe cite a few examples?

道格，你能舉幾個例子嗎？

Sure. The number of actual, what we call a pitch, which is a station for a robot to work on the car in general assembly, is about 1/4 of the typical industry average for number of stations it uses to build a car. So the way we do subassemblies and the care we've taken and designed for manufacturing does make it much simpler. But as J.B. said, each of those stations is fairly automated and requires time and engineering to make it work.

當然。實際數量，我們稱之為間距，是機器人在汽車組裝過程中工作的工位數量，大約是製造汽車所需的典型行業平均工位數量的 1/4。因此，我們製造子組件的方式以及我們為製造採取和設計的措施確實使製造變得更加簡單。但正如 J.B. 所說，每個站點都相當自動化，需要時間和工程才能運作。

And I guess, my follow-up's on that point. So in the battery assembly and automation, things that you're working through, and the software for configuring the robots is how I'm thinking of this, is it a certain number of man-hours that have to go into this and then it's fixed? Or like you know the fix? Or what are you throwing at it right now? Is it people or is it time required to do or all of the above?

我想，我的後續問題就是針對這一點。那麼，在電池組裝和自動化方面，您正在處理的事情以及用於配置機器人的軟體就是我所想的，是否需要投入一定數量的工時才能解決？或者您知道解決辦法嗎？或者你現在正在向它扔什麼？是人力還是所需時間，還是以上皆是？

Yes. We're throwing a sheer amount of people at replacing machines. And then occasionally, there's like some part of a production manufacturing process where the machine is probably kind of like broken, and then we have to kind of bypass to a manual operation.

是的。我們投入了大量人力來更換機器。然後偶爾，在生產製造過程的某個部分，機器可能會出現故障，然後我們必須繞過手動操作。

Until we fix the automation.

直到我們修復自動化問題。

Yes, until we fix the automation. But that's really -- it's really inefficient because this thing is really not designed for a manual bypass to your broken machine or a machine when the software is not right or whatever the case may be.

是的，直到我們修復自動化問題。但這確實——效率真的很低，因為這個東西實際上並不是為手動繞過損壞的機器或軟體不正常或其他情況的機器而設計的。

It's just an extremely complicated machine with the combined electrical, mechanical and software challenges. It's not that different than what we do bringing up a brand-new car and a lot of the...

它是一台極其複雜的機器，綜合了電氣、機械和軟體方面的挑戰。這與我們養一輛新車以及許多其他事情並沒有什麼不同…

Yes. It is harder to supplement with manuals than S or X because the system is designed as a very tightly integrated automated system. So if there's an [X brand] -- we will be to try to supplement or make up for a machine not working with manual activity. So we think of it like -- it's like if you had a spreadsheet and a couple of cells in the spreadsheet were manually calculated, well, yes, you could still do your spreadsheet stuff but it's going to be a lot slower until the last cell is automated, and then it's going to be super fast.

是的。與 S 或 X 相比，它更難用手冊進行補充，因為該系統被設計為一個非常緊密整合的自動化系統。因此，如果有 [X 品牌]——我們將嘗試補充或彌補無法透過手動活動工作的機器。所以我們認為它就像——如果你有一個電子表格，並且電子表格中的幾個單元格是手動計算的，那麼，是的，你仍然可以做你的電子表格工作，但它會慢很多，直到最後一個單元格自動化，然後它會變得非常快。

Our next question comes from Romit Shah of Nomura Instinet.

我們的下一個問題來自野村極訊的羅米特·沙阿 (Romit Shah)。

Great. Congratulations on the milestone. The competitiveness of Autopilot is something that's come up a lot recently, and I just wanted to ask about your hardware capability. We're actually at a technology conference today hosted by NVIDIA. And their newest autonomous solution, according to NVIDIA, is 10x more powerful than the version that Tesla's using, and they're saying it can get you to level 5 autonomy. And so along those lines, the year-over-year improvement in the NVIDIA board just seems really significant. And I was curious, Elon, if you could just talk about what you think you need to do from a hardware perspective to advance Autopilot.

偉大的。恭喜您取得這一里程碑。自動駕駛儀的競爭力是最近常被提及的話題，我只是想問一下你們的硬體能力。今天我們實際上參加了由 NVIDIA 主辦的技術會議。據 NVIDIA 稱，他們最新的自動駕駛解決方案比特斯拉使用的版本強大 10 倍，並且他們表示可以達到 5 級自動駕駛水平。因此，從這個角度來看，NVIDIA 主機板的同比改進似乎確實非常顯著。我很好奇，埃隆，你是否可以從硬體角度談談你認為需要做些什麼來推進自動駕駛儀的發展。

Well, first of all, I think that we'll be able to achieve full autonomy with the current hardware. The question is not just full autonomy, but full autonomy with what level of reliability and what will be acceptable to regulators. But I feel quite confident that we can achieve human-level -- approximately human-level autonomy with the current computing hardware. Now regulators may require some significant margin above human capability in order for a full autonomy to be engaged. I mean to say it needs to be 50% safer, 100% safer, 1,000% safer, I don't know. I'm not sure they know either. But that's -- but I think I'm confident that when we can get to approximately human level with our current hardware. And yes, we'll have more to say on the hardware front soon, we're just not yet ready to say anything now. But I feel very optimistic on that front. For customers that have signed up for full subject riding capability, we'll push that option. The -- if it does turn out that a computer upgrade is necessary in order to meet the regulatory requirements in that area, we will replace their computer with something with greater power, which is sort of unplug the other one, plug a new one in. But we feel confident of the competitiveness of our hardware strategy. I would say that we are certain that our hardware strategy is better than any other option by a lot.

嗯，首先，我認為我們能夠利用現有的硬體實現完全自主。問題不僅在於完全自主，還在於完全自主具有何種程度的可靠性以及監管機構可以接受的程度。但我非常有信心，我們可以利用目前的計算硬體來實現人類水平——大約人類水平的自主性。現在，監管機構可能需要超出人類能力的一定幅度才能完全自主。我的意思是說它需要更安全 50%、更安全 100%、更安全 1,000%，我不知道。我也不確定他們是否知道。但那是——但我認為我有信心，當我們利用現有的硬體時，我們可以達到大致人類的水平。是的，我們很快就會在硬體方面有更多消息要說，只是現在我們還沒準備好說任何話。但我對此感到非常樂觀。對於已簽約全程騎乘服務的客戶，我們將推行該選項。如果確實需要升級計算機以滿足該地區的監管要求，我們將用功率更大的計算機替換他們的計算機，這就相當於拔掉舊的計算機，再插上新的計算機。但我們對我們的硬體策略的競爭力充滿信心。我想說的是，我們確信我們的硬體策略比任何其他選擇都好得多。

Okay. And then if I could ask, you said that the deposit balance for Model 3 strengthened. Can you give us what that actual balance was?

好的。然後如果我可以問的話，您說 Model 3 的押金餘額增加了。能告訴我們實際餘額是多少嗎？

We don't give specific balance of deposits by car line. We just give the combined number, which you can see on our balance sheet for the customer deposits.

我們不提供按汽車線路劃分的具體押金餘額。我們只給出合併數字，您可以在我們的客戶存款資產負債表上看到。

Our next question comes from John Murphy of Bank of America Merrill Lynch.

我們的下一個問題來自美銀美林的約翰·墨菲。

Just a question on quarterly cash flow for the fourth quarter and the first quarter. I mean, it sounds like, obviously, there's some delays here on the Model 3, which is understandable, given the complexity. I'm just curious, as we think about cash flow for the next 2 quarters, would we think about them relatively similarly to what we just saw in the third quarter plus what you would -- whatever you would sell out of inventory so it might be a bit better? I'm just trying to understand, Deepak, how much of that $2.5 billion in the inventory is finished goods that you might be able to sell out of in the fourth quarter.

我只是想問一下第四季和第一季的季度現金流。我的意思是，聽起來，Model 3 顯然存在一些延遲，考慮到其複雜性，這是可以理解的。我只是好奇，當我們考慮接下來兩個季度的現金流時，我們是否會以與我們剛剛在第三季度看到的情況相對相似的方式考慮它們，再加上您會賣掉的庫存，這樣可能會好一點？我只是想知道，迪帕克，這 25 億美元的庫存中有多少是成品，你們可能在第四季賣掉它們。

Well, firstly, as we continue to ramp up Model 3, our cash flow of operations is going to increase or improve significantly over the next few quarters. And it's -- this is the positive virtuous cycle of cash flow of working capital that Model 3 provides us, because we effectively pay our suppliers later when we collect from our customers. And also, this quarter, our CapEx payments will start to decline as we pay off, over the next couple of quarters, all the remaining Model 3-related CapEx. So there should be an improving trend over the next 2, 3 quarters.

首先，隨著我們繼續增加 Model 3 的產量，我們的營運現金流將在未來幾季內大幅增加或改善。這就是 Model 3 為我們提供的營運資本現金流的良性循環，因為我們在從客戶那裡收款後才有效地向供應商付款。此外，本季我們的資本支出將開始下降，因為我們將在接下來的幾季內償還所有剩餘的與 Model 3 相關的資本支出。因此未來 2、3 個季度應該會出現改善趨勢。

But to be fair, Deepak, I mean, it sounds like this is a little bit more uncertain than you thought before as far as production and delivery. So I'm just trying to understand what kind of cash you can generate out of the inventory that you think you hold right now.

但公平地說，迪帕克，我的意思是，就生產和交付而言，這聽起來比你之前想像的要不確定一些。所以我只是想了解您可以從您現在持有的庫存中產生多少現金。

Yes. So firstly, our inventory is going to come down on S and X, and also, what's important is it is -- given these short-term delays, we have to be prudent in how we spend our money. And so we are managing our CapEx and OpEx growth to be in line with the growth of our fleet. And so for example, CapEx related to our stores or service centers or Superchargers, we are slowing that down to be in line, and that's logical. We've got growth for our fleet. So all those actions will come through in terms of helping us conserve cash.

是的。因此，首先，我們的庫存將在 S 和 X 上下降，而且，重要的是 - 考慮到這些短期延遲，我們必須謹慎地花錢。因此，我們正在管理資本支出和營運支出的成長，以與我們機隊的成長保持一致。例如，與我們的商店、服務中心或超級充電站相關的資本支出，我們正在放慢速度以保持一致，這是合乎邏輯的。我們的船隊規模有所成長。因此，所有這些行動都將幫助我們節省現金。

Our next question comes from Ryan Brinkman of JPMorgan.

我們的下一個問題來自摩根大通的瑞安·布林克曼。

Great. Just with regard to the ramp-up of the Model 3 production, I can see what's happening with the 5,000 per week target from 1Q to 4Q -- or from, now, it's 1Q versus 4Q. But I think it's less clear from reading the letter, what's happening with the previous guidance of the 10,000 units per week at some point in 2018? Is that now like beyond 2018? I think, before, investors were estimating that if you could hit it at the end of '18, you'd do over 250,000 vehicles. If you could hit it more towards the middle, you'd do over 325,000. But what now would be a reasonable expectation based upon what you know for the Model 3s that do get built in 2018?

偉大的。就 Model 3 產量提升而言，我可以看到從第一季到第四季每週 5,000 輛的目標會發生什麼情況——或者從現在來看，是第一季與第四季的對比。但我認為從這封信中不太清楚，2018 年某個時候每週 10,000 台的先前指導會發生什麼？現在就像 2018 年以後一樣嗎？我認為，先前投資者估計，如果你能在 2018 年底實現這一目標，你的汽車銷售將超過 25 萬輛。如果你能將其打得更靠近中間，那麼你的數字將超過 325,000。但根據您對 2018 年生產的 Model 3 的了解，現在合理的預期是什麼？

So it's a bit too early to make the exact number. But I think, if you extrapolate from 5,000 units towards the end of Q1, we do want to hold off on giving CapEx until we are confident about cash flow on Model 3. So then that's a question of how long it takes to implement everything necessary to get to 10,000 units a week for Model 3, which is a number we are confident can be sustained from a [grand] standpoint.

因此現在確定確切數字還為時過早。但我認為，如果以第一季末的 5,000 輛為基準進行推斷，我們確實希望推遲提供資本支出，直到我們對 Model 3 的現金流有信心為止。那麼問題來了，需要多長時間才能實現所有必要措施，使 Model 3 的周產量達到 10,000 輛，從宏觀角度來看，我們有信心可以維持這個數字。

And we want to figure out how much we can push the 5,000 up from the existing equation.

我們想弄清楚我們可以將 5,000 從現有方程式中提高多少。

Yes, that is true.

是的，確實如此。

And then learn from those and figure out, how do we redesign what will we do for the next step and spend more efficiently our CapEx? So it's the right thing to do.

然後從中學習並弄清楚，我們如何重新設計下一步要做的事情並更有效地使用我們的資本支出？所以這是正確的做法。

Yes. Yes, exactly. As I mentioned earlier, we're finding that some parts of the line, they very clearly are capable of 6,000 or that 7,000 units a week, and maybe more than that, just by shortening path length, speeding up robots, adding some robots where there are -- where the choke points exist, simplifying some of the processes and a few minor part redesigns sum up for how much you can improve cycle time. So yes.

是的。是的，確實如此。正如我之前提到的，我們發現生產線的某些部分每週顯然能夠生產 6,000 或 7,000 個單位，甚至更多，只需縮短路徑長度、加快機器人速度、在瓶頸處添加一些機器人、簡化一些流程和一些小部分的重新設計，就能大大改善週期時間。是的。

Okay. Actually, that's helpful. Maybe just as a follow-up -- go ahead...

好的。事實上，這很有幫助。也許只是作為後續行動——繼續吧…

And -- no, go ahead.

而且——不，繼續吧。

Oh, I was just going to say, is the gross margin discussion also related to this at all? I mean, I see the reduced outlook for 4Q, but do you feel any differently about, for example, the ability to do 25% margin when you're doing kind of 250,000 run rate? And as long as the production is going to be restrained, do you have any ability to continue to preference for longer maybe the higher-margin, higher trim level variance of the Model 3 to help with that?

哦，我只是想說，毛利率討論也與此有關嗎？我的意思是，我看到第四季度的前景有所下降，但是，當運行率為 250,000 時，您是否對實現 25% 利潤的能力有不同的看法？只要產量受到限制，您是否有能力繼續優先考慮利潤率更高、裝飾水平更高的 Model 3 來幫助實現這一目標？

We can fine-tune those things when we get there, but overall, our -- and I'm reinforcing this again, these are all short-term issues, and it doesn't change our long-term prognosis on Model 3 gross margin.

我們可以在到達那裡時對這些事情進行微調，但總的來說，我再次強調這一點，這些都是短期問題，它不會改變我們對 Model 3 毛利率的長期預測。

Our next question comes from Alex Potter of Piper Jaffray.

我們的下一個問題來自 Piper Jaffray 的 Alex Potter。

Yes, was wondering, I guess, to the extent that these production bottlenecks are ultimately somebody else's fault, is it worth your time trying to call back some of the cost that you're presumably incurring due to the subcontractor, I guess, dropping the ball, as you put it?

是的，我想，如果這些生產瓶頸最終是別人的錯，那麼是否值得你花時間嘗試收回由於分包商失誤而可能產生的部分成本，正如你所說的那樣？

Yes. I think first of all, I think, at the end of the day, everything is our fault and my problem, most of all. If we picked the wrong subcontractor, we're the fault. So just -- I don't want us to be -- sort of us externalizing responsibility. Really, it's our fault for picking the wrong supplier and then not realizing it until way later in the game. We will be able to call back some amounts, but it certainly will not make up for the lost revenue, the lost free cash flow. So some amount, yes, but it's not going to matter that much.

是的。我認為首先，我認為，歸根結底，一切都是我們的錯，最重要的是我的問題。如果我們選擇了錯誤的分包商，那麼責任就在於我們。所以只是 — — 我不希望我們 — — 把責任外化。確實，這是我們的錯誤，因為我們選擇了錯誤的供應商，直到遊戲後期才意識到這一點。我們將能夠收回一些金額，但肯定無法彌補損失的收入和損失的自由現金流。是的，有一定的數量，但這並不重要。

The goal is right now to fix the problem.

現在的目標是解決這個問題。

Yes, exactly.

是的，確實如此。

Okay, fair enough. I guess, one other issue, you referenced a gross margin headwind on the S and X due to trim and mix. Was wondering if you could talk maybe a little bit more explicitly about what that was, and then what the corrective measures you're taking to address that.

好吧，夠公平。我想，還有一個問題，您提到由於裝飾和混合，S 和 X 的毛利率面臨阻力。想知道您是否可以更明確地談談那是什麼，以及您採取了什麼糾正措施來解決這個問題。

Yes. Jon you want to answer?

是的。喬恩你想回答嗎？

Yes, it's Jon. I can address a piece of this. So a large chunk of it was discontinued trims. We've introduced the 100-kilowatt battery pack, which has a 335-mile range in Model S. And as a result of that, we discontinued the 90-kilowatt pack. And as those cars were in inventory, we reduced price to move them out. And so that was a piece of the gross margin headwind that won't repeat in -- as we go forward. And in addition to that, the mix did shift. We sold more 100-kilowatt cars actually than we predicted we would, but order rate went up for the 75s even faster. And so we sold more 75-kilowatt cars in the mix than we'd predicted, and that had a gross margin impact as well. Given demand is in -- it continues to increase for the 100-kilowatt pack and the mix shift is occurring more towards that product, we'll see, as we indicated in the letter, increasing margins as we roll into Q4 and then into Q1. So this is -- the heart of the discontinuation really was the success of us debottlenecking the 100-kilowatt production that we've talked about in Q2 and really rolling out into strong demand in Q3.

是的，他是喬恩。我可以解決其中的一部分。因此，其中很大一部分是已停產的裝飾。我們推出了 100 千瓦的電池組，在 Model S 中可行駛 335 英里。因此，我們停產了 90 千瓦的電池組。由於這些汽車有庫存，我們降低價格將其售出。因此，這是毛利率逆風的一部分，但隨著我們繼續前進，這種情況不會再發生。除此之外，混合確實發生了變化。我們實際銷售的 100 千瓦汽車比我們預期的要多，但 75 千瓦汽車的訂單率上升得更快。因此，我們銷售的 75 千瓦汽車數量超出了我們的預期，這也對毛利率產生了影響。鑑於對 100 千瓦電池組的需求持續增加，且產品組合更多地向該產品轉變，我們將看到，正如我們在信中所指出的，隨著我們進入第四季度和第一季度，利潤率將會增加。所以，停產的核心實際上是我們成功地消除了我們在第二季度談到的 100 千瓦生產瓶頸，並在第三季度真正滿足了強勁的需求。

Yes. We also just increased the amount of value that's in a Model S...

是的。我們也增加了 Model S 的價值…

And the X.

還有 X。

And X, but particularly Model S, because we're hoping it to be greater differentiation between the S and the Model 3. So the basic cost, the fundamental cost of a Model S increased because of more included content. So the full Model Ss have air suspension, for example, perhaps a bunch of premium contents were included by default. Just about there needs to be a get clear reason for people to buy a Model S over a Model 3.

還有 X，特別是 Model S，因為我們希望 S 和 Model 3 之間有更大的差異。因此，由於包含的內容更多，Model S 的基本成本、根本成本會增加。例如，全套 Model Ss 都配備空氣懸架，可能預設包含一系列優質內容。人們購買 Model S 而不是 Model 3 幾乎需要一個明確的理由。

And the market responded really strongly to that in terms of demand. So in Q3, the Model S in the U.S. outsold the Mercedes S-Class by 2x -- over 2x, actually. And if you added up the sales of Audi A7 and A8, the BMW 7 Series and the Porsche Panamera, we outsold all those combined. So the market really did respond to the increased value.

就需求而言，市場對此反應非常強烈。因此，在第三季度，美國市場上的 Model S 銷量是賓士 S-Class 轎車的 2 倍——實際上是 2 倍以上。如果將奧迪 A7 和 A8、BMW 7 系列和保時捷 Panamera 的銷量加起來，我們的銷量就超過了所有這些車型的總和。因此市場確實對價值的增加做出了反應。

Yes.

是的。

Yes. And all of our deliveries in terms of our market share in the U.S., it went up in Q3 for S and X. Especially...

是的。就我們在美國市場的份額而言，S 和 X 的所有交付量在第三季都有所上升。特別是…

S and X, both.

S 和 X，兩者皆是。

In the recent market, yes compared to Q2.

在最近的市場中，與第二季相比是的。

Yes. And I suppose some of the articles from our quarterly earnings letter about sort of answer your question kind of S and X -- why we reduced production on S and X. We didn't reduce it very much. It's just sort of perhaps from about 2,000 units a week to 1,800, and we did in order to bring down inventory. So mainly just because inventory was too high. We also just needed a bunch of people on the Model 3 line. So we thought we'll take the third shift from Model S and the X and apply it to Model 3. Because really, running out of labor pool, honestly. It's like we're second labor pool dry, both in -- in one of the Gigafactory and in Fremont. And so it's like -- yes, there's just only so many people that can make it to the factory. And then we're out finding that we're able to improve the efficiency of the production of the S and X. So previously, it required 3 shifts to do 2,000 units a week. And it's important to appreciate, like the whole supply chain and everything is all -- it's all sized to 2,000 units a week. Sure, like why can't you just spontaneously make 2,500 units a week? Well, it's because the entire supply chain, all the parts, everything's got to go to 2,500, and that requires a bunch of CapEx. Then you got to match sort of -- the increase stores. Like everything's got to sort of work in cadence. So we sort of like decided on what seems like the right number. We think sort of the right number's about 100,000 units a year, combined S and X, and resize the supply chain accordingly. But we expect to continue making production efficiency improvements on the S and X line and be able to take that from -- you're up at 1,800 units a week to 2,000 units a week in probably over the next year and still be on 2 shifts, which means that our labor hours are reducing per vehicle, and that gets us to our sort of roughly 100,000 unit a year cadence and we can work on supply chain efficiencies and the like. But we do expect to make an important point. We expect to sell more cars in Q4...

是的。我想我們季度收益信中的一些文章可以回答您的問題，即 S 和 X——為什麼我們減少了 S 和 X 的產量。我們並沒有減少太多。大概就是從每週 2,000 台減少到 1,800 台，我們這樣做是為了降低庫存。所以主要是因為庫存太高。我們還需要一群人負責 Model 3 生產線。因此，我們認為我們將把 Model S 和 X 的第三班轉移到 Model 3 上。因為說實話，勞動資源真的不夠了。就像我們是第二個勞動力資源枯竭的國家，無論是在超級工廠還是在弗里蒙特。是的，能進工廠的人確實有限。然後我們發現我們能夠提高 S 和 X 的生產效率。以前，每週需要 3 班才能生產 2,000 台。重要的是要認識到，整個供應鏈和所有一切都是——每週的產量都是 2,000 個單位。當然，為什麼你不能每週自發性地生產 2,500 個單位呢？嗯，這是因為整個供應鏈、所有零件、所有東西都必須達到 2,500 個，而這需要大量的資本支出。然後你必須匹配某種——增加商店。就像一切都必須按照節奏進行一樣。因此，我們決定了一個看似正確的數字。我們認為正確的數字是每年約 10 萬台，S 和 X 的總和，並相應地調整供應鏈規模。但我們預計將繼續提高 S 和 X 生產線的生產效率，並能夠將產量從每週 1,800 輛提高到明年的每週 2,000 輛，並且仍然採用兩班倒，這意味著我們每輛車的工時正在減少，這使我們達到每年大約 100,000 輛的生產節奏，我們可以致力於提高供應效率等。但我們確實希望提出一個重要的觀點。我們預計第四季度汽車銷量將增加…

Correct. Than we did in Q3.

正確的。比我們在第三季所做的還要多。

Than in Q3. So we expect sales and deliveries to be higher in Q4 than Q3 but have to reduce Model S and X inventory to achieve that.

比第三季更高。因此，我們預計第四季度的銷售和交付量將高於第三季度，但必須減少 Model S 和 X 的庫存才能實現這一目標。

Next question comes from Rod Lache of Deutsche Bank.

下一個問題來自德意志銀行的羅德·拉赫 (Rod Lache)。

Just had a question about how we should be thinking about capital spending maybe at a high level next year. It sounds like you're going to be deploying some capital to increase to 10,000 units per week. And obviously, there've also been some reports about you investing in another assembly facility in China. So is your CapEx still expected to be lower in 2018 versus 2017?

我有一個問題，關於明年我們應該如何考慮高水準的資本支出。聽起來您將要投入一些資金來將產量增加到每週 10,000 台。顯然，也有報告指出您在中國投資了另一家組裝廠。那麼，預計 2018 年的資本支出仍會低於 2017 年嗎？

So Rod, in terms of the China factory, I'll leave for Elon to make comments on that. But I think maybe better if we hold on, broadly speaking, to that question to the next quarter when we provide full 2018 guidance and give you better clarity on our capital spend for the different elements in our plan.

因此，羅德，關於中國工廠的問題，我將讓埃隆對此發表評論。但我認為，如果我們從廣義上講將這個問題留到下個季度再討論，情況會更好，屆時我們將提供完整的 2018 年指導，並讓您更清楚地了解我們計劃中不同要素的資本支出。

I suspect it's comparable and similar to 2017. We have some -- obviously some -- it's somewhat of a strategic choice. Do we have higher CapEx and higher growth or lower CapEx and lower growth? Yes. So it's -- if we do that we can move that lever where it makes sense, where it makes sense to do so. As mentioned earlier though, we want to make sure we know what to scale before we spend money on it. And so for the Model 3, figuring out which production lines can be simply accelerated and which production lines need to be duplicated. We'd far rather accelerate production line than duplicate it. If we were to make those CapEx decisions because right now, we'd be making them -- we'd be kind of shooting in the dark.

我認為它與 2017 年的情況類似。我們有一些——顯然是一些——這在某種程度上是一種戰略選擇。我們的資本支出是否更高、成長更快，還是資本支出更低、成長是否更慢？是的。所以——如果我們這樣做，我們就可以把槓桿移到有意義的地方。但正如前面提到的，我們希望確保在花錢之前知道要擴展什麼。對於 Model 3 來說，需要弄清楚哪些生產線可以簡單加速，哪些生產線需要複製。我們寧願加速生產線，也不願複製它。如果我們現在就做出這些資本支出決策，那麼我們就是在盲目行動。

Yes, exactly.

是的，確實如此。

But -- in respect to China, I wouldn't expect any significant CapEx on China until 2019. It won't be material in 2018. The China plan is sort of maybe something like -- this is just a -- like don't set your watch by this, but we -- it's sort of a rough target of start manufacturing in about 3 years, and it would be serving the China market and perhaps the -- some other countries in the region. And that's really its intent, is to be able to provide Model 3 and Model Y. We won't be making Model S and X, but we'll be making probably Model 3, probably Model Y primarily for the local Chinese market. And it's really the only way to make the cars affordable in China. But it's 3 years out, so...

但是，就中國而言，我預計直到 2019 年中國才會出現任何重大的資本支出。2018 年這不會成為重大問題。中國的計劃可能有點像——這只是一個——不要以此為準，但我們——這是一個粗略的目標，即在大約 3 年後開始生產，它將服務於中國市場，或許還有——該地區的一些其他國家。它的真正目的是能夠提供 Model 3 和 Model Y。我們不會生產 Model S 和 X，但我們可能會生產 Model 3 和 Model Y，主要針對中國本土市場。這確實是讓中國消費者買得起汽車的唯一方法。但已經是三年後了，所以...

And just to clarify 2 points. Is your objective to have something that's kind of Fremont-sized in China? And I wanted to also clarify your earlier comment about when exactly the production of Model 3 goes exponential. Were you suggesting that, that...

只是想澄清兩點。您的目標是在中國打造出像弗里蒙特那樣規模的企業嗎？我還想澄清一下您之前關於 Model 3 的產量何時會呈指數級增長的評論。你是在暗示那件事，那件事…

Let's measure right now.

我們現在就測量一下。

Yes. It's at -- oh, I guess, yes, off of a low number, but are you getting to a few thousand per week already by the end of this year? Or did you mean to say that you'll have a few thousand produced in total by the end of the year?

是的。哦，我想是的，這個數字很低，但是到今年年底，你們每週的銷量能達到幾千輛嗎？或者你的意思是，到今年年底，你們總共將生產幾千台？

Oh, no, no. Again, it's really tricky because of that being exponential. If you'd have moved the calendar date by plus, minus a few weeks, you'd see gigantic differences in weekly output. But what I meant was in -- something like a few thousand units per week at the end of Q4. But does it reflect like if you said, "Okay, what about a few weeks after Q4?" I'd say, "Yes, definitely." So it's just going to be very, very sharp. Rising very, very sharply at that time.

哦，不，不。再次，由於它是指數級的，所以這確實很棘手。如果您將日曆日期移動幾週，您會看到每週產量的巨大差異。但我的意思是——第四季末每週產量大約是幾千台。但它是否反映瞭如果你說，「好的，那麼第四季度之後幾週怎麼樣？」我會說，「是的，當然。」所以它會非常非常敏銳。當時上漲非常非常劇烈。

To be clear, Elon's talking about a broad guidance. He's just giving...

需要明確的是，埃隆談論的是一個廣泛的指導。他只是給予...

This is my guess.

這是我的猜測。

Yes, exactly.

是的，確實如此。

I mean, it'll be like a fire jet in a vertical climb here. It's like from one moment to the nextit's suddenly very different.

我的意思是，它就像一股火焰噴射器在這裡垂直爬升。就好像從一個時刻到下一個時刻，一切都突然變得非常不同。

It sounds like you'll be able to provide some pretty high confidence update on the fourth quarter earnings call.

聽起來您將能夠在第四季度收益電話會議上提供一些相當有信心的更新。

Yes. For sure, yes. Absolutely.

是的。確實如此。絕對地。

Even with the deliveries announcement, we'll have some feedback for you, as we mentioned in the letter.

即使發布了交貨公告，我們也會向您提供一些反饋，正如我們在信中提到的那樣。

Yes. We're -- I would have -- I think very -- we'll have very good understanding and high clarity on the Q4 earnings call.

是的。我認為我們會對第四季度收益電話會議有非常好的理解和清晰的認識。

Okay. And then the China size, is this a Fremont type of project?

好的。那麼中國的規模，這是弗里蒙特類型的計畫嗎？

I mean, it's something in the hundreds of thousands of vehicles per year. I'm not sure where it is exactly in the -- it's at least a couple hundred thousand vehicles a year, maybe more.

我的意思是，每年有數十萬輛汽車。我不確定具體數字是多少——每年至少有幾十萬輛汽車，甚至更多。

Our next question comes from Toni Sacconaghi of Bernstein.

我們的下一個問題來自伯恩斯坦的托尼·薩科納吉。

Yes, I have a question and a follow-up, please. Elon, you just talked about sort of this trade-off between growth and capital spending. And quite frankly, I think it's really the first time that I've heard you talk about that potential trade-off. Usually, Tesla's been all about doing as much as quickly as possible to lead the move to electrification, to establish a first-mover advantage, et cetera. So is the hesitancy in going all-out growth? Is that a concern that you might run out of cash and have to raise more cash? Is that a bandwidth concern for the organization in terms of trying to do too much too quickly? Is that a concern about using capital effectively? What's at the root of that decision? And why isn't the -- why is there even a decision, I guess, is the question?

是的，我有一個問題，請跟進一下。埃隆，你剛才談到了成長和資本支出之間的權衡。坦白說，我認為這確實是我第一次聽到您談論這種潛在的權衡。通常，特斯拉一直致力於盡快採取盡可能多的行動來引領電氣化進程、建立先發優勢等等。那麼，對於全力發展是否存在猶豫呢？您是否擔心現金耗盡，因此必須籌集更多現金？對於組織來說，如果試圖在太短的時間內完成太多任務，這是否會造成頻寬問題？這是對有效利用資本的擔憂嗎？做出這項決定的根本原因是什麼？為什麼沒有——為什麼甚至沒有做出決定，我想，這是一個問題？

I mean, I would say it's probably a bit of all. I mean, it's prudent for us to think through all of that as we are continuing to grow. Certainly, we would want to be in a certain sense of fiduciary responsibility that we have in addition to just growing like crazy. So...

我的意思是，我想說這可能都有一點。我的意思是，隨著我們不斷成長，仔細考慮所有這些問題是明智之舉。當然，除了瘋狂增長之外，我們還希望具備一定的信託責任。所以...

I mean, these are mad, substantial growth rates for the car industry. And I think some made some comparison of Tesla's growth rate relative to Ford in the Model T era. And we're talking about a rate of growth faster than the Model T, which is the fastest in history. So these are nutty growth rates.

我的意思是，對於汽車產業來說，這些是瘋狂的、可觀的成長率。我認為有些人將特斯拉的成長率與福特在 Model T 時代的成長率進行了比較。我們正在談論的成長速度比 T 型車還要快，這是史上最快的成長速度。所以，這些都是瘋狂的成長率。

It's certainly not the first time we've thought about this.

這當然不是我們第一次思考這個問題。

Yes. We have talked about that. When our growth rate, I don't have -- recall the exact numbers, but I think it's been in the 70%, 80% every year. And next year even with 5,000, it'll be like crazy compared to this year. So our growth rate continues to be extraordinary.

是的。我們已經討論過這個問題了。我們的成長率，我不記得確切的數字，但我認為每年都在 70% 到 80% 左右。明年即使有 5,000 人，與今年相比也會非常瘋狂。因此我們的成長率持續保持驚人。

Yes. Yes. If our growth rate continues at anything like that in the coming years, I mean, if it continues to be something like that, Tesla will be the largest car company in the world by volume as well.

是的。是的。如果我們在未來幾年繼續保持這樣的成長率，那麼特斯拉也將成為全球產量最大的汽車公司。

And Toni, it may be helpful if it accelerates with new product introductions too. Model X reached Model S demand rates in half the time. So at twice the rate of demand build. So not only are we growing, but we're accelerating as we grow.

東尼，如果新產品的推出也能加速這一進程，可能會有所幫助。Model X 僅用一半的時間就達到了 Model S 的需求率。因此需求的成長速度是原來的兩倍。因此，我們不僅在成長，而且在成長的同時還在加速發展。

Yes, exactly. Right. Model 3 will be, I'd call it, 5x -- it'll be 5x Model S or X.

是的，確實如此。正確的。我認為 Model 3 將是 5x——它將是 Model S 或 X 的 5x。

Yes, and, if you look at the timing and its order of magnitude, shifts downward. Yes.

是的，如果你看時間及其數量級，你會發現它正在向下移動。是的。

I guess, the question is...

我想，問題是...

(inaudible) looks like, yes.

（聽不清楚）看起來是的。

But really, perhaps to punctuate a little bit more, you've talked about pretty soon you're going to be close to cash flow-generative once you get the volume on the Model 3. And so I'm just surprised why you're actually not trying to step on that as quickly as possible, because extensively, once you get to that level, then cash flow really doesn't become a problem. And so is there any difference in that view? Otherwise, I'm just struggling to sort of reconcile why you don't want to get to scale, get to volume, get to positive operating cash flow as quickly as possible.

但實際上，也許可以再強調一下，您說過，一旦 Model 3 達到產量，您很快就會接近產生現金流。所以我很驚訝為什麼您實際上沒有盡快實現這一目標，因為從廣義上講，一旦達到那個水平，那麼現金流就不會成為問題。那麼這種觀點有什麼不同嗎？否則，我只是很難理解為什麼你不想盡快擴大規模、提高產量、獲得正的經營現金流。

Just to be clear, we are trying to get as fast as we can to 5,000, and then we will work as fast as we can to get to 10,000.

需要明確的是，我們正在努力盡快達到 5,000，然後我們將盡快達到 10,000。

Yes. I don't think we were saying we wouldn't do it. We're just saying we have to think through it and make the strategic trade-offs in terms of timing. But we'd think through it.

是的。我認為我們並沒有說我們不會這麼做。我們只是說我們必須仔細考慮並在時間方面做出戰略權衡。但我們會仔細考慮。

Yes, I mean it's sort of like we're wondering what fuels everyone's interpretations of timescales. For us, it's like, well, should we have the growth to 10,000 be -- take 9 months, 12 months or 15 months? Sort of these are like flash-in-the-pan timescales for other manufacturers.

是的，我的意思是，這有點像我們想知道是什麼促使每個人對時間尺度做出這樣的解釋。對我們來說，問題是，成長到 10,000 需要 9 個月、12 個月還是 15 個月？對其他製造商來說，這些就像是曇花一現的時間表。

Right, okay. If I could just follow up on a separate topic. On the S and X gross margins, they look like they must have fallen materially, unless Model 3 gross margins were worse than minus 1,000%. So maybe you can help us understand what S and X margins -- gross margins were this quarter. And given most of the onetime stuff is gone and the mix shift is favorable, why wouldn't they snap back to be similar or better next quarter? And do you think that the promotional activity helped drive volume for S and X this quarter?

好的，好的。如果我可以跟進一個單獨的話題。就 S 和 X 的毛利率而言，它們看起來肯定大幅下降，除非 Model 3 的毛利率低於負 1,000%。所以也許您可以幫助我們了解本季的 S 和 X 利潤率——毛利率是多少。鑑於大多數一次性的東西都消失了，而且混合轉變是有利的，為什麼它們不會在下個季度恢復到類似或更好的狀態？您認為促銷活動有助於推動本季 S 和 X 的銷售嗎？

Yes. I mean, I -- firstly, your analysis is completely off from what we see internally. And the mix shift that we saw, part of that continues in Q4 and...

是的。我的意思是，首先，您的分析與我們內部看到的情況完全不同。我們看到的組合轉變部分將在第四季繼續…

Largely because we're custom -- we're largely custom orders, so there's orders that were placed in Q3 that we will ship in Q4.

主要是因為我們是定制的——我們主要是定制訂單，所以我們在第三季度下的訂單將在第四季度發貨。

Right. And then as we achieve -- well, continue to achieve efficiencies and also work on that mix shift, which takes time, we will continue to see improvement. And I have full confidence in S and X gross margin.

正確的。然後，當我們實現——好吧，繼續實現效率並致力於混合轉變時，這需要時間，我們將繼續看到改進。我對S和X的毛利率充滿信心。

Yes. Because the Tesla cars being sold in Q4 are inventory rundown and some clearing older models.

是的。因為第四季出售的特斯拉汽車都是庫存車和一些清倉的老款車型。

Service loaners.

服務借貸者。

Discontinued models, the service loaners. And those go for slightly lower average selling price than a custom-order vehicle that has maybe a point or 2 effects on gross margin. But yes, I mean, it should get back to the mid-20s essentially in Q4.

停產的型號，服務借用者。這些車輛的平均售價比客製化車輛略低，但可能對毛利率產生 1 到 2 個百分點的影響。但是的，我的意思是，它應該在第四季度回到 20 年代中期。

Our next question comes from Brian Johnson of Barclays.

我們的下一個問題來自巴克萊銀行的布萊恩·約翰遜。

Yes, wanted to just drill down on the service revenue and expenses line. Not something we often talk about, but a lot of the other questions have been asked. Looks like year-over-year revenues were up $180 million, costs were up $247 million. Could you just talk about the drivers of that change between what's left of the drivetrain outsource business, the CPO business, the service loaner actual vehicles expense and then the cost of the PP&E for the actual people and service infrastructure?

是的，只想深入了解服務收入和支出。這不是我們經常談論的話題，但許多其他問題已經被問過了。看起來，與去年同期相比，營收增加了 1.8 億美元，成本增加了 2.47 億美元。您能否談談動力傳動系統外包業務、CPO 業務、服務借用實際車輛費用以及實際人員和服務基礎設施的 PP&E 成本之間變化的驅動因素？

Yes. So I think what you see there is the increase in PP&E for the service infrastructure. We wanted to get out in front of demand as we're increasing both S and X fleet size and also of Model 3. So we opened a location just about every 4 days in Q3. And to get ahead of that demand, you probably saw that we put 180 mobile vehicles on the road, and we plan to double that this quarter. And so a lot of that, what you see is PP&E. In terms of the drivetrain issue that you mentioned, that's mostly behind us. In fact, we see very little of that now. The reliability for S and X continues to improve. And you asked about the CPO business. The CPO business, for us, last year -- or last quarter was about a $238 million revenue business. We expect that to grow to $1 billion run rate -- or $1 billion business for all of 2017. And so that business is growing rapidly at the same time. And we're running those -- we do our own CPO refurbishment. We do that in the same service infrastructure that we're servicing the cars. So you see a little bit of that cost into that line as well.

是的。所以我認為您看到的是服務基礎設施的 PP&E 的增加。隨著我們擴大 S 和 X 車隊規模以及 Model 3 的規模，我們希望能夠領先於需求。因此，我們在第三季幾乎每 4 天開設一家門市。為了滿足這一需求，您可能已經看到我們在路上投入了 180 輛移動車輛，我們計劃本季將這一數字翻一番。其中，您看到的很多都是 PP&E。至於您提到的動力傳動系統問題，基本上已經解決了。事實上，我們現在很少看到這樣的情況。S 和 X 的可靠性不斷提高。您詢問了 CPO 業務。對我們來說，去年或上個季度的 CPO 業務收入約為 2.38 億美元。我們預計這一數字將成長至 10 億美元的運作率，或 2017 年全年的業務額將達到 10 億美元。因此，業務也在同時快速成長。我們正在運行這些——我們進行自己的 CPO 翻新。我們在為汽車提供服務的同一服務基礎設施中實現這一目標。因此，您也會看到其中一部分成本進入了該生產線。

Okay. And my follow-on for Deepak, probably, is can you walk us through the depreciation when you produce, for example, in the second quarter those 100 -- P100D cars Mr. Musk talked about going into the loaner fleet? Where do those -- how do those get depreciated while they're in the loaner fleet? And when they're transferred to be sold, what's the accounting on that?

好的。我對 Deepak 的後續問題是，您能否向我們介紹一下當您在第二季度生產那 100 輛 P100D 汽車時折舊的情況，馬斯克先生談到這些汽車將進入借用車隊？這些車輛在藉用車隊中時會在哪裡貶值？當它們被轉移出售時，會計處理是怎樣的？

Yes. They are capitalized as inventory because these cars are salable. And when these cars get sold, the depreciation related to those cars gets recognized in COGS.

是的。由於這些汽車具有銷售能力，因此它們被資本化為庫存。當這些汽車售出時，與這些汽車相關的折舊就會計入 COGS。

Okay. So it's not in the cost of the service centers?

好的。那麼這不包含在服務中心的成本中嗎？

No.

不。

The next question comes from Joseph Spak of RBC Capital Markets.

下一個問題來自加拿大皇家銀行資本市場的約瑟夫‧斯帕克 (Joseph Spak)。

You also mentioned some constraints in body shop welding and final assembly. And final assembly obviously makes sense, given constraints elsewhere. I was wondering if you could talk a little bit about welding. And then as you get to your year-end run rate, is there still going to be a discrepancy between sort of different parts of the entire line? Or do you think everything is going to be roughly at the same level?

您還提到了車身車間焊接和最終組裝中的一些限制。考慮到其他方面的限制，最終組裝顯然是有意義的。我想知道您是否可以談談焊接。那麼，當您達到年終運行率時，整個生產線的不同部分之間是否還會存在差異？或者您認為一切都會大致處於同一水平？

Doug, would you like to take that on?

道格，你願意接受這個任務嗎？

Well, with respect to welding, the rate is controlled by -- are you specifically asking about the video? Or do you have another...

嗯，就焊接而言，速率是由——您具體問的是視頻嗎？或者您還有其他...

I'm sorry. In the letter, it said body shop welding is listed as a constraint.

對不起。信中稱，車身車間焊接被列為限制因素。

Yes, it was not the same constraints.

是的，這不是相同的限制。

It wasn't listed as a constraint. Yes.

它沒有被列為限制。是的。

It's not the same level of constraint as the Gigafactory, but it is one of the more complex parts of the overall assembly line. So to reach our overall production goals, that has to ramp significantly. But again, it's not at the same level of constraint as modules. And it's really driven just by the sheer number of robots in the body shop. It's the highest concentration of robots anywhere in our overall production line. But it is coming up well. The bodies that we're building are of excellent quality. We've had fantastic crash results in testing them. And we're building more and more every day. We're ahead of the rest of the production curve.

它與超級工廠的約束程度不同，但它是整個裝配線中較為複雜的部分之一。因此，為了實現我們的整體生產目標，我們必須大幅提高產量。但同樣，它與模組的約束等級不同。而這其實只是由車身修理廠中大量的機器人所推動的。這是我們整個生產線上機器人密度最高的。但一切進展順利。我們正在建造的車身質量非常好。我們在測試中獲得了非常好的碰撞結果。我們每天都在建造越來越多的建築。我們領先其他生產企業。

Okay. And then as a follow-up on the capital question, I mean, Elon, I think, a year ago on this call, you said to go from 5,000 to 10,000 was -- would require a fair amount of capital, but you were confident that it'd be less than you're going 0 to 5,000. And now that you have some real-world experience with the ramp, I'm wondering if you have any different views there, if you could put a little bit of a finer point on that comment.

好的。然後作為關於資本問題的後續問題，我的意思是，埃隆，我想，在一年前的這次電話會議上，您說過，從 5,000 人增加到 10,000 人需要相當多的資本，但您有信心這會比從 0 到 5,000 人所需的資金要少。現在您已經擁有了一些有關坡道的實際經驗，我想知道您是否有不同的看法，您是否可以對該評論進行更詳細的闡述。

Yes. I don't think -- I mean, we actually feel even more strongly that our efficiency of CapEx on the next phase will be significant compared to the first phase.

是的。我不這麼認為——我的意思是，我們實際上更強烈地感覺到，與第一階段相比，下一階段的資本支出效率將顯著提高。

Yes, absolutely. Some elements will require almost no CapEx. It's -- really come to realize that the -- you really want to make a factory go incredibly fast. Like really -- I think speed is the ultimate weapon when it comes to innovation or production, and we're pushing robots to the limit in terms of the speed that they can operate at, and asking our suppliers to make robots go way faster. And that they're shocked because nobody's ever asked them that question before. It's like if you can see the robot move, it's too slow. We should be carrying about air friction, like things moving so fast. It should be -- you should need a strobe light to see it. And that's incredibly critical to CapEx efficiency. And also we're going to be designing a lot of the robotic elements and automotion on it internally. So yes, because plenty of suppliers are just too slow to respond in some cases.

是的，絕對是。有些元素幾乎不需要資本支出。這真的讓人意識到——你確實想讓工廠運作得非常快。真的——我認為速度是創新或生產的終極武器，我們正在將機器人的運行速度推向極限，並要求我們的供應商讓機器人運行得更快。他們感到震驚，因為以前從來沒有人問過他們這個問題。就好像如果你能看到機器人移動，那它就太慢了。我們應該考慮空氣摩擦，就像物體移動得如此之快。應該是——你需要一盞頻閃燈才能看到它。這對於資本支出效率來說至關重要。我們還將在內部設計許多機器人元素和自動化運動。是的，因為在某些情況下很多供應商的反應太慢了。

Okay. We have 10 more questions in the queue, so we're obviously not going to get to everybody. Elon, do you want to take just a couple more?

好的。我們還有 10 個問題需要回答，因此我們顯然無法回答所有問題。伊隆，你還想再拍幾張嗎？

Sure.

當然。

The next question comes from Colin Rusch from Oppenheimer.

下一個問題來自奧本海默公司的 Colin Rusch。

Could you talk about the percentage of sales that are coming from these loaners to the fleet vehicles? We're trying to reconcile the MSRP declines that you implemented and what, it looks like, is a little bit more severe ASP decline. And then also, if you could talk a little bit about why you felt that it was necessary to add value to the Model S and Model X while lowering price. It seems like you should be able to drive volumes with one or the other.

您能談談這些借用車輛的銷售額佔車隊銷售額的百分比嗎？我們正在嘗試調和您實施的 MSRP 下降和看起來更嚴重的 ASP 下降。另外，您能否稍微談談為什麼您認為有必要在降低價格的同時增加 Model S 和 Model X 的價值。看起來你應該能夠用其中一個來驅動卷。

Yes, I think, to the first question, I would say it's roughly about 5% of [total sales]

是的，對於第一個問題，我想說這大約佔[總銷售額]的 5%

Yes. Very -- yes. Very low single digits in terms of service loaner sales as a percentage of total units.

是的。非常——是的。服務借用銷售量佔總銷售量的比例非常低，僅為個位數。

Yes. We -- as far as the prices, it was -- Model X was always -- it was really the one that saw more of a price reduction than other things. And then the 100-kilowatt hour pack, which was -- 100-kilowatt pack cars was artificially priced high because we were production -- like really production-constrained on that pack. It was never our intention to price it quite that high, so we reduced it a little bit and then added some content as to both. So we just sort of split it between some price reductions where we thought things were a little overpriced, and then added some content just to have a clear differentiation. We weren't quite sure what the response would be to the Model 3. So maybe we might have overcorrected a little bit, but that's kind of where it is.

是的。就價格而言，Model X 一直是降價幅度最大的車型。然後是 100 千瓦時的電池組，100 千瓦時的電池組汽車的價格被人為地抬高了，因為我們的生產——就像這種電池組的產量受到真正限制一樣。我們從來沒有打算將其定價那麼高，因此我們稍微降低了價格，然後添加了一些內容。因此，我們只是將其分為一些降價產品，我們認為這些產品有點定價過高，然後添加一些內容，以便形成明顯的差異。我們不太確定人們對 Model 3 的反應如何。所以我們可能有點矯枉過正了，但事實就是這樣。

Okay. And then just moving to the China strategy. Obviously, with the permanent magnet requirements for the DC motor for the Model 3 and what we've seen historically with export restrictions in China and improved environmental enforcement in terms of mining practices, how important is that to the strategy of moving into China and maintaining your supply lines for the growth of the Model 3?

好的。然後轉向中國戰略。顯然，鑑於 Model 3 直流電機的永磁要求，以及我們歷史上看到的中國出口限制和採礦實踐方面環境執法的加強，這對於進入中國市場並維持供應線以促進 Model 3 增長的戰略有多重要？

I think we think about China more from a demand side than anything. We're building complete cars and shipping them. We're shipping them across the ocean and into the largest electric vehicle market in the world. So what really pulls us into China primarily is to be able to supply that market and to make the cars more affordable, as Elon said, so that we're not forcing consumers to experience tariffs as we bring those cars in. That's a much bigger impact than any of the supply chain or sourcing materials issue.

我認為我們更多是從需求方面考慮中國。我們正在製造整輛車並進行運輸。我們將它們運過海洋，進入世界上最大的電動車市場。因此，正如伊隆所說，真正吸引我們進入中國市場的主要原因是為了能夠滿足該市場的需求，並使汽車更便宜，這樣我們就不會在將這些汽車引入中國時強迫消費者承擔關稅。這比任何供應鍊或採購材料問題的影響都要大得多。

The next question comes from Rob Cihra of Guggenheim.

下一個問題來自古根漢的 Rob Cihra。

Great. I recognize it's not the biggest focus right now, but I'm just curious on solar declining as you expected, but just wondering when you think that can start growing again. Is that a function of Solar Roof? Or is that sort of moving past your sales changes? And then, I guess, similarly on energy storage, the ramp looking -- sort of exiting this year into 2018, is that constrained by the Model 3? Or is that on its own separate track?

偉大的。我知道這不是目前最大的關注點，但我只是對您所預期的太陽能下降感到好奇，只是想知道您認為太陽能可以再次開始增長。這是 Solar Roof 的功能嗎？或者這會影響到你們的銷售變化？然後，我想，同樣在能源儲存方面，今年到 2018 年的成長趨勢看起來會受到 Model 3 的限制嗎？還是這是它自己的獨立軌道？

Yes, we are -- we do expect the solar demand to rebound as we move solar sales into all of our stores, which is a much more efficient channel for demand generation. And that's just what's sort of conventional solar. The Solar Roof stuff, we expect, is going to be at -- or well, we're confident it's going to have extremely high demand. And we're just going through the validation process for the solar trials. It does -- and they're working right now, I should point out. So I have the Solar Roof tiles on my house. So -- and I don't even notice that they're there because they blend in so well. But they -- so they look really good but a roof is expected to last a long time. So at least 25, 30 years. And so there's some rate at which we can do accelerated life testing on -- for the rest of the component. So we can maybe try to accelerate life testing on a 30-year roof in sort of 6 months, but it's hard to do it in less than about that 6 months. So and then we're going to pack that into the production process. So I have no doubt that this will be a very significant part of the business down the road, it just takes a little while to get this behemoth rolling. But once it gets rolling, it's going to be a behemoth.

是的，我們確實預期太陽能需求將會反彈，因為我們將太陽能銷售轉移到我們所有的商店，這是一個更有效的需求創造管道。這就是傳統的太陽能。我們預計，太陽能屋頂產品的需求將會非常高——或者說，我們相信它的需求將會非常高。我們正在進行太陽能試驗的驗證過程。確實如此——我應該指出，他們現在正在工作。所以我的房子上安裝了太陽能屋頂瓦片。所以——我什至沒有註意到它們的存在，因為它們融合得很好。但是它們——它們看起來真的很好，但屋頂預計會持續很長時間。所以至少25到30年。因此，我們可以按照一定的速率對其餘組件進行加速壽命測試。因此，我們也許可以嘗試在 6 個月內加速完成 30 年屋頂的壽命測試，但很難在不到 6 個月的時間內完成。然後我們將把它納入生產流程。因此我毫不懷疑這將成為未來業務中非常重要的一部分，只是需要一點時間來讓這個龐然大物運作。但一旦開始運轉，它就會變成龐然大物。

And we continue to install pilot engineering, early customer homes. We continue the cadence of that.

而我們繼續安裝試點工程，早期客戶住宅。我們將繼續保持這樣的節奏。

Yes. You have one in your house in the woods.

是的。你在樹林裡的房子裡就有一棵。

Yes, this is J.B. I installed one, and quite a few others at this point more than 10. And we still are on track to turn on some -- most of the production line in Buffalo at the end of this year to start ramping final actual production versus this in the final factory.

是的，這是 J.B。我安裝了一個，還有其他幾個，目前已經超過 10 個了。我們仍有望在今年底啟動布法羅的部分生產線——大部分生產線，開始提高最終工廠的實際產量。

Yes.

是的。

And maybe to your point about the separation from Model 3, those production areas are largely separate.

也許正如您所說與 Model 3 分離，這些生產區域基本上是分開的。

That's right for the pack side.

對於包裝方來說這是正確的。

Yes, storage versus vehicles. The energy storage production is actually growing at a really -- actually doing really well by our ability to complete the South Australia project or be on track to complete that. That's...

是的，存儲與車輛。能源儲存生產實際上正在以真正的速度增長——實際上，憑藉我們完成南澳大利亞項目的能力或按計劃完成該項目，其增長確實非常好。那是...

In Puerto Rico.

在波多黎各。

As well -- yes, as well as the deployments in Puerto Rico and elsewhere in the Caribbean. That's been running at nominal rate and doing quite well. So those are quite separate.

是的，還有在波多黎各和加勒比地區其他地區的部署。它一直以正常速度運行，而且表現相當不錯。所以它們是完全不同的。

And down the road, there will be some cell conflict. I mean, I think if you sort of fast-forward a year or 2, we really need to think about cell production as being a constraint. And some of the (inaudible) going into cell production so they can go a couple of years out, making sure that we have a secure supplies of lithium hydroxide, cobalt. There's actually more amount of cobalt. I mean to say nickel, but yes, sort of...

將來，就會出現一些細胞衝突。我的意思是，我認為如果你快轉一兩年，我們真的需要將細胞生產視為一個限制。其中一些（聽不清楚）將投入電池生產，以便能夠使用幾年，確保我們有安全的氫氧化鋰和鈷供應。實際上鈷的含量更多。我的意思是說鎳，但是是的，有點......

Nickel, graphite, copper or aluminum.

鎳、石墨、銅或鋁。

Yes. The separator like line.

是的。像線一樣的分隔符號。

The module ones that we're operating to assemble the cells into modules are totally separate. So that -- it's this Model 3 module line in that order that we're focused on right now and improving quickly, but the energy module line, in the same building, coincidentally, but it is a totally separate line.

我們操作的將電池組裝成模組的模組是完全獨立的。因此，我們現在重點關注的是 Model 3 模組生產線，而該生產線正在快速改進，但能源模組生產線雖然也在同一棟建築物裡，但這是一條完全獨立的生產線。

Yes.

是的。

Okay. I think that's, unfortunately, all the time we have today. Appreciate all your great questions, and we look forward to talking to you next quarter. Goodbye.

好的。不幸的是，我想我們今天只有這麼多時間了。感謝您提出的所有重要問題，我們期待下個季度與您交談。再見。

Ladies and gentlemen, this concludes today's conference. Thank you for your participation and have a wonderful day.

女士們、先生們，今天的會議到此結束。感謝您的參與並祝您有美好的一天。