(UBS) 2023 Q4 法說會逐字稿

Good morning, and welcome, everyone. Before we start, I would like to draw your attention to our cautionary statement slide at the back of today's results presentation. Please also refer to the risk factors filed with our group results today, together with our additional disclosures in our SEC filings. On Slide 2, you can see our agenda for today. It's now my pleasure to hand over to Sergio Ermotti, Group CEO.

早上好，歡迎大家。在我們開始之前，我想提請您注意今天結果簡報後面的警告聲明投影片。另請參閱今天隨我們集團業績提交的風險因素，以及我們在 SEC 文件中披露的其他資訊。在投影片 2 上，您可以看到我們今天的議程。現在我很高興將工作交給集團執行長 Sergio Ermotti。

Thank you, Sarah, and good morning, everyone. 2023 was a defining year for UBS as we acquired Credit Suisse in one of the largest transactions in banking history, setting a new long-term trajectory for our franchise. It was also an intense year that required exceptional focus from all of our colleagues during periods of significant change and uncertainty. We stayed close to our clients, helping them manage a rapidly evolving geopolitical and macroeconomic backdrop as well as the turmoil that occurred in the financial system last March.

謝謝莎拉，大家早安。 2023 年對瑞銀來說是決定性的一年，我們收購了瑞士信貸，這是銀行業史上最大的交易之一，為我們的特許經營業務設定了新的長期軌跡。這也是緊張的一年，在發生重大變化和不確定性的時期，需要我們所有同事格外關注。我們與客戶保持密切聯繫，幫助他們應對快速變化的地緣政治和宏觀經濟背景以及去年三月金融體系發生的動盪。

The strength and stability of UBS provides is a direct result of our decade-long sustainable strategy and our unwavering commitment to maintaining a balance sheet for all seasons and a focus on risk and capital efficiency. For these reasons, clients reward UBS with their extended trust and confidence during periods of volatility and market uncertainty. And it allowed UBS to credibly step in and stabilize the Swiss and wider financial system by taking over Credit Suisse.

瑞銀的實力和穩定性是我們長達十年的永續策略以及我們堅定不移地致力於維持所有季節的資產負債表以及關注風險和資本效率的直接結果。基於這些原因，客戶在波動和市場不確定時期給予瑞銀長期的信任和信心。它還使瑞銀能夠透過收購瑞士信貸可靠地介入並穩定瑞士和更廣泛的金融體系。

We have acquired an enterprise that has suffered from many years of unsustainable capital allocation and underinvestment in its businesses and control framework. This resulted in cost and capital inefficiencies, significant losses, and ultimately, substantial franchise erosion. However, the acquisition accelerates our strategic priorities by providing UBS with a complementary client base, stronger regional presence, more products and services as well as many talented people.

我們收購的一家企業多年來一直遭受不可持續的資本配置以及業務和控制框架投資不足的困擾。這導致成本和資本效率低下、重大損失，並最終導致特許經營權受到嚴重侵蝕。然而，此次收購為瑞銀提供了互補的客戶群、更強大的區域影響力、更多的產品和服務以及眾多人才，從而加速了我們的策略優先事項。

This gives us great confidence in our ability to meet our ambitions and deliver long-term growth and consistently higher returns. We made great progress on our plans in 2023. We successfully won back, retained and grew clients' assets while beginning the restructuring phase. We have also substantially reduced funding costs and run-down noncore books. In our first full quarter as a combined firm, we stabilized Credit Suisse's client franchises and achieved underlying profitability. This permitted us to pay down the extraordinary liquidity support and voluntarily terminate the loss protection agreement guaranteed by the Swiss government.

這讓我們對實現我們的抱負、實現長期成長和持續更高回報的能力充滿信心。我們在 2023 年的計劃上取得了巨大進展。在開始重組階段的同時，我們成功贏回、保留並成長了客戶的資產。我們也大幅降低了融資成本和精簡的非核心書籍。在合併後的第一個完整季度，我們穩定了瑞士信貸的客戶群並實現了基本盈利。這使我們能夠償還額外的流動性支持，並自願終止瑞士政府擔保的損失保護協議。

We also provided important clarity for all of our stakeholders as we finalize our target operating model. Notably, we established the perimeter for noncore and legacy and move forward with fully integrating our Swiss domestic operations. Our progress continued in the fourth quarter. We maintain momentum with our clients with $22 billion in net new assets in GWM bringing our total to $77 billion since the closing of the acquisition. In the quarter, we also cut another $1 billion in exit rate gross costs as we move forward on our restructuring plans. Nearly 80% of noncore and legacy $12 billion decline in risk-weighted assets in the second half was driven by our active wind downs.

在最終確定目標營運模式時，我們也為所有利害關係人提供了重要的清晰度。值得注意的是，我們建立了非核心和遺留業務的邊界，並繼續全面整合我們的瑞士國內業務。我們在第四季繼續取得進展。我們與客戶保持良好勢頭，長城汽車淨新資產達 220 億美元，自收購完成以來，我們的資產總額達到 770 億美元。在本季度，隨著我們推進重組計劃，我們也削減了 10 億美元的退出率總成本。下半年，非核心和遺留風險加權資產下降了 120 億美元，其中近 80% 是由我們主動削減資產造成的。

We achieved all of this while maintaining our capital strength. Our CET1 capital ratio increased to 14.5%, helping us to build capacity for higher capital returns, while at the same time, preparing to absorb integration charges and tax inefficiencies. A great and often overlooked measure of the group's resilience and self-sufficiency is our total loss absorbing capacity, which now stands at $200 billion. Given the ongoing debate following the events of last March, this is particularly relevant to me.

我們在保持資本實力的同時實現了這一切。我們的 CET1 資本比率增加至 14.5%，幫助我們建立獲得更高資本回報的能力，同時準備吸收整合費用和稅收效率低。衡量集團彈性和自給自足能力的一個重要且經常被忽視的指標是我們的總損失吸收能力，目前該能力為 2000 億美元。鑑於去年三月事件後正在進行的辯論，這對我來說尤其重要。

Lastly, let me highlight some things I'm especially proud of and which I believe is the essential driver of what will make this successful journey, a great story. Our people have embraced both our culture and the opportunity ahead while collaborating on the integration. This will allow us to continue to serve clients and fulfill our growth initiatives.

最後，讓我強調一些讓我特別自豪的事情，我相信這些是使這次成功的旅程成為偉大故事的基本驅動力。我們的員工在整合合作的過程中接受了我們的文化和未來的機會。這將使我們能夠繼續為客戶服務並實現我們的成長計劃。

Before I take you through our plans for the next phase and -- of the acquisition, I will hand over to Todd to cover our fourth quarter results.

在我向您介紹我們下一階段的計劃以及收購的計劃之前，我將讓托德介紹我們第四季度的業績。

Thank you, Sergio, and good morning, everyone. You'll recall that with our third quarter earnings, we introduced underlying performance metrics that strip out items that we don't consider to be representative of underlying performance, primarily pull to par effects from the purchase price allocation process and integration-related expenses. In this respect, when assessing the progress we are making in our underlying performance, it is important to remember that our underlying operating expense baseline is the combination of the cost stacks of 2 globally systemically important banks, such that our underlying costs in absolute terms remain elevated and will for some time. .

謝謝你，塞爾吉奧，大家早安。您會記得，在我們的第三季收益中，我們引入了基本績效指標，剔除了我們認為不代表基本績效的項目，主要是從購買價格分配流程和整合相關費用中拉出標準效應。在這方面，在評估我們在基本績效方面取得的進展時，重要的是要記住，我們的基本營運費用基準是兩家全球系統重要性銀行的成本疊加的組合，因此我們的基本成本絕對值保持不變升高並將持續一段時間。 。

This quarter, our underlying performance also excludes a material loss relating to our ownership interest in SIX Group. In my remarks, I will refer to these underlying numbers in U.S. dollars and compare them to our performance last quarter, unless stated otherwise.

本季度，我們的基本業績也排除了與我們在 SIX Group 的所有權權益相關的重大損失。在我的發言中，除非另有說明，我將引用這些以美元計算的基本數據，並將其與我們上季度的業績進行比較。

Starting with the P&L on Slide 6. PBT in the fourth quarter was $592 million, a decrease of $322 million from the third quarter, mainly driven by lower client activity and billable invested assets as well as the U.K. bank levy and the U.S. FDIC special assessment relating to last year's U.S. bank closures. Credit loss expenses were $136 million this quarter, mainly relating to P&C and the IB. On a reported basis, the fourth quarter net loss was $279 million including a net tax benefit of $473 million primarily resulting from a revaluation of our deferred tax assets as we completed our business planning process. As we continue to execute on our integration plans at pace and benefit from seasonally higher client activity, we expect substantial improvement in our first quarter reported net profit as compared to 4Q '23.

從投影片6 上的損益表開始。第四季的PBT 為5.92 億美元，較第三季減少3.22 億美元，主要是因為客戶活動和可計費投資資產減少以及英國銀行徵費和美國FDIC 特別評估所致與去年美國銀行倒閉有關。本季信用損失費用為 1.36 億美元，主要與財產險和 IB 相關。根據報告，第四季度淨虧損為 2.79 億美元，其中包括 4.73 億美元的淨稅收收益，這主要是由於我們完成業務規劃流程後對遞延稅資產進行了重估。隨著我們繼續快速執行我們的整合計劃，並受益於季節性增加的客戶活動，我們預計第一季報告的淨利潤將較 2023 年第四季大幅改善。

Moving to revenues on Slide 6. Group revenues decreased by 3% sequentially to $10.4 billion driven by lower recurring and net management fees on a reduced average invested asset base, lower fair value and exit gains in noncore and legacy as well as decreased transaction-based revenues across the divisions. Total reported revenues reached $10.9 billion, which included $944 million from pull to par and related effects in our core businesses. As mentioned, we also marked down our investment in SIX by $508 million to reflect the lower valuation of SIX's Stake in Worldline as well as SIX's goodwill impairment relating to its ownership of the Spanish Stock Exchange.

轉向幻燈片6 上的收入。集團收入環比下降3%，至104 億美元，原因是平均投資資產基礎減少導致經常性費用和淨管理費下降、非核心和遺留資產的公允價值和退出收益下降以及基於交易的收益減少各部門的收入。報告總收入達 109 億美元，其中包括核心業務拉動及相關影響帶來的 9.44 億美元。如前所述，我們也將對 SIX 的投資減少了 5.08 億美元，以反映 SIX 所持 Worldline 股份的估值較低以及 SIX 與其西班牙證券交易所所有權相關的商譽減損。

Moving to Slide 7. Operating expenses for the group increased to $9.7 billion, up 1%. Our combined workforce was reduced by around 4,000 in the quarter, bringing year-to-date reductions to 17,000 or down 11% versus the workforce of both banks at the end of 2022. These reductions contributed to our achievement of around $4 billion in gross run rate cost saves exiting 2023 when compared to the 2022 baseline. Integration-related expenses were $1.8 billion, of which, $794 million were personnel-related, including a pension benefit equalization charge of $245 million and $604 million from real estate and technology asset expenses.

轉向幻燈片 7。該集團的營運支出增加至 97 億美元，成長 1%。本季我們的員工總數減少了約4,000 人，年初至今裁員人數達到17,000 人，與2022 年底兩家銀行的員工人數相比，減少了11%。這些裁員使我們實現了約40 億美元的總營業額與 2022 年基線相比，2023 年將節省費率成本。與整合相關的支出為 18 億美元，其中 7.94 億美元與人事相關，包括 2.45 億美元的退休金福利均等化費用以及 6.04 億美元的房地產和技術資產支出。

The pension charge did not affect CET1 capital as we recorded an offsetting gain in OCI. On a reported basis, including integration-related expenses, OpEx was $11.5 billion.

退休金費用並未影響 CET1 資本，因為我們在 OCI 中記錄了抵銷收益。根據報告，包括與整合相關的費用，營運支出為 115 億美元。

Turning to the performance in our businesses, beginning with Global Wealth Management on Slide 8. As mentioned last quarter, to align with peers, we now report net new money plus dividends and interest under the label of net new assets. We will also continue to disclose net new fee generating assets now for the combined franchise. We saw continued momentum in flows with $22 billion in net new assets with particularly strong performance in APAC and the Americas.

轉向我們業務的業績，從幻燈片 8 上的全球財富管理開始。正如上季度提到的，為了與同業保持一致，我們現在在淨新資產的標籤下報告淨新資金加上股息和利息。我們也將繼續揭露合併後的特許經營權的淨新收費資產。我們看到淨新資產持續保持成長勢頭，淨資產達 220 億美元，其中亞太地區和美洲的表現尤其強勁。

We also attracted $16 billion of net new deposits with net inflows across both the UBS and Credit Suisse platforms and including deposit inflows in the Americas for the first time since 2021. Despite the significant outflows of Credit Suisse in the first half of 2023, we generated around $54 billion of net new assets across the platforms for the full year as we stabilize Credit Suisse and grew our combined franchise.

我們也吸引了160 億美元的淨新存款，淨流入瑞銀和瑞信平台，其中包括自2021 年以來首次流入美洲的存款。儘管瑞信在2023 年上半年出現大量資金外流，但我們仍產生了隨著我們穩定瑞信並擴大我們的合併特許經營權，全年各平台的淨新資產約為 540 億美元。

Moving on to GWM's P&L. Profit before tax was $778 million, down 31% sequentially, driven by lower revenues and higher operating expenses. Credit provisions were a $7 million released in the quarter. Revenues of $5.4 billion were 3% lower, with decreases in NII and recurring fees, and with transactional revenues overall impacted by lower client activity, but nonetheless strong on the UBS platform, up 10% year-over-year. Net interest income was down 2%, reflecting tapering deposit mix effects in the U.S. and ongoing deleveraging, partially offset by stronger deposit revenues on higher volumes.

接下來是長城汽車的損益表。由於收入減少和營運費用增加，稅前利潤為 7.78 億美元，環比下降 31%。本季發放的信貸準備金為 700 萬美元。營收為 54 億美元，下降 3%，NII 和經常性費用減少，交易收入整體受到客戶活動減少的影響，但瑞銀平台的收入仍然強勁，較去年同期成長 10%。淨利息收入下降 2%，反映出美國存款組合效應的逐漸縮減和持續的去槓桿化，但部分被存款收入增加而抵消。

Recurring fees were down 2% reflecting a lower average billing base. Operating expenses increased 5% to $4.6 billion, mainly due to the FDIC special assessment, litigation provisions and higher marketing and branding costs. Important to note is that we continue to see progress in taking down costs across GWM where we are integrating Credit Suisse. Specifically, in the parts of our wealth business outside the U.S., underlying operating expenses ex-litigation and FX ticked down in the quarter and have dropped 8% compared to 2Q '23 on an exit rate basis. In the U.S., where a year-over-year comparison is more relevant, costs were down 2% ex-financial adviser compensation, the FDIC assessment and litigation.

經常性費用下降了 2%，反映出平均計費基數較低。營運支出成長 5%，達到 46 億美元，主要是由於 FDIC 特別評估、訴訟條款以及更高的行銷和品牌成本。值得注意的是，我們在整合瑞士信貸的長城汽車中繼續看到在降低成本方面取得的進展。具體而言，在我們美國以外的財富業務部分，除訴訟外和外匯方面的基本營運費用在本季度有所下降，按退出率計算，與 2023 年第二季度相比下降了 8%。在美國，年比比較更有意義，前財務顧問薪酬、FDIC 評估和訴訟成本下降了 2%。

Turning to Personal and Corporate Banking on Slide 9. In its first full quarter since the announcement of the Swiss decision at the end of August, P&C generated a pretax profit of CHF 794 million, up 3% with lower revenues more than offset by lower operating expenses and credit charges. As I highlighted last quarter in connection with September trends, the focus on win-back and coverage alignment across both Swiss platforms continues to contribute to strong financial performance for P&C, including over $7 billion of net new deposit inflows in the fourth quarter and revenue resiliency.

轉向幻燈片 9 上的個人和企業銀行業務。自 8 月底宣布瑞士決定以來的第一個完整季度，P&C 實現稅前利潤 7.94 億瑞士法郎，增長 3%，收入下降被營業收入下降所抵消。費用和信貸費用。正如我在上一季度關於9 月趨勢時所強調的那樣，對兩個瑞士平台的贏回和覆蓋範圍一致性的關注繼續為財產險和意外險的強勁財務業績做出貢獻，包括第四季度超過70 億美元的淨新存款流入和收入彈性。

Net interest income was down 1% as the benefits from deposit inflows and higher rates were slightly more than offset by the effects of lower loan volumes and clients shifting deposits into higher-yielding products. We expect NII for P&C and GWM combined and in U.S. dollar terms to be roughly flat sequentially in the first quarter with higher rates broadly offsetting the residual effects of deposit mix shifts and the initial impact of financial resource optimization, which Sergio and I will cover in greater detail shortly.

淨利息收入下降了 1%，因為存款流入和利率上升帶來的好處被貸款量減少和客戶將存款轉移到收益較高產品的影響略為抵消。我們預計第一季財產保險和長城汽車綜合的NII（以美元計算）將大致持平，較高的利率將大致抵消存款組合變化的殘餘影響以及金融資源優化的初步影響，Sergio 和我將在稍後會提供更多詳細資訊。

Non-NII revenues in P&C declined by 11%, mostly driven by transaction-based income, including lower client activity, particularly in corporate and institutional clients. Credit loss expenses in the quarter were CHF 72 million, mainly related to defaults across several names on the Credit Suisse platform and from aligning, provisioning approaches pertaining to Credit Suisse's watch list credits. I would also note that PPA adjustments have reduced the level of CLE this quarter.

財險和意外險的非 NII 收入下降了 11%，主要是由於基於交易的收入，包括客戶活動減少，特別是企業和機構客戶。本季的信貸損失費用為 7,200 萬瑞士法郎，主要與瑞士信貸平台上多個名稱的違約以及與瑞士信貸觀察名單信貸相關的調整、撥備方法有關。我還想指出，購電協議的調整降低了本季的 CLE 水準。

While we have now substantially aligned provisions and methodologies across both books, we could see a continuation of the elevated levels of CLE in P&C for the foreseeable future, given Credit Suisse's higher historical credit risk profile and the current economic environment. OpEx dropped by 5% on lower personnel and real estate expenses.

雖然我們現在已經在兩本書中大幅調整了條款和方法，但考慮到瑞士信貸較高的歷史信用風險狀況和當前的經濟環境，我們可以看到在可預見的未來，財產和意外險中的CLE 水準將持續維持在高水準。由於人員和房地產支出減少，營運支出下降了 5%。

Moving to Slide 10. Underlying PBT and asset management increased 16% to $180 million on seasonally higher performance fees and from gains on disposals that closed in the quarter, notably our joint venture in South Korea. Net management fees were down slightly on lower average invested assets in the quarter. OpEx increased 4% to $625 million, mainly from higher personnel expenses and litigation charges. Net new money in the quarter was negative $12 billion, predominantly from 2 large outflows in indexed equities, while we continue to see client demand for SMA and private markets capabilities.

轉向投影片 10。由於季節性較高的績效費用以及本季關閉的處置（特別是我們在韓國的合資企業）的收益，基礎 PBT 和資產管理增長了 16%，達到 1.8 億美元。由於本季平均投資資產下降，淨管理費略有下降。營運支出成長 4%，達到 6.25 億美元，主要是因為人員費用和訴訟費用增加。本季淨新增資金為負 120 億美元，主要來自指數股票的兩次大規模流出，同時我們持續看到客戶對 SMA 和私募市場能力的需求。

Turning to the Investment Bank on Slide 11. As we said last quarter, since the IB has taken on only select parts of Credit Suisse's Investment Bank, we continue to consider year-over-year comparisons to be instructive in describing the performance of the business, in particular, regarding revenues. The operating loss of $280 million primarily reflects 34% higher costs, mainly personnel and technology related, while revenues from onboarded Credit Suisse staff are only beginning to build. Underlying revenues, not including $277 million of pull-to-par accretion and other effects increased 11% year-over-year to $1.9 billion.

轉向幻燈片 11 上的投資銀行。正如我們上季度所說，由於 IB 僅承擔了瑞士信貸投資銀行的部分業務，因此我們繼續認為同比比較對於描述業務績效具有指導意義，特別是關於收入。 2.8 億美元的營運虧損主要反映了 34% 的成本上漲，主要是與人員和技術相關的成本，而瑞信新員工帶來的收入才剛開始增加。基礎收入（不包括 2.77 億美元的拉升成長和其他影響）年增 11%，達到 19 億美元。

Global Banking revenues increased 69% with fee pool outperformance across key products and across all regions and particular strength in leveraged and debt capital markets as well as strong performance in the Americas. Global Markets revenues were down 4%, reflecting declines in rates and FX more than offsetting growth in equity derivatives, cash equities and financing, the latter of which topped off its best full year on record.

全球銀行業收入成長了 69%，主要產品和所有地區的費用池表現均出色，槓桿和債務資本市場尤其強勁，美洲表現強勁。全球市場收入下降 4%，反映出利率和外匯的下降遠遠抵消了股票衍生性商品、現金股和融資的成長，後者創下了有史以來最好的全年業績。

I should highlight that cash equities gained global market share over the course of 2023. During the fourth quarter, we completed the Credit Suisse banking team integration, which is already showing in our M&A pipeline. Similarly, for markets, we expect to substantially complete onboarding of the team and the majority of its trading positions to UBS infrastructure by the end of 1Q. With improving market activity, a growing banking pipeline and advanced progress on integration, we expect the IB to return to profitability in the first quarter.

我應該強調的是，現金股票在 2023 年獲得了全球市場份額。在第四季度，我們完成了瑞士信貸銀行團隊的整合，這已經在我們的併購管道中得到體現。同樣，對於市場而言，我們預計到第一季末將基本完成團隊及其大部分交易頭寸向瑞銀基礎設施的入職。隨著市場活動的改善、銀行通路的擴大以及整合的進展，我們預計 IB 將在第一季恢復獲利。

Moving to noncore and legacy on Slide 12. Underlying PBT was negative $977 million. In the quarter, we reduced RWA by $6 billion with 3/4 of the decrease from active wind down. LRD dropped by $19 billion and is down 1/3 since 2Q '23. Revenues were $162 million in the quarter. As in 3Q, on average, we exited positions at or above our marks. Credit loss expenses were negligible in the quarter, now that the majority of the NCL book is accounted for at fair value. Notably, underlying OpEx was down 9% as we continue to reduce headcount. Integration-related expenses of $749 million consisted mainly of real estate impairment charges.

前往投影片 12 上的非核心和遺留資產。基礎 PBT 為負 9.77 億美元。本季度，我們將 RWA 減少了 60 億美元，其中 3/4 的降幅來自主動縮減。 LRD 下降了 190 億美元，自 2023 年第二季以來下降了 1/3。該季度營收為 1.62 億美元。與第三季一樣，平均而言，我們在等於或高於我們的水平的情況下平倉。由於 NCL 帳簿的大部分以公允價值核算，本季的信用損失費用可以忽略不計。值得注意的是，隨著我們繼續減少員工人數，基本營運支出下降了 9%。 7.49 億美元的整合相關費用主要包括房地產減損費用。

Moving to CET1 capital and RWA on Slide 13. Our capital position remains strong, with capital ratios comfortably above our guidance and regulatory requirements. The CET1 capital ratio improved 10 basis points to 14.5% as the negative impacts from the reported loss and dividend accruals were more than offset by RWA reductions ex-FX and a net write-up of temporary difference DTAs. Both CET1 capital and RWAs were significantly impacted by currency translation, which broadly offset each other in the CET1 capital ratio. Currency translation effects also accounted for more of the $80 billion increase in LRD this quarter. We also retained higher HQLA to underpin increased deposit balances and to address the new Swiss liquidity requirements that just took effect. I will return shortly to comment on how we're thinking more broadly about capital liquidity and funding as we work towards delivering our financial ambitions by the end of 2026.

轉向幻燈片 13 上的 CET1 資本和 RWA。我們的資本狀況仍然強勁，資本比率遠高於我們的指導和監管要求。 CET1 資本比率提高了 10 個基點，達到 14.5%，因為報告的損失和應計股息的負面影響被不包括外匯的 RWA 減少和臨時差異 DTA 的淨增記所抵消。 CET1 資本和 RWA 均受到貨幣換算的顯著影響，這在 CET1 資本比率中大致相互抵消。本季 LRD 成長 800 億美元，貨幣換算效應也佔了很大一部分。我們還保留了更高的 HQLA，以支撐存款餘額的增加，並滿足剛生效的瑞士新的流動性要求。我很快就會回來評論我們如何更廣泛地思考資本流動性和融資問題，以期在 2026 年底前實現我們的財務目標。

Let me also briefly touch on a few reporting changes we are implementing from the first quarter of 2024. First, we are transferring the high net worth client segment from the Swiss Bank of Credit Suisse to Global Wealth Management to best meet our clients' needs and align to UBS' divisional structure. These clients represent an estimated $60 billion in invested assets and $550 million in annual revenues. Second, and as I highlighted last quarter, we are pushing out to our business divisions substantially all balance sheet, equity and P&L items that were previously retained centrally. We will restate 2023 to ensure comparability and publish an updated time series ahead of 1Q results.

我還想簡要談談我們從 2024 年第一季開始實施的一些報告變化。首先，我們正在將高淨值客戶群從瑞士信貸銀行轉移到全球財富管理，以最好地滿足客戶的需求和與瑞銀的部門結構保持一致。這些客戶的投資資產估計為 600 億美元，年收入為 5.5 億美元。其次，正如我在上個季度所強調的那樣，我們正在將之前集中保留的所有資產負債表、股權和損益項目基本上推向我們的業務部門。我們將重申 2023 年，以確保可比性，並在第一季結果之前發布更新的時間序列。

With that, I'll hand back to Sergio for the investor update.

接下來，我將向 Sergio 報告投資者的最新情況。

Thank you, Todd. For more than a decade, UBS has stood out among its GC peers for its favorable mix of businesses and unique model. Our global asset gathering operation and Swiss Universal Bank are at the core of our strategy, and they are complemented by our capital-light investment bank. Since 2012, our ambition to be the world's leading global wealth manager has served us well, allowing us to generate over $50 billion in capital for shareholders through the end of 2022 while also investing in sustainable long-term growth.

謝謝你，托德。十多年來，瑞銀以其良好的業務組合和獨特的模式在GC同行中脫穎而出。我們的全球資產收集業務和瑞士環球銀行是我們策略的核心，並由我們的輕資本投資銀行補充。自2012 年以來，我們成為世界領先的全球財富管理公司的雄心壯志為我們提供了良好的幫助，使我們能夠在2022 年底之前為股東創造超過500 億美元的資本，同時也投資於可持續的長期成長。

The Credit Suisse deal accelerates our strategy. We are the only truly global wealth manager with nearly $4 trillion in invested assets across a client franchise that would be nearly impossible to replicate.

瑞士信貸的交易加速了我們的策略。我們是唯一一家真正的全球財富管理公司，在客戶特許經營中擁有近 4 兆美元的投資資產，這幾乎是不可能複製的。

Globally, GWM clients benefit from our unparalleled advice, products and services. We are the #1 wealth manager in Switzerland, EMEA and APAC. In these regions, our invested assets have grown by at least 50% due to the acquisition, the equivalent of a decade of growth. In the Americas, we are a top player in the U.S. and are #1 in Latin America. The acquisition is also reinforcing our position as the #1 universal bank in Switzerland. This is not a function of our size or market share, but the clear result of the value we bring to our clients through our One Firm approach, expertise and global reach that is particularly important to our large corporate and small and medium enterprise clients.

在全球範圍內，長城汽車的客戶受益於我們無與倫比的建議、產品和服務。我們是瑞士、歐洲、中東和非洲和亞太地區排名第一的財富管理公司。在這些地區，我們的投資資產因收購而成長了至少50%，相當於十年的成長。在美洲，我們是美國的頂尖企業，在拉丁美洲排名第一。此次收購也鞏固了我們作為瑞士第一大全能銀行的地位。這不是我們的規模或市場份額的函數，而是我們透過 One Firm 方法、專業知識和全球影響力為客戶帶來價值的明確結果，這對我們的大型企業和中小企業客戶尤其重要。

With $1.6 trillion in invested assets, asset management has improved our competitiveness globally and expanded our presence in growth markets. We have strengthened the value provided to clients through complementary products across key asset classes. In the Investment Bank, we are reinforcing our competitive position with our key clients. We will continue to build durable and profitable market share in the areas that differentiate UBS for our clients while now deploying a smaller proportion of the group's financial resources compared to pre-acquisition levels.

憑藉 1.6 兆美元的投資資產，資產管理提高了我們的全球競爭力，並擴大了我們在成長市場的影響力。我們透過關鍵資產類別的互補產品增強了為客戶提供的價值。在投資銀行領域，我們正在加強我們與主要客戶的競爭地位。我們將繼續在使瑞銀為客戶脫穎而出的領域建立持久且有利可圖的市場份額，同時與收購前的水平相比，現在部署的集團財務資源比例較小。

We finished 2023 with strong momentum in terms of our integration time line. While we have full confidence in our ability to fulfill our goals, we are not complacent about the magnitude and complexity of the task ahead. Given the evident structural issues with Credit Suisse's business model and lack of profitability, there is a significant amount of restructuring and optimization that must take place over the next 3 years before we can harvest the full benefits of the combination. As we previously communicated, during 2024 and 2025, we will incur substantial integration-related expenses as we materially restructure and remove duplication across our operations. The noncore and legacy portfolio will continue to be a meaningful drag on our results as it is actively unwound.

就整合時間表而言，我們以強勁的勢頭結束了 2023 年。雖然我們對實現目標的能力充滿信心，但我們對未來任務的規模和複雜性並不自滿。鑑於瑞信業務模式存在明顯的結構性問題且缺乏獲利能力，未來三年內必須進行大量重組和優化，才能獲得合併帶來的全部效益。正如我們之前所傳達的，在 2024 年和 2025 年期間，我們將進行大量重組並消除業務重複，從而產生大量與整合相關的費用。非核心和遺留投資組合將繼續對我們的業績產生重大拖累，因為它正在積極解除。

In addition, over the next 3 years, Credit Suisse's core businesses, we also continue to require balance sheet optimization. While we will sacrifice some reported profitability and growth in the short term, we are convinced this will improve the quality of our long-term growth trajectory and bring greater cost and capital efficiency. As a result, we are reiterating our targets to realize an underlying return on CET1 capital of around 15% and cost income ratio of less than 70% as we exit 2026.

另外，未來3年，瑞信的核心業務，我們也不斷要求資產負債表優化。雖然我們將在短期內犧牲一些報告的獲利能力和成長，但我們相信這將提高我們長期成長軌蹟的質量，並帶來更高的成本和資本效率。因此，我們重申我們的目標，在 2026 年退出時實現 CET1 資本的基本回報率達到 15% 左右，成本收入率低於 70%。

As I've said before, 2024 is a pivotal year for UBS. We are taking a staged approach in our execution plan to minimize the risk of disruption for clients and employees. With over 6,000 deliverables over the next 3 years, the task is not as simple as the illustrative overview you see on Slide 18. We expect to complete the merger of our parent banks and establish a single U.S. IHC by the end of the first half of the year. The merger of our Swiss entities should occur before the end of the third quarter.

正如我之前所說，2024 年對瑞銀來說是關鍵的一年。我們在執行計劃中採取分階段的方法，以盡量減少對客戶和員工造成乾擾的風險。未來 3 年將有超過 6,000 個可交付成果，任務並不像您在幻燈片 18 中看到的說明性概述那麼簡單。我們預計在 2018 年上半年末完成母銀行的合併並建立單一的美國 IHC那一年。我們的瑞士實體的合併應在第三季末之前進行。

Completing these key milestones will allow us to realize the associated cost, capital and funding benefits. This significant legal entity mergers are a prerequisite for the first wave of client migrations and will allow us to begin streamlining and decommissioning legacy platforms in the second half of 2024. This process will continue into 2025 before we begin the transition towards our target state in 2026.

完成這些關鍵里程碑將使我們能夠實現相關的成本、資本和融資效益。這項重大的法人實體合併是第一波客戶遷移的先決條件，並使我們能夠在2024 年下半年開始精簡和退役遺留平台。這個過程將持續到2025 年，然後我們開始向2026 年的目標狀態過渡。

Again, I am sure we all appreciate the significant costs associated with running and combining 2 G-SIBs including 1 that is still structurally unprofitable. This is why a pure integration cost journey is not enough. We also need to deeply restructure to get to an appropriate cost base. Therefore, the realization of our integration plans and the run-down of the noncore and legacy portfolio is expected to result in around $30 billion in gross cost reductions by the end of 2026. In addition to supporting our cost/income ratio target, the decrease also provides us with the necessary capacity to enhance the resilience of our combined infrastructure. It will also allow us to continue to drive enduring growth by investing in talent, products and services.

再次強調，我相信我們都明白營運和合併 2 個 G-SIB 所需的巨額成本，其中 1 個 G-SIB 在結構上仍無盈利。這就是為什麼純粹的整合成本之旅是不夠的。我們還需要進行深度重組，以達到適當的成本基礎。因此，到 2026 年底，我們的整合計畫的實現以及非核心和遺留投資組合的縮減預計將導致總成本減少約 300 億美元。除了支持我們的成本/收入比目標之外，還為我們提供了增強聯合基礎設施彈性的必要能力。它還將使我們能夠透過投資人才、產品和服務繼續推動持久成長。

We will focus on improving the client experience and lowering the cost to serve by leveraging our already leading technology proficiencies. Another key driver of value creation will come from improved use of our financial resources. Obviously, the most prominent example is the noncore and legacy portfolio, where we expect our wind-down efforts to result in a capital release of over $6 billion by the end of 2026. Of equal importance, we need to optimize the utilization of financial resources across the core businesses to improve returns on risk-weighted assets.

我們將利用我們已經領先的技術能力，專注於改善客戶體驗並降低服務成本。價值創造的另一個關鍵驅動力將來自於更好地利用我們的財務資源。顯然，最突出的例子是非核心和遺留投資組合，我們預計到 2026 年底我們的逐步結束工作將釋放超過 60 億美元的資本。同樣重要的是，我們需要優化財務資源的利用跨核心業務，以提高風險加權資產的報酬。

As you can see on the slide, Credit Suisse's capital efficiency and profitability were compromised in recent years by capital-intensive exposures, underpriced resources and products and our deliveries that were not aligned to underlying risks. While in the short term, it will be difficult to produce the best-in-class returns that UBS had previously, our aim is to narrow the gap in a reasonable time frame. This will require repricing and or exiting low-returning exposures.

正如您在幻燈片中看到的那樣，近年來，瑞信的資本效率和盈利能力因資本密集型風險敞口、資源和產品定價過低以及我們的交付與潛在風險不相符而受到損害。雖然短期內很難達到瑞銀先前的同類最佳回報，但我們的目標是在合理的時間範圍內縮小差距。這將需要重新定價和/或退出低迴報風險敞口。

We will also remain disciplined to ensure that pricing reflects the underlying risk and value of the advice, products and services we provide. As we do this, we will expect to capture gross inflows in GWM and P&C as we prioritize relationships where we provide more holistic client coverage. As I said, we assume that our actions to improve capital efficiency will result in a lower growth trajectory through 2025 and necessary trade-off to create long-term value.

我們也將繼續遵守紀律，確保定價反映我們提供的建議、產品和服務的潛在風險和價值。當我們這樣做時，我們將期望獲得長城汽車和財產險的總流入，因為我們優先考慮提供更全面的客戶覆蓋的關係。正如我所說，我們假設我們提高資本效率的行動將導致 2025 年成長軌跡下降，並需要進行必要的權衡以創造長期價值。

Now moving to our medium-term priorities and ambitions for our business divisions, starting with GWM. We have robust momentum across our entire platform, and our top objectives are to stay close to clients and improve adviser productivity. In Switzerland, EMEA and APAC, we expect PBT margins to eventually exceed 40% in each of these regions as we capture the benefits of our fortified leadership positions and integration-related synergies. While our U.S. Wealth Management business will profit from our strengthened investment bank and asset management franchises, it is not directly benefiting from increased scale related to the acquisition. Therefore, we need to keep working on improving our profitability. Over the next 3 years, we will organically invest to institutionalize our platform by building out our core banking infrastructure to provide clients with a more comprehensive loan and deposit offering and by rolling out more products and services to ultra high net worth and family and institutional wealth clients.

現在轉向我們業務部門的中期優先事項和目標，從長城汽車開始。我們整個平台都有強勁的發展勢頭，我們的首要目標是與客戶保持密切聯繫並提高顧問的工作效率。在瑞士、歐洲、中東和非洲和亞太地區，隨著我們從鞏固的領導地位和整合相關的協同效應中獲益，我們預計這些地區的 PBT 利潤率最終將超過 40%。雖然我們的美國財富管理業務將從我們加強的投資銀行和資產管理特許經營權中獲利，但它並沒有直接受益於與收購相關的規模擴大。因此，我們需要繼續努力提高獲利能力。未來三年，我們將透過建造核心銀行基礎設施，為客戶提供更全面的貸款和存款服務，並為超高淨值以及家庭和機構財富推出更多產品和服務，有機投資以使我們的平台製度化客戶。

We will further leverage our advisory capabilities through our global CIO platform. In particular, we aim to provide our international clients who have interest in the U.S. with more access to our American advisers and products. We will also continue to invest in our infrastructure to augment the user experience and improve productivity. We expect PBT margins in the U.S. to remain in the low double digit in the near term, but we are confident that the actions we take will help produce mid-teens profit margins by the end of 2026. This will put us in a position to explore opportunities to further narrow the gap to our peers.

我們將透過我們的全球 CIO 平台進一步發揮我們的諮詢能力。特別是，我們的目標是為對美國感興趣的國際客戶提供更多接觸我們美國顧問和產品的機會。我們也將繼續投資基礎設施，以增強用戶體驗並提高生產力。我們預計美國的 PBT 利潤率在短期內將保持在兩位數的低位，但我們有信心，我們採取的行動將有助於在 2026 年底前實現中雙位數的利潤率。這將使我們能夠探索進一步縮小與同儕差距的機會。

Our actions will allow GWM to attract around $100 billion in net new assets per annum through 2025 as we expect to continue growth in our platform to partially be offset by the outflows related to the capital efficiency initiatives I described a moment ago. From 2026, our aim is to build to around $200 billion in net new assets annually by 2028. Overall, this level of organic growth over 3 years would nearly add up to the Credit Suisse franchise we just acquired and will power our ambition to surpass $5 trillion in invested assets.

我們的行動將使長城汽車能夠在 2025 年之前每年吸引約 1000 億美元的淨新資產，因為我們預計我們平台的持續增長將部分被我剛才描述的資本效率舉措相關的資金外流所抵消。從2026 年開始，我們的目標是到2028 年每年淨新資產達到約2,000 億美元。總體而言，三年內的有機成長水準幾乎相當於我們剛收購的瑞士信貸特許經營權，並將推動我們超越5 美元的雄心萬億投資資產。

Greater scale alongside our cost and capital efficiency measures will support GWM's ability to achieve improved profitability with an expected underlying cost/income ratio of less than 70%. In Switzerland, we are the leading bank for multinationals and SMEs, and we also serve more than 1 in 3 households. To reiterate, our uniqueness is not driven by size, but by our ability to provide these clients with access to innovative products, solutions, digital applications and global footprint. In recent years, P&C's consistent investments to improve the client experience and boost efficiency has supported steady growth and higher returns. We will replicate display book for our combined client franchises. Meanwhile, we will lower our cost to serve by streamlining our operations, decommissioning legacy technology platforms and removing branch duplications.

更大的規模以及我們的成本和資本效率措施將支持長城汽車提高獲利能力，預期基本成本/收入比低於 70%。在瑞士，我們是跨國公司和中小企業的領先銀行，我們也為超過三分之一的家庭提供服務。重申一下，我們的獨特性並不是由規模決定的，而是由我們為這些客戶提供創新產品、解決方案、數位應用程式和全球足蹟的能力決定的。近年來，財產險公司在改善客戶體驗和提高效率方面的持續投資支持了穩定的成長和更高的回報。我們將為我們的合併客戶特許經營複製展示冊。同時，我們將透過簡化營運、退役遺留技術平台和消除分公司重複來降低服務成本。

Our ambition is for P&Cs to report a cost/income ratio below 50% as we exit 2026. In Asset Management, we are building on our differentiated offering in sustainable investing and SMEs with an expanded alternatives platform, which includes new capabilities in credit. Our aim is to keep growing our higher-margin products and capture the benefits of our increased scale in customized indexing and a deeper regional footprint. We will do this while building on our strong partnership with global wealth management to drive growth. While our improved strategic positioning and product offering will help us meet the evolving needs of our clients, we are not immune to structural issues facing the asset management industry.

我們的目標是，到2026 年結束時，財產險和意外險的成本/收入比將低於50%。在資產管理方面，我們正在可持續投資和中小企業方面提供差異化的產品，並透過擴展的另類平台（其中包括新的信貸功能）進行建置。我們的目標是繼續發展利潤率更高的產品，並從客製化索引規模擴大和更深層的區域足跡中獲益。我們將在實現這一目標的同時，與全球財富管理公司建立牢固的合作夥伴關係，以推動成長。雖然我們改進的策略定位和產品供應將幫助我們滿足客戶不斷變化的需求，但我們也不能倖免於資產管理產業面臨的結構性問題。

This makes the realization of cost synergies a critical component of our plan to get to a cost/income ratio below 70% by the end of 2026, while self-funding investments for growth initiative will be delivered. The acquisition has added capability that were already of strategic importance for our investment bank. Therefore, in terms of strategy, clients' priorities and risk discipline, nothing changes. In Global Banking, we have significantly strengthened our coverage and product teams in growth markets that are aligned to GWM, notably the Americas and APAC. We have reinforced our leading position in Switzerland. And globally, we expect our broader and deeper solutions across M&A, equity capital markets and leverage and capital markets to drive profitable market share.

這使得實現成本協同效應成為我們計劃的一個重要組成部分，該計劃旨在到 2026 年底將成本/收入比率降至 70% 以下，同時將實施自籌資金投資促進成長計劃。此次收購增加了對我們投資銀行已經具有策略重要性的能力。因此，在策略、客戶優先事項和風險紀律方面沒有任何變化。在全球銀行業務中，我們顯著加強了與長城汽車一致的成長市場的覆蓋範圍和產品團隊，特別是美洲和亞太地區。我們鞏固了在瑞士的領先地位。在全球範圍內，我們預計我們在併購、股權資本市場以及槓桿和資本市場方面更廣泛、更深入的解決方案將推動可獲利的市場份額。

We are already seeing the benefits with notable mandate successes across the globe. In Global Markets, we are bolstering core products and services that are most relevant to our clients, including electronic trading, financing and equity derivatives. Our award-winning equities and FX franchises will now serve an even larger and broader client base, also supported by our strengthened global research coverage of the most relevant and fastest-growing sectors.

我們已經看到了全球範圍內顯著成功的授權所帶來的好處。在全球市場，我們正在支援與客戶最相關的核心產品和服務，包括電子交易、融資和股票衍生性商品。我們屢獲殊榮的股票和外匯特許經營權現在將服務於更大、更廣泛的客戶群，這也得到了我們對最相關和增長最快的行業的強化全球研究覆蓋的支持。

By deploying its products and services across a more diversified institutional corporate and financial sponsor client base. In addition to the improved connectivity with our clients in GWM and P&C, the investment bank is poised to achieve around 15% return on attributed equity over the cycle. And it will do this while consuming no more than 25% of the group's risk-weighted assets.

透過在更多元化的機構企業和金融贊助商客戶群中部署其產品和服務。除了改善與 GWM 和 P&C 客戶的聯繫外，該投資銀行還準備在整個週期中實現 15% 左右的歸屬股權回報率。它將在消耗不超過集團風險加權資產 25% 的情況下實現這一目標。

As I mentioned before, the active rundown of the noncore and legacy portfolio releases capital, removes tail risks and complexity and reduces our cost base, allowing us to improve our returns. We have made good progress late. We have closed over 2,000 NCL's books, including full exit of several macro books and are largely closed -- we have largely closed our noncore cash equities, convertible and prime services exposures. To date, we have decommissioned around 150 NCL systems and retired nearly 20% of its models.

正如我之前提到的，非核心和遺留投資組合的積極縮減釋放了資本，消除了尾部風險和複雜性，並降低了我們的成本基礎，使我們能夠提高回報。我們後期取得了很好的進展。我們已經關閉了 2,000 多份 NCL 帳簿，包括全面退出幾筆宏觀帳簿，並且基本上已經關閉——我們基本上已經關閉了非核心現金股票、可轉換和主要服務風險敞口。到目前為止，我們已經退役了大約 150 個 NCL 系統，並退役了近 20% 的型號。

As we further wind down this portfolio we will focus on economic profitability, including funding, operating and capital cost. We will also remain focused on basing our priorities with the needs of our clients and counterparties. Our ambition is for NCL's underlying loss to move to around $1 billion with the residual portfolio of total risk-weighted assets accounting for around 5% of the group's by the end of 2026. By the end of 2024, we expect combined risk credit and market risk, risk-weighted assets to be substantially below $40 billion. Capital strength has been a key pillar of our strategy, and we remain committed to maintaining a balance sheet for all seasons.

隨著我們進一步縮減該投資組合，我們將重點放在經濟盈利能力，包括融資、營運和資本成本。我們也將繼續專注於根據客戶和交易對手的需求來確定我們的優先事項。我們的目標是，到2026 年底，NCL 的基本損失將達到10 億美元左右，風險加權資產總額的剩餘投資組合佔該集團的5% 左右。到2024 年底，我們預計風險信貸和市場綜合損失將達到10 億美元左右。風險，風險加權資產遠低於 400 億美元。資本實力一直是我們策略的關鍵支柱，我們仍然致力於維持所有季節的資產負債表。

We expect to operate with a CET1 capital ratio of around 14%. This will provide us with a substantial capital buffer relative to our minimum regulatory requirements during the integration, but also as our capital requirements increase over time. As we fund growth with part of our retained profits, we will also seek to calibrate the proportion of cash dividend versus buybacks. For the 2023 financial year, we intend to propose an ordinary dividend of $0.70, an increase of 27% year-on-year. With respect to our progressive dividend policy, we are accounting for a mid-teen percentage increase in 2024.

我們預計 CET1 資本比率約為 14%。這將為我們提供相對於整合期間最低監管要求的大量資本緩衝，而且隨著我們的資本要求隨著時間的推移而增加。當我們以部分留存利潤為成長提供資金時，我們也將尋求調整現金股利與回購的比例。 2023財年，我們擬建議發放普通股利0.70美元，較去年同期成長27%。就我們的漸進式股利政策而言，我們預計 2024 年將實現中位數百分比的成長。

We also plan to continue to distribute excess capital to shareholders via repurchases. In the short term, it is prudent to hold off until the parent bank merger is complete in the first half of this year. Then we expect to resume buying back stocks with a target of up to $1 billion in 2024. Our ambition in 2026 is for total capital returns to exceed pre-acquisition levels with share repurchases, most likely being the biggest component.

我們也計劃繼續透過回購向股東分配多餘資本。短期來看，謹慎的做法是延後到今年上半年母行合併完成。然後，我們預計將在 2024 年恢復股票回購，目標為 10 億美元。我們到 2026 年的目標是透過股票回購（很可能是最大的組成部分）使總資本回報率超過收購前的水平。

As you can see from this slide, in terms of returns on capital, we expect to build towards our 15% return on CET1 target as we exit 2026 with 2024 still reflecting the significant restructuring and optimization work taking place as we integrate Credit Suisse. Our plan is not relying on overly optimistic market assumptions. And if necessary, we have the flexibility to adjust our plans as needed to respond to changes in the underlying assumptions.

正如您從這張投影片中看到的，就資本回報率而言，我們預計在2026 年退出時將實現15% 的CET1 回報率目標，而2024 年仍反映出我們整合瑞士信貸時正在進行的重大重組和優化工作。我們的計劃並不依賴過於樂觀的市場假設。如有必要，我們可以根據需要靈活調整我們的計劃，以應對基本假設的變化。

When our cost and capital efficiency measures are behind us, we expect to increase -- we expect our increased scale and enhanced client franchises will position us to attain sustainably higher returns, starting with a reported return on CET1 capital of around 18% in 2028.

當我們的成本和資本效率措施過去時，我們預計會增加——我們預計規模的擴大和客戶特許經營的增強將使我們能夠獲得可持續的更高回報，從報告的2028 年CET1 資本回報率約為18% 開始。

With that, I hand back to Todd for more details on our plans.

說完，我向托德詢問有關我們計劃的更多細節。

Thanks again, Sergio. The strategic and detailed planning we've undertaken over the last several months now informs a clear path towards our objectives of generating an underlying return on CET1 capital of around 15% and an underlying cost/income ratio of less than 70% by the time we complete the integration of Credit Suisse at the end of 2026. In the next few minutes, I'll describe the ways in which we expect to achieve these objectives, offer details on trajectories and comment on how we'll measure progress.

再次感謝，塞爾吉奧。我們在過去幾個月中進行的策略和詳細規劃現在為我們的目標提供了一條清晰的道路，即到我們的目標時，CET1 資本的基本回報率約為15%，基本成本/收入比低於70%。到 2026 年底完成瑞士信貸的整合。在接下來的幾分鐘內，我將描述我們期望實現這些目標的方式，提供有關軌蹟的詳細信息，並評論我們將如何衡量進展情況。

I want to emphasize that our plans are based on the complex work required to restructure our cost base that at present supports the infrastructure of 2 G-SIBs and to enhance the returns on financial resources deployed in our core businesses that have been diluted by the acquisition.

我想強調的是，我們的計劃是基於重組成本基礎所需的複雜工作，該成本基礎目前支援2 個G-SIB 的基礎設施，並提高部署在因收購而稀釋的核心業務中的財務資源的回報。

These significant efficiency undertakings come at a cost, whether through integration-related expenses or somewhat slower net new asset growth while we optimize the balance sheet over the next few quarters. Ultimately, the key to delivering our long-term financial ambitions is the discipline we're applying now in driving cost and financial resource efficiency.

這些重大效率措施是有代價的，無論是透過整合相關費用，或是在我們在未來幾季優化資產負債表的同時，新資產淨成長速度有所放緩。最終，實現我們長期財務目標的關鍵是我們現在在提高成本和財務資源效率方面所採用的紀律。

Moving to Slide 30, which provides an overview of the main drivers of the expected return on capital uplift between now and the end of. 2026. Our financial ambitions are mainly dependent on controllable factors and market assumptions that are in line with consensus rather than blue sky scenarios.

現在轉到投影片 30，該投影片概述了從現在到年底資本預期回報率上升的主要驅動因素。 2026年，我們的財務目標主要取決於可控因素和符合共識的市場假設，而不是藍天情境。

Our focus is on building high-quality and sustainable revenue streams to support healthy and attractive returns over the long term. In this respect, we'll drive most of the improvement over the integration timeline by rightsizing our cost base, optimizing financial resources and normalizing the tax rate. Importantly, by building our plans primarily around cost and resource optimization, we retain flexibility and optionality in execution. For example, while we expect to continue investing for growth in our core businesses, we have discretion to pace the spend in case markets are less constructive.

我們的重點是建立高品質和可持續的收入流，以支持長期健康和有吸引力的回報。在這方面，我們將透過調整成本基礎、優化財務資源和規範稅率來推動整合時間表的大部分改進。重要的是，透過主要圍繞成本和資源優化製定計劃，我們在執行中保留了靈活性和選擇性。例如，雖然我們預計將繼續投資以促進核心業務的成長，但如果市場建設性較差，我們可以酌情調整支出節奏。

Finally, as we progress with simplification of our legal entity structure, we'll see additional support to our capital returns from the normalization of the effective tax rate dropping to around 23% by 2026.

最後，隨著我們在簡化法人實體結構方面取得進展，我們將看到有效稅率正常化到 2026 年降至 23% 左右，從而為我們的資本回報提供額外支持。

Moving to details of our revenue expectations on Slide 31. First, we believe GWM's income outside of NII will be one of the main drivers of our growth. As we expand our GWM invested asset base and enhance our solution offerings and capabilities, we expect to increase both recurring fee and transaction-based income with stronger net margins. By staying close to our clients, continuing to win back assets and offering differentiated products and services to help navigate challenging market conditions, we expect to attract around $200 billion in net new assets over the next 2 years while optimizing returns on financial resources.

轉到幻燈片 31 上我們收入預期的詳細資訊。首先，我們相信長城汽車在 NII 之外的收入將是我們成長的主要推動力之一。隨著我們擴大長城汽車的投資資產基礎並增強我們的解決方案產品和能力，我們預計會增加經常性費用和基於交易的收入，並帶來更強勁的淨利潤。透過與客戶保持密切聯繫、繼續贏回資產並提供差異化產品和服務來幫助應對充滿挑戰的市場條件，我們預計未來兩年將吸引約2000 億美元的淨新資產，同時優化財務資源回報。

Beyond 2025, with the optimization work largely behind us, we expect annual net new asset growth to build to $200 billion by 2028 and to surpass $5 trillion in assets under management at that time. In addition to growing our asset base, we believe we're in a strong position to offset some of the structural fee margin pressure visible in the industry by leveraging a unified shelf of CIO-led products and solutions as well as increasing discretionary mandate penetration across our expanded client base. Further positive contribution to our GWM top line is expected from transaction-based fees.

2025 年後，隨著優化工作基本結束，我們預計到 2028 年年度新資產淨成長將達到 2,000 億美元，屆時管理資產將超過 5 兆美元。除了擴大我們的資產基礎之外，我們相信，透過利用 CIO 主導的產品和解決方案的統一框架以及提高全權委託的滲透率，我們有能力抵消行業中可見的一些結構性費用利潤率壓力。我們擴大了客戶群。基於交易的費用預計將對我們的長城汽車營收做出進一步的正面貢獻。

This growth is expected to be driven by the continued expansion of distribution channels and product capabilities, including growing and leveraging our successful GWM-IB joint coverage initiatives as well as broadening our scalable transaction-based advisory offerings for high and ultra high net worth clients and clients with professional markets expertise. On top of revenue improvement, we also believe we can enhance GWM's net margins and drive greater returns overall by leveraging the benefits of increased scale, realizing cost synergies from the Credit Suisse integration and emphasizing data and AI capabilities to improve adviser productivity.

這一成長預計將由分銷管道和產品能力的持續擴張所推動，包括發展和利用我們成功的GWM-IB 聯合覆蓋計劃，以及擴大我們為高淨值和超高淨值客戶提供的可擴展的基於交易的諮詢服務以及具有專業市場知識的客戶。除了收入改善之外，我們還相信，透過利用規模擴大的好處、實現與瑞士信貸整合的成本協同效應以及強調數據和人工智慧功能以提高顧問的生產力，我們可以提高長城汽車的淨利潤並推動整體回報更大。

Second, in our investment bank, we're well positioned to achieve revenue accretion relatively quickly, especially as we're selectively adding key Credit Suisse IB resources directly to the UBS platform. As a result, we accelerate our IB strategy by doubling our banking presence in the U.S. and building on our market-leading strengths in Switzerland, EMEA and APAC. As the newly onboarded bankers return to full productivity over the next 12 to 18 months, we expect banking to generate almost twice its baseline revenues by 2026, assuming supportive markets.

其次，在我們的投資銀行領域，我們處於有利位置，能夠相對較快地實現收入成長，特別是當我們有選擇地將關鍵的瑞士信貸 IB 資源直接添加到瑞銀平台時。因此，我們透過將美國的銀行業務擴大一倍，並鞏固我們在瑞士、歐洲、中東和非洲和亞太地區的市場領先優勢，加快了我們的IB策略。隨著新入職的銀行家在未來 12 至 18 個月內恢復全部生產力，假設市場支持，我們預計到 2026 年，銀行業的收入將幾乎是基準收入的兩倍。

We also aim to drive incremental client flow across derivatives and solutions, execution services and financing with support from around 400 Credit Suisse colleagues joining our markets business.

我們也致力於在加入我們市場業務的約 400 名瑞信同事的支持下，推動衍生性商品和解決方案、執行服務和融資方面的客戶流量增量。

Additionally, we expect continued revenue growth in the IB from technology and resource investments, we've made in capabilities such as research, FX, prime brokerage and equity derivatives and from increased connectivity between the IB and GWM. We also priced in a return to more normalized markets versus 2023.

此外，我們預期IB的收入將持續成長，這得益於技術和資源投資，我們在研究、外匯、大宗經紀和股票衍生性商品等方面的能力，以及IB和GWM之間互聯性的增強。我們也預期 2023 年市場將回歸更加正常化。

Moving to net interest income in GWM and P&C. As I mentioned earlier, we expect NII in U.S. dollar terms to remain roughly stable in the first quarter of 2024 versus 4Q '23. As we look out beyond the first quarter, full year 2024 NII is expected to decline by mid-single digits from annualized 4Q '23 levels, mainly on lower rates and as our financial resource optimization measures impact loan volumes.

轉向長城汽車和財產險的淨利息收入。正如我之前提到的，我們預計 2024 年第一季以美元計算的 NII 與 2023 年第四季相比將大致保持穩定。展望第一季之後，預計 2024 年全年 NII 預計將比 23 年第四季年化水準下降中個位數，這主要是由於利率下降以及我們的金融資源優化措施影響貸款量。

Over the second half of the planned horizon, we expect NII to recover, resulting from funding cost efficiencies, stable implied forward rates and improved loan revenues. I'll cover the steps we're taking to drive funding efficiencies in a few moments. Rounding out the revenue picture across core businesses, we expect stable revenues in P&C outside of NII and in asset management as we take actions to offset market headwinds and potential dissynergies from the Credit Suisse acquisition while focusing these franchises on driving cost synergy realization and improvements in operating efficiency. In particular, P&C will continue its focus on winning back flows, improving asset efficiency and defending market share in Switzerland. While Asset Management embeds new investment capabilities acquired from Credit Suisse, and continues its key role in providing advisory support to our global wealth management clients.

在計畫期限的後半段，由於融資成本效率、穩定的隱含遠期利率和貸款收入的改善，我們預期國家資訊基礎設施將恢復。我稍後將介紹我們為提高融資效率所採取的步驟。完善核心業務的收入狀況，我們預期國家資訊基礎設施之外的財產與意外險和資產管理收入將保持穩定，因為我們採取行動抵消市場阻力和瑞士信貸收購帶來的潛在不協同效應，同時將這些特許經營權集中在推動成本協同效應的實現和改善營運效率。特別是，P&C 將繼續致力於贏得回流、提高資產效率並捍衛瑞士的市場份額。資產管理嵌入了從瑞士信貸獲得的新投資能力，並繼續在為我們的全球財富管理客戶提供諮詢支援方面發揮關鍵作用。

Finally, in NCL, we're not pricing in revenue growth as we look forward as the now largely fair value book reflects our expectation of exit prices. The roughly $3.1 billion of PPA adjustments we made to the NCL accrual book before we tagged most of the positions as held for sale, are now subsumed in the marks. Hence, we expect NCL revenues in any given quarter from here to be around 0 with positioned P&L from sales, unwinds and marks, net of hedging and funding costs, all to be broadly offsetting. Of course, as our first priority in NCL remains taking out costs and releasing sub-optimally deployed capital, will the time sacrifice P&L on position exits in pursuit of these aims?

最後，在 NCL 中，我們沒有按照我們的預期定價收入成長，因為現在的公允價值帳面很大程度上反映了我們對退出價格的預期。在將大部分部位標記為待售之前，我們對 NCL 應計帳簿進行了約 31 億美元的 PPA 調整，現在已包含在標記中。因此，我們預計從現在起任何特定季度的 NCL 收入都在 0 左右，銷售、平倉和標記的定位損益（扣除對沖和融資成本）都將被廣泛抵銷。當然，由於我們在 NCL 中的首要任務仍然是消除成本並釋放次優配置的資本，為了實現這些目標，是否會犧牲頭寸退出的時間損益？

Turning to costs on Slide 32. Of the around $13 billion in gross cost saves we expect to deliver by the end of 2026, around $4 billion or 1/3 are already reflected in our 2023 exit rate,. By the end of 2024, we expect to generate more than $2 billion in gross exit rate saves with more towards the latter half of the year after completion of the largest legal entity mergers. As indicated on the slide, we expect to drive further gross cost saves of around $4 billion by the end of 2025 with the balance coming out as we exit 2026.

轉向投影片 32 上的成本。我們預計到 2026 年底將節省約 130 億美元的總成本，其中約 40 億美元（即 1/3）已反映在我們 2023 年的退出率中。到 2024 年底，我們預計總退出率將節省超過 20 億美元，在最大的法人實體合併完成後，下半年將節省更多。如投影片所示，我們預計到 2025 年底，將進一步節省約 40 億美元的總成本，並在 2026 年結束時結清餘額。

The nonlinear trajectory of cost saves between 2023 and 2026, reflects the intensity of our integration work with the legal entity mergers, migration of over 1 million clients and decommissioning of platforms requiring significant levels of workforce to execute against our time lines, especially over the next 12 to 18 months. As we progress on and ultimately complete these complex aspects of the integration, our resource requirements for these various programs of work will diminish, leading to considerable cost reductions by the end of 2025 when we expect to have delivered a substantial portion of our integration milestones.

2023 年至2026 年間成本節省的非線性軌跡反映了我們在法人實體合併、超過100 萬客戶的遷移以及平台退役方面的整合工作的強度，這些工作需要大量的勞動力來按照我們的時間表執行，特別是在接下來的時間裡12至18個月。隨著我們在整合的這些複雜方面取得進展並最終完成，我們對這些不同工作計劃的資源需求將會減少，從而在 2025 年底之前大幅降低成本，屆時我們預計將實現大部分整合里程碑。

The back-end portion of our cost save plan relates mainly to completing hardware and software decommissioning, in particular, switching off redundant legacy applications and infrastructure. This includes the applications in the various support and control functions like risk and finance, where the work is naturally sequenced to follow the completion of client-facing technology decommissioning. As Sergio mentioned, we'll reinvest part of the gross saves generated from the integration into enhancing the resilience of our technology estate and funding organic business growth in our core divisions.

我們成本節約計畫的後端部分主要涉及完成硬體和軟體退役，特別是關閉冗餘的遺留應用程式和基礎設施。這包括風險和財務等各種支援和控制功能中的應用程序，其中的工作自然地按照面向客戶的技術退役的完成進行排序。正如塞爾吉奧所提到的，我們將把整合產生的部分節省總額再投資於增強我們技術產業的彈性，並為我們核心部門的有機業務成長提供資金。

In terms of the nature of the gross cost saves, we expect that roughly half will be personnel-related costs as we streamline our front office operations across businesses and deliver synergies in our support and control functions. The remaining balance of saves will be derived predominantly from hardware and software decommissioning, real estate rationalization and reduced service requirements from external providers and contractors.

就總成本節省的性質而言，隨著我們簡化跨業務的前台運營並在支援和控制職能中發揮協同作用，我們預計大約一半將是與人員相關的成本。剩餘的節省餘額將主要來自硬體和軟體退役、房地產合理化以及外部供應商和承包商服務需求的減少。

Moving to integration-related expenses, which we expect to total to around $13 billion by the end of 2026, including the $4.5 billion incurred to date. Our objective is to front-load these expenses where possible as they typically pave the way for run rate savings. For example, in real estate, we've taken restructuring and impairment charges on select properties, reducing the current run rate cost of our footprint by $400 million per year, down 15% from 2022 levels. This save comes as a result of taking $1 billion in integration-related real estate charges through the end of 2023 with a payback of 2.5 years. This said, the timing of integration-related expenses and the resulting saves vary depending on the cost category. Some charges can be provisioned upfront as in the real estate example. While other provisions are recorded later, like severance costs for personnel whose services are required until an integration milestone is completed, such as the legal entity mergers or client platform migration.

轉向與整合相關的支出，我們預計到 2026 年底，該支出總額將達到約 130 億美元，其中包括迄今為止產生的 45 億美元。我們的目標是盡可能預先承擔這些費用，因為它們通常為節省運行率鋪平道路。例如，在房地產領域，我們對選定的房產進行了重組和減損費用，使我們目前的營運成本每年減少 4 億美元，比 2022 年的水準下降 15%。這項節省是由於到 2023 年底前減少了 10 億美元的整合相關房地產費用，投資回收期為 2.5 年。也就是說，整合相關費用的時間安排以及由此產生的節省會根據成本類別而有所不同。一些費用可以像房地產範例一樣預先提供。其他條款則稍後記錄，例如在完成整合里程碑（例如法人實體合併或客戶端平台遷移）之前需要提供服務的人員的遣散費。

While we remain focused on accelerating these costs to achieve future savings wherever possible, we nevertheless expect to recognize integration-related expenses over the entire 3-year planning horizon, albeit with as much as 80% to 90% incurred by the end of 2025. Although the timing will differ, we still expect total integration-related costs to be broadly offset in our pretax P&L by the recognition of PPA-related pull-to-par revenue effects, including the portion now in the NCL marks as described earlier.

雖然我們仍然專注於加速這些成本，以盡可能實現未來的節省，但我們預計在整個 3 年規劃期內確認與整合相關的費用，儘管到 2025 年底產生的費用將高達 80% 至 90%。儘管時間會有所不同，但我們仍然預計，透過認識到與購電協議相關的拉動收入效應，包括目前在NCL 標記中的部分（如前文所述），與整合相關的總成本將在我們的稅前損益表中廣泛抵銷。

Turning to NCL costs on Slide 33. We expect around half of the group's planned $13 billion in gross saves and a considerable majority of net saves to be achieved as a function of running down NCL's book as well as eliminating its broader cost stack related to Credit Suisse's complex legal entity structure and its historical G-SIB status. This includes expenses associated with governing, operating and maintaining Credit Suisse's many regulated legal entities and branches. As I have highlighted, the mergers of our largest group entities later this year are expected to enable further workforce consolidation and management delayering.

轉向幻燈片33 上的NCL 成本。我們預計，該集團計劃的130 億美元總節省額中約有一半以及淨節省額的相當大一部分將通過減少NCL 賬簿以及消除與信貸相關的更廣泛成本堆棧來實現。Suisse 複雜的法律實體結構及其歷史上的 G-SIB 地位。這包括與管理、營運和維護瑞信眾多受監管法人實體和分支機構相關的費用。正如我所強調的，今年稍後我們最大的集團實體的合併預計將進一步實現勞動力整合和管理分層。

For reference, our target legal entity structure is presented in the appendix. Additionally, with complete exits of larger books of business in NCL, we expect to drive cost saves by reducing staff aligned to the unit and eliminating expensive to maintain technology applications and infrastructure. In this respect, we expect the trajectory of cost saves in NCL to accelerate in the second half of this year and to hasten further over the course of the following 2 years, depending on the timing of larger scale exits of position books.

作為參考，我們的目標法人實體結構列於附錄。此外，隨著 NCL 較大業務的完全退出，我們希望透過減少與該部門相關的人員並消除昂貴的技術應用和基礎設施維護費用來節省成本。在這方面，我們預計 NCL 的成本節省軌跡將在今年下半年加速，並在接下來的兩年內進一步加速，具體取決於更大規模退出持倉的時間。

Ultimately, our objective is to limit the cost drag from NCL to a level substantially below $1 billion as we exit 2026, a drop of over 85% when compared to its 2022 cost base. Since the formation of NCL after the Credit Suisse acquisition, we've also taken steps to reduce the risk that any remaining costs are left stranded once we stop reporting NCL as a separate segment expected in 2027. We completed most of this work ahead of NCL's formation. When we reviewed the way in which Credit Suisse's corporate center costs were allocated among the divisions. As part of our planning process, we identified an additional $300 million of such costs that we'll reallocate to the core business divisions where they are more appropriately managed. This change will form part of the planned restatements that I described earlier.

最終，我們的目標是在 2026 年退出時將 NCL 的成本拖累限制在遠低於 10 億美元的水平，與 2022 年的成本基礎相比下降超過 85%。自從瑞士信貸收購後NCL 成立以來，我們還採取了措施，以降低一旦我們預計在2027 年停止將NCL 作為一個單獨的部門報告，任何剩餘成本就會陷入困境的風險。我們在NCL 之前完成了大部分工作形成。當我們檢視瑞信企業中心成本在各部門之間分配的方式。作為我們規劃流程的一部分，我們確定了另外 3 億美元的此類成本，我們將把這些成本重新分配給核心業務部門，以便對其進行更適當的管理。這項變更將構成我先前描述的計畫重述的一部分。

For 2024, we expect NCL to incur underlying operating expenses of around $4 billion, generating a pretax loss of also around $4 billion in light of the zero revenue guidance I offered earlier.

到 2024 年，我們預計 NCL 將產生約 40 億美元的基本營運費用，根據我之前提供的零收入指導，產生約 40 億美元的稅前損失。

Moving to our balance sheet on Slide 34. Maintaining a balance sheet for all seasons is key to everything we do. It gives us the ability to withstand financial shocks and the flexibility to support our clients in all climates. It's especially critical during this complex integration process. As highlighted earlier during the fourth quarter review, we are maintaining appropriately prudent capital and liquidity levels while executing the restructuring of Credit Suisse and preparing for new regulatory requirements. This is also the case for our key operating subsidiaries. With these considerations in mind, I'll now cover how we think about capital, liquidity and funding across the group as we look out over the planning horizon.

前往投影片 34 上的資產負債表。維持所有季節的資產負債表是我們所做的一切的關鍵。它使我們能夠抵禦金融衝擊，並能夠靈活地在各種氣候條件下為客戶提供支援。在這個複雜的整合過程中，這一點尤其重要。正如早些時候在第四季度審查中所強調的，我們在執行瑞信重組並為新的監管要求做好準備的同時，保持適當審慎的資本和流動性水平。我們的主要營運子公司也是如此。考慮到這些因素，我現在將介紹在展望規劃範圍時我們如何看待整個集團的資本、流動性和融資。

First, capital. At the end of 4Q, the group maintained a going concern capital ratio of 17%, over 200 basis points above the current Swiss requirements, comprised of 14.5% in CET1 capital and 2.5% in additional Tier 1 capital. Between 2026 and 2030, our going concern capital requirement is expected to increase by around 180 basis points to 16.7% as the effects of the currently larger balance sheet and greater market share from the Credit Suisse acquisition are phased in. To improve efficiency of our capital stack, we intend to fund this increase by cost effectively building out the permissible AT1 bucket over time, bringing the going concern capital ratio to around 18%, while broadly maintaining our CET1 capital ratio at around 14%. In this respect, following last year's successful raises, we expect to issue up to $2 billion in AT1 in 2024.

第一，資本。截至第四季末，該集團的持續經營資本比率維持在17%，比瑞士現行要求高出200多個基點，其中CET1資本為14.5%，額外一級資本為2.5%。 2026 年至2030 年間，隨著目前資產負債表規模擴大和瑞士信貸收購帶來的市場份額擴大的影響逐步顯現，我們的持續經營資本要求預計將增加約180 個基點，達到16.7%。提高我們的資本效率堆疊，我們打算透過成本有效地逐步建立允許的 AT1 桶來為這一增長提供資金，使持續經營資本比率達到 18% 左右，同時將我們的 CET1 資本比率大致維持在 14% 左右。在這方面，繼去年成功融資後，我們預計在 2024 年發行高達 20 億美元的 AT1。

A word on going concern capital at our parent bank, UBS AG on a pro forma post-merger basis. The main takeaway here is that we expect a healthy buffer over regulatory requirements on a fully applied basis. And even without the substantial regulatory concession historically applied to Credit Suisse AG's investments in subsidiaries. Any increases in UBS AG's going concern capital requirements from greater market share and a larger balance sheet will be funded in much the same way I described for the group and by being disciplined in rightsizing UBS AG and its subsidiaries.

關於我們的母銀行瑞銀集團 (UBS AG) 合併後預計持續經營資本的情況。這裡的主要結論是，我們預計在充分應用的基礎上對監管要求有一個健康的緩衝。即使沒有歷史上對瑞士信貸集團子公司投資進行的重大監管讓步。由於更大的市場份額和更大的資產負債表而導致瑞銀集團持續經營資本要求的任何增加，都將以與我為該集團描述的方式大致相同的方式提供資金，並嚴格限制瑞銀集團及其子公司的規模。

In terms of gone concern capital, I would highlight that for now, UBS AG's standalone requirement serves as the binding constraint for the group. As such, we consider the group's current substantial TLAC buffers to be appropriate. And accordingly, we intend to replace maturing TLAC at similar tenors. Over time, as we reduce the leverage in our businesses, we expect to see the level of HoldCo start to tick down with some potential to tighten average spreads in the back book.

就消失資本而言，我要強調的是，目前瑞銀集團的獨立要求對該集團具有約束力。因此，我們認為該集團目前的大量 TLAC 緩衝是合適的。因此，我們打算以類似的期限取代到期的 TLAC。隨著時間的推移，隨著我們業務槓桿率的降低，我們預計控股公司的水平將開始下降，並有可能收緊帳簿中的平均利差。

On to liquidity and funding. Beyond our approach to TLAC and AT1, our strategic objective in the context of liquidity and funding is to balance efficiency with resiliency and safety. In this respect, we maintain liquidity levels among the highest in the industry, satisfying the more stringent Swiss liquidity requirements that took effect last month. At the same time, we've begun executing on a funding plan that drives significant funding cost efficiencies over the next 3 years, principally from reducing the size of our balance sheet. Specifically, we expect to reduce LRD by over $100 billion at constant FX via the wind-down of NCL and from resource optimization across our core business divisions, driving down funding needs.

關於流動性和資金。除了我們的 TLAC 和 AT1 方法之外，我們在流動性和資金方面的策略目標是在效率與彈性和安全性之間取得平衡。在這方面，我們保持了業內最高的流動性水平，滿足了上個月生效的更嚴格的瑞士流動性要求。同時，我們已經開始執行一項融資計劃，該計劃將在未來三年內顯著提高融資成本效率，主要是透過縮小資產負債表規模。具體來說，我們預計透過 NCL 的逐步結束以及我們核心業務部門的資源優化，以固定匯率計算，LRD 將減少超過 1000 億美元，從而降低融資需求。

We also aim to narrow the structural funding gap of the Swiss entity inherited from Credit Suisse, increasing the self-sufficiency of the post-merger Swiss banking subsidiary. In this respect, deposits remain a key source of funding. We'll continue to focus on winning them back with emphasis on stability reflected in tenors, products and counterparty selection. In addition to applying discipline on deposit pricing, we expect to take actions to optimize our funding mix and drive down costs, including reducing our levels of OpCo by making further use of Swiss covered bonds and tapping an expanded variety of funding markets. Overall, as a result of lower funding needs, diversified and more stable funding sources, tighter issuance spreads relative to 2023 levels and disciplined deposit pricing, we believe we can realize funding cost saves of up to $1 billion by 2026 on top of the saves achieved last year. This is reflected in our long-term NII guidance that I described earlier.

我們也旨在縮小從瑞士信貸繼承的瑞士實體的結構性資金缺口，並提高合併後瑞士銀行子公司的自給自足能力。在這方面，存款仍是主要的資金來源。我們將繼續專注於贏回他們，重點是體現在期限、產品和交易對手選擇上的穩定性。除了對存款定價實行紀律外，我們還希望採取行動優化我們的融資組合併降低成本，包括透過進一步利用瑞士擔保債券和開拓更廣泛的融資市場來降低我們的 OpCo 水平。總體而言，由於資金需求降低、資金來源更加多元化和穩定、發行價差相對於2023 年水準收緊以及嚴格的存款定價，我們相信，到2026 年，我們可以在已實現的節省基礎上節省高達10 億美元的融資成本去年。這反映在我之前描述的我們的長期 NII 指導中。

Let me now walk you through our RWA expectations over the next 3 years. In NCL, we expect the runoff of its book to drive a decrease in risk-weighted assets of $45 billion by the end of 2026, bringing us to around 5% of the group's total RWAs before any further post-integration derisking. In our core businesses, we expect Basel III to increase RWA by around $15 billion beginning in 2025, primarily from FRTB, credit risk and CVA changes in the final standard. The core businesses are also expected to absorb around $10 billion of additional RWA net of $14 billion from converting Credit Suisse's risk models to the appropriate UBS standard.

現在讓我向您介紹我們對未來 3 年的 RWA 期望。對於 NCL，我們預計到 2026 年底，其帳簿的流失將導致風險加權資產減少 450 億美元，在進一步整合後去風險之前，風險加權資產將佔該集團總風險加權資產的 5% 左右。在我們的核心業務中，我們預計巴塞爾 III 從 2025 年開始將 RWA 增加約 150 億美元，主要來自最終標準中的 FRTB、信用風險和 CVA 變化。預計核心業務還將吸收約 100 億美元的額外 RWA，其中 140 億美元是透過將瑞士信貸的風險模型轉換為適當的瑞銀標準而獲得的。

I would also highlight that we expect the resource optimization work we're undertaking to result in RWA reduction of around $15 billion in the core businesses. Importantly, this impact can vary depending on the availability of revenue growth opportunities driving accretive returns. All told, over the next 3 years, group RWA is expected to drop from its current levels by $35 billion at constant FX, freeing up around $5 billion in CET1 capital.

我還要強調的是，我們預計我們正在進行的資源優化工作將使核心業務的 RWA 減少約 150 億美元。重要的是，這種影響可能會有所不同，具體取決於驅動增值回報的收入成長機會的可用性。總而言之，在未來 3 年中，以固定匯率計算，集團 RWA 預計將從目前水準下降 350 億美元，從而釋放約 50 億美元的 CET1 資本。

Turning to tax on Slide 37. As mentioned, we expect to operate with a relatively high effective tax rate in 2024, mainly due to losses generated by various Credit Suisse entities, primarily in Switzerland, the U.S. and the U.K. that cannot, at present, offset profits in their counterpart UBS entities in the same jurisdictions. The legal entity mergers planned for later this year will resolve a considerable level of this inefficiency, driving down our effective tax rate to around 40% by the end of 2024. Further optimization of our legal entity structure, combined with improved profitability and opportunities for tax planning are expected to drive the effective tax rate to below 30% by the end of 2025 and finally, to our normal levels of around 23% in 2026.

轉向幻燈片 37 上的稅收。如前所述，我們預計 2024 年將以相對較高的有效稅率運營，這主要是由於瑞信各實體（主要位於瑞士、美國和英國）產生的損失，目前無法抵銷同一司法管轄區的對應瑞銀實體的利潤。計劃於今年稍後進行的法人實體合併將在很大程度上解決這種低效率問題，到2024 年底將我們的有效稅率降低至40% 左右。進一步優化我們的法人實體結構，同時提高盈利能力和稅收機會規劃預計到 2025 年底將有效稅率降至 30% 以下，並最終在 2026 年達到 23% 左右的正常水平。

In terms of deferred tax assets, our year-end 2023 balance sheet reflects recognition of around $3 billion in net tax loss DTAs, mainly relating to the U.S. Of those, we expect to amortize around $0.5 billion against profits and convert around $2 billion into temporary difference DTAs by the end of 2025, seeking to maintain a balance equal to the eligible cap of 10% of our CET1 capital. The remaining level of recognized net tax loss DTAs of $0.5 billion, absent further planning considerations is expected to remain relatively stable over the near term.

就遞延所得稅資產而言，我們2023 年底的資產負債表反映了約30 億美元的淨稅收損失DTA 的確認，主要與美國有關。其中，我們預計將攤銷約5 億美元的利潤，並將約20 億美元轉換為臨時稅款到 2025 年底之前實施差異 DTA，力求維持相當於我們 CET1 資本 10% 的合格上限的餘額。如果沒有進一步的規劃考慮，預計 DTA 的剩餘淨稅收損失水準為 5 億美元，預計在短期內將保持相對穩定。

It is worth highlighting that the more modest level of tax loss DTAs expected over the next couple of years limits the impact of one of the key differentiators between tangible equity and CET1 signaling their convergence.

值得強調的是，預計未來幾年稅收損失的較溫和水平限制了有形股權和 CET1 之間的關鍵區別之一的影響，表明它們的趨同。

Finally, let me briefly touch on how we plan to communicate our progress across the integration time line. As you would expect, demonstrating the headway we're making in our cost reduction plans is and will remain of paramount importance. We intend to regularly report on developments and to track our performance versus the OpEx and integration cost trajectories I described earlier, even when we switch back to focusing on year-over-year comparisons by 3Q '24. NCL risk reduction will continue to feature in our quarterly performance reporting, and we'll periodically check in on where we stand in terms of key integration milestones, including the legal entity mergers, systems migration of client accounts and infrastructure decommissioning as well as improving overall efficiency in the utilization of our financial resources.

最後，讓我簡要談談我們計劃如何在整合時間線上傳達我們的進展。正如您所期望的那樣，展示我們在成本削減計劃中取得的進展現在和將來都至關重要。我們打算定期報告進度，並追蹤我們的績效與我之前描述的營運支出和整合成本軌蹟的比較，即使我們在 2024 年第三季之前轉回關注同比比較。 NCL 風險降低將繼續在我們的季度業績報告中佔據重要地位，我們將定期檢查我們在關鍵整合里程碑方面的進展情況，包括法人實體合併、客戶帳戶的系統遷移和基礎設施退役以及整體改善提高我們財政資源的利用效率。

With that, I hand back to Sergio for his closing remarks before we move to Q&A.

至此，在我們進入問答環節之前，我將請塞爾吉奧做結束語。

Thank you, Todd. To recap, we are pleased with the progress we have made so far. As you can see and you heard we have detailed plans to achieve our ambitions. We are in full execution mode. While our progress over the next 3 years will not be measured in a straight line, our strategy is clear. With enhanced scale and capabilities across our leading client franchises and improved resource discipline, we will drive sustainable long-term growth and higher returns. We are confident that by the end of 2026 and beyond, this will allow us to deliver significant value for all of our stakeholders, particularly our clients will benefit from even -- an even stronger products and service capabilities.

謝謝你，托德。總而言之，我們對迄今為止所取得的進展感到滿意。正如您所看到和聽到的，我們有詳細的計劃來實現我們的抱負。我們處於全面執行模式。雖然我們未來三年的進展不會以直線來衡量，但我們的策略是明確的。透過擴大我們領先客戶特許經營的規模和能力以及改善資源紀律，我們將推動可持續的長期成長和更高的回報。我們相信，到 2026 年底及以後，這將使我們能夠為所有利害關係人提供巨大的價值，特別是我們的客戶將受益於甚至更強大的產品和服務能力。

Our people will have a better platform to grow their careers and our shareholders will benefit from higher capital returns. Last but not least, we will remain a reliable economic partner, employer and taxpayer in the communities where we operate.

我們的員工將擁有更好的職涯發展平台，我們的股東將受益於更高的資本回報。最後但並非最不重要的一點是，我們將仍然是我們經營所在社區的可靠經濟合作夥伴、雇主和納稅人。

With that, let's get started with questions.

接下來，讓我們開始提問。

(Operator Instructions)

（操作員說明）

We got our first question from Kian Abouhossein from JPMorgan.

我們的第一個問題是來自摩根大通的基安阿布侯賽因 (Kian Abouhossein)。

By looking at the slides, I can put together a revenue picture as you're giving some details around risk return on risk-weighted assets in the long term as well as your risk-weighted assets overall absolute. So I get to about $48.5 billion of revenues which implies around a 70% cost/income of $34 billion. And clearly, first of all, I wanted to see if the revenue assumption that I'm making here in calculation is reasonable and what underlying scenarios you used to calculate that?

透過查看投影片，我可以將收入狀況放在一起，因為您提供了有關長期風險加權資產的風險回報以及風險加權資產整體絕對值的一些詳細資訊。因此，我得到的收入約為 485 億美元，這意味著 340 億美元的成本/收入約為 70%。顯然，首先，我想看看我在計算中所做的收入假設是否合理，以及您使用什麼基本場景來計算它？

And secondly, on the cost side, clearly, even if I assume some kind of growth rate in kind of cost inflation, I still see that most of the cost savings come from your legacy noncore reduction. So it looks like a lot of flexibility. So can you talk a little bit about -- is my calculation correct to some extent? And secondly, how should I think about the cost flexibility as it seems to mainly come from noncore and legacy. That's the first question.

其次，在成本方面，顯然，即使我假設成本通膨存在某種成長率，我仍然認為大部分成本節省來自傳統的非核心削減。所以看起來有很大的靈活性。那麼你能談談——我的計算在某種程度上是正確的嗎？其次，我應該如何考慮成本彈性，因為它似乎主要來自非核心和遺留。這是第一個問題。

If I may, just secondly, on the investment bank, you're clearly making a big investment push. And here, I want to understand at what point do you see delivery has to be achieved. I think you mentioned N26 in terms of revenue improvement, but is there any milestones that have to be achieved in order to illustrate that this cost income will continuously improve not just in the first quarter.

其次，在投資銀行方面，您顯然正在大力推動投資。在這裡，我想了解您認為必須在什麼時候實現交付。我認為您提到N26是在收入改善方面，但是是否需要實現任何里程碑才能說明這種成本收入將持續改善，而不僅僅是在第一季。

Thank you for your questions. Let me take the first. So I think in terms of the way you're thinking about it, I'd say the key is to think about a cost/income ratio below 70% is really the driver as we exit 2026. The revenue picture that we gave as I commented is not based on blue sky scenarios, you see that for 2 of the core business divisions, we effectively priced in flat revenue growth, NCL we priced in flat revenue growth. We talked quite I think appropriately about what we would expect from GWM as it improves its asset base. And of course, on the IB coming from a low 2023 and given the onboarding of the Credit Suisse bankers, we've discussed and getting them productive over the next 12 to 18 months, one could see that our revenue picture is appropriate in that respect and not toppy.

謝謝您的提問。讓我來第一個。因此，我認為，就您的思考方式而言，我認為關鍵是考慮成本/收入比低於 70%，這才是我們退出 2026 年的真正推動因素。我給出的收入情況評論不是基於藍天情景，你看，對於2 個核心業務部門，我們實際上以持平的收入成長定價，NCL 我們以持平的收入成長定價。我們充分討論了我們對長城汽車的期望，因為它改善了其資產基礎。當然，對於來自 2023 年低點的 IB 以及瑞士信貸銀行家的加入，我們已經討論過並讓他們在未來 12 到 18 個月內富有成效，人們可以看到我們的收入狀況在這方面是合適的而且不是頂級的。

That said, when you look at, say, the return on RWA, which is, I think, what you use as a basis, that is certainly our ambition is to do the financial resource optimization to improve the ratio of revenues over RWA, and that's clearly something we know we need to do. You saw in the depiction of how dilutive the CS revenues have been on that metric. So clearly, we're going to keep working on that. But the key really the takeaway here is that as both Sergio and I said, we have the flexibility to pace the reinvestments of the $13 billion in gross cost saves depending on how that revenue trajectory develops. So for us, that's really the key, maintaining less than a 70% cost/income ratio. That's where the discipline comes in. And as I said, pricing in what is an appropriate revenue picture and just ensuring we keep to the gross cost saves and then we could pace the reinvestment as appropriate.

也就是說，當你看 RWA 的回報時，我認為你以此為基礎，我們的目標當然是進行財務資源優化，以提高收入與 RWA 的比率，而這顯然是我們需要做的事情。您在描述中看到了 CS 收入對此指標的稀釋程度。很明顯，我們將繼續努力。但真正的關鍵在於，正如 Sergio 和我所說，我們可以根據收入軌蹟的發展情況，靈活地調整 130 億美元總成本節省的再投資節奏。所以對我們來說，保持低於 70% 的成本/收入比才是真正的關鍵。這就是紀律的用武之地。正如我所說，定價適當的收入情況並確保我們保持總成本節省，然後我們可以適當調整再投資的節奏。

Kian, vis-a-vis your second question on the IB. I think, of course, we do expect the onboarded resources, particularly in the banking part of the business to start to ramp up to average productivity of the incumbent UBS bankers. And that will happen and is already happening, to be honest, because we have been observing good mandates winning. Of course, now what we need is the second condition, how do at first, one is, do we win mandates, do we get tractions. And the answer is clearly yes. So I'm very pleased with that outcome.

Kian，關於你關於 IB 的第二個問題。當然，我認為，我們確實期望入職資源，特別是銀行業務部分的資源，能夠開始提高到現任瑞銀銀行家的平均生產力。老實說，這種情況將會發生並且已經發生，因為我們一直在觀察良好的授權獲勝。當然，現在我們需要的是第二個條件，首先怎麼做，一個是我們是否贏得了授權，我們是否獲得了牽引力。答案顯然是肯定的。所以我對這個結果非常滿意。

Now the most difficult question to answer is, is the market going to be there to support monetizing those mandates. And what's going on. It's very difficult to predict at the near future, so past -- a very, very hard 2023, but the momentum is very good. So I do think that it's important to measure that. The other observation I tried to take on execute the transaction will be, are we gaining market shares? How do we do relatively to our competitors? A third element, which is very important for me, how is the IB contributing to the value creation in our wealth management and P&C businesses because it's very, very important, is a pillar. It's a very important driver and particularly now in the U.S., but also, for example, in Australia, but also in APAC. In general, we can drive this real value creation by working closer together.

現在最難回答的問題是，市場是否會支持這些任務的貨幣化。發生了什麼事。很難預測不久的將來，所以已經過去了——非常非常艱難的 2023 年，但勢頭非常好。所以我確實認為衡量這一點很重要。我在執行交易時試圖採取的另一個觀察是，我們是否獲得了市場份額？與競爭對手相比，我們的表現如何？第三個要素對我來說非常重要，即IB如何為我們的財富管理和財產險業務的價值創造做出貢獻，因為它非常非常重要，是一個支柱。這是一個非常重要的驅動力，尤其是現在在美國，在澳洲和亞太地區也是如此。總的來說，我們可以透過更緊密的合作來推動真正的價值創造。

But lastly, it will be, over the cycle, can they deliver return on allocated equity as we set as a target. So it's a set of short-term and medium-term and long-term measures that we will use. But I'm confident that the trajectory we had in the last 7, 8 years, which as volatility elements will continue, but in a way that accrues value to our shareholders and clients.

但最後，在整個週期中，他們能否實現我們設定的目標所分配的股本回報。所以這是我們將使用的一套短期、中期和長期措施。但我相信，我們過去七、八年的發展軌跡，作為波動因素，將持續下去，但將為我們的股東和客戶帶來價值。

And we now have our next caller, which is Chris Hallam from Goldman Sachs.

現在我們接到了下一個來電者，他是來自高盛的 Chris Hallam。

So first, on Slide 28, if I zoom in on 2026, you've guided to an exit run rate of 15% return on core Tier 1. But for the year as a whole, you flagged double digit, which I guess is sort of 10% to 12%. So I was just wondering if there's something specific happening later towards the end of 2026 that's causing a sort of big jump up in profitability or perhaps whether I'm just being a bit too pessimistic on assuming the double-digit means 10% to 12%. And then second, on distribution, we have the details in terms of what you want to do on the dividend this year. Also the comments you've made on buybacks for 24 and for 2025. So I was just thinking about how you think about the overall payout ratio longer term 2026 onwards and the split in that between dividends and buybacks?

首先，在投影片 28 上，如果我放大 2026 年，您會指導核心一級的退出運行率為 15%。但就全年而言，您標記為兩位數，我想這有點像10%至12%。所以我只是想知道 2026 年底晚些時候是否會發生一些特定的事情，導致盈利能力大幅上升，或者我是否對假設兩位數意味著 10% 到 12% 的假設有點過於悲觀。其次，關於分配，我們有關於今年股息的詳細資訊。還有您對 24 日和 2025 年回購的評論。所以我只是在想您如何看待 2026 年以後的長期總體派息率以及股息和回購之間的分配？

Todd, you take the first.

托德，你先走。

Chris. So on the first, I think what's -- that dynamic is effectively the benefit of having the full year of '26 absorb all the savings that we're working super hard to achieve over the next 2 to 3 years. So during the course of 2026, we're still going to be taking significant costs out. In particular, the expectation is more in the middle and back office, where, as I mentioned, things are sequenced a bit. We have to get the client tech decommissioning done, and you'll start to see sort of a lot of the middle and back office functions, including, say, my own, where we'll see more of the cost takeout in the latter part of the journey. And so what you're seeing really priced in at the end of '26 is the full harvesting effectively the complete cost income story, whereas in 2026 in year, of course, you're just having the averaging effect over the course of the year.

克里斯。因此，首先，我認為這種動態實際上是讓 26 年全年吸收我們在未來 2 到 3 年內努力實現的所有節省的好處。因此，在 2026 年期間，我們仍將削減大量成本。特別是，人們對中後台的期望更多，正如我所提到的，那裡的事情是有順序的。我們必須完成客戶技術退役，你將開始看到很多中後台職能，包括我自己的職能，我們將在後半部分看到更多的成本支出旅程的。因此，您在 26 年底看到的真正定價是有效地全面收穫完整的成本收入故事，而在 2026 年，當然，您只是獲得了全年的平均效應。

Yes, Chris, on payback, of course, in 2026, we're going to have to factor in different considerations. But generally speaking, I would say that we want to continue to have a good mix. I think that our progressive dividend policy is extremely unlikely to change over the long term. So I think that we want to continue to deliver a cash dividend growth every year. The pace will be a function as well of where the stock trades, right? So I mean at the end of the day, there is an element of balancing cash versus stock, depending on where the stock trades. Having said that, I do recognize that also from a prudential and capital management standpoint of view, share buybacks offers more flexibility, right? So what we want to always make sure that our cash dividend is sacrosanct, and our progressive policy is also very, very important. Therefore, we're always going to measure this in 2 ways. Our dividend will be the benchmark also in respect of making sure that we have an attractive story for more yield focused equity investors.

是的，克里斯，當然，說到回報，到 2026 年，我們將不得不考慮不同的因素。但總的來說，我想說我們希望繼續保持良好的組合。我認為從長遠來看，我們的漸進式股利政策極不可能改變。因此，我認為我們希望每年繼續實現現金股息成長。速度也將取決於股票交易的地點，對嗎？所以我的意思是，歸根結底，需要平衡現金與股票，這取決於股票的交易地點。話雖如此，我確實認識到，從審慎和資本管理的角度來看，股票回購提供了更大的靈活性，對吧？所以我們要隨時確保我們的現金股利是神聖不可侵犯的，而且我們的進步政策也非常非常重要。因此，我們總是用兩種方式來衡量這一點。我們的股息也將成為確保我們為更注重收益的股票投資者提供有吸引力的故事的基準。

Thank you, Chris. And now moving on to Jeremy Sigee, who's calling from BNP Paribas Exane.

謝謝你，克里斯。現在請 Jeremy Sigee 從法國巴黎銀行 (BNP Paribas Exane) 打電話。

I apologies, my video is not working, actually. So I'm audio only. So sorry for that. Two questions, if I could. So I think what you said about RWA reductions is very welcome in the target of 5, 10 in the medium term, and that frees up a lot of capital, which is really great to hear. You talked about optimization outside noncore, so within the core divisions. And I just wonder if you could sort of talk about that a bit more. Just give us some examples of the kind of lazy assets that you think you can cut. So that's my first question.

抱歉，我的影片實際上無法播放。所以我只講音頻。對此感到非常抱歉。如果可以的話，有兩個問題。因此，我認為您所說的關於 RWA 削減的內容對於中期 5、10 的目標非常受歡迎，這釋放了大量資本，這真是太好了。您談到了非核心部門以外的最佳化，以及核心部門內部的最佳化。我只是想知道你是否可以多談談這個問題。請給我們一些您認為可以削減的惰性資產的例子。這是我的第一個問題。

The second one is back on the capital returns. You talked about '24 and you talked about '26 on the buyback. And I just wondered in terms of how we think about what you might be able to do in 2025, is 14% CET1 relative -- the relevant thresholds? Are there other constraints that will constrain you in terms of what buybacks you can do in '25. So does it have to wait for the Swiss integrations to be done? Does it have to wait for noncore milestones? If you could just talk about the constraints that would affect that, that would be great.

第二個是資本報酬率的回歸。你談到了 24 年，也談到了 26 年的回購。我只是想知道，我們如何看待 2025 年你可以做什麼，14% CET1 是相對的——相關閾值嗎？是否還有其他限制會限制您在 25 年可以進行的回購。那麼是否必須等待瑞士整合完成？是否必須等待非核心里程碑？如果您能談談影響這一點的限制因素，那就太好了。

Sorry, you take the first.

抱歉，你拿第一個。

Okay. Jeremy. So on the first, in terms of RWA reduction, you were looking for examples in terms of optimization in the core. So I'd say the classic example would be where on, say, on the Credit Suisse side in Wealth Management, to give an example, we are inheriting a situation where there was just, say, a loan relationship between the bank and a client and perhaps we weren't bringing to bear the holistic client array of services that is our expectation to sort of do now. It's been the blueprint for us in UBS, GWM. And so that's just an example where you have kind of a monoline is a simple example of that.

好的。傑里米.因此，首先，就 RWA 減少而言，您正在尋找核心最佳化方面的範例。所以我想說，經典的例子是，比如說，在財富管理領域的瑞士信貸方面，舉個例子，我們繼承了一種情況，比如說，銀行和客戶之間只有貸款關係也許我們沒有像我們現在期望的那樣提供全面的客戶服務。這是我們瑞銀、長城汽車的藍圖。這只是一個例子，單線就是一個簡單的例子。

Another example could be pricing. So you might not be getting the pricing for the risks that you're effectively taking with respect to that financing. So I think those are 2 examples where we need to do work to ensure the holistic client coverage is brought to bear in a given situation where we're looking at pricing opportunities in particular cases.

另一個例子可能是定價。因此，您可能無法獲得與該融資相關的有效風險的定價。因此，我認為這兩個例子是我們需要努力確保在特定情況下（我們正在尋找特定情況下的定價機會）實現整體客戶覆蓋的例子。

Yes. Jeremy, in respect of share buyback in 2025, I think it's a little bit early to discuss that. But I would say that, first of all, the integration, the Swiss topic is a 2024 matter. So by mid-2024 or during 2024 latest, we know exactly how we manage the integration of the parent company, the U.S. entities and the Swiss operation. That will -- so in 2025, it's unlikely to play a role in our capital return policies. The 14% is a good assumption. And what we mean by around 14% means 13.8% to 14.2%, not 14.5%.

是的。 Jeremy，關於 2025 年的股票回購，我認為現在討論這個還為時過早。但我想說，首先，一體化，瑞士話題是2024年的事。因此，到 2024 年中期或最遲 2024 年期間，我們將確切地知道如何管理母公司、美國實體和瑞士業務的整合。那麼到 2025 年，它不太可能在我們的資本回報政策中發揮作用。 14% 是一個很好的假設。我們所說的14%左右是指13.8%到14.2%，而不是14.5%。

When we have excess capital, well above the 14% is because we are creating the buffer to do share buyback to offset temporary timing differences between cost to achieve in our integration journey and the savings we realize and have the necessary buffer to also phase in the reduction of our tax rate. So in a sense, nothing really changes. But we do indeed expect also the underlying profitability to improve and therefore, potentially giving us more flexibility. But this is something that we will focus in exactly 12 months' time, and we will communicate our plans for 2025.

當我們擁有過剩資本時，遠高於14% 是因為我們正在創建股票回購的緩衝，以抵消整合過程中實現的成本與我們實現的節省之間的臨時時間差異，並擁有必要的緩衝來分階段進行降低我們的稅率。所以從某種意義上來說，沒有什麼真正改變。但我們確實預期潛在的獲利能力也會改善，因此可能會為我們帶來更大的靈活性。但這是我們將在 12 個月後重點關注的事情，我們將傳達 2025 年的計劃。

And our next caller is Andy Coombs, calling from Citigroup.

我們的下一個來電者是花旗集團的安迪·庫姆斯 (Andy Coombs)。

So the first one, I would just be going back to some of the math that Kian outlined at the start and just trying to understand your decision-making process. So if you look at Slide 20, I think you said the 9% revenue to RWA post Basel IV. So you're suggesting exit run rate of $46 billion of revenues, 7% cost/income, $32 billion of costs. And that's a couple of billion below the full year '26 consensus revenues and full year '26 costs appreciate when comparing exit versus full year. But with that in mind, could you elaborate on where you've identified the additional cost opportunities given that you're previously 10, now you're at 13? And you're on the type of saying we are sacrificing some top line growth in order to enhance returns to also where you've made the decision to perhaps come out some product areas where there was a revenue opportunity? That's the first question.

因此，第一個，我只是回顧 Kian 在開始時概述的一些數學知識，並試著理解你的決策過程。因此，如果你看幻燈片 20，我想你說的是巴塞爾 IV 後 RWA 的 9% 收入。因此，您建議的退出運行率為 460 億美元的收入、7% 的成本/收入、320 億美元的成本。當比較退出與全年時，這比 26 年全年共識收入和 26 年全年成本升值低了幾十億。但考慮到這一點，考慮到您以前是 10 歲，現在是 13 歲，您能否詳細說明您在哪裡確定了額外成本機會？您的意思是說，我們正在犧牲一些營收成長，以提高回報，您也決定推出一些有收入機會的產品領域？這是第一個問題。

Second question is on capital return. Again, trying to run the numbers, 5,10 RWAs, 14% core Tier 1. You need to be on that basis, $71.5 billion in core Tier 1 capital, you're at $78 billion today. So you have, hell lot of excess capital there. Then there's the retained earnings coming through. So just trying to understand, are there any other moving parts aside from the amortization of the FINMA waiver between tangible equity and core Tier 1 capital over the next 3 to 4 years?

第二個問題是關於資本回報。再次嘗試計算數字，5.10 RWA，14% 核心一級資本。在此基礎上，核心一級資本為 715 億美元，今天的資本為 780 億美元。所以你有很多多餘的資本。然後是留存收益。因此，我想了解一下，除了 FINMA 豁免在未來 3 到 4 年內在有形股權和核心一級資本之間的攤銷之外，是否還有其他變動因素？

So I'll let Todd take the questions and only noting that you may have got the revenues wrong, but you may address this issue.

因此，我將讓托德回答問題，只是指出您可能弄錯了收入，但您可以解決這個問題。

Okay. Yes. So Andy, I will just go on the cost side because I think I addressed the revenue side anyway in response to Kian. I would -- I'd also -- it's also important to point out just quickly on that slide that, as we say in there, it's pre-impact from the Basel III final and model updates. So that also will impact on the return of RWA.

好的。是的。所以安迪，我只想談談成本方面，因為我想我無論如何都談到了收入方面，以回應基安。我想——我也想——在這張投影片上快速指出這一點也很重要，正如我們在那裡所說的，這是巴塞爾協議 III 最終和模型更新的預影響。這也會影響 RWA 的回歸。

In terms of additional cost opportunities that we found as you asked. I mean, first, I would say we're just confirming what we said last year about greater than $10 billion and saying we had to go do the work to validate all the details. And so the $13 billion that we've come out with, neither Sergio nor I think that that's going further, it was, for us, always the neighborhood of where we thought the plan -- the detailed bottom-up plans would get us and ultimately, when we were communicating greater than $10 billion that was an informed estimate, of course, because we had done a fair bit of work. But of course, all the work that we've done over the last 3 months validating that number. So that's sort of the first thing it's just important to emphasize that it's not as if we've gone deeper.

根據您的要求，我們發現了額外的成本機會。我的意思是，首先，我想說我們只是確認去年所說的超過 100 億美元，並說我們必須去做工作來驗證所有細節。因此，我們已經拿出了130 億美元，塞爾吉奧和我都不認為這會更進一步，對我們來說，它始終是我們認為計劃的附近- 詳細的自下而上的計劃將使我們和最終，當我們溝通的金額超過 100 億美元時，這當然是一個明智的估計，因為我們已經做了相當多的工作。當然，我們在過去 3 個月所做的所有工作都驗證了這個數字。所以這是第一件事，重要的是要強調我們並沒有走得更深。

But in terms of -- on that basis, I would just say that the $13 billion remains for us on a gross basis, critical. I said half is going to be personnel related. Half is -- the other half will be consistent, comprised of things like mainly tech but also real estate, also third-party costs. So again, it's a validation of what we've done. And also, as I highlighted, going through the trajectories giving you a sense of when we think these will hit through.

但在此基礎上，我只想說，以總額計算，130 億美元對我們來說仍然至關重要。我說一半與人事有關。一半是——另一半將是一致的，主要包括技術，但也包括房地產，以及第三方成本。再說一遍，這是對我們所做工作的驗證。而且，正如我所強調的，透過這些軌跡，您可以了解我們認為這些軌跡何時會實現。

And just quickly on the -- you asked about sacrificing top line growth. I think the point that both Serge and I have made is just, of course, when you do a financial resource optimization work, and we've done this before, naturally to reduce the balance sheet means at times, well, you're going to be sacrificing revenues as assets come down. And so it all comes down to the accretion of return on CET1 ultimately and how we think about this in terms of trade-offs. So that's how I would respond to that.

很快，您就詢問了是否要犧牲營收成長。我認為塞爾日和我所提出的觀點只是，當然，當你進行財務資源優化工作時，我們之前已經這樣做過，自然地減少資產負債表有時意味著，嗯，你會隨著資產減少而犧牲收入。因此，這一切最終都取決於 CET1 回報的增加以及我們如何在權衡方面考慮這一點。這就是我對此的回應。

And then I think you were saying any other differences if I took your point on CET1 and tangible equity, was that the point that you were making, the differences, I think you were saying, Andy?

然後，如果我接受你關於 CET1 和有形資產的觀點，我認為你會說任何其他差異，這就是你所提出的觀點，差異，我想你是在說，安迪？

It's exactly not just going to get open capital build.

這不僅僅是獲得開放的資本建設。

Yes. So I was -- well, I was just pointing out in terms of convergence, as I highlighted, historically, one of the big differentiators between CET1, which we think, by the way, is the right model anyway because that's the basis for being able to buy back shares and pay dividends. So we think measuring return on CET1 capital is right. But we know there's always interest in that CET1 versus TE. So what I was just suggesting was that our as our tax loss DTAs, which were one of the big differentiators are amortizing down and being converted into 10 different DTAs, which are CET1 accretive that, that becomes much less of a delta and therefore, signals a move towards convergence.

是的。所以我——嗯，我只是在收斂方面指出，正如我在歷史上強調的那樣，CET1 之間的最大區別之一，順便說一句，我們認為無論如何，這是正確的模型，因為這是存在的基礎能夠回購股票並支付股利。因此，我們認為衡量 CET1 資本報酬率是正確的。但我們知道人們總是對 CET1 與 TE 感興趣。所以我剛才建議的是，我們的稅收損失 DTA（這是最大的差異化因素之一）正在攤銷並轉換為 10 種不同的 DTA（CET1 增值），這變得不再是三角洲，因此發出信號走向融合的一步。

Yes. Maybe let me just add quickly to your comment on driving optimization of the balance sheet and return on risk-weighted assets. You mentioned if we are planning to exit products, I have to say that -- never say never because in the next 2 or 3 years, you never know how developments work out. But at this stage, everything that we don't deem as project we want to have this part of noncore. So it's all about repricing the existing core relationships and businesses. It's not about exiting businesses. I mean I'm talking about meaningful businesses, of course, right?

是的。也許讓我快速補充一下您對推動資產負債表優化和風險加權資產回報的評論。你提到如果我們計劃退出產品，我不得不說——永遠不要說永遠，因為在接下來的兩三年裡，你永遠不知道開發會如何進行。但在現階段，所有我們不認為是專案的東西，我們都希望擁有這部分非核心內容。因此，這一切都是為了重新定價現有的核心關係和業務。這與退出業務無關。我的意思是我正在談論有意義的業務，當然，對吧？

So I don't expect -- it's really -- and that's the reason why it's not an immediate effect because we have to manage the relationship. We have to manage the discussion with clients in a way that they understand risk reward for us, for them, they understand the value of the advice we give to clients, the services and products we give. We also have to make sure that where applicable, we stop having discounts. And so -- and this is over time, of course, going to help to close the gap.

所以我不期望——確實如此——這就是為什麼它不會立即產生影響的原因，因為我們必須管理這種關係。我們必須以一種讓客戶了解我們的風險回報的方式來管理與客戶的討論，對他們來說，他們了解我們向客戶提供的建議、我們提供的服務和產品的價值。我們還必須確保在適用的情況下停止提供折扣。所以——當然，隨著時間的推移，這將有助於縮小差距。

That's great. Perhaps I could just follow up on the opening remarks. I think you said my revenue calculation is wrong on Slide 20. The 5,10 I think, is post Basel IV. And in the footnote, you said it's 9% post the Basel IV finalization model update. So should we be taking 5, 10x the 9% or 5, 10x the 10% on the slide, just to be clear?

那太棒了。也許我可以跟進開場白。我想你說我在幻燈片 20 上的收入計算是錯的。我認為 5,10 是巴塞爾 IV 後的結果。在腳註中，您說這是巴塞爾 IV 最終確定模型更新後的 9%。那麼為了清楚起見，我們應該在投影片上取 5、10 倍的 9% 還是 5、10 倍的 10%？

Well, it would be 5x, 10x the 9% since that would be the return inclusive of the -- so that's apples and apples.

嗯，這將是 9% 的 5 倍、10 倍，因為這將是包含 - 所以這就是蘋果和蘋果的回報。

And our next caller is Anke Reingen from RBC.

我們的下一個來電者是來自 RBC 的 Anke Reingen。

The first one is on a path from the 15% to the 18%. I mean, your previous target in 15%... Question is Q4 question. Can you maybe...

第一個是從 15% 到 18% 的道路。我的意思是，您之前的目標是 15%...問題是第四個問題。你能不能也許...

We've got a bad Internet connection. Sorry if you wouldn't mind starting again.

我們的網路連線很差。抱歉，如果您不介意重新開始。

Yes. Sorry, hopefully that works. If you can talk about the path from the 15% to the 18% in 2028, return on core Tier 1 capital, given you at 15% to 18% before, so how conservative is the timing as well as the 18% compared to your previous range? And how much is that self-help versus market? And the second question is Q4 question. Your net fee generating assets were negative in Q4. If you can maybe elaborate a bit on what's been driving this?

是的。抱歉，希望這能起作用。如果你能談談2028年從15%到18%的路徑，核心一級資本的回報率，假設你之前是15%到18%，那麼與你的相比，這個時機以及18%有多保守？之前的範圍？自助與市場相比有多少？第二個問題是Q4問題。您的淨費用產生資產在第四季為負值。您能否詳細說明一下是什麼推動了這個趨勢？

Anke, I'll take this one. I think -- and you take the second, Todd. I guess on the exit rate, we are trying to model what the potential will be and I outlined that we can definitely convert back into a level of value creation that is in the middle range. It's -- maybe it's also appropriate to remember that if we wanted to really reiterate the old story, we would have talked about 15% to 18%. And what we are saying is that we believe the exit rate is 18%. So I believe that the combined story over time will deliver a better, more stable, less volatile returns. And those returns will be in the mid of that range between -- from above 15%, around 18%. So I would say that the nuances of the changes are the one I just mentioned. So we are not talking about 15% to 18%. I believe that we are well positioned to be sustainably in the high teens going forward.

安克，這個我要了。我想──你選第二個，托德。我想在退出率方面，我們正在嘗試對潛力進行建模，我概述了我們絕對可以轉換回中等範圍的價值創造水平。也許也應該記住，如果我們想真正重申舊故事，我們會談論 15% 到 18%。我們所說的是，我們認為退出率為 18%。因此，我相信隨著時間的推移，綜合故事將帶來更好、更穩定、波動更小的回報。這些回報率將介於 15% 以上至 18% 左右之間。所以我想說，這些變化的細微差別就是我剛才提到的。所以我們不是在談論 15% 到 18%。我相信我們已經做好了充分準備，可以在未來的十幾歲的時候持續發展。

I don't think there is a level of being conservative 5 years ahead. We need to really work out the execution of the phase and understand what is the potential. And over time, we will fine-tune short-term ambitions.

我認為未來 5 年不會有保守的程度。我們需要真正弄清楚該階段的執行情況並了解潛力是什麼。隨著時間的推移，我們將調整短期目標。

Anke, on the net new fee generating assets in the quarter, as you mentioned, they were negative, just unpack that a bit. We saw good NNFGA on the UBS platform. What you see a bit is more the Credit Suisse dynamic in terms of mandates on the Credit Suisse platform and the fact that there was a net outflow of mandates that also could be as well from relationship managers who have left. We are countering that by virtue of having now have an aligned CIO view and aligned solutions and offerings that we're bringing out to both -- on both platforms. So we expect going forward that the CS mandates that perhaps we were seeing a bit less of than ideal, we should be able to stem that issue a bit going forward from an NNFGA perspective.

安克，正如您所提到的，就本季的淨新增收費資產而言，它們是負值，請稍微解釋一下。我們在UBS平台上看到了很棒的NNFGA。你看到的更多是瑞士信貸在瑞士信貸平台上的委託方面的動態，以及委託淨流出的事實，這也可能來自離開的客戶關係經理。我們正在反擊這一點，因為我們現在在兩個平台上都擁有一致的資訊長觀點以及一致的解決方案和產品。因此，我們預計，CS 的要求可能會比我們看到的不太理想，但我們應該能夠從 NNFGA 的角度來解決這個問題。

And our next caller is Alastair Ryan from Bank of America.

我們的下一個來電者是來自美國銀行的 Alastair Ryan。

Can I ask net new assets, the $100 billion guide that feels like about interest and dividends. Sorry I was looking at your (inaudible).

我可以問一下淨新資產嗎，這個 1000 億美元的指南感覺就像是關於利息和股息的。抱歉，我正在看你的（聽不清楚）。

Yes. we are losing the connection, Alastair. It's better you switch the video, so probably it should be better.

是的。我們正在失去聯繫，阿拉斯泰爾。你最好切換一下視頻，這樣可能會更好。

Okay, apologies. Technology is not my specialty. $100 billion net new assets in 2024 and '25. That feels like about dividends and interest, given the shape of the balance sheet you provided in the slides. So could you just talk just expand a little bit on what else the underlying outflow assumptions you're making, perhaps on some of the relationships you took over with Credit Suisse, whether that's the case? And secondly, cash now 18% of the balance sheet, very, very high liquidity coverage ratio. Is that something that's just the new run rate? Or can you bring that down as you complete the complex legal entity restructuring?

好吧，抱歉。技術不是我的專長。 2024 年和 25 年淨新資產將達到 1,000 億美元。考慮到您在幻燈片中提供的資產負債表的形狀，這感覺就像股息和利息。那麼，您能否稍微擴展一下您正在做出的其他基本流出假設，也許是您與瑞士信貸接手的一些關係，是否是這種情況？其次，現金現在佔資產負債表的18%，流動性覆蓋率非常非常高。這只是新的運行率嗎？或者您可以在完成複雜的法人實體重組後將其降低嗎？

Alastair, I'll take those. So on -- first, on net new assets, the $100 billion over the next 2 years just reflects the fact that to the point that I think we've been making that while we're going to continue to grow the asset base, I mean, $100 billion is still $100 billion over the next -- each of the next 2 years, $200 billion by the end of 2025. And that's a focus of the team. In terms of where we think the appropriate ambition would be normally when we're just in growth -- full growth mode and not looking to also ensure that appropriate hygiene on the balance sheet, that's reflecting that discount in there a bit.

阿拉斯泰爾，我會接受的。等等 - 首先，就淨新資產而言，未來兩年的 1000 億美元只是反映了這樣一個事實：我認為我們已經實現了這一點，同時我們將繼續擴大資產基礎，我也就是說，1000 億美元在接下來的兩年中仍然是1000 億美元，到2025 年底將達到2000 億美元。這是團隊的重點。就我們認為適當的目標通常是在我們剛剛處於成長階段——全面成長模式而不是確保資產負債表上的適當衛生而言，這反映了那裡的折扣。

We still think it's a strong number. It's still growing the asset base. It's still providing a basis to grow revenues, as I highlighted in my comments, but it is reflecting the fact that in addition to growing client relationships and bringing more and more aligned products and solutions to our clients, there are going to be situations as we both highlighted, where perhaps we see potential outflows because of decisions we've made around given service, for example, trying to up price alone potentially unsuccessfully and then seeing that roll off and then potentially the collateral moving out of the bank as a result. So it's just appropriate to price in some of that as we do this good and necessary work to ensure ultimately stronger return on RWA and sustainably higher returns in the long run.

我們仍然認為這是一個強勁的數字。它的資產基礎仍在成長。正如我在評論中所強調的那樣，它仍然為增加收入提供了基礎，但它反映了這樣一個事實：除了發展客戶關係並為我們的客戶帶來越來越多的一致產品和解決方案之外，我們還會遇到以下情況：兩者都強調，我們可能會看到潛在的資金外流，因為我們圍繞給定的服務做出了決定，例如，嘗試單獨提高價格可能會不成功，然後看到價格下降，然後可能導致抵押品從銀行流出。因此，當我們進行這項良好且必要的工作以確保最終獲得更高的 RWA 回報以及從長遠來看可持續更高的回報時，對其中一些因素進行定價是適當的。

In terms of cash or the HQLA that we have, yes, you could assume going forward that, that is structurally our run rate for now just given the new Swiss liquidity ordinance requirements that we're complying with. So you can assume that, that's right. Naturally, we're focusing on winning back deposits and continuing to diversify sources of funding, not least given the structural funding gap we've inherited from the Credit Suisse subsidiary in Switzerland. So we're taking steps in our funding plan to narrow that. But in the end, you can assume that for now, that level of liquidity is sort of run rate level.

就現金或我們擁有的 HQLA 而言，是的，您可以假設，鑑於我們正在遵守新的瑞士流動性法規要求，這在結構上是我們目前的運行速度。所以你可以假設，這是正確的。當然，我們的重點是贏回存款並繼續實現資金來源多元化，尤其是考慮到我們從瑞士信貸瑞士子公司繼承的結構性資金缺口。因此，我們正在融資計劃中採取措施來縮小這一範圍。但最終，您可以假設目前的流動性水準是運行率水準。

The next caller is Giulia Miotto from Morgan Stanley.

下一個來電者是來自摩根士丹利的朱莉婭·米奧托(Giulia Miotto)。

So my first question goes to GWM Americas. I think the target is low teens until 2026 and then up to mid-teens PBT margin. So what strategic actions are you taking to structure the mix of profitability in this division? I think I heard basically building the banking platform in-house. But if you can give us more color on that? So that's my first longer-winded question, whereas on the short term, in terms of transaction margins, those have been subdued for a while, especially in Asia. What evidence are you seeing or are you seeing any evidence of that coming back?

我的第一個問題是關於長城汽車美洲公司的。我認為到 2026 年，PBT 利潤率的目標是低十幾歲，然後達到中十幾歲。那麼，您將採取哪些策略行動來建立該部門的獲利能力組合？我想我聽說基本上是在內部建立銀行平台。但你能給我們更多的資訊嗎？這是我的第一個冗長的問題，而從短期來看，就交易利潤率而言，交易利潤率已經低迷了一段時間，尤其是在亞洲。您看到了什麼證據或您是否看到任何證據表明這一點？

Giulia. So in terms of the sorts of investments we're making, as you mentioned, we think the core banking infrastructure work is critical because that effectively institutionalizes clients much more effectively in doing that. The more that you have a broader suite of products and capabilities to offer clients the more in effect, it becomes -- they become stickier. The clients and the advisers become stickier. We know that playbook. We run that playbook in every part of the world outside the U.S. And so it's something that, for us, is quite fundamental, and so we're going to continue to do that and continue to invest in digital capabilities to make being both a client and adviser of the U.S. business of GWM better.

茱莉亞.因此，就我們正在進行的投資類型而言，正如您所提到的，我們認為核心銀行基礎設施工作至關重要，因為這可以更有效地使客戶制度化。你為客戶提供的產品和能力越多，效果就越好——他們就會變得更有黏性。客戶和顧問的黏性變得更強。我們知道那本劇本。我們在美國以外的世界各地都運行這個劇本，所以這對我們來說是非常重要的，所以我們將繼續這樣做，並繼續投資於數位能力，以成為客戶兼任長城汽車美國業務顧問。

There are also some other things that we're doing to bring that profit margin up. Sergio mentioned in his comments, A lot of it is also about products and capabilities, and we're seeing that start to hit through. And that's just in terms of, again, borrowing a page from the playbook that we use outside the U.S., it's global markets approach. So it's having a more joint GWM investment bank approach to serving clients from a transactional perspective, especially clients with more sophisticated needs. Also from a lending perspective as well having more of a focus on lending solutions as we've done outside the U.S. as well.

我們也採取了其他一些措施來提高利潤率。塞爾吉奧在評論中提到，其中許多內容也與產品和功能有關，我們看到這一點開始體現。這只是從我們在美國以外使用的劇本中藉用的一頁，這是全球市場的方法。因此，它採用了一種更聯合的長城汽車投資銀行方法，從交易角度為客戶提供服務，尤其是具有更複雜需求的客戶。同樣從貸款的角度來看，我們也更加關注貸款解決方案，就像我們在美國以外所做的那樣。

So I think doing all that is where we think just doing the sort of good blocking and tackling should support a profit margin in mid-teens over the next 2 to 3 years. In terms of transaction margins in APAC, yes, I think we are seeing -- we actually saw some good performance in the fourth quarter from a TRx perspective, in particular, on the UBS platform, which is encouraging. So we're -- and also in APAC, again, given just our diversification in the region, we're not just limited to 1 location potentially underperforming from an equity market perspective. And we actually saw a good performance in the region. In particular, we saw good performance in transactions in Japan this quarter. And so we have a good diversified approach to ensure that even if 1 -- as I said, 1 particular part of the region isn't generating the sorts of margins that are ideal for us that we're able to compensate.

因此，我認為，只要做好這一切，我們認為只要做好攔網和搶斷，就應該在未來 2 到 3 年內將利潤率維持在十幾歲左右。就亞太地區的交易利潤率而言，是的，我認為我們正在看到——從TRx 的角度來看，我們實際上在第四季度看到了一些良好的表現，特別是在瑞銀平台上，這是令人鼓舞的。因此，我們在亞太地區也是如此，鑑於我們在該地區的多元化，我們不僅限於從股票市場角度來看可能表現不佳的 1 個地區。我們實際上看到了該地區的良好表現。特別是本季我們在日本的交易表現良好。因此，我們有一個良好的多元化方法，以確保即使 1 - 正如我所說，該地區的 1 個特定部分沒有產生我們能夠補償的理想利潤。

And our next call is Stefan Stalmann from Autonomous.

我們的下一個電話是來自 Autonomous 的 Stefan Stalmann。

I want to first ask on the share buyback restart this year. I was a bit surprised that you make this link between the legal entity merger, the parent banks and the ability to restart the share buyback. Do you see actually a direct link there between group payout capacity and what happens to the parent bank merger? Or is it just a shortfall for you to say if the merger works, that's a good indication that the integration is online, and that's why I can go back to share buybacks?

我想先問一下今年重啟股票回購的問題。我有點驚訝你在法人實體合併、母銀行和重啟股票回購的能力之間建立了連結。您是否認為集團支付能力與母銀行合併之間有直接關聯？或者你說如果合併成功，那是一個很好的跡象，表明整合已經上線，這就是為什麼我可以回去股票回購？

And the second question is on capital requirements. You have obviously presented the plan very much on the basis of the rules as they currently stand, but we also have an upcoming review by the government, and we don't know how that looks like. On a confidence scale of 1 to 10, where do you think the outcome will be? Do you think your numbers will still be proven fine after this review? Or do you think it could change?

第二個問題是關於資本要求。顯然，您在很大程度上是根據目前的規則提出了該計劃，但我們也即將接受政府的審查，我們不知道情況如何。如果置信度為 1 到 10，您認為結果會是多少？您認為經過這次審查後，您的數字仍然會被證明是好的嗎？或者你認為它可以改變嗎？

I think the link between share buyback and the parent bank merger and the underlying U.S. operation and later on the Swiss one, it's very relevant because if we have a delay, our ability to start to deliver on the cost synergies will come just later. And therefore, we would lose capital buffers that we believe is necessary. So I think it's totally -- there is no gaming or nothing. It's just prudent, reasonable way to look at -- the 2 major risks associated with such an integration is regulatory approvals to execute, legal entity mergers. We are talking about 50-plus countries, okay? And the second one is IT migration. This is probably more the '24 into 2025 as we start to migrate.

我認為股票回購與母行合併以及潛在的美國業務和後來的瑞士業務之間的聯繫非常相關，因為如果我們有延遲，我們開始實現成本協同效應的能力將稍後出現。因此，我們將失去我們認為必要的資本緩衝。所以我認為這完全是——沒有遊戲，什麼都沒有。這是謹慎、合理的看待方式——與此類整合相關的兩個主要風險是執行法人實體合併的監管批准。我們正在談論 50 多個國家，好嗎？第二個是IT遷移。這可能是 24 世紀到 2025 年我們開始遷移的時間。

So if we don't get into a good place, with our parent company merger by the end of the second quarter, we have a delayed effect, which has to be reflected in our prudence in terms of how we accrue capital. So I hope this is very clear now.

因此，如果我們沒有在第二季末完成母公司合併，我們就會產生延遲效應，這必須反映在我們累積資本的謹慎態度上。所以我希望現在已經非常清楚了。

In terms of capital requirements, yes. Well, I mean I can only say -- watch and listen to what has been said publicly by different international and domestic experts around the topic of capital and why Credit Suisse failed. Credit Suisse didn't fail because of lack of capital or lack of liquidity per se, but it failed because partially, I would say, the loss of trust and confidence, the lack of underlying profitability, and that created a self-fulfilling problem.

就資本要求而言，是的。嗯，我的意思是我只能說——觀看和聆聽不同國際和國內專家圍繞資本話題以及瑞士信貸為何失敗的公開言論。瑞士信貸並不是因為缺乏資本或流動性本身而失敗，但我想說，它失敗的部分原因是信任和信心的喪失，缺乏潛在的盈利能力，這造成了一個自我實現的問題。

I think if you look at regulation, the regulation was well applied and fully functional for UBS. So the same regulation should have worked for Credit Suisse. I do think that I'm pretty convinced that any authorities and governments before taking actions on capital, they will also have to sit down and look at what happened, like the commission that is investigating on the matter is doing. And everybody will have to pose and think about what they could have done better, being a little bit more self-critical about what happened.

我認為，如果你看看監管，你會發現該監管對瑞銀來說應用得很好且功能齊全。因此，同樣的規定也應該適用於瑞士信貸。我確實認為，我非常確信，任何當局和政府在對資本採取行動之前，都必須坐下來看看發生了什麼，就像正在調查此事的委員會正在做的那樣。每個人都必須擺出姿勢並思考他們可以做得更好的地方，對所發生的事情進行更多的自我批評。

So I believe the current regime and no experts is saying that more capital is necessary. So I'm not going to give you an answer on my rating of confidence because there is only downside on that. But I can only tell you that fact or telling us a crystal-clear story. That capital is not the way to manage such a situation.

所以我相信目前的政權和專家都沒有說需要更多的資本。所以我不會給你關於我的信心評級的答案，因為這只有缺點。但我只能告訴你這個事實，或是告訴我們一個清晰的故事。這種資本並不是應對這種情況的方法。

And now moving on to Adam Terelak, who's calling in from Mediobanca.

現在請來 Adam Terelak，他從 Mediobanca 打電話來。

I've got 3 on capital, one of which is a clarification. And I wanted to dig into Slide 36, the $15 billion of balance sheet optimization, clearly, it's talking about net of growth as well. So can we get a feeling for what the underlying moving parts are because it's clearly 2 go in different directions and whether there's any kind of regulatory securitization type benefit to think about, so non-revenue costing RWA efficiencies to think about on the forward look?

我有 3 個關於資本的內容，其中之一是澄清。我想深入研究幻燈片 36，即 150 億美元的資產負債表優化，顯然，它也討論了淨增長。那麼，我們能否了解潛在的活動部分是什麼，因為這顯然是兩個不同的方向，以及是否有任何類型的監管證券化類型的好處需要考慮，因此在前瞻性方面需要考慮非收入成本的RWA 效率？

And then linked to that, clearly, the lower RWA outlook has created a lot of flexibility in your plan. But how do you guys think about redeploying your balance sheet if there are profitable growth opportunities, particularly given that your stock is trading above tangible book or CET1? And then just a clarification on the AT1 build-out, it is increasing to 18% by 2029, but I think you referenced 2026 as well in terms of that Tier 1 capital requirements. So if you could just give us color on the AT1 build-out timeline would be very helpful?

與此相關的是，顯然，較低的 RWA 前景為您的計劃創造了巨大的靈活性。但是，如果存在獲利成長機會，特別是考慮到您的股票交易價格高於有形帳面或 CET1，您如何考慮重新部署您的資產負債表？然後只是對 AT1 擴建進行澄清，到 2029 年它將增加到 18%，但我認為您在一級資本要求方面也提到了 2026 年。那麼如果您能為我們提供有關 AT1 建置時間表的資訊會非常有幫助嗎？

So let me -- thanks for that, Adam. Let me just cover the last 1 is 2029 because that's the -- that is how we've modeled and also just given the way the -- our expectations are on the too big to fail requirements coming in impacting on going concern capital out till 2030. So that is the correct read.

所以讓我——謝謝你，亞當。讓我簡單介紹一下最後一個是 2029 年，因為這就是我們建模的方式，也是我們的預期，即太大而不能失敗的要求將影響到 2030 年的持續經營資本. 所以這是正確的讀法。

In terms of the first question on Slide 36, so the 5, 10 effectively where we think we get to, of course, is net of growth. So there is growth that is priced in. So the fact that we have, say, balance sheet optimization in the core businesses, we say net of growth. So this is trade-offs that we're making. And look, we've done this before, and it's taking the balance sheet in areas where there are opportunities to generate greater returns on RWA. That's the work that we're doing. And obviously, where there are opportunities to grow, especially to start to begin to harvest the combination and the scale that we have, clearly, that will be the case.

就投影片 36 上的第一個問題而言，我們認為實際上達到的 5、10 當然是淨成長。因此，成長已被定價。事實上，我們在核心業務中進行了資產負債表優化，我們說的是淨成長。所以這是我們正在做出的權衡。看，我們以前已經這樣做過，並且正在將資產負債表納入有機會產生更大 RWA 回報的領域。這就是我們正在做的工作。顯然，只要有成長機會，特別是開始收穫我們所擁有的組合和規模，顯然，情況就會如此。

Yes. I guess, a 5% return on risk-weighted assets is not acceptable, right? So I think that's the reason I'm saying it makes no sense for us to try to overly impress anybody with growth on the top line if this is just destroying value or not sustainable. So we are willing to take a step back in terms of growth. But still, in some areas, are we going to grow. Now it's very important to understand the restructuring element up until the end of 2026, Afterwards, we will grow, of course, we will grow. So we are not a restructuring story. We will grow again because our business will grow. But from a base that I believe is going to be much more reliable and sustainable.

是的。我想，風險加權資產5%的報酬率是不能接受的，對吧？因此，我認為這就是我說的原因，如果這只是破壞價值或不可持續，那麼我們試圖以營收成長過度給任何人留下深刻印像是沒有意義的。因此，我們願意在成長方面退一步。但在某些領域，我們仍然會成長。現在了解 2026 年底之前的重整要素非常重要，之後我們會成長，當然，我們會成長。所以我們不是一個重組故事。我們將再次成長，因為我們的業務將會成長。但我相信這個基礎會更可靠、更永續。

Can I follow up in terms of what volume of RWA are sitting below kind of your aspiration in terms of RO, RWA, just trying to size the opportunity in terms of recycling your risk weights into high-growth?

我可以跟進 RWA 的數量低於您在 RO、RWA 方面的願望嗎？只是試圖確定將風險權重轉化為高增長的機會大小？

Well, you look at the balance sheet of Credit Suisse that we onboarded as revenues on risk-weighted assets of 5% on average in 2022. Now we are already taking actions, but this is the volume you have to think about. So we were perfectly happy with the return profiles of our wealth management and IB and Swiss Bank operations. So we need to now bring it back. And I think it's very important that it's all about giving clear directions to our people.

好吧，你看看瑞士信貸的資產負債表，我們在 2022 年加入的風險加權資產平均收入為 5%。現在我們已經在採取行動，但這是你必須考慮的數量。因此，我們對財富管理、IB 和瑞士銀行業務的回報狀況感到非常滿意。所以我們現在需要把它帶回來。我認為為我們的員工提供明確的方向非常重要。

Our new colleagues from Credit Suisse fully understand that. They are now following what they believe also is the best way to create value for clients, for shareholders but also for clients because we want to be predictable. We want to be a partner that is there. And where the relationship allows us to tell what are our expectations and what is the client expectations and that will need to be addressed. And we now have a clear aligned way of looking at how to develop and grow the business.

我們瑞士信貸的新同事完全理解這一點。他們現在遵循他們認為為客戶、股東和客戶創造價值的最佳方式，因為我們希望是可預測的。我們希望成為那裡的合作夥伴。這種關係使我們能夠了解我們的期望是什麼，客戶的期望是什麼以及需要解決的問題。我們現在有一個明確一致的方式來考慮如何發展和發展業務。

And moving on to Ben Goy, who's joining us from Deutsche Bank.

接下來是來自德意志銀行加入我們的 Ben Goy。

Two questions, please, one on Global Wealth Management, one on the Investment Bank. Maybe you can add a bit more color on the $100 billion net new asset run rate, it should rise to $200 billion per year by '28. So just wondering how much is reduced impact from business exits or kind of risk appetite that financial adviser leaving? And then how much is to say, acceleration of the platform of a unified platform? And then secondly, it sounds like the Credit Suisse Bank as you onboarded pretty low revenue so far. It's picking up the next 1 to 2 years. I was just wondering because you mentioned for the market position that it will be transferred end of Q1, you also feel that in Sales & Trading, the Credit Suisse colleagues you onboarded have been under-earning and whether they would see an acceleration this year?

請提兩個問題，一是關於全球財富管理，一是關於投資銀行。也許你可以為 1000 億美元的淨新資產運行率添加更多色彩，到 28 年它應該會升至每年 2000 億美元。那麼，只是想知道業務退出或財務顧問離開的風險偏好所帶來的影響有多大？那麼統一平台的平台加速是多少呢？其次，這聽起來像瑞士信貸銀行，因為到目前為止您的收入相當低。未來 1 到 2 年將會回升。我只是想知道，因為您提到市場地位將在第一季末轉移，您還覺得在銷售和交易方面，您入職的瑞信同事收入一直不足，今年是否會出現加速？

Ben. So in terms of the run rate of net new assets from $100 billion, I would say, as Sergio just highlighted in response to the last question, for sure, will grow when the -- once we feel like the balance sheet is in a better spot. We think that, that will build quickly in terms of us focusing on growth. So the bridge to $200 billion wall, we're not disclosing specifically what we think the numbers are, you can expect that certainly in 2026, we should start to see that come up pretty significantly and then build to $200 billion by '28. So I would say it's not necessarily just a linear straight line. We should see a bit of an acceleration early on in 2026, but I think there's some hard yards that we have modeled in to get to the $200 billion in the latter part of that 5-year cycle.

本.因此，就 1000 億美元起的淨新資產運行率而言，我想說，正如 Sergio 在回答最後一個問題時強調的那樣，當我們感覺資產負債表狀況更好時，肯定會增長。點。我們認為，如果我們專注於成長，這將很快建立起來。因此，在通往2000 億美元牆的橋樑上，我們不會具體披露我們認為的數字，您可以預期，當然在2026 年，我們應該開始看到這一數字顯著上升，然後到28 年增至2000 億美元。所以我想說它不一定只是一條直線。我們應該會在 2026 年初看到一些加速，但我認為我們已經建模了一些硬碼，以便在 5 年周期的後半部分達到 2000 億美元。

In terms of IB productivity on the market side. I mean one of the key points that I highlighted was actually onboarding on the market side, fully onboarding not only the traders, but their positions, which is now -- it's been a 4Q, but really, it's an intense piece of work in 1Q where we expect the majority of the positions that are going to be onboarded on UBS infrastructure. Once that happens, we think that the markets personnel should be able to start generating appropriate revenues. Yes, there's a ramp, but it's not the same as in -- on the banking side where that productivity is going to take a longer ramp as you might appreciate it. But we should see, and we expect that we'll see better productivity pretty quickly once the positions are onboarded on to the UBS infrastructure.

就市場端的IB生產力而言。我的意思是，我強調的關鍵點之一實際上是市場方面的入職，不僅是交易員的全面入職，還有他們的頭寸，現在已經是第四季度了，但實際上，這是第一季度的一項緊張工作我們預計大部分職位將在瑞銀基礎設施上任職。一旦發生這種情況，我們認為市場人員應該能夠開始產生適當的收入。是的，確實有一個斜坡，但它與銀行業方面的情況不同，銀行業的生產力將需要更長的斜坡，正如你可能會欣賞的那樣。但我們應該看到，我們預計，一旦這些職位被納入瑞銀基礎設施，我們很快就會看到更好的生產力。

And our next caller is Tom Hallett from KBW.

我們的下一個來電者是 KBW 的 Tom Hallett。

So most of my questions have been answered, but just maybe going back to NII. You said it will grow again in the second half of the planning period. Am I right in just assuming that's the second half of 2025, so i.e., kind of NII should decline through to early 2025? And then secondly, one of your peers in the U.S. said the deposit mix changes were kind of ending. Is that what you're seeing as well? And could you maybe just clarify the wider international business, what's going on in the deposit mix changes there or what you expect going forward?

我的大部分問題都已得到解答，但也許還是要回到 NII。你說規劃期下半年會再成長。我假設那是 2025 年下半年，也就是說 NII 應該會降到 2025 年初，對嗎？其次，一位美國同行表示，存款組合的變化即將結束。這也是你所看到的嗎？您能否澄清一下更廣泛的國際業務，那裡的存款組合發生了什麼變化，或者您對未來的期望是什麼？

Sure. Tom. So in terms of NII, yes, we see the recovery coming from more mid-2025. So that's correct, that's the right read. So again, just given how we're pricing in rate reductions, whether they come, I think, as you know, the different views, but whether they come over 12 months or 18 months. So we're running our models, but we definitely have rate reductions before we see stability into '25 for sure. And then that stability then corresponds as well with what we think would be a pickup in loan volumes and loan revenues overall. On top of, of course, the funding efficiencies that I talked about at length during my comments that really start to accelerate the recovery in NII in the latter part of the -- or the second half effectively of the 3-year planning cycle.

當然。湯姆.因此，就 NII 而言，是的，我們預計 2025 年中期會出現復甦。所以這是正確的，這是正確的閱讀。再說一次，考慮到我們如何定價降息，我認為，如你所知，降息是否會出現，有不同的觀點，但降息是否會持續 12 個月還是 18 個月。因此，我們正在運行我們的模型，但在我們肯定會看到 25 年穩定之前，我們肯定會降低利率。這種穩定性也與我們認為的貸款量和整體貸款收入的增加相一致。當然，除此之外，我在評論中詳細談到的融資效率確實開始加速國家資訊基礎設施的復甦，即在三年規劃週期的後半段——實際上是後半段。

In terms of deposit mix effects, absolutely. We've seen a tapering in the U.S. We started seeing that even last quarter, even in 3Q. We're seeing that continue to taper, still seeing a little bit of that, though, where there's spillover in higher rates in some of the non-U.S. dollar currencies, in particular, in Switzerland. So we're still seeing a bit of deposit mix shifts but we sort of price them more or less out of our outlook once we get beyond 1Q.

就存款組合效應而言，絕對是如此。我們已經看到美國的消費量逐漸減少。甚至在上個季度，甚至在第三季度，我們就開始看到這種情況。我們看到利率繼續縮減，但仍然看到了一點，一些非美元貨幣（尤其是瑞士）的利率上升產生了外溢效應。因此，我們仍然看到存款組合發生了一些變化，但一旦超過第一季度，我們對它們的定價或多或少超出了我們的預期。

And in terms of how that looks, across, I think, the U.S. We're now -- we've seen stability first time since 4Q '21 that we've had net deposit inflows. So that's good. In APAC, we've actually seen some good deposit inflows also not least just given win-backs. So there's that impact as well. And in Switzerland, we're seeing a bit of a slightly downward move in terms of deposit inflows. So just to give you a sense of sort of the deposit volume as I see it across the spectrum.

就情況而言，我認為，美國現在自 21 年第四季以來首次看到存款淨流入穩定。所以這樣很好。在亞太地區，我們實際上看到了一些良好的存款流入，而且不僅僅是贏回。所以也有這種影響。在瑞士，我們看到存款流入略有下降。所以只是為了讓您了解我在整個範圍內看到的存款量。

And our next caller is Andrew Lim from Societe Generale.

我們的下一個來電者是來自法國興業銀行的 Andrew Lim。

So the first one on capital. Maybe trying to square your RWA guidance with how you feel about buybacks. So looking at that equation, that 5, 10 on RWAs obviously quite low versus consensus. But if we take consensus capital let's say, $80 billion, $81 billion, then you're looking at about 15.8% CET1 ratio. So we will to the conclusion there as your buyback potential is quite a lot higher than what you've indicated or maybe your expectation for CET1 capital is maybe materially lower than $81 billion. So I just wanted to see how you feel about that?

所以第一個是關於資本的。也許嘗試將您的 RWA 指導與您對回購的感受結合。因此，從這個等式來看，RWA 的 5,10 與共識相比顯然相當低。但如果我們採用共識資本，比如說 800 億美元、810 億美元，那麼你會看到大約 15.8% 的 CET1 比率。因此，我們將得出結論，因為您的回購潛力比您所表示的要高得多，或者您對 CET1 資本的預期可能大大低於 810 億美元。所以我只是想看看你對此有何感想？

And then the second question is on the NII guidance that you've given. Obviously, we draw down into the deposit mix shift. But (inaudible) from one of your competitors are also one of the big drivers there has been deleveraging of loans? And I wanted to see if that was actually a big driver for yourselves as well. and how this has impacted your thoughts on NII for this year and going forward?

第二個問題是關於您提供的 NII 指導。顯然，我們會降低存款組合的轉變。但是（聽不清楚）您的競爭對手之一也是貸款去槓桿化的主要推動者之一？我想看看這是否真的是你們自己的一大推手。這對您今年和未來對 NII 的看法有何影響？

So I'll take -- on the second one, no, we're not seeing I mean we've had some deleveraging that we've highlighted in prior quarters, but we're not seeing that as a major factor in our guidance at this point other than around the impacts from the resource optimization that I've highlighted. But in particular, around Lombard, deleveraging, we're not pricing that to any significant degree into our guidance. I was just trying to pick up on your first point, where you were -- sorry, you were trying to square where the RWA levels are in terms of how that informs the way you want to think about share buybacks. I just want to understand your point. If you can repeat that.

所以我會認為——關於第二個，不，我們沒有看到我的意思是我們已經在前幾個季度強調了一些去槓桿化，但我們並不認為這是我們指導中的一個主要因素在這一點上，除了我強調的資源優化的影響之外。但特別是在倫巴第地區，去槓桿化方面，我們並沒有在很大程度上將其納入我們的指導中。我只是想回答你的第一點，抱歉，你試圖將 RWA 水平與你如何考慮股票回購的方式平方。我只是想了解你的觀點。如果你能重複的話。

Yes. So let's say, we're taking the consensus of $81 billion CET1 capital. You've indicated on Slide 10 on RWA. So that would be 15.9% CET1 ratio. So actually, there's quite a lot of buffer maybe $5 billion or so above $5.5 billion buybacks that you might be pointing forward from 2026. So there's either a lot more capacity for you to actually push up your buybacks there or maybe you're thinking that CET1 capital might be a bit lower than what consensus thinks. So I just want to see what you think about it?

是的。假設我們一致同意 CET1 資本為 810 億美元。您已在投影片 10 中指出了 RWA。因此，CET1 比率為 15.9%。所以實際上，從2026 年開始，你可能會指出，在55 億美元的回購之上，可能還有50 億美元左右的緩衝空間。因此，要嘛你有更多的能力來實際推動你的回購，要嘛你可能認為CET1 資本可能比一般認為的要低。所以我只是想看看你對此有何看法？

Yes, I think -- okay, clear. So yes, I think in terms of your CET1 capital calculations, I'm not sure that squares with how we've -- we model under 1 baseline scenario. But I think it's fair to say that if we generate as we go out to 2026, the extent to which we're able to generate the returns that we expect to generate at the end of 2026 that there will be sufficient capacity. As Sergio said, to be able to undertake as much share buybacks as we had, in fact, more so than pre-acquisition levels. So I think I won't comment specifically on whether your CET1 number is the same number we consider under one scenario, but I think it's fair to say that there is share buyback capacity naturally if we hit these targets that we set out.

是的，我想——好吧，清楚了。所以，是的，我認為就您的 CET1 資本計算而言，我不確定這是否與我們在 1 個基準情境下建模的方式相符。但我認為可以公平地說，如果我們到 2026 年能夠產生預期在 2026 年底產生的回報，那麼我們將有足夠的產能。正如塞爾吉奧所說，能夠進行盡可能多的股票回購，事實上，比收購前的水平還要多。所以我想我不會具體評論你的CET1數字是否與我們在一種情況下考慮的數字相同，但我認為可以公平地說，如果我們達到我們設定的這些目標，自然就會有股票回購能力。

And now moving on to Nicolas Payen from Kepler Cheuvreux.

現在轉向來自 Kepler Cheuvreux 的 Nicolas Payen。

I have 2 questions, please, 2 on Wealth Management. The first one would be on your pretax profit margin targets in the U.S. You're targeting mid-teens by 2026 and it's still significantly below what your U.S. peers are doing. So I wanted to know what kind of levers you can pull to have this convergence towards the profitability level that we are seeing at the U.S. peers? And the second one will be on the net inflow that you're targeting. Is there any geographies where you see the most potential or where you are the most excited about where you -- where the CS merger is bringing new capabilities and new outlook?

我有 2 個問題，其中 2 個是關於財富管理的。第一個是您在美國的稅前利潤率目標。您的目標是到 2026 年達到十幾歲左右，但它仍然大大低於美國同行的水平。所以我想知道可以利用什麼樣的槓桿來實現我們在美國同業中看到的獲利水準的趨同？第二個是您目標的淨流入。您認為哪些地區最具潛力，或者您對 CS 合併帶來新功能和新前景感到最興奮？

Yes. Thanks, Nicolas. So on the -- look, on the pretax profit, as we laid out, I think Sergio in his prepared comments and mine in response to a question earlier, we're building back to mid-teens through the work that we've described, which we think is quite important. At that point in time, getting to what we think is an appropriate level given where we are now. Then at that stage, we have options to consider beyond that to narrow the gap further. And that's certainly the plan. So it's a little bit of a walk before we run and we wanted to just be clear that we -- the things that we think that need to happen in the U.S. business that we're going to do over the next 3 years will set us up for success and being able to sort of then at that stage, drive greater returns and narrow the gap further beyond 2026.

是的。謝謝，尼古拉斯。因此，就稅前利潤而言，正如我們所闡述的那樣，我認為塞爾吉奧在他準備好的評論中和我在回答之前回答的問題中，我們正在通過我們所描述的工作回到十幾歲左右的水平，我們認為這一點非常重要。到那時，考慮到我們現在所處的位置，達到我們認為合適的水平。然後在那個階段，我們可以考慮進一步縮小差距的選擇。這當然就是計劃。因此，在我們跑步之前，我們需要先走一段路，我們想明確的是，我們認為美國業務需要在未來 3 年內做的事情將使我們為成功做好準備，並能夠在那個階段取得更大的回報，並在2026 年後進一步縮小差距。

In terms of the geographies in GWM that we're excited about, I mean, just off the top, and I've talked about this before, but certainly, places where we become really meaningful. We're excited about many places that the CS integration brings to bear on wealth. But what comes to minor places where meaningfully change is what we had in the particular region, just given maybe a focus on different client segment. Maybe we exited. So 2 examples come to mind would be Brazil, more on the former in terms of the client segment we focused on. Another is Australia, where we exited, again, more of an affluent practice that we had many years ago, and we have an opportunity now to inherit a business in Australia, aligned by the way, with the IB in Australia, which is quite exciting. And that business is more the high net worth and the ultra that is our bread and butter. So 2 examples where -- and for different reasons of what excites us in terms of the acquisition.

就長城汽車的地理位置而言，我們感到興奮，我的意思是，就在頂部，我之前已經討論過這一點，但當然，我們變得真正有意義的地方。我們對 CS 整合在許多方面對財富產生影響感到興奮。但是，我們在特定地區所做的有意義的改變是在較小的地方發生的，只是考慮到可能關注不同的客戶群。也許我們退出了。因此，我想到的兩個例子是巴西，就我們關注的客戶群而言，更多的是前者。另一個是澳大利亞，我們再次退出了多年前的富裕實踐，現在我們有機會繼承澳大利亞的業務，順便說一句，與澳大利亞的IB保持一致，這是相當令人興奮的。業務更多的是高淨值和超高淨值，這是我們的麵包和黃油。兩個例子——以及出於不同的原因，讓我們對收購感到興奮。

And our final caller is Piers Brown from HSBC.

我們的最後一位來電者是來自匯豐銀行的皮爾斯·布朗(Piers Brown)。

Most of my questions have been answered. But maybe just a final one on litigation. Just whether there's anything in the plan for sort of a business as usual normalized charge for litigation? I know you've taken a lot of adjustments on CS acquisition, you got $4 billion of balance sheet reserves at this stage. But having had a good chance to look at the case book at this point? Is there anything in there which you think might still burden the P&L over the course of the targets that you've made out this morning?

我的大部分問題都得到了解答。但也許只是關於訴訟的最後一項。只是計劃中是否有任何與往常一樣的標準化訴訟費用的計劃？我知道你們在收購CS方面做了很多調整，現階段你們有40億美元的資產負債表準備金。但此時有很好的機會查看案例書嗎？您認為在實現今天早上設定的目標過程中，是否有任何內容可能仍會對損益表造成負擔？

Yes. I mean, just refer you to the litigation note, which gives both the UBS heritage and Credit Suisse heritage legacies there, say that's the best bet. Otherwise, I'd just tell you that our provision levels augmented by the PPA that I described in August, we're comfortable with the levels we're at, just given the where those matters sit, but that's all I would comment in terms of litigation at this stage.

是的。我的意思是，請您參閱訴訟說明，其中提供了瑞銀遺產和瑞士信貸遺產，這是最好的選擇。否則，我只想告訴你，我在八月份描述的購電協議增強了我們的供應水平，考慮到這些問題所在，我們對目前的水平感到滿意，但這就是我要評論的全部內容現階段的訴訟。

Thank you. And there are no more questions. So it just leaves it for me to hand back to Sergio for final remarks.

謝謝。沒有更多問題了。因此，我只能將最後的評論交還給塞爾吉奧。

Well, it will be very short. I won't abuse of your patience. You have been with us. Thank you for 2 hours plus. Thanks for the questions. Thanks for attending. I hope you got enough information. But most importantly, if you have any further needs or any further questions, please reach out to Sarah's team IR or I'm sure between myself and Todd, we'd have a chance to catch up with many of you in the next few weeks.

嗯，時間會很短。我不會濫用你的耐心。你一直和我們在一起。謝謝你2個多小時。感謝您的提問。感謝您的參加。我希望你得到足夠的資訊。但最重要的是，如果您有任何進一步的需求或任何其他問題，請聯繫Sarah 的團隊IR，或者我確信我和托德之間，我們有機會在接下來的幾週內與你們中的許多人聯繫。

Thank you for attending, and enjoy the rest of the day. Thank you.

感謝您的出席，祝您有個愉快的一天。謝謝。