摩根大通 (JPM) 2021 Q4 法說會逐字稿

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to JPMorgan Chase's Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2021 Earnings Call. This call is being recorded (Operator Instructions) We will now go live to the presentation. Please stand by.

早上好，女士們，先生們。歡迎參加摩根大通 2021 年第四季度和全年財報電話會議。正在錄製此通話（操作員說明）我們現在將進行演示。請待命。

At this time, I'd like to turn the call over to JPMorgan Chase's Chairman and CEO, Jamie Dimon; and Chief Financial Officer, Jeremy Barnum. Mr. Barnum. Please go ahead.

在這個時候，我想把電話轉給摩根大通的董事長兼首席執行官傑米戴蒙；和首席財務官傑里米·巴納姆。巴納姆先生。請繼續。

Thank you, operator. Good morning, everyone. The presentation is available on our website, and please refer to the disclaimer in the back. It's slightly longer this quarter to cover both our fourth quarter and full year results as well as spend some time talking about the outlook for next year.

謝謝你，接線員。大家，早安。該演示文稿可在我們的網站上找到，請參閱後面的免責聲明。本季度的時間稍長，以涵蓋我們的第四季度和全年業績，並花一些時間討論明年的前景。

Starting with the fourth quarter on Page 1. The firm reported net income of $10.4 billion, EPS of $3.33 on revenue of $30.3 billion and delivered an ROTCE of 19%. These results included a $1.8 billion net credit reserve release, which I'll cover in more detail shortly. Adjusting for this, we delivered a 17% ROTCE this quarter.

從第 1 頁的第四季度開始。該公司報告的淨收入為 104 億美元，每股收益為 3.33 美元，收入為 303 億美元，ROTCE 為 19%。這些結果包括 18 億美元的淨信貸儲備釋放，我將在稍後更詳細地介紹。對此進行調整後，我們本季度實現了 17% 的 ROTCE。

Touching on a few highlights. As we suggested last quarter, we have started to see a pickup in loan growth, 8% year-on-year and 3% quarter-on-quarter, ex-PPP, with a significant portion of this growth coming from AWM and Markets. But we're also seeing positive indicators in Card as well as increasing revolver utilization in C&I. And it was an exceptionally strong quarter for investment banking, particularly M&A, as well as another good quarter in AWM.

談到幾個亮點。正如我們上個季度所建議的那樣，我們已經開始看到貸款增長有所回升，同比增長 8%，環比增長 3%（不含 PPP），其中很大一部分增長來自 AWM 和市場。但我們也看到 Card 的積極指標以及 C&I 中左輪手槍的使用率增加。對於投資銀行業務（尤其是併購）而言，這是一個異常強勁的季度，也是 AWM 的另一個好季度。

On Page 2, we have some more detail on the fourth quarter. Revenue of $30.3 billion was up 1% year-on-year. Net interest income was up 3%, primarily driven by balance sheet growth, partially offset by lower CIB Markets NII. And NII was down 1%, largely driven by normalization in CIB Markets and lower production revenue in Home Lending, mostly offset by higher IB fees on strong advisory.

在第 2 頁，我們有更多關於第四季度的詳細信息。收入為 303 億美元，同比增長 1%。淨利息收入增長 3%，主要受資產負債表增長推動，部分被 CIB Markets NII 下降所抵消。 NII 下降了 1%，主要是由於 CIB 市場的正常化和房屋貸款的生產收入下降，大部分被強大的諮詢費用較高的 IB 費用所抵消。

You'll notice that we've added some memo lines to this page this quarter to show NII and NIR, excluding Markets, as well as the third line of stand-alone Markets total revenue, which, as we said before, is more consistent with the way we run the company. We'll be keeping this format going forward, and you'll see later that this is how we will talk about the outlook.

您會注意到，我們在本季度在此頁面中添加了一些備註行，以顯示不包括市場的 NII 和 NIR，以及獨立市場總收入的第三行，正如我們之前所說，更加一致以我們經營公司的方式。我們將繼續保持這種格式，稍後您會看到這就是我們談論前景的方式。

If you look at things on this basis, the drivers are the same, but the numbers are a little different. NII, excluding Markets, is up 4%. NIR, excluding Markets, is up 3%. And Markets is down 11% on normalization. Expenses of $17.9 billion were up $1.8 billion or 11%, largely on higher compensation. And credit costs were a net benefit of $1.3 billion, reflecting reserve releases.

如果你在這個基礎上看東西，驅動是一樣的，但數字有點不同。不包括市場的 NII 上漲了 4%。不包括市場的 NIR 上漲了 3%。市場在正常化後下跌了 11%。 179 億美元的支出增加了 18 億美元或 11%，主要是由於更高的薪酬。信貸成本為 13 億美元的淨收益，反映了儲備金的釋放。

Looking at the full year results on Page 3. The firm reported net income of $48.3 billion, EPS of $15.36 and record revenue of $125.3 billion. We delivered a return on tangible common equity of 23% or 18%, excluding the reserve releases.

查看第 3 頁的全年業績。該公司報告的淨收入為 483 億美元，每股收益為 15.36 美元，創紀錄的收入為 1253 億美元。我們的有形普通股回報率為 23% 或 18%，不包括儲備釋放。

And then on to reserves, Page 4. We released $1.8 billion this quarter, reflecting a more balanced outlook due to the continued resilience in the macroeconomic environment. Our outlook remains constructive, but our reserve balances still account for various sources of uncertainty and potential downside as a result of the remaining abnormal features of the economic environment.

然後是準備金，第 4 頁。本季度我們釋放了 18 億美元，這反映出由於宏觀經濟環境的持續彈性，前景更加平衡。我們的前景仍然具有建設性，但由於經濟環境仍存在異常特徵，我們的儲備餘額仍會導致各種不確定性和潛在下行空間。

On to balance sheet and capital on Page 5. We ended the quarter with a CET1 ratio of 13%, up slightly, and reflecting nearly $5 billion of capital distributions to shareholders, including $1.9 billion of net repurchases.

關於第 5 頁的資產負債表和資本。本季度末我們的 CET1 比率為 13%，略有上升，反映了近 50 億美元的股東資本分配，包括 19 億美元的淨回購。

With that, let's go to our businesses, starting with Consumer & Community Banking on Page 6. CCB reported net income of $4.2 billion, including reserve releases of $1.6 billion. Revenue of $12.3 billion was down 4% year-on-year and reflects lower production margins in Home Lending and higher acquisition costs in Card, partially offset by higher Asset Management fees in Consumer & Business Banking. Many of the key balance sheet drivers are in line with the prior quarter.

有了這個，讓我們來看看我們的業務，從第 6 頁的消費者和社區銀行業務開始。建行報告的淨收入為 42 億美元，其中包括 16 億美元的準備金釋放。收入為 123 億美元，同比下降 4%，反映出房屋貸款的生產利潤率下降和卡的購置成本增加，部分被消費者和商業銀行業務的資產管理費用增加所抵消。許多關鍵的資產負債表驅動因素與上一季度一致。

Deposits were up 20% year-on-year and 4% sequentially. And client investment assets were up 22% year-on-year, about evenly split between market performance and flows. Combined, credit and debit spend was up 27% versus the fourth quarter of '19, with each quarter in 2021 showing sequential growth compared to 2019. Within that, travel and entertainment spend was up 13% versus 4Q '19, though we have seen some softening in recent weeks contemporaneously with the Omicron wave.

存款同比增長 20%，環比增長 4%。客戶投資資產同比增長 22%，市場表現和流量基本平均分配。與 2019 年第四季度相比，信用卡和借記卡支出合計增長 27%，與 2019 年相比，2021 年每個季度均呈現環比增長。其中，旅遊和娛樂支出與 19 年第四季度相比增長 13%，儘管我們已經看到最近幾週與 Omicron 浪潮同時出現了一些疲軟。

Card outstandings were up 5% year-on-year but remained down 8% versus 4Q '19. However, it's promising to see that while revolving balances bottomed in May of 2021, since then, they've kept pace with 2019 growth rates.

信用卡未償付同比增長 5%，但與 19 年第四季度相比仍下降 8%。然而，有希望看到，雖然循環餘額在 2021 年 5 月觸底，但自那時以來，它們一直與 2019 年的增長率保持同步。

In Home Lending, loans were down 1% year-on-year, but up 1% quarter-on-quarter as prepayments have slowed. And it was another strong quarter for originations, totaling $42.2 billion, up 30% year-on-year. In fact, it was the highest fourth quarter since 2012, driven by increase in both purchase and refi volumes.

在房屋貸款方面，貸款同比下降 1%，但由於提前還款放緩，貸款環比增長 1%。這是另一個強勁的季度，總額為 422 億美元，同比增長 30%。事實上，這是自 2012 年以來第四季度的最高水平，這得益於購買量和再融資量的增長。

In Auto, average loans were up 7% year-on-year and up 1% quarter-on-quarter. After several strong quarters, the lack of vehicle supply resulted in a decline in originations to $8.5 billion, down 23% year-on-year. So overall, loans, ex-PPP, were up 2% year-on-year and sequentially, driven by Card and Auto. And expenses of $7.8 billion were up 10% year-on-year on higher compensation as well as continued investments in technology and marketing.

在汽車領域，平均貸款同比增長 7%，環比增長 1%。在經歷了幾個強勁的季度之後，汽車供應不足導致原產額下降至 85 億美元，同比下降 23%。因此，總體而言，在卡和汽車的推動下，除購買力平價外的貸款同比和環比增長 2%。由於更高的薪酬以及對技術和營銷的持續投資，78 億美元的支出同比增長 10%。

Next, the CIB on Page 7. CIB reported net income of $4.8 billion on revenue of $11.5 billion for the fourth quarter. And for the full year, net income was $21 billion on record revenue of $52 billion. Investment Banking revenue of $3.2 billion was up 28% versus the prior year and up 6% sequentially. IB fees were up 37% year-on-year, primarily driven by a strong performance in advisory. And we maintained our #1 rank with a full year wallet share of 9.5%.

接下來是第 7 頁的 CIB。CIB 報告第四季度的收入為 115 億美元，淨收入為 48 億美元。全年淨收入為 210 億美元，創紀錄的收入為 520 億美元。投資銀行業務收入為 32 億美元，同比增長 28%，環比增長 6%。 IB 費用同比增長 37%，主要受諮詢業務強勁表現的推動。我們以 9.5% 的全年錢包份額保持了我們的第一名。

In advisory, we were up 86%, and it was the third consecutive all-time record quarter benefiting from elevated M&A volumes that continued throughout 2021, specifically from mid-sized deals. Debt underwriting fees were up 14%, driven by an active leveraged loan market, primarily linked to acquisition financing. And in equity underwriting, fees were up 12%, primarily driven by our strong performance in IPOs.

在諮詢方面，我們增長了 86%，這是連續第三個創紀錄的季度，受益於整個 2021 年持續增長的併購量，特別是中型交易。在活躍的槓桿貸款市場（主要與收購融資相關）的推動下，債務承銷費上漲了 14%。在股票承銷方面，費用增長了 12%，主要是由於我們在 IPO 中的強勁表現。

Moving to Markets. Total revenue was $5.3 billion, down 11% against a record fourth quarter last year. Compared to 2019, we were up 7%, driven by a strong performance in equities. Fixed Income was down 16% year-on-year, reflecting a more difficult trading environment early in the quarter, especially in rates, as well as continued normalization from the favorable trading performance last year in currencies, emerging markets, credit and commodities.

轉移到市場。總收入為 53 億美元，比去年第四季度創紀錄的下降 11%。與 2019 年相比，在股市強勁表現的推動下，我們上漲了 7%。固定收益同比下降 16%，反映了本季度初的交易環境更加困難，尤其是利率，以及貨幣、新興市場、信貸和大宗商品去年良好的交易表現繼續正常化。

Equity Markets were down 2% on $2 billion of revenue as continued strength in prime was more than offset by modest weakness in derivatives. For the full year, equities revenue was $10.5 billion, up 22% and an all-time record. It was a particularly strong year for both Investment Banking and Markets. And looking ahead, we do expect some modest normalization of the wallet in 2022. However, for purposes of the first quarter in Investment Banking, the overall pipeline remains quite robust.

股票市場因 20 億美元的收入而下跌 2%，因為主要市場的持續強勁被衍生品的溫和疲軟所抵消。全年，股票收入為 105 億美元，增長 22%，創歷史新高。對於投資銀行和市場而言，這是特別強勁的一年。展望未來，我們確實預計 2022 年錢包會適度正常化。但是，就投資銀行業務的第一季度而言，整體管道仍然相當強勁。

Payments revenue was $1.8 billion, up 26% year-on-year or up 7%, excluding net gains on equity investments. And the year-on-year growth was from higher fees and deposits, largely offset by deposit margin compression. Securities Services revenue of $1.1 billion was flat year-on-year. Expenses of $5.8 billion were up 18% year-on-year, predominantly due to higher compensation as well as volume-related and legal expenses. And credit costs were a net benefit of $126 million, driven by the reserve release I mentioned upfront.

支付收入為 18 億美元，同比增長 26% 或增長 7%，不包括股權投資的淨收益。同比增長來自更高的費用和存款，很大程度上被存款保證金壓縮所抵消。證券服務收入為 11 億美元，與去年同期持平。 58 億美元的費用同比增長 18%，主要是由於更高的薪酬以及與數量相關的法律費用。在我前面提到的儲備金釋放的推動下，信貸成本帶來了 1.26 億美元的淨收益。

Moving to Commercial Banking on Page 8. Commercial Banking reported net income of $1.3 billion and an ROE of 20%. Revenue of $2.6 billion was up 6% year-on-year on record Investment Banking revenue, driven by continued strength in M&A and acquisition-related financing. Expenses of $1.1 billion were up 11% year-on-year, largely due to investments and higher volume and revenue-related expenses.

轉到第 8 頁的商業銀行業務。商業銀行業務報告的淨收入為 13 億美元，ROE 為 20%。在併購和收購相關融資持續強勁的推動下，投資銀行業務收入達到創紀錄的 26 億美元，同比增長 6%。 11 億美元的費用同比增長 11%，主要是由於投資以及與數量和收入相關的費用增加。

Deposits were up 8% sequentially on seasonality. Loans were down 1% year-on-year and up 2% sequentially, excluding PPP. C&I loans were up 4%, ex-PPP, primarily driven by higher revolver utilization and originations in middle markets and increased short-term financing and corporate client banking. CRE loans were up 1%, with higher new loan originations, offset by net payoff activity. And credit costs were a net benefit of $89 million, driven by reserve releases, with net charge-offs of 2 basis points.

季節性存款環比增長 8%。貸款同比下降 1%，環比增長 2%，不包括 PPP。 C&I 貸款增長 4%，不包括購買力平價，這主要是由於更高的左輪手槍利用率和中間市場的起源以及短期融資和企業客戶銀行業務的增加。 CRE 貸款增長 1%，新增貸款增加，但被淨償付活動抵消。在準備金釋放的推動下，信貸成本淨收益為 8900 萬美元，淨沖銷 2 個基點。

And then to complete our lines of business, AWM on Page 9. Asset & Wealth Management reported net income of $1.1 billion with a pretax margin of 34%. Revenue of $4.5 billion was up 16% year-on-year as higher management fees and growth in deposits and loans were partially offset by deposit margin compression. Expenses of $3 billion were up 9% year-on-year, predominantly driven by higher performance-related compensation and distribution fees.

然後為了完成我們的業務，AWM 在第 9 頁。資產和財富管理報告的淨收入為 11 億美元，稅前利潤率為 34%。收入 45 億美元，同比增長 16%，因為較高的管理費用和存貸款的增長被存款利潤率壓縮部分抵消。 30 億美元的費用同比增長 9%，主要是由於與業績相關的薪酬和分銷費用增加。

For the quarter, net long-term inflows were $34 billion and, for the full year, were positive across all channels, asset classes and regions, totaling a record $164 billion. AUM of $3.1 trillion and overall client assets of $4.3 trillion, up 15% and 18% year-on-year, respectively, were driven by strong net inflows and higher market levels. And finally, loans were up 4% quarter-on-quarter, with continued strength in custom lending, mortgages and securities-based lending, while deposits were up 15% sequentially.

本季度的長期淨流入為 340 億美元，全年所有渠道、資產類別和地區的淨流入為正，總計達到創紀錄的 1640 億美元。強勁的淨流入和更高的市場水平推動了 3.1 萬億美元的 AUM 和 4.3 萬億美元的整體客戶資產，同比分別增長 15% 和 18%。最後，貸款環比增長 4%，定制貸款、抵押貸款和證券貸款持續強勁，而存款環比增長 15%。

Turning to Corporate on Page 10. Corporate reported a net loss of $1.1 billion. Revenue was a loss of $545 million, down $296 million year-on-year. NII was up $160 million, primarily on higher rates, mostly offset by continued deposit growth. And NIR was down $456 million, primarily due to lower net gains on legacy equity investments. Expenses of $251 million were down $110 million year-on-year.

轉到第 10 頁的企業。企業報告淨虧損 11 億美元。收入虧損 5.45 億美元，同比減少 2.96 億美元。 NII 增加了 1.6 億美元，主要是由於較高的利率，大部分被存款的持續增長所抵消。 NIR 下降了 4.56 億美元，主要是由於傳統股權投資的淨收益下降。費用為 2.51 億美元，同比減少 1.1 億美元。

So with that, as we close the books on 2021, we think it's important to take a step back and look at the performance over the last few years through the volatility of the COVID period, and then pivot to discussing the 2022 and medium-term outlook. So turning to Page 11. What stands out is the stability of both revenues and returns through a very volatile period, especially when you strip out the reserve build and subsequent releases in 2020 and 2021.

因此，在我們結束 2021 年的賬簿時，我們認為重要的是退後一步，通過 COVID 時期的波動來審視過去幾年的表現，然後轉向討論 2022 年和中期外表。所以轉到第 11 頁。最突出的是收入和回報在一個非常不穩定的時期內的穩定性，尤其是當您剔除儲備金以及 2020 年和 2021 年的後續版本時。

If you look at the revenue drivers on the bottom left-hand side of the page, you see overall revenue growth with some significant diversification benefits. NII, ex-Markets, was down nearly 20% on the headwinds of lower rates and card revolve that we've discussed throughout the year. This was partially offset by significant NIR growth, ex-Markets, largely from higher IB fees and AWM management and performance fees. And we also saw strength across products and regions in CIB Markets as the extraordinary market environment in 2020 did not normalize as much as we expected in 2021.

如果您查看頁面左下角的收入驅動因素，您會看到整體收入增長以及一些顯著的多元化收益。 NII，ex-Markets，在我們全年討論的較低利率和卡旋轉的逆風中下跌了近 20%。這部分被市場前 NIR 的顯著增長所抵消，主要來自更高的 IB 費用和 AWM 管理和績效費用。由於 2020 年非凡的市場環境並沒有像我們在 2021 年預期的那樣正常化，我們還看到了 CIB Markets 跨產品和區域的實力。

So when you look across the company, we saw consistent modest revenue growth as well as good performance in the areas that we control, notably, staying in front of our clients to serve them well and managing our risks effectively resulting in quite stable returns, once again proving the power of the JPMorgan Chase platform.

因此，縱觀整個公司，我們看到了持續適度的收入增長以及我們控制的領域的良好表現，特別是站在客戶面前為他們提供良好的服務並有效地管理我們的風險，從而獲得相當穩定的回報，一旦再次證明了摩根大通平台的力量。

So turning to the next page. The strong revenue performance and consistent returns have further bolstered our confidence in forging ahead with an investment strategy designed to ensure that we're prepared for the long term. On the left-hand side of the page, you can see the expense drivers from 2019 to 2021. The first bar is structural. And while the growth of 2% is modest over the 2-year period, that includes some COVID-related effects that we would see as temporary, including, for example, lower T&E spend and elevated employee attrition. And we do expect some catch-up in those effects as we look forward.

於是翻到下一頁。強勁的收入表現和持續的回報進一步增強了我們通過旨在確保我們為長期做好準備的投資策略而勇往直前的信心。在頁面的左側，您可以看到 2019 年至 2021 年的費用驅動因素。第一個欄是結構性的。雖然 2% 的增長在 2 年內是溫和的，但其中包括一些與 COVID 相關的影響，我們認為這些影響是暫時的，例如，降低 T&E 支出和增加員工流失率。我們確實希望在我們期待的過程中能夠趕上這些影響。

Then the middle bar is $3.4 billion of growth in volume and revenue-related expenses. Some significant portion of that is driven by increases in incentive compensation, primarily from Investment Banking, Markets and Asset & Wealth Management, the major areas where we have seen exceptionally strong results and where changes in compensation are more closely linked to changes in performance.

然後中間條是 34 億美元的銷量增長和與收入相關的費用。其中很大一部分是由激勵薪酬的增加推動的，主要來自投資銀行、市場和資產與財富管理，我們在這些主要領域看到了異常強勁的業績，薪酬的變化與業績的變化更密切相關。

And remember, we've seen a lot of market appreciation and strong flows in AWM and CCB. So don't assume all of this is CIB as you look forward because there are some versions of the world where the markets and fee, well, it goes one way, and AUM goes the opposite way.

請記住，我們已經看到 AWM 和建行的大量市場升值和強勁流動。所以不要假設所有這一切都是你所期待的 CIB，因為在世界的某些版本中，市場和費用，嗯，它是單向的，而 AUM 是相反的。

And then this bar also includes volume-related noncomp expenses such as brokerage and distribution fees, some of which are true expenses and some of which are bottom line neutral because they're offset with revenue gross-ups. Then the last bar of $1.7 billion, as previewed with you this time last year, is a result of our investment agenda, which we've been executing largely according to our plans and consistent with our long-standing priorities.

然後這個欄還包括與數量相關的非補償費用，例如經紀和分銷費用，其中一些是真實的費用，其中一些是底線中性的，因為它們被收入總額所抵消。然後，去年這個時候與您一起預覽的最後一個 17 億美元是我們投資議程的結果，我們一直在按照我們的計劃執行，並與我們的長期優先事項保持一致。

You can see the breakdown of the total investment spend on the right-hand side of the page, $9.6 billion growing to $11.3 billion across the categories that we've often discussed. We're continuing to broaden our footprint and expand our distribution network. Then marketing, where the significant increase in spend as part of the reopening in the second half of last year resulted in a full year spend comparable to 2019.

您可以在頁面右側看到總投資支出的細目，在我們經常討論的類別中，從 96 億美元增長到 113 億美元。我們將繼續擴大我們的足跡並擴大我們的分銷網絡。然後是營銷，作為去年下半年重新開放的一部分，支出的顯著增加導致全年支出與 2019 年相當。

And tech, which we've broadened to include tech-adjacent spend, reflecting our recognition that tech means more than just software development. It encompasses data and analytics, AI as well as the physical aspects of modernization, such as data centers. And what's really powerful to note here is our ability to make these investments, which are quite significant in dollar terms and are designed to secure our future, while still delivering excellent current returns.

還有技術，我們已將其擴大到包括技術相關支出，這反映了我們認識到技術不僅僅意味著軟件開發。它包括數據和分析、人工智能以及現代化的物理方面，例如數據中心。這裡真正值得注意的是我們進行這些投資的能力，這些投資以美元計算非常重要，旨在確保我們的未來，同時仍然提供出色的當前回報。

So over the next few pages, let's double-click into some of these investment areas to see what we're doing, starting with examples of marketing and distribution on Page 13. We've expanded our reach across the U.S. and are thrilled to be the first bank in all contiguous 48 states, an important milestone in our branch market expansion plans.

因此，在接下來的幾頁中，讓我們雙擊其中一些投資領域，看看我們在做什麼，從第 13 頁的營銷和分銷示例開始。我們已經擴大了在美國的影響力，很高興能成為在所有連續 48 個州的第一家銀行，這是我們分行市場擴張計劃的重要里程碑。

We also continue to expand internationally, including 13 international markets as part of our Commercial Bank expansion, China in both our CIB and AWM businesses, and in the U.K. with Chase U.K., where we've seen exciting progress since we launched in September, although we expect this to be a multiyear journey before having a measurable impact on the firm overall.

我們還繼續在國際上擴張，包括作為商業銀行擴張的一部分的 13 個國際市場，我們在 CIB 和 AWM 業務中的中國市場，以及在英國與 Chase UK 的合作，自 9 月推出以來，我們已經看到了令人興奮的進展，儘管我們預計這將是一個多年的旅程，然後才能對整個公司產生可衡量的影響。

We continue to hire bankers and advisers in Investment Banking, private banking and wealth management, really across all of the wholesale and consumer footprint, where we believe we have opportunities to better penetrate geographies and sectors to continue to grow share. And as I just said, the point of our investment strategy is to secure the future of the company. So we're not making short-term claims about share outcome causality, but as you can see at the bottom of the page, our market shares are robust and growing broadly across the company.

我們繼續聘請投資銀行、私人銀行和財富管理領域的銀行家和顧問，真正涵蓋所有批發和消費者足跡，我們相信我們有機會更好地滲透到地區和行業以繼續增加份額。正如我剛才所說，我們投資戰略的重點是確保公司的未來。因此，我們不會對股票結果的因果關係做出短期聲明，但正如您在頁面底部看到的那樣，我們的市場份額強勁，並且在整個公司範圍內廣泛增長。

Turning to Page 14. In addition to all of our distribution-related investments, a critical foundational component of our strategy is technology, where we spend over $12 billion annually, with about half of that being investments or, as we sometimes call it, change the bank spend.

轉到第 14 頁。除了我們所有與分銷相關的投資外，我們戰略的一個關鍵基礎組成部分是技術，我們每年在技術上的支出超過 120 億美元，其中大約一半是投資，或者，我們有時稱之為變革銀行消費。

It's important to understand what's in the investment category. About half of that is foundational and mandatory, which includes regulatory-related investments, modernization and the retirement of technical debt, in addition to other key strategic initiatives to help us face the future.

了解投資類別中的內容很重要。其中大約一半是基礎性和強制性的，其中包括與監管相關的投資、現代化和技術債務的償還，以及其他幫助我們面對未來的關鍵戰略舉措。

On the left-hand side, you can see some more detail around this. Modernization, which includes migrations to the cloud as well as upgrading legacy infrastructure and architecture; data strategy that enables us to extract the value that exists in our proprietary data set by cleaning it and staging it in the right ways and then deploying modern techniques against it; attracting and acquiring top talent with modern skills; and a product operating model, which is obviously a popular buzzword these days.

在左側，您可以看到更多細節。現代化，包括遷移到雲以及升級舊的基礎設施和架構；數據策略使我們能夠通過清理並以正確的方式對其進行分級，然後針對它部署現代技術來提取我們專有數據集中存在的價值；吸引和獲取具有現代技能的頂尖人才；以及產品運營模式，這顯然是當今流行的流行語。

But if you look through all that, it reflects the simple reality that the best products get delivered when developers and business owners are working together iteratively with end-to-end ownership. Underpinning all of this is our continued emphasis on cybersecurity to protect the firm and our clients and customers as well as maintaining a sound control environment.

但是，如果您仔細觀察所有這些，它反映了一個簡單的現實，即當開發人員和企業所有者以端到端的所有權迭代地合作時，可以交付最好的產品。所有這一切的基礎是我們對網絡安全的持續重視，以保護公司、我們的客戶和客戶，並保持良好的控制環境。

Moving to the right-hand side. The other half of the investment spend is to drive innovation across our businesses and with our client-facing products. We believe it's critical to identify and resolve customer pain points and improve the user experience. And we're attacking the problem with a combination of building, partnering and buying.

移動到右手邊。投資支出的另一半用於推動我們的業務和麵向客戶的產品的創新。我們認為識別和解決客戶痛點並改善用戶體驗至關重要。我們正在通過構建、合作和購買相結合的方式來解決這個問題。

And so a few examples of that. On the retail side, we've been able to digitalize existing product offerings with applications like Chase MyHome and launch a cloud native digital bank with our recent Chase U.K. launch. On the wholesale side, we've continued to innovate on our Execute trading platform, commercialized blockchain through Onyx and are building out Real-Time Payments capabilities.

舉幾個例子。在零售方面，我們已經能夠使用 Chase MyHome 等應用程序將現有產品數字化，並通過我們最近推出的 Chase U.K. 推出雲原生數字銀行。在批發方面，我們繼續在我們的 Execute 交易平台上進行創新，通過 Onyx 將區塊鏈商業化，並正在構建實時支付功能。

In addition, our modernization allows us to more efficiently partner with or acquire more digitally centered companies. And you can see several examples of this on the page. So taken together, our strategy and investments are critical to ensuring that we can compete with the most innovative players out there, whether we're the ones pushing the envelope of innovation or responding quickly to the creativity of our competitors but doing so at scale.

此外，我們的現代化使我們能夠更有效地與更多以數字為中心的公司合作或收購。你可以在頁面上看到幾個這樣的例子。因此，綜上所述，我們的戰略和投資對於確保我們能夠與最具創新性的參與者競爭至關重要，無論我們是推動創新的極限，還是快速響應競爭對手的創造力，但要大規模地這樣做。

With that, let's talk about the outlook and the year ahead, starting on Page 15. As you'll remember from Daniel's comments in December, the 17% that we have talked about as a medium-term ROTCE target is not realistic for 2022. We do expect to see some tailwinds to NII, including the benefit of the latest implieds and the expectation that card revolve rates will increase.

有了這個，讓我們從第 15 頁開始討論展望和未來一年。正如您從丹尼爾 12 月的評論中所記得的那樣，我們所說的 17% 作為中期 ROTCE 目標對於 2022 年是不現實的。我們確實預計 NII 會出現一些順風，包括最新隱含的好處以及卡片循環率將增加的預期。

But the headwinds likely exceed the tailwinds as capital markets normalize off an elevated wallet, and we continue to make additional investments, as well as the impact of inflationary pressures. However, despite these potential challenges for the near-term outlook, we do continue to believe in 17% ROTCE as our central case for the medium term as rates continue to move higher, and we realize business growth, driven by our investments.

但隨著資本市場在高額錢包下正常化，逆風可能超過順風，我們繼續進行額外投資，以及通脹壓力的影響。然而，儘管短期前景面臨這些潛在挑戰，但隨著利率繼續走高，我們仍然相信 17% 的 ROTCE 是我們中期的核心案例，並且我們在投資的推動下實現了業務增長。

So let us try to give you more detail around forward-looking drivers that could be headwinds or tailwinds. So first, the rate curve. Our central case does not require a return to a 2.5% Fed funds target rate as the current forward curve only prices in 625 basis point hikes over the next 3 years.

因此，讓我們嘗試為您提供更多關於可能是逆風或順風的前瞻性驅動因素的詳細信息。首先，利率曲線。我們的中心案例不需要回到 2.5% 的聯邦基金目標利率，因為當前的遠期曲線僅反映未來 3 年加息 625 個基點。

Assuming we realize the forward curve, from there, we see the outcomes as being relatively symmetric, with plus or minus 175 basis points of ROTCE impact as a reasonable range relative to our central case. And of course, there are obviously any number of rate paths to get there, which could produce different outcomes over the near term.

假設我們意識到遠期曲線，從那裡，我們認為結果是相對對稱的，相對於我們的中心案例，ROTCE 影響正負 175 個基點是一個合理的範圍。當然，顯然有任何數量的利率路徑可以到達那裡，這可能會在短期內產生不同的結果。

In this illustration, the downside assumes that rates stay relatively constant to current spot rates, whereas upside would be driven by a combination of a steeper yield curve and more hikes together with a more favorable deposit reprice experience. And of course, what we are evaluating here is the impact of rates in isolation on NII. But for the performance of the company as a whole, credit matters a lot. And the reason why rates are higher will have an impact on that.

在此圖中，下行假設利率相對於當前即期利率保持相對恆定，而上行將由更陡峭的收益率曲線和更多加息以及更有利的存款重新定價經驗共同推動。當然，我們在這裡評估的是孤立利率對 NII 的影響。但對於整個公司的業績而言，信用非常重要。利率較高的原因將對此產生影響。

In markets and banking, we feel good about the share we've taken. And there are reasons why the beginning of a rate hiking cycle could be quite healthy for fixed income revenues in particular, at least in the sense that it might provide a partial offset to what we would otherwise expect in terms of post-COVID revenue normalization.

在市場和銀行業，我們對我們所獲得的份額感覺良好。加息週期的開始對於固定收益收入來說可能是非常健康的，這是有原因的，至少從某種意義上說，它可能會部分抵消我們在 COVID 後收入正常化方面的預期。

In our central case, markets and banking normalized somewhat in 2022 relative to their respective record years in 2020 and 2021 and resume modest growth thereafter. The downside case assumes a return to 2019 trend line levels with sub-GDP growth rates, whereas the upside case assumes continued growth from current elevated levels.

在我們的中心案例中，相對於 2020 年和 2021 年各自的創紀錄年份，市場和銀行業在 2022 年有所恢復，此後恢復適度增長。下行情況假設以低於 GDP 的增長率回到 2019 年趨勢線水平，而上行情況假設從目前的高水平繼續增長。

As we've been discussing in consumer, the big surprise as we emerge from the worst moments of the pandemic was the lower level of card revolve even as spend has started to return. In our central case, we assume healthy sales growth on the back of continued economic recovery and strong account acquisitions. And that, combined with relatively constant revolve rates, generates a strong recovery in revolving balances.

正如我們一直在消費者中討論的那樣，當我們從大流行的最糟糕時刻中走出來時，最大的驚喜是，即使支出已經開始恢復，卡的旋轉水平也較低。在我們的中心案例中，我們假設在持續的經濟復甦和強勁的客戶獲取的支持下，銷售增長穩健。再加上相對恆定的周轉率，周轉餘額強勁復甦。

But there are those who worry about a permanent structural shift in consumer behavior, which could be a source of downside. And in that scenario, revolving balances could stay depressed relative to the long-term pre-pandemic averages, resulting in approximately 50 basis points of downside relative to our central case. Of course, there could be an upside case where revolving balances recover much faster, but we believe the risks here are more likely to be skewed to the downside.

但也有人擔心消費者行為的永久性結構性轉變，這可能是不利因素。在這種情況下，相對於大流行前的長期平均水平，循環餘額可能會保持低迷，導致相對於我們的中心情況下降約 50 個基點。當然，可能存在循環餘額恢復得更快的上行情況，但我們認為這裡的風險更有可能偏向下行。

And then let's touch on inflation for a second, which is obviously increasingly relevant. On balance, modest inflation that leads to higher rates is good for us. But under some scenarios, elevated inflationary pressures on expenses could more than offset the rates benefit, which could represent around 75 basis points of downside.

然後讓我們先談談通貨膨脹，這顯然越來越重要。總的來說，導致更高利率的適度通脹對我們有利。但在某些情況下，支出的通脹壓力上升可能會抵消利率收益，這可能代表約 75 個基點的下行空間。

And while it's not on the page, another key driver is capital, where, even though we remain hopeful, our central case assumes no recalibration of the rules and that we will operate at a higher CET1, reflecting that we finished the year in the 4.5% G-SIB bucket, which equates to a 1% increase from G-SIB in the central case, although, as a reminder, that does not become binding until 2024. This is a good opportunity to point out that QE deposit growth and growth of the overall financial system proxied by GDP growth of the factors in the original 2015 rule release, combined, represent two full G-SIB buckets.

雖然它不在頁面上，但另一個關鍵驅動因素是資本，儘管我們仍然充滿希望，但我們的核心案例假設沒有重新校準規則，並且我們將以更高的 CET1 運營，這反映了我們在 4.5 中完成了這一年% G-SIB 桶，這相當於在中心案例中比 G-SIB 增加 1%，儘管提醒一下，直到 2024 年才具有約束力。這是指出 QE 存款增長和增長的好機會由原始 2015 年規則發布中的因素的 GDP 增長所代表的整個金融體系的總和代表兩個完整的 G-SIB 桶。

So in the absence of those, we would still be in the 3.5% bucket. With that in mind, any recalibration could be a tailwind. And each 1% change in the CET1 level is worth about 150 basis points of ROTCE. And to be clear, for simplicity, we've assumed a normal credit environment in the analysis on the page. So when we take a step back, 17% remains our central case in the medium term. But over the next 1 to 2 years, we expect to earn modestly below that target.

因此，如果沒有這些，我們仍將處於 3.5% 的桶中。考慮到這一點，任何重新校準都可能是順風。而 CET1 水平每變化 1%，就價值約 150 個基點的 ROTCE。為了清楚起見，為簡單起見，我們在頁面上的分析中假設了正常的信用環境。因此，當我們退後一步時，17% 仍然是我們在中期的核心案例。但在接下來的 1 到 2 年，我們預計收入將略低於該目標。

In light of all that, let's talk about near-term guidance on Page 16. We expect NII, excluding Markets, to be roughly $50 billion in 2022, up approximately $5.5 billion from 2021. As I mentioned upfront, this is a change relative to how we've previously guided as we feel that the ups and downs of Markets' NII can be a distraction when the vast majority of that variation is likely to be bottom line neutral.

有鑑於此，讓我們在第 16 頁討論近期指引。我們預計 2022 年不包括市場的 NII 約為 500 億美元，比 2021 年增加約 55 億美元。正如我前面提到的，這是相對於我們之前的指導方式，因為我們認為市場 NII 的起伏可能會分散注意力，而絕大多數這種變化可能是底線中性的。

Looking at the key drivers of that for 2022, there are a few major factors. Rates. With the market implieds suggesting approximately 3 hikes later this year and the recent steepening of the yield curve, we would expect to see about $2.5 billion more NII from that effect. You can see at the bottom right, we've shown you the third quarter earnings at-risk and an estimate of what we would expect to disclose in the 10-K, reflecting the year-end rate curve and changes in the portfolio composition.

縱觀 2022 年的主要驅動因素，有幾個主要因素。費率。由於市場暗示今年晚些時候大約有 3 次加息以及近期收益率曲線變陡，我們預計該效應將增加約 25 億美元的 NII。您可以在右下角看到，我們向您展示了第三季度面臨風險的收益以及我們預計在 10-K 中披露的估計值，反映了年終利率曲線和投資組合構成的變化。

And as we note in our quarterly filings, there are lots of reasons to be careful in trying to use EIR to predict NII changes under real-world conditions. But at a high level, if you look at the numbers on the bottom right and what's happening to the yield curve recently, you should find the $2.5 billion increase relatively intuitive.

正如我們在季度報告中指出的那樣，在嘗試使用 EIR 來預測現實條件下的 NII 變化時，有很多理由要小心謹慎。但在較高的水平上，如果您查看右下角的數字以及收益率曲線最近發生的情況，您應該會發現 25 億美元的增長相對直觀。

Then balance sheet growth and mix, where we are expecting higher spend and new originations to drive revolving balances back to 2019 levels, and also benefiting from securities deployment towards the end of 2021 and into 2022. And partially offsetting both of those factors is the roll-off of PPP. So while we do expect NII to increase year-on-year, depending on the path of rates, it may take a couple of years to return to the full NII-generating capacity of the company.

然後是資產負債表增長和混合，我們預計更高的支出和新的發起將推動循環餘額回到 2019 年的水平，並且還受益於 2021 年底和 2022 年的證券部署。部分抵消這兩個因素的是滾動-關閉 PPP。因此，雖然我們確實預計 NII 會同比增加，但取決於利率的路徑，可能需要幾年時間才能恢復公司的全部 NII 生成能力。

Turning to Page 17. As we said at the outset of this section, we are in for a couple of years of sub-target returns. Despite this, we are going to continue to invest, and we're not going to let temporary headwinds distract us from critical strategic ambitions.

轉到第 17 頁。正如我們在本節開頭所說，我們將獲得幾年的次目標回報。儘管如此，我們將繼續投資，我們不會讓暫時的逆風分散我們對關鍵戰略雄心的注意力。

And so looking at adjusted expenses, we expect roughly $77 billion in 2022, an increase of about $6 billion year-on-year or 8%. And before we go into the breakdown, it's worth noting, while the year-on-year increase is eye-catching, a meaningful portion of it is actually the annualization of post-reopening trends from the second half of 2021 across various categories.

因此，從調整後的費用來看，我們預計 2022 年約為 770 億美元，同比增長約 60 億美元或 8%。在我們進行細分之前，值得注意的是，雖然同比增長引人注目，但其中一個有意義的部分實際上是從 2021 年下半年開始各個類別的重新開放後趨勢的年度化。

So starting with the first bucket on the page, which is the structural expense increase. As I alluded to earlier, we are seeing some catch-up this year, both from the impact of inflation and our compensation expenses as well as higher noncomp expense with the resumption of T&E, then volume and revenue-related expenses. Remember that this is both comp and noncomp.

所以從頁面上的第一個桶開始，這是結構性費用的增加。正如我之前提到的，今年我們看到了一些追趕，包括通貨膨脹和我們的補償費用的影響，以及隨著 T&E 的恢復而增加的非補償費用，然後是與數量和收入相關的費用。請記住，這既是 comp 又是 noncomp。

From a comp perspective, to the extent we are assuming some normalization of capital markets revenues, there should be a tailwind here. But keep in mind a couple of points. The normalization assumption for Markets and IB fees at this point is pretty modest. And our assumption for AUM is for modest increases. At the same time, we have the impact of volume growth on noncomp, both in Wholesale and in Consumer, which is offset by lower Auto lease depreciation.

從比較的角度來看，就我們假設資本市場收入正常化的程度而言，這裡應該有順風。但請記住幾點。目前市場和 IB 費用的正常化假設相當適中。我們對 AUM 的假設是適度增加。同時，我們對批發和消費者的非競爭性業務量增長產生了影響，這被較低的汽車租賃折舊率所抵消。

And most importantly, we are adding another $3.5 billion of investments, which, I would note, includes the run rate impact of our acquisitions as well as some of the run rate effects that I just mentioned and reflects similar themes to the ones I discussed earlier. As I wrap up, it's another good moment to stop and note how privileged we are to have the financial strength and the earnings-generating capacity to absorb these inflationary pressures while also making critical investments to secure the future of the company.

最重要的是，我們正在增加另外 35 億美元的投資，我要指出，其中包括我們收購的運行率影響以及我剛才提到的一些運行率影響，反映了與我之前討論的主題相似的主題.在我結束時，這是另一個停下來並註意我們有多麼榮幸擁有財務實力和創收能力來吸收這些通脹壓力，同時還進行關鍵投資以確保公司未來的好時機。

So in closing, on Page 18, we're happy with what we've been able to achieve over the last 2 years, not only the business results, some of which are highlighted here on the page, but also continuing to serve our customers, clients and communities, and importantly, executing on our strategic priorities. As we look ahead, we will continue to invest and innovate to build and strengthen this franchise for the long term. And while there may be headwinds in the near term as we continue to work through the consequences of the pandemic, we've never felt better about the company and our position in this very competitive dynamic landscape.

最後，在第 18 頁，我們對過去 2 年所取得的成就感到滿意，不僅是業務成果，其中一些在頁面上突出顯示，而且還繼續為我們的客戶服務、客戶和社區，重要的是，執行我們的戰略重點。展望未來，我們將繼續投資和創新，以長期建立和加強這個特許經營權。儘管在我們繼續努力應對大流行的後果時，短期內可能會遇到逆風，但我們對公司和我們在這個競爭激烈的動態環境中的地位從未有過更好的感覺。

So with that, operator, please open the line for Q&A.

因此，接線員，請打開問答線。

(Operator Instructions) And our first question is coming from the line of Erika Najarian from UBS.

（操作員說明）我們的第一個問題來自瑞銀集團的 Erika Najarian。

Jeremy, my first question is for you, and it's on Page 16, and it's a two-part question on this guidance. The first is, could you help us size the timing and magnitude of deposit beta that you presume in this $50 billion number as well as the size of securities deployment?

傑里米，我的第一個問題是給你的，它在第 16 頁，它是關於本指南的一個由兩部分組成的問題。首先是，您能否幫助我們確定您在這個 500 億美元的數字中假設的存款貝塔的時間和規模以及證券部署的規模？

And the second part to that question is, clearly, we're missing that white box, right, in terms of CIB Markets' contribution. And if you could give us sort of rails to think about CIB Markets in light of your comments about more modest normalization versus the idea that this business is naturally liability sensitive?

這個問題的第二部分顯然是，就 CIB Markets 的貢獻而言，我們錯過了那個白盒子。如果您可以根據您對更適度的正常化的評論與該業務自然對責任敏感的想法給我們一些關於 CIB Markets 的思考？

Right. Okay. So three questions in there. Let me take them one at a time. So beta. At the end of the day, the reprice experience is going to be a function of the competitive environment. But for the purposes of working through the guidance, I can tell you that we're assuming that this hiking cycle is going to be generally similar to the prior hiking cycle, all else equal.

正確的。好的。所以里面有三個問題。讓我一個接一個。所以貝塔。歸根結底，重新定價體驗將取決於競爭環境。但為了完成指導的目的，我可以告訴你，我們假設這個徒步旅行週期與之前的徒步旅行週期大致相似，其他一切都相同。

The environment is a little bit different in some important respects. So I think the system this time around is flushed with deposits, is flushed with liquidity in a way that it wasn't before. So that could, at the margin, make the reprice a little bit slower.

環境在一些重要方面略有不同。所以我認為這一次的系統充斥著存款，以前所未有的方式充斥著流動性。因此，在邊際上，這可能會使重新定價稍慢一些。

On the other hand, the competitive environment is different, especially with some of the neo bank entrants, and that could go in the other direction. So it will be what it will be. But for the purposes of the guidance, we're assuming a reprice experience that's similar to what we experienced in the prior cycle.

另一方面，競爭環境不同，尤其是一些新銀行進入者，這可能會朝著另一個方向發展。所以它會是什麼。但出於指導的目的，我們假設重新定價體驗類似於我們在上一個週期中的體驗。

In terms of deployment, obviously, deployment is going to be a situational decision. But if you're looking at the $4 billion bar on Page 16, securities deployment is a modest contributor to that $4 billion number. The bulk of it is the loan growth narrative, particularly in Card.

在部署方面，顯然，部署將是一個情境決定。但是，如果您查看第 16 頁上的 40 億美元條形圖，證券部署對 40 億美元的數字貢獻不大。其中大部分是貸款增長的敘述，尤其是在 Card 中。

And then in terms of Markets NII, the whole point of not guiding explicitly to Markets NII is to avoid getting distracted by the noise there, which can come from a lot of really kind of irrelevant places, like interest rate hikes in Brazil and cash versus futures positions, which is the example I'd like to give. But big picture, if you need something for your model or whatever, there's a couple of things we could suggest.

然後就 Markets NII 而言，不明確指導 Markets NII 的全部目的是避免被那裡的噪音分散注意力，這些噪音可能來自許多真正不相關的地方，比如巴西的加息和現金兌現期貨頭寸，這是我想舉的例子。但是大局觀，如果您需要為您的模型或其他東西提供一些東西，我們可以提出一些建議。

So if you look at the supplement, we've actually been disclosing the Markets NII number for some time in the supplement. So you actually have a pretty decent time series of that number over time. If you regress that thing against the Fed funds rate, you'll actually see that there's a pretty clear negative correlation there. And so you can draw some conclusions from that.

因此，如果您查看補編，我們實際上已經在補編中披露 Markets NII 編號已有一段時間了。所以隨著時間的推移，你實際上有一個相當不錯的時間序列。如果你把這個東西與聯邦基金利率進行回歸，你實際上會發現那裡有一個非常明顯的負相關。所以你可以從中得出一些結論。

But I just will point out that like in any given moment, relatively small changes to the mix of the Markets balance sheet can really change the NII quite significantly, even in an environment of no policy rate changes. So it's sort of like a health warning against putting too much emphasis on that projection.

但我只想指出，就像在任何特定時刻一樣，市場資產負債表組合的相對較小的變化確實可以相當顯著地改變 NII，即使在沒有政策利率變化的環境中也是如此。所以這有點像一個健康警告，不要過分強調這個預測。

Very clear. My second compound question is on capital, if you could give us an update. I know that January 1 is the adoption for SA-CCR. If you could give us an estimate on the impact to CET1? And just to clarify, that 17% medium-term ROTCE does take into account that your G-SIB surcharge is 4.5%?

非常清楚。我的第二個複合問題是關於資本的，如果你能給我們一個更新。我知道 1 月 1 日是 SA-CCR 的採用。能否給我們估計一下對 CET1 的影響？澄清一下，17% 的中期 ROTCE 確實考慮到了您的 G-SIB 附加費為 4.5%？

Yes. So let me do the second one first. So in short, yes. So as I said in the script, we are not assuming any recalibration in that 17% target. So that does mean 4.5% G-SIB in the equity component of that number. In terms of SA-CCR, the impact of SA-CCR adoption was about $40 million of standardized RWA. So I think if you do the math, that's like 10 basis points of CET1.

是的。所以讓我先做第二個。簡而言之，是的。因此，正如我在腳本中所說，我們不假設對 17% 的目標進行任何重新校準。所以這確實意味著該數字的股票部分中有 4.5% 的 G-SIB。在 SA-CCR 方面，採用 SA-CCR 的影響約為 4000 萬美元的標準化 RWA。所以我認為如果你做數學，這就像 CET1 的 10 個基點。

Our next question is coming from John McDonald from Autonomous Research.

我們的下一個問題來自 Autonomous Research 的 John McDonald。

Jeremy, I want to follow up on that. Maybe a broader discussion on how you're managing the capital constraints, these SLRs and the rising G-SIB. And what does it mean for balancing share buybacks, which obviously reduced this quarter, preferred issuance and other levers that you have?

傑里米，我想跟進。也許更廣泛地討論您如何管理資本限制、這些 SLR 和不斷上升的 G-SIB。這對於平衡本季度明顯減少的股票回購、優先發行和您擁有的其他槓桿意味著什麼？

Yes. So as you know, John, in terms of share buybacks, that's at the bottom of our capital stack. So to the extent that we're seeing robust loan growth, other opportunities to invest in the business as well as potential M&A opportunities, those are all going to come ahead of buybacks. And so I don't want to sort of guide on our buyback plans for next year, which, under SCB, as you know, are really quite flexible as a function of the earnings generation outcomes of the capital build.

是的。如你所知，約翰，就股票回購而言，這是我們資本堆棧的底部。因此，就我們看到強勁的貸款增長、其他投資業務的機會以及潛在的併購機會而言，這些都將在回購之前出現。因此，我不想為我們明年的回購計劃提供指導，正如你所知，在渣打銀行的領導下，作為資本建設的創收結果的函數，該計劃非常靈活。

But you can kind of draw your own conclusions in terms of the growth and the minimums that we see in the future as well as the loan growth as well as some of the investments that we're making. And frankly, we're kind of happy about that. That's just -- we want the capital to be used that way rather than being used for buybacks.

但是您可以就增長和我們在未來看到的最低限度以及貸款增長以及我們正在進行的一些投資得出自己的結論。坦率地說，我們對此感到有點高興。那隻是 - 我們希望以這種方式使用資金，而不是用於回購。

Okay. And then as the follow-up, maybe compound follow-up. The new CET1 target, or where you expect to kind of run this year, if you could clarify that. And also, any color on the modest normalization of the FICC and equities wallets that you could flush out?

好的。然後作為後續，也許是複合後續。新的 CET1 目標，或者你希望今年運行的地方，如果你能澄清一下的話。此外，您可以清除 FICC 和股票錢包的適度正常化的任何顏色嗎？

Yes. So in terms of the target, I mean, I said previously that 12% was not off the table, and that remains true. Depending on the outcome of the rule side, depending on the Basel III end game, depending on all the various components, you can see a world where 12% remains the minimum.

是的。所以就目標而言，我的意思是，我之前說過 12% 並沒有被排除在外，這仍然是正確的。取決於規則方面的結果，取決於巴塞爾協議 III 的最終結果，取決於所有不同的組成部分，你可以看到 12% 仍然是最低限度的世界。

But as you can see, and as I said in response to Erika a second ago, the 17% target assumes something closer to 13% as a function of the expected increases in G-SIB and some other factors. So we're kind of going to operate in that type of range throughout the year with obviously the flexibility that we have.

但正如你所看到的，正如我在一秒鐘前回應 Erika 時所說的那樣，17% 的目標假設接近 13% 作為 G-SIB 的預期增長和其他一些因素的函數。因此，我們將全年在這種類型的範圍內運營，顯然我們擁有的靈活性。

And then, sorry, you also asked about normalization of Markets and IB fees. I mean, I would say, if you'd asked in the middle of the year, we were talking a little bit about thinking that a reversion to 2019 run rate was a thing that like could happen in theory.

然後，抱歉，您還詢問了市場和 IB 費用的正常化。我的意思是，我會說，如果你在年中問過，我們談論的是認為恢復到 2019 年的運行率是理論上可能發生的事情。

The way we feel right now, our central case is, obviously, that we will see some normalization from exceptionally strong performance, both in IB fees and in Markets. But I think we're expecting that normalization to be a little bit less, like we're near all the way down to the 2019 levels, partially because the banking pipeline is really very robust.

顯然，我們現在的感覺是，我們將看到異常強勁的表現（無論是在 IB 費用還是在市場方面）的正常化。但我認為我們預計正常化會少一點，就像我們一直接近 2019 年的水平一樣，部分原因是銀行渠道確實非常強勁。

We feel good about the kind of organic growth in equities and some of the share gains there. And then in fixed income, we've already seen a decent amount of normalization there actually. And as the monetary policy environment evolves next year, that could actually create some tailwinds for that business.

我們對股票的有機增長以及那裡的一些份額收益感到滿意。然後在固定收益方面，我們實際上已經看到了相當多的正常化。隨著明年貨幣政策環境的演變，這實際上可能為該業務創造一些順風。

Next up, we have Glenn Schorr from Evercore ISI.

接下來，我們有來自 Evercore ISI 的 Glenn Schorr。

I wonder if I could ask a little follow-up on the expense side. Slide 17 breaks [a lot out]. First, I'm curious on -- if I overgeneralize and say, 40% [you used to call] structural comp normalization and a 60% investment -- and thank you, I just saw a further breakout in the bottom of the slide. But the question I have is how much of that 60%, the higher volume, the investments, has investments made? In other words, you made 11 either M&A deals or investments over the last like 15 months. How much of that is related to that coming through the P&L? Or straight-up brand-new investments for '22 entering for all those items that you listed below?

我想知道我是否可以在費用方面進行一些跟進。幻燈片 17 中斷 [很多]。首先，我很好奇——如果我過度概括地說，40% [你曾經稱之為] 結構性補償正常化和 60% 的投資——謝謝你，我剛剛在幻燈片底部看到了進一步的突破。但我的問題是，在這 60% 中，投資量越大，投資了多少？換句話說，在過去的 15 個月裡，您進行了 11 筆併購交易或投資。其中有多少與通過損益表產生的相關？還是為 '22 進入您在下面列出的所有項目中的直接全新投資？

Right. Okay. I think I get your question, Glenn. So number one, to the extent that we've done some M&A over the last 15 months, as you allude to, and that, that has introduced some expenses into the run rate, the run rate impact of that is in the $3.5 billion. It's a relatively modest contribution. On the top of my head, I want to say it's probably like $300 million or something like that. So it could be a little bit more, depending on some factors. So that's one point.

正確的。好的。我想我明白了你的問題，格倫。所以第一，就我們在過去 15 個月裡進行的一些併購而言，正如你所提到的，這已經在運行率中引入了一些費用，運行率的影響是 35 億美元。這是一個相對適度的貢獻。在我的腦海中，我想說這可能是 3 億美元或類似的東西。所以它可能會更多一點，這取決於一些因素。所以這是一點。

The other point is that there are different types of investments here. So if you look at, for example, the change in the marketing expense and the marketing investments that come through marketing expense in Card, a lot of the decisioning of that actually happened as part of the reopening in the middle of the year. So that's actually already in the run rate. Whereas, other aspects of the investment agenda are obviously thinks that we're executing now, expanding in places, hiring people, hiring technologists to do things that we need to do. So hopefully, that answers your question.

另一點是這裡有不同類型的投資。因此，例如，如果您看一下營銷費用的變化以及通過 Card 營銷費用帶來的營銷投資，很多決策實際上都是在年中重新開放時發生的。所以這實際上已經在運行速度中。然而，投資議程的其他方面顯然是認為我們現在正在執行、在地方擴張、僱用人員、僱用技術人員來做我們需要做的事情。所以希望這能回答你的問題。

And maybe if I could just ask a very general question. I think people get normalizing capital markets and a higher investment spend, then that adds up to falling short of the 17%, over time, target. The question -- the simple question I have is the fact that you've mentioned multiyear shortfall, is that a function of timing of NII going full run rate with the timing of capital markets, sort of, and the higher [generator], as you just answered with John's question?

也許我可以問一個非常籠統的問題。我認為人們得到正常化的資本市場和更高的投資支出，隨著時間的推移，這加起來沒有達到 17% 的目標。問題——我的一個簡單問題是，你提到了多年短缺的事實，是 NII 全面運行時間與資本市場時間的函數，以及更高的 [發電機]，如你剛剛回答了約翰的問題？

Yes. Your line is breaking up a tiny bit, but I think I basically hear your question. And I think the simple answer is yes. So in other words, we're sort of saying that as we -- as the environment continues to normalize in a variety of ways, so that includes policy rate normalization, rate curve normalization as well as run rate normalization and Markets revenues, with the sort of some background expectation of growth in our Markets and Investment Banking revenues.

是的。你的線路有點中斷，但我想我基本上聽到了你的問題。我認為簡單的答案是肯定的。所以換句話說，我們有點說，隨著環境繼續以各種方式正常化，包括政策利率正常化、利率曲線正常化以及運行利率正常化和市場收入，隨著對我們的市場和投資銀行業務收入增長的某種背景預期。

With the background expectation of growth, and when all of that plays out and is finished playing out, we believe we should be back to 17%, all else equal. So the -- you can kind of see -- it's not that long, if you know what I mean, in terms of like what the current forwards imply about when you get back to a sort of more normalized policy rate environment.

在增長的背景預期下，當所有這些都結束並結束時，我們相信我們應該回到 17%，其他條件相同。所以 - 你可以看到 - 如果你明白我的意思，就當你回到一種更加正常化的政策利率環境時，當前遠期意味著什麼，它並沒有那麼長。

John (sic) [Glenn], I would just like to add, we don't really know about 2023. And I'd be very cautious in that. Plus I expect more interest rates increases than is in the implied curve. And obviously, the world is very competitive.

約翰（原文如此）[格倫]，我想補充一下，我們真的不知道 2023 年。我會非常謹慎。另外，我預計利率上升幅度將超過隱含曲線。顯然，這個世界競爭非常激烈。

I also want to point out that a 17% return on tangible equity, if we can get that for the rest of our lives, would be exceptional. So reconfirming that, that's kind of what we think we can do is pretty good. By the way, I would say 15% on tangible equity for the rest of my life, if I can guarantee that.

我還想指出，17% 的有形資產回報率，如果我們能在餘生中得到這個回報，那將是非常出色的。因此，再次確認這一點，這是我們認為我們可以做的非常好的事情。順便說一句，如果我能保證的話，我會說在我的餘生中有 15% 的有形資產。

Next up is a question from Ken Usdin from Jefferies.

接下來是 Jefferies 的 Ken Usdin 提出的問題。

I wanted to ask you just a couple of more questions on loans. You mentioned that you're starting to see some better activity. I wanted to just ask if you can kind of just flesh out what you're seeing across corporate lending, commercial lending, noticing that the wholesale-related commitments were actually down 3% sequentially. So can you kind of just talk us through what clients are saying and doing? And just how strong can that rebound on the corporate and commercial side could we see as we go forward?

我想再問你幾個關於貸款的問題。你提到你開始看到一些更好的活動。我想問你是否可以充實一下你在企業貸款、商業貸款中看到的情況，注意到與批發相關的承諾實際上環比下降了 3%。那麼你能不能簡單地告訴我們客戶在說什麼和做什麼？在我們前進的過程中，我們能看到企業和商業方面的反彈有多強？

Sure. Yes. So in terms of C&I loan growth, as I said in the script, we are seeing an uptick in revolver utilization rates, especially in the commercial bank. And it remains sort of skewed to the smaller clients. But we are starting to see an uptick in that, actually, even in the bigger clients. So that's, I guess, an encouraging sign.

當然。是的。因此，就 C&I 貸款增長而言，正如我在腳本中所說，我們看到左輪手槍使用率上升，尤其是在商業銀行。而且它仍然偏向於較小的客戶。但實際上，即使在更大的客戶中，我們也開始看到這種情況有所上升。所以，我想，這是一個令人鼓舞的跡象。

One of the things I've heard from the folks who run those businesses is that one driver of that is CEOs and management teams, who've been burned by low inventory levels as a result of the supply chain problems, wanting to run higher inventories. And that is maybe driving higher utilization there which, as a result, while it would, I guess, theoretically be a relatively permanent increase in utilization, it is not a thing that you can sort of project forward in terms of compounding the growth.

我從經營這些企業的人那裡聽到的一件事是，其中一個驅動因素是 CEO 和管理團隊，他們因供應鏈問題而被低庫存水平所燒毀，想要提高庫存.這可能會推動那裡更高的利用率，因此，雖然我想，理論上它會相對永久地提高利用率，但就複合增長而言，這不是你可以預測的事情。

But at the same time, we're also hearing really quite a bit of confidence in the C-suites and, all else equal, that should be positive for C&I loan growth. But clearly, the levels there are modest still in a world where capital markets have been exceptionally receptive to investment-grade issuance, in particular, and more recently, the high-yield issuance throughout the sort of pandemic period. And so people are well funded from capital markets issuance.

但與此同時，我們也聽到了對高管層的信心，而且在其他條件相同的情況下，這應該對工商業貸款增長有利。但顯然，在資本市場異常接受投資級發行，尤其是最近，在整個大流行期間的高收益發行的世界中，該水平仍然不高。因此，人們從資本市場發行中獲得了充足的資金。

Okay. Second question is just on fees. There are a couple of zigs and zags in mortgage banking, securities servicing, which were both down a little bit more than expected, and Card did get a little bit better. Can you just kind of give us a little bit of color on the drivers of each of those, please?

好的。第二個問題只是關於費用。抵押貸款銀行業務、證券服務領域出現了一些曲折，兩者的下降都比預期的要多一些，而 Card 確實有所好轉。請您給我們一點關於每個驅動程序的顏色，好嗎？

Yes, sure. So there's a lot of stuff in there. So let me do mortgage and cards. So in mortgage, you'll see that if you sort of try to do a margin calculation by taking the production revenue and dividing it and so on, you do see an apparently significant drop in margin there.

是的，當然。所以里面有很多東西。所以讓我做抵押和信用卡。因此，在抵押貸款中，您會看到，如果您嘗試通過獲取生產收入並對其進行除以等等來進行利潤率計算，您確實會看到那裡的利潤率明顯顯著下降。

So there's a few drivers of that. One is the margins were actually slightly elevated in the prior quarter as a result of the timing of the flow-through of the loan-specific pricing adjustments. So that's one factor.

所以有一些驅動因素。一是由於特定貸款定價調整的流通時間，上一季度的利潤率實際上略有提高。所以這是一個因素。

In addition, you actually -- we did -- despite the fact that it was an exceptionally strong overall quarter of originations and for funded loans, as we started to see higher rates towards the end of the quarter, we did see the dynamic that you would expect in terms of drop in saleable new lock volume and so on. So that's a little bit of a factor.

此外，您實際上 - 我們確實做到了 - 儘管這是一個異常強勁的整體季度發起和融資貸款，因為我們在本季度末開始看到更高的利率，我們確實看到了您的動態預計可銷售的新鎖數量會下降等等。所以這是一個小因素。

And then there's the sort of the normal organic dynamics, where you tend to see margin compression in mortgage, with rates selling off a little bit. So you have a bunch of factors driving a slightly lower number there, but the overall mortgage environment is quite healthy. And though, obviously, with higher rates, we expect things to be weaker next year. We're still predicting a $3 trillion mortgage market next year, which, by historical standards, is very robust. So that's that part.

然後是那種正常的有機動態，您往往會看到抵押貸款的保證金壓縮，利率略有下降。所以你有很多因素導致那裡的數字略低，但整體抵押貸款環境相當健康。不過，顯然，隨著利率的提高，我們預計明年的情況會更弱。我們仍然預測明年將有 3 萬億美元的抵押貸款市場，按照歷史標準，這個市場非常強勁。這就是那部分。

And then in Card, I imagine that you're looking at the Card income line, where we had a significant drop last quarter. And this quarter, the number is also sort of relatively depressed relative to what we had 2 quarters ago when it was quite high.

然後在 Card 中，我想您正在查看 Card 收入線，上個季度我們的收入大幅下降。而本季度，與我們兩個季度前相當高的數字相比，這個數字也相對較低。

So you'll remember that for Card income, we had a sort of one-off item last quarter depressing the number. This quarter, we have another sort of one-off-ish type item, which is the impact of the Southwest co-brand renegotiation, which is public. So that's contributing to the Card income line and to the revenue rate a little bit.

所以你會記得，對於卡收入，我們在上個季度有一種一次性項目壓低了這個數字。本季度，我們有另一種一次性類型的項目，這是西南聯合品牌重新談判的影響，它是公開的。因此，這對卡收入線和收入率有所貢獻。

But it's important to note that in the background of all this is the impact of the customer acquisition amortization account for revenue expense, which, as you know, amortizes over 12 months. And so as I mentioned earlier, as part of the big sort of increase in customer engagement, as part of the reopening in the middle of the year, we ramped that up quite significantly to 100,000 point offers in the market and stuff like that. And so that's coming through the numbers.

但重要的是要注意，在所有這一切的背景下，客戶獲取攤銷賬戶對收入費用的影響，如您所知，該賬戶攤銷超過 12 個月。正如我之前提到的，作為客戶參與度大幅提高的一部分，作為年中重新開放的一部分，我們將市場上的報價大幅提高到 100,000 點等。所以這是通過數字來的。

So as a result, when you look at the sort of full year revenue rate for Card of around 10%, we actually see that as a reasonable central case for next year with the sort of elevated marketing and customer acquisition amortization being offset, obviously, by expected growth in NII with the revolve narrative that we've laid out.

因此，當您查看大約 10% 的 Card 全年收入率時，我們實際上認為這是明年的一個合理的中心案例，顯然，較高的營銷和客戶獲取攤銷被抵消了，通過我們制定的旋轉敘述，NII 的預期增長。

Sir, that question is from Jim Mitchell coming from Seaport Research.

先生，這個問題來自 Seaport Research 的 Jim Mitchell。

Just -- you guys are doubling the investment spend, so clearly seeing success in the prior efforts. So can you just give us a little bit big picture discussion on what you're seeing from a return on investment standpoint and what time frame? Because I think you kind of alluded to 2023 still being a little bit subpar in return. So does that mean the payback is a little longer, and you still expect significant growth in investment spend in '23?

只是 - 你們正在將投資支出翻倍，因此清楚地看到之前的努力取得了成功。那麼，您能否就您從投資回報的角度和時間框架所看到的內容，給我們一些大的圖景討論？因為我認為您在某種程度上暗示了 2023 年的回報率仍然有點低。那麼這是否意味著回報會更長一些，並且您仍然預計 23 年的投資支出會顯著增長？

Yes, sure. So I mean, at some level, the question that you're asking is this perennial question of how can we be sure that the investments that we're making are paying back and on what time line and how do we measure that? And it's interesting. We were just talking about Card marketing. I think of that as a continuum.

是的，當然。所以我的意思是，在某種程度上，你要問的問題是一個長期存在的問題，即我們如何確保我們所做的投資得到回報，以及在什麼時間線以及我們如何衡量？這很有趣。我們只是在談論卡片營銷。我認為這是一個連續體。

You have continuum of investments that start with Card marketing, where every dollar that we put into a Card marketing investment is part of a very sophisticated, extremely data-driven, highly measurable set of decisioning to ensure that all of those are accretive and when we have sort of measurable outcomes in the short term. So there's a lot of science there, and it's pretty precise, and you get feedback pretty quickly.

您有從卡片營銷開始的連續投資，我們投入卡片營銷投資的每一美元都是非常複雜、極其數據驅動、高度可衡量的決策的一部分，以確保所有這些都是增值的，當我們在短期內有某種可衡量的結果。所以那裡有很多科學，而且非常精確，你很快就會得到反饋。

At the other end of the continuum is tech modernization type stuff, which is a big part of the theme right now. And those things are things that are just we obviously need to do them. If we don't do them, we'll be clunky and inefficient and hamstrung in the future when we're trying to compete. And it's impossible to prove in some narrow financial sense that there is a tangible return payback from that, but we know that they're absolutely mandatory.

在連續體的另一端是技術現代化類型的東西，這是目前主題的重要組成部分。這些事情是我們顯然需要做的事情。如果我們不這樣做，我們將在未來嘗試競爭時變得笨拙、效率低下並且手足無措。並且不可能從某種狹隘的財務意義上證明這會帶來切實的回報，但我們知道它們絕對是強制性的。

So when we think a little bit about the revenue outlook in our kind of normalized run rate, we are certainly assuming that many of the investments that we're making now and that we've made over the last couple of years will produce the revenues that we expect in that time horizon. But a lot of what we're doing is not of that nature. And in some sense, those are actually the most important investments because they're the hardest decisions to make.

因此，當我們稍微考慮一下我們正常運行率的收入前景時，我們肯定會假設我們現在正在進行的以及過去幾年所做的許多投資將產生收入我們期望在那個時間範圍內。但是我們正在做的很多事情都不是那種性質的。從某種意義上說，這些實際上是最重要的投資，因為它們是最難做出的決定。

And some are very basic. Opening 400 branches, $800 million a year, obviously, the payback comes over time. Adding thousands of sales people kind of know pretty much what the payback is, but obviously, it comes over time. And so it's a whole mix. And just think about it is, expenses, you should expect to go up a little bit in 2023.

有些是非常基本的。開設 400 家分店，每年 8 億美元，顯然，回報會隨著時間的推移而出現。增加成千上萬的銷售人員幾乎知道回報是什麼，但顯然，它會隨著時間的推移而出現。所以這是一個完整的組合。想想看，費用，你應該預計到 2023 年會略有上升。

All right. That's helpful. And then just a follow-up on -- just on the NII. I think futures markets are now pricing in the four hikes. I think you have three in your assumptions. If we do get a four hikes starting in March, is that a material change to the NII outlook for this year in your models?

好的。這很有幫助。然後只是對 NII 的跟進。我認為期貨市場現在正在為四次加息定價。我認為你的假設有三個。如果我們確實從 3 月開始進行四次加息，這對你們模型今年的 NII 前景是否有重大變化？

Yes. So if you look at the bottom left-hand side of Page 16, Footnote 3, an extremely small print, you will note that the implied curve that we use is from January 5. So you can take that curve and whatever the current curve is and use the table on the bottom right and add a long list of caveats that I won't give you and draw your own conclusions. But I mean, it should be a modest increase, modest additional tailwind. Very modest.

是的。因此，如果您查看第 16 頁腳註 3 的左下角，這是一個極小的字體，您會注意到我們使用的隱含曲線是從 1 月 5 日開始的。所以您可以採用該曲線以及當前曲線是什麼並使用右下角的表格並添加一長串我不會給您的警告並得出您自己的結論。但我的意思是，這應該是適度的增長，適度的額外順風。很謙虛。

While we wait for the next question, I said something inaccurate before. I realized I wasn't that confident when I said it. The $40 billion standardized RWA increase in SA-CCR, if you do the math, is obviously not 10 basis points of CET1. It's 30 basis points of CET1. So correction coming through there.

在我們等待下一個問題的時候，我之前說了一些不准確的話。當我說這句話時，我意識到我並沒有那麼自信。如果你算一下，SA-CCR 中 400 億美元的標準化 RWA 增加顯然不是 CET1 的 10 個基點。這是 CET1 的 30 個基點。所以修正通過那裡。

Next we have a question from Betsy Graseck from Morgan Stanley.

接下來我們有一個來自摩根士丹利的 Betsy Graseck 的問題。

Okay. So a couple of questions. First, on the NII outlook, could you give us a sense as to what's embedded in that with regard to your thoughts on how balance sheet shrinkage at the Fed, right, the QT is going to impact the liquidity pool? And then how much of that liquidity pool you currently are assuming is going to get redeployed into the more duration in your forward look?

好的。所以有幾個問題。首先，關於 NII 的前景，您能否讓我們了解一下您對美聯儲資產負債表收縮的看法，QT 將如何影響流動性池？然後，您目前假設的流動資金池中有多少將被重新部署到您的前瞻中更長的期限？

Yes, sure. So I mean, I forgot exactly what the market is assuming about the start of QT at this point, QT2 as they're now calling it. But from us, and I looked closely, there was expected to be a pretty long lag between sort of the end of the hiking cycle and the beginning of QT2. Maybe people are now starting to accelerate that.

是的，當然。所以我的意思是，我完全忘記了市場在這一點上對 QT 開始的假設，他們現在稱之為 QT2。但在我們看來，我仔細觀察，預計在徒步旅行週期的結束和 QT2 的開始之間會有相當長的延遲。也許人們現在開始加速這一進程。

But in any case, the important point is that as a result of the acceleration of tapering, the amount of balance sheet growth is ending pretty quickly. And therefore, the impact on system-wide deposit growth should be quite modest this year. And that is -- and our assumptions are consistent with that. In other words, we're not assuming lots of deposit growth next year because, ultimately, that's going to be primarily as a function of the Fed balance sheet size. But obviously, we are still assuming modest growth rather than reduction as a function of QT, if you know what I'm saying.

但無論如何，重要的一點是，由於加速縮減，資產負債表的增長量很快就會結束。因此，今年對全系統存款增長的影響應該不大。那就是 - 我們的假設與此一致。換句話說，我們不會假設明年存款會大幅增長，因為最終這將主要取決於美聯儲資產負債表的規模。但顯然，如果你知道我在說什麼，我們仍然假設 QT 的函數是適度增長而不是減少。

And so -- then in terms of deployment, you can see in the supplement that we already did some deployment this quarter. It was primarily in the front of the curve. So we're still being quite cautious about really buying duration. But -- and if you look at, again, Page 16, you notice that we call out securities deployment as a modest driver of that $4 billion increase that's tied as balance sheet growth and mix. So it's reasonable to assume that we might be -- we might do a little bit of duration buying if the rate curve develops as the forwards predict, but it shouldn't be too dramatic.

因此，在部署方面，您可以在補充材料中看到我們本季度已經進行了一些部署。它主要位於曲線的前端。因此，我們仍然對真正購買久期持謹慎態度。但是 - 如果您再次查看第 16 頁，您會注意到我們將證券部署稱為 40 億美元增長的適度驅動力，這與資產負債表的增長和混合有關。因此有理由假設我們可能會 - 如果利率曲線如遠期預測的那樣發展，我們可能會做一些久期購買，但它不應該太戲劇化。

Okay. And then my second question is just on the investments, the $3.5 billion that you've got incremental here. And I assume that this is built up bottoms up from business unit leaders' requests to do everything that you mentioned in the call. And my question here is what percentage, roughly, like just got numbers, but what percentage are you giving them this year? In other words, if they ask for 7, you're giving them 3.5%, and we should expect another uptick materially in 2023?

好的。然後我的第二個問題是關於投資，你在這裡增加的 35 億美元。而且我認為這是自下而上建立的業務部門領導要求做你在電話中提到的所有事情。我的問題是，大概是多少百分比，就像剛剛得到的數字一樣，但是今年你給他們的百分比是多少？換句話說，如果他們要求 7，你給他們 3.5%，我們應該期待在 2023 年再次大幅上漲嗎？

I know, Jamie, you mentioned 77% is a run rate that we should grow from next year. But I'm kind of asking a slightly different question, which is how much of what they need are you giving them this year? And a subset question is, at what point -- does this fully fund your ability to get into the cloud for U.S. consumer?

我知道，傑米，你提到 77% 是我們應該從明年開始增長的運行率。但我有點問一個稍微不同的問題，那就是今年你給了他們多少他們需要的東西？一個子問題是，在什麼時候 - 這是否完全支持您為美國消費者進入雲計算的能力？

Okay. How do you answer that question? We do not sit at the table and tell people you can only do x. We sit at a table and ask people what do you want to do? So think of it, it's 100% within our capability because some things you just simply can't do. You can't attack 14 funds at the same time or something like that. And the -- that's number one.

好的。你如何回答這個問題？我們不會坐在桌旁告訴人們你只能做 x。我們坐在一張桌子旁，問人們你想做什麼？所以想一想，這 100% 在我們的能力範圍內，因為有些事情你根本做不到。你不能同時攻擊 14 只基金或類似的東西。而且 - 這是第一。

So we want to make those kind of investments. Each one goes through kind of rigorous process as is necessary. Some of them are table stakes. I do remember sitting around the table one day and people talking about digital account opening and do NPV. I was like just don't do an NPV. Just get it done. That's just serving your client properly and stuff like that.

所以我們想做這樣的投資。每個人都經過必要的嚴格過程。其中一些是賭注。我確實記得有一天坐在桌子旁，人們談論開設數字賬戶並進行 NPV。我就像只是不做NPV。把它做好。那隻是正確地為您的客戶服務以及類似的東西。

And so -- and like as I said, a lot of you -- I mean, Jeremy mentioned it's 400 branch in the United States. It's 13 sites overseas. It's more countries, more products. It's all the things we should be doing that you'd want to do if you owned 100% of the company. So it may not be what you do if you have to meet NII next quarter of X, Y or Z or something like that.

所以——就像我說的，你們中的很多人——我的意思是，傑里米提到它在美國有400家分公司。它在海外有 13 個站點。更多的國家，更多的產品。如果您擁有公司 100% 的股份，這就是我們應該做的所有事情。因此，如果您必須在 X、Y 或 Z 或類似的情況下與 NII 會面，您可能不會這樣做。

So -- and the second part of your question, it wasn't that, it was the consumer digital and stuff like that. We're not going to start giving you real numbers and all that, but that is a march. That's a journey, and it's hard. And we want to get there as soon as possible. Pieces and pockets have already gotten there. So certain applications and certain datasets are already running on the private cloud, somewhere in the public cloud, some parts of the company ahead of other parts of the companies, that's a lot of work.

所以 - 你問題的第二部分，不是那個，而是消費者數字和類似的東西。我們不會開始給你真實的數字之類的，但那是一場遊行。這是一段旅程，而且很艱難。我們希望盡快到達那裡。碎片和口袋已經到了那裡。所以某些應用程序和某些數據集已經在私有云上運行，在公共雲的某個地方，公司的某些部分領先於公司的其他部分，這是很多工作。

And there is -- you guys have pointed a little bit call it bubbles expression there. We're not going to disclose that either, because then we just got a doctor closing 84 other bubble expenses. Those are our responsibility. And to the extent we have opportunities to do more, we will do more. We have extraordinary capability.

還有——你們已經指出了一點，稱之為氣泡表達。我們也不會透露這一點，因為那時我們剛剛有一位醫生關閉了其他 84 項泡沫費用。這些是我們的責任。如果我們有機會做得更多，我們就會做得更多。我們有非凡的能力。

And I think -- I just also want to point out, Jeremy, you mentioned the assumptions around capital. I mean, SLR, G-SIFI, and most of the other -- should be recalibrated, okay? Even the regulars say these things should be recalibrated for the global side, the global economy. If you put capital against treasuries and capital Fed deposits and let's see what happens.

我想——我還想指出，傑里米，你提到了關於資本的假設。我的意思是，SLR、G-SIFI 和其他大多數——應該重新校準，好嗎？就連常客也表示，這些事情應該針對全球、全球經濟重新調整。如果您將資本與國債和美聯儲資本存款相提並論，讓我們看看會發生什麼。

So we -- on that, we're kind of conservative. We're not going to be expecting a lot of relief. But even some of the folks yesterday we mentioned that were being questioned prospects were being questioned about SLR, acknowledge that there are issues around SLR that are not good for the markets.

所以我們 - 在這方面，我們有點保守。我們不會期待很多緩解。但即使是我們昨天提到的一些被質疑前景的人也被質疑 SLR，承認 SLR 存在不利於市場的問題。

And Betsy, the only thing I want to add to that, which I was going to basically say the same thing, this whole like ask for 10 and hope to get 5. I mean, we would -- we aim to manage the company much better than that. So I certainly don't have that type of authority. That's not the way it works.

Betsy，我唯一想補充的是，我基本上會說同樣的話，整個就像要求 10 並希望得到 5。我的意思是，我們會 - 我們的目標是管理公司比那更好。所以我當然沒有那種權力。這不是它的工作方式。

And I think the important point is that what actually happens is a ton of scrutiny of the investment agenda 2 or 3 levels down in the organization with a lot of discipline there. So that's where the conversations happen about whether this makes sense to you now, whether it's through our priority now, whether we have the capacity to do it, whether -- in the case of where the returns are measurable, where it's producing the right returns. And that's really part of how we operate the company and part of the discipline of the day to day.

而且我認為重要的一點是，實際發生的事情是對組織內 2 或 3 層的投資議程進行大量審查，那裡有很多紀律。因此，這就是關於這對你現在是否有意義、是否通過我們現在的優先事項、我們是否有能力這樣做、是否——在回報是可衡量的情況下，它在哪裡產生正確回報的對話發生的地方.這確實是我們運營公司的一部分，也是日常紀律的一部分。

Yes. I'd like to give you another example. If we can spend $2 billion more and get to the cloud tomorrow, I would do that in a second. All right.

是的。我想再舉一個例子。如果我們明天可以多花 20 億美元進入雲端，我會在一秒鐘內做到這一點。好的。

But this step function that we see this year -- I mean, given the pace of competition and the impact of everything that's going on, it's possible we could see this type of step function again.

但是我們今年看到的這個階梯函數——我的意思是，考慮到競爭的步伐和正在發生的一切的影響，我們有可能再次看到這種類型的階梯函數。

It's possible. But if it happens, it will be for a good reason. And I've read about the competition. There's global competition, there's nonbank competitions, direct fiber lending competition. There's change street competition, there's pseudo competition, there's fintech competition, there's PayPal competition. There's it's a lot of competition, and we intend to win. And sometimes you guys spend a few bucks.

這是可能的。但如果發生這種情況，那將是有充分理由的。我已經閱讀了有關比賽的信息。有全球競爭，有非銀行競爭，有直接纖維借貸競爭。有變化街頭競爭，有偽競爭，有金融科技競爭，有 PayPal 競爭。競爭很激烈，我們打算贏。有時你們會花幾塊錢。

Okay. I got it.

好的。我得到了它。

And I want to emphasize, too, embedded upon that, as we've always said, we're going to -- we want to be very, very competitive and pay. There's a $1 billion in merit increase. There's a lot more compensation for our top bankers and traders and managers who actually say, by the way, did an extraordinary job in the last couple of years delivering this stuff. And we will be competitive and pay. And if that squeezes margin a little bit for shareholders, so be it.

我也想強調，正如我們一直說的那樣，我們將要 - 我們想要非常非常有競爭力並支付報酬。功績增加了 10 億美元。對我們的頂級銀行家、交易員和經理來說，他們實際上說，順便說一句，在過去幾年裡，他們在提供這些東西方面做得非常出色。我們將具有競爭力和報酬。如果這會稍微擠壓股東的利潤，那就這樣吧。

And next up, we have Steve Chubak from Wolfe Research.

接下來，我們有來自 Wolfe Research 的 Steve Chubak。

So I want to start off with a question on capital. [Cos] highlighted in his swan song speech, the potential for Basel IV implementation, increasing capital requirements as much as 20% for select banks. While we haven't seen a formal proposal from the Fed, I was just hoping you could provide just some preliminary thoughts how you're handicapping the risk of higher RWA inflation ahead of Basel IV adoption? And to what extent is that contemplated in the updated ROTCE guidance?

所以我想從一個關於資本的問題開始。 [Cos] 在他的絕唱演講中強調了實施巴塞爾協議 IV 的潛力，將選定銀行的資本要求提高多達 20%。雖然我們還沒有看到美聯儲的正式提議，但我只是希望你能提供一些初步想法，你是如何在巴塞爾協議 IV 採用之前阻礙 RWA 通脹上升的風險的？更新後的 ROTCE 指南在多大程度上考慮了這一點？

Yes. So Steve...

是的。所以史蒂夫...

Don't give too much. Is it...

不要給太多。是嗎...

No, no.

不，不。

They were like 18 different things to it.

他們就像18個不同的東西。

No, it's fine. This is fine. It's a very reasonable question. So okay. So here you go. So when you look at the current state of the so-called Basel III endgame or Basel IV proposals, and you look at the RWA components of them in isolation, you've got the change in the credit conversion factors, which, all else equal, is a tailwind. You've got the fundamental review of the trading book, which is quite complicated and it's going to depend on institution by institution, but it's potentially, for some folks, a headwind. And then you've got the introduction of operational risk capital into standardized RWA.

不，還好。這可以。這是一個非常合理的問題。沒關係。所以給你。因此，當您查看所謂的巴塞爾協議 III 殘局或巴塞爾協議 IV 提案的當前狀態，並且孤立地查看它們的 RWA 組成部分時，您會發現信用轉換因子發生了變化，其他所有因素都相同, 是順風。您已經對交易賬簿進行了基本審查，這非常複雜，並且將取決於各個機構，但對於某些人來說，這可能是一個逆風。然後您將操作風險資本引入標準化 RWA。

And if you look at sort of central case estimates of all those things in a simple way, you will conclude that there's a bunch of RWA inflation. But a couple of things. First, this all takes place in the context of the global regulatory community, or at least, in the U.S., saying that the system has enough capital. And it doesn't actually need more capital. And it's important to realize, which...

如果您以簡單的方式查看所有這些事情的中心案例估計，您會得出結論，存在大量 RWA 通貨膨脹。但是有幾件事。首先，這一切都發生在全球監管界的背景下，或者至少在美國，說該系統有足夠的資本。它實際上並不需要更多的資金。重要的是要意識到，這...

By the way, anyone does any real analysis at all would come to that conclusion.

順便說一句，任何人進行任何真正的分析都會得出這個結論。

Yes. So -- and so it is important to realize, Steve, that as you know, obviously, there are additional tools. So the most important one of which is how the standardized output floors interact with the introduction of operational risk capital into standardized RWA. And then, in turn, how that interacts potentially with the Collins floor as well as more generally the fact that there are opportunities to tweak, potential double accounting and the stress capital buffer against FRTB and so on and so forth.

是的。所以——所以重要的是要意識到，史蒂夫，正如你所知，顯然還有其他工具。因此，其中最重要的一項是標準化輸出底限如何與將操作風險資本引入標準化 RWA 相互作用。然後，反過來，這如何與柯林斯地板潛在地相互作用，以及更普遍的事實是有機會進行調整、潛在的雙重會計和針對 FRTB 的壓力資本緩衝等等。

So the point of all this is that there are more levers and tools here than just the overall RWA inflation. And the way we see the world, we don't expect the Basel III endgame, in and of itself, to increase the dollars of capital that we need to carry as a company.

所以這一切的重點是，這裡有更多的槓桿和工具，而不僅僅是整體 RWA 通脹。而我們看待世界的方式，我們並不期望巴塞爾協議 III 的最後階段，就其本身而言，會增加我們作為一家公司需要攜帶的資本美元。

And you were conservative in saying it's to 4.5% G-SIB.

你保守地說它是 4.5% G-SIB。

Exactly. And we are allowing the G-SIFI increases to flow through to the medium-term ROTCE assumptions.

確切地。我們允許 G-SIFI 增加流向中期 ROTCE 假設。

Thanks for clarifying that and for not punting on the topic of Basel IV. Just for my follow-up here, on payment...

感謝您澄清這一點，也感謝您不討論巴塞爾 IV 的主題。只是為了我在這裡跟進，付款時...

It's expanded for now. We will very, very aggressively manage those things when we know the actual numbers, like very aggressively manage them.

現在已經擴展了。當我們知道實際數字時，我們將非常非常積極地管理這些事情，比如非常積極地管理它們。

Fair enough, Jamie. You certainly have a track record that supports that. Just for my follow-up on card payment normalization. How are you thinking about the trajectory for card payment rates? And just maybe to speak to your confidence level that we see card payment rates return to pre-pandemic levels, just given the emerging threats from BNPL that you cited and still elevated personal savings rates?

夠公平的，傑米。你肯定有支持這一點的記錄。只是為了我對卡支付規範化的跟進。您如何看待信用卡支付率的軌跡？只是考慮到您提到的來自 BNPL 的新威脅並且個人儲蓄率仍在上升，也許只是為了說明您的信心水平，即我們看到信用卡支付率恢復到大流行前的水平？

Yes, sure. So I still, to be honest, get a little bit confused between payment rates and revolve rates and all these various ratios. But I think it's a little bit simpler. If you just take a step back, if you look at the revolve rate and you look at the overall level of revolving balances and what we sort of expect for that. So there's a few things to note.

是的，當然。所以，老實說，我仍然對支付率和循環率以及所有這些不同的比率感到有些困惑。但我認為它有點簡單。如果您退後一步，如果您查看周轉率並查看周轉餘額的整體水平以及我們對此的期望。所以有幾點需要注意。

So the revolve rate, having dropped quite a bit, has more or less stabilized. There's a little bit of a blip in the fourth quarter as a function of holiday spend and maybe some Omicron stuff. But broadly, it's stabilized. In the meantime, the growth in overall card loans has now, for several quarters in a row, produced modest growth in revolving card balances. And our central case for next year basically assumes that, that trend stays in place.

因此，旋轉速度已經下降了很多，或多或少地穩定了下來。由於假期支出和一些 Omicron 的因素，第四季度出現了一些小插曲。但總的來說，它已經穩定下來。與此同時，整體信用卡貸款的增長已經連續幾個季度帶來循環卡餘額的適度增長。我們明年的中心案例基本上假設，這種趨勢保持不變。

So what's important about that is that we're not assuming some sort of aggressive return of the revolving rate to the pre-pandemic levels. We're simply assuming that it stabilizes and that overall card loan growth, therefore, contributes its fair share of revolving loan growth.

因此，重要的是，我們不會假設周轉率會以某種激進的方式恢復到大流行前的水平。我們只是假設它趨於穩定，因此整體信用卡貸款增長貢獻了其在循環貸款增長中的公平份額。

And so the kind of central case that we put on the page for the balance sheet contribution to NII growth in 2022 has, very roughly speaking, revolving balances getting back to the pre-pandemic levels by the end of 2022, roughly. And then, sorry, Steve, I think you had another -- was there another part of that question that I forgot?

因此，我們在頁面上提出的關於 2022 年資產負債表對 NII 增長的貢獻的核心案例，非常粗略地說，到 2022 年底，循環餘額大致恢復到大流行前的水平。然後，對不起，史蒂夫，我想你還有一個問題——我忘記了那個問題的另一部分嗎？

No, no, that's sufficient. That's perfect.

不不不，這就夠了。那很完美。

Okay. Great.

好的。偉大的。

Next, we have Matt O'Connor from Deutsche Bank.

接下來，我們有來自德意志銀行的 Matt O'Connor。

As we think about the 17% medium-term target, can you help frame what you think or what's being assumed on the efficiency ratio? And then maybe on credit costs as well, please?

當我們考慮 17% 的中期目標時，您能否幫助構建您的想法或對效率比的假設？然後也許還有信貸成本，好嗎？

Yes, sure. So in terms of credit costs, as I said, we're assuming a roughly normal credit environment at that point. So that would mean card charge-off rates back into the sort of low to mid-3s type of thing, as we said, pre-pandemic, we were assuming we would get to, especially as we underwrite some slightly higher loss vintages over time.

是的，當然。因此，就信貸成本而言，正如我所說，我們假設當時的信貸環境大致正常。因此，這將意味著信用卡沖銷率回到那種低到中等的 3s 類型，正如我們所說，在大流行前，我們假設我們會達到，特別是隨著時間的推移我們承保一些略高的損失年份.

And building reserves as the loan books grow.

隨著貸款賬簿的增長，建立準備金。

Importantly. Yes, exactly. So I mean, I would just broadly describe and consistently with the way we're describing it, which is kind of medium-term guidance in a normalized environment, that the charge-off environment should, in turn, be normal. So that's that.

重要的。對，就是這樣。所以我的意思是，我只是廣泛地描述並與我們描述它的方式保持一致，這是正常化環境中的一種中期指導，即沖銷環境反過來應該是正常的。就是這樣。

And then you're kind of asking me, I guess, about the overhead ratio a little bit. So personally, I kind of don't love that measure. I think it's more of an output than an input. And more often than not, it's driven by revenues, not expenses. And more often than not, in the short term, the revenue number that's swinging is a function of the rate curve. So essentially, the overhead ratio just becomes a proxy for the Fed funds rate, which makes it not a great management tool for the company.

然後你有點問我，我猜，關於開銷比率的問題。所以就個人而言，我有點不喜歡這種衡量標準。我認為它更多的是輸出而不是輸入。而且通常情況下，它是由收入而非支出驅動的。而且，在短期內，波動的收入數字通常是利率曲線的函數。因此，從本質上講，間接費用比率只是成為聯邦基金利率的代表，這使得它不是公司的一個很好的管理工具。

But having said that, in the assumptions that we're using to build up that 17% rate, we do get back to something like a 55% overhead ratio. But as Jamie said before, if that number has to go up to deliver the right returns, in the long term, it will. Like we don't consider it to be a constraint.

但是話雖如此，在我們用來建立 17% 比率的假設中，我們確實回到了 55% 的間接費用比率。但正如 Jamie 之前所說，如果這個數字必須上升以提供正確的回報，從長遠來看，它會的。就像我們不認為這是一個約束。

Okay. Then obviously, the math implies to get back to 55%. You have kind of outside operating leverage for a few years, right? I mean -- because I think the efficiency ratio goes the wrong way again in '22 for the couple of years of pretty big operating leverage, right?

好的。顯然，數學意味著要回到 55%。你有幾年的外部經營槓桿，對吧？我的意思是——因為我認為效率比在 22 年再次出現錯誤，因為這幾年的經營槓桿相當大，對吧？

You've got to do your own models, okay?

你必須做你自己的模型，好嗎？

Yes. I mean, for me, op rate, in a world where there are inflationary pressures, there's a lot of post-pandemic effects in the numbers, and we have some critical investments to make. The notion of operating leverage at the level of the company's overall numbers for me becomes just not terribly meaningful. I'm not criticizing your question. I understand what you're asking, but it's just kind of another way, when you think about it.

是的。我的意思是，對我來說，操作率，在一個存在通脹壓力的世界裡，數字上有很多大流行後的影響，我們有一些關鍵的投資要做。對我來說，在公司整體數字水平上的經營槓桿的概念變得沒有太大意義。我不是在批評你的問題。我理解你在問什麼，但是當你考慮它時，這只是另一種方式。

Okay. And I was just curious, Jamie, you're mentioning -- I still think ready to go up more than expected. Obviously, expectations have moved up quite a bit, and I'm just wondering kind of what's basing that opinion. And it's -- on a [flybar], do you think the long end will go up or if it hasn't gone up yet, why will it from here?

好的。我只是好奇，傑米，你提到的——我仍然認為準備好上漲超過預期。顯然，期望值已經上升了很多，我只是想知道這種觀點的基礎是什麼。而且它是 - 在 [flybar] 上，你認為長端會上升，或者如果它還沒有上升，為什麼會從這裡開始？

Well, first of all, we prepare for all eventualities here. We're not kind of guessing at one. But the consumer is very strong. And it's all with respect to the fact that people suffering still, on COVID and all that. The fact is, despite of Omicron, in spite of supply chains, 2021 was one of the best growth years ever. And 2022, it looks like it either be 3.5% or 4%, which is actually pretty good.

好吧，首先，我們在這里為所有可能發生的情況做好準備。我們不是一種猜測。但消費者非常強大。這一切都與人們仍在遭受新冠病毒和所有這些痛苦的事實有關。事實是，儘管有 Omicron，儘管有供應鏈，但 2021 年是有史以來增長最好的年份之一。到 2022 年，看起來要么是 3.5%，要么是 4%，這實際上相當不錯。

The consumer is $2 trillion more in their balance sheet, their home prices are up, asset prices are up, jobs are plentiful, wages are going up, which is good for them. You know what, we're not against that. And sharing the wealth a little bit of America's recovery with everybody so the consumer is in really good shape.

消費者的資產負債表中增加了 2 萬億美元，他們的房價上漲，資產價格上漲，就業機會充足，工資上漲，這對他們有利。你知道嗎，我們並不反對。並與每個人分享一點美國經濟復甦的財富，這樣消費者的狀態就非常好。

There's spending. I mean, Jeremy took you through the numbers. 25% more is mainly pre-COVID. 25% more. And that number drives all the order books for everybody else, whether it's goods and services and, obviously, it's bouncing around between goods and service dollar kind of stuff like that.

有支出。我的意思是，傑里米帶你瀏覽了這些數字。多出 25% 主要是在新冠疫情之前。 25% 以上。這個數字推動了其他所有人的所有訂單，無論是商品和服務，顯然，它在商品和服務美元之類的東西之間來回跳躍。

Businesses equally are in very good shape with care and capability and confidence levels high. What have they seen? They're seeing their order books go up, more cars, more motors, more patios, more home improvements, more homes, more demand. We have a shortage of homes in America.

企業同樣處於非常良好的狀態，關心、能力和信心水平很高。他們看到了什麼？他們看到他們的訂單增加，更多的汽車，更多的馬達，更多的露台，更多的家庭裝修，更多的家庭，更多的需求。我們在美國的房屋短缺。

So you see the table is set pretty well with -- for the growth -- with obviously the negative being inflation and how that gets navigated and stuff like that. And so my view is a pretty good chance there'll be more than 4, okay? it could be 6 or 7. I mean, I grew up in the world where you -- Paul Volcker raised up interest rates, 200 basis points, on a Saturday night. And this whole notion that somehow it's going to be sweet and gentle and no one's ever going to be surprised, I think, is a mistake. That does not mean we won't have growth. It does not mean unemployment but more to a good position and stuff like that.

因此，您會看到表格設置得很好 - 對於增長 - 顯然負面因素是通貨膨脹以及它是如何得到控制的等等。所以我的觀點是很有可能會有超過 4 個，好嗎？可能是 6 或 7。我的意思是，我在你長大的世界里長大——保羅沃爾克在周六晚上提高了 200 個基點的利率。我認為，這整個概念會以某種方式變得甜蜜和溫和，並且沒有人會感到驚訝，這是一個錯誤。這並不意味著我們不會有增長。這並不意味著失業，而是更多地意味著一個好的職位和類似的東西。

So -- and the other fact is it may very well be possible that they're long rates, and I'm a little surprised how low they stayed. But the long rates may react more to the actual QE and then QT. And so one point, the Fed is going to be letting run off $100 billion or whatever number a month they're going to come up with. And then you may see loan rates react a little bit to that.

所以 - 另一個事實是它們很可能是長期利率，我有點驚訝他們保持多低。但長期利率可能會對實際的量化寬鬆政策做出更多反應，然後才是量化寬鬆政策。因此，有一點，美聯儲將在一個月內動用 1000 億美元或任何他們想出的數字。然後你可能會看到貸款利率對此有所反應。

And particularly, I just said about growth and demand for capital and stuff like that, that also tends to drive 10-year bond rates and all that. So all things being equal, if you look at the company, and it's very important, we have huge firepower to grow, to expand, to make loans, to extend duration. And you look at capital liquidity, I just want to point out, it's $1.7 trillion -- these numbers I've never seen the bank with them.

特別是，我剛剛談到了增長和對資本之類的需求，這也往往會推動 10 年期債券利率等等。所以在所有條件相同的情況下，如果你看看公司，這非常重要，我們有巨大的火力來發展、擴張、發放貸款、延長期限。你看看資本流動性，我只想指出，這是 1.7 萬億美元——這些數字我從未見過銀行有這些數字。

So -- and you look at percentages, not just gross amounts, $1.7 trillion in cash and marketable securities and $1 trillion of loans, okay? There's $500 million or $600 billion of those cash markets here that could be deployed in higher-yielding assets or loans when -- and if the time comes depending on all these capital constraints and stuff like that, we have to deal with.

所以 - 你看的是百分比，而不僅僅是總額，1.7 萬億美元的現金和有價證券以及 1 萬億美元的貸款，好嗎？這裡有 5 億或 6000 億美元的現金市場可以部署在收益更高的資產或貸款中——如果時機成熟，取決於所有這些資本限制和類似的東西，我們必須處理。

And those are extraordinary numbers. It's $2.5 trillion deposits. And we don't like taking risky deposits. Those are -- they may go down a little bit in QT and all that. But look at how this balance sheet is funded. I've never seen a bank balance sheet like that. And that's -- think of that as kind of firepower over time as we navigate through the world. And so we're in pretty good shape. And if I wish I could own 100% of the company be private.

這些都是非凡的數字。這是2.5萬億美元的存款。而且我們不喜歡冒險存款。那些是 - 他們可能會在 QT 和所有這些中下降一點。但是看看這個資產負債表是如何獲得資金的。我從未見過這樣的銀行資產負債表。這就是 - 當我們穿越世界時，隨著時間的推移將其視為一種火力。所以我們的狀態非常好。如果我希望我能擁有公司 100% 的股份，那就是私有的。

Can I just sneak in, based on all that, I was thinking like the expense pressure or increase that we're seeing at JPMorgan or expect to see in '22, do you think this is indicative of the broader market. As you talk to leaders outside of banks and they see the pipeline of volumes, do you think there's going to be material surprises on expenses for the broader market?

基於所有這些，我可以偷偷溜進去嗎，我在想像我們在摩根大通看到或期望在 22 年看到的費用壓力或增加，你認為這是否預示著更廣泛的市場。當您與銀行以外的領導者交談時，他們看到了交易量的增長，您認為大盤的開支是否會出現重大意外？

Yes, I would expect that because it was every CEO was talking about wages and certain inflation and stuff like that. But I just -- I don't want to be, as CEO, don't -- please don't say I'm complaining about wages. I think wages going up is a good thing for the people who have the wages going up. And businesses simply have to deal with changes in prices.

是的，我預計會這樣，因為每個 CEO 都在談論工資和某些通貨膨脹之類的東西。但我只是——我不想成為首席執行官，不要——請不要說我在抱怨工資。我認為工資上漲對工資上漲的人來說是一件好事。企業只需要應對價格的變化。

So if you -- commodity prices go up and down, mozzarella goes up and down, wages go up and down, the CEOs shouldn't be crybabies about. They just deal with it. The job is to serve your client as best you can with all the other factors out there. And so I'm not opposed to it.

所以如果你——商品價格漲跌，馬蘇里拉奶酪漲跌，工資漲跌，CEO們不應該哭鬧。他們只是處理它。工作是在所有其他因素的情況下盡可能地為您的客戶服務。所以我並不反對。

And -- but I do think you'll see more people seeing wage pressure, et cetera, and some have more ability to offset it than others. It hasn't stopped us from doing anything. Zero. None. Nada. We're not cutting back in growth plans or bankers or markets or countries because there was some wage inflation.

而且 - 但我確實認為你會看到更多的人看到工資壓力等等，而且有些人比其他人更有能力抵消它。它並沒有阻止我們做任何事情。零。沒有。納達。我們不會因為工資上漲而削減增長計劃、銀行家、市場或國家。

Next, we have a question from Ebrahim Poonawala from Bank of America.

接下來，我們有一個來自美國銀行的 Ebrahim Poonawala 的問題。

Just two very quick follow-ups. One, Jeremy, in terms of capital deployment, just talk to us about inorganic growth. And is there any likelihood that you'll look at any larger M&A transactions to use your currency at any point this year? And should we see a slowdown or a let-up in the pace of inorganic fintech investments that you've been on over the last year? If you could address those two.

只是兩個非常快速的後續行動。一、Jeremy，在資本配置方面，就跟我們聊聊無機增長吧。您是否有可能在今年的任何時候考慮任何更大的併購交易以使用您的貨幣？我們是否應該看到您在過去一年中進行的無機金融科技投資步伐放緩或放緩？如果你能解決這兩個問題。

So the large transactions, like over billions, unlikely.

因此，超過數十億的大宗交易不太可能發生。

But we'll always look. We're always open-minded. We're looking all over the place for things that fit in and stuff like that. And then the pace of fintech investors, stuff like that, that won't change at all.

但我們會一直看。我們總是心胸開闊。我們到處尋找適合的東西和類似的東西。然後金融科技投資者的步伐，諸如此類，根本不會改變。

Yes. For my version of that, which is consistent with Jamie's, is that we continue to be interested in looking at M&A, and we're doing that. Obviously, yes, very large deals aren't realistic. And the fintech investment part is definitely part of the stuff that we're looking at when we look at deals.

是的。對於我的版本，這與傑米的一致，是我們繼續對併購感興趣，我們正在這樣做。顯然，是的，非常大的交易是不現實的。金融科技投資部分絕對是我們在查看交易時所關注的內容的一部分。

That's helpful. And just double-clicking on something, Jamie, that you mentioned. You've talked about when more square banks leaving the ground open for fintechs over the last few years. Just talk to us, to the extent you can, how are these investments? Clearly, the market is focused on near-term expenses, ROTCE pressures. But talk to us, 2 years or 3 years fast forward, how do you feel about JPM as the franchise competing with big tech, fintech head-to-head?

這很有幫助。只需雙擊你提到的東西，Jamie。您已經談到了在過去幾年中，更多的方形銀行何時為金融科技公司敞開大門。請盡可能與我們交談，這些投資如何？顯然，市場關注的是近期費用、ROTCE 壓力。但是與我們談談，快進 2 年或 3 年，您如何看待 JPM 作為與大型科技、金融科技正面競爭的特許經營權？

Great. But it's battle-engaged. I mean, some of these people do a very good job. I think there are some things we, your bank, should have done, so we should be a little self-critical. But we have the capability, the economies of scale and all these things.

偉大的。但它是參與戰鬥的。我的意思是，其中一些人做得很好。我認為有些事情我們，你的銀行，應該做的，所以我們應該有點自我批評。但我們有能力、規模經濟和所有這些東西。

What we're not going to do is hamstring ourselves to meet an overhead target. That's just not even on the card. So -- and we have assets and strengths. Look, the competition is very bright. I mean, they're bobbing and weaving. They're not changing, and they're not static. And I think sometimes people feel like they're static and they're not static.

我們不打算做的是束縛自己以實現開銷目標。這甚至不在卡片上。所以 - 我們有資產和優勢。看，競爭很激烈。我的意思是，他們在搖擺和編織。它們沒有變化，也不是靜止的。而且我認為有時人們覺得他們是靜止的，他們不是靜止的。

So -- but if we do a good job, like today, on consumer, I'm sure some you saw your Chase customers, free trading, a lot of ATMs. You've got better and better services, more navigation bars, more offers, more travel, more rewards, more -- and you got more of that coming. And we've gotten friendlier on overdraft. We've gotten -- that's just one business. That's true for every single business.

所以 - 但是如果我們像今天一樣在消費者方面做得很好，我敢肯定你看到了你的大通客戶，免費交易，很多自動取款機。你得到了越來越好的服務、更多的導航欄、更多的優惠、更多的旅行、更多的獎勵等等——而且你會得到更多。而且我們在透支方面變得更加友好。我們已經得到 - 這只是一項業務。對於每一個企業來說都是如此。

So if I look at the way [they run and compete] with JPMorgan, that's going be pretty tough competition. Like take Chase U.K., we've been very, very clear that costs us money. And a lot of you want payback tomorrow and stuff like that. We'll not disclose those numbers, but we are there for the long run. We're going to be adding products and services and countries for the rest of our lives, okay? So I doubt, over the long run, we'll fail. We may not do -- we may not become the best digital bank in the U.K. or somewhere in the short run.

因此，如果我看看他們與摩根大通的[他們經營和競爭]的方式，那將是一場相當激烈的競爭。就像英國大通銀行一樣，我們非常非常清楚這會花錢。你們中的很多人都希望明天得到回報之類的東西。我們不會透露這些數字，但從長遠來看，我們會在那裡。我們將在餘生中添加產品、服務和國家，好嗎？所以我懷疑，從長遠來看，我們會失敗。我們可能不會——我們可能不會成為英國或短期內最好的數字銀行。

Next, we have Mike Mayo from Wells Fargo Securities.

接下來，我們有來自富國銀行證券的 Mike Mayo。

Jamie, I hear that you're ready to do an LBO on JPMorgan, that you're so confident?

傑米，我聽說你準備在摩根大通做槓桿收購，你這麼有信心嗎？

Yes. I think you'd help me raise the equity capital.

是的。我想你會幫我籌集股本。

Well, that's what I'm trying to figure out here with -- your -- it's a little frustrating, this call, because the guidance you've given has given all the bad news without any targets. I mean, you're saying we have to wait 2 years for the 17% ROTCE despite the booming economy. You're guiding for the second year in a row of negative operating leverage. I get it. That's not how you run the company.

嗯，這就是我在這裡試圖弄清楚的——你的——這有點令人沮喪，這個電話，因為你給出的指導已經給出了沒有任何目標的所有壞消息。我的意思是，你是說儘管經濟蓬勃發展，但我們必須等待 2 年才能獲得 17% 的 ROTCE。您連續第二年處於負經營槓桿率。我知道了。這不是你經營公司的方式。

But $15 billion of investments, that's up 1.5 over the last 3 years. And that $15 billion is enough to capitalize the 11th largest U.S. bank. So you gave us that, but you didn't tell us what to expect from all those investments in terms of what specific market share gains are you targeting? What specific revenues do you expect? When do you expect that? Can you put some more meat on the bones here?

但是 150 億美元的投資，比過去 3 年增加了 1.5 美元。而這 150 億美元足以資本化這家美國第 11 大銀行。所以你給了我們這個，但你沒有告訴我們對所有這些投資的期望是什麼，就你的目標是什麼特定的市場份額收益？您期望的具體收入是多少？你什麼時候期待？你能在骨頭上多放點肉嗎？

Because this is -- that $5 billion of investment spend, look, it worked. You gained share. That $10 billion of investment spend, it worked, you gained share. But now you're going to $15 billion. It might not always work so well. So can you, again, put more meat on the bones? The stock is down 5%. The feedback so far is like you're spending the rate hikes for investments over the next 10 years. That's great. You're in there for the long term, but a lot of the investors aren't planning to invest for a 10-year horizon.

因為這是 - 50 億美元的投資支出，看，它奏效了。你獲得了份額。那 100 億美元的投資支出，它奏效了，你獲得了份額。但現在你將達到 150 億美元。它可能並不總是那麼好。那麼你能再一次在骨頭上放更多的肉嗎？該股下跌5%。到目前為止的反饋就像您將加息用於未來 10 年的投資。那太棒了。你是長期投資的，但很多投資者並不打算投資 10 年。

Michael, I feel your pain and frustration. It is very possible in 2023, we'll have a 17% ROTCE. It depends on how we deploy our capital. It depends on fixed income markets. It depends on a bunch of stuff like that. But every -- so -- but the 400 branches that we're building, those things will get the contribution profitability just like we expect. The thousand bankers we're adding in private banking and Chase Wealth Management, we're pretty sure we'll get to breakeven but just we expect that takes a couple of years.

邁克爾，我感受到你的痛苦和沮喪。 2023 年很有可能，我們將有 17% 的 ROTCE。這取決於我們如何部署我們的資金。這取決於固定收益市場。這取決於一堆這樣的東西。但是，除了我們正在建設的 400 個分支機構之外，每一個——所以——這些東西都會像我們預期的那樣獲得貢獻盈利能力。我們在私人銀行和大通財富管理中增加了數千名銀行家，我們很確定我們會達到收支平衡，但我們預計這需要幾年時間。

And so yes, we can't -- we're not going to tell you all of those things. And Jeremy mentioned some of the tech stuff is just kind of we have to do it, and there's a little bit of bubble expense in that. There's even a little bit of bubble expense on the new headquarters. And so we're pretty comfortable we're doing the right things. And we're being a little conservative.

所以是的，我們不能——我們不會告訴你所有這些事情。傑里米提到了一些技術的東西是我們必須要做的，這有一點泡沫費用。新總部甚至還有一點泡沫費用。所以我們很舒服，我們正在做正確的事情。而且我們有點保守。

Like Jeremy, you're talking about the Card stuff, the return. Yes, I told our folks that we're getting our Card growth this year, but they were so skeptical. The American consumer is very strong. Our products and services are very good.

像傑里米一樣，你在談論卡片的東西，回報。是的，我告訴我們的人，我們今年的卡增長，但他們非常懷疑。美國消費者非常強大。我們的產品和服務非常好。

Chase, we call now self-directed investing, has $55 billion. I think Robinhood has, I think, $80 billion the last time I saw or something like that. We're not sitting here bragging about our product because, I would tell you, it's not good enough yet. But it's got $55 billion without us doing virtually anything and or no marketing and no real stuff like that.

大通，我們現在稱之為自主投資，擁有 550 億美元。我認為 Robinhood 在我上次看到或類似的情況下擁有 800 億美元。我們不會坐在這裡吹噓我們的產品，因為，我會告訴你，它還不夠好。但它有 550 億美元，而我們幾乎沒有做任何事情，或者沒有營銷，也沒有類似的東西。

So there's a lot of stuff coming. The competition, we have to face. Some of these acquisitions we made will contribute to profit, maybe not exactly in 2022. But -- and I mentioned the deployment of the balance sheet. We're pretty conservative in deploying the balance sheet. That may not always be true.

所以會有很多東西來。競爭，我們必鬚麵對。我們進行的其中一些收購將有助於盈利，也許不會完全在 2022 年。但是——我提到了資產負債表的部署。我們在部署資產負債表方面相當保守。這可能並不總是正確的。

I'll follow up and then I'll requeue after my follow-up. But as it relates to technology, specifically, Jeremy, you talked about retiring technical debt. And so that's kind of playing defense, but also on the offensive side. Where are you investing for tech, where you would expect some more revenues? You talked about digital banking in the U.K. Are you also going to Brazil? What other countries are you targeting for that?

我會跟進，然後我會在跟進後重新排隊。但因為它與技術有關，特別是 Jeremy，你談到了技術債務的退還。所以這是一種防守，但也在進攻端。您在哪裡投資技術，您希望在哪裡獲得更多收入？您談到了英國的數字銀行業務。您也要去巴西嗎？您還針對哪些其他國家/地區？

Yes. I mean -- it's funny. I wouldn't actually describe retiring technical debt as playing defense. I mean, I think, that's actually a great example of the whole point of this conversation, which is that retiring technical debt is an easy thing to not do if you're applying defense focused on short-term targets. But if you're playing offense for the long term, it's exactly this type of decision that creates some of the frustration that you're articulating that's critical for the long-term success of the country -- the company. So that's -- I mean...

是的。我的意思是——這很有趣。我實際上不會將退休的技術債務描述為防守。我的意思是，我認為，這實際上是這次談話的全部要點的一個很好的例子，如果你正在應用專注於短期目標的防禦，那麼償還技術債務是一件容易的事。但是，如果你長期進攻，正是這種類型的決定會造成你所表達的一些挫敗感，這對於國家 - 公司的長期成功至關重要。那就是——我的意思是...

And Mike, to tell you, so we spent $2 billion on brand-new data centers, okay, which have all the cloud capability you can have in private data centers and stuff like that. We're still running the old data centers. Now we're not going to get involved in every time we talk to you, I'll explain every part of the pancake buildup of expenses going in and expenses going out.

還有邁克，告訴你，我們花了 20 億美元購買全新的數據中心，好吧，它擁有私有數據中心和類似的東西可以擁有的所有云功能。我們仍在運行舊的數據中心。現在我們不會每次與您交談時都參與其中，我將解釋投入和支出的煎餅積累的每一部分。

But all this stuff going to these new data centers, which is now completely up and running, are on apps. Well, some are, but most of the applications that go in have to be cloud eligible. Most of the data that goes in has to be cloud eligible.

但是所有這些進入這些新數據中心的東西，現在已經完全啟動並運行，都在應用程序上。好吧，有些是，但大多數進入的應用程序必須符合雲計算條件。進入的大部分數據必須符合雲計算條件。

We're running a whole bunch of major programs, which I don't think we disclosed, on AWS. And we're working with Google and Microsoft to run stuff -- some of the stuff in the cloud because we want to have multiple cloud capabilities. And this year, roughly 30%, 40%, 50% of all our apps and all data will be moving to cloud-related type of stuff.

我們正在 AWS 上運行一大堆主要程序，我認為我們沒有披露這些程序。我們正在與穀歌和微軟合作運行一些東西——一些東西在雲中，因為我們想要擁有多種雲功能。今年，我們所有應用程序和所有數據中大約有 30%、40%、50% 將轉移到與雲相關的東西。

This stuff is absolutely totally valuable. I mean, I can't -- if you sat in this room and look at the power of the cloud and big data on risk, fraud, marketing, capabilities, offers, customer satisfaction, do with errors and complaints, prospecting, it's extraordinary. You actually see some of that already in how we manage stuff.

這東西絕對值錢。我的意思是，我不能——如果你坐在這個房間裡，看看雲計算和大數據在風險、欺詐、營銷、能力、報價、客戶滿意度、處理錯誤和投訴、潛在客戶方面的力量，那真是非同尋常.您實際上已經在我們管理事物的方式中看到了其中的一些內容。

Like, for example, with all the fraud and all the cyber and all the ransomware, are forced to close down this year. There's a reason for that. It's because we've deployed huge capabilities in those things. So we have to do those things. And that's a margin that will be hugely valuable for us. And you'll see some of that benefit, which is why we're comfortable that we'll continue to grow and expand and earn.

例如，所有的欺詐、所有的網絡和所有的勒索軟件都被迫在今年關閉。這是有原因的。這是因為我們在這些方面部署了巨大的能力。所以我們必須做這些事情。這是一個對我們來說非常有價值的利潤。你會看到其中的一些好處，這就是為什麼我們對我們將繼續成長、擴張和盈利感到滿意的原因。

Like I said, with 17% return on tangible capital. I would take that. If I could push a button and give you that for the next 20 years, I would take it. And also, if I did it for the next 20 years, that number would probably be like a big part of the GDP in the United States of America.

就像我說的，有形資本回報率為 17%。我會接受的。如果我可以按下一個按鈕並在接下來的 20 年裡給你它，我會接受它。而且，如果我在接下來的 20 年裡這樣做，這個數字可能會占美國 GDP 的很大一部分。

Okay. I'll requeue for my follow-up.

好的。我會重新排隊等待我的後續行動。

I just want to -- Michael asked a very -- another very good question on market shares. We expect to go up in retail deposit market share, investment market share, private banking market share, fixed income market share, equity market share, investment banking market share, global market share, payments market share and securities services and market share, commercial banking market share, and what did I miss? I'd be surprised if any of them go down. And we're not going to give you the number.

我只是想——邁克爾問了一個非常——關於市場份額的另一個非常好的問題。我們預計零售存款市場份額、投資市場份額、私人銀行市場份額、固定收益市場份額、股票市場份額、投資銀行市場份額、全球市場份額、支付市場份額和證券服務市場份額、商業銀行市場份額，我錯過了什麼？如果其中任何一個倒下，我會感到驚訝。我們不會給你這個號碼。

As per now, we have one last question from Gerard Cassidy from RBC Capital Markets.

目前，我們有來自加拿大皇家銀行資本市場的 Gerard Cassidy 的最後一個問題。

Jeremy, I'm trying to figure out what the discussion topic is going to be first quarter of 2023 when we talk about fourth quarter numbers. And I think it might have more to do with Credit than we're hearing about on the call today. Can you share with us the underwriting standards that you guys are using compared to what they were at the height of the crisis back in 2020? I'm assuming they're easier today because the economy is stronger. But also, can you compare them to 2019. How does it look today versus what you guys were doing in 2019?

傑里米，當我們談論第四季度的數字時，我正試圖弄清楚 2023 年第一季度的討論主題是什麼。而且我認為這可能與 Credit 的關係比我們今天在電話會議上聽到的更多。與 2020 年危機最嚴重時的標準相比，您能與我們分享一下你們使用的承保標準嗎？我假設他們今天更容易，因為經濟更強勁。但是，您能否將它們與 2019 年進行比較。今天的情況與你們 2019 年的情況如何？

Yes, sure. So I think broadly for the company, there's no really large change in our credit risk appetite, and therefore, in our underwriting standards. I think I alluded to a little bit -- I alluded a little bit to this earlier, which is there's a subtlety in the Card business, where, if you remember, pre-pandemic, we had talked about Card charge-off rates being at 3.25% and maybe trending a little bit higher over time as a function of some underwriting of some slightly higher risk vintages, still well within our credit box, still within our overall credit risk appetite, but just a slight shift in the composition of the portfolio there.

是的，當然。所以我認為，就公司而言，我們的信用風險偏好沒有太大變化，因此，我們的承保標準也沒有太大變化。我想我提到了一點——我早些時候提到了一點，這是信用卡業務的一個微妙之處，如果你還記得，在大流行之前，我們曾談到信用卡沖銷率是3.25%，並且隨著時間的推移可能會略有上升，這是由於一些風險稍高的年份的一些承保，仍然在我們的信用範圍內，仍然在我們的整體信用風險偏好範圍內，但投資組合的構成只是略有變化那裡。

So that happened back then, and we just didn't see it flow through because of, obviously, the extraordinary dynamics that we've experienced through the pandemic. And now we're exiting the fourth quarter of this year with a Card net charge-off rate. And I forget the exact number, it was something like 1.2% or something. So...

所以這發生在當時，我們只是沒有看到它通過，顯然，我們在大流行中經歷了非凡的動態。現在我們以信用卡淨沖銷率退出今年第四季度。我忘記了確切的數字，大概是 1.2% 之類的。所以...

Which you'll never see again in [your life].

你在[你的生活]中永遠不會再看到它。

Obviously exceptionally low well. So the question then becomes like -- so -- and then I think somewhere in your question, there was also about like when we sort of leaned into the reopening, how did we modify the credit box and the standards? And the answer to that is that we returned it essentially to the pre-pandemic level. So we were obviously very confident in light of what we were seeing about what kind of Credit condition for.

顯然異常低井。所以問題就變成了——所以——然後我想在你的問題的某個地方，當我們有點傾向於重新開放時，我們是如何修改信用框和標準的？答案是我們基本上將其恢復到大流行前的水平。因此，鑑於我們所看到的關於什麼樣的信用條件，我們顯然非常有信心。

It got tied little bit, and now it's back to where it was it...

它被綁了一點，現在它又回到了原來的位置......

Exactly. Exactly.

確切地。確切地。

And none of that was completely material to the results. But yes, one of the things in Jeremy's will -- we've been over earning on credit for years. And we expect that eventually to normalize. You could argue how fast and what time, but credit card has been a number that you've never seen in our lives. Middle market has been lower than ever. Other sales have been lower than ever. Mortgages have been lower than ever. Cards. They're all low. Eventually, they're going to normalize. Eventually, they're -- and then we kind of build that in from months.

而這些都不是對結果完全重要的。但是，是的，傑里米遺囑中的一件事——我們多年來一直在賒賬。我們預計最終會正常化。您可能會爭論多快和什麼時間，但信用卡一直是您在我們生活中從未見過的數字。中間市場比以往任何時候都低。其他銷售額比以往任何時候都低。抵押貸款比以往任何時候都低。牌。他們都很矮。最終，它們將正常化。最終，他們是——然後我們在幾個月內建立了它。

And the other thing is the loan book. And this is very important. Your own modeling, just assume as the loan book grows, we will add reserves pretty much proportionate to the growth of loan book. All things being equal. We've got CECL and all this stuff like that. But -- so there's -- that's a flip to the negative, obviously, for next year.

另一件事是貸款簿。這是非常重要的。您自己的模型，只是假設隨著貸款賬簿的增長，我們將根據貸款賬簿的增長增加準備金。所有的事情都是平等的。我們有 CECL 和所有類似的東西。但是 - 所以有 - 這顯然是對明年的負面影響。

One item. Yes. And so Gerard, to your point about the fourth quarter of next year, right? I mean, one lens to look at that through is, what do we think the trajectory of normalization of Card net charge-offs is through the course of 2022?

一項。是的。所以杰拉德，你的觀點是明年第四季度，對吧？我的意思是，一個值得關注的鏡頭是，我們認為 2022 年卡淨沖銷正常化的軌跡是什麼？

And I don't want to get into too much specific guidance there, but the numbers that we're putting on the page roughly assume that we get back to that kind of like low 3s around the end of 2022 or early '23 in terms of Card net charge-offs. So yes, on the one hand, maybe we'll be talking a lot about the fact that those numbers are going up but they will have actually gone up exactly in line with our expectations.

而且我不想在那裡進行太多具體的指導，但是我們在頁面上放置的數字大致假設我們會在 2022 年底或 23 年初回到那種低 3 分卡淨沖銷。所以是的，一方面，也許我們會談論很多關於這些數字正在上升的事實，但它們實際上會完全符合我們的預期。

Great. And just as a quick follow-up, Jamie, and Jeremy, you talked about the balance sheet, the way it is, today and all that liquidity. And I think, Jamie, you said $500 billion could be put to use. How long will you guys -- will it take you to get to a balance sheet and a mix of business that looks like you would have thought back in 2019 before this whole pandemic started and the balance sheet did what it did?

偉大的。作為快速跟進，Jamie 和 Jeremy，你們談到了資產負債表、今天的情況以及所有的流動性。我認為，傑米，你說過可以使用 5000 億美元。你們需要多長時間才能獲得資產負債表和業務組合，看起來就像在整個大流行開始之前您會在 2019 年想到的那樣，並且資產負債表做了它所做的事情？

I think we're in a -- I mean, again, some of those outcomes of decisions you make based on client stuff. But the real fact is we got Basel IV, a lot of changes. And when all that happens, we'll give you a little bit better update how we're going to deploy capital and invest the balance sheet and stuff like that. But we're in no rush to reinvest part of that balance sheet. We'll be very patient.

我認為我們處於 - 我的意思是，再次，您根據客戶資料做出的一些決策結果。但真正的事實是我們得到了巴塞爾 IV，有很多變化。當這一切發生時，我們會給你更好的更新我們將如何部署資本和投資資產負債表之類的東西。但我們並不急於對資產負債表的一部分進行再投資。我們會非常耐心。

Mike Mayo have another question.

Mike Mayo 還有一個問題。

Just more detail on the tech spend. And what I asked before was on digital banking, you're going to the U.K. What other countries are you going to? Again, just looking for some more specifics, at least, on digital banking and other tech areas, we expect revenue of pickup, not just -- you mentioned fraud and AML and ransomware and cyber, and that's all -- that's table stakes, as you would say. But as far as actually getting revenue growth from your tech investments, and starting off with digital banking, which new markets are you entering? .

更多關於技術支出的細節。我之前問的是關於數字銀行的問題，你要去英國。你要去哪些其他國家？再一次，至少在數字銀行和其他技術領域尋找更多細節，我們預計收入會增加，而不僅僅是 - 你提到欺詐和反洗錢以及勒索軟件和網絡，僅此而已 - 這是賭注，因為你會說。但就實際從您的技術投資中獲得收入增長，並從數字銀行開始，您正在進入哪些新市場？ .

Yes. So on digital banking, we're not going to disclose specific countries that we're going into one.

是的。因此，在數字銀行業務方面，我們不會透露我們要進入的具體國家。

There's one we're talking about for next year, I think, just one.

我想，我們正在談論明年的一個，只有一個。

Yes. Well, I mean, I think, just to validate Mike's question. As you know, we have made this investment in C6 in Brazil. So Brazil, it's not exactly the same. It's not a de novo build by us, but we're there. We're engaged. It's a significant investment. And Brazil is like a very interesting country from a consumer banking perspective, and the digital play there is quite interesting. So that's one example. And obviously, we're thinking about additional places to go, and we'll let you know when we do it.

是的。嗯，我的意思是，我想，只是為了驗證邁克的問題。如您所知，我們在巴西的 C6 進行了這項投資。所以巴西，不完全一樣。這不是我們從頭構建的，但我們在那裡。已訂婚。這是一項重大投資。從消費銀行的角度來看，巴西就像一個非常有趣的國家，那裡的數字遊戲非常有趣。這就是一個例子。顯然，我們正在考慮更多的去處，當我們這樣做時會通知你。

Okay. And the other tech investments where you could expect additional revenues, what would that include? I mean, for example, with your marketing and the degree you're using AI and big data for what kind of improved take rates do you have. Or just again, looking for more specifics where you can provide it.

好的。以及您可以期待額外收入的其他技術投資，其中包括什麼？我的意思是，例如，你的市場營銷和你使用人工智能和大數據的程度，你有什麼樣的提高的錄取率。或者再次，尋找更多可以提供的細節。

Yes. I mean, I don't know. I'm personally not a big fan of these types of like anecdotal individual like tech stories. I mean there's cool stuff, like we're doing some AI-enabled lead optimization stuff in AWM, for example. So I could come up with a list of like 20 things like that. But in reality, it's really much more about the embedding of the modernization and the digitization of the whole ecosystem as part of customer engagement and competition and making the company more efficient and all that type of stuff.

是的。我的意思是，我不知道。我個人不是這類像科技故事這樣的軼事個人的忠實粉絲。我的意思是有一些很酷的東西，例如我們在 AWM 中做一些支持 AI 的潛在客戶優化。所以我可以列出大約 20 條類似的東西。但實際上，這更多是關於將整個生態系統的現代化和數字化嵌入作為客戶參與和競爭的一部分，並使公司更高效以及所有這些類型的東西。

The examples where it's like, I spent $10 million on x that's technology as opposed to like branch build or banker hiring, as Jamie says, and you can then attach a tangible revenue outcome to that. I'm sure we have some of those examples somewhere. I don't have them with me. Maybe we can talk about them next quarter. But I generally think that, that sort of gets into a lot of anecdotal stuff that distracts from the big picture.

就像 Jamie 所說的那樣，我在 x 技術上花費了 1000 萬美元，而不是像分支機構建設或銀行家招聘那樣，然後你可以將有形的收入結果附加到該技術上。我確信我們在某處有一些這樣的例子。我沒有他們。也許我們可以在下個季度討論它們。但我通常認為，這會涉及到很多軼事，分散了大局的注意力。

Okay. Last one. On the -- what is your total tech spend again? I thought I saw it in the deck. How much of that is to run the bank versus change the bank? And then as it relates to the cloud specifically, what do you expect -- as a bold move to move Chase, the core bank to the cloud, what do you expect that to save once that gets done?

好的。最後一個。關於——你的技術總支出又是多少？我以為我在甲板上看到了它。其中有多少是經營銀行而不是改變銀行？然後，當它具體與雲相關時，您期望什麼 - 作為將核心銀行 Chase 遷移到雲的大膽舉措，您希望一旦完成，它會節省什麼？

Yes. So a couple of things. If you go back to my prepared remarks, so it's like $12-ish billion, a bit more 50-50 run the bank, change the bank. And within the change agenda, half again is kind of modernization-type stuff as opposed to features and products. So it gives you a little bit of a...

是的。所以有幾件事。如果你回到我準備好的評論，那麼這就像 12 億美元，多一點 50-50 運行銀行，改變銀行。在變革議程中，有一半是現代化類型的東西，而不是功能和產品。所以它給你一點...

And Mike, I'm going to give you one example, which may be a little helpful on this tech platform thing. I think these numbers are accurate. We did this a while ago. Card runs a mainframe, which is quite good. We have one of the most efficient, most economic, 60 million accounts, et cetera. It's been updated a few years. But it's a mainframe system in the old data center.

邁克，我將給你舉一個例子，這可能對這個技術平台的事情有點幫助。我認為這些數字是準確的。我們前一陣子就這樣做了。卡運行大型機，相當不錯。我們擁有 6000 萬個賬戶等最高效、最經濟的賬戶之一。它已經更新了幾年。但它是舊數據中心的大型機系統。

When it gets modernized, to the cloud, the cost savings by running that and marginalizing it will be $30 million or $40 million a year. That isn't the reason we're doing it. The reason we're doing it is once you get that to the cloud that the database is that it uses to feed its risk, marketing, fraud, real-time offers and stuff like that become accessible to enormous app and machine learning. So that you can -- when Mike Mayo is going home on a Friday night, we can offer you -- we know what you like to eat at steakhouse, so you can hear immediately offers, and fraud stuff is 10x what it is today. And so that's the real value.

當它現代化到雲端時，通過運行它並將其邊緣化，每年可以節省 3000 萬美元或 4000 萬美元的成本。這不是我們這樣做的原因。我們這樣做的原因是，一旦你把它帶到雲上，數據庫就會用來提供風險、營銷、欺詐、實時報價和類似的東西，這些東西就可以被巨大的應用程序和機器學習訪問。這樣你就可以——當邁克梅奧週五晚上回家時，我們可以為你提供——我們知道你喜歡在牛排館吃什麼，所以你可以立即聽到報價，欺詐行為是今天的 10 倍。這就是真正的價值。

The value isn't the immediate cost save that you've gone from -- you're saving $30 million running this application a year. I want the $30 million. And the other thing that allows you to do is to augment that mainframe system -- you touch a mainframe system, you've got to be a little careful when you go into it to make some modifications.

價值並不是您所節省的直接成本——您每年運行此應用程序可節省 3000 萬美元。我想要3000萬美元。另一件允許你做的事情是擴充那個大型機系統——你接觸到一個大型機系統，當你進入它進行一些修改時你必須小心一點。

So like in the old days, you used to modify that mainframe system 4x a year. Big releases and stuff like that, of course, multiple for multiple reasons. Now you can go in and modernize a little piece of it every week, every day. And so that's why it's so important to do this. And it's also -- makes it why it's hard to quantify the benefits and the cost.

因此，就像過去一樣，您過去每年要修改 4 次大型機系統。大版本和類似的東西，當然，多個原因有多種。現在，您可以每週、每天對其中的一小部分進行現代化改造。這就是為什麼這樣做如此重要的原因。這也是為什麼難以量化收益和成本的原因。

But Mike, just a big one example, I guess, from a business that I know you know well. If you look at Teresa's securities services business, it's an interesting example of the way the investment relates to the strategy. So in that business, as you know, historically, winning new mandates, especially on services administration, tended to involve significant correlated large increases in expenses as you had to onboard a lot of fund accountants. And so that was typically the dynamic there.

但是邁克，我想這只是一個很大的例子，來自我知道你很熟悉的一家企業。如果你看看 Teresa 的證券服務業務，這是投資與戰略相關方式的一個有趣例子。因此，正如您所知，從歷史上看，在該業務中，贏得新任務，尤其是在服務管理方面，往往會導致費用大幅增加，因為您必須聘請大量基金會計師。所以這通常是那裡的動態。

And I think a lot of the investment that we're making there is to make that business a little bit more scalable in that respect. So that when we win new business, it's a little bit more accretive. So that's kind of an interesting example of is that tech investment that produces more revenue? I mean, I guess. I would describe it as investment that means that when we win the revenue, it's more profitable, for example. At the same time, we're also building out some really great capabilities in there in terms of data and stuff like that, which maybe will help us win more mandates.

而且我認為我們在那裡進行的很多投資是為了使該業務在這方面更具可擴展性。因此，當我們贏得新業務時，它會增加一點點。那麼這是一個有趣的例子，說明技術投資會產生更多收入嗎？我的意思是，我猜。我會將其描述為投資，例如，當我們贏得收入時，它會更有利可圖。與此同時，我們也在數據和類似的東西方面建立了一些非常強大的能力，這可能會幫助我們贏得更多的授權。

Like for example -- we got to end this call because we've got so [many stuff to do]. Like just for example, it's an important one, and Teresa stole all the credit for this. We now are using JPMorgan's investment banking derivative capability to help clients who use derivatives for custody, to value them and stuff like that. A lot of people simply can't do that.

例如——我們必須結束這次通話，因為我們有很多[要做的事情]。就像舉個例子一樣，這是一個重要的，特蕾莎為此偷走了所有的功勞。我們現在正在使用摩根大通的投資銀行衍生品能力來幫助使用衍生品進行託管的客戶，對它們進行估值等等。很多人根本無法做到這一點。

And of course, believe it or not, a lot of portfolios now, they're using more and more what you and I called derivatives as part of the portfolio management. That cost us time. It costs money. It's on the cloud. It's hugely valuable to Teresa having a competitive advantage.

當然，不管你信不信，現在有很多投資組合，他們越來越多地使用你我所說的衍生品作為投資組合管理的一部分。這花費了我們時間。它要花錢。它在雲端。對特蕾莎來說，擁有競爭優勢是非常有價值的。

Folks, thank you very much for taking some time with us. Good luck, everybody. Yes.

伙計們，非常感謝您花時間與我們在一起。祝大家好運。是的。

Thank you.

謝謝你。

Everyone, that marks the end of your call for today. You may now disconnect. Thank you for joining. Enjoy the rest of your day.

大家，這標誌著你們今天的通話結束。您現在可以斷開連接。感謝您的加入。享受你一天的剩餘時間。