DoorDash Inc (DASH) 2022 Q3 法說會逐字稿

Thank you for standing by. My name is Heather, and I will be your conference operator today. At this time, I would like to welcome everyone to the Q3 2022 DASH Earnings Conference Call. (Operator Instructions)

謝謝你的支持。我的名字是Heather，今天我將成為你們的會議接線員。在這個時候，我想歡迎大家參加 2022 年第三季度 DASH 收益電話會議。 （操作員說明）

Thank you. Andy Hargreaves, you may begin your conference.

謝謝你。 Andy Hargreaves，你可以開始你的會議了。

Thanks, Heather. Good afternoon, everyone, and thanks for joining us for our third quarter 2022 earnings call.

謝謝，希瑟。大家下午好，感謝您加入我們的 2022 年第三季度財報電話會議。

I'm pleased to be joined today by Co-Founder, Chair and CEO, Tony Xu; and CFO, Prabir Adarkar.

我很高興今天有聯合創始人、董事長兼首席執行官 Tony Xu 加入；和首席財務官 Prabir Adarkar。

We'll be making forward-looking statements during today's call, including our expectations of our business, the macroeconomic environment, financial position and operating performance, our market and local commerce opportunities, future financial results and guidance, our strategies and our investment approach. Forward-looking statements are subject to risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially from those described and some such risks are described in our risk factors included in our SEC filings, including our 10-Ks and 10-Qs. You should not rely on our forward-looking statements as predictions of future events. We disclaim any obligation to update any forward-looking statements, except as required by law.

我們將在今天的電話會議中做出前瞻性陳述，包括我們對業務的預期、宏觀經濟環境、財務狀況和經營業績、我們的市場和當地商業機會、未來的財務業績和指導、我們的戰略和投資方法。前瞻性陳述受風險和不確定性的影響，可能導致實際結果與所描述的結果存在重大差異，我們在 SEC 文件中包含的風險因素中描述了一些此類風險，包括我們的 10-Ks 和 10-Qs。您不應依賴我們的前瞻性陳述作為對未來事件的預測。除法律要求外，我們不承擔更新任何前瞻性陳述的義務。

During this call, we will discuss certain non-GAAP financial measures. Information regarding our non-GAAP financial results, including a reconciliation of such non-GAAP results to the most directly comparable GAAP financial measures may be found in our letter to shareholders, which is available on our Investor Relations website. These non-GAAP measures should be considered in addition to our GAAP results and are not intended to be a substitute for our GAAP results.

在本次電話會議中，我們將討論某些非公認會計準則財務措施。有關我們的非 GAAP 財務業績的信息，包括此類非 GAAP 業績與最直接可比的 GAAP 財務指標的對賬，請參閱我們致股東的信函，該信函可在我們的投資者關係網站上找到。除了我們的 GAAP 結果之外，還應考慮這些非 GAAP 措施，並且不能替代我們的 GAAP 結果。

Finally, this call in its entirety is being audio webcast on our Investor Relations website. An audio replay of this call will be available on our website shortly after the call ends.

最後，整個電話會議正在我們的投資者關係網站上進行音頻網絡直播。通話結束後不久，我們的網站上將提供此通話的音頻重播。

As in previous quarters, we'll go straight to questions. So with that, Heather, please open the line to the first question.

與前幾個季度一樣，我們將直接提出問題。因此，Heather，請打開第一個問題的線路。

(Operator Instructions) And your first question comes from the line of Ross Sandler with Barclays.

（操作員說明）您的第一個問題來自巴克萊銀行的羅斯桑德勒。

Congrats on the quarter. Maybe just starting with macro, any color on what you're seeing across either the U.S. or international markets, thus far in 4Q, and where trends are holding up pretty well versus possibly slowing down a bit?

祝賀本季度。也許只是從宏觀開始，您在美國或國際市場上看到的任何顏色，到目前為止，在第四季度，以及趨勢保持良好而不是可能放緩一點？

And then the second question is, thanks for the chart on contribution margin for the U.S. restaurant. That's very helpful. In the letter, you mentioned that the last few quarters, you've been above that 7% level. So could you just talk about what are the biggest drivers of that? Is that higher percent of repeats and getting some marketing efficiency out of that? Or is that driver efficiencies? Any color on what's taking that north of 7%, and are there markets that are in the double digits? Or is there like a natural limit to how high that could get?

然後第二個問題是，感謝美國餐廳的邊際貢獻圖表。這很有幫助。在信中，你提到過去幾個季度，你一直高於 7% 的水平。那麼你能談談最大的驅動因素是什麼嗎？是否有更高的重複率並從中獲得一些營銷效率？或者是驅動效率？ 7% 以北的原因有什麼顏色嗎？是否有兩位數的市場？或者有一個自然限制可以達到多高？

Ross, it's Tony. I'll start with the first one and answer briefly the second and hand it off to Prabir. On the first question, obviously, we've seen tremendous resilience in the business. In the U.S. business, you've seen continued growth north of 25% GOV. On the marketplace revenues north of 30% growth each -- for each of the last 5 quarters now. And on the flip side, this is in the face of an energy crisis, pretty sticky inflation and a war in Europe, and so it's sometimes hard to try to square the 2.

羅斯，是托尼。我將從第一個開始，然後簡要回答第二個，然後將其交給 Prabir。在第一個問題上，顯然，我們已經看到了業務的巨大彈性。在美國業務中，您已經看到 GOV 超過 25% 的持續增長。在過去 5 個季度中，每個季度的市場收入均增長 30% 以上。另一方面，這是面對能源危機、相當棘手的通貨膨脹和歐洲的戰爭，因此有時很難使兩者平方。

But I think the way that we've been thinking about things is really looking at it from a historical current day and future perspective. Historically, in the last 60 years in that time frame, only 2 of the last 60 years have we seen a decline in food spend in the U.S., and that's specifically in the restaurant and grocery industries. And so I think even though all of us are wondering how to quantify the macro headwinds. Food is the most resilient category. I think historically, that's shown to be true.

但我認為我們一直在思考事物的方式實際上是從歷史的當前和未來的角度來看待它。從歷史上看，在過去的 60 年中，過去 60 年中只有 2 年我們看到美國的食品支出下降，特別是在餐飲和雜貨行業。所以我認為即使我們所有人都想知道如何量化宏觀逆風。食品是最具彈性的類別。我認為從歷史上看，這是事實。

Current day, what we see in our own business is something largely the same. We also disclosed in the results that we saw our monthly active consumers grow, all-time highs in our DashPass membership program. And so what you're seeing is order rates of those who joined after the pandemic have largely resembled those who joined during the pandemic. Certainly, you see some softness and impact on the non-DashPass cohorts on a relative basis. But by and large, we're talking about extraordinarily similar types of ordering behavior. So that's what we see kind of currently.

今天，我們在自己的業務中看到的情況基本相同。我們還在結果中披露，我們看到我們的月度活躍消費者增長，在我們的 DashPass 會員計劃中創下歷史新高。因此，您所看到的是，在大流行之後加入的人的訂單率在很大程度上與在大流行期間加入的人相似。當然，相對而言，您會看到對非 DashPass 群組的一些軟化和影響。但總的來說，我們談論的是非常相似的訂購行為類型。這就是我們目前所看到的。

So on a go-forward basis, when I kind of square everything, I mean even as the market leader, sometimes it's hard to remember, but we're still less than 10% of the U.S. restaurant industry sales. When you look overseas, we're a much lower percentage than that. And so when I square, I think, the fundamentals, both in terms of the leading industry retention and order frequency in the U.S. business, the industry-leading retention order frequency in the European business, particularly with Wolt, who grew at 60% on a euro basis, significantly faster than its peers, and then I square that strong fundamentals with the future potential and runway in these categories, I think that's why you're seeing the resilience as well as what was reflected in our guidance.

因此，在前進的基礎上，當我把所有事情都放在一起時，我的意思是即使作為市場領導者，有時也很難記住，但我們仍然不到美國餐飲業銷售額的 10%。當你看海外時，我們的比例要低得多。因此，當我考慮基本面時，無論是在美國業務中領先的行業保留率和訂單頻率方面，還是在歐洲業務中行業領先的保留訂單頻率方面，尤其是 Wolt，他在以歐元為基礎，明顯快於同行，然後我將強勁的基本面與這些類別的未來潛力和跑道相提並論，我認為這就是為什麼你會看到彈性以及我們的指導中反映的內容。

On the second question, I think one of the things that -- and I'll let Prabir kind of talk about some of the details and specifics with respect to the contribution margin disclosure. But I think when I take a step back of what has happened in the last 2.5 years, obviously, there was a pandemic. There was a lot of changes in the macro climate as we've seen particularly '22 versus '21. We've seen regulatory pressures with the likes of Prop 22. And in spite of, I think, all of those ups, downs, sideways, twist and turns, our business has grown fourfold the U.S. marketplace business. We've gained an extra 14 points of category share even as the market leader heading into the pandemic, and we've kind of extended that lead.

關於第二個問題，我認為其中一件事 - 我會讓 Prabir 談談有關邊際貢獻披露的一些細節和細節。但我認為，當我退後一步回顧過去 2.5 年發生的事情時，很明顯，流行病爆發了。正如我們所看到的，尤其是 22 年與 21 年，宏觀氣候發生了很多變化。我們已經看到了像 22 號提案這樣的監管壓力。我認為，儘管所有這些起起落落、橫盤整理、曲折，我們的業務增長了四倍於美國市場業務。即使市場領導者進入大流行，我們也獲得了額外的 14 個類別份額，並且我們已經擴大了這一領先優勢。

And so I think I'm really proud of the team for being able to operate in such volatility. And so how did that happen? Well, I wish there was a silver bullet, but there really isn't. This is a business where you really have to be in the details. Every line item counts, every line item matters, every line item compounds, their interaction affects and dynamics in between the line items. And it's really measuring and managing all of these inches that, I think, has given us the compound interest and advantage that you've seen now accrue over the last 2.5 years.

所以我認為我真的為團隊能夠在如此動蕩的環境中運作感到自豪。那是怎麼發生的呢？好吧，我希望有靈丹妙藥，但實際上沒有。這是一項您必須真正了解細節的業務。每個行項目都很重要，每個行項目都很重要，每個行項目複合，它們的交互影響和行項目之間的動態。我認為，它確實在測量和管理所有這些英寸，這給了我們你在過去 2.5 年中所見的複利和優勢。

Ross, it's Prabir. Just to add on to Tony's points. Look, in comparison to other areas of e-commerce, frankly, other consumer tech companies who have been fairly resilient, and I think that's a function of a couple of things, it's the stickiness of the category we operate in as well as the best-in-class retention with our product. Logically, there is some impact from macro, but that impact seems to be much more limited to less habituated, more occasional customers. DashPass, on the other hand, has higher retentions we've talked about in the past, and the user behavior for DashPass continues to remain strong.

羅斯，是普拉比爾。只是為了補充托尼的觀點。看，坦率地說，與電子商務的其他領域相比，其他具有相當彈性的消費科技公司，我認為這是幾件事的結果，這是我們經營的類別的粘性以及最好的- 我們的產品具有一流的保留率。從邏輯上講，宏觀有一些影響，但這種影響似乎更局限於不習慣、更偶爾的客戶。另一方面，DashPass 的留存率更高，我們過去曾談到過，而且 DashPass 的用戶行為繼續保持強勁。

And so all that to say that when you look at our consumer metrics in Q3 as well as now in October, consumer metrics continue to remain strong. Tony pointed to our monthly active users that have grown both year-on-year and quarter-on-quarter. Order frequency has grown year-on-year.

綜上所述，當您查看我們在第三季度以及現在 10 月的消費者指標時，消費者指標繼續保持強勁。 Tony 指出我們的月度活躍用戶同比和環比都在增長。訂單頻率同比增長。

Pace of customer acquisition continues to remain strong. And all of that basically establishes a foundation for solid growth, not just in Q4, but into 2023, and that's what we're really seeing in the results.

客戶獲取的步伐繼續保持強勁。所有這一切基本上為穩健增長奠定了基礎，不僅在第四季度，而且到 2023 年，這就是我們在結果中真正看到的。

So that's the color that of macro. On your question on the contribution margin, I think your specific question was why our 2022 incremental is higher than the average of 7%. 2021 was impacted by higher Dasher cost due to a more expensive labor market. Today, the labor market has normalized. But in addition, we've actually made certain product improvements that have enhanced the retention of our existing fleet of Dashers and also an incremental supply hours from each Dasher.

這就是宏的顏色。關於您關於邊際貢獻的問題，我認為您的具體問題是為什麼我們的 2022 年增量高於 7% 的平均值。由於勞動力市場更加昂貴，2021 年受到了更高的 Dasher 成本的影響。今天，勞動力市場已經正常化。但除此之外，我們實際上已經進行了某些產品改進，這些改進提高了我們現有 Dasher 車隊的保留率，並增加了每台 Dasher 的供應時間。

And a combination of these 2 things, has actually led to a benefit in terms of Dasher all-in cost that includes cost per order as well as Dasher acquisition costs. And so this benefit in Dasher costs in 2022 has led to higher incrementals this year compared to the general average. Those product improvements will continue benefiting our cost structure. And so you see the impact of that, by the way, in our Q4 EBITDA guidance.

這兩件事的結合，實際上帶來了 Dasher 總成本方面的好處，包括每個訂單的成本以及 Dasher 採購成本。因此，與總體平均水平相比，2022 年 Dasher 成本的這一優勢導致今年的增量更高。這些產品改進將繼續使我們的成本結構受益。順便說一下，您可以在我們的第四季度 EBITDA 指南中看到其影響。

And then on your question about other markets above 7% and so on and so forth, I just wanted to remind everyone on what we've said historically, which was we don't operate our business to a target margin, but rather we aim to maximize total profit dollars. And the objective we have in providing the incremental percentages as well as the progression and contribution profit through all -- through COVID, through COVID reopening, through Prop 22, through inflation and all these factors was really to provide proof points on our execution and to provide visibility into our margin trajectory going forward. And so practically, what that means is we will flex margins that increases total profit dollars.

然後關於你關於其他市場超過 7% 等等的問題，我只是想提醒大家我們在歷史上所說的話，即我們不會將業務運營到目標利潤率，而是我們的目標是最大化總利潤美元。我們通過 COVID、COVID 重新開放、Prop 22、通貨膨脹和所有這些因素提供增量百分比以及進展和貢獻利潤的目標實際上是為我們的執行提供證據，並提供我們未來利潤軌蹟的可見性。所以實際上，這意味著我們將增加利潤總額的利潤。

Your next question comes from the line of Bernie McTernan.

您的下一個問題來自 Bernie McTernan。

On the non-restaurant piece and the drag on profitability, can you rank order, maybe put some percentages around the largest drags on total company profitability, whether it's grocery convenience or international? And then just thinking through maybe what needs to happen to unlock those to be profitable, whether it's scale or technology advancements.

關於非餐廳部分和對盈利能力的拖累，你能否對公司總盈利能力的最大拖累進行排序，或者對公司總盈利能力的最大拖累進行一些百分比，無論是雜貨便利還是國際化？然後只是考慮可能需要發生什麼來解鎖那些盈利的東西，無論是規模還是技術進步。

Yes. Maybe I can start. It's Tony. And then I'll hand it to Prabir on, I think, some of the numbers. I think it starts -- it's important to understand why we're investing in some of these categories. I mean the goal of DoorDash was always to build the largest local commerce marketplace and the largest local commerce platform in an effort to make sure that every physical business can be successful as they move into the digital economy. And our investments into both our non-restaurants category as well as our non-U.S. operations, I think, are really bearing fruit.

是的。也許我可以開始了。是托尼。然後我會把它交給Prabir，我想，一些數字。我認為它開始了——重要的是要了解我們為什麼要投資其中一些類別。我的意思是，DoorDash 的目標始終是建立最大的本地商業市場和最大的本地商業平台，以確保每個實體企業在進入數字經濟時都能取得成功。我認為，我們對非餐廳類別以及非美國業務的投資確實取得了成果。

If you looked at what has transpired in the last couple of years, we effectively have grown a business that was largely 0 in the non-restaurants category into several businesses of billions of dollars of GOV run rate with improving margin economics. And the third-party convenience business is a category leader as well as a variable profit breakeven. As one example, for instance, the earliest business that we started outside the restaurants category. Today, we have over 75,000 partners outside of restaurants, which is more than any other platform in North America, again, from almost a standing start a couple of years ago.

如果你看看過去幾年發生的事情，我們實際上已經將一家在非餐館類別中基本上為 0 的企業發展為幾家具有數十億美元政府運營率的企業，同時提高了利潤率。第三方便利業務是品類領先者，也是可變利潤盈虧平衡點。例如，我們最早在餐廳類別之外開展的業務。今天，我們在餐廳之外擁有超過 75,000 家合作夥伴，這再次比幾年前幾乎一成不變的北美任何其他平台都多。

And so the way we think about investing again is similar to what Prabir said to the last question around maximizing total long-term cash flow. And as we see projects, we invest according to what stage they're at. And so as long as we're seeing product market fit signals, we'll continue to invest. And if we don't, we'll pull back.

因此，我們再次考慮投資的方式類似於 Prabir 在關於最大化總長期現金流的最後一個問題中所說的。當我們看到項目時，我們會根據它們所處的階段進行投資。因此，只要我們看到產品市場契合信號，我們就會繼續投資。如果我們不這樣做，我們就會撤退。

And just to add to Tony's comments, Bernie, let me share a couple of data points that give us excitement and conviction around these investments. The first point, which we've made in the past is these markets that we're attempting to expand into, whether the new categories or international, these are large trillion dollar market. And even a few points of penetration in these large markets could add massive scale to our business.

為了補充托尼的評論，伯尼，讓我分享幾個數據點，這些數據點讓我們對這些投資感到興奮和信念。我們過去提出的第一點是我們試圖擴展到的這些市場，無論是新類別還是國際市場，這些都是萬億美元的巨大市場。即使是在這些大市場中的幾個滲透點也可以為我們的業務增加巨大的規模。

Second, we're seeing very strong signs of progress. And in some cases, we've been operating in these areas for less than a couple of years. Our new verticals, our convenience and grocery business is growing over 80% year-on-year. Our U.S. third-party grocery business is growing over 100% year-on-year, and that's significantly faster than other companies that operate in this space. Our international business is growing over 50% year-on-year on a constant currency basis, and you compare that to other European food delivery players that are showing single-digit year-on-year growth rate.

其次，我們看到了非常強烈的進步跡象。在某些情況下，我們在這些領域開展業務的時間還不到幾年。我們的新垂直領域、便利和雜貨業務同比增長超過 80%。我們的美國第三方雜貨業務同比增長超過 100%，這比在該領域運營的其他公司要快得多。按固定匯率計算，我們的國際業務同比增長超過 50%，您將其與其他歐洲食品配送公司的同比增長率進行比較。

And so our performance is a function of the fact that we've built a product that people like and keep coming back to, i.e., better retention and growing order frequency. And so we like what we see in terms of product market fit. This is exactly the thesis that we had laid out when we made these investments, a little investments in both or investments in our new categories, and they're playing out just as we had originally talked they would.

因此，我們的表現取決於我們構建了人們喜歡並不斷回訪的產品這一事實，即更好的保留率和不斷增長的訂單頻率。所以我們喜歡我們在產品市場契合方面看到的東西。這正是我們在進行這些投資時提出的論點，對兩者都有一點投資或對我們的新類別進行投資，它們正在發揮作用，就像我們最初所說的那樣。

Now in terms of profitability, we wouldn't do any of these things unless we believe there was a path to attractive unit economics. And as Tony alluded earlier, we measure these things regularly to ensure that the steady progress is being made towards steady-state economics. We're beginning to see early proof points, some of which we cited in the letter. And third-party convenience, we expect to get to a variable profit breakeven by the end of this year. We had committed to this earlier on in the year, and we're on track to deliver on that commitment. And our third-party grocery business will continue to improve margins. Q3 margins are better than Q2. And so these are exciting proof points along the way.

現在就盈利能力而言，除非我們相信有一條通往有吸引力的單位經濟的道路，否則我們不會做任何這些事情。正如托尼早些時候提到的那樣，我們定期測量這些東西，以確保朝著穩態經濟取得穩步進展。我們開始看到早期的證據，我們在信中引用了其中一些。以及第三方便利，我們預計到今年年底將實現可變利潤盈虧平衡。我們在今年早些時候就已經承諾了這一點，並且我們正在努力兌現這一承諾。我們的第三方雜貨業務將繼續提高利潤率。第三季度的利潤率好於第二季度。因此，這些都是沿途令人興奮的證明點。

And if you look at what we have done in the U.S. restaurant business, which we've laid out in great detail in the shareholder letter, it's about repeating those playbooks in these other areas. It's not -- there's no single silver bullet. It's the exact same factors around improving the efficiency of deliveries, optimizing defect rates that ultimately will help these areas get to profitability just like the U.S. business did. And so we have a long way to go, but we continue to improve products. We continue to get more efficient. We believe we can drive outsized growth along with margin improvement.

如果你看看我們在美國餐館業務中所做的事情，我們在股東信中詳細闡述了這些內容，那就是在這些其他領域重複這些劇本。不是——沒有單一的靈丹妙藥。圍繞提高交付效率、優化缺陷率的因素完全相同，最終將幫助這些領域像美國企業一樣實現盈利。所以我們還有很長的路要走，但我們會繼續改進產品。我們繼續提高效率。我們相信，隨著利潤率的提高，我們可以推動超額增長。

Your next question comes from the line of Deepak Mathivanan.

您的下一個問題來自 Deepak Mathivanan。

Great. Tony, a question on investing for the long term. Your philosophy is very clear, and it makes a lot of sense. But interest rates have gone up a lot in the last like 3 to 6 months. Clearly, that's made the cost of capital for many businesses higher. But as you kind of think about internally for prioritizing projects for higher ROIs or maybe faster payback periods kind of for this new capital environment, how are you sort of approaching this in the context of your investing philosophy?

偉大的。托尼，關於長期投資的問題。你的哲學很清楚，很有意義。但在過去的 3 到 6 個月裡，利率上升了很多。顯然，這使得許多企業的資本成本更高。但是當你在內部考慮為更高的投資回報率或更快的投資回報期優先考慮項目時，在這種新的資本環境中，你是如何在你的投資理念的背景下解決這個問題的？

And then second question, maybe for Prabir. The disclosure on U.S. restaurant contribution margin is very helpful. But maybe given that it's one of your oldest business, how should we think about the growth of it right now? There's a lot of concern that core U.S. restaurant marketplace is maturing. Maybe you can help address that at least qualitatively, that would be great.

然後是第二個問題，也許是針對 Prabir。美國餐廳貢獻率的披露非常有幫助。但也許考慮到它是您最古老的業務之一，我們現在應該如何看待它的發展？很多人擔心美國的核心餐飲市場正在走向成熟。也許你可以幫助至少在質量上解決這個問題，那會很棒。

Sure. Deepak, I'll take the first one. With respect to investing, frankly, in any environment, whether we're talking about a low interest rate environment or a high interest environment, we're obviously taking that as one input into how we make investments. But the primary input, there's always going to be, are we investing appropriate to the stage of the project? I think it's just as easy to overinvest when "times" are good even though you're not seeing the signal that you want to see. And we've been very disciplined about that, whether it's been our entry into other countries or our foray into other categories beyond the restaurant category, our build-out of the advertising business.

當然。迪帕克，我要第一個。關於投資，坦率地說，在任何環境中，無論我們談論的是低利率環境還是高利率環境，我們顯然都將其作為我們投資方式的一種投入。但主要的投入，總是會是，我們的投資是否適合項目的階段？我認為，當“時間”好的時候，即使你沒有看到你想看到的信號，也很容易過度投資。我們對此非常自律，無論是我們進入其他國家還是我們涉足餐廳類別之外的其他類別，我們對廣告業務的擴展。

And then on the flip side, I think sometimes you cannot take enough risk, especially when you have a strong, robust, resilient business that gives you the cash flows to invest in some of these other categories. So from where I sit, certainly, we're taking that into account in terms of the cost of capital and making sure that we're operating with discipline, making sure that as we've grown tremendously the company over the last couple of years that we're as efficient as we were heading into the last couple of years.

另一方面，我認為有時你不能承擔足夠的風險，尤其是當你擁有強大、穩健、有彈性的業務，為你提供現金流來投資於其他一些類別時。因此，從我所在的位置來看，當然，我們在資本成本方面考慮到這一點，並確保我們有紀律地運作，確保隨著公司在過去幾年裡的巨大發展我們和過去幾年一樣高效。

And that takes a lot of discipline, but it also takes a lot of intentional focus to make sure that we're not just investing in people, but we're investing in the systems to allow us to see operating leverage into the future. And so those are the things that we're doing to make sure that we're investing with discipline. But I would still say the primary input, especially as we look into some of these investments into newer areas, whether it's overseas or into other categories or into new business areas, it's really, are we investing appropriate to the stage of the project?

這需要大量的紀律，但也需要大量的有意識的關注，以確保我們不僅投資於人，而且投資於系統，讓我們看到未來的運營槓桿。因此，這些就是我們正在做的事情，以確保我們以紀律進行投資。但我還是要說主要投入，特別是當我們研究其中一些投資到新領域時，無論是海外還是其他類別或新業務領域，真的，我們的投資是否適合項目階段？

And just add one more comment to that, Deepak, which is I'll go back to my comment about the size of these markets, right? These are large trillion-dollar markets, where money can be made. And even a small amount of penetration in these markets, there's a lot of GMV that can convert ultimately to free cash flow. And so if you just pencil out the math given the scale of these opportunities and our success with execution historically, the ROI math will work. So to be honest, what makes the math work is essentially the scale of these opportunities combined with our execution.

只需再添加一條評論，Deepak，我將回到我對這些市場規模的評論，對嗎？這些是價值萬億美元的大型市場，可以從中賺錢。即使在這些市場的少量滲透，也有很多 GMV 最終可以轉化為自由現金流。因此，如果您只是根據這些機會的規模以及我們在歷史上的執行成功率來計算數學，那麼投資回報率數學就會起作用。所以說實話，使數學工作的本質上是這些機會的規模與我們的執行相結合。

On your question regarding sort of the U.S. business and growth. I'll point you to a couple of things, which is it's easy to get stuck in the quarter-to-quarter sort of dynamic, and you've got third-party data providers that sometimes provide data with very little basis. But what I will say is the following, which is our level of penetration even in the U.S. remains small. Whether it's a percentage of overall restaurant sales or a percentage of the population that are actually using DoorDash we're a small portion of the overall opportunity, and we continue to grow.

關於您關於美國業務和增長的問題。我將向您指出幾件事，即很容易陷入季度到季度的動態中，而且您有第三方數據提供商，有時提供的數據基礎很少。但我要說的是，即使在美國，我們的滲透水平仍然很小。無論是餐廳整體銷售額的百分比還是實際使用 DoorDash 的人口的百分比，我們都只是整體機會的一小部分，而且我們還在繼續增長。

MAUs have continued to grow, which is a good sign. Even despite the fact that you've had restaurants reopening, cities reopening, people going back into the store, despite that and through that, our business has continued to grow. Whereas in other areas of e-commerce, we've actually seen the growth expectations been taken down.

MAU 持續增長，這是一個好兆頭。即使您已經讓餐館重新開業，城市重新開業，人們又回到商店，儘管如此，並且通過這些，我們的業務仍在繼續增長。而在電子商務的其他領域，我們實際上已經看到增長預期被降低了。

And what that points to is the fact that this is an enduring category. People eat. People eat regardless of what's happening to inflationary pressures and other things. They may modulate their behavior and adjust from which restaurants they're eating at or the number of items in their basket and so on, but they still eat. And you're seeing the resilience of that habit in our numbers.

這表明這是一個持久的類別。人吃飯。無論通貨膨脹壓力和其他事情發生了什麼，人們都會吃東西。他們可能會調整自己的行為並調整他們在哪些餐館吃飯或籃子裡的物品數量等等，但他們仍然吃。你在我們的數字中看到了這種習慣的彈性。

And so the opportunity as we look forward in order to continue increasing the size of the scale of the business is for us to make progress on the fundamentals, which is selection, quality and affordability. We talked about new categories. Part of the reason we're bringing on new categories is because it's a new use case for those people that perhaps don't want to use DoorDash for restaurants. They can now use it to get their flowers or get their convenience items or get their grocery items or get their liquor delivery.

因此，我們期待繼續擴大業務規模的機會是讓我們在選擇、質量和可負擔性等基礎上取得進展。我們談到了新的類別。我們引入新類別的部分原因是，對於那些可能不想在餐廳使用 DoorDash 的人來說，這是一個新的用例。他們現在可以用它來買花、買便利品、買雜貨或送酒。

And so a growing number of our new customers now are actually coming to DoorDash to try these new categories, and this is going to unlock the next leg of growth as we continue increasing our penetration of the U.S. population. So hopefully, that provides some perspective on how I think about growth on a go-forward basis.

因此，我們現在越來越多的新客戶實際上來到 DoorDash 嘗試這些新類別，隨著我們繼續增加對美國人口的滲透率，這將開啟下一個增長階段。因此，希望這為我如何看待未來的增長提供了一些視角。

Your next question comes from the line of Eric Sheridan.

您的下一個問題來自 Eric Sheridan。

Maybe two, if I can. First, maybe taking a step back in a bigger picture question. I understood the change in consumer behavior you're seeing and the long runway on penetration. What impact has lower competitive intensity played in the industry over the last 6 to 8 months? And how do you think that potentially informs elements of some of the more mature markets seeing only 2 or 3 players in some instances going after some of the market opportunities where it was just a couple of quarters ago that there was a lot of private capital in the sector looking at all different aspects of delivery and some of that has been more rationalized over the last couple of quarters? That would be number one.

如果可以的話，也許兩個。首先，也許在一個更大的問題上退後一步。我了解您所看到的消費者行為的變化以及滲透的漫長道路。在過去 6 到 8 個月中，較低的競爭強度對該行業產生了哪些影響？您如何看待這可能會告知一些更成熟市場的要素，在某些情況下，只有 2 或 3 個參與者在追逐一些市場機會，而就在幾個季度前，還有很多私人資本在該行業著眼於交付的所有不同方面，其中一些在過去幾個季度中變得更加合理化？那將是第一名。

And then in markets where you're more of a challenger brand than a market leader as a result of some of the markets you acquired through the Wolt acquisition. Can you help us better understand how you see moving the needle from where your market share position is today to more of a market-leading position in the next couple of years? What are some of the levers you most focused on executing against?

然後在您通過收購 Wolt 獲得的一些市場中，您更像是一個挑戰者品牌而不是市場領導者。您能否幫助我們更好地了解您如何看待如何將您的市場份額從今天的位置轉變為未來幾年的市場領先地位？您最專注於執行的一些槓桿是什麼？

Yes. Maybe I can start, Eric, and I'll let Prabir chime in here. I think the answer to both of those questions is that it's a very competitive industry out there. And I'm not sure that there's ever been a "letdown" in terms of competitive intensity. And that's because, at least from where I sit, I believe the highest form of competition is always growing, and that's really consumer expectations.

是的。也許我可以開始，Eric，我會讓 Prabir 插嘴。我認為這兩個問題的答案是，這是一個競爭非常激烈的行業。而且我不確定在競爭強度方面是否有過“失望”。那是因為，至少從我所處的位置來看，我相信最高形式的競爭總是在增長，而這確實是消費者的期望。

I think to me, whether we are the market leader or whether we are not yet the market leader, it's really about an investment in product quality. Consumers are always going to expect more selection of stores they can order from, greater affordability, better quality of service and superior customer support. And to me, that really, at the end of the day, is what's going to rate-limit our ability to penetrate the large runways that both Prabir and I have discussed, whether it's the restaurant industry, the grocery industry, the retail categories.

我認為，無論我們是市場領導者還是我們還不是市場領導者，這實際上都是對產品質量的投資。消費者總是期望他們可以從更多的商店選擇、更實惠的價格、更好的服務質量和卓越的客戶支持。對我來說，歸根結底，這將限制我們進入普拉比爾和我討論過的大型跑道的能力，無論是餐飲業、雜貨業還是零售業。

And that's really what we see. But I wouldn't say that there's been lower competitive intensity in one form or another. I still think that the biggest challenge is making sure that we can get consumers to actually try the product.

這就是我們所看到的。但我不會說某種形式的競爭強度較低。我仍然認為最大的挑戰是確保我們可以讓消費者真正嘗試產品。

I also would say that with respect to maybe the premise in the second question, I think there's a common miss out there that Wolt is not a market leader in the majority of its markets when it actually is. And so I do think that some of this might just be where there's some unreliable third-party reporting. But what I would say is both the instruction I give to our U.S. teams or our teams overseas, it's making sure that we continue making sure to invest in the product quality so that we see gains in our retention and order frequency, which only leads us to compound that advantage over time, whether that's as the market leader or whether that's someone just entering the market.

我還要說，關於第二個問題的前提，我認為有一個普遍的錯誤是，Wolt 在其大多數市場中並不是市場領導者，而實際上它是。所以我確實認為其中一些可能只是存在一些不可靠的第三方報告的地方。但我要說的是我給我們的美國團隊或我們的海外團隊的指示，它確保我們繼續確保投資於產品質量，以便我們看到保留率和訂單頻率的收益，這只會引導我們無論是作為市場領導者還是剛剛進入市場的人，都可以隨著時間的推移複合這種優勢。

Yes. And just to add one data point to that, Eric. I mean if you just look at Wolt's performance, we were super proud of the team and what they've built. In Q3, they grew 60% year-on-year in euro terms. Now I can't think of an example of another European food delivery company that's going at those rates. And from what I've seen, they're growing single digits year-on-year.

是的。埃里克，只是為了添加一個數據點。我的意思是，如果你只看沃爾特的表現，我們就會為這支球隊和他們所建立的東西感到非常自豪。在第三季度，以歐元計算，它們同比增長了 60%。現在我想不出另一家歐洲食品配送公司以這樣的速度運行的例子。從我所見，他們每年都在以個位數的速度增長。

So it's hard to sit here and say that Wolt is not gaining share just given the disparity in growth rates versus relying on third-party data and issues with their approaches and so on. So I rely on the absolute growth rate, which is, in my mind, a pretty reliable proof point around the fact that the Wolt team has created a product and experience that has higher retention, enables growing order frequency, and that's what's allowed them to produce the growth rates that they're posting.

因此，很難坐在這裡說 Wolt 沒有獲得份額，只是考慮到增長率與依賴第三方數據的差異以及他們的方法等問題。所以我依賴絕對增長率，在我看來，這是一個非常可靠的證據，證明 Wolt 團隊創造了一種具有更高保留率的產品和體驗，能夠增加訂單頻率，這就是他們能夠做到的產生他們發布的增長率。

Your next question comes from the line of James Lee.

您的下一個問題來自 James Lee。

Two here, please. First off, DashPass, I was wondering, is there any flexibility or room to increase your fees given your expanded offering and value proposition to customers? And also on DashMart, can you guys talk about the pace of investments in there in terms of new stores and geographic expansion? Any change in consumer behavior or unit economics to help you to kind of reaffirm your long-term thinking there?

請來兩個。首先，我想知道 DashPass 是否有任何靈活性或空間來增加您的費用，因為您提供擴展的產品和對客戶的價值主張？在 DashMart 上，你們能談談在新店和地域擴張方面的投資步伐嗎？消費者行為或單位經濟學的任何變化可以幫助您重申您的長期想法嗎？

Thanks for the question, James. I'll take the first one and then Tony can talk with the second. Just as a general philosophy, we're trying to improve selection quality and affordability. And particularly in the third dimension, affordability means -- to us means reducing friction that's caused by consumer fees, whether it's through DashPass or the non-DashPass product. It's trying to reduce fees or commissions on merchants and increase Dasher earnings.

謝謝你的問題，詹姆斯。我會拿第一個，然後托尼可以和第二個說話。就像一般理念一樣，我們正在努力提高選擇質量和可負擔性。特別是在第三個維度，可負擔性意味著——對我們來說，意味著減少由消費者費用引起的摩擦，無論是通過 DashPass 還是非 DashPass 產品。它試圖降低商家的費用或佣金，並增加 Dasher 的收入。

So in our case, we don't need to increase DashPass rates as a way of making the unit economics work because even at their current rates, DashPass economics work fine even without taking into account the subscription fee. So I view an increase in subscription fee at DashPass as being something that would actually slow down the pace of DashPass adoption which we've been very happy with so far. It continues to remain the largest paid membership program in the food category.

因此，在我們的案例中，我們不需要提高 DashPass 費率作為使單位經濟學發揮作用的一種方式，因為即使按照目前的費率，即使不考慮訂閱費，DashPass 經濟學也能正常工作。因此，我認為 DashPass 訂閱費的增加實際上會減慢 DashPass 的採用速度，到目前為止我們對此感到非常滿意。它仍然是食品類別中最大的付費會員計劃。

We hit record highs in terms of our DashPass subscribers. And the pace of growth in this program has frankly been consistent despite some of the partnerships that other competitors may have entered into or despite the bundled offerings that other competitors may be providing. I mean despite all of those things, we're seeing DashPass grow. So we like the way it's set up. We like the way it's position us for growth. And at least right now, there's no intent to change anything in terms of the fee structure.

我們的 DashPass 訂戶數量創下歷史新高。儘管其他競爭對手可能已經建立了一些合作夥伴關係，或者儘管其他競爭對手可能提供捆綁產品，但該計劃的增長速度坦率地說是一致的。我的意思是，儘管有所有這些事情，我們還是看到了 DashPass 的增長。所以我們喜歡它的設置方式。我們喜歡它為我們定位的方式。至少現在，在收費結構方面沒有任何改變的意圖。

Yes, James. And if I could, I'll just add a bit to this before heading into the DashMart question, which is I think one of the things I'm most proud of the team for accomplishing is that in the last 2.5 years, even though we stated in the shareholder letter, all of the growth that we've seen both top and bottom line in our business. What I'm really proud of is that in achieving all of that for the platform, we've been able to increase earnings for Dashers, increase sales for merchants and reduce fees on a continued basis over the last 2.5 years for consumers.

是的，詹姆斯。如果可以的話，我會在進入 DashMart 問題之前再補充一點，我認為在過去的 2.5 年裡，我為團隊完成的最自豪的事情之一是，儘管我們在股東信中說，我們在業務中看到的所有增長。我真正引以為豪的是，在為平台實現所有這些目標的過程中，我們已經能夠增加 Dashers 的收入，增加商家的銷售額，並在過去 2.5 年中持續降低消費者的費用。

And so -- and DashPass certainly has been a big part of that on the consumer front. But we've really done this while improving the offerings for each of the audiences that we're lucky to serve.

所以——DashPass 無疑是消費者方面的重要組成部分。但我們確實做到了這一點，同時為我們有幸服務的每一位觀眾改進了產品。

On the DashMart question, I think it's important to start with like what we're doing and why we're doing it. With DashMart, one of the things that we've been studying very closely is why do certain industries get penetrated? Or why do they move from offline to online? Obviously, the restaurant delivery industry, even though, again, it has a large runway for growth, it has reached a certain level of penetration that something, say, grocery delivery or retail delivery or delivery from other types of stores has only reached a fraction of.

關於 DashMart 的問題，我認為重要的是從我們正在做什麼以及我們為什麼這樣做開始。對於 DashMart，我們一直在密切研究的一件事是為什麼某些行業會被滲透？或者他們為什麼從線下轉向線上？顯然，餐飲外賣行業，儘管它有很大的增長空間，但它已經達到了一定程度的滲透率，比如雜貨店外賣或零售外賣或其他類型商店的外賣只達到了一小部分的。

And one of the things that we've seen so far is that the setup for third-party delivery in a lot of these non-restaurant categories isn't really optimized for delivery. It's really optimized for going inside the store, for browsing. As a result, some of these stores don't even know exactly what's on the shelf. And as a result, what you see in sometimes third-party delivery is a product that is more expensive than what someone would pay inside the store. They don't always get exactly what they want when they actually buy it, and it doesn't always show up faster than a consumer can shop on their own. And as a result, you haven't seen that penetration.

到目前為止，我們看到的一件事是，在許多這些非餐廳類別中，第三方交付的設置並未真正針對交付進行優化。它確實針對進入商店和瀏覽進行了優化。結果，其中一些商店甚至不知道貨架上有什麼。結果，您有時在第三方交付中看到的是一種比某人在商店內支付的產品更昂貴的產品。他們在實際購買時並不總是能得到他們想要的東西，而且它的出現速度並不總是比消費者自己購物的速度快。結果，您還沒有看到這種滲透。

And so our belief is in addition to working with all of these fantastic partners who we're really, really privileged to work with, whether it's Sprouts Farmers Markets or Giant Eagle or Loblaws or in retail categories, people like DICK'S Sporting Goods or Sephora is that we want to start by working with them to really understand how can we bring incremental demand right out of the gate. But we also want to invent the future of the industry.

因此，我們的信念是，除了與所有這些我們非常非常有幸與之合作的出色合作夥伴合作之外，無論是 Sprouts Farmers Markets、Giant Eagle 或 Loblaws 還是零售類別，像 DICK'S Sporting Goods 或 Sephora 這樣的人我們想從與他們合作開始，真正了解我們如何才能立即帶來增量需求。但我們也想創造這個行業的未來。

And we believe the future in the industry has to offer a product that is going to be -- give customers exactly what they expect when they order at around the same prices of what they pay in store and certainly with greater convenience than they could do it on their own. And so DashMart is really a part of that. And we're doing that in concert with all of these partners that we've been lucky to team up with. And we're doing that here in the United States, we're doing that overseas. And that's really what DashMart is. It's going to be a very important infrastructural components for the future.

而且我們相信，該行業的未來必須提供一種產品——當客戶以與他們在商店支付的價格大致相同的價格訂購時，為他們提供他們所期望的東西，而且肯定比他們做的更方便他們自己。所以 DashMart 確實是其中的一部分。我們正在與所有這些我們有幸與之合作的合作夥伴一起做這件事。我們在美國這樣做，我們也在海外這樣做。這就是 DashMart 的真正意義所在。它將成為未來非常重要的基礎設施組件。

Now that said, just like with all investments at DoorDash, it's not just about the long-term strategy of how can we maximize long-term profit dollars. It's about how can we also invest with discipline according to the stage of the projects. And so that's what we're doing with DashMarts, too. It's not just what we're doing with the third-party business. We're doing that with DashMarts as well, making sure that we can achieve product market fit. Once we see that, we continue investing. And if we keep seeing that grow, we will continue to make those investments.

話雖如此，就像 DoorDash 的所有投資一樣，這不僅僅是關於我們如何最大化長期利潤的長期戰略。這是關於我們如何根據項目的階段進行有紀律的投資。這也是我們對 DashMarts 所做的事情。這不僅僅是我們對第三方業務所做的事情。我們也在 DashMarts 上這樣做，以確保我們能夠實現產品市場匹配。一旦我們看到這一點，我們就會繼續投資。如果我們繼續看到這種增長，我們將繼續進行這些投資。

And so far, we like what we see. But there's a long road ahead, right? We've just started the DashMart business really a couple of years ago. So we're learning very, very quickly, and we have to keep improving our product quality.

到目前為止，我們喜歡我們所看到的。但前方的路還很長，對吧？幾年前，我們才真正開始了 DashMart 業務。所以我們學習非常非常快，我們必須不斷提高我們的產品質量。

Your next question comes from the line of Youssef Squali.

您的下一個問題來自 Youssef Squali。

Two questions, please. First, maybe just looking at the P&L. Your market efficiency has gone up tremendously. I think in the last year, I think your sales and marketing as a percentage of revenue dropped by something like 1,000 basis points. So it's down not only on a percentage basis but even on an absolute basis.

請教兩個問題。首先，也許只看損益表。您的市場效率已大大提高。我認為在去年，我認為您的銷售和營銷佔收入的百分比下降了大約 1,000 個基點。所以它不僅在百分比基礎上下降，甚至在絕對基礎上下降。

I was wondering if you can kind of unpack that a little bit for us in terms of where is the efficiency coming from. Is it better ad rates? Is it maybe less spend on the U.S. restaurant category, where you obviously dominate? Maybe just kind of help us understand the drivers of that. And is that the primary driver for the higher EBITDA expectation for Q4?

我想知道你是否可以為我們解釋一下效率來自哪裡。廣告費率更高嗎？在美國餐廳類別上的花費可能會減少嗎？顯然您在該類別中占主導地位？也許只是幫助我們了解其驅動因素。這是否是第四季度 EBITDA 預期較高的主要驅動因素？

And second, on Wolt, maybe just help us understand the acceleration in GOVs there. I think in the letter you talked about customer acquisition at an all-time high, which is really impressive just all things considered. So maybe just help us understand, again, sustainability of that as we go forward and maybe specific countries where you're seeing such a huge performance.

其次，在 Wolt 上，也許只是幫助我們了解 GOV 的加速。我認為您在信中談到了客戶獲取的歷史最高水平，考慮到所有因素，這確實令人印象深刻。因此，也許只是幫助我們再次了解我們前進的可持續性以及您看到如此巨大表現的特定國家/地區。

So maybe I'll take both of those questions. And Tony, chime in if there's anything else to add. So first on the marketing efficiency point, I just want to go back to some of the comments that we had shared when we went public back in the S-1, which is once you've acquired a cohort and the cohort sort of gets into its second, third, fourth year of life, the marketing spend associated with that cohort declines. It declines materially, right? Because there is no "marketing maintenance spend" that's required. And so what that means is as our business gets larger and our base of existing consumers gets larger, that provides leverage in sales and marketing.

所以也許我會回答這兩個問題。托尼，如果還有什麼要補充的，請插話。因此，首先關於營銷效率這一點，我只想回到我們在 S-1 中公開時分享的一些評論，即一旦您獲得了一個群組並且該群組進入了在其生命的第二、第三、第四年，與該群體相關的營銷支出下降。它實質上下降了，對嗎？因為不需要“營銷維護支出”。因此，這意味著隨著我們的業務越來越大，我們現有的消費者群體越來越大，這將為銷售和營銷提供槓桿作用。

Now more specifically, if you were to tear apart the sales and marketing line and look at CAC versus Dasher acquisition cost versus marketing acquisition -- versus merchant acquisition costs. There is leverage on CAC, but particularly in '22 compared to '21, there's been a lot of leverage in terms of our Dasher acquisition costs. And that's been driven by product improvements that we've made. We're making it easier to Dash. Dashers are putting more hours into our platform. The retention of our fleet has gone up.

現在更具體地說，如果你要拆開銷售和營銷線，看看 CAC 與 Dasher 獲取成本與營銷獲取 - 與商家獲取成本。 CAC 有影響力，但特別是在 22 年與 21 年相比，在我們的 Dasher 採購成本方面有很多影響力。這是由我們所做的產品改進推動的。我們讓 Dash 變得更容易。 Dashers 在我們的平台上投入了更多時間。我們船隊的留存率上升了。

And as a result, that means we need to acquire fewer Dashers to perform -- to actually to fulfill the deliveries that are happening on our platform. And so that's provided leverage in addition to the point I made about an increase in the existing base of consumers. So that's the response to your marketing efficiency question.

因此，這意味著我們需要獲得更少的 Dashers 來執行——才能真正完成我們平台上發生的交付。因此，除了我提出的增加現有消費者基礎的觀點之外，這還提供了槓桿作用。這就是對您的營銷效率問題的回應。

When -- on the Wolt question, it comes down to a couple of factors. I mean Wolt operates in markets that have 300 million people, right? And these markets have low levels of penetration. In fact, even in the oldest markets, Wolt adoption levels are less than 10%. So there's a lot of room for growth just to expand customer acquisition in the markets in which they operate as well as expand to new cities in those countries in which they operate.

什麼時候——關於沃爾特的問題，歸結為幾個因素。我的意思是 Wolt 在擁有 3 億人口的市場中運營，對嗎？而且這些市場的滲透率很低。事實上，即使在最古老的市場，Wolt 的採用率也低於 10%。因此，僅在他們經營的市場擴大客戶獲取以及擴展到他們經營的國家的新城市，就有很大的增長空間。

So that, coupled with the fact that the retention in the Wolt app is super high and order frequency continues to increase because the macro point that people like eating, people like the convenience of food delivery. And therefore, they only end up increasing their utilization of the product, the combination of these 2 things has helped them drive the results that you're seeing.

因此，再加上 Wolt 應用的留存率超高，訂單頻率不斷增加，因為人們喜歡吃的宏觀點，人們喜歡送餐的便利。因此，他們最終只會增加產品的利用率，這兩件事的結合幫助他們推動了您所看到的結果。

Your next question comes from the line of Doug Anmuth.

您的下一個問題來自 Doug Anmuth。

I just want to ask if you have any update to your commentary from last quarter, just suggesting a modest increase in '23 EBITDA.

我只是想問一下您對上個季度的評論是否有任何更新，只是建議 '23 EBITDA 適度增加。

And then secondly, 2 things that come up a lot with investors, higher insurance costs and then also the regulatory environment just given the DOL ruling and Prop 22 status kind of still outstanding. So maybe you could comment on those.

其次，投資者經常想到的兩件事，更高的保險成本，以及剛剛給予 DOL 裁決和 Prop 22 地位的監管環境仍然很突出。所以也許你可以評論這些。

Sure. Maybe I'll start. And Tony, you can chime in whenever you want. So on the EBITDA point, so I think we said in our letter, we expect that the U.S. restaurant business will continue to grow in 2023 and will increase its contribution profit, both in dollar and margin tops, right? Historically, what's happened is we've taken the majority of those profits and we have reinvested them in these investment areas.

當然。也許我會開始。托尼，你可以隨時插話。所以在 EBITDA 方面，我想我們在信中說過，我們預計美國餐飲業務將在 2023 年繼續增長，並將增加其貢獻利潤，無論是美元還是利潤率，對吧？從歷史上看，發生的事情是我們拿走了大部分利潤，並將它們再投資到這些投資領域。

We're at a point where these investment areas are getting -- exhibiting margin improvement, and so the investment dollars don't perfectly offset the increase in the contribution profit in the restaurant business, and that's going to create some flow-through impact to EBITDA. So the combination of these 2 things, which is increasing restaurant profit, coupled with margin improvement in the investment areas, will help us increase annual EBITDA, both in dollar and margin terms in 2023.

我們正處於這些投資領域正在增長的地步——表現出利潤率的提高，因此投資資金並不能完全抵消餐飲業務貢獻利潤的增加，這將對息稅折舊攤銷前利潤。因此，這兩件事的結合，即增加餐廳利潤，再加上投資領域的利潤率提高，將幫助我們在 2023 年增加以美元和利潤率計算的年度 EBITDA。

The only caveat I'll make is we continue to remain in investment mode, and so I'll change this approach if we identify attractive growth opportunities. But today, at current trajectory and current portion speed, we expect to increase annual EBITDA.

我要提出的唯一警告是，我們將繼續保持投資模式，因此如果我們發現有吸引力的增長機會，我將改變這種方法。但今天，按照目前的軌跡和當前的部分速度，我們預計年度 EBITDA 將增加。

On your question on insurance, actually, when you look at our insurance cost in Q3 versus Q2, as a percentage of our GOV, our insurance costs were flat. So good progress in Q3. I won't declare the winners yet. We've got to watch this closely, but there's been no increase, at least as a percentage in Q3 relative to Q2.

關於保險的問題，實際上，當您查看我們在第三季度與第二季度的保險成本時，作為我們 GOV 的百分比，我們的保險成本是持平的。第三季度進展順利。我還不會宣布獲勝者。我們必須密切關注這一點，但沒有增加，至少第三季度相對於第二季度的百分比沒有增加。

Yes, Doug, and on the question regarding regulatory and what we're seeing, we're largely seeing pretty much exactly what we would have expected. I mean I think just to make sure we're on the same fact basis. With respect to, say, the DOL announcement that was made recently, it doesn't change our business model or reclassify drivers. And in many ways, just is an affirmation of President Obama's administration's determination that there are independent contractor workers out there. And that, more broadly, they're largely quite supportive of this line of work.

是的，Doug，關於監管和我們所看到的問題，我們在很大程度上看到了我們所期望的。我的意思是我認為只是為了確保我們基於相同的事實基礎。例如，關於最近發布的 DOL 公告，它不會改變我們的商業模式或重新分類驅動程序。在許多方面，這只是對奧巴馬總統政府對獨立承包商工人的決心的肯定。而且，更廣泛地說，他們在很大程度上非常支持這項工作。

And so what we've seen is outside of a handful of cities, and it's been the same count of cities that have, I would say, frankly, perhaps abused their power and are trying to overregulate the industry, by and large, I think lawmakers, regulators, anyone in policy that we've spoken to has been very productive in terms of making sure that we can serve Dashers together.

因此，我們所看到的只是少數幾個城市之外，我認為坦率地說，可能濫用權力並試圖對行業進行過度監管的城市數量相同，我認為立法者、監管者以及與我們交談過的任何政策制定者在確保我們可以一起為 Dashers 服務方面都非常富有成效。

I mean again, let's remind everyone what Dashers want. In terms of their activity, the average Dasher, and we're talking about 3 million Dashers every quarter, Dashers are working fewer than 4 hours a week on average, 90% of Dashers work fewer than 10 hours a week. This is in the United States. And so what they're saying with their feet is the #1 thing they value about the DoorDash platform is really the flexibility that it offers. And then when you look at what they say and we look at -- take Proposition 22 as an example, Dashers prefer -- 87% of Dashers preferred staying as independent contractors. The vast majority of voters in California supported Proposition 22.

我的意思是，讓我們提醒大家 Dashers 想要什麼。就他們的活動而言，平均 Dasher，我們每個季度大約有 300 萬 Dasher，Dasher 平均每週工作不到 4 小時，90% 的 Dasher 每週工作不到 10 小時。這是在美國。所以他們用腳說的是他們看重的關於 DoorDash 平台的第一件事就是它提供的靈活性。然後，當您查看他們所說的內容時，我們會看到 - 以 22 號提案為例，Dashers 更喜歡 - 87% 的 Dashers 更願意繼續作為獨立承包商。加州絕大多數選民支持第 22 號提案。

And so I'm optimistic that regulators and policymakers will take this into account and actually reflect what Dashers want, which is that they'd like to see labor laws catch up candidly to the modern-day realities of what the future of work really is, which is people ought to be able to control where they work when they work. And that's really what we see. So we don't really expect any new changes versus what we've said before.

所以我很樂觀，監管機構和政策制定者會考慮到這一點，並真正反映 Dashers 想要什麼，那就是他們希望看到勞動法坦率地趕上工作未來真正的現代現實，即人們在工作時應該能夠控制他們在哪里工作。這就是我們所看到的。因此，與我們之前所說的相比，我們並不真正期待任何新的變化。

And Doug, just to add to Tony's comments there. Obviously, in some cases, this regulation introduces new cost into the system. And our goal in such situations is to try to execute as efficiently as we can and try to optimize the way that cost. But in some situations, the cost might be onerous and cannot be entirely optimized away. And so we have a right and an expectation to able to generate a profit in the markets we operate in. And if those costs are overly onerous, we will act to protect our EBITDA guidance. And so I want to make sure that, that's clear.

還有道格，只是為了補充托尼的評論。顯然，在某些情況下，該法規會在系統中引入新的成本。在這種情況下，我們的目標是盡可能高效地執行，並嘗試優化成本方式。但在某些情況下，成本可能很繁重，無法完全優化掉。因此，我們有權並期望能夠在我們經營的市場中產生利潤。如果這些成本過於繁重，我們將採取行動保護我們的 EBITDA 指導。所以我想確保這一點很清楚。

Your next question comes from the line of Brian Nowak.

您的下一個問題來自 Brian Nowak。

Great. I have one for Tony just on business philosophy and sort of risk management through different macro scenarios. The business is holding on great so far. But if we sort of walk into a scenario where in '23, you potentially have a weaker consumer in the U.S. or Europe and maybe your more cash flow generative U.S. business decelerates or has some impact from macro, can you just sort of put us in that world and talk to us about sort of your investment philosophy in both your more developed businesses as well as the earlier more developing products? Just to ensure you're best positioned to drive these industries post-recovery while also doing the best you can to sort of maintain and improve employee morale, which in part probably matters around the stock.

偉大的。我有一個給托尼的，只是關於經營理念和通過不同宏觀情景進行的風險管理。到目前為止，該業務一直保持良好狀態。但是，如果我們進入一個場景，在 23 年，你可能在美國或歐洲有一個較弱的消費者，也許你的更多現金流產生的美國業務減速或受到宏觀影響，你能不能把我們放在那個世界，和我們談談你在更發達的業務以及早期更發展的產品中的投資理念？只是為了確保您在復蘇後處於推動這些行業的最佳位置，同時盡最大努力維持和提高員工士氣，這在一定程度上可能與股票有關。

Brian, yes, I mean, I think the investment philosophy has been largely consistent with what we've done. And I mean, I think even when I think about the last 10 quarters, basically from when we've become public to where we are now, what we outlined in the S-1, we've kind of just continued marching towards that drumbeat of telling the narrative of how we want to be the local commerce company, both building the largest local commerce marketplace, the largest local commerce platform and how we're making investments in towards doing that.

布賴恩，是的，我的意思是，我認為投資理念與我們所做的基本一致。我的意思是，即使我想到過去 10 個季度，基本上從我們公開到現在的情況，我們在 S-1 中概述的內容，我們只是繼續朝著那個鼓點前進講述我們希望如何成為本地商業公司的敘述，既要建立最大的本地商業市場、最大的本地商業平台，又要如何為此進行投資。

I mean I think it's important to take note of what has happened in the last 2.5 years. I mean we went from a one business line company into now 5 businesses with investments into operations overseas outside of the restaurant category, an ads business, a platform business with products like DoorDash Drive and Storefront.

我的意思是，我認為記錄過去 2.5 年發生的事情很重要。我的意思是，我們從一家單一業務線公司發展為現在的 5 家企業，投資於餐廳類別以外的海外業務、廣告業務、平台業務，其產品包括 DoorDash Drive 和 Storefront。

And so when I think about what we are today, the biggest thing that I've been thinking a lot about is how do we actually make sure we continue to stay disciplined about investing commensurate to the stage of those projects. Now obviously, there's a lot of macro headwinds, as you mentioned, and that have changed in the past year. But for me, all that suggests is just it's going to put pressure on our execution. But obviously, if we're not -- if it puts pressure on the consumer, which is, I think, the point that you're going towards, and we're not seeing signal in some of these investment areas, then we certainly would pull back and invest accordingly.

因此，當我想到我們今天的情況時，我一直在思考的最重要的事情是，我們如何真正確保我們繼續保持與這些項目的階段相稱的投資紀律。現在顯然，正如您所提到的，有很多宏觀不利因素，並且在過去一年中發生了變化。但對我來說，所有這些都表明它會對我們的執行施加壓力。但很明顯，如果我們沒有——如果它給消費者帶來壓力，我認為，這就是你要達到的目標，而且我們在其中一些投資領域沒有看到信號，那麼我們當然會撤退並進行相應的投資。

And so for me, it's really, again, about keeping that discipline even though we've gone from 1 business now to 5 businesses. And just to also put things in perspective just for everyone on the line, a lot of the investment dollars are going into our non-U.S. and our non-restaurants category businesses. And the size of those investments now have built a business that's larger than all of DoorDash just a few years ago. And so we certainly like what we see. But obviously, if we're seeing behavior come down because of macro pressures, we will invest accordingly.

所以對我來說，即使我們已經從現在的 1 家企業變成了 5 家企業，這真的是再次保持這種紀律。而且為了讓每個在線的人都能夠正確看待事情，很多投資資金都流向了我們的非美國和非餐廳類別業務。現在，這些投資的規模已經建立了一個比幾年前的所有 DoorDash 都要大的業務。所以我們當然喜歡我們所看到的。但顯然，如果我們看到行為因宏觀壓力而下降，我們將相應地進行投資。

And just to add to Tony's comments, Brian. I mean remember, our core U.S. restaurant business is growing and generates significant cash flow, right? And historically, we've invested the vast majority of this to grow scale in these other areas, into new categories, in international. But these investments are discretionary. And that means that if for one reason or another, we're better served by pulling back on the investment because we're not seeing the right signal in terms of consumer demand, because we're not seeing the right improvement in terms of unit economics or whatever, we can alter the pace of the investment.

只是為了補充托尼的評論，布賴恩。我的意思是請記住，我們的核心美國餐廳業務正在增長並產生大量現金流，對嗎？從歷史上看，我們已經投資了其中的大部分來擴大這些其他領域的規模，進入新的類別，在國際上。但這些投資是可自由支配的。這意味著，如果出於某種原因，我們最好通過撤回投資來獲得更好的服務，因為我們沒有看到消費者需求方面的正確信號，因為我們沒有看到單位方面的正確改善經濟學或其他什麼，我們可以改變投資的步伐。

So far, we've been pretty disciplined with capital allocation. You can see that now in the results in terms of the U.S. restaurant business, and the plan is to continue being equally disciplined going forward.

到目前為止，我們在資本配置方面一直很自律。你現在可以從美國餐飲業的結果中看到這一點，並且計劃在未來繼續保持同樣的紀律。

Your final question comes from the line of Mark Mahaney.

您的最後一個問題來自 Mark Mahaney。

Two questions, please. I know somebody already asked you about macro impact on the demand side. Anything you'd call out on the supply side? Anything about the need for extra side hustle that's maybe led you to bring in more Dashers?

請教兩個問題。我知道有人已經問過你對需求方面的宏觀影響。你有什麼要在供應方面呼籲的嗎？是否需要額外的副業可能會導致您引入更多的 Dashers？

And then secondly, Prabir, your comments about '23. We always parse your words very carefully. That last quarter, you had said the increased annual EBITDA by a modest amount. And this time, when finishing your answer to the question, just said you would increase annual EBITDA but you didn't use the modest word. Is there anything to read into that? Sorry to ask you such a precise question, but I just want to make sure we're not missing any nuances.

其次，Prabir，您對 23 年的評論。我們總是非常仔細地解析您的話。上個季度，您曾說過年度 EBITDA 略有增加。而這一次，在完成你對問題的回答時，只是說你會增加年度 EBITDA，但你沒有使用謙虛的詞。有什麼要讀的嗎？很抱歉問你這麼精確的問題，但我只是想確保我們沒有遺漏任何細微差別。

Yes. Maybe I'll take both. So Mark, on the Dasher supply question, this is the point I made sort of through today's conversation around the labor market being more normalized this year than it was last year. And so that's having an impact on, obviously, to some degree, advertising rates but also in terms of supply that's available to become Dashers. And that benefit has been turbocharged by product improvements that have now improved the retention of the fleet and is actually generating incremental supply hours from existing Dashers. And so both of those things means you just don't have -- you don't need to acquire as many new Dashers.

是的。也許我會兩者兼得。所以馬克，關於 Dasher 供應問題，這就是我在今天關於勞動力市場今年比去年更加正常化的談話中提出的觀點。因此，很明顯，這在一定程度上會影響廣告費率，但也會影響可成為 Dashers 的供應量。產品改進現在已經提高了車隊的保留率，並且實際上從現有的 Dashers 中產生了更多的供應時間，從而進一步提高了這種優勢。所以這兩件事都意味著你沒有——你不需要購買那麼多新的 Dashers。

So the labor environment -- so long story short, the labor environment has resulted in all-in Dasher costs being better today. And that's been -- and because of the product improvement that we've made, we expect that to continue benefiting our cost structure in Q4 as well as 2023, provided there's no shocks in the labor environment.

所以勞動力環境——長話短說，勞動力環境導致今天的綜合 Dasher 成本更好。這就是 - 由於我們已經進行了產品改進，我們預計如果勞動力環境沒有衝擊，我們預計將在第四季度和 2023 年繼續使我們的成本結構受益。

On the question around 2023, I'd urge you not to over-extrapolate on a word or 2. Really, we're not providing quantitative guidance. But what I am trying to share with you is when you think about the underlying dynamics of the business, the reason you didn't see a lot of EBITDA expansion going from '21 into '22 was because the pick-up in terms of contribution profit from the U.S. restaurant business was largely soaked up by the investments.

關於 2023 年左右的問題，我敦促您不要過度推斷一兩個詞。實際上，我們並沒有提供定量指導。但是我想與您分享的是，當您考慮業務的潛在動態時，您沒有看到從 21 年到 22 年 EBITDA 擴張的原因是因為貢獻方面的回升美國餐飲業務的利潤大部分被投資吸收。

We're at a point right now where the investments are getting better from a margin perspective, while the U.S. business continues to grow and, therefore, throws off more dollars and has continuing improvements in the margins, and it's not a perfect offset anymore. It used to be, not anymore. And that's going to generate incremental EBITDA, both in dollar terms and in margin terms. We'll come back to you with specific guidance on 2023 in Q4, which is in line with our normal cadence.

從利潤率的角度來看，我們現在正處於投資變得更好的地步，而美國業務繼續增長，因此投入了更多的美元，利潤率也在不斷提高，這不再是完美的抵消。以前是，現在不是了。這將產生增量的 EBITDA，無論是以美元計算還是以利潤率計算。我們將在第四季度為您提供 2023 年的具體指導，這與我們的正常節奏一致。

There are no further questions at this time. Mr. Andy Hargreaves, I now turn the call back over to you.

目前沒有其他問題。安迪·哈格里夫斯先生，我現在把電話轉給你。

Great. Thank you, everybody, for joining us today. We appreciate both your time today and your support, and look forward to talking with many of you soon. Have a good evening.

偉大的。謝謝大家今天加入我們。我們感謝您今天的時間和您的支持，並期待很快與你們中的許多人交談。祝你有個美好的夜晚。

This does conclude today's conference call. You may now disconnect.

這確實結束了今天的電話會議。您現在可以斷開連接。