UBS Group AG (UBS) 2023 Q2 法說會逐字稿

Ladies and gentlemen, good morning. Welcome to the UBS Second Quarter 2023 Results Presentation. (Operator Instructions) At this time, it's my pleasure to hand over to Sarah Mackey, UBS Investor Relations. Please go ahead, madam.

女士們、先生們，早上好。歡迎來到瑞銀 2023 年第二季度業績發布會。 （操作員說明） 現在，我很高興將工作移交給瑞銀投資者關係部門的 Sarah Mackey。請繼續，女士。

Good morning, and welcome, everyone. Before we start, I would like to draw your attention to our cautionary statement slide at the back of today's results presentation. Please also refer to the risk factors filed with our group results today together with additional disclosures in our SEC filings.

早上好，歡迎大家。在我們開始之前，我想提請您注意今天結果演示文稿後面的警告聲明幻燈片。另請參閱今天與我們的集團業績一起提交的風險因素以及我們向 SEC 文件中披露的其他信息。

On Slide 2, you can see our agenda for today. It's now my pleasure to hand over to Sergio Ermotti, Group CEO.

在幻燈片 2 上，您可以看到我們今天的議程。現在我很高興將工作交給集團首席執行官塞爾吉奧·埃爾莫蒂 (Sergio Ermotti)。

Thank you, Sarah, and good morning, everyone. I hope you had a relaxing summer break. For us, the past 8 weeks were intense as we were busy writing the next chapter of UBS' history. This is the first-ever acquisition involving 2 global systemically important banks. It was announced only 5 months ago, and we closed it less than 100 days ago. This would not have been possible without the extraordinary effort and dedication from my colleagues across both organizations.

謝謝莎拉，大家早上好。我希望你度過了一個輕鬆的暑假。對於我們來說，過去的 8 周非常緊張，因為我們正忙於書寫瑞銀歷史的下一個篇章。這是有史以來首次涉及兩家全球系統重要性銀行的收購。它是在 5 個月前宣布的，而我們在不到 100 天前就關閉了它。如果沒有兩個組織的同事們的非凡努力和奉獻精神，這是不可能實現的。

It also required extensive cooperation from the Swiss government and regulators in Switzerland and around the world. We are swiftly executing on our integration plans, already achieving a number of important milestones. We established a target operating model, created a dedicated integration office and rolled out responsibilities with management appointments up to 3 levels below the group Executive Board, just to name a few.

它還需要瑞士政府以及瑞士和世界各地監管機構的廣泛合作。我們正在迅速執行我們的整合計劃，已經實現了許多重要的里程碑。我們建立了目標運營模式，創建了專門的整合辦公室，並任命了集團執行董事會以下最多 3 級的管理人員，等等。

We are also making progress on our cost savings and derisking plans and resolving some legacy matters for both firms. Following a detailed analysis, we determinated and ended back -- we terminated and handed back all Swiss government support a few weeks ago. Lastly, we decided to fully integrate the Swiss business of Credit Suisse after a thorough strategic review.

我們還在成本節約和降低風險計劃方面取得進展，並解決了兩家公司的一些遺留問題。經過詳細分析，我們決定並結束了——幾週前我們終止並歸還了所有瑞士政府的支持。最後，經過徹底的戰略評估，我們決定全面整合瑞士信貸的瑞士業務。

The thing I'm proudest about is that clients have rewarded our unwavering commitment with extended trust. Thanks to their restored belief in the combined firm, we were able to swiftly stabilize the Credit Suisse score, its wealth, Asset Management and Swiss Bank franchises. We are happy to see markets recognizing our ongoing work.

最令我自豪的是，客戶以長期的信任回報了我們堅定不移的承諾。由於他們恢復了對合併後公司的信心，我們能夠迅速穩定瑞士信貸的評分、財富、資產管理和瑞士銀行的特許經營權。我們很高興看到市場認可我們正在進行的工作。

Our strategy is unchanged, and the Credit Suisse acquisition will act as an accelerant to our plans. We will strengthen our position as the only truly global wealth manager and as the leading Swiss universal bank with scaled-up Asset Management and a focused Investment Bank. With a highly complementary footprint, we will reinforce our position in key growth markets, including the Americas and APAC, and build on our leadership in Switzerland and EMEA.

我們的戰略沒有改變，收購瑞士信貸將加速我們的計劃。我們將通過擴大資產管理和專注的投資銀行，鞏固我們作為唯一真正的全球財富管理公司和領先的瑞士全能銀行的地位。憑藉高度互補的足跡，我們將鞏固我們在美洲和亞太地區等關鍵增長市場的地位，並鞏固我們在瑞士和歐洲、中東和非洲的領導地位。

We will relentlessly focus on clients and continuously improve and expand our services and products. With $5.5 trillion in assets across the combined firm, the transaction adds scale that will lead to increased efficiencies. This will allow us to better focus our resources and target investments that provide superior level of client service. We will achieve our strategy while remaining disciplined in our resource management across the entire firm.

我們將堅持不懈地以客戶為中心，不斷改進和拓展我們的服務和產品。合併後公司的資產達 5.5 萬億美元，此次交易擴大了規模，從而提高了效率。這將使我們能夠更好地集中資源和目標投資，提供卓越水平的客戶服務。我們將實現我們的戰略，同時在整個公司的資源管理中保持紀律。

The IB consuming no more than 25% of the group's risk-weighted assets and the round-down of the Non-core and Legacy Portfolio are just 2 of the more visible examples of our approach. In essence, we will repeat what this bank successfully accomplished during the last decade. Before I discuss the Swiss Bank decision, let me give you a brief overview of our assessment of Credit Suisse as of March 19. Since then, and especially after we closed the acquisition in June, we conducted an in-depth analysis that has only confirmed the necessity of the decisive actions taken over that weekend.

IB 消耗的集團風險加權資產不超過 25%，以及非核心和遺留投資組合的捨入只是我們方法中兩個更明顯的例子。本質上，我們將重複這家銀行在過去十年中成功取得的成就。在討論瑞士銀行的決定之前，讓我簡要概述一下截至3 月19 日我們對瑞信的評估。從那時起，特別是在我們於6 月份完成收購之後，我們進行了深入分析，結果僅證實了這一點：那個週末採取果斷行動的必要性。

It was not just a matter of liquidity drying up. Credit Suisse's business model and business mix was deeply flawed and its reputation severely damaged. With this structural lack of underlying profitability, unsustainable capital allocation and negative revenue and cost prospects, the bank was no longer in a position to continue on its own. This is clearly visible from the year-to-date losses Credit Suisse reported today, a culmination of the bank's 2 loss-making years.

這不僅僅是流動性枯竭的問題。瑞士信貸的商業模式和業務組合存在嚴重缺陷，其聲譽受到嚴重損害。由於結構性缺乏潛在盈利能力、不可持續的資本配置以及負面的收入和成本前景，該銀行不再能夠繼續依靠自身力量。從瑞士信貸今天公佈的年初至今的虧損中可以清楚地看出這一點，這是該銀行連續兩年虧損的頂峰。

Thanks to our financial and balance sheet strength, UBS was in a position to answer a rescue call from the Swiss government, helping to stabilize the financial system. Importantly, the transaction preserves the best of Credit Suisse's excellent client relationships, people and industry-leading products that in other plausible scenarios would have been weakened or lost.

憑藉我們的財務和資產負債表實力，瑞銀能夠響應瑞士政府的救援號召，幫助穩定金融體系。重要的是，此次交易保留了瑞士信貸最好的優秀客戶關係、人員和行業領先的產品，而這些在其他可能的情況下可能會被削弱或丟失。

Unlocking Credit Suisse's strength as part of UBS will allow us to build something of a more enduring value for all stakeholders. This combination will reinforce our status as a premier global franchise, one that our own market, Switzerland, can be proud of. We are humbled by this task and the responsibility entrusted to us. But let me make one thing absolutely clear. Our ability to stabilize Credit Suisse and return the government guarantees in a timely fashion should not take away from the gravity of the situation we inherited, nor should it diminish the scope and scale of the task ahead.

作為瑞銀的一部分，釋放瑞士信貸的實力將使我們能夠為所有利益相關者創造更持久的價值。這一合併將鞏固我們作為全球首屈一指的特許經營商的地位，我們自己的市場瑞士也可以為此感到自豪。我們對這項任務和賦予我們的責任感到謙卑。但讓我絕對明確一件事。我們穩定瑞信並及時歸還政府擔保的能力不應減輕我們繼承的局勢的嚴重性，也不應縮小未來任務的範圍和規模。

So that being said, let me walk you through how we come to our decision on the future of Credit Suisse Schweiz. As I promised when I returned as a CEO a few months ago, the decision would be driven by facts, not emotion, and mindful of the extraordinary circumstances of the transaction. We conducted an extremely thorough review involving teams comprised of some of the best people across both firms with support from external experts, where needed.

話雖這麼說，讓我向您介紹一下我們如何就瑞信瑞士的未來做出決定。正如我幾個月前重返首席執行官崗位時所承諾的那樣，決策將基於事實而非情感，並考慮到交易的特殊情況。我們進行了極其徹底的審查，團隊由兩家公司的一些最優秀的人才組成，並在需要時得到外部專家的支持。

Our analysis focused on 4 key aspects that, for us, would determine the long-term viability of the business. We examined what the decision would entail for our clients, shareholders and employees. And we gave special consideration to financial and funding sustainability. We started with a broad spectrum of possibilities ranging from IPO, sale, partial or full integration to a spin-off and even a dual-brand strategy. Eventually, based on our criteria, we narrowed down our selection to the 2 best options: a full integration; or a spin-off of a focused perimeter, which would exclude segments requiring global capabilities.

我們的分析集中在 4 個關鍵方面，對我們來說，這些方面將決定業務的長期生存能力。我們研究了這一決定會給我們的客戶、股東和員工帶來什麼影響。我們特別考慮了財務和資金的可持續性。我們從廣泛的可能性開始，從首次公開募股、出售、部分或全部整合到分拆，甚至雙品牌戰略。最終，根據我們的標準，我們將選擇範圍縮小到兩個最佳選項：完全集成；或者是一個集中邊界的分拆，這將排除需要全球能力的部分。

The final outcome was crystal clear: full integration is by far the best choice. It is not just that the financial merits of integration are greater, it is also the best way forward for our clients for whom the industry-leading offering will improve and broaden as we combine products and capabilities from both firms. The alternative would have been a bleak one, considering the current situation, combined with the necessity to carve out most of its global capabilities. Even a more focused spin-off of Credit Suisse Schweiz would fail to meet the needs of many of its corporate clients, as well as the entrepreneurs, it considers core.

最終的結果非常明確：全面整合是迄今為止最好的選擇。整合不僅可以帶來更大的財務效益，而且對於我們的客戶來說，這也是前進的最佳途徑，隨著我們結合兩家公司的產品和能力，行業領先的產品將得到改善和擴大。考慮到目前的形勢，再加上需要發揮其大部分全球能力，另一種選擇將是黯淡的。即使瑞士信貸瑞士分拆的業務更加集中，也無法滿足其許多企業客戶以及它認為核心的企業家的需求。

At the same time, separation from the group would entail a costly, risky and lengthy carve-out of technology platforms, causing uncertainty for clients and employees for years to come. Moreover, our analysis revealed a substantial dependency of the Swiss subsidiary on financial resources and operational support from the parent. As a result, it would have existed as a fragile entity, struggling to close its funding gap, unable to compete effectively and failing to deliver sustainable returns. We believe this would not have been an acceptable proposition for clients, employees and very likely, regulators.

與此同時，從該集團分離將需要代價高昂、風險巨大且漫長的技術平台剝離，給客戶和員工帶來未來幾年的不確定性。此外，我們的分析顯示，瑞士子公司嚴重依賴母公司的財務資源和運營支持。因此，它將作為一個脆弱的實體而存在，努力縮小資金缺口，無法有效競爭，也無法提供可持續的回報。我們認為，對於客戶、員工以及很可能的監管機構來說，這不是一個可以接受的提議。

By contrast, being a part of UBS ensure it will have continuous banking from one of the most stable and trusted global financial institutions. The strength of UBS will underpin the franchise and provide access to efficient funding, as demonstrated by our ability to return all extraordinary government and central bank facilities. We take our social responsibilities very seriously. This is why I have repeatedly emphasized the fact that employment-related consideration must be a key decision-making factor in our evaluation.

相比之下，作為瑞銀的一部分，確保其能夠從最穩定、最值得信賴的全球金融機構之一獲得持續的銀行服務。瑞銀的實力將支撐我們的特許經營權，並提供高效的融資渠道，我們有能力返還所有政府和中央銀行的非凡貸款就證明了這一點。我們非常重視我們的社會責任。所以我一再強調，就業考量一定要作為我們考核的一個關鍵決策因素。

We have analyzed their impact in both absolute terms and in relation to the Swiss job market. Every lost job is painful for us. Unfortunately, in this situation, cuts were unavoidable regardless of the selected scenario. We are committed to minimizing the impact on employees by treating them fairly, providing them with financial support, outplacement services and retraining opportunities. Our aim here is to enable those affected to take advantage of a quite healthy Swiss job market, where more open positions in finance are available than there are job seekers.

我們分析了它們對瑞士就業市場的絕對影響和相關影響。每一次失業對我們來說都是痛苦的。不幸的是，在這種情況下，無論選擇何種方案，削減都是不可避免的。我們致力於通過公平對待員工、為他們提供財務支持、再就業服務和再培訓機會，盡量減少對員工的影響。我們的目標是讓受影響的人能夠利用相當健康的瑞士就業市場，那裡的金融領域空缺職位比求職者更多。

Let me emphasize the vast majority of the cost reduction will come from natural attrition, retirement and internal mobility. Around 1,000 redundancies will result from the integration of Credit Suisse Schweiz. This will be spread over a couple of years, starting in late 2024. Importantly, the alternative spin-off scenario -- in the alternative spin-off scenario, restructuring would also have been necessary and resulted in about 600 redundancies. In addition, the necessity to profoundly restructure other parts of Credit Suisse is expected to lead to about 2,000 additional redundancies in Switzerland over the next couple of years.

我要強調的是，絕大多數成本削減將來自自然減員、退休和內部流動。瑞士信貸瑞士銀行的整合將導致約 1,000 名裁員。這將持續幾年，從 2024 年底開始。重要的是，在替代分拆方案中，重組也是必要的，並導致約 600 人裁員。此外，由於需要對瑞信其他部門進行深度重組，預計未來幾年瑞士將再裁員約 2,000 人。

After weighting all the above factors, we come to the view that a full integration is the best way forward. Our decision reinforces our commitment to clients, employees and the Swiss economy. Our goal is to make the integration and the transition for clients as smooth as possible. The 2 Swiss ring-fenced entities will operate separately until their planned legal integration in 2024. Credit Suisse brand and operation will remain separate during that time. We will gradually migrate clients onto our system and expect to finish this process in 2025.

在權衡上述所有因素後，我們認為全面整合是最好的前進方向。我們的決定強化了我們對客戶、員工和瑞士經濟的承諾。我們的目標是使客戶的整合和過渡盡可能順利。這兩家瑞士實體將分別運營，直至計劃於 2024 年進行法律整合。在此期間，瑞士信貸的品牌和運營將保持獨立。我們將逐步將客戶端遷移到我們的系統上，預計在 2025 年完成這一過程。

Given this, nothing will change for clients in the foreseeable future, and they do not have to take any immediate action. We will continue to provide the premier levels of service that they have come to expect. And with the time, they will begin to see the further benefits of the combined franchise. As we're progressing the integration, we remain fully committed to our personal, private, institutional and corporate clients.

鑑於此，在可預見的未來，客戶不會發生任何變化，他們不必立即採取任何行動。我們將繼續提供他們所期望的一流服務水平。隨著時間的推移，他們將開始看到合併後的特許經營權的進一步好處。在我們推進整合的過程中，我們仍然完全致力於為我們的個人、私人、機構和企業客戶提供服務。

In terms of lending, thanks to our even stronger capital base, our intention is to keep the combined exposure unchanged. We are sensitive to the important role both firms play in the lives of our employees and their communities. We want to remain an employer of choice in Switzerland, offering attractive career opportunities.

在貸款方面，由於我們的資本基礎更加強大，我們的目的是保持合併風險敞口不變。我們對兩家公司在我們員工及其社區的生活中發揮的重要作用非常敏感。我們希望繼續成為瑞士的首選雇主，提供有吸引力的職業機會。

Last but not least, as we combine, we will honor all agreed sponsorships of civic, sporting and cultural activities in Switzerland at least until the end of 2025. I have made it abundantly clear to our colleagues that they must not be distracted by the integration. We cannot take our eyes off our vision and must remain focused on client needs. After all, competition in the Swiss market remains robust. The cantonal banks in aggregate will continue to have the highest market shares in all relevant personal and commercial banking products. And our branch network, even after the merger, is the third biggest.

最後但並非最不重要的一點是，當我們合併時，我們將至少在2025 年底之前兌現對瑞士公民、體育和文化活動的所有商定贊助。我已向我們的同事明確表示，他們絕不能因合併而分心。我們不能把目光從我們的願景上移開，必須繼續關注客戶的需求。畢竟，瑞士市場的競爭依然激烈。州級銀行總體上將繼續在所有相關個人和商業銀行產品中擁有最高的市場份額。即使在合併之後，我們的分支機構網絡仍然是第三大。

We welcome the challenge. Competition is what makes all of us better and what makes the Swiss financial system stronger. Now given the events leading up to the acquisition, stabilizing the Credit Suisse client franchises globally has been our most immediate priority. Since closing in June, we have won back clients' confidence, as evidenced by the positive asset flows and strong engagement across Wealth Management and the Swiss business. We saw formidable momentum in deposits with $23 billion in inflows for the quarter, $18 billion of which came into Credit Suisse's Wealth Management and Swiss Bank.

我們歡迎挑戰。競爭使我們所有人變得更好，也使瑞士金融體系更加強大。現在考慮到收購前發生的事件，穩定瑞士信貸在全球的客戶特許經營權一直是我們最緊迫的任務。自 6 月份交割以來，我們重新贏得了客戶的信心，財富管理和瑞士業務的積極資產流動和強有力的參與就證明了這一點。我們看到存款勢頭強勁，本季度流入 230 億美元，其中 180 億美元流入瑞士信貸財富管理和瑞士銀行。

Meanwhile, UBS Wealth Management has delivered the highest second quarter net new money performance in over a decade. We are pleased to share that this positive trend has carried on into July and August. While the quarter is not over yet, so far, we have attracted net new assets of $8 billion for the combined Wealth Management businesses. It is encouraging and rewarding to see the franchise stabilize so quickly. Winning back the more than $200 billion of client assets that left Credit Suisse over the past year won't be easy, but recapturing as much as we can is one of our top priorities.

與此同時，瑞銀財富管理第二季度的淨新資金表現創十多年來最高。我們很高興地告訴大家，這種積極的趨勢一直持續到七月和八月。雖然本季度尚未結束，但到目前為止，我們已為合併後的財富管理業務吸引了 80 億美元的淨新資產。看到球隊如此迅速地穩定下來是令人鼓舞和值得的。贏回去年離開瑞士信貸的超過 2000 億美元的客戶資產並不容易，但盡可能奪回是我們的首要任務之一。

Let's move to assets that have been designated as noncore. First, let me briefly touch on the $9 billion risk-weighted assets that will be included in the combined Investment Bank. These assets were selected through a disciplined process designed to enhance our global banking and derivatives operations. The transferred businesses are expected to be accretive from next year. They will help drive economies of scale while adding only 13% to the Investment Bank's current non-op risk-weighted assets. The remaining $17 billion of Credit Suisse's Investment Bank, as you can see from the chart, will be transferred to the newly formed non-core and legacy units. This will also include Credit Suisse's entire capital release Unit as well as selected assets from the combined Wealth and Asset Management businesses that are not aligned with our risk appetite or strategy.

讓我們轉向被指定為非核心的資產。首先，讓我簡單介紹一下合併後的投資銀行將納入的 90 億美元風險加權資產。這些資產是通過嚴格的流程選擇的，旨在增強我們的全球銀行和衍生品業務。預計轉移的業務將從明年開始增值。它們將有助於推動規模經濟，同時僅使投資銀行當前的非運營風險加權資產增加 13%。從圖表中可以看出，瑞信投資銀行剩餘的 170 億美元將轉移到新成立的非核心和遺留部門。這還包括瑞士信貸的整個資本釋放部門以及來自合併後的財富和資產管理業務的選定資產，這些資產與我們的風險偏好或戰略不符。

Overall, the Non-core Legacy will comprise of $224 billion in LRD with a significant portion of high-quality and liquid assets and $55 billion in risk-weighted assets, including -- excluding op-risk, risk-weighted assets. With the perimeter largely defined, we are already executing on our strategy to exit these assets in a timely and efficient manner. We made a good start in the second quarter, reducing positions representing a total of $9 billion in risk-weighted assets. Around half of those come from sales that we actively pursued.

總體而言，非核心遺產將包括 2240 億美元的 LRD，其中很大一部分是高質量和流動性資產，以及 550 億美元的風險加權資產，其中不包括操作風險、風險加權資產。隨著邊界基本確定，我們已經在執行及時有效地退出這些資產的策略。我們在第二季度取得了良好的開端，共減持了 90 億美元的風險加權資產。其中大約一半來自我們積極追求的銷售。

As I mentioned before, this is not the first time our organization has managed a successful round-down of noncore assets. Our previous experience is a big part of why we are confident in our ultimate success. A clear priority for us is to take out a substantial part of the operating cost associated with this unit. I will touch on that in a minute.

正如我之前提到的，這並不是我們組織第一次成功地對非核心資產進行舍入。我們之前的經驗是我們對最終成功充滿信心的重要原因。我們的一個明確的優先事項是消除與該裝置相關的大部分運營成本。我稍後會談到這一點。

Thanks to our strong capital position and markdowns we took as part of the PPA adjustments, we have substantial flexibility in order to optimize the outcome. These are not distressed assets, so we can maintain positions if they preserve value. Our decisions whether to do so will be based on economic profitability, taking into account funding, operating and capital costs of the portfolio. On those positions we do decide to exit, we will move at pace, acting fairly and protecting our clients and counterparties.

由於我們強大的資本狀況以及我們在購電協議調整中採取的降價措施，我們擁有很大的靈活性來優化結果。這些不是不良資產，因此如果它們保值，我們可以維持頭寸。我們是否這樣做的決定將基於經濟盈利能力，同時考慮投資組合的融資、運營和資本成本。對於我們確實決定退出的頭寸，我們將加快步伐，公平行事並保護我們的客戶和交易對手。

The natural runoff profile is a steep one. As you can see from the chart, we will have a 50% or $27 billion reduction in non-op risk, risk-weighted assets by 2026 and a similar reduction in LRD. But let me assure you that our proactive approach to accelerate the wind-down will continue.

自然徑流剖面較為陡峭。從圖表中可以看出，到 2026 年，我們的非運營風險、風險加權資產將減少 50%，即 270 億美元，LRD 也將減少類似的規模。但我向你們保證，我們將繼續採取積極主動的方式來加速逐步結束。

Now let's turn to cost reduction, a key element of returning to profitability and creating sustainable value across the combined firm. First, as we speak, we are actively addressing the need for deep restructuring at Credit Suisse. This is an acceleration and expansion of the work that the firm itself so as necessary to put a stop to losing money.

現在讓我們轉向降低成本，這是恢復盈利能力並在整個合併後的公司創造可持續價值的關鍵因素。首先，正如我們所說，我們正在積極解決瑞信深度重組的需求。這是公司本身為製止虧損所必需的工作的加速和擴展。

Secondly, additional efforts are required to generate synergies across the combined businesses. We aim to take out over $10 billion in gross expenses from the combined franchise based on full year 2022 cost base. Around half of that will come from restructuring the Investment Bank and running down noncore assets. The other half will come from actions across the rest of our operations. There is meaningful duplication and can be removed, thousands of applications and IT platforms to be decommissioned and hundreds of legal entities to be merged or closed to make us more efficient and effective.

其次，需要付出更多努力來在合併後的業務之間產生協同效應。根據 2022 年全年成本基礎，我們的目標是從合併後的特許經營權中扣除超過 100 億美元的總支出。其中大約一半將來自重組投資銀行和削減非核心資產。另一半將來自我們其他業務部門的行動。存在有意義的重複並且可以被刪除，數以千計的應用程序和 IT 平台需要退役，數以百計的法律實體需要合併或關閉，以使我們更加高效和有效。

Let me give you an example. Of Credit Suisse's current 3,000-plus IT applications, only around 300 will be integrated into UBS infrastructure, contributing to our combined future business model. Importantly, we will continue investing to make our platforms and processes more resilient and support our existing and future growth ambitions. We will also absorb some further inflation. All told, we aim to bring the group's underlying cost/income ratio exit rate below 70% in 2026.

讓我舉一個例子。在瑞信目前的 3,000 多個 IT 應用程序中，只有大約 300 個將集成到瑞銀基礎設施中，為我們未來的綜合業務模式做出貢獻。重要的是，我們將繼續投資，使我們的平台和流程更具彈性，並支持我們現有和未來的增長目標。我們還將吸收一些進一步的通貨膨脹。總而言之，我們的目標是到 2026 年將該集團的基本成本/收入比退出率降至 70% 以下。

We are 2.5 months into one of the biggest and most complex bank mergers in history. We are executing our plans at pace and wasting no time in delivering value for all our stakeholders, including shareholders. In the next 4 to 6 months, our focus will be on restoring underlying profitability while progressing on other areas, including business transformation, client migration and simplification of our combined legal entity structure. On the latter, a key milestone will be the merger of our parent operating entities, UBS AG and Credit Suisse AG. This step planned for 2024 will allow us to simplify our structure and operating model, optimize capital and liquidity within the group and will support achieving our cost savings ambitions.

歷史上規模最大、最複雜的銀行合併之一正在進行 2.5 個月。我們正在快速執行我們的計劃，不失時機地為包括股東在內的所有利益相關者創造價值。未來 4 至 6 個月，我們的重點將是恢復基本盈利能力，同時在其他領域取得進展，包括業務轉型、客戶遷移和簡化合併後的法人實體結構。對於後者，一個重要的里程碑將是我們的母公司運營實體 UBS AG 和 Credit Suisse AG 的合併。計劃於 2024 年實施的這一步驟將使我們能夠簡化結構和運營模式，優化集團內部的資本和流動性，並將支持實現我們節省成本的目標。

We expect to substantially complete our integration program by 2026. A key pillar of our strategy is to maintain a balance sheet for all seasons, one that supports our capital-generative business and allows us to offer attractive capital returns. We expect to operate at around 14% CET1 capital ratio over the medium term. And as we exit 2026, we aim to achieve an underlying return on CET1 of around 15%.

我們預計到 2026 年將基本完成我們的整合計劃。我們戰略的一個關鍵支柱是維持所有季節的資產負債表，以支持我們的資本生成業務並使我們能夠提供有吸引力的資本回報。我們預計中期內 CET1 資本比率將保持在 14% 左右。當我們退出 2026 年時，我們的目標是實現 CET1 15% 左右的基本回報。

As you know, we have suspended share repurchases for the time being, but we remain committed to growing our dividend and returning excess capital to shareholders through buybacks. We will update you on our plans in this regard with the fourth quarter results.

如您所知，我們暫時暫停了股票回購，但我們仍然致力於增加股息並通過回購將多餘資本返還給股東。我們將通過第四季度的業績向您通報我們在這方面的計劃。

With that, let me hand over to Todd.

接下來，讓我把任務交給托德。

Thank you, Sergio. Good morning, everyone. It is a privilege to be with you today as Group CFO, especially at this watershed moment for UBS. Since my appointment, my focus has been on the financial consolidation of the 2 firms, progressing the work done on transaction adjustments, optimizing our liquidity and funding position, firming up our cost savings and enhancing financial reporting controls for the expanded group.

謝謝你，塞爾吉奧。大家，早安。今天很榮幸能以集團首席財務官的身份與您在一起，特別是在瑞銀的這個分水嶺時刻。自上任以來，我的工作重點是兩家公司的財務整合、推進交易調整工作、優化我們的流動性和融資狀況、鞏固我們的成本節約並加強擴大集團的財務報告控制。

Regardless of whether staff come from Credit Suisse or UBS, I've been extremely impressed with the dedication of the finance team. I'm proud of what we, as a unit, have already been able to accomplish. And we, like the entire firm, continued to execute at pace. We recognize that this is a complex deal, but our aim is to be clear and forthcoming in explaining the financial implications of our actions during this critical period and beyond.

無論員工來自瑞信還是瑞銀，財務團隊的奉獻精神都給我留下了深刻的印象。我對我們作為一個整體已經取得的成就感到自豪。我們和整個公司一樣，繼續按部就班地執行。我們認識到這是一項複雜的交易，但我們的目標是明確、坦率地解釋我們的行動在這一關鍵時期及之後的財務影響。

Today, I'll cover our second quarter operating performance, the impact of the merger on our balance sheet and capital as of day 1 and, finally, our integration plan and outlook. Let's start with the quarter on Slide 17. I'll refer to UBS Group AG's consolidated results, which this quarter include 1 month of Credit Suisse's operating performance presented under IFRS and in U.S. dollars.

今天，我將介紹我們第二季度的運營業績、合併對我們第一天的資產負債表和資本的影響，最後是我們的整合計劃和前景。讓我們從幻燈片17 上的季度開始。我將參考瑞銀集團(UBS Group AG) 的綜合業績，該季度包括瑞士信貸(Credit Suisse) 根據國際財務報告準則(IFRS) 以美元計算的1 個月經營業績。

On a reported basis, the second quarter profit was $29 billion, both pre- and post-tax. These results were largely driven by the net impact from items related to the acquisition, principally negative goodwill of $28.9 billion and integration-related expenses and acquisition costs. Excluding these items, the group pretax profit was $1.1 billion, of which $2 billion from the UBS subgroup and negative $0.8 billion from the Credit Suisse subgroup.

根據報告，第二季度稅前和稅後利潤為 290 億美元。這些結果很大程度上是由與收購相關的項目的淨影響推動的，主要是 289 億美元的負商譽以及與整合相關的費用和收購成本。剔除這些項目，集團稅前利潤為11億美元，其中20億美元來自瑞銀子集團，負8億美元來自瑞信子集團。

Turning to Slide 18. The negative goodwill of $28.9 billion is calculated as the difference between the consideration UBS paid and the fair value of the acquired net assets after taking into account the various PPA adjustments of negative $25 billion. The roughly $6 billion difference between the negative goodwill reported today and the amount included in the Form F-4 registration statement just prior to closing is principally explained by 2 factors. First, Credit Suisse generated operating losses over the first 5 months of 2023 that were not captured in the F-4, which was prepared as if the transaction occurred on December 31, 2022.

轉向幻燈片 18。289 億美元的負商譽是根據瑞銀支付的對價與所收購淨資產的公允價值之間的差額計算的，其中考慮了各種 PPA 調整後的負 250 億美元。今天報告的負商譽與交割前 F-4 表格登記聲明中包含的金額之間存在約 60 億美元的差異，這主要是由兩個因素造成的。首先，瑞士信貸在 2023 年前 5 個月產生了經營虧損，而 F-4 中並未反映該虧損，而 F-4 的編制假設交易發生在 2022 年 12 月 31 日。

Second, we applied additional net negative PPA adjustments to Credit Suisse's financial assets and liabilities, reflecting a more detailed fair value assessment post-closing. The total net PPA adjustments of negative $25 billion consist primarily of marks of negative $14.7 billion in connection with financial assets and liabilities. This includes negative $12.4 billion on mainly fixed rate accrual assets and liabilities, of which around $8.5 billion relates to our core businesses and around $4 billion to Non-core and Legacy.

其次，我們對瑞士信貸的金融資產和負債進行了額外的淨負購電協議調整，反映了交割後更詳細的公允價值評估。 PPA 淨調整總額為負 250 億美元，主要包括與金融資產和負債相關的負 147 億美元。這包括主要為固定利率應計資產和負債的負 124 億美元，其中約 85 億美元與我們的核心業務有關，約 40 億美元與非核心和遺留業務有關。

In addition, we made negative $2.3 billion of further necessary adjustments to fair value positions, mostly related to Non-core and Legacy. The negative $8.5 billion of marks on core business accrual financial instruments include, for example, PPA adjustments on the Swiss mortgage book, which were almost entirely interest rate-driven. The majority of the accrual basis positions are expected to mature within the next 3 to 4 years and, if held to maturity, will pull to par.

此外，我們對公允價值頭寸進行了 23 億美元的進一步必要調整，主要與非核心和遺留相關。例如，核心業務應計金融工具的負 85 億美元標記包括對瑞士抵押貸款賬簿的購電協議調整，這些調整幾乎完全由利率驅動。大多數應計基礎頭寸預計將在未來 3 至 4 年內到期，如果持有至到期，將回升至平價。

Of the total marks on accrual positions, $6 billion pretax or $5 billion net of tax, are CET1 capital neutral as FINMA has granted us transitional relief, which mainly applies to Swiss mortgages. The transitional treatment is subject to linear amortization concluding by June 30, 2027. The negative marks of $2.3 billion on fair value assets and liabilities that I mentioned earlier reflect UBS' assessment of the complexity, liquidity and model risk uncertainties in the book as well as the relevant markets for potential strategic exits.

在應計頭寸的總分中，稅前 60 億美元或稅後 50 億美元是 CET1 資本中性，因為 FINMA 已向我們授予過渡性減免，主要適用於瑞士抵押貸款。過渡處理須在2027 年6 月30 日之前完成線性攤銷。我之前提到的公允價值資產和負債23 億美元的負標記反映了瑞銀對賬簿中的複雜性、流動性和模型風險不確定性的評估，以及潛在戰略退出的相關市場。

We also made PPA adjustments of negative $4.5 billion to capture UBS' determination of Credit Suisse's provisions and contingent liabilities related to litigation, regulatory and similar matters. This includes $1.5 billion of incremental provisions Credit Suisse took in the second quarter.

我們還對購電協議進行了負 45 億美元的調整，以反映瑞銀對瑞信與訴訟、監管和類似事項相關的準備金和或有負債的決定。其中包括瑞士信貸在第二季度提取的 15 億美元增量撥備。

Other net PPA adjustments totaling to negative $5.5 billion largely relate to GAAP differences associated with pension accounting, but also goodwill and intangibles and fair value marks on nonfinancial assets and liabilities, including software and real estate.

其他總計為負 55 億美元的淨 PPA 調整主要與與養老金會計相關的 GAAP 差異有關，但也與商譽、無形資產以及非金融資產和負債（包括軟件和房地產）的公允價值標記有關。

Of the total negative $25 billion of PPA adjustments, negative $17 billion is CET1 capital relevant with the balance relating to the $5 billion regulatory waiver I mentioned earlier and other items that are filtered out of CET1 capital, such as pension accounting differences, goodwill and intangibles.

在PPA 調整總額為250 億美元的負值中，負170 億美元是與我之前提到的50 億美元監管豁免相關的餘額以及從CET1 資本中濾除的其他項目（例如養老金會計差異、商譽和無形資產）相關的CET1 資本。 。

Overall, we believe the negative goodwill, including the PPA adjustments therein, in addition to underpinning almost $240 billion of acquired RWA, provides us with sufficient capacity to absorb the cost to achieve our 2 key savings objectives: first, an efficient wind-down of the noncore businesses and associated overhead we acquired; and second, positive operating leverage and synergies in our core franchises, all while remaining capital generative over the integration time line.

總體而言，我們認為，負商譽，包括其中的購電協議調整，除了支撐近2400 億美元收購的RWA 之外，還為我們提供了足夠的能力來吸收成本，以實現我們的兩個關鍵節約目標：首先，有效減少我們收購的非核心業務和相關管理費用；其次，我們的核心特許經營業務具有積極的運營槓桿和協同效應，同時在整合時間內保持資本生成能力。

We are highly confident that we can successfully integrate Credit Suisse, enhancing our business model and operating metrics while continuing to ensure we maintain world-class capital ratios and a balance sheet for all seasons.

我們非常有信心能夠成功整合瑞士信貸，增強我們的業務模式和運營指標，同時繼續確保我們在所有季節保持世界一流的資本比率和資產負債表。

On Page 19, we illustrate how the transaction strengthens key financial measures from day 1, offering us a highly attractive starting point as we commence this journey. Since the acquisition, our capital position is even stronger with almost $200 billion total loss absorbing capacity and a CET1 capital ratio of 14.4%.

在第 19 頁，我們說明了該交易如何從第一天起加強關鍵財務指標，為我們開始這一旅程提供了一個極具吸引力的起點。自收購以來，我們的資本狀況更加強勁，吸收總損失的能力接近 2000 億美元，CET1 資本比率為 14.4%。

Additionally, our tangible book value per share is up 49% quarter-on-quarter. And today, we manage over $5.5 trillion of invested assets with a unique and meaningful presence in all the major markets across the globe.

此外，我們每股有形賬面價值環比增長 49%。如今，我們管理著超過 5.5 萬億美元的投資資產，在全球所有主要市場擁有獨特而有意義的影響力。

Remaining on capital on Slide 20. The strength of our balance sheet is the foundation of our success and the reason why we were able to restore financial stability and client trust in such a short amount of time. As of the end of June, as just mentioned, our CET1 capital ratio was 14.4%, and our CET1 leverage ratio was 4.8%. Included in our capital ratio this quarter are the impacts from the closing of the Credit Suisse acquisition, including a $10 billion operational risk RWA reduction from diversification benefits and a combined lower forward-looking risk profile.

幻燈片 20 上的剩餘資本。我們的資產負債表實力是我們成功的基礎，也是我們能夠在如此短的時間內恢復財務穩定和客戶信任的原因。正如剛才提到的，截至6月底，我們的CET1資本比率為14.4%，我們的CET1槓桿率為4.8%。我們本季度的資本比率包括完成瑞士信貸收購的影響，包括多元化收益帶來的 100 億美元操作風險 RWA 降低以及較低的前瞻性風險狀況。

Looking through to the end of the year, we expect our CET1 capital ratio to remain around 14% as the benefit of RWA reductions, improvements in our underlying profitability, mainly from cost saves, and CET1 capital relevant pull to par effects from the PPA adjustments are expected to largely but not fully offset integration-related expenses. We also expect to maintain a CET1 capital ratio of around 14% and a CET1 leverage ratio of more than 4% over the medium term.

展望今年年底，我們預計我們的 CET1 資本比率將保持在 14% 左右，因為 RWA 減少、我們的基本盈利能力改善（主要來自成本節約）以及 PPA 調整帶來的 CET1 資本相關拉動效應預計將在很大程度上但不會完全抵消整合相關費用。我們還預計中期內將 CET1 資本比率維持在 14% 左右，CET1 槓桿率維持在 4% 以上。

You have often heard us referring to our balance sheet for all seasons and our capital-generative operating model that allows us to service clients and invest in the business through the cycle. It's how we've operated over the last decade, and it's how we intend to continue to operate going forward. So rest assured, maintaining a balance sheet for all seasons will remain among our very top priorities.

您經常聽到我們提到我們所有季節的資產負債表以及我們的資本生成運營模式，該模式使我們能夠在整個週期內為客戶提供服務並投資於業務。這就是我們過去十年的運營方式，也是我們未來打算繼續運營的方式。因此請放心，維持所有季節的資產負債表仍將是我們的首要任務。

On liquidity and funding on Slide 21, we closed the quarter with an average liquidity coverage ratio of 175%, well above our prior quarter level, and a net stable funding ratio of 118%. The liquidity coverage ratio increase largely reflects the elevated HQLA levels at Credit Suisse, including the effect of the usage of the Swiss National Bank facilities. As Sergio highlighted, positive net new deposits in the past few months enabled us to repay ELA+ and terminate the public liquidity backstop facility, as announced earlier this month. We expect to continue attracting net new deposits. And as of this week, we've already seen, in the third quarter, $13 billion of positive net new deposit flows in our combined Wealth Management and Swiss franchises. While this will help us narrow the inherited funding gap and continue to manage our liquidity coverage ratio at prudent levels, we expect to resume execution of our funding plans shortly.

關於幻燈片 21 中的流動性和融資，我們本季度結束時的平均流動性覆蓋率為 175%，遠高於上一季度的水平，淨穩定融資率為 118%。流動性覆蓋率的增加很大程度上反映了瑞士信貸優質流動性水平的提高，包括使用瑞士國家銀行貸款的影響。正如 Sergio 所強調的那樣，正如本月早些時候宣布的那樣，過去幾個月的淨新增存款為正，使我們能夠償還 ELA+ 並終止公共流動性支持設施。我們預計將繼續吸引淨新存款。截至本週，我們已經看到，在第三季度，我們的財富管理和瑞士特許經營業務合併後的淨新增存款流量為 130 億美元。雖然這將幫助我們縮小繼承的資金缺口並繼續將我們的流動性覆蓋率管理在審慎的水平，但我們預計很快將恢復執行我們的融資計劃。

In addition to maintaining significant liquidity and funding buffers on a consolidated basis, we're actively managing the allocation of financial resources among our significant legal entities, which also have stand-alone funding requirements and will continue to operate while we progress towards our target legal entity structure. We're working towards merging Credit Suisse AG into UBS AG in 2024 as this is a critical step to removing resource allocation bottlenecks and enabling the realization of business and operational efficiencies.

除了在綜合基礎上保持大量流動性和資金緩衝外，我們還積極管理重要法人實體之間的財務資源分配，這些實體也有獨立的資金需求，並將在我們朝著法定目標邁進的同時繼續運營。實體結構。我們正在努力於 2024 年將瑞士信貸銀行 (Credit Suisse AG) 併入瑞銀集團 (UBS AG)，因為這是消除資源分配瓶頸並實現業務和運營效率的關鍵一步。

Now on to Slide 22. Excluding Credit Suisse's performance in June, the effects of the acquisition I mentioned earlier and a gain on sale of $848 million in Asset Management last year, UBS' pretax profit in the quarter was $2 billion, up 12% year-over-year.

現在看幻燈片22。排除瑞士信貸6 月份的業績、我之前提到的收購的影響以及去年出售資產管理業務8.48 億美元的收益，瑞銀該季度的稅前利潤為20 億美元，同比增長12 % -同比。

Before turning to the UBS subgroup business division, starting on Page 23, let me first point out that for the second quarter, the negative goodwill as well as a substantial portion of integration-related expenses have been retained and reported in group functions. Starting with the third quarter, we intend to consolidate the reporting of our business divisions across the UBS and Credit Suisse subgroups and will report integration-related expenses in the respective combined segments.

在轉向瑞銀子集團業務部門之前，從第 23 頁開始，讓我首先指出，在第二季度，負商譽以及很大一部分整合相關費用已保留並在集團職能中報告。從第三季度開始，我們打算合併瑞銀和瑞士信貸集團各業務部門的報告，並將報告各自合併部門的整合相關費用。

All references to figures are in U.S. dollars and comparisons are year-over-year unless stated otherwise. In Global Wealth Management, we delivered net new money of $16 billion, the strongest second quarter in over a decade, with inflows across Switzerland, EMEA and APAC and despite $5 billion in seasonal tax payments in the U.S. We also delivered net new fee-generating assets of $13 billion or an annualized growth rate of 4% with positive flows across all regions as well as net new deposits of $5 billion.

除非另有說明，所有數據參考均以美元為單位，且比較均為逐年比較。在全球財富管理領域，我們交付了160 億美元的淨新增資金，這是十多年來最強勁的第二季度，資金流入瑞士、歐洲、中東和非洲和亞太地區，儘管美國的季節性稅款支付了50 億美元。我們還交付了新的淨新費用生成資產規模達 130 億美元，年化增長率為 4%，所有地區均出現正向流動，新增淨存款達 50 億美元。

These strong inflows across net new money, fee-generating assets and deposits demonstrate our continuous focus on active client engagement and the trust our clients place in us. This was especially important during a quarter where the macro backdrop and developments with Credit Suisse placed a premium on our investment advice and the stability of our GWM franchise.

這些淨新資金、收費資產和存款的強勁流入表明我們持續關注積極的客戶參與以及客戶對我們的信任。在宏觀背景和瑞士信貸的發展對我們的投資建議和長城汽車特許經營權的穩定性給予重視的季度中，這一點尤其重要。

Profit before tax was $1.1 billion, down 4% despite strong growth in EMEA and Switzerland, up 15% and 9%, respectively. Positive top line contributions from all regions outside of Americas supported a 1% revenue increase, which was more than offset by higher expenses.

儘管歐洲、中東和非洲和瑞士增長強勁，分別增長 15% 和 9%，但稅前利潤為 11 億美元，下降 4%。來自美洲以外所有地區的積極收入貢獻支持了 1% 的收入增長，但這一增長被較高的支出所抵消。

In the Americas, revenues were down 4%, mainly as net interest income reflected continued rotation into higher-yielding deposits and investments from transactional and sweep deposit accounts. Although we expect NII in the Americas to continue to tick down sequentially from ongoing cash sorting and deleveraging in the current rates environment, we nevertheless continue to see the U.S. market as a strategic priority for us, and hence, we continue to invest in the business for future growth. As a result, we expect our pretax margin in the Americas to be low double digit to mid-teens over the near term.

在美洲，收入下降了 4%，主要是因為淨利息收入反映了交易和儲蓄存款賬戶持續轉向高收益存款和投資。儘管我們預計美洲的NII將因當前利率環境下持續的現金分類和去槓桿化而繼續下降，但我們仍然將美國市場視為我們的戰略重點，因此，我們繼續投資於該業務為了未來的成長。因此，我們預計短期內我們在美洲的稅前利潤率將低至兩位數至十幾歲左右。

On to total GWM revenues. Net interest income was up 14% year-over-year and down 3% sequentially, the latter reflecting mix shifts and lower deposit and loan balances, partly offset by higher deposit margins. Recurring net fee income decreased 3% due to negative market performance, while positive inflows were offset by clients' continued repositioning into lower-margin solutions. As a reminder, we bill based on daily balances in the Americas and on month-end balances everywhere else. As such, second quarter revenues did not fully reflect June's market rally, which we're seeing benefit the third quarter.

長城汽車總收入。淨利息收入同比增長 14%，環比下降 3%，後者反映了結構變化和存貸款餘額下降，但部分被存款利差上升所抵消。由於市場表現不佳，經常性淨費用收入下降了 3%，而客戶繼續重新定位到利潤率較低的解決方案，抵消了正流入。提醒一下，我們在美洲根據每日餘額計費，在其他地區根據月末餘額計費。因此，第二季度的收入並未完全反映 6 月份的市場反彈，而我們認為這將有利於第三季度。

Transaction-based income decreased 6%, impacted by investor uncertainty, particularly in Americas and APAC. However, towards the end of the second quarter and into the third, we're seeing a pickup in both client sentiment and transactional momentum, especially in APAC. Operating expenses, ex litigation, integration-related expenses and FX, were up 3%, driven by increases in technology and personnel expenses.

受投資者不確定性的影響，特別是在美洲和亞太地區，基於交易的收入下降了 6%。然而，在第二季度末和第三季度，我們看到客戶情緒和交易勢頭都有所回升，尤其是在亞太地區。受技術和人員費用增加的推動，運營費用、除訴訟費用、整合相關費用和外匯費用增長了 3%。

Turning to Personal & Corporate Banking on Slide 24. We delivered another record quarter, excluding past one-off gains. Profit before tax was up 54% to CHF 612 million. Revenues increased 24% with increases across all revenue lines, highlighting continued momentum in the business. Net interest income increased by 45% year-on-year and 12% quarter-on-quarter. Sequentially, we continue to see loan growth, while the deposit base remained roughly stable.

轉向幻燈片 24 上的個人和企業銀行業務。我們的季度業績又創歷史新高，不包括過去的一次性收益。稅前利潤增長 54%，達到 6.12 億瑞士法郎。所有收入線的收入均增長了 24%，凸顯了業務的持續增長勢頭。淨利息收入同比增長45%，環比增長12%。隨後，我們繼續看到貸款增長，而存款基礎保持大致穩定。

Costs were up 9%, driven by continued tech investments and higher personnel expenses. The cost-to-income ratio was 51%, a 7 percentage point improvement year-on-year, demonstrating strong positive operating leverage. We saw a strong momentum with 10% annualized growth in net new investment products and almost 6,000 net new clients, reflecting the trust our clients continue to place in us.

由於持續的技術投資和更高的人員開支，成本上漲了 9%。成本收入比為51%，同比提升7個百分點，運營槓桿強勁。我們看到了強勁的勢頭，淨新投資產品年化增長率為 10%，淨新客戶數量接近 6,000 名，反映了客戶對我們持續的信任。

Moving to Slide 25. In Asset Management, the profit before tax was $90 million. Excluding last year's gain on sale, total revenues decreased 5% with lower net management fees, driven by market headwinds, asset mix as well as lower performance fees. These headwinds were partially offset by 1% lower costs. Net new money in the quarter was strong at $17 billion, a 6% annualized growth rate. Net new money, excluding money markets and associates, was $19.5 billion with positive momentum in SMAs and alternatives.

轉向幻燈片 25。資產管理部門的稅前利潤為 9000 萬美元。排除去年的銷售收益，受市場逆風、資產組合以及績效費用降低的推動，總收入下降了 5%，淨管理費也有所下降。這些不利因素被成本降低 1% 部分抵消。本季度新增資金淨額強勁，達 170 億美元，年化增長率為 6%。不包括貨幣市場和聯營公司的淨新資金為 195 億美元，SMA 和另類投資勢頭良好。

Turning to Slide 26. In the Investment Bank, the profit before tax was $139 million. The operating environment for the Investment Bank's trading businesses was defined by significant lower equity volatility levels compared to the prior year period. Within Global Markets, this resulted in a meaningful decline in client activity levels across both equities and FRC, where revenues of $1.5 billion were down 11%, broadly consistent with our peer group.

轉向幻燈片 26。投資銀行的稅前利潤為 1.39 億美元。與上年同期相比，投資銀行交易業務的運營環境是股票波動性水平顯著降低。在全球市場內，這導致股票和 FRC 的客戶活動水平大幅下降，其中 15 億美元的收入下降了 11%，與我們的同行群體基本一致。

Our financing business continued to deliver strong results, reporting its best second quarter and best first half on record. This demonstrates the resilience of our balanced portfolio of risk-efficient businesses as we continue to invest in capabilities that are critical to our clients. Global Banking revenues of $371 million were down 2% as the second quarter saw the global fee pool hit its lowest quarterly level since 2012. In the second quarter, we significantly outperformed the fee pool in EMEA and gained share in global M&A. Operating expenses were up 2%, predominantly on higher tech investments, offsetting lower provisions for litigation, regulatory and similar matters.

我們的融資業務繼續取得強勁業績，取得了有記錄以來最好的第二季度和上半年業績。這表明，隨著我們繼續投資於對客戶至關重要的能力，我們的風險高效業務均衡投資組合具有彈性。全球銀行業務收入為3.71 億美元，下降2%，第二季度全球費用池觸及2012 年以來的最低季度水平。第二季度，我們的表現顯著優於EMEA 的費用池，並在全球併購中增加了份額。運營支出增長 2%，主要用於高科技投資，抵消了訴訟、監管和類似事項撥備的減少。

On Slide 27, I now turn to Credit Suisse AG's full second quarter results, which were separately published earlier today. Credit Suisse AG's reported pretax loss for the second quarter was CHF 8.9 billion. This result includes several large items, including CHF 2.2 billion in adjustments to fair value marks, CHF 1.8 billion in software write-downs, CHF 1.3 billion in additional litigation provisions and CHF 1 billion for a goodwill impairment. Stripping out these and other items that are not representative of Credit Suisse AG's underlying performance in the quarter, the adjusted operating loss was CHF 2.1 billion.

在幻燈片 27 上，我現在轉向瑞士信貸公司第二季度的完整業績，該業績於今天早些時候單獨發布。瑞信第二季度稅前虧損為 89 億瑞士法郎。這一結果包括幾項大項目，包括 22 億瑞士法郎的公允價值標記調整、18 億瑞士法郎的軟件減記、13 億瑞士法郎的額外訴訟準備金和 10 億瑞士法郎的商譽減值。剔除這些以及其他不能代表瑞士信貸集團本季度基本業績的項目，調整後的運營虧損為 21 億瑞士法郎。

Not included in this figure are the results of a few legal entities that fall outside of Credit Suisse AG's consolidation scope. Including those entities, the Credit Suisse subgroup's pro forma second quarter adjusted operating loss was CHF 2 billion. In discussing the Credit Suisse subgroup performance in the second quarter, I'll focus on this CHF 2 billion adjusted loss as it better informs the starting point for the group in combination with UBS' quarterly underlying performance.

該數字中不包括一些不屬於瑞士信貸集團合併範圍的法人實體的業績。包括這些實體在內，瑞士信貸集團第二季度預計調整後運營虧損為 20 億瑞士法郎。在討論瑞士信貸集團第二季度的業績時，我將重點關注這 20 億瑞士法郎的調整後虧損，因為它結合瑞銀的季度基本業績更好地反映了該集團的起點。

On Slide 28, Credit Suisse's quarterly adjusted pretax loss was largely driven by operating losses in the Credit Suisse Investment Bank and the capital release unit as well as elevated funding costs in Credit Suisse's Corporate Center. Sequentially, revenues declined by 38%, driven by Credit Suisse's Investment Bank, down 78%, where the sharp drop in revenues was due to little to no new activity in the context of expected exits following the acquisition.

在幻燈片 28 中，瑞信季度調整後的稅前虧損主要是由瑞信投資銀行和資本釋放部門的運營虧損以及瑞信企業中心融資成本上升造成的。隨後，在瑞士信貸投資銀行下降 78% 的推動下，收入下降了 38%，其中收入急劇下降的原因是在收購後預期退出的情況下幾乎沒有新的活動。

Second quarter revenues also reflected elevated funding costs, primarily from the Swiss National Bank facilities. Going forward, we'll focus on 2 key priorities in relation to Credit Suisse's Investment Bank and Capital Release Unit: first, rebuild activity and profitability levels of the businesses we decided to retain as part of our core Investment Bank; second, actively manage the wind-down of businesses and positions that are not aligned to our strategy. These include those already in the Credit Suisse capital release unit and Investment Bank not retained as core and will be managed and reported within our Non-core and Legacy segment beginning in the third quarter.

第二季度的收入也反映出融資成本上升，主要來自瑞士國家銀行的融資。展望未來，我們將重點關注與瑞士信貸投資銀行和資本釋放部門相關的兩個關鍵優先事項：首先，重建我們決定保留為核心投資銀行一部分的業務的活動和盈利水平；二是積極管理不符合戰略的業務和崗位的退出。其中包括已經在瑞士信貸資本釋放部門和投資銀行中未保留為核心的部門，並將從第三季度開始在我們的非核心和遺留部門中進行管理和報告。

Moreover, as the wind-down is executed, we'll decisively take out all costs in relation to resources, technology and real estate that are not needed to support either what is retained in our core Investment Bank or what is strictly required to efficiently wind down businesses and positions managed by our Non-core and Legacy team.

此外，隨著結束的執行，我們將果斷地剔除與資源、技術和房地產相關的所有成本，這些成本不需要支持我們核心投資銀行中保留的費用，也不需要支持有效結束的嚴格要求。減少由我們的非核心和傳統團隊管理的業務和職位。

In contrast to Credit Suisse's Investment Bank and capital release unit, we saw relative stability across Credit Suisse's Wealth Management, Swiss Bank and Asset Management segments. In Credit Suisse Wealth Management, we've seen a stabilization of net new assets trending from substantial outflows in April to net inflows in June with $14 billion of net new deposits in the quarter. We remain focused on introducing Credit Suisse's clients to the unrivaled value proposition of the combined firm to counterbalance any headwinds to our flows from lag effects stemming from past or future attrition of Credit Suisse relationship managers.

與瑞士信貸的投資銀行和資本釋放部門相比，我們看到瑞士信貸的財富管理、瑞士銀行和資產管理部門相對穩定。在瑞士信貸財富管理公司，我們看到淨新資產趨於穩定，從 4 月份的大幅流出轉向 6 月份的淨流入，本季度淨新增存款為 140 億美元。我們仍然專注於向瑞信的客戶介紹合併後公司無與倫比的價值主張，以抵消瑞信關係經理過去或未來的流失造成的滯後效應對我們的資金流動造成的任何阻力。

In addition to clear and decisive actions to retain client assets, we also implemented client adviser incentive programs with a clear objective to win back and sustainably retain client assets. Quarter-to-date, these actions have helped us to attract net new deposits of $10 billion and positive net new assets in the Credit Suisse Wealth Management franchise. Credit Suisse's adjusted operating expenses were down 10% sequentially, reflecting actions initiated before and after the merger announcement as well as voluntary attrition of employees. As of the end of the second quarter, head count was down by over 8,000 compared to the end of 2022, split roughly equally between internal and external staff.

除了採取明確而果斷的行動來保留客戶資產外，我們還實施了客戶顧問激勵計劃，其目標明確，以贏回並可持續地保留客戶資產。本季度迄今，這些行動幫助我們吸引了 100 億美元的淨新存款，並為瑞士信貸財富管理特許經營業務吸引了正淨新資產。瑞士信貸調整後的運營費用環比下降了 10%，反映了合併公告前後採取的行動以及員工的自願減員。截至第二季度末，與 2022 年底相比，員工人數減少了 8,000 多人，內部員工和外部員工的人數大致相等。

I now turn to Slide 29. On an illustrative and underlying basis, the sum of the UBS subgroup pretax profit of $2 billion and the Credit Suisse subgroup pretax loss of $2.2 billion after translation to U.S. dollars equals a combined pro forma group operating loss of around negative $0.3 billion. You can consider this indicative level as a useful starting point to contextualize the trajectory of our underlying profitability going forward and assess the steps we are taking to achieve our ambitions.

我現在轉向幻燈片 29。作為說明性和基本依據，換算成美元後，瑞銀集團 20 億美元的稅前利潤和瑞士信貸集團 22 億美元的稅前虧損之和相當於預計集團運營虧損約負3億美元。您可以將此指示性水平視為一個有用的起點，以了解我們未來潛在盈利能力的軌跡，並評估我們為實現我們的抱負而採取的步驟。

First and foremost, we're executing on our cost reduction plans at pace, and we expect positive combined underlying profits in the second half of 2023. We expect to deliver underlying exit rate cost savings of over $3 billion by the end of the year, which will benefit our 2024 results, and to incur a broadly similar amount of integration-related expenses in 2H '23. While neutral to our underlying performance, I would note that such integration-related expenses will be partly offset by pull-to-par effects of over $1.5 billion.

首先也是最重要的是，我們正在快速執行成本削減計劃，我們預計 2023 年下半年將實現積極的綜合基本利潤。我們預計到今年年底將實現超過 30 億美元的基本退出率成本節省，這將有利於我們2024 年的業績，並在2023 年2 季度產生大致相似數量的整合相關費用。雖然對我們的基本業績持中性態度，但我要指出的是，此類與整合相關的費用將被超過 15 億美元的拉動效應部分抵消。

Second, asset and deposit retention and win-back initiatives will continue to support the positive momentum across our Wealth Management businesses. In particular, we expect to see positive underlying contribution from the Credit Suisse Wealth Management franchise by the first half of 2024. We will apply the same systematic approach to client and asset retention and win-back across all of our core franchises, especially following today's announcement in connection with the Swiss businesses.

其次，資產和存款保留和贏回舉措將繼續支持我們財富管理業務的積極勢頭。特別是，我們預計到2024 年上半年，瑞士信貸財富管理特許經營業務將做出積極的潛在貢獻。我們將在所有核心特許經營業務中採用相同的系統方法來保留客戶和資產並贏回收益，特別是在今天的與瑞士企業有關的公告。

Third, our second quarter 2023 pro forma results include $550 million of funding costs related to the Swiss National Bank facilities that Credit Suisse reported in its corporate center. The repayment of these facilities will lead to materially lower funding costs in the third quarter and further benefits in the fourth quarter for the combined group.

第三，我們的 2023 年第二季度預計業績包括瑞士信貸在其企業中心報告的與瑞士國家銀行融資相關的 5.5 億美元融資成本。這些貸款的償還將導致第三季度的融資成本大幅降低，並在第四季度為合併後的集團帶來進一步的收益。

Continuing on the NII topic, sequentially for 3Q '23, we expect a low single-digit percentage decline in our combined Wealth Management businesses with positive contribution from the Credit Suisse franchise and a mid-single-digit percentage decline in our Swiss businesses. This excludes the pull-to-par effects I mentioned earlier. These elements in combination with disciplined resource management and a focused execution mindset across the leadership team give us confidence in our ability to deliver a successful integration, starting with approaching breakeven in the third quarter and returning to positive underlying profitability before the end of the year.

繼續討論NII 主題，23 年第三季度，我們預計我們的綜合財富管理業務將出現低個位數百分比下降，其中瑞士信貸特許經營業務將出現積極貢獻，而我們的瑞士業務將出現中個位數百分比下降。這不包括我之前提到的拉平效應。這些要素與整個領導團隊嚴格的資源管理和專注的執行思維相結合，使我們對實現成功整合的能力充滿信心，從第三季度接近盈虧平衡開始，並在年底前恢復到正的基本盈利能力。

With that, I'll hand back to Sergio for his closing remarks.

接下來，我將請塞爾吉奧作結束語。

Thank you, Todd. As we speak, the geopolitical and macroeconomic outlook remains volatile and difficult to predict. But of course, major developments on this front will impact our business in the short term. As always, our first priority is to stay close to clients and help them manage the challenges and opportunities presented by this uncertain environment. For us, this is business as usual, and we remain focused on this priority.

謝謝你，托德。就在我們說話的時候，地緣政治和宏觀經濟前景仍然不穩定且難以預測。當然，這方面的重大發展將在短期內影響我們的業務。一如既往，我們的首要任務是與客戶保持密切聯繫，幫助他們應對這種不確定環境帶來的挑戰和機遇。對我們來說，一切照舊，我們仍然專注於這一優先事項。

At the same time, we are -- we will also execute on our integration plans with determination and pace that will unlock significant economies of scale, allowing us to fund future investments as we continue to pursue growth opportunities. We are well aware of the additional trials and responsibility that accompany this transaction. We will not betray that trust, remaining faithful to our strong culture and conservative risk management. I'm excited about the opportunities that lie ahead of us. I strongly believe UBS will emerge as a stronger global financial institution, one of even greater value to its clients while remaining safe and delivering superior returns.

與此同時，我們還將堅定不移地執行整合計劃，這將釋放顯著的規模經濟，使我們能夠在繼續尋求增長機會的同時為未來的投資提供資金。我們非常清楚此次交易帶來的額外考驗和責任。我們不會背叛這種信任，繼續忠於我們強大的文化和保守的風險管理。我對我們面前的機會感到興奮。我堅信瑞銀將成為一家更強大的全球金融機構，在保持安全並提供卓越回報的同時，為客戶提供更大的價值。

With that, let's get started with questions.

接下來，讓我們開始提問。

(Operator Instructions) First question is from Jeremy Sigee from BNP Paribas.

（操作員說明）第一個問題來自法國巴黎銀行的 Jeremy Sigee。

There's a lot to get through and a lot of questions. I'll just ask 2 things. One is, could you talk about the Swiss integration, which obviously takes time? And I think you said it's going to legally close in '24 and then physically integrate in '25. I just wondered what determines that time frame and how you manage, how you intend to keep the businesses stable whilst they're in that slight sort of limbo period. So that's my first question.

有很多事情需要解決，也有很多問題。我只問兩件事。一是，您能談談瑞士一體化嗎？這顯然需要時間？我想你說過它將在 24 年合法關閉，然後在 25 年實際整合。我只是想知道是什麼決定了這個時間框架以及您如何管理，您打算如何在業務處於那種輕微的不穩定時期時保持業務穩定。這是我的第一個問題。

And the second question is about sort of capital stack. The 14% CET1 target, I imagine it implies that you're going to reissue AT1 and rebuild the AT1 part of your capital stack, and I saw a headline the other day that you might even do that this autumn. I just wondered if you can comment on that aspect, your intentions in terms of issuing AT1?

第二個問題是關於資本堆棧的類型。 14％的CET1目標，我想這意味著你將重新發行AT1並重建你的資本堆棧的AT1部分，前幾天我看到一個標題，你甚至可能在今年秋天這樣做。我只是想知道您是否可以評論一下這方面，您發行AT1的意圖？

Thank you, Jeremy. So well, first of all, on the integration, of course, now that we go through, as I mentioned, it's very important to understand the sequence of how we're going to go through the merger of the different legal entities. We -- as I mentioned before, our intention is to merge the 2 parent company, UBS AG and Credit Suisse AG. And as a follow-through, different entities underneath will go through the same process. So we need to optimize the timing from different aspects and, last but not least, also the one of regulatory approvals.

謝謝你，傑里米。那麼，首先，關於整合，當然，正如我所提到的，既然我們已經完成了合併，那麼了解我們將如何完成不同法律實體合併的順序非常重要。正如我之前提到的，我們的目的是合併兩家母公司：UBS AG 和 Credit Suisse AG。作為後續，下面的不同實體將經歷相同的過程。所以我們需要從各個方面來優化時機，最後也是最重要的一點，就是監管審批的時機。

So we are starting now the process to do that in terms of the Swiss business. The way we will manage that is by, as I mentioned, first of all, assuring that all people employed in the Swiss businesses at UBS and Credit Suisse will not be subject to any redundancies until the end of 2024. So what's the most important message is to clients that nothing changes for them. And our view is to make it very smooth for clients to go through the transition.

因此，我們現在正在開始針對瑞士業務做到這一點的流程。正如我所提到的，我們的管理方式是，首先確保瑞銀和瑞士信貸瑞士業務部門的所有員工在 2024 年底之前不會受到任何裁員。那麼最重要的信息是什麼對於客戶來說，他們沒有任何改變。我們的觀點是讓客戶能夠非常順利地完成過渡。

And so once we go through this kind of legal process and regulatory process of merging the 2 entities, we did -- at the same time, we are also tackling the IT migration, the operational migration. And this is something that will only be completed early on in 2025. So what we -- the message here is to -- is a balance between showing the way forward to our people, to clients, but without rush and in a stable manner so that people -- our clients continue to be served in the way they expect to be served.

因此，一旦我們完成了合併這兩個實體的法律流程和監管流程，我們就做到了——同時，我們也在解決 IT 遷移和運營遷移問題。這件事要到 2025 年初才能完成。所以我們——這裡的信息是——是向我們的員工和客戶展示前進的道路之間的平衡，但不著急，以穩定的方式，這樣我們的客戶將繼續以他們期望的方式得到服務。

In terms of the CET1 target, well, of course, AT1 continues to be an important element of our capital stack and strategy. I will not comment on speculations of this. We are watching the market carefully. We will assess the timing and the need of tapping the markets when appropriate. But yes, of course, we are looking at the AT1 markets, and we will make our consideration when appropriate.

就 CET1 目標而言，當然，AT1 仍然是我們資本堆棧和戰略的重要組成部分。我不會對此事的猜測發表評論。我們正在仔細觀察市場。我們將在適當的時候評估開拓市場的時機和需求。但是，當然，我們正在關注 AT1 市場，我們會在適當的時候做出考慮。

The next question is from Alastair Ryan from Bank of America.

下一個問題來自美國銀行的 Alastair Ryan。

It's Alastair, BofA. Sergio, great to have clarity on the strategy and obviously, the markets as delighted as you are -- that the flows have come back. Just then on operating costs, very clear ambitions, and it looks like you're bringing forward a little '27 to '26 when you've landed everything. But just given the size of the operating costs in the old Credit Suisse Investment Bank and noncore, can you give us any sense about how quickly you can go there? So the a large restructuring charge, integration charge in the second half. But does that cost number move out quickly so that you normalize profitability? Or is there still quite a long tail to the cost in that part of the business? It's just IB Classic, the revenues have gone, the costs still lingering, how quickly they go?

我是美國銀行的阿拉斯泰爾。塞爾吉奧，很高興能夠明確戰略，顯然，市場和你一樣高興——資金流已經回來了。就在那時，關於運營成本，非常明確的雄心壯志，當你完成所有任務後，看起來你將把“27”提前到“26”。但考慮到舊瑞士信貸投資銀行和非核心業務的運營成本規模，您能否告訴我們您能以多快的速度實現這一目標？所以下半年要進行大的重組、整合。但這個成本數字是否會很快消失，從而使盈利能力正常化？或者這部分業務的成本是否仍然存在相當長的尾部？這只是IB Classic，收入已經消失，成本仍然揮之不去，它們消失得有多快？

I'll pass it to Todd.

我會把它交給托德。

Alastair, yes, in terms of the speed at which we expect to take out costs, as Sergio and I said, we've been operating at pace in terms of the cost takeout, which is among our top priorities in terms of, in particular, restructuring, the parts of Credit Suisse that need immediate attention and restructuring. And so you see how we're making very strong progress out of the gate in terms of the cost takeout through the second half of '23 and the cost to achieve those cost takeout as well.

阿拉斯泰爾，是的，就我們預計消除成本的速度而言，正如塞爾吉奧和我所說，我們一直在按成本消除的速度進行運營，這是我們的首要任務之一，特別是、重組，瑞士信貸需要立即關注和重組的部分。因此，您可以看到我們如何在 23 年下半年的成本削減以及實現這些成本削減的成本方面取得了非常強勁的進展。

We've obviously modeled to get to the targets that -- or the landing zones that we described earlier in terms of returns and a cost/income ratio at the end of 2026. But as you say, that the costs do have a long tail in some cases, and that's because of the complexity of the operation that we have to unpack because you have significant infrastructure and technology. You have a very large array of legal entities, over 1,000 legal entities that have to be addressed.

顯然，我們已經進行了建模，以實現我們之前在 2026 年底的回報和成本/收入比方面描述的目標或著陸區。但正如你所說，成本確實有一個長尾在某些情況下，這是因為我們必須分解操作的複雜性，因為您擁有重要的基礎設施和技術。您有大量的法人實體，需要解決的法人實體超過 1,000 個。

And just back one proof point on the software components, there are 3,000 applications. And the work that our team has done suggests that we will only integrate 300 into UBS. That takes time. And so, yes, there is a long tail, but you can count on us to operate quickly.

只要回到軟件組件的一個證據，就有 3,000 個應用程序。我們團隊所做的工作表明，我們只會將 300 家公司整合到瑞銀集團中。這需要時間。因此，是的，存在長尾，但您可以信賴我們的快速運營。

The last thing I would say is in terms of clarity on a sense of as those things hit through because we give a degree of clarity through the second half of the year, and we give sort of our landing zone, we will come back with further clarity once we do the business planning process in the second half of the year, and that will be with our fourth quarter earnings in early February.

我要說的最後一件事是，隨著這些事情的發生，我們會在一定程度上明確我們的著陸區，我們會帶著進一步的信息回來。一旦我們在下半年完成業務規劃流程，我們就會在二月初的第四季度收益中明確這一點。

And I would probably complement Todd's observation because it's very important that the fact that the vast majority of the assets in noncore and legacy are supported by the Credit Suisse IB platform. So as we progress in winding down, call it, the core day-to-day operation from the front office standpoint of view, whatever is left is going to be legacy infrastructure, IB infrastructure that is only there for noncore.

我可能會補充托德的觀察，因為絕大多數非核心和遺留資產都得到瑞士信貸 IB 平台的支持，這一事實非常重要。因此，隨著我們逐步逐步結束，從前台的角度來看，核心的日常運營，剩下的都將是遺留基礎設施，即僅適用於非核心的 IB 基礎設施。

And so you can see how then this will be a very important element in determining how quickly we get rid of noncore assets because as a consequence of that, we accelerate the winding down of this operation. So -- but I think that's exactly what we are working on, and we will give you more detail in early on next year when we present our Q4 results and our 3-year plan.

所以你可以看到，這將是決定我們擺脫非核心資產的速度的一個非常重要的因素，因為結果是，我們加速了這項業務的結束。所以，但我認為這正是我們正在努力的方向，我們將在明年初公佈第四季度業績和三年計劃時向您提供更多詳細信息。

The next question is from Chris Hallam from Goldman Sachs.

下一個問題來自高盛的克里斯哈勒姆。

Just 2 from me. First, in Wealth Management, you've talked about now essentially being at scale in every growth market globally. But in tangible terms, what does that enhanced scale enabled you to do that perhaps you weren't able to do previously? And have you seen any proactive response from competitors and reaction to that enhanced scale? That's my first question.

就我2個。首先，在財富管理方面，您談到現在在全球每個增長市場中基本上都已形成規模。但從具體的角度來看，規模的擴大使您能夠做到哪些以前可能無法做到的事情？您是否看到競爭對手做出了積極的反應以及對擴大規模的反應？這是我的第一個問題。

And then second, looking at the banking business in Switzerland, now the dust has settled. Does all the volatility we saw earlier in the year changed at all how you think strategically about running? The combined Swiss Bank, be it in terms of capital funding, liquidity, et cetera? I guess just sort of simply, has your risk appetite changed in Switzerland?

其次，看看瑞士的銀行業務，現在塵埃落定。我們今年早些時候看到的所有波動是否改變了您對跑步的戰略思考？合併後的瑞士銀行在資本融資、流動性等方面表現如何？我想簡單地說，您在瑞士的風險偏好是否發生了變化？

Thank you. So well, I mean, look, in terms of scale, of course, there is an economic -- economy of scale. So being able to leverage UBS' IT platform as we onboard all the assets, it's a huge advantage because we have, call it, marginal cost effects. But also when you look at the geographic footprint of the 2 operations, they are extremely complementary in some areas by relationships, but also in geographic terms, i.e., for example, in Brazil, right? So we had a lot of operation, Credit Suisse is much stronger. We now create a very important player.

謝謝。那麼，我的意思是，從規模來看，當然存在經濟——規模經濟。因此，在我們裝載所有資產時能夠利用瑞銀的 IT 平台，這是一個巨大的優勢，因為我們有所謂的邊際成本效應。而且，當您查看這兩家公司的地理足跡時，您會發現它們在某些領域的關係以及地理方面具有極大的互補性，例如在巴西，對吧？所以我們進行了很多操作，瑞士信貸要強大得多。我們現在創造了一個非常重要的球員。

In Asia, we really reinforced our position and both in North Asia and Southeast Asia. I think that in Switzerland is quite clear and also across Europe where there are different markets where ideally, it's a very fragmented market in general, wealth management, particularly in Europe. So there, we create economy of scales and things that we would have not been able to fund from our organic standpoint of view. So it's very important.

在亞洲，我們確實鞏固了我們在北亞和東南亞的地位。我認為在瑞士這一點非常明顯，整個歐洲都有不同的市場，理想情況下，財富管理市場總體上非常分散，尤其是在歐洲。因此，我們創造了規模經濟，以及從我們有機的角度來看我們無法資助的事情。所以這非常重要。

As I mentioned before, also Credit Suisse across the board in Asset Management and Wealth Management brings capabilities and excellent products that can be then leveraged into our -- into the UBS client franchise.

正如我之前提到的，瑞士信貸在資產管理和財富管理領域也全面帶來了能力和優秀的產品，這些能力和產品可以用於我們的瑞銀客戶特許經營權。

Have we seen competitors? Yes, I mean, the reaction of competitors, of course. They started to take advantage of the fragile situation of Credit Suisse already during 2022, late 2022, of course, at the beginning of the year. And it's a pretty normal situation. So now having said that, I think that as you saw from the flows, clients are now comfortable and they understand the value added for the franchise. We are able to retain and actually re-attract by clients. So now it's our turn to be proactive. And we will not spare any efforts to regain back any lost assets.

我們見過競爭對手嗎？是的，我的意思是，當然，競爭對手的反應。他們早在 2022 年、2022 年末、當然是年初就開始利用瑞士信貸脆弱的局勢。這是很正常的情況。話雖如此，我認為正如您從流程中看到的那樣，客戶現在感到很舒服，並且他們了解特許經營的附加值。我們能夠留住並真正重新吸引客戶。所以現在輪到我們主動出擊了。我們將不遺餘力地追回丟失的資產。

So in terms of the Swiss, has anything -- is anything changing? I mean it's very important to reiterate that nothing changes in the way we run our Swiss businesses until they are fully integrated, right? So from a client standpoint of view and in service and risk and capital allocation, nothing changes. And even after we merged, our commitment, as I said in my remarks, is that we will continue to sustain the combined lending book. Of course, there are exceptional risky situations. But our principle is very clear, 1 and 1 makes 2. We want to keep our market share in Switzerland. Switzerland is strategic, absolutely strategic for the group, and we will not want to lose any of the market share we have today.

那麼就瑞士人而言，有什麼變化嗎？我的意思是，重申一下非常重要的一點：在完全整合之前，我們經營瑞士業務的方式不會發生任何變化，對吧？因此，從客戶的角度來看，在服務、風險和資本分配方面，沒有任何變化。即使在我們合併之後，正如我在發言中所說，我們的承諾是我們將繼續維持合併後的貸款簿。當然，也有特殊的危險情況。但我們的原則非常明確，1加1等於2。我們希望保持在瑞士的市場份額。瑞士對於集團來說具有戰略意義，絕對具有戰略意義，我們不想失去我們今天擁有的任何市場份額。

Next question is from Kian Abouhossein from JPMorgan.

下一個問題來自摩根大通的 Kian Abouhossein。

First question is on risk-weighted assets you have around $557 billion, $145 billion operational risk-weighted assets. And I'm just wondering how we should think about the exit run rate in 2026 in terms of total risk-weighted assets as well as in terms of operational risk-weighted assets, if I may?

第一個問題是關於風險加權資產，您擁有約 5570 億美元、1450 億美元的運營風險加權資產。我只是想知道我們應該如何考慮 2026 年總風險加權資產以及運營風險加權資產的退出運行率，如果可以的話？

And then second question is related to the noncore. Could you talk a little bit about the P&L effect of the noncore ex any proactive write-downs or sales, so to say, leading to potential write-downs? I just try to understand the P&L in terms of run rate of the noncore legacy bank, if I may.

第二個問題與非核心相關。您能否談談非核心前任主動減記或銷售（也就是說，導致潛在減記）對損益的影響？如果可以的話，我只是嘗試根據非核心遺留銀行的運行率來理解損益表。

Kian, in terms of the op-risk RWA, we will come back next quarter after doing a fair bit of additional modeling in terms of the op-risk RWA of the combined bank. We've started to have initial views on that and initial discussions with our regulators and that informed the $10 billion reduction that I spoke about in my comments.

Kian，就操作風險 RWA 而言，我們將在對合併銀行的操作風險 RWA 進行大量額外建模後，在下個季度回來。我們已經開始對此提出初步看法，並與監管機構進行初步討論，這為我在評論中談到的 100 億美元削減提供了依據。

And then in terms of the trajectory and how we think about the $557 billion towards 2026, you'll have more color on that in terms -- after we complete the business planning process and our 3YSP and come back early next year as mentioned.

然後，就發展軌跡以及我們如何看待 2026 年 5570 億美元的情況而言，在我們完成業務規劃流程和 3YSP 並在明年初返回之前，您將會對此有更多的了解。

In terms of the -- you asked about the P&L and the run rate in noncore. So what I would say on that is -- so first off, it's the thing that's most important is to take costs out and to focus very significantly on the cost takeout because there's a significant level of overhead and costs that aren't associated with the wind-down of the portfolio. So the way to think about it is that we have emphasized so far today that we have to take costs out and effectively the cost that sit in parts of Credit Suisse that don't work.

就非核心業務而言，您詢問了損益表和運行率。因此，我想說的是，首先，最重要的是削減成本，並非常關注成本削減，因為存在大量與成本無關的管理費用和成本。投資組合的縮減。因此，思考這個問題的方法是，我們今天到目前為止已經強調，我們必須消除成本，並有效地消除瑞信無法發揮作用的部分的成本。

And so those costs, whether they be personnel costs or whether they be technology costs or real estate costs, they move into noncore and legacy if they don't support the core businesses, and they have to be run down extremely quickly. And so I would say, first and foremost, it's a cost -- the way to think about it is the cost rundown over the integration time line. Then there's the asset run down, and we talked about the trajectory from a natural rundown perspective. And of course, as Sergio mentioned, that we will be strategically and actively looking at that.

因此，這些成本，無論是人員成本、技術成本還是房地產成本，如果不支持核心業務，它們就會轉入非核心和遺留成本，並且必須極快地消耗掉。所以我想說，首先也是最重要的是，這是一種成本——思考它的方式是集成時間線上的成本縮減。然後是資產流失，我們從自然流失的角度討論了軌跡。當然，正如塞爾吉奧提到的，我們將從戰略上積極地考慮這一點。

And of course, we -- from that perspective, we have taken some PPA adjustments in excess of $5 billion relating to noncore and legacy. I think that's a useful way to think about, too, the fact that some of that post the par and some of that will be fair value positions. And we will manage that book on the most capital efficient way that we can and dispose of positions as appropriate. And also keeping -- and yes, just considering funding costs and the cost of operations, technology, people, et cetera.

當然，從這個角度來看，我們對非核心和遺留項目進行了超過 50 億美元的購電協議調整。我認為這也是一種有用的思考方式，因為其中一些是平價頭寸，而另一些則是公允價值頭寸。我們將以最有效的資本效率方式管理該賬簿，並酌情處置頭寸。並且還要保留——是的，只考慮融資成本以及運營、技術、人員等成本。

Okay. If I may, just very briefly, on the risk-weighted assets, if I can take a very simplistic view, and I just assume, yes, I know the runoff. I can make some assumptions about Basel IV; and then op risk, clearly very difficult to predict. If I want to be conservative, one could assume that ultimately, the risk-weighted asset conservatively should not grow, if at all, should materially decline.

好的。如果可以的話，我可以非常簡單地談談風險加權資產，如果我可以採取非常簡單的觀點，我只是假設，是的，我知道徑流。我可以對巴塞爾 IV 做出一些假設；然後是操作風險，顯然很難預測。如果我想保守一點，人們可以假設最終，保守地風險加權資產不應該增長，如果有的話，應該大幅下降。

Kian, it's -- we can't really comment right now. We are modeling. We are really going through the details of the plan. We need to really also go through the exercise. I'm sure you appreciate, when we put together legal entities, the optimization of all that, it's a fairly complex operation. So it's -- I wouldn't go into a territory of projecting risk-weighted assets going forward because, one, there are 2 elements -- well, 3 elements. The starting point is a good starting point. We know that we can make some adjustments in the next 3 to 4 months. Op risk was one of the subject. But then you need to go through, first of all, what are the efficiencies we take out as we run down assets, yes. What are the efficiency on optimizing legal entity operations? And then what is the growth? Because remember, we are going to grow as well. And we have to attach also that prospect into the equation. I wouldn't go into too much of a risk-weighted asset projection until you see what we tell you in Q3 and Q4 -- for the Q4 results.

Kian，我們現在無法發表評論。我們正在建模。我們正在認真研究該計劃的細節。我們也確實需要進行練習。我相信您會欣賞，當我們將法律實體放在一起時，所有這些的優化，這是一個相當複雜的操作。所以，我不會進入預測未來風險加權資產的領域，因為，一，有兩個要素——嗯，三個要素。起點是一個好的起點。我們知道我們可以在未來 3 到 4 個月內做出一些調整。操作風險是主題之一。但首先，你需要了解我們在消耗資產時所取得的效率是多少，是的。優化法人運營的效率如何？那麼增長是什麼呢？因為請記住，我們也會成長。我們還必須將這一前景納入考慮之中。在您看到我們在第三季度和第四季度告訴您的第四季度結果之前，我不會過多地進行風險加權資產預測。

The next question is from Flora Bocahut from Jefferies.

下一個問題來自 Jefferies 的 Flora Bocahut。

I'd like to go back actually to some of the elements you have discussed on this call already, especially the NCL. Maybe trying to help us understand how much of the RoCET1 improvement towards '26 is going to be driven by this unit, considering only the natural runoff here, trying to help us assess already at this stage what -- how loss-making it is today and how loss-making it would end up being in '26, if you only consider the natural runoff?

我實際上想回到你們在這次電話會議上討論過的一些內容，特別是 NCL。也許試圖幫助我們了解 RoCET1 向 '26 邁進的改進有多少是由該單元推動的，僅考慮此處的自然徑流，試圖幫助我們在現階段評估目前的虧損程度如果只考慮自然徑流，26 年最終會造成多大的損失？

And then the other question I wanted to raise is on the cost saves, just to make sure I understand correctly. So you basically have already a target of $3 billion cost saves on an annualized run rate at the end of this year, but this is compared to the end of '22, I think. So how much of the annualized $3 billion do you kind of already have in the Q2 accounts, please?

然後我想提出的另一個問題是關於成本節省，只是為了確保我理解正確。因此，您基本上已經制定了到今年年底按年化運行率節省 30 億美元成本的目標，但我認為這是與 22 年底相比的。那麼，您第二季度賬戶中已經有多少年化 30 億美元了？

In terms of -- I'll take the -- just maybe address the second point first. In terms of the cost saves in the -- in terms of what we're projecting by the end of the year at $3 billion, in terms of what we see already in the second quarter, we haven't disclosed that specific number. But I think from just the headcount reductions that I mentioned in my remarks, you can probably consider that there's somewhere more than -- around half has already started to hit through in what we're already seeing in our underlying results.

就——我會採取——也許首先解決第二點。就我們預計到今年年底節省的成本而言，就我們在第二季度已經看到的 30 億美元而言，我們尚未透露具體數字。但我認為，僅從我在講話中提到的裁員來看，您可能會認為，有超過一半左右的人員已經開始實現我們在基本結果中已經看到的結果。

In terms of the RoCET1 and how to think about NCL as we go through the process. I mean, for sure, NCL is going to be something that weighs down on our RoCET1 naturally, just given the fact that we have significant -- at least over the 2024 to 2026 period, if you just look at the natural profile rundown, which is effectively a basis for how we started thinking about the RoCET1, not the only way we started to model it, but for sure, one of the ways that we were thinking about it. There's a drag by definition in the sense that by the end of '26, you could see in the slide, the natural profile has roughly half going away.

就 RoCET1 以及我們在整個過程中如何思考 NCL 而言。我的意思是，可以肯定的是，NCL 自然會成為對我們 RoCET1 造成壓力的因素，因為我們至少在 2024 年至 2026 年期間有重大影響，如果你只看自然概況概要，實際上，它是我們開始思考RoCET1 的基礎，這不是我們開始建模的唯一方法，但肯定是我們思考它的方法之一。從定義上講，存在一種阻力，即到 26 年底，您可以在幻燈片中看到，自然輪廓大約消失了一半。

Now we can model different scenarios, as can you, but we're not going to discuss how we're thinking about it. And obviously, some of that is still very much unknown. In terms of the cost takeout, we would expect to be taking out the lion's share of the costs in noncore and legacy by the time the integration is materially complete. By definition, we would do that. There will be -- we expect some residual carry that we'll have to take on or continue to run down beyond 2026. So there is some, if you will, negative burn that is associated with NCL in our modeling.

現在我們可以模擬不同的場景，你也可以，但我們不會討論我們是如何思考的。顯然，其中一些仍然非常未知。就成本支出而言，我們預計在整合實質上完成時，將扣除非核心和遺留成本的大部分。根據定義，我們會這樣做。我們預計，到 2026 年之後，我們將不得不承擔或繼續減少一些剩餘收益。因此，如果您願意的話，在我們的模型中，會有一些與 NCL 相關的負消耗。

The next question is from Stefan Stalmann from Autonomous Research.

下一個問題來自 Autonomous Research 的 Stefan Stalmann。

I have 2 numbers questions, please. So the first one is on capitalized software. You have taken these roughly $1.8 billion of software impairments in the PPA. Can you give us a rough sense of how much of a remaining amount of capitalized software remains in your group accounts that relates to CS? Is there a risk of further impairments given that you want to retain only about 10% of these systems?

我有 2 個數字問題，請問。第一個是大寫軟件。您已經在 PPA 中考慮了大約 18 億美元的軟件減值。您能否讓我們大致了解一下您的集團帳戶中與 CS 相關的剩餘資本化軟件數量有多少？鑑於您只想保留這些系統的 10% 左右，是否存在進一步受損的風險？

And the second question relates to your capital requirements. So you showed it still at 10.6% CET1 over risk-weighted assets. If we were to apply the current capital metrics that is outlined in Swiss banking law, what would be the capital requirement if there was no FINMA transitional (inaudible) please?

第二個問題與您的資本要求有關。因此，您顯示的 CET1 仍高於風險加權資產的 10.6%。如果我們要應用瑞士銀行法中概述的當前資本指標，如果沒有 FINMA 過渡（聽不清），資本要求是多少？

Stefan, in terms of the capitalized software, as you say, $1.8 billion was the amount that was in the Credit Suisse AG reported number today. I think in the PPA number overall, in total, there was slightly more about $2 billion. You can look at the CS balance sheet from year-end or Q1, Q2 -- or sorry, Q1 or year-end and see there was a capitalized software in the neighborhood of $3 billion. So effectively, what we have done is taken 2/3 down and have 1/3 left on a shorter economic useful life that aligns with how we think about, a, the time it's going to take just to fully decommission everything; and b, leaving what we think we still get value from at the end. So all that has been sort of factored into the PPA. So I don't see necessarily further impairments. But because we now have just what's left, about $1 billion that will have a shorter economic useful life that aligns to how we're thinking about the restructuring.

Stefan，就資本化軟件而言，正如您所說，瑞士信貸集團今天報告的數字為 18 億美元。我認為購電協議的總金額略多於 20 億美元。您可以查看年底或第一季度、第二季度的 CS 資產負債表，或者抱歉，第一季度或年底，您會發現有一個資本化軟件的資本額約為 30 億美元。因此，實際上，我們所做的工作已經減少了 2/3，經濟使用壽命還剩 1/3，這與我們的想法是一致的：a，完全退役所需的時間； b，留下我們認為最終仍能從中獲得價值的東西。因此，所有這些都已納入購電協議中。因此，我認為不一定會出現進一步的損害。但因為我們現在只剩下大約 10 億美元，它們的經濟使用壽命會較短，這與我們對重組的想法是一致的。

Yes. Stefan, on CET1, I think when you look at the fully implemented regime in Switzerland, which is not applicable to us until 2027, it would be around 12.5%, 12 point plus. And that's -- the reason why we raised our CET1 ratio was both to reflect a buffer there to accommodate for the restructuring. But also it's a clear, call it, small front running of what we expect to come as a consequence of that and our -- and the finalization of Basel III, which is partially already in our books. So you can count on this number to be calibrated with a pretty medium-term -- medium to long-term expectation of the current interpretation of all regulatory regimes worldwide, including Switzerland.

是的。 Stefan，關於CET1，我認為當你看看瑞士完全實施的製度時，它要到2027年才適用於我們，大約是12.5%，多了12個百分點。這就是——我們提高 CET1 比率的原因是為了反映為重組提供的緩衝。但這也是我們預期的結果的一個明確的小規模前期運行，以及我們的巴塞爾協議 III 的最終確定，部分內容已經在我們的書中。因此，您可以指望這個數字會根據對包括瑞士在內的全球所有監管制度的當前解釋的中長期預期進行校準。

The next question is from Anke Reingen from RBC.

下一個問題來自 RBC 的 Anke Reingen。

The first is on revenue dis-synergies. I mean, listening to your comments and especially that you think you can keep this with market share unchanged. Is it something you really think maybe people get overly concerned and you don't see quite bad risk of revenue dis-synergies given if you potentially have to contact some of this more attractive rates on incentivizing your advisers?

第一個是收入協同效應。我的意思是，聽聽您的評論，尤其是您認為可以在市場份額不變的情況下保持這一點。您是否真的認為人們可能會過度擔心，並且如果您可能必須聯繫一些更具吸引力的利率來激勵您的顧問，那麼您不會看到收入不協同的嚴重風險？

And then secondly, on Slide 16 ratio as the return path and the block about the funding cost efficiencies, and it's something you -- I guess, apart from the drop out of the higher expense of funding at Credit Suisse. Is there other areas where you see the material benefits from lowering funding costs and overall group benefits? Because it gets to block us the same time as the cost price rightsizing. Obviously, you can maybe elaborate a bit more on that area.

其次，在幻燈片 16 中，比率作為回報路徑和有關融資成本效率的塊，我想，除了瑞士信貸放棄較高的融資費用之外。您是否在其他領域看到了降低融資成本和整體集團效益帶來的物質利益？因為它與成本價格調整同時阻礙了我們。顯然，您也許可以在該領域進行更多詳細說明。

Okay, Anke, let me take the first question. First of all, I haven't said that we will keep our market share. I think that our ambition is to keep the market share. Now having said that, it's Credit Suisse's lost market share and business in the last 12 months or so. So what we count on is the fact that we will be able to recapture and regain some of the market share, and what you saw lately in the last couple of months is a good sign of that. But of course, we are not -- we are realistic, and we are also factoring in that we may lose some market shares because some clients may or may not feel that they want to have certain concentration risk.

好的，安克，我來回答第一個問題。首先，我並沒有說過我們會保持我們的市場份額。我認為我們的目標是保持市場份額。話雖如此，瑞士信貸在過去 12 個月左右的時間裡失去了市場份額和業務。因此，我們所指望的是，我們將能夠重新奪回並重新獲得一些市場份額，而您在過去幾個月中看到的情況就是一個好兆頭。但當然，我們不是——我們是現實的，我們也考慮到我們可能會失去一些市場份額，因為一些客戶可能會或可能不會覺得他們希望有一定的集中風險。

So there is no danger of us budgeting or planning blue-sky scenarios on that one. We are realistic, but that should not be confused with our desire to keep as much as we can.

因此，我們對此進行預算或規劃藍天情景並不存在危險。我們很現實，但這不應該與我們盡可能多地保留的願望相混淆。

And Anke, on the second -- actually, yes, the second question, in terms of material benefits we see, you obviously highlighted the most significant one, which will be just the takeout of the significant costs that we were wearing in connection with the PLB and the ELA+ facilities. But I would say, and as I remarked earlier that we expect the positive contribution from the Credit Suisse Wealth Management franchise in our NII in 3Q. And that comes principally from having stabilized the business and net new deposits that are also helping on NII. So I would say that's another factor that is helping on the underlying profitability.

安克，關於第二個問題——實際上，是的，第二個問題，就我們看到的物質利益而言，您顯然強調了最重要的一個，這只是我們在與PLB 和 ELA+ 設施。但我想說，正如我之前所說，我們預計瑞士信貸財富管理特許經營權將在第三季度對我們的 NII 做出積極貢獻。這主要來自於穩定了業務和淨新存款，這也對國家信息基礎設施有所幫助。所以我想說這是有助於提高潛在盈利能力的另一個因素。

The next question is from Benjamin Goy from Deutsche Bank.

下一個問題來自德意志銀行的本傑明·戈伊。

Two questions from my side. The first, to play devil's advocate, are there more outflows to come where you kind of already head out for some clients, but maybe some longer-term structures, partnerships or anything like that take time to see the outflows?

我這邊有兩個問題。首先，唱反調，在你已經為一些客戶提供服務的地方是否還會有更多的資金外流，但也許一些長期結構、合作夥伴關係或類似的東西需要時間才能看到資金外流？

And then secondly, for the first time in a while, your CET1 capital is higher than your tangible book value or almost the same. So is there now the 15% return on CET1? Should it also be broadly similar to RoTE going forward? Or should we expect more moving parts towards, yes, 2026?

其次，一段時間以來第一次，您的 CET1 資本高於您的有形賬面價值或幾乎相同。那麼現在CET1有15%的回報嗎？未來它是否也應該與 RoTE 大致相似？或者我們是否應該期待 2026 年會有更多變化？

Thank you. Let me take the first question. I guess, as I mentioned before, now we are -- on the wealth management broader perimeter, I think that what's -- of course, we may still have a client adviser that's resigned over the last 3, 4 months or that as they move into a new organization, they may be able to bring some assets with them. What we see right now is clear that the ability of the people that left a while ago to really move assets, it's fairly limited. And this is nothing new compared to what UBS went through 10 years ago or more than 10 years ago, in recognizing that there is a lot of institutional loyalty of the client base. And now that we have stabilized the franchises, of course, we are even stronger in retaining assets. And as I mentioned before, our desire is to rebring back assets. So look, the movements -- the gross movements are going to be very difficult to predict, but the net outcome, we feel pretty comfortable will be positive.

謝謝。讓我回答第一個問題。我想，正如我之前提到的，現在我們- 在財富管理更廣泛的範圍內，我認為- 當然，我們可能仍然有一位在過去3、4 個月內辭職的客戶顧問，或者隨著他們的變動而辭職的客戶顧問進入一個新組織時，他們也許能夠帶來一些資產。我們現在清楚地看到，不久前離開的人真正轉移資產的能力相當有限。與瑞銀 10 年前或 10 多年前所經歷的情況相比，這並不是什麼新鮮事，瑞銀認識到客戶群具有很高的機構忠誠度。現在我們已經穩定了特許經營權，當然，我們在保留資產方面就更加強大了。正如我之前提到的，我們的願望是重新奪回資產。所以看，這些變化——總體變化將很難預測，但我們感到相當滿意的最終結果將是積極的。

And Benjamin, in terms of the return on CET1 versus ROTA impact, I'd say there are 2 factors that do argue in favor of moving in that direction, just not yet, but for sure. On the first one, the denominator effect were bigger. And so that's obviously going to make the difference between the historic ROTA versus RoCET1 smaller, by definition. So -- and that -- so that denominator effect is now in play, and it is helpful, as you suggest, probably as well contributing to what you observed.

本傑明，就 CET1 與 ROTA 影響的回報而言，我想說有兩個因素確實支持朝這個方向發展，雖然還沒有，但肯定是這樣。第一個，分母效應更大。因此，根據定義，這顯然會縮小歷史 ROTA 與 RoCET1 之間的差異。因此，分母效應現在正在發揮作用，並且正如您所建議的那樣，它很有幫助，也可能有助於您觀察到的結果。

The other one, though, which has been our historic delta that really has given us pause to move off what we think is a more meaningful return measure or DTAs. But there, of course, as they amortize down because these generally -- well, no, not exclusively, but generally relate to very old losses that we're now continuing to just chip away at, as that balance comes down, then that's yet another factor that would argue in favor of moving to the other measure.

然而，另一個問題是我們的歷史性三角洲，它確實讓我們停下來放棄我們認為更有意義的回報措施或避免雙重徵稅協定。但是，當然，當它們攤銷時，因為這些通常 - 嗯，不，不完全是，但通常與非常舊的損失有關，我們現在正在繼續削減這些損失，隨著餘額的下降，那麼這還沒有另一個支持採取其他措施的因素。

Well, for the foreseeable future and from the other angle of measuring our capital return flexibility, the CET1 ratio is a better proxy because this is the true binding constraint.

那麼，在可預見的未來，從衡量我們資本回報靈活性的另一個角度來看，CET1比率是一個更好的指標，因為這是真正的約束約束。

The next question is from Amit Goel from Barclays.

下一個問題來自巴克萊銀行的阿米特·戈爾。

The first question was -- I appreciate there's a lot of moving parts. So we're going to spend a bit of time trying to kind of update estimates and all that kind of stuff. But in terms of the path for the RoCET1 to get to that kind of 15% 2026 exit rates, are you able to give any color in terms of expectations for 2024, 2025 or how you'd like it to trend?

第一個問題是——我知道有很多變化的部分。因此，我們將花一些時間嘗試更新估計和所有類似的東西。但就 RoCET1 達到 2026 年 15% 退出率的路徑而言，您能否給出對 2024 年、2025 年的預期或您希望其發展趨勢的任何顏色？

And then secondly, just on the costs, it would be great to get a bit more color on the savings. So I'm just kind of curious, it seems like $10 billion of gross, but how much net saving or how much reinvestment of that do you expect to do where you found the incremental $2 billion versus the $8 billion? And also how you're spending the $12 billion restructuring because it does seem like quite a big number? So just wondering if there could be benefits there as well.

其次，就成本而言，如果能夠在節省成本方面獲得更多的色彩，那就太好了。所以我只是有點好奇，總金額似乎是 100 億美元，但與 80 億美元相比，您預計增量 20 億美元會帶來多少淨儲蓄或多少再投資？另外，您將如何花費 120 億美元的重組費用，因為這看起來確實是一個相當大的數字？所以只是想知道那裡是否也有好處。

Amit, so as mentioned in terms of color -- further color on the trajectory as to we get end of '23 to end of '26, we'll come back on that, provide update in 3Q as to where we are, but then a much more fulsome perspective after our business planning process is complete by the end of the year into early next year.

阿米特，正如顏色方面所提到的——關於我們從 23 年底到 26 年底的軌蹟的進一步顏色，我們會回來討論這一點，在第三季度提供關於我們所處位置的更新，但是然後在我們的業務規劃流程在年底到明年初完成後，我們將獲得更豐富的視角。

In terms of the cost savings, as Sergio also made remarked in his comments, the gross number is greater than $10 billion, as you highlight, but we will be making investments. We're going to grow our business. We're going to invest in technology. We're going to also deal with inflationary factors if need be. So we -- that's all in the thinking around it. Around half of the gross cost saves relate to effectively restructuring the Credit Suisse IB and CRU units, and the other half gross relates to the synergies we expect to realize, but then that will be -- there'll be investments back into the technology and the people to grow the core franchises.

在節省成本方面，正如 Sergio 在他的評論中也指出的那樣，正如您所強調的那樣，總金額超過 100 億美元，但我們將進行投資。我們要發展我們的業務。我們將投資於技術。如果需要的話，我們還將應對通貨膨脹因素。所以我們——這就是圍繞它的思考。大約一半的總成本節省與有效重組瑞士信貸 IB 和 CRU 部門有關，另一半總成本與我們期望實現的協同效應有關，但隨後就會對技術和技術進行投資人們發展核心特許經營權。

The next question is from Andrew Lim from Societe Generale.

下一個問題來自法國興業銀行的 Andrew Lim。

So firstly, on the fair value markdowns that you've taken there, related to that, could you give us an idea of the maturity remaining on these financial assets and how we should think about the reversal of those markdowns? So you've highlighted more than $1.5 billion for the second half of this year. Is that the kind of run rate that we should be expecting going forward?

首先，關於您在那裡進行的與此相關的公允價值降價，您能否告訴我們這些金融資產的剩餘期限以及我們應該如何考慮這些降價的逆轉？因此，您強調了今年下半年的收入超過 15 億美元。這是我們應該期待的未來運行率嗎？

And then secondly, on the NCL, perhaps I can ask it a different way. Do you have a better idea now of what the ultimate cumulative losses might be from the NCL? Would they be less than the $5 billion maybe that you might have been exposed to under the LPA agreements? That's my question.

其次，關於 NCL，也許我可以用不同的方式來問。您現在對 NCL 的最終累計損失可能是多少有更好的了解嗎？它們是否會低於您根據 LPA 協議可能接觸到的 50 億美元？這就是我的問題。

And then thirdly, might I quickly ask on the domestic side, certainly for some businesses, you'll have a significant market share. And I wonder if there's any maybe regulatory risk that market share might be looked at and you'd be forced to bring it down to a level, which is more palatable to the regulators?

第三，我可以快速問一下，在國內方面，當然對於某些企業來說，你們將擁有很大的市場份額。我想知道是否存在任何可能的監管風險，即市場份額可能會被考慮，並且您將被迫將其降低到監管機構更容易接受的水平？

Yes, because you asked 3 questions instead of 2, I'll take the last one. On the market share one, as you know, we got regulatory approvals to basically not be subject to any competitive constraints. And that was done just to secure and be able to communicate and to be able to place. Although it was already crystal clear as it is today that there is no market share topics for the combined unit in Switzerland. I mean, if you go across the board, cantonal banks are larger on any dimensions of relevant personal and commercial banking business in Switzerland. When you measure in terms of branches, we are, combined, the third largest player.

是的，因為您問了 3 個問題，而不是 2 個問題，所以我會選擇最後一個。在市場份額方面，大家知道，我們得到了監管部門的批准，基本上不受任何競爭限制。這樣做只是為了確保安全、能夠進行通信以及能夠進行定位。儘管現在已經很清楚，合併後的部門在瑞士沒有市場份額問題。我的意思是，如果全面考慮的話，瑞士各州銀行在相關個人和商業銀行業務的任何方面都規模更大。當你以分支機構來衡量時，我們綜合起來是第三大參與者。

So now this is very relevant because some people may argue, well, the cantonal banks are combined versus you being one unit. Well, the fact -- the true of the matter is that we compete in those cantons with the local cantonal banks. It's extremely relevant to make that difference. Therefore, we will, of course, contribute what's the competitive authorities have to say about it and put our views into the set. But I don't really expect that on a fact-based discussions, we will be subject to any limitation or meaningful limitations in respect of our activities going forward.

所以現在這非常相關，因為有些人可能會說，州銀行是合併在一起的，而不是一個單位。好吧，事實是，我們在這些州與當地的州銀行競爭。做出這種改變是非常重要的。因此，我們當然會貢獻競爭機構對此的看法，並將我們的觀點納入其中。但我真的不希望在基於事實的討論中，我們未來的活動會受到任何限製或有意義的限制。

Andrew, let me just unpack your first and second. I think they're related. On the first, as we highlighted earlier, we took around $15 billion of fair value marks on financial assets and liabilities, $12.5 billion where we indicated would pull to par because they relate to accrual accounted positions, another roughly $2.5 billion related to fair value positions where we had marks -- further markdown in light of sort of liquidity model risk, other type issues.

安德魯，讓我來解開你的第一個和第二個。我認為它們是相關的。首先，正如我們之前強調的，我們對金融資產和負債進行了約150 億美元的公允價值標記，其中125 億美元將拉至標準值，因為它們與應計會計頭寸相關，另外約25 億美元與公允價值頭寸相關我們有標記的地方——鑑於某種流動性模型風險和其他類型的問題，進一步降價。

On the piece that pulls to par, just keep in mind that $4 billion of that $12.5 billions relates to noncore and legacy. So that's important to know, and about $8.5 billion more in our core businesses. On the core business piece, generally speaking, we see 3 to 4 years that we should unwind between 70% and 80%. There will be a longer tail, especially on some fixed rate loans that will go longer than that. So we'll see pull-to-par effects that extend beyond the 3- to 4-year time frame, but most of it will accrete to income over the shorter time frame, as I mentioned.

在達到標準的部分，請記住，這 125 億美元中的 40 億美元與非核心和遺產相關。因此，了解這一點很重要，而且我們的核心業務還增加了約 85 億美元。在核心業務方面，一般來說，我們預計 3 到 4 年內我們應該放鬆 70% 到 80% 之間的業務。尾部將會更長，尤其是某些固定利率貸款的尾部會更長。因此，我們將看到拉動效應超出 3 到 4 年的時間範圍，但正如我提到的，其中大部分將在較短的時間範圍內增加收入。

To the NCL point, though, since we have roughly $4 billion of the pull to par in NCL and roughly $2 billion in the fair value marks, so you have $5 billion to $6 billion of fair value adjustments in NCL. And I think to go to your second question. That's important to understand, just given that we think that the positions are appropriately marked. And from here, we will continue to consider all of our optionality in terms of running down the portfolio, as Sergio mentioned earlier, in the most capital and cost-efficient way. But we think the positions are being carried at appropriate levels presently.

不過，就 NCL 而言，由於 NCL 的平價拉力約為 40 億美元，公允價值標記約為 20 億美元，因此 NCL 的公允價值調整為 50 億至 60 億美元。我想回答你的第二個問題。理解這一點很重要，因為我們認為這些位置已被適當標記。從這裡開始，我們將繼續考慮以最具資本和成本效益的方式運行投資組合方面的所有選擇，正如塞爾吉奧之前提到的那樣。但我們認為目前這些職位處於適當的水平。

Your next question is from Adam Terelak from Mediobanca.

您的下一個問題來自 Mediobanca 的 Adam Terelak。

I want to get under the hood a little bit more in Wealth Management. Firstly, on the CS business acquired, clearly, there are some business exits to worry about from -- that you see noncore in kind of the Wealth Management unit. Can you give us a sense of what the revenue attached to that might look like, but also any detail on AT1 cost savings that's come through the NII in that division as well?

我想更深入地了解財富管理。首先，在收購的客戶服務業務上，顯然，有一些業務退出值得擔心——你會看到財富管理部門的非核心業務。您能否讓我們了解一下該部門的收入情況，以及通過該部門的 NII 節省 AT1 成本的任何細節？

And then secondly, the competitive environment. I noticed in your GWM business, UBS stand-alone costs are up on lower revenues. I just want to know kind of what the cost is to retain managers at this point, whether you're seeing kind of competitive landscape on the RM side or the adviser side, but also in your deposit side, what sort of campaigns have you been running to re-attract deposits? And how easy or difficult has that been in the current rate and deposit environment?

其次，競爭環境。我注意到，在貴公司的長城汽車業務中，瑞銀的獨立成本因收入下降而上升。我只是想知道此時留住經理的成本是多少，無論您是否看到 RM 方面或顧問方面的競爭格局，而且在您的存款方面，您進行了什麼樣的活動跑去重新吸引存款？在當前的利率和存款環境下，這有多容易或多困難？

Adam, on the second one, I would just say in terms of GWM costs, so there's a very significant positive operating leverage outside of the U.S. So that's important to note. This is in the GWM -- sorry, in the UBS subgroup GWM, very significant positive operating leverage. We were investing for growth in that business, but that business as well has been -- saw a strong NII performance and had strong PBT growth, as I highlighted in my comments earlier.

Adam，關於第二個問題，我只想說 GWM 成本，因此在美國以外地區存在非常顯著的積極運營槓桿，所以這一點值得注意。這是在 GWM 中——抱歉，在瑞銀子集團 GWM 中，有非常顯著的正運營槓桿。我們投資該業務是為了實現增長，但正如我之前在評論中強調的那樣，該業務也看到了強勁的 NII 表現和強勁的 PBT 增長。

As I also highlighted, it's more on the GWM overall side, just the fact that we've seen a lot of cash sorting and rotation on NII in the Americas, and that sort of pulled the Americas revenue down reasonably significantly, say, quarter-on-quarter, year-on-year. And as a result, we see that negative operating leverage. But we're continuing to invest in that business across the board. And so some of that as well contributes to the higher costs.

正如我還強調的那樣，更多的是在 GWM 整體方面，事實上，我們在美洲的 NII 上看到了大量的現金分類和輪換，這使得美洲的收入相當顯著地下降，比如說，季度 -按季度、按年。結果，我們看到了負的運營槓桿。但我們將繼續全面投資該業務。因此，其中一些也導致了更高的成本。

On your deposit campaign question, I would say that like any bank, we value deposits. We value deposits in the win-back context in wealth management. We also just value deposits to fund our business loan growth, et cetera. So there's nothing I've seen that I would call out there in terms of deposit betas that have moved in a direction I would consider it to be anything other than what we see across peers.

關於你的存款活動問題，我想說，像任何銀行一樣，我們重視存款。我們在財富管理的贏回背景下重視存款。我們還只是對存款進行增值，為我們的商業貸款增長提供資金等等。因此，我認為存款貝塔值的變化方向與我們在同行中看到的情況不同，我認為沒有什麼可以指出的。

In terms of the acquired, you were asking business exits and the revenue attached. At this point, we have -- in terms of what's being expected to move into noncore and legacy that was highlighted on one of the earlier slides, the revenue attached with that business is less than $100 million on an annualized basis in terms of net revenues, in terms of what's moving across, and that's, of course, not risk-adjusted for -- and so that needs to be considered.

就收購而言，您要求業務退出和附帶的收入。目前，就之前一張幻燈片中強調的預計將進入非核心和遺留業務而言，該業務的年化收入淨收入不到 1 億美元，就正在發生的事情而言，當然，這沒有經過風險調整——因此需要考慮這一點。

In terms of AT1 cost savings that hit to the business from what it had been, say, anything there has really just been captured in the Credit Suisse Corporate Center as an offset potentially to the inflated costs. So I would expect that, that will normalize now as the businesses come together.

就 AT1 成本節省而言，瑞士信貸企業中心實際上剛剛捕獲了任何東西，以抵消膨脹的成本。因此，我預計，隨著業務的整合，這種情況現在將會正常化。

So funding assumes that, that incorporates...

因此，資金假設包括……

Can you repeat? It wasn't clear, sorry.

你可以重複嗎？不清楚，抱歉。

Is there any funding noise AT1 versus liquidity facility to source that in the corporate center rather than us?

AT1 與流動性工具之間是否存在任何資金噪音，以在公司中心而不是我們那裡獲取資金？

That was our understanding from Credit Suisse's practice pre-acquisition, yes.

是的，這是我們對瑞士信貸收購前實踐的理解。

Your next question is from Andrew Coombs from Citi.

您的下一個問題來自花旗銀行的安德魯·庫姆斯。

It's Andrew Coombs from Citi. Two, if I may. Firstly, I want to come back to a follow-up on the PPA pull-to-par effect, but in relationship to the restructuring charges. You made this comment that out to the period at the end of 2026, I think restructuring charges will be largely but not wholly offset by the PPA pull-to-par effect. And then in your later comments, you talked about $12.5 billion of pull-to-par effect, of which $4.5 billion would be noncore and that most of that will be recognized in the 3- to 4-year time frame. So can we assume restructuring charges of the magnitude of $12.5 billion? And can you give us a feel for the timing of those relative to PPA pull to par?

我是花旗銀行的安德魯·庫姆斯。如果可以的話，兩個。首先，我想回顧一下購電協議拉平效應的後續情況，但與重組費用有關。您曾評論說，到 2026 年底，我認為重組費用將在很大程度上但不會完全被 PPA 拉平效應所抵消。然後在您後來的評論中，您談到了 125 億美元的拉動效應，其中 45 億美元將是非核心的，其中大部分將在 3 到 4 年的時間框架內得到認可。那麼我們可以承擔 125 億美元的重組費用嗎？您能否讓我們了解一下與 PPA 相關的時間安排？

And then the second question is on Slide 29. You provided a useful quarterly trajectory going from minus 0.3% in Q2, and you talked about breakeven in Q3, but you also flagged $750 million of savings, $550 million of funding cost savings. There's a $650 million arguably one-off ECL charge on the noncredit impaired CS portfolio this quarter. So just trying to understand that going from minus 0.3% to 0, even with all of those additional benefits Q-on-Q, what's the offset? I guess there'll be some seasonality on revenue, a bit of a decline in NII. But any more color there?

第二個問題在幻燈片29 上。您提供了一個有用的季度軌跡，從第二季度的負0.3% 開始，您談到了第三季度的盈虧平衡，但您還標記了7.5 億美元的節省， 5.5 億美元的融資成本節省。本季度非信用減值的 CS 投資組合可能會產生 6.5 億美元的一次性 ECL 費用。因此，只是想了解一下，即使有所有這些額外的好處，從負 0.3% 到 0，抵消額是多少？我猜收入會出現一些季節性，NII 會略有下降。但還有更多顏色嗎？

So Andrew, in terms of the -- yes, in terms of -- I'll take the second point first. In terms of the story on the underlying profitability, yes, I mean just to be very clear that the cost saves that we expect to see by the end of 2023 of $3 billion, which we think you can price into 2024, some of that has been realized. But as I -- the way I would think about it is there is work that's ongoing, and we expect that the greater than $3 billion number is something that we'll see at the end of the year hitting through.

所以安德魯，就——是的，就——而言，我將首先考慮第二點。就基本盈利能力而言，是的，我的意思是要非常清楚地表明，我們預計到 2023 年底將節省 30 億美元的成本，我們認為您可以將其計入 2024 年的價格，其中一些已經已實現。但就我而言，我的想法是，有一些工作正在進行中，我們預計到今年年底我們將看到超過 30 億美元的數字。

I would continue to reemphasize the funding cost point that was in 2Q that will benefit 3Q and fully in 4Q that helps. And then the stabilization of as flows and all that will sort of hit through as we go on an underlying basis. And as I said, we expect to break even in the third quarter coming out of roughly a $300 million-plus improvement and then to be positive in 4Q for the reasons that I mentioned.

我將繼續再次強調第二季度的融資成本點，這將使第三季度受益，並在第四季度完全有所幫助。然後隨著我們在基礎上的發展，流量的穩定以及所有這些都會發生。正如我所說，我們預計在第三季度實現盈虧平衡，實現約 3 億美元以上的改善，然後由於我提到的原因，在第四季度實現正值。

In terms of the restructuring you asked about, we'll come back in further details in terms of how much restructuring specifically they'll be. We're giving a perspective that we expect the number to be broadly offset by the pull-to-par effects. But at this point in time, we're going to need to detail that out through the business planning process and come back as we have said in -- with our fourth quarter earnings.

關於你提到的重組，我們將進一步詳細說明重組的具體規模。我們給出的觀點是，我們預計這一數字將被拉平效應廣泛抵消。但此時此刻，我們需要通過業務規劃流程詳細說明這一點，並像我們在第四季度收益中所說的那樣回來。

The last question is from Vishal Shah from Morgan Stanley.

最後一個問題來自摩根士丹利的 Vishal Shah。

My first one is on Wealth Management. Just wanted to get a sense on how you are assessing the business overlaps in that segment or you've had further chance to sort of look at different regions and how to respond to all the ongoing competitive pressures and in terms of relationship managers and then sort of bankers in that segment. So if you could give a bit of an update on that side?

我的第一個主題是財富管理。只是想了解您如何評估該細分市場中的業務重疊，或者您有進一步的機會來研究不同的地區以及如何應對所有持續的競爭壓力以及關係經理的方面，然後進行排序該領域的銀行家。那麼您能否提供這方面的一些最新情況？

And then the second one is on the Investment Bank of CS noncore perimeter of $55 billion. I know in one of your slides, you have provided a natural runoff rate. But I was just trying to get a sense if you could provide any sort of color in terms of what is your sort of ambition on actively winding down this perimeter in terms of time line, i.e., could we expect the next 2 years, basically by '25, broadly most of this rundown to be done? Is that a fair assumption? Or are you looking at it in a bit of a different way?

第二個是在 CS 非核心領域的投資銀行，規模為 550 億美元。我知道在您的一張幻燈片中，您提供了自然徑流率。但我只是想了解一下，您是否可以提供任何形式的顏色，說明您在時間線方面積極縮小這一範圍的雄心是什麼，即我們是否可以預期未來兩年，基本上是通過'25，大致上這個清單的大部分內容要完成嗎？這是一個公平的假設嗎？或者你以不同的方式看待它？

Vishal, I mean I think on that second question, we've addressed that in the sense that we offer the natural rundown just given, of course, we have to take care and ensure that we're protecting our counterparties, and we're doing things in the best interest of the firm. And so on these positions that we will look strategically to exit them as quickly as possible. But at this point, I would say we'll come back and give you progress as we've done already in 2Q in terms of the actual RWA reduction relative to the natural runoff profile, we'll continue to do that. And to the extent we can give more color through any -- through our planning process, we will. But again, these are positions where we think, naturally, there will be strategic exits and opportunities that arise and not something we'll be disclosing.

維沙爾，我的意思是，我認為關於第二個問題，我們已經解決了這個問題，從我們提供剛才給出的自然概要的意義上來說，當然，我們必須小心並確保我們保護我們的交易對手，而且我們為公司的最大利益而做事。對於這些職位，我們將戰略性地尋求盡快退出。但在這一點上，我想說，我們會回來並為您帶來進展，就像我們在第二季度已經在相對於自然徑流剖面的實際 RWA 減少方面所做的那樣，我們將繼續這樣做。在某種程度上，我們可以通過任何方式——通過我們的規劃過程——提供更多的色彩，我們會的。但同樣，我們認為這些職位自然會出現戰略退出和機會，但我們不會披露這些內容。

In terms of your first question on Wealth Management and assessing business overlaps, I mean, in general, the way we approached integration is to look at Credit Suisse is adding value in a lot of the areas in which we already operate, but also, as Sergio mentioned, the areas where we have less of a presence. Brazil was mentioned. There are important parts of the Middle East, where that's the case, important parts of Southeast Asia, also much bigger in Europe overall.

關於你關於財富管理和評估業務重疊的第一個問題，我的意思是，總的來說，我們實現整合的方式是看看瑞士信貸正在為我們已經運營的許多領域增加價值，但同時，塞爾吉奧提到了我們較少涉足的領域。提到了巴西。中東有重要的地區，東南亞的重要地區，整個歐洲也有更大的地區。

So in terms of assessing the overlaps, I mean, in the end of the day, relationship managers have their client relationships, and we want to retain them all. And of course, we're looking at how to manage the business in the most efficient and effective way. I would make one additional comment, which is very important, which is that if announced the area market heads on a combined basis, and that was very important just in the last several weeks, and it was in the comment Sergio made as well because when we start integrating how we approach the market. And so we're in the market on an integrated basis, which, of course, just took time just -- even though we've moved quickly in the 2.5 months since we've closed to be in the market on an integrated basis, having market heads that have now been decided across Wealth Management on a combined and integrated basis is quite a step that helps us to manage some of the business overlaps and competitive pressures that you were asking about.

因此，在評估重疊方面，我的意思是，歸根結底，客戶關係經理擁有他們的客戶關係，我們希望保留所有客戶關係。當然，我們正在研究如何以最高效和最有效的方式管理業務。我想提出一個額外的評論，這一點非常重要，那就是，如果在合併的基礎上宣佈區域市場負責人，這在過去幾週內非常重要，塞爾吉奧也發表了評論，因為當我們開始整合我們進入市場的方式。因此，我們在綜合的基礎上進入市場，當然，這只是需要時間——儘管自從我們結束在綜合的基礎上進入市場以來，我們在 2.5 個月內採取了迅速的行動，現在，財富管理部門已經在綜合和整合的基礎上確定了市場負責人，這是一個相當大的步驟，可以幫助我們管理您所詢問的一些業務重疊和競爭壓力。

Okay. That was the last answer and questions. And we -- I'm sure we're going to have a chance to stay in touch between now and November 7 when we announce the Q3 results. For the time being, thank you for dialing in. Thanks for your questions. And well, as I said, looking forward to staying in touch. Thank you.

好的。這是最後的答案和問題。我確信從現在到 11 月 7 日公佈第三季度業績期間，我們將有機會保持聯繫。目前，感謝您撥入。感謝您的提問。好吧，正如我所說，期待保持聯繫。謝謝。

Ladies and gentlemen, the webcast and Q&A session for analysts and investors is over. You may disconnect your lines. We will now take a short break and continue with the media Q&A session at 10:45 CET. Thank you.

女士們、先生們，面向分析師和投資者的網絡直播和問答環節已經結束。您可以斷開線路。我們現在將稍作休息，並於歐洲中部時間 10:45 繼續媒體問答環節。謝謝。