Doordash, Inc. (DASH) 2022 Q3 法說會逐字稿

Thank you for standing by. My name is Heather, and I will be your conference operator today. At this time, I would like to welcome everyone to the Q3 2022 DASH Earnings Conference Call. (Operator Instructions)

感謝各位稍候。我叫 Heather，今天將擔任本次電話會議的接線員。此刻，我想歡迎各位參加 2022 年第三季 DASH 財報電話會議。（接線員指示）

Thank you. Andy Hargreaves, you may begin your conference.

謝謝。Andy Hargreaves，您可以開始會議。

Thanks, Heather. Good afternoon, everyone, and thanks for joining us for our third quarter 2022 earnings call.

謝謝你，Heather。各位下午好，感謝各位參加我們 2022 年第三季財報電話會議。

I'm pleased to be joined today by Co-Founder, Chair and CEO, Tony Xu; and CFO, Prabir Adarkar.

我很高興今天與我們的共同創辦人、董事長兼執行長 Tony Xu，以及財務長 Prabir Adarkar 一同出席。

We'll be making forward-looking statements during today's call, including our expectations of our business, the macroeconomic environment, financial position and operating performance, our market and local commerce opportunities, future financial results and guidance, our strategies and our investment approach. Forward-looking statements are subject to risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially from those described and some such risks are described in our risk factors included in our SEC filings, including our 10-Ks and 10-Qs. You should not rely on our forward-looking statements as predictions of future events. We disclaim any obligation to update any forward-looking statements, except as required by law.

在今天的電話會議中，我們將作出前瞻性陳述，包括我們對業務、總體經濟環境、財務狀況與營運表現、市場與在地商務機會、未來財務結果與指引、策略以及投資方法的預期。前瞻性陳述受風險與不確定性影響，可能導致實際結果與所述內容存在重大差異；其中部分風險已載於我們向美國證券交易委員會（SEC）提交的文件（包括 10-K 與 10-Q）中的風險因素。您不應將我們的前瞻性陳述視為對未來事件的預測。除法律要求外，我們不承擔更新任何前瞻性陳述之義務。

During this call, we will discuss certain non-GAAP financial measures. Information regarding our non-GAAP financial results, including a reconciliation of such non-GAAP results to the most directly comparable GAAP financial measures may be found in our letter to shareholders, which is available on our Investor Relations website. These non-GAAP measures should be considered in addition to our GAAP results and are not intended to be a substitute for our GAAP results.

在本次電話會議中，我們將討論若干非 GAAP 財務衡量指標。關於我們的非 GAAP 財務結果之資訊（包括將該等非 GAAP 結果與最直接可比的 GAAP 財務衡量指標進行調節之對照表），可在我們的股東信中查閱；該信可於我們的投資人關係網站取得。這些非 GAAP 指標應與我們的 GAAP 結果一併考量，且不旨在取代我們的 GAAP 結果。

Finally, this call in its entirety is being audio webcast on our Investor Relations website. An audio replay of this call will be available on our website shortly after the call ends.

最後，本次電話會議全程將於我們的投資人關係網站進行音訊網路直播。本次電話會議結束後不久，我們的網站將提供音訊重播。

As in previous quarters, we'll go straight to questions. So with that, Heather, please open the line to the first question.

如同前幾季，我們將直接進入問答。那麼，Heather，請開放第一個提問。

(Operator Instructions) And your first question comes from the line of Ross Sandler with Barclays.

（接線員指示）第一個問題來自 Barclays 的 Ross Sandler。

Congrats on the quarter. Maybe just starting with macro, any color on what you're seeing across either the U.S. or international markets, thus far in 4Q, and where trends are holding up pretty well versus possibly slowing down a bit?

恭喜本季表現。先從總體環境談起，能否分享一下你們在第四季迄今於美國或國際市場看到的情況？哪些趨勢仍維持得相當不錯，哪些可能開始稍微放緩？

And then the second question is, thanks for the chart on contribution margin for the U.S. restaurant. That's very helpful. In the letter, you mentioned that the last few quarters, you've been above that 7% level. So could you just talk about what are the biggest drivers of that? Is that higher percent of repeats and getting some marketing efficiency out of that? Or is that driver efficiencies? Any color on what's taking that north of 7%, and are there markets that are in the double digits? Or is there like a natural limit to how high that could get?

第二個問題是，感謝你們提供美國餐廳貢獻毛利率的圖表，這非常有幫助。你們在股東信中提到，過去幾季你們一直高於 7% 的水準。能否談談最主要的驅動因素是什麼？是回購/回流（repeat）占比提高並因此帶來行銷效率？還是履約/配送效率？能否補充一些細節，究竟是什麼讓它高於 7%？是否有市場達到雙位數？或者這個水準有一個自然上限，能提高到多高？

Ross, it's Tony. I'll start with the first one and answer briefly the second and hand it off to Prabir. On the first question, obviously, we've seen tremendous resilience in the business. In the U.S. business, you've seen continued growth north of 25% GOV. On the marketplace revenues north of 30% growth each -- for each of the last 5 quarters now. And on the flip side, this is in the face of an energy crisis, pretty sticky inflation and a war in Europe, and so it's sometimes hard to try to square the 2.

Ross，我是 Tony。我先回答第一個問題，第二個問題我也簡要回應一下，然後交給 Prabir。關於第一個問題，很明顯我們的業務展現出極強的韌性。在美國業務方面，你們看到 GOV 持續成長超過 25%。在平台（marketplace）營收方面，過去連續 5 個季度每一季的成長都超過 30%。另一方面，這是在能源危機、相當黏著的通膨，以及歐洲戰爭的背景下發生的，因此有時很難把這兩者對照起來理解。

But I think the way that we've been thinking about things is really looking at it from a historical current day and future perspective. Historically, in the last 60 years in that time frame, only 2 of the last 60 years have we seen a decline in food spend in the U.S., and that's specifically in the restaurant and grocery industries. And so I think even though all of us are wondering how to quantify the macro headwinds. Food is the most resilient category. I think historically, that's shown to be true.

但我認為我們的思考方式，是從歷史、當下與未來的角度來看。從歷史來看，在過去 60 年的期間裡，美國食品支出出現下滑的年份只有 2 年，而且特別是在餐廳與雜貨產業。因此我認為，即使我們都在思考如何量化總體逆風，食品仍是最具韌性的類別；歷史上也證明確實如此。

Current day, what we see in our own business is something largely the same. We also disclosed in the results that we saw our monthly active consumers grow, all-time highs in our DashPass membership program. And so what you're seeing is order rates of those who joined after the pandemic have largely resembled those who joined during the pandemic. Certainly, you see some softness and impact on the non-DashPass cohorts on a relative basis. But by and large, we're talking about extraordinarily similar types of ordering behavior. So that's what we see kind of currently.

就當下而言，我們在自身業務中看到的情況大致相同。我們也在業績中揭露，我們的月活躍消費者成長，DashPass 會員方案的會員數也創下歷史新高。因此你們看到的是，疫情後加入的用戶，其下單率大致與疫情期間加入的用戶相似。當然，相較之下，非 DashPass 的族群確實出現一些疲軟並受到影響。但整體而言，我們談的是極為相近的下單行為。這就是我們目前所看到的狀況。

So on a go-forward basis, when I kind of square everything, I mean even as the market leader, sometimes it's hard to remember, but we're still less than 10% of the U.S. restaurant industry sales. When you look overseas, we're a much lower percentage than that. And so when I square, I think, the fundamentals, both in terms of the leading industry retention and order frequency in the U.S. business, the industry-leading retention order frequency in the European business, particularly with Wolt, who grew at 60% on a euro basis, significantly faster than its peers, and then I square that strong fundamentals with the future potential and runway in these categories, I think that's why you're seeing the resilience as well as what was reflected in our guidance.

至於未來展望，當我把所有因素綜合起來看，即使我們是市場領導者，有時也很難記得我們在美國餐廳產業銷售額中的占比仍不到 10%。放眼海外，我們的占比更低。因此當我綜合基本面——包括美國業務在業界領先的留存與下單頻率、歐洲業務（特別是 Wolt）同樣業界領先的留存與下單頻率；Wolt 以歐元計算成長 60%，顯著快於同業——再把這些強勁基本面與這些類別未來的潛力與成長跑道相結合，我認為這就是你們看到韌性，以及我們指引所反映內容的原因。

On the second question, I think one of the things that -- and I'll let Prabir kind of talk about some of the details and specifics with respect to the contribution margin disclosure. But I think when I take a step back of what has happened in the last 2.5 years, obviously, there was a pandemic. There was a lot of changes in the macro climate as we've seen particularly '22 versus '21. We've seen regulatory pressures with the likes of Prop 22. And in spite of, I think, all of those ups, downs, sideways, twist and turns, our business has grown fourfold the U.S. marketplace business. We've gained an extra 14 points of category share even as the market leader heading into the pandemic, and we've kind of extended that lead.

關於第二個問題，我認為其中一點——我會讓 Prabir 針對貢獻毛利率揭露的細節與具體項目做說明——但如果我退一步回顧過去 2.5 年發生的事，顯然有疫情，也有許多總體環境的變化，特別是 2022 年相較 2021 年。我們也面臨像是 Prop 22 之類的監管壓力。儘管有這些起伏、波動與轉折，我們的美國平台業務規模成長了四倍。即使在疫情前我們已是市場領導者，我們仍額外提升了 14 個百分點的類別市占，並且進一步擴大了領先優勢。

And so I think I'm really proud of the team for being able to operate in such volatility. And so how did that happen? Well, I wish there was a silver bullet, but there really isn't. This is a business where you really have to be in the details. Every line item counts, every line item matters, every line item compounds, their interaction affects and dynamics in between the line items. And it's really measuring and managing all of these inches that, I think, has given us the compound interest and advantage that you've seen now accrue over the last 2.5 years.

因此我對團隊能在如此高波動的環境下運作感到非常自豪。那這是怎麼做到的？我希望有一個萬靈丹，但其實沒有。這是一門必須深入細節的生意。每一個科目都很重要、每一個科目都會累積、每一個科目之間的互動也會影響彼此的效果與動態。我認為正是對這些「每一寸」的衡量與管理，讓我們獲得了你們在過去 2.5 年看到的複利效應與優勢。

Ross, it's Prabir. Just to add on to Tony's points. Look, in comparison to other areas of e-commerce, frankly, other consumer tech companies who have been fairly resilient, and I think that's a function of a couple of things, it's the stickiness of the category we operate in as well as the best-in-class retention with our product. Logically, there is some impact from macro, but that impact seems to be much more limited to less habituated, more occasional customers. DashPass, on the other hand, has higher retentions we've talked about in the past, and the user behavior for DashPass continues to remain strong.

Ross，我是 Prabir。我補充 Tony 的觀點。坦白說，與電商的其他領域相比，或與其他相當具韌性的消費者科技公司相比，我們也相當有韌性。我認為這有幾個原因：一是我們所處類別的黏著度，二是我們產品具備同級最佳的留存。從邏輯上來說，總體環境確實會帶來一些影響，但這種影響似乎更局限於較不習慣使用、較偶爾下單的客群。相較之下，DashPass 的留存率更高，我們過去也談過，而 DashPass 的使用者行為仍持續強勁。

And so all that to say that when you look at our consumer metrics in Q3 as well as now in October, consumer metrics continue to remain strong. Tony pointed to our monthly active users that have grown both year-on-year and quarter-on-quarter. Order frequency has grown year-on-year.

總之，當你們看我們第三季的消費者指標以及目前 10 月的數據，消費者指標仍然維持強勁。Tony 提到我們的月活躍用戶無論年增或季增都在成長；下單頻率也呈現年增。

Pace of customer acquisition continues to remain strong. And all of that basically establishes a foundation for solid growth, not just in Q4, but into 2023, and that's what we're really seeing in the results.

客戶獲取的步伐持續保持強勁。而這一切基本上為穩健成長奠定了基礎，不僅是在第四季，也延伸到 2023 年，而這正是我們在結果中真正看到的。

So that's the color that of macro. On your question on the contribution margin, I think your specific question was why our 2022 incremental is higher than the average of 7%. 2021 was impacted by higher Dasher cost due to a more expensive labor market. Today, the labor market has normalized. But in addition, we've actually made certain product improvements that have enhanced the retention of our existing fleet of Dashers and also an incremental supply hours from each Dasher.

以上就是宏觀面的補充說明。關於你對貢獻毛利（contribution margin）的問題，我想你具體問的是，為什麼我們 2022 年的增量（incremental）高於 7% 的平均值。2021 年受到更昂貴的勞動市場影響，Dasher 成本較高。如今，勞動市場已趨於正常化。此外，我們實際上也做了一些產品改進，提升了現有 Dasher 車隊的留存，同時也提高了每位 Dasher 的增量供給工時。

And a combination of these 2 things, has actually led to a benefit in terms of Dasher all-in cost that includes cost per order as well as Dasher acquisition costs. And so this benefit in Dasher costs in 2022 has led to higher incrementals this year compared to the general average. Those product improvements will continue benefiting our cost structure. And so you see the impact of that, by the way, in our Q4 EBITDA guidance.

而這兩項因素的結合，實際上帶來了 Dasher 全包成本（all-in cost）的改善，包含每單成本以及 Dasher 招募成本。因此，2022 年 Dasher 成本的這項改善，使得今年的增量高於一般平均水準。這些產品改進將持續讓我們的成本結構受益。順帶一提，你也可以在我們第四季 EBITDA 指引中看到其影響。

And then on your question about other markets above 7% and so on and so forth, I just wanted to remind everyone on what we've said historically, which was we don't operate our business to a target margin, but rather we aim to maximize total profit dollars. And the objective we have in providing the incremental percentages as well as the progression and contribution profit through all -- through COVID, through COVID reopening, through Prop 22, through inflation and all these factors was really to provide proof points on our execution and to provide visibility into our margin trajectory going forward. And so practically, what that means is we will flex margins that increases total profit dollars.

接著關於你問到其他市場高於 7% 等等，我只是想提醒大家我們過去一貫的說法：我們經營業務並不是以某個目標毛利率為導向，而是以最大化總利潤金額為目標。我們提供增量百分比、以及貢獻利潤在整個期間的演進——歷經 COVID、COVID 解封、Prop 22、通膨以及所有這些因素——其目的其實是為了提供我們執行力的佐證，並讓大家看見我們未來的毛利率走勢。實務上，這代表我們會彈性調整毛利率，以提高總利潤金額。

Your next question comes from the line of Bernie McTernan.

下一個問題來自 Bernie McTernan。

On the non-restaurant piece and the drag on profitability, can you rank order, maybe put some percentages around the largest drags on total company profitability, whether it's grocery convenience or international? And then just thinking through maybe what needs to happen to unlock those to be profitable, whether it's scale or technology advancements.

關於非餐廳業務以及對獲利能力的拖累，你能否按影響程度排序，或用一些百分比說明對公司整體獲利拖累最大的項目是哪些——例如雜貨、便利商店或國際業務？另外再想一下，要讓這些業務轉為獲利可能需要哪些條件，例如規模擴張或技術進步。

Yes. Maybe I can start. It's Tony. And then I'll hand it to Prabir on, I think, some of the numbers. I think it starts -- it's important to understand why we're investing in some of these categories. I mean the goal of DoorDash was always to build the largest local commerce marketplace and the largest local commerce platform in an effort to make sure that every physical business can be successful as they move into the digital economy. And our investments into both our non-restaurants category as well as our non-U.S. operations, I think, are really bearing fruit.

好的。我可以先開始。我是 Tony，然後我會把一些數字的部分交給 Prabir。我認為首先——理解我們為什麼投資這些類別很重要。DoorDash 的目標一直是打造最大的在地商務（local commerce）市集與最大的在地商務平台，努力確保每一家實體商家在邁向數位經濟時都能成功。我們對非餐廳類別以及非美國業務的投資，我認為確實正在開花結果。

If you looked at what has transpired in the last couple of years, we effectively have grown a business that was largely 0 in the non-restaurants category into several businesses of billions of dollars of GOV run rate with improving margin economics. And the third-party convenience business is a category leader as well as a variable profit breakeven. As one example, for instance, the earliest business that we started outside the restaurants category. Today, we have over 75,000 partners outside of restaurants, which is more than any other platform in North America, again, from almost a standing start a couple of years ago.

如果你看看過去幾年發生的事情，我們實際上已把原本在非餐廳類別幾乎為 0 的業務，發展成多個以 GOV 年化運行率（run rate）計達數十億美元、且毛利結構持續改善的業務。第三方便利商店業務是該類別的領導者，同時也達到變動利潤損益兩平（variable profit breakeven）。舉例來說，這是我們最早在餐廳類別之外開始的業務。如今，我們在餐廳之外已有超過 75,000 家合作夥伴，這比北美任何其他平台都多——而幾年前我們幾乎是從零開始。

And so the way we think about investing again is similar to what Prabir said to the last question around maximizing total long-term cash flow. And as we see projects, we invest according to what stage they're at. And so as long as we're seeing product market fit signals, we'll continue to invest. And if we don't, we'll pull back.

因此，我們對投資的思考方式也再次與 Prabir 對上一題所說的相似：以最大化長期總現金流為目標。當我們看到專案時，會依其所處階段來決定投資力度。只要我們看到產品市場契合（product market fit）的訊號，就會持續投資；如果沒有，我們就會收縮。

And just to add to Tony's comments, Bernie, let me share a couple of data points that give us excitement and conviction around these investments. The first point, which we've made in the past is these markets that we're attempting to expand into, whether the new categories or international, these are large trillion dollar market. And even a few points of penetration in these large markets could add massive scale to our business.

再補充 Tony 的評論，Bernie，我分享幾個數據點，說明為什麼我們對這些投資感到興奮並且有信心。第一點，我們過去提過：我們嘗試擴張的這些市場——不論是新類別或國際市場——都是規模達數兆美元的巨大市場。即使在這些大市場中只取得幾個百分點的滲透率，也可能為我們的業務帶來巨大的規模。

Second, we're seeing very strong signs of progress. And in some cases, we've been operating in these areas for less than a couple of years. Our new verticals, our convenience and grocery business is growing over 80% year-on-year. Our U.S. third-party grocery business is growing over 100% year-on-year, and that's significantly faster than other companies that operate in this space. Our international business is growing over 50% year-on-year on a constant currency basis, and you compare that to other European food delivery players that are showing single-digit year-on-year growth rate.

第二，我們看到非常強勁的進展跡象。而且在某些情況下，我們在這些領域的營運時間還不到兩年。我們的新垂直業務（new verticals），也就是便利與雜貨業務，年增超過 80%。我們在美國的第三方雜貨業務年增超過 100%，而且明顯快於同業。我們的國際業務以固定匯率（constant currency）計年增超過 50%；相較之下，其他歐洲外送玩家的年增率只有個位數。

And so our performance is a function of the fact that we've built a product that people like and keep coming back to, i.e., better retention and growing order frequency. And so we like what we see in terms of product market fit. This is exactly the thesis that we had laid out when we made these investments, a little investments in both or investments in our new categories, and they're playing out just as we had originally talked they would.

因此，我們的表現反映出我們打造了人們喜歡、並會持續回來使用的產品，也就是更好的留存與更高的下單頻率。因此，就產品市場契合而言，我們對目前看到的狀況感到滿意。這正是我們在進行這些投資時所提出的論點——無論是對新類別或國際市場的投資——而它們的發展也正如我們當初所說的那樣逐步實現。

Now in terms of profitability, we wouldn't do any of these things unless we believe there was a path to attractive unit economics. And as Tony alluded earlier, we measure these things regularly to ensure that the steady progress is being made towards steady-state economics. We're beginning to see early proof points, some of which we cited in the letter. And third-party convenience, we expect to get to a variable profit breakeven by the end of this year. We had committed to this earlier on in the year, and we're on track to deliver on that commitment. And our third-party grocery business will continue to improve margins. Q3 margins are better than Q2. And so these are exciting proof points along the way.

至於獲利能力，如果我們不相信有通往具吸引力單位經濟（unit economics）的路徑，我們不會做任何一項。正如 Tony 先前提到的，我們會定期衡量這些業務，以確保正穩步朝向穩態經濟模型（steady-state economics）前進。我們開始看到一些早期的佐證，其中部分已在股東信中引用。第三方便利商店業務，我們預期在今年底前達到變動利潤損益兩平。我們今年稍早就做出這項承諾，目前也正按計畫交付。我們的第三方雜貨業務也將持續改善毛利率；第三季毛利率優於第二季。因此，這些都是過程中令人振奮的里程碑。

And if you look at what we have done in the U.S. restaurant business, which we've laid out in great detail in the shareholder letter, it's about repeating those playbooks in these other areas. It's not -- there's no single silver bullet. It's the exact same factors around improving the efficiency of deliveries, optimizing defect rates that ultimately will help these areas get to profitability just like the U.S. business did. And so we have a long way to go, but we continue to improve products. We continue to get more efficient. We believe we can drive outsized growth along with margin improvement.

如果你看看我們在美國餐廳業務所做的事情——我們已在股東信中非常詳細地說明——核心就是把那些作法複製到其他領域。這不是——沒有單一的靈丹妙藥。最終能幫助這些領域走向獲利的，仍是同樣的因素：提升配送效率、優化缺陷率（defect rates）等，正如美國業務當初做到的一樣。因此，我們還有很長的路要走，但我們會持續改進產品、持續提升效率。我們相信能在推動超額成長的同時，也帶來毛利率改善。

Your next question comes from the line of Deepak Mathivanan.

下一個問題來自 Deepak Mathivanan。

Great. Tony, a question on investing for the long term. Your philosophy is very clear, and it makes a lot of sense. But interest rates have gone up a lot in the last like 3 to 6 months. Clearly, that's made the cost of capital for many businesses higher. But as you kind of think about internally for prioritizing projects for higher ROIs or maybe faster payback periods kind of for this new capital environment, how are you sort of approaching this in the context of your investing philosophy?

很好。Tony，我有一個關於長期投資的問題。你的理念非常清楚，也很有道理。但過去大約 3 到 6 個月利率上升很多，顯然使許多企業的資本成本提高。不過當你在新的資本環境下，內部思考如何優先排序專案、追求更高的 ROI 或可能更快的回收期時，你在投資理念的脈絡下是如何看待並採取做法的？

And then second question, maybe for Prabir. The disclosure on U.S. restaurant contribution margin is very helpful. But maybe given that it's one of your oldest business, how should we think about the growth of it right now? There's a lot of concern that core U.S. restaurant marketplace is maturing. Maybe you can help address that at least qualitatively, that would be great.

第二個問題可能給 Prabir。你們揭露美國餐廳業務的貢獻毛利率非常有幫助。但既然這是你們最早期的業務之一，我們現在應該如何看待它的成長？市場上有很多擔憂，認為美國核心餐廳市集正在成熟。也許你可以至少從定性角度回應一下，那會很棒。

Sure. Deepak, I'll take the first one. With respect to investing, frankly, in any environment, whether we're talking about a low interest rate environment or a high interest environment, we're obviously taking that as one input into how we make investments. But the primary input, there's always going to be, are we investing appropriate to the stage of the project? I think it's just as easy to overinvest when "times" are good even though you're not seeing the signal that you want to see. And we've been very disciplined about that, whether it's been our entry into other countries or our foray into other categories beyond the restaurant category, our build-out of the advertising business.

當然可以。Deepak，我先回答第一個。就投資而言，坦白說，在任何環境下，不論我們談的是低利率環境或高利率環境，我們顯然都會把這點作為我們進行投資決策的一項輸入。但最主要的輸入永遠會是：我們的投資是否符合專案所處的階段？我認為在「景氣」好的時候也同樣很容易過度投資，即使你並沒有看到你想看到的訊號。我們在這方面一直非常自律，無論是我們進入其他國家，或是我們跨足餐廳品類以外的其他品類，或是我們建置廣告業務。

And then on the flip side, I think sometimes you cannot take enough risk, especially when you have a strong, robust, resilient business that gives you the cash flows to invest in some of these other categories. So from where I sit, certainly, we're taking that into account in terms of the cost of capital and making sure that we're operating with discipline, making sure that as we've grown tremendously the company over the last couple of years that we're as efficient as we were heading into the last couple of years.

另一方面，我認為有時候你反而可能承擔的風險不夠，特別是當你擁有一個強健、穩健且具韌性的業務，能提供現金流讓你投資於這些其他品類時。就我所處的位置來看，我們當然會把這點納入考量，包括資本成本，並確保我們以紀律運作；也確保在過去幾年公司大幅成長之後，我們的效率能與進入過去幾年之前一樣高。

And that takes a lot of discipline, but it also takes a lot of intentional focus to make sure that we're not just investing in people, but we're investing in the systems to allow us to see operating leverage into the future. And so those are the things that we're doing to make sure that we're investing with discipline. But I would still say the primary input, especially as we look into some of these investments into newer areas, whether it's overseas or into other categories or into new business areas, it's really, are we investing appropriate to the stage of the project?

這需要很大的紀律，但也需要非常有意識的聚焦，確保我們不只是投資在人員上，也投資在系統上，讓我們能在未來看到營運槓桿。因此，這些就是我們為了確保以紀律投資所做的事情。但我仍會說，最主要的輸入，特別是當我們檢視對一些較新領域的投資時，不論是海外、其他品類或新的業務領域，核心其實是：我們的投資是否符合專案所處的階段？

And just add one more comment to that, Deepak, which is I'll go back to my comment about the size of these markets, right? These are large trillion-dollar markets, where money can be made. And even a small amount of penetration in these markets, there's a lot of GMV that can convert ultimately to free cash flow. And so if you just pencil out the math given the scale of these opportunities and our success with execution historically, the ROI math will work. So to be honest, what makes the math work is essentially the scale of these opportunities combined with our execution.

再補充一點，Deepak，我想回到我先前關於這些市場規模的評論，對吧？這些都是規模達數兆美元的大市場，是可以賺錢的。即便在這些市場中只取得一小部分滲透率，也會有大量的 GMV 最終可以轉化為自由現金流。因此，如果你根據這些機會的規模以及我們過往的執行成功來簡單推算，ROI 的數學是成立的。坦白說，讓這個數學成立的，本質上就是這些機會的規模加上我們的執行力。

On your question regarding sort of the U.S. business and growth. I'll point you to a couple of things, which is it's easy to get stuck in the quarter-to-quarter sort of dynamic, and you've got third-party data providers that sometimes provide data with very little basis. But what I will say is the following, which is our level of penetration even in the U.S. remains small. Whether it's a percentage of overall restaurant sales or a percentage of the population that are actually using DoorDash we're a small portion of the overall opportunity, and we continue to grow.

關於你問到美國業務與成長的問題。我想指出幾點：很容易陷入逐季的動態，而且有些第三方資料提供者有時會在缺乏充分依據的情況下提供數據。但我想說的是：即使在美國，我們的滲透率仍然很小。不論是占整體餐廳銷售的比例，或是實際使用 DoorDash 的人口比例，我們都只占整體機會的一小部分，而且我們仍在持續成長。

MAUs have continued to grow, which is a good sign. Even despite the fact that you've had restaurants reopening, cities reopening, people going back into the store, despite that and through that, our business has continued to grow. Whereas in other areas of e-commerce, we've actually seen the growth expectations been taken down.

MAU（每月活躍用戶）持續成長，這是一個好跡象。即使餐廳重新開放、城市重新開放、人們回到店內消費，儘管如此、也在這樣的背景下，我們的業務仍持續成長。相較之下，在電商的其他領域，我們其實看到成長預期被下修。

And what that points to is the fact that this is an enduring category. People eat. People eat regardless of what's happening to inflationary pressures and other things. They may modulate their behavior and adjust from which restaurants they're eating at or the number of items in their basket and so on, but they still eat. And you're seeing the resilience of that habit in our numbers.

這所反映的是，這是一個持久的品類。人要吃飯。無論通膨壓力或其他事情如何發展，人們都會吃。他們可能會調整行為，例如改變去哪家餐廳用餐、或調整購物籃中的品項數量等等，但他們仍然會吃。而你也能從我們的數據中看到這種習慣的韌性。

And so the opportunity as we look forward in order to continue increasing the size of the scale of the business is for us to make progress on the fundamentals, which is selection, quality and affordability. We talked about new categories. Part of the reason we're bringing on new categories is because it's a new use case for those people that perhaps don't want to use DoorDash for restaurants. They can now use it to get their flowers or get their convenience items or get their grocery items or get their liquor delivery.

因此，展望未來，為了持續擴大業務規模，我們的機會在於把基本功做得更好，也就是選擇（selection）、品質（quality）與可負擔性（affordability）。我們談到新類別。我們引入新類別的部分原因，是因為這為那些可能不想用 DoorDash 訂餐廳的人提供了新的使用情境。他們現在可以用它來買花、買便利商品、買雜貨，或是叫酒類外送。

And so a growing number of our new customers now are actually coming to DoorDash to try these new categories, and this is going to unlock the next leg of growth as we continue increasing our penetration of the U.S. population. So hopefully, that provides some perspective on how I think about growth on a go-forward basis.

因此，我們的新客戶中有愈來愈多的人其實是為了嘗試這些新類別而來到 DoorDash，而這將在我們持續提升對美國人口的滲透率時，解鎖下一階段的成長。希望這能提供一些觀點，說明我如何看待未來的成長。

Your next question comes from the line of Eric Sheridan.

你的下一個問題來自 Eric Sheridan。

Maybe two, if I can. First, maybe taking a step back in a bigger picture question. I understood the change in consumer behavior you're seeing and the long runway on penetration. What impact has lower competitive intensity played in the industry over the last 6 to 8 months? And how do you think that potentially informs elements of some of the more mature markets seeing only 2 or 3 players in some instances going after some of the market opportunities where it was just a couple of quarters ago that there was a lot of private capital in the sector looking at all different aspects of delivery and some of that has been more rationalized over the last couple of quarters? That would be number one.

如果可以的話，我可能有兩個問題。第一個，先退一步問一個更宏觀的問題。我理解你們看到的消費者行為變化，以及滲透率仍有很長的跑道。過去 6 到 8 個月，產業競爭強度降低帶來了什麼影響？你認為這可能如何影響一些較成熟市場的情況——在某些情況下只有 2 到 3 個玩家在追逐部分市場機會；而就在幾個季度前，這個領域還有大量私募資本在關注外送的各個面向，而過去幾個季度其中一些已變得更理性、更被整合？這是第一個。

And then in markets where you're more of a challenger brand than a market leader as a result of some of the markets you acquired through the Wolt acquisition. Can you help us better understand how you see moving the needle from where your market share position is today to more of a market-leading position in the next couple of years? What are some of the levers you most focused on executing against?

第二個，在一些市場中，因為你們透過收購 Wolt 而取得的市場，你們更像是挑戰者品牌而非市場領導者。你能否幫助我們更好地理解，你們如何看待在未來幾年把市占率從目前的位置推進到更偏市場領先的位置？你們最專注執行的槓桿有哪些？

Yes. Maybe I can start, Eric, and I'll let Prabir chime in here. I think the answer to both of those questions is that it's a very competitive industry out there. And I'm not sure that there's ever been a "letdown" in terms of competitive intensity. And that's because, at least from where I sit, I believe the highest form of competition is always growing, and that's really consumer expectations.

好的。Eric，也許我先開始，然後讓 Prabir 也補充。我認為這兩個問題的答案是：這是一個競爭非常激烈的產業。而我不確定競爭強度是否曾經有過任何「降溫」。因為至少就我所見，我相信最高形式的競爭一直在成長，那就是消費者的期待。

I think to me, whether we are the market leader or whether we are not yet the market leader, it's really about an investment in product quality. Consumers are always going to expect more selection of stores they can order from, greater affordability, better quality of service and superior customer support. And to me, that really, at the end of the day, is what's going to rate-limit our ability to penetrate the large runways that both Prabir and I have discussed, whether it's the restaurant industry, the grocery industry, the retail categories.

對我而言，不論我們是市場領導者，或我們尚未成為市場領導者，關鍵都在於對產品品質的投資。消費者永遠會期待更多可下單的店家選擇、更高的可負擔性、更好的服務品質，以及更優質的客戶支援。對我來說，歸根結底，這才是會限制我們滲透到我和 Prabir 所談到的那些巨大成長跑道的因素，不論是餐廳產業、雜貨產業，或零售品類。

And that's really what we see. But I wouldn't say that there's been lower competitive intensity in one form or another. I still think that the biggest challenge is making sure that we can get consumers to actually try the product.

這就是我們所看到的。但我不會說競爭強度在某種形式上有所降低。我仍然認為最大的挑戰是確保我們能讓消費者實際去嘗試這個產品。

I also would say that with respect to maybe the premise in the second question, I think there's a common miss out there that Wolt is not a market leader in the majority of its markets when it actually is. And so I do think that some of this might just be where there's some unreliable third-party reporting. But what I would say is both the instruction I give to our U.S. teams or our teams overseas, it's making sure that we continue making sure to invest in the product quality so that we see gains in our retention and order frequency, which only leads us to compound that advantage over time, whether that's as the market leader or whether that's someone just entering the market.

另外，關於第二個問題中的前提，我也想說，我認為外界有一個常見的誤解：Wolt 在其多數市場並不是市場領導者，但事實上它是。因此，我確實認為其中一部分可能只是因為有些不可靠的第三方報告。不過我想說的是，無論我給美國團隊或海外團隊的指示，都是要確保我們持續投資於產品品質，讓我們在留存率與下單頻率上看到提升，而這只會讓我們隨時間複利地擴大優勢——不論我們是市場領導者，或是剛進入市場的參與者。

Yes. And just to add one data point to that, Eric. I mean if you just look at Wolt's performance, we were super proud of the team and what they've built. In Q3, they grew 60% year-on-year in euro terms. Now I can't think of an example of another European food delivery company that's going at those rates. And from what I've seen, they're growing single digits year-on-year.

是的。再補充一個數據點，Eric。我的意思是，如果你只看 Wolt 的表現，我們對團隊以及他們所打造的一切感到非常自豪。第三季以歐元計算，他們年增 60%。我現在想不出還有哪一家歐洲外送公司能以這樣的速度成長。而就我所見，他們的年增率是個位數。

So it's hard to sit here and say that Wolt is not gaining share just given the disparity in growth rates versus relying on third-party data and issues with their approaches and so on. So I rely on the absolute growth rate, which is, in my mind, a pretty reliable proof point around the fact that the Wolt team has created a product and experience that has higher retention, enables growing order frequency, and that's what's allowed them to produce the growth rates that they're posting.

所以很難坐在這裡說 Wolt 沒有在提升市占，尤其是考量到其成長率的差距，而不是依賴第三方數據以及其方法上的問題等等。因此我依據的是絕對成長率；在我看來，這是相當可靠的佐證，證明 Wolt 團隊打造出一個留存率更高、能提升下單頻率的產品與體驗，而這也讓他們得以交出目前所呈現的成長率。

Your next question comes from the line of James Lee.

下一個問題來自 James Lee。

Two here, please. First off, DashPass, I was wondering, is there any flexibility or room to increase your fees given your expanded offering and value proposition to customers? And also on DashMart, can you guys talk about the pace of investments in there in terms of new stores and geographic expansion? Any change in consumer behavior or unit economics to help you to kind of reaffirm your long-term thinking there?

我有兩個問題。首先，關於 DashPass，我想請問，鑑於你們擴大的服務內容與對客戶的價值主張，是否有彈性或空間提高費用？另外關於 DashMart，你們能否談談在新店開設與地理擴張方面的投資節奏？消費者行為或單位經濟是否有任何變化，能幫助你們再次確認你們的長期看法？

Thanks for the question, James. I'll take the first one and then Tony can talk with the second. Just as a general philosophy, we're trying to improve selection quality and affordability. And particularly in the third dimension, affordability means -- to us means reducing friction that's caused by consumer fees, whether it's through DashPass or the non-DashPass product. It's trying to reduce fees or commissions on merchants and increase Dasher earnings.

謝謝你的問題，James。我先回答第一個，然後 Tony 會談第二個。就整體理念而言，我們正努力提升選擇的品質與可負擔性。特別是在第三個面向，可負擔性對我們而言意味著降低由消費者費用所造成的摩擦，不論是透過 DashPass 或非 DashPass 產品。也就是嘗試降低費用，或降低對商家的費率／抽成，並提高 Dasher 的收入。

So in our case, we don't need to increase DashPass rates as a way of making the unit economics work because even at their current rates, DashPass economics work fine even without taking into account the subscription fee. So I view an increase in subscription fee at DashPass as being something that would actually slow down the pace of DashPass adoption which we've been very happy with so far. It continues to remain the largest paid membership program in the food category.

因此就我們而言，我們不需要透過提高 DashPass 費率來讓單位經濟成立，因為即使在目前的費率下，DashPass 的經濟性也運作良好，甚至不必把訂閱費納入考量。所以我認為，提高 DashPass 的訂閱費反而會放慢 DashPass 的採用速度，而我們迄今對其採用速度一直非常滿意。它仍然是食品類別中最大的付費會員計畫。

We hit record highs in terms of our DashPass subscribers. And the pace of growth in this program has frankly been consistent despite some of the partnerships that other competitors may have entered into or despite the bundled offerings that other competitors may be providing. I mean despite all of those things, we're seeing DashPass grow. So we like the way it's set up. We like the way it's position us for growth. And at least right now, there's no intent to change anything in terms of the fee structure.

我們的 DashPass 訂閱用戶數創下歷史新高。而且坦白說，這個計畫的成長速度一直很一致，儘管其他競爭對手可能建立了一些合作夥伴關係，或提供了綁定式方案。我的意思是，儘管有這些因素，我們仍看到 DashPass 在成長。所以我們喜歡目前的設計方式，也喜歡它為我們帶來的成長定位。至少就目前而言，沒有打算在費率結構上做任何改變。

Yes, James. And if I could, I'll just add a bit to this before heading into the DashMart question, which is I think one of the things I'm most proud of the team for accomplishing is that in the last 2.5 years, even though we stated in the shareholder letter, all of the growth that we've seen both top and bottom line in our business. What I'm really proud of is that in achieving all of that for the platform, we've been able to increase earnings for Dashers, increase sales for merchants and reduce fees on a continued basis over the last 2.5 years for consumers.

是的，James。如果可以的話，在進入 DashMart 的問題之前，我想再補充一點：我對團隊最感到自豪的一件事是，在過去 2.5 年裡，儘管我們在股東信中提到，我們的業務在營收與獲利（top and bottom line）都看到成長；但我真正引以為傲的是，在為平台達成這些成果的同時，我們也能提高 Dasher 的收入、提升商家的銷售，並在過去 2.5 年持續為消費者降低費用。

And so -- and DashPass certainly has been a big part of that on the consumer front. But we've really done this while improving the offerings for each of the audiences that we're lucky to serve.

因此——而 DashPass 當然在消費者端扮演了很重要的角色。但我們確實是在改善我們有幸服務的每一個受眾的供給內容的同時，做到這一點。

On the DashMart question, I think it's important to start with like what we're doing and why we're doing it. With DashMart, one of the things that we've been studying very closely is why do certain industries get penetrated? Or why do they move from offline to online? Obviously, the restaurant delivery industry, even though, again, it has a large runway for growth, it has reached a certain level of penetration that something, say, grocery delivery or retail delivery or delivery from other types of stores has only reached a fraction of.

關於 DashMart 的問題，我認為重要的是先從我們在做什麼、以及為什麼要做開始談起。就 DashMart 而言，我們一直非常密切地研究：為什麼某些產業會被滲透？或為什麼它們會從線下轉到線上？很明顯地，餐廳外送產業即使仍有很大的成長空間，但它已達到一定的滲透率；而像雜貨外送、零售外送或其他類型商店的外送，滲透率只達到其中的一小部分。

And one of the things that we've seen so far is that the setup for third-party delivery in a lot of these non-restaurant categories isn't really optimized for delivery. It's really optimized for going inside the store, for browsing. As a result, some of these stores don't even know exactly what's on the shelf. And as a result, what you see in sometimes third-party delivery is a product that is more expensive than what someone would pay inside the store. They don't always get exactly what they want when they actually buy it, and it doesn't always show up faster than a consumer can shop on their own. And as a result, you haven't seen that penetration.

而我們目前看到的一點是，在許多非餐廳類別中，第三方外送的配置其實並沒有針對外送做最佳化，而是針對進店、逛店做最佳化。因此，有些店甚至不清楚貨架上到底有哪些商品。結果就是，你在第三方外送上有時會看到：商品比消費者在店內購買更貴；實際買到時不一定拿到完全想要的品項；而且送達速度也不一定比消費者自己去買更快。也因此，你沒有看到那樣的滲透率。

And so our belief is in addition to working with all of these fantastic partners who we're really, really privileged to work with, whether it's Sprouts Farmers Markets or Giant Eagle or Loblaws or in retail categories, people like DICK'S Sporting Goods or Sephora is that we want to start by working with them to really understand how can we bring incremental demand right out of the gate. But we also want to invent the future of the industry.

因此，我們的信念是：除了與這些我們非常、非常榮幸能合作的優秀夥伴一起努力之外——不論是 Sprouts Farmers Markets、Giant Eagle、Loblaws，或在零售類別中像 DICK'S Sporting Goods、Sephora——我們希望先從與他們合作開始，真正理解如何一開始就能帶來增量需求。但我們也希望去發明這個產業的未來。

And we believe the future in the industry has to offer a product that is going to be -- give customers exactly what they expect when they order at around the same prices of what they pay in store and certainly with greater convenience than they could do it on their own. And so DashMart is really a part of that. And we're doing that in concert with all of these partners that we've been lucky to team up with. And we're doing that here in the United States, we're doing that overseas. And that's really what DashMart is. It's going to be a very important infrastructural components for the future.

我們相信，產業的未來必須提供一種產品——能在顧客下單時給到他們所期待的內容，價格大致與店內支付的價格相當，並且在便利性上肯定要優於他們自己去買。因此，DashMart 正是其中的一部分。我們也會與這些我們有幸結盟的夥伴協同推進。我們在美國做，也在海外做。而這就是 DashMart 的定位：它將成為未來非常重要的基礎設施組成。

Now that said, just like with all investments at DoorDash, it's not just about the long-term strategy of how can we maximize long-term profit dollars. It's about how can we also invest with discipline according to the stage of the projects. And so that's what we're doing with DashMarts, too. It's not just what we're doing with the third-party business. We're doing that with DashMarts as well, making sure that we can achieve product market fit. Once we see that, we continue investing. And if we keep seeing that grow, we will continue to make those investments.

不過話說回來，就像 DoorDash 的所有投資一樣，這不只是關於長期策略——我們如何最大化長期的利潤金額；也關乎我們如何依據專案所處階段，以有紀律的方式投資。因此我們在 DashMart 也是這麼做的。這不只是我們在第三方業務上做的事；我們在 DashMart 也同樣如此，確保我們能達到產品市場契合（product-market fit）。一旦看到這點，我們就會持續投資；如果我們持續看到成長，我們也會繼續進行這些投資。

And so far, we like what we see. But there's a long road ahead, right? We've just started the DashMart business really a couple of years ago. So we're learning very, very quickly, and we have to keep improving our product quality.

到目前為止，我們喜歡我們所看到的結果。但前方還有很長的路，對吧？我們真正開始 DashMart 業務也就是幾年前的事。所以我們學得非常、非常快，也必須持續提升我們的產品品質。

Your next question comes from the line of Youssef Squali.

下一個問題來自 Youssef Squali。

Two questions, please. First, maybe just looking at the P&L. Your market efficiency has gone up tremendously. I think in the last year, I think your sales and marketing as a percentage of revenue dropped by something like 1,000 basis points. So it's down not only on a percentage basis but even on an absolute basis.

我有兩個問題。第一個，或許從損益表（P&L）來看，你們的市場效率大幅提升。我想在過去一年，你們的銷售與行銷費用占營收比重下降了大約 1,000 個基點。所以不僅在比例上下降，甚至在絕對金額上也下降。

I was wondering if you can kind of unpack that a little bit for us in terms of where is the efficiency coming from. Is it better ad rates? Is it maybe less spend on the U.S. restaurant category, where you obviously dominate? Maybe just kind of help us understand the drivers of that. And is that the primary driver for the higher EBITDA expectation for Q4?

我想請問你們能否幫我們拆解一下效率是從哪裡來的？是更好的廣告費率嗎？還是可能在美國餐廳類別的投入更少——畢竟你們在那裡明顯占主導地位？希望你們能幫助我們理解其驅動因素。而這是否是第四季 EBITDA 預期提高的主要驅動因素？

And second, on Wolt, maybe just help us understand the acceleration in GOVs there. I think in the letter you talked about customer acquisition at an all-time high, which is really impressive just all things considered. So maybe just help us understand, again, sustainability of that as we go forward and maybe specific countries where you're seeing such a huge performance.

第二點，關於 Wolt，或許請協助我們理解那邊 GOV 的加速情況。我想你們在股東信中提到客戶獲取創下歷史新高，這在各種因素考量下都非常令人印象深刻。所以也請再幫我們理解一下，往後這樣的表現是否具可持續性，以及你們在哪些特定國家看到如此強勁的表現。

So maybe I'll take both of those questions. And Tony, chime in if there's anything else to add. So first on the marketing efficiency point, I just want to go back to some of the comments that we had shared when we went public back in the S-1, which is once you've acquired a cohort and the cohort sort of gets into its second, third, fourth year of life, the marketing spend associated with that cohort declines. It declines materially, right? Because there is no "marketing maintenance spend" that's required. And so what that means is as our business gets larger and our base of existing consumers gets larger, that provides leverage in sales and marketing.

那我可能一起回答這兩個問題。Tony，如果還有什麼要補充也請加入。首先談行銷效率，我想回到我們在上市、也就是在 S-1 裡分享過的一些評論：一旦你獲取了一個 cohort（客群批次），而且這個 cohort 進入其生命週期的第二年、第三年、第四年時，與該 cohort 相關的行銷支出會下降，而且是顯著下降，對吧？因為不需要所謂的「行銷維持支出」。這代表著，隨著我們的業務規模變大、既有消費者基礎變大，我們在銷售與行銷上就能產生槓桿效應。

Now more specifically, if you were to tear apart the sales and marketing line and look at CAC versus Dasher acquisition cost versus marketing acquisition -- versus merchant acquisition costs. There is leverage on CAC, but particularly in '22 compared to '21, there's been a lot of leverage in terms of our Dasher acquisition costs. And that's been driven by product improvements that we've made. We're making it easier to Dash. Dashers are putting more hours into our platform. The retention of our fleet has gone up.

更具體來說，如果你把銷售與行銷這一行拆開來看，去比較 CAC 與 Dasher 獲取成本，以及行銷獲取——以及商家獲取成本。CAC 確實有槓桿，但特別是 2022 年相較 2021 年，我們在 Dasher 獲取成本方面有很大的槓桿改善。這是由我們所做的產品改進所驅動的。我們讓 Dash 變得更容易。Dashers 在我們平台上投入更多工時。我們車隊的留存率也提高了。

And as a result, that means we need to acquire fewer Dashers to perform -- to actually to fulfill the deliveries that are happening on our platform. And so that's provided leverage in addition to the point I made about an increase in the existing base of consumers. So that's the response to your marketing efficiency question.

因此，這表示我們需要獲取更少的 Dashers，才能——實際上是為了履行在我們平台上發生的配送。除了我剛才提到既有消費者基礎擴大所帶來的槓桿之外，這也提供了額外的槓桿。所以這就是對你行銷效率問題的回應。

When -- on the Wolt question, it comes down to a couple of factors. I mean Wolt operates in markets that have 300 million people, right? And these markets have low levels of penetration. In fact, even in the oldest markets, Wolt adoption levels are less than 10%. So there's a lot of room for growth just to expand customer acquisition in the markets in which they operate as well as expand to new cities in those countries in which they operate.

至於 Wolt 的問題，主要取決於幾個因素。Wolt 在總人口約 3 億的市場中營運，對吧？而且這些市場的滲透率很低。事實上，即便在最成熟的市場，Wolt 的採用率也不到 10%。因此，無論是在其既有營運市場中擴大客戶獲取，或是在其營運國家中拓展到新的城市，都還有很大的成長空間。

So that, coupled with the fact that the retention in the Wolt app is super high and order frequency continues to increase because the macro point that people like eating, people like the convenience of food delivery. And therefore, they only end up increasing their utilization of the product, the combination of these 2 things has helped them drive the results that you're seeing.

再加上 Wolt App 的留存率非常高、下單頻次持續提升，因為從宏觀角度來看，人們喜歡吃東西，也喜歡外送的便利性。因此，他們最終只會增加對產品的使用。這兩點的結合，幫助他們推動你所看到的成果。

Your next question comes from the line of Doug Anmuth.

下一個問題來自 Doug Anmuth。

I just want to ask if you have any update to your commentary from last quarter, just suggesting a modest increase in '23 EBITDA.

我想問一下，你們是否有更新上季的說法，也就是你們當時提到 2023 年 EBITDA 會小幅增加。

And then secondly, 2 things that come up a lot with investors, higher insurance costs and then also the regulatory environment just given the DOL ruling and Prop 22 status kind of still outstanding. So maybe you could comment on those.

第二點，投資人常常提到兩件事：保險成本上升，以及監管環境——尤其考量到 DOL 的裁定以及 Prop 22 的狀態似乎仍未完全定案。能否請你們評論一下？

Sure. Maybe I'll start. And Tony, you can chime in whenever you want. So on the EBITDA point, so I think we said in our letter, we expect that the U.S. restaurant business will continue to grow in 2023 and will increase its contribution profit, both in dollar and margin tops, right? Historically, what's happened is we've taken the majority of those profits and we have reinvested them in these investment areas.

好的。我先開始，Tony 你隨時可以補充。關於 EBITDA，我想我們在信中說過，我們預期美國餐廳業務在 2023 年會持續成長，並提升其貢獻利潤（contribution profit），不論是金額或利潤率層面，對吧？過去的情況是，我們把其中大部分利潤再投入到這些投資領域。

We're at a point where these investment areas are getting -- exhibiting margin improvement, and so the investment dollars don't perfectly offset the increase in the contribution profit in the restaurant business, and that's going to create some flow-through impact to EBITDA. So the combination of these 2 things, which is increasing restaurant profit, coupled with margin improvement in the investment areas, will help us increase annual EBITDA, both in dollar and margin terms in 2023.

我們目前正處於這些投資領域開始——呈現利潤率改善的階段，因此投資金額並不會完全抵消餐廳業務貢獻利潤的增加，這將對 EBITDA 產生一定的流入（flow-through）影響。因此，這兩點的結合——餐廳利潤增加，加上投資領域的利潤率改善——將幫助我們在 2023 年提升年度 EBITDA，不論以金額或利潤率衡量。

The only caveat I'll make is we continue to remain in investment mode, and so I'll change this approach if we identify attractive growth opportunities. But today, at current trajectory and current portion speed, we expect to increase annual EBITDA.

我唯一要補充的是，我們仍然處於投資模式，因此如果我們發現具吸引力的成長機會，我們會調整這個做法。但以目前的軌跡與目前的進展速度來看，我們預期年度 EBITDA 會增加。

On your question on insurance, actually, when you look at our insurance cost in Q3 versus Q2, as a percentage of our GOV, our insurance costs were flat. So good progress in Q3. I won't declare the winners yet. We've got to watch this closely, but there's been no increase, at least as a percentage in Q3 relative to Q2.

至於你問的保險，實際上，當你看我們第三季相較第二季的保險成本、以 GOV 的百分比來看，我們的保險成本是持平的。所以第三季有不錯的進展。我還不會太早宣布勝利。我們必須密切觀察，但至少在第三季相對第二季的百分比上沒有增加。

Yes, Doug, and on the question regarding regulatory and what we're seeing, we're largely seeing pretty much exactly what we would have expected. I mean I think just to make sure we're on the same fact basis. With respect to, say, the DOL announcement that was made recently, it doesn't change our business model or reclassify drivers. And in many ways, just is an affirmation of President Obama's administration's determination that there are independent contractor workers out there. And that, more broadly, they're largely quite supportive of this line of work.

是的，Doug，關於監管以及我們所看到的情況，我們大致上看到的幾乎完全符合我們的預期。我想先確保我們在事實基礎上是一致的。就最近的 DOL 公告而言，它不會改變我們的商業模式，也不會重新分類司機。某種程度上，這也只是再次確認歐巴馬總統政府時期的判定：市場上確實存在獨立承包商（independent contractor）工作者。而且更廣泛地說，他們大多相當支持這類工作型態。

And so what we've seen is outside of a handful of cities, and it's been the same count of cities that have, I would say, frankly, perhaps abused their power and are trying to overregulate the industry, by and large, I think lawmakers, regulators, anyone in policy that we've spoken to has been very productive in terms of making sure that we can serve Dashers together.

因此我們看到的是，除了少數幾個城市——而且我會說，坦白講，這些城市的數量一直都差不多——可能濫用其權力、試圖對產業過度監管之外，整體而言，我認為我們接觸過的立法者、監管機構，以及任何政策相關人士，都非常有建設性，確保我們能一起為 Dashers 提供服務。

I mean again, let's remind everyone what Dashers want. In terms of their activity, the average Dasher, and we're talking about 3 million Dashers every quarter, Dashers are working fewer than 4 hours a week on average, 90% of Dashers work fewer than 10 hours a week. This is in the United States. And so what they're saying with their feet is the #1 thing they value about the DoorDash platform is really the flexibility that it offers. And then when you look at what they say and we look at -- take Proposition 22 as an example, Dashers prefer -- 87% of Dashers preferred staying as independent contractors. The vast majority of voters in California supported Proposition 22.

再說一次，提醒大家 Dashers 想要的是什麼。就他們的活動而言，平均每位 Dasher——我們每季談的是 300 萬名 Dashers——平均每週工作少於 4 小時，90% 的 Dashers 每週工作少於 10 小時。這是在美國。因此，他們用行動表達的是：他們最重視 DoorDash 平台的第 1 件事，確實是它所提供的彈性。再看他們怎麼說——以 Proposition 22 為例，Dashers 更偏好——87% 的 Dashers 偏好維持獨立承包商身分。加州絕大多數選民也支持 Proposition 22。

And so I'm optimistic that regulators and policymakers will take this into account and actually reflect what Dashers want, which is that they'd like to see labor laws catch up candidly to the modern-day realities of what the future of work really is, which is people ought to be able to control where they work when they work. And that's really what we see. So we don't really expect any new changes versus what we've said before.

因此我樂觀地認為，監管者與政策制定者會把這些納入考量，並真正反映 Dashers 想要的：坦白說，他們希望勞動法能追上現代對「未來工作型態」的現實，也就是人們應該能掌控在哪裡工作、何時工作。這就是我們所看到的。因此，相較我們之前所說的，我們不太預期會有新的變化。

And Doug, just to add to Tony's comments there. Obviously, in some cases, this regulation introduces new cost into the system. And our goal in such situations is to try to execute as efficiently as we can and try to optimize the way that cost. But in some situations, the cost might be onerous and cannot be entirely optimized away. And so we have a right and an expectation to able to generate a profit in the markets we operate in. And if those costs are overly onerous, we will act to protect our EBITDA guidance. And so I want to make sure that, that's clear.

Doug，我再補充 Tony 剛才的評論。顯然，在某些情況下，這些監管會為系統引入新的成本。我們在這種情況下的目標，是盡可能高效率地執行，並嘗試以最佳方式去優化這些成本。但在某些情況下，成本可能很沉重，無法完全透過優化消除。因此，我們有權利也有合理期待，能在我們營運的市場中產生利潤。如果那些成本過於沉重，我們將採取行動以保護我們的 EBITDA 指引。我想確保這點很清楚。

Your next question comes from the line of Brian Nowak.

下一個問題來自 Brian Nowak。

Great. I have one for Tony just on business philosophy and sort of risk management through different macro scenarios. The business is holding on great so far. But if we sort of walk into a scenario where in '23, you potentially have a weaker consumer in the U.S. or Europe and maybe your more cash flow generative U.S. business decelerates or has some impact from macro, can you just sort of put us in that world and talk to us about sort of your investment philosophy in both your more developed businesses as well as the earlier more developing products? Just to ensure you're best positioned to drive these industries post-recovery while also doing the best you can to sort of maintain and improve employee morale, which in part probably matters around the stock.

很好。我有一個問題想請教 Tony，主要是關於商業理念，以及在不同總體經濟情境下的風險管理。到目前為止，業務表現仍然相當穩健。但如果我們走進一種情境：在 2023 年，美國或歐洲的消費者可能轉弱，而你們在美國、現金流創造能力較強的業務可能放緩或受到總體環境影響，你能否帶我們進入那個世界，談談你們在較成熟的業務以及較早期、仍在發展中的產品上，投資理念大概會是什麼？主要是想確保你們在復甦後能以最佳狀態推動這些產業，同時也盡可能維持並提升員工士氣，而這部分可能也與股價有關。

Brian, yes, I mean, I think the investment philosophy has been largely consistent with what we've done. And I mean, I think even when I think about the last 10 quarters, basically from when we've become public to where we are now, what we outlined in the S-1, we've kind of just continued marching towards that drumbeat of telling the narrative of how we want to be the local commerce company, both building the largest local commerce marketplace, the largest local commerce platform and how we're making investments in towards doing that.

Brian，是的，我的意思是，我認為投資理念大致上一直與我們過去所做的一致。而且我的意思是，即使我回顧過去 10 個季度，基本上從我們上市到現在，我們在 S-1 裡所闡述的內容，我們其實就是持續沿著那個節奏前進，持續講述我們如何希望成為在地商務公司（local commerce company）的敘事：一方面打造最大的在地商務市集、最大的在地商務平台，以及我們如何為了做到這點而進行投資。

I mean I think it's important to take note of what has happened in the last 2.5 years. I mean we went from a one business line company into now 5 businesses with investments into operations overseas outside of the restaurant category, an ads business, a platform business with products like DoorDash Drive and Storefront.

我的意思是，我認為重要的是注意過去 2.5 年發生了什麼。我們從一家只有單一業務線的公司，發展到現在有 5 個業務，並且投資於海外營運、餐廳品類以外的業務、廣告業務，以及包含 DoorDash Drive 和 Storefront 等產品的平台業務。

And so when I think about what we are today, the biggest thing that I've been thinking a lot about is how do we actually make sure we continue to stay disciplined about investing commensurate to the stage of those projects. Now obviously, there's a lot of macro headwinds, as you mentioned, and that have changed in the past year. But for me, all that suggests is just it's going to put pressure on our execution. But obviously, if we're not -- if it puts pressure on the consumer, which is, I think, the point that you're going towards, and we're not seeing signal in some of these investment areas, then we certainly would pull back and invest accordingly.

所以當我思考我們今天的狀態時，我一直在想的最大重點是：我們要如何確保能持續保持紀律，依照這些專案所處的階段來進行相稱的投資。當然，如你所提到，總體環境逆風很多，而且在過去一年也有所變化。但對我而言，這些都意味著它會對我們的執行帶來壓力。不過很明顯地，如果——如果它對消費者造成壓力（我想這是你問題的核心），而我們在某些投資領域又看不到訊號，那我們當然會收斂並相應調整投資。

And so for me, it's really, again, about keeping that discipline even though we've gone from 1 business now to 5 businesses. And just to also put things in perspective just for everyone on the line, a lot of the investment dollars are going into our non-U.S. and our non-restaurants category businesses. And the size of those investments now have built a business that's larger than all of DoorDash just a few years ago. And so we certainly like what we see. But obviously, if we're seeing behavior come down because of macro pressures, we will invest accordingly.

所以對我來說，重點仍然是保持那份紀律，即使我們已從 1 個業務變成 5 個業務。另外也想替線上所有人補充一下背景：相當多的投資資金正投入在我們的非美國業務，以及非餐廳品類的業務。而這些投資的規模，如今已打造出一個比幾年前整個 DoorDash 還要大的業務。因此我們確實喜歡我們所看到的進展。但很明顯地，如果我們看到因總體壓力而導致行為下滑，我們也會相應調整投資。

And just to add to Tony's comments, Brian. I mean remember, our core U.S. restaurant business is growing and generates significant cash flow, right? And historically, we've invested the vast majority of this to grow scale in these other areas, into new categories, in international. But these investments are discretionary. And that means that if for one reason or another, we're better served by pulling back on the investment because we're not seeing the right signal in terms of consumer demand, because we're not seeing the right improvement in terms of unit economics or whatever, we can alter the pace of the investment.

再補充 Tony 的評論，Brian。我的意思是，請記得，我們美國核心餐廳業務仍在成長，並且產生可觀的現金流，對吧？而歷史上，我們把其中絕大部分再投資，用來在其他領域擴大規模，包含新類別與國際市場。但這些投資是可裁量的。也就是說，如果因為某些原因，我們更適合收斂投資——例如我們沒有看到消費需求的正確訊號，或沒有看到單位經濟（unit economics）的適當改善等等——我們就可以調整投資節奏。

So far, we've been pretty disciplined with capital allocation. You can see that now in the results in terms of the U.S. restaurant business, and the plan is to continue being equally disciplined going forward.

到目前為止，我們在資本配置上一直相當有紀律。你現在也可以從美國餐廳業務的結果看出來，而我們的計畫是在未來也同樣保持這樣的紀律。

Your final question comes from the line of Mark Mahaney.

你們的最後一個問題來自 Mark Mahaney 的提問。

Two questions, please. I know somebody already asked you about macro impact on the demand side. Anything you'd call out on the supply side? Anything about the need for extra side hustle that's maybe led you to bring in more Dashers?

兩個問題，謝謝。我知道已經有人問過你們總體環境對需求端的影響。那供給端方面，有沒有什麼特別要指出的？例如是否因為需要額外的兼差收入（side hustle），讓你們引進更多 Dashers？

And then secondly, Prabir, your comments about '23. We always parse your words very carefully. That last quarter, you had said the increased annual EBITDA by a modest amount. And this time, when finishing your answer to the question, just said you would increase annual EBITDA but you didn't use the modest word. Is there anything to read into that? Sorry to ask you such a precise question, but I just want to make sure we're not missing any nuances.

第二個問題，Prabir，關於你對 2023 年的評論。我們一向非常仔細地解讀你的用詞。上個季度你曾說年度 EBITDA 會小幅增加（by a modest amount）。但這次你在回答問題的最後只說年度 EBITDA 會增加，沒有用到「小幅」這個詞。這裡有什麼可以解讀的嗎？抱歉問得這麼精準，但我想確保我們沒有漏掉任何細微差異。

Yes. Maybe I'll take both. So Mark, on the Dasher supply question, this is the point I made sort of through today's conversation around the labor market being more normalized this year than it was last year. And so that's having an impact on, obviously, to some degree, advertising rates but also in terms of supply that's available to become Dashers. And that benefit has been turbocharged by product improvements that have now improved the retention of the fleet and is actually generating incremental supply hours from existing Dashers. And so both of those things means you just don't have -- you don't need to acquire as many new Dashers.

是的。也許我兩個都回答。Mark，關於 Dasher 供給的問題，這就是我今天在對話中提到的重點：今年的勞動市場比去年更趨於正常化。因此這對——在某種程度上——廣告費率有影響，但也影響到可成為 Dashers 的供給量。而這個好處又因產品改進而被進一步放大：這些改進提升了車隊的留存，並且實際上從既有 Dashers 產生了額外的供給工時。因此，這兩件事意味著你不需要——你不需要招募那麼多新的 Dashers。

So the labor environment -- so long story short, the labor environment has resulted in all-in Dasher costs being better today. And that's been -- and because of the product improvement that we've made, we expect that to continue benefiting our cost structure in Q4 as well as 2023, provided there's no shocks in the labor environment.

所以勞動環境——簡而言之，勞動環境使得目前整體 Dasher 成本更好。而且——再加上我們所做的產品改進——我們預期這將在第四季以及 2023 年持續有利於我們的成本結構，前提是勞動環境沒有出現任何衝擊。

On the question around 2023, I'd urge you not to over-extrapolate on a word or 2. Really, we're not providing quantitative guidance. But what I am trying to share with you is when you think about the underlying dynamics of the business, the reason you didn't see a lot of EBITDA expansion going from '21 into '22 was because the pick-up in terms of contribution profit from the U.S. restaurant business was largely soaked up by the investments.

至於 2023 年的問題，我會建議你不要因為一兩個字就過度外推。實際上，我們並沒有提供量化指引。但我想跟你分享的是：當你思考這個業務的底層動態時，你之所以沒有看到從 2021 年到 2022 年有很大的 EBITDA 擴張，是因為美國餐廳業務在貢獻利潤（contribution profit）方面的提升，基本上大多被投資所吸收了。

We're at a point right now where the investments are getting better from a margin perspective, while the U.S. business continues to grow and, therefore, throws off more dollars and has continuing improvements in the margins, and it's not a perfect offset anymore. It used to be, not anymore. And that's going to generate incremental EBITDA, both in dollar terms and in margin terms. We'll come back to you with specific guidance on 2023 in Q4, which is in line with our normal cadence.

我們現在所處的階段是：投資從毛利率角度來看正在變得更好；同時美國業務持續成長，因此帶來更多美元貢獻，且毛利率也持續改善，兩者之間不再是完全抵消。以前是，但現在不是了。這將帶來額外的 EBITDA，不論以金額或以利潤率來看都是如此。我們會在第四季就 2023 年提供更具體的指引，這也符合我們一貫的節奏。

There are no further questions at this time. Mr. Andy Hargreaves, I now turn the call back over to you.

目前沒有其他問題。Andy Hargreaves 先生，我現在把電話會議交回給您。

Great. Thank you, everybody, for joining us today. We appreciate both your time today and your support, and look forward to talking with many of you soon. Have a good evening.

很好。謝謝各位今天加入。我們感謝各位今天撥冗參與與支持，也期待很快能與各位中的許多人再度交流。祝各位晚安。

This does conclude today's conference call. You may now disconnect.

今天的電話會議到此結束。各位現在可以掛線。