Doordash, Inc. (DASH) 2021 Q4 法說會逐字稿

Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for standing by, and welcome to the DoorDash Fourth Quarter Fiscal 2022 Earnings Call. (Operator Instructions) After the Thank you.

各位女士、先生，感謝您稍候，歡迎參加 DoorDash 2022 財年第四季財報電話會議。（接線員指示）謝謝。

Andy Hargreaves, Vice President of Investor Relations, you may begin your conference.

投資人關係副總裁 Andy Hargreaves，您可以開始您的會議。

Thanks. So hello, everybody, and thanks for joining us for our fourth quarter 2021 earnings call. I'm pleased to be joined today by Co-Founder, Chair and CEO, Tony Xu; and CFO, Prabir Adarkar.

謝謝。各位大家好，感謝各位參加我們 2021 年第四季財報電話會議。今天很高興與我們的共同創辦人、董事長兼執行長 Tony Xu，以及財務長 Prabir Adarkar 一同出席。

We'd like to remind everyone that we'll be making forward-looking statements during this call, including our expectations of our business, future financial results and guidance, strategy and statements regarding the recently announced acquisition of the Wolt's transaction result.

我們想提醒各位，本次電話會議中我們將作出前瞻性陳述，包括我們對業務的預期、未來財務結果與指引、策略，以及關於近期宣布收購 Wolt 交易結果的相關陳述。

Forward-looking statements are subject to risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially from those described in forward-looking statements, and some such risks are described in our risk factors, including in our SEC filings, including Form 10-K. You shouldn't rely on our forward-looking statements as predictions of future events. We disclaim any obligation to update any forward-looking statements, except as required by law.

前瞻性陳述受風險與不確定性影響，可能導致實際結果與前瞻性陳述所描述者存在重大差異；其中部分風險已在我們的風險因素中說明，包括我們向 SEC 提交的文件（包括 Form 10-K）。您不應將我們的前瞻性陳述視為對未來事件的預測。除法律要求外，我們不承擔更新任何前瞻性陳述的義務。

During this call, we will discuss certain non-GAAP financial measures. Information regarding our non-GAAP financial results, including a reconciliation of non-GAAP results to the most directly comparable GAAP financial measures may be found in our investor letter, which is available on our IR site. These non-GAAP measures should be considered in addition to our GAAP results and are not intended to be a substitute for our GAAP results.

在本次電話會議中，我們將討論若干非 GAAP 財務衡量指標。關於我們的非 GAAP 財務結果之資訊（包括非 GAAP 結果與最直接可比的 GAAP 財務衡量指標之調節表）可在我們的投資人信中找到，該信可於我們的投資人關係網站取得。這些非 GAAP 指標應與我們的 GAAP 結果一併考量，並非用以取代我們的 GAAP 結果。

Finally, this call, in its entirety, is being audio webcast on our Investor Relations website. An audio replay of the call will be available on our website shortly after the call ends.

最後，本次電話會議全程將在我們的投資人關係網站進行音訊網路直播。電話會議結束後不久，網站上將提供音訊重播。

And with that, we can go straight to questions.

接下來我們直接進入問答。

(Operator Instructions) Your first question comes from the line of Douglas Anmuth with JPMorgan.

（接線員指示）您的第一個問題來自 JPMorgan 的 Douglas Anmuth。

I know you're focused on maximizing the long-term profit dollars. Just hoping you could provide some more color on how to think about the near-term investment and loss levels in some of the new categories just relative to the profit and cash generation that you mentioned in the core restaurant business.

我知道你們專注於最大化長期的利潤金額。想請你們多補充一些說明：相較於你們提到的核心餐廳業務所帶來的利潤與現金創造能力，該如何看待新類別在短期的投資與虧損水準？

Doug, thanks for the question. Yes, that's right. We are focused on maximizing scale. And the reason for that is because we operate in very large categories that are underpenetrated today. What I'll say is we're not breaking out the margins of the investments in our new categories other than to say that the U.S. business is growing nicely and has an increase in contribution margins, both on a quarter-on-quarter and a year-on-year basis. So that increase in profit is what we're funding into these investments. And we're watching for core signals around retention and order frequency to make sure that they hit our term thresholds.

Doug，謝謝你的問題。是的，沒錯。我們專注於最大化規模。原因在於我們所處的類別非常龐大，而目前滲透率仍偏低。我想說的是，除了指出美國業務成長良好，且貢獻毛利率（contribution margins）無論季對季或年對年皆有所提升之外，我們不會另外拆分新類別投資的利潤率。這部分增加的利潤，就是我們用來支持這些投資的資金來源。同時，我們也會觀察留存與下單頻率等核心訊號，確保其達到我們的長期門檻。

Your next question comes from the line of Youssef Squali with Truist Securities.

您的下一個問題來自 Truist Securities 的 Youssef Squali。

Two questions from me, please. One, did you guys see any benefits from Omicron during the quarter? And how has January and early February trended versus your expectations?

我有兩個問題。第一，你們在本季是否從 Omicron 中看到任何好處？1 月與 2 月初的趨勢相較於你們的預期如何？

And second, can you maybe speak to recent trends in the competitive landscape? And do you believe as your main competitor has been talking about that you guys may have lost some share in the U.S.? And if so, maybe just if you can flesh that out for us in terms of geos and product types where you feel you need to maybe regain some share?

第二，能否談談近期競爭格局的趨勢？你們是否認為如主要競爭對手所提到的，你們在美國可能流失了一些市占？如果是的話，能否就地區與產品類型等面向，說明你們覺得需要在哪些地方把市占拿回來？

So maybe I'll start the Omicron question, and then Tony can chime in with the competitive landscape. On Omicron specifically, the impact in Q4, even January, has been relatively muted, it's not significant that I would call it out. And certainly, not significant when compared to the impact we saw from COVID in -- early in Q2. In fact, with every sort of successive variant, the impact on our business has basically diminished. And so the Q4 outperformance, I wouldn't attribute that to Omicron.

我先回答 Omicron 的問題，接著 Tony 可以補充競爭格局。就 Omicron 而言，第四季、甚至 1 月的影響都相對有限，並不顯著到需要特別提出；當然，與我們在第二季初期看到的 COVID 影響相比，更是不顯著。事實上，隨著每一次新的變異株出現，對我們業務的影響基本上都在減弱。因此，第四季的優於預期表現，我不會歸因於 Omicron。

And Tony, if you want to comment on the competitive landscape and all.

Tony，如果你想就競爭格局等方面補充的話。

Yes. Youssef, we actually haven't noticed any share loss in any time period recently in the fourth quarter or for the year of 2021. And I think when you think about maybe why this is, it really just breaks out into, I think, basic math, right? On new customers, we continue to be the leading acquirer of all customers that come into the industry for the first time. And then when you think about the possibility of new customer acquisition, especially just given how deep some of these channels are, they're really deeper than any other possible channel in which you can acquire new customers into the industry.

好的。Youssef，我們其實沒有注意到在近期任何期間出現市占流失，無論是第四季或 2021 全年。我想，若要思考原因，基本上就是簡單的數學問題。就新客而言，我們仍是整個產業中首次進入的客戶之主要獲客者。再者，當你思考新客獲取的可能性，特別是考量到其中一些渠道的深度，它們確實比任何其他可能用來為產業帶來新客的渠道都更深。

I think the second part of how you can gain share, certainly, is just what is the retention and order frequency of these customers. And we continue to have leading retention and order frequency in the category. And this has always been our focus, by the way, which is to make sure that we build the best product, which you can see as demonstrated through these leading both new customer acquisition as well as retention metrics.

我認為提升市占的第二個部分，當然是這些客戶的留存與下單頻率。我們在該類別中持續保持領先的留存與下單頻率。順帶一提，這一直都是我們的重點：確保我們打造最好的產品；而你也可以從我們在新客獲取與留存指標上的領先表現看出來。

And as a result, when I think about just it -- this ties a little bit to, I think, the previous question that Doug was asking, just how large the core business opportunity is in U.S. restaurants, the fact that even as the share leader and continuing to be the fastest-growing part of the industry, we're only 5% of U.S. industry sales.

因此，當我思考——這也與 Doug 先前的問題有點相關——美國餐廳核心業務機會有多大時，事實是，即便我們是市占領先者，且仍是產業中成長最快的部分，我們也僅占美國產業銷售額的 5%。

And I think when you look at all of our active users, while we had a record quarter of 25 million monthly active consumers, we're a single-digit percentage of the populations that we serve. And certainly, as you start adding into some of these new categories as well as international geographies, and there's the platform side of what we do with products like Drive and Storefront. I mean we are a tiny, tiny, tiny fraction of the opportunity in front of us, and that's why we're very excited in investing.

再看我們所有的活躍用戶，雖然我們本季創下 2,500 萬月活躍消費者的紀錄，但相對於我們所服務的人口，我們仍只占個位數百分比。當你再把一些新類別與國際市場納入考量，以及我們在平台端的產品（例如 Drive 與 Storefront），我們在眼前機會中所占的比例其實非常非常非常小，這也是為什麼我們對投資感到非常興奮。

But that said, in terms of how we view the future, besides staying disciplined in terms of how we make investments, it first and foremost starts with making sure that we have the best product, which is going to offer the best combination of selection, quality, affordability and service. And so long as we continue doing that, I think the scoreboard will continue taking care of itself.

不過話說回來，就我們如何看待未來而言，除了在投資上保持紀律之外，首要之務仍是確保我們擁有最好的產品，提供最佳的選擇、品質、可負擔性與服務組合。只要我們持續做到這一點，我認為成績自然會反映出來。

And just to add to Tony's point, Youssef, to answer your question directly, over the last 12 months, we've gained 2 points of share -- over 2 points of share on the third-party data sources. And specifically, with respect to Q4, we believe we've gained shares. We grew faster than our peers based on their publicly reported numbers for their U.S. businesses.

另外補充 Tony 的觀點，Youssef，直接回答你的問題：過去 12 個月，根據第三方數據來源，我們的市占提升了 2 個百分點以上。特別就第四季而言，我們相信我們是增加了市占。依據同業公開揭露的美國業務數字，我們的成長速度快於同業。

Your next question comes from Ross Sandler with Barclays.

您的下一個問題來自 Barclays 的 Ross Sandler。

Two questions. So is there anything unique about the experience thus far in Canada and Australia that gives you confidence that once Wolt comes into the fray that you'll be able to run the same playbook successfully? I think there's some skepticism in the investment community that what you see in the U.S. is replicable in the international countries. So maybe just talk a little bit about that.

兩個問題。第一，到目前為止你們在加拿大與澳洲的經驗，有沒有什麼獨特之處，讓你們有信心在 Wolt 加入之後，仍能成功複製同一套作戰手冊？我想投資圈對於你們在美國看到的模式是否能在國際市場複製，仍有一些質疑。能否多談一點？

And then Prabir, your sales and marketing expense was actually down a bit quarter-on-quarter in contrast to GOV being up nicely. So I think the letter mentioned customer acquisition being a little bit more efficient. Can you just elaborate a little bit on that? Is that some of that retention you're talking about kicking in? Or is that anything else on marketing efficiency?

第二，Prabir，你們的銷售與行銷費用季對季其實略有下降，但 GOV 卻明顯上升。我想股東信提到獲客效率有所提升。你能否再多說明一下？這是否是你們提到的留存開始發揮作用？或是還有其他行銷效率提升的因素？

Yes. Why don't I take the first question on some of our performance and progress internationally, and then I'll have Prabir take the second question on the sales and marketing expenses. With respect to our international progress, I mean, we're super excited in what we've seen, and that's why we're only continuing to invest more there. And again, it starts with how do we find product market fit, and then how do we actually scale up our investments appropriately given what we're seeing.

好的。我先回答第一個關於我們在國際市場的表現與進展，接著請 Prabir 回答第二個關於銷售與行銷費用的問題。就國際進展而言，我們對目前看到的成果感到非常興奮，這也是為什麼我們只會持續加大投資。同樣地，起點在於我們如何找到產品市場契合（product-market fit），接著再根據我們所看到的情況，如何適當地擴大投資規模。

And what we see is increased selection that we're offering customers, better quality of experience, more -- greater and greater affordability levels, especially with our investments through programs like DashPass, and better service levels. As a result, we're seeing higher order frequencies, higher retention, increased engagement with some of our new categories as well in these countries. And so, that's really what we're seeing from customers, and frankly, their voice as well as their -- how they choose to spend their dollars is really what informs us and guides us.

我們看到的是，我們為客戶提供了更多選擇、更好的體驗品質、更——更高且持續提升的可負擔性水準，特別是透過像 DashPass 這類計畫的投資，以及更好的服務水準。因此，我們在這些國家看到更高的下單頻率、更高的留存率，並且在一些新類別上也看到更高的參與度。所以，這確實就是我們從客戶端看到的情況；坦白說，他們的聲音以及他們——他們選擇如何花費他們的錢，才是真正讓我們獲得資訊並指引我們前進的依據。

And so we're only seeing progress there. And I think those inputs are what has translated into certain outputs such as our revenue growth, order growth, category share growth, all of these things. So I think once we've nailed these inputs, that's why you're seeing the growth of the investments behind them. And that's why we're also really excited about the Wolt partnership because we'll get to do this on a bigger scale across over 20 countries.

因此，我們只看到那方面持續在進展。我認為，這些投入已轉化為某些產出，例如我們的營收成長、訂單成長、類別市占成長等等。我想一旦我們把這些投入要素做好，你就會看到背後投資的成長。也因此我們對 Wolt 的合作夥伴關係感到非常興奮，因為我們將能在超過 20 個國家以更大規模來做這件事。

And Prabir, you want to take the sales topic?

Prabir，你要來談談銷售這個主題嗎？

Yes. And just to finish up that point, I mean there's obviously been category share growth that Tony alluded to. But in addition, I mean, we stay super disciplined when it comes to these investments. That's what's allowed us to grow the U.S. business, and we're applying the same rigor to whether it's new categories or international, and we are seeing margin improvement. And so that then allows us to invest more with greater confidence. So let me just conclude that point.

好的。再把那點補充完：Tony 提到的類別市占成長當然存在。但除此之外，我們在這些投資上始終保持高度紀律。這讓我們得以成長美國業務；而無論是新類別或國際市場，我們都以同樣的嚴謹標準來執行，並且我們也看到利潤率改善。這就讓我們能以更高的信心投入更多資源。那我就把這點做個結尾。

And on your question on sales and marketing. The reason why sales and marketing declined was because our driver acquisition, our Dasher acquisition costs were lower quarter-on-quarter. As we've said in earlier quarters, we've fixed the undersupply situation that we faced earlier in Q2, and we find ourselves well supplied, and we expect to be well supplied in 2022. And the big reason for that is because the people that generally become Dashers are a very different audience than the types of people that the other gig economy compete -- companies are competing for.

至於你關於銷售與行銷的問題。銷售與行銷費用之所以下降，是因為我們的外送員招募——Dasher 招募成本較前一季更低。正如我們在前幾季所說，我們已經解決了先前在第二季面臨的供給不足問題；目前我們的供給相當充足，而且我們預期 2022 年也會維持充足供給。其主要原因在於，一般會成為 Dasher 的人群，與其他零工經濟競爭——其他公司所競逐的人群非常不同。

So specifically, I think we had said over 90% of Dashers had -- really, they have no plans to drive for rideshare and only 4% say they prefer to drive rideshare compared to food delivery. And so the reasons for that is because you don't need a car to Dash. You can Dash on a scooter, you can Dash on a bike. It tends to be safer because you're not sharing your personal space with another human being.

更具體地說，我想我們曾提到，超過 90% 的 Dasher——基本上，他們沒有計畫去做共乘駕駛，只有 4% 表示相較於外送，他們更偏好去開共乘。原因在於，你不需要一台車也能 Dash。你可以騎滑板車 Dash、騎腳踏車 Dash。這通常也更安全，因為你不需要與另一個人共享你的私人空間。

So as a result of that, it's a very different audience that we can go after. And because we find ourselves well supplied, those Dashers acquisition costs and resulting sales and marketing costs declined quarter-on-quarter.

因此，我們能鎖定的是一個非常不同的受眾。也因為我們目前供給充足，這些 Dasher 的招募成本以及相應的銷售與行銷成本就較前一季下降。

Your next question comes from the line of Deepak Mathivanan with Wolfe Research.

下一個問題來自 Wolfe Research 的 Deepak Mathivanan。

Two questions from us. So first, Tony, in 2021, you guys launched a lot of new offerings and expanded across many verticals. The pace of innovation was pretty strong. But as we think about '22 and maybe even '23, what are 1 or 2 main initiatives you feel is ready to graduate and kind of become more meaningful on financial KPIs in the next, like, 12 to 24 months?

我們有兩個問題。第一個，Tony，2021 年你們推出了很多新產品，並在許多垂直領域擴張，創新速度相當快。但當我們思考 2022 年、甚至 2023 年時，有哪 1 到 2 個主要計畫，你覺得已經準備好「畢業」，並在接下來大約 12 到 24 個月內，對財務 KPI 變得更有意義？

And then second question, maybe for Prabir. It seems like MAU was up 20% last year, and frequency was also up pretty nicely. But as we think about your guidance, 19% GOV growth at the high end for full year, how should we think about the assumptions for MAU growth frequency and AOV for this year?

第二個問題可能給 Prabir。看起來去年 MAU 成長了 20%，頻次也提升得相當不錯。但當我們看你們的指引，全年在高端是 19% 的 GOV 成長，今年我們應該如何看待 MAU 成長、頻次與 AOV 的假設？

Deepak, on the first question, I appreciate the comments on product innovation. We're always trying to accelerate that, especially when we hear signals from how we can serve customers better, whether they be consumers, merchants or Dashers. And so we're constantly trying to increase the pace when we see that opportunity, and only until we find product market fit do we actually scale them into fairly large businesses. And I think we've had a track record of doing this now, whether it's certainly our core U.S. restaurants business, then building products on our platform like DoorDash Drive as well as Storefront.

Deepak，關於第一個問題，謝謝你對產品創新的評論。我們一直試著加速這件事，特別是當我們從「如何更好地服務客戶」的訊號中聽到機會時——不論是消費者、商家或 Dasher。因此，只要看到機會，我們就會不斷嘗試提高速度；而只有在我們找到產品市場契合（product-market fit）之後，我們才會把它們擴大成相當大的業務。我想我們已經有這方面的紀錄了，無論是我們美國餐廳核心業務，或是在平台上打造像 DoorDash Drive 以及 Storefront 這樣的產品。

We're the leading category player in the convenience category, in the pickup category. We've taken businesses pretty much from scratch in these new categories of convenience, grocery and other categories from 0 into now $1 billion-plus scale businesses that 14% of our monthly active users spend time in. And so I think there's been a lot of progress, to your point.

我們在便利商店（convenience）類別、到店自取（pickup）類別都是領先的類別玩家。我們在便利、雜貨以及其他新類別中，幾乎是從零開始把業務做起來，現在已經成為規模超過 10 億美元的業務；而我們每月活躍用戶中有 14% 會在這些類別上花時間。因此，正如你所說，我們確實取得了很多進展。

In terms of just focusing on 1 or 2 things, what we tend to do is our investment philosophy is really it starts with building the best product. And so long as we like what we're seeing from a product market fit perspective, and we're constantly trying to make every detail right within each one of these categories, then do we stage gate further investment into growing these, whether it be into new geographies, into more merchants. We doubled the number of nonrestaurant partners, for example, in our marketplace in 2021.

至於只聚焦 1 到 2 件事，我們通常的投資理念是：從打造最好的產品開始。只要從產品市場契合的角度來看，我們喜歡我們所看到的結果，而且我們持續在每個類別把每個細節做到位，接著我們才會以階段性關卡（stage gate）的方式，進一步投入資源來成長這些業務——不論是拓展到新地理區域，或擴展到更多商家。舉例來說，我們在 2021 年把市集中的非餐廳合作夥伴數量翻倍。

But we have a lot of work to do. And so the way I think about it is so long as we stick to our investment philosophy of making sure that we build the best possible product as measured by our retention and order frequency and we stay disciplined in how we can scale them, not just with capital, but frankly with the right leaders placed in these initiatives as well as the right team allocated to those leaders, we'll be in a great spot.

但我們還有很多工作要做。所以我的看法是，只要我們堅持投資理念：確保打造出可能最好的產品——以留存率與下單頻率來衡量——並且在擴張方式上保持紀律，不只是資本投入，坦白說也包括在這些計畫中配置合適的領導者，以及為這些領導者配置合適的團隊，我們就會處在非常好的位置。

And then, Deepak, on your question around the '22 and obviously, the longer-term outlook, look, at its simplest, the goal is to increase MAUs and to continue driving up order sequences. We don't run the business on a 1-year clock. And we think about planting seeds for many, many years in the future. So the way to think about it is these categories in the food categories to be underpenetrated. In that core business at our current run rate, we're less than -- still middle -- to 5% of total restaurant sales.

然後，Deepak，關於你對 2022 年以及更長期展望的問題——最簡單來說，目標是提升 MAU，並持續推升下單序列（order sequences）。我們不會用 1 年的時鐘來經營這門生意。我們思考的是為未來很多很多年播種。所以可以這樣理解：食品類別仍然滲透率偏低。在核心業務以我們目前的運行速度來看，我們仍不到——仍然大約只有餐廳總銷售額的中個位數百分比（約 5% 左右）。

And so even in core food, there's significant room for continued adoption and engagement increases. Now you add to that these other categories that we've made initial foray into, right, whether it's convenience, grocery, alcohol, pet food, retail and so on. These are massive markets that are also in lower -- lesser penetrated compared to the food category.

因此，即便在核心餐飲上，仍有很大的空間可以持續提高採用率與參與度。再加上我們初步切入的其他類別，對吧——無論是便利、雜貨、酒類、寵物食品、零售等等。這些都是龐大的市場，而且相較於餐飲類別，它們的滲透率也更低。

So we put these 2 things together, it's an exciting opportunity set ahead. And based on these signals that we are seeing in terms of early adoption and engagement as we transition from being a food delivery app to basically all of your -- serving all of your local commerce needs. It gives us confidence that we will sustain a healthy growth rate for a long period of time.

所以把這兩點結合起來，前方是一個令人振奮的機會集合。基於我們看到的這些訊號——在早期採用與參與度方面——當我們從一個外送餐飲 App 轉型為基本上能滿足你所有——服務你所有在地商務需求的平台時，這讓我們有信心能在很長一段時間內維持健康的成長率。

Your next question comes from the line of Andrew Boone with JMP Securities.

下一個問題來自 JMP Securities 的 Andrew Boone。

Two, please. One, can you just update on your progress on advertising? And can that contribute to 2022? Or is it a longer-term initiative?

兩個問題。第一，你能否更新一下你們在廣告方面的進展？這能在 2022 年有所貢獻嗎？還是這是一個更長期的計畫？

And then secondly, on nonrestaurant verticals. Where are you seeing traction with consumers? Is it grocery? Is it alcohol? Can you be a little bit more specific there?

第二，關於非餐廳垂直領域。你們在哪些品類看到消費者的牽引力？是雜貨嗎？是酒類嗎？你能否更具體一點？

Yes. Sure. I'll take both of those, and feel free to add Prabir. On the first question around advertising, we're seeing tremendous excitement pretty much actually from all of the stakeholders, from advertisers, from retailers, from restaurants, from consumers. And to me, what's really important is making sure that we can achieve 2 objectives, which sometimes can come at odds with one another. One is that we offer the best return in -- advertiser return in terms of their return on spend. And the second is how do we make sure that we certainly not degrade but ideally improve the consumer shopping experience. And these are the 2 things that we're constantly focused on. And so we're in no rush to monetize, although we're really excited by what we're seeing.

好的，當然。我來回答這兩個問題，也歡迎 Prabir 補充。第一個關於廣告的問題，我們看到幾乎所有利害關係人都非常興奮——包括廣告主、零售商、餐廳以及消費者。對我而言，真正重要的是確保我們能達成兩個目標，而這兩個目標有時可能彼此衝突。第一是，我們要在廣告主的投放回報（return on spend）方面提供最佳回報。第二是，我們要如何確保我們不但不會降低，理想上還能提升消費者的購物體驗。這兩件事是我們持續專注的重點。因此，我們並不急著變現，儘管我們對目前看到的情況感到非常興奮。

But these are kind of our objective functions, if you will, when it comes to advertising. It's doing really well. It's off to a tremendous start. There is extraordinary demand. But I think staying disciplined on, again, building the best possible product to allow us to have these long-term sustained periods of growth is what -- is how we think about this.

但在廣告方面，這些可以說是我們的目標函數。它的表現非常好，起步極為強勁，需求非常旺盛。但我認為，保持紀律、再次專注於打造最好的產品，以便讓我們能夠擁有這些長期且可持續的成長期，這就是——這也是我們看待這件事的方式。

With respect to, I think, the new categories, we're actually seeing traction within each category. And I think in some regard, this is probably not a surprise. I mean, just think about some of these categories, whether it's things that you're stocking up in your pantry or grocery shopping or everything in between. I mean, these are the highest frequency possible categories when it comes to consumer spend. And all we're really doing is, I think, adding to the incremental demand on one side by making sure that customers can get things delivered in minutes, not hours or days. And then on the other side, we're enabling these retailers and merchants to be able to do it through their own channels, their own apps, their own websites.

至於我認為的新類別，我們其實在每個類別內都看到了進展與動能。而且在某種程度上，這大概也不令人意外。你想想看這些類別，不論是你在食品儲藏櫃裡補貨、採買雜貨，或介於兩者之間的各種需求。就消費者支出而言，這些都是可能最高頻的類別。而我們真正做的，我認為，是一方面透過確保顧客能在幾分鐘內而不是幾小時或幾天後收到商品，來增加增量需求；另一方面，我們也讓這些零售商與商家能透過他們自己的渠道、自己的 App、自己的網站來完成這件事。

And so I think for those reasons, that's why we're seeing this growth. I mean, I think as you saw in our shareholder letter, on an aggregate basis, about 14% of our monthly active shoppers have shopped in a category outside of restaurants. But that number is substantially higher than that in hundreds of markets already. And so -- and this is pretty universal across categories.

因此我認為，基於這些原因，我們才會看到這樣的成長。我是說，我想你在我們的股東信中也看到，從整體來看，大約 14% 的月活躍購物者曾在餐廳以外的類別購物。但在數百個市場中，這個數字已經顯著高於此。而且——這在各個類別中相當普遍。

And Andrew, just on your -- just to go back to the advertising question, we are expecting advertising revenues to grow in 2022, but we will invest those incremental profits in the growth initiatives with the aim of maximizing long-term profit dollars.

另外，Andrew，回到你關於廣告的問題，我們預期 2022 年的廣告收入會成長，但我們會把這些新增利潤投入到成長計畫中，目標是最大化長期的利潤金額。

Your next question comes from the line of Eric Sheridan with Goldman Sachs.

下一個問題來自高盛（Goldman Sachs）的 Eric Sheridan。

Maybe just dovetailing with some of what we've talked about so far. As you move into more categories and you think about more product evolution over the long term, I think in the shareholder letter, there was a comment about retention and frequency and LTV. How should we be thinking about long-term margin structure or the long-term LTV-to-CAC in this business now versus maybe the prepandemic period when you IPO-ed a couple of years ago? And how would you frame what you've learned over the last couple of years with respect to that thing?

也許延續我們目前談到的一些內容。當你們進入更多類別，並從長期角度思考更多產品演進時，我記得在股東信中有提到留存、頻次與 LTV。那麼，我們應該如何看待這項業務的長期毛利結構，或長期的 LTV 對 CAC（LTV-to-CAC），相較於你們幾年前 IPO、疫情前的時期？以及你們在過去幾年對這方面學到了什麼，你會如何表述？

Thanks for the question. Just to -- let me take that question. The first thing I'd say is what we shared in the letter was meant to be a framework for how we think about how we manage the business. So today, we're not managing the business to a certain margin. We're not trying to increase margins quarter-on-quarter. We're not trying to manage to an absolute amount of EBITDA. Instead, what we do is we invest. And we invest in areas. We start small, and we look for signals along 2 dimensions. The first is product market fit. So we alluded to the fact that 14% of our MAUs use verticals outside of food. That's a signal of product market fit. We're looking for the frequency signals.

謝謝你的問題。我來回答這個問題。首先我要說的是，我們在信中分享的內容，是作為我們如何管理業務的思考框架。因此今天，我們並不是把業務管理到某個特定的利潤率；我們也不是試圖讓利潤率逐季提高；我們也不是試圖管理到某個絕對的 EBITDA 金額。相反地，我們做的是投資。我們在一些領域投資，先從小規模開始，並沿著兩個維度尋找訊號。第一個是產品市場契合度（product market fit）。我們提到 14% 的 MAU 使用了食品以外的垂直類別，這就是產品市場契合度的訊號。我們也在觀察頻次的訊號。

We're looking for the impact of initiatives and actions we take on retention on the core platform, whether it's relative to the core platform. If we see product market fit signals, that's one criteria that's been met. The second is are we making progress on unit economics. So we have a view for each business what target unit economics need to be in order to meet our return threshold. And so we're looking for steady progress. When we see both of these things, like we have with our new verticals, like we have with our international business and with our platform business, that's when we start scaling up our investments. And so that's the framework we generally use versus trying to target a certain margin.

我們在看我們採取的各項計畫與行動，對核心平台留存的影響——不論是相對於核心平台的表現。如果我們看到產品市場契合度的訊號，那就代表滿足了一項條件。第二個是我們是否在單位經濟（unit economics）上取得進展。對於每個業務，我們都對達到回報門檻所需的目標單位經濟有一個看法。因此我們在尋找穩定的進步。當我們同時看到這兩件事——就像我們在新垂直類別、國際業務以及平台業務上所看到的那樣——我們就會開始擴大投資規模。因此，這是我們通常使用的框架，而不是去鎖定某個特定的利潤率。

The reason we included that example in the shareholder letter was to provide a case study of how we think about it. Because if you were trying to grow margins period-on-period, a product like DashPass would never come to be. It just wouldn't because on each order, DashPass has a lower unit margin. But as we said from the beginning, if you're optimizing for long-term profit dollars, and we have confidence in the increasing order frequency of the DashPass program, as a result, the total dollars we can generate per user on the platform are higher compared to the alternatives. And so I'm not avoiding the question legitimately because we aren't running the business to certain target margins, but we're happy with the progress we're making on maximizing long-term profit dollars.

我們之所以在股東信中納入那個例子，是為了提供一個案例研究，說明我們如何思考這件事。因為如果你試圖讓利潤率逐期成長，像 DashPass 這樣的產品就永遠不會出現。它就是不會，因為在每一筆訂單上，DashPass 的單位毛利較低。但正如我們從一開始所說，如果你是在最佳化長期的利潤金額，而且我們對 DashPass 計畫帶來的下單頻次提升有信心，那麼因此我們在平台上每位用戶能產生的總金額，會高於其他替代方案。所以我並不是在刻意迴避這個問題，因為我們確實不是把業務運行在某些目標利潤率上；但我們對於在最大化長期利潤金額方面取得的進展感到滿意。

The one thing that gives me further confidence or sort of room for upside is the advertising opportunity, where the advertising opportunity only grows as our users and our engagement grows. And today, compared to a year ago, we've got 40% more MAUs. Compared to several years ago, we're 3x, 4x the size of our business. And these individuals are engaging with us, not just in the restaurant vertical because all of these different other verticals and over multiple services within the app, which then gives us a tremendous opportunity to not just create new business lines, but also generate advertising revenue with a healthy ROAS.

另外一件讓我更有信心、或說提供更多上行空間的是廣告機會；隨著我們的用戶與互動提升，廣告機會只會變得更大。今天相較於一年前，我們的 MAU 多了 40%。相較於幾年前，我們的業務規模已經是 3 倍、4 倍。這些人與我們互動，不僅是在餐廳垂直類別，還因為 App 內有各種不同的其他垂直類別，以及多項服務，這讓我們有巨大的機會不僅創造新的業務線，也能以健康的 ROAS 產生廣告收入。

And so I think of that as upside to the model. It's not something that you should bake in certainly in the near term because we need to be very careful about how we, not just enable our advertising ROAS, but do so in a way that doesn't degrade the consumer experience.

因此我把它視為模型的上行空間。這當然不是你應該在短期內就納入預期的東西，因為我們必須非常謹慎，確保我們不只是提升廣告的 ROAS，也要以不損害消費者體驗的方式來做到。

The only thing I'd add to what Prabir said is really, I think the latter part of the question around what have we learned kind of during the pre-COVID kind of post-COVID era of behavior is just the resilience of the category and how I think we've put to rest, I think, this question of what happens to demand as diners go back and eat inside restaurants? Well, I think, clearly, takeout and delivery, as shown by our performance not just in the fourth quarter, but also in 2021, just in an aggregate is that they're complementary. It's very possible to eat inside of a restaurant and get delivery because we eat 3 times or more maybe per day, and that's over 100 shopping moments per month.

我唯一想補充 Prabir 所說的是，關於問題後半段——也就是我們在 COVID 前後這段行為變化期間學到了什麼——我認為就是這個類別的韌性，以及我想我們已經讓「當用餐者回到餐廳內用時，需求會怎麼樣？」這個問題告一段落。嗯，我認為很明顯地，外帶與外送——從我們不僅在第四季、也在 2021 年整體的表現就能看出——它們是互補的。你完全可能既在餐廳內用、也同時叫外送，因為我們一天吃三餐甚至更多，而這相當於每月超過 100 次的購物時刻。

And then you start adding in these other categories, and you just ask yourself the question, "Well, is it complementary to go inside shopping malls or other types of stores and maybe get it delivered online or over the Internet." And I think that's kind of what we've seen certainly in the restaurant delivery business, and we're starting to see that in all of our other categories.

接著你再把其他類別加進來，你就會問自己：「去購物中心或其他類型的商店逛街，是否也能與線上或透過網路配送互補？」我認為這正是我們在餐廳外送業務中確實看到的情況，而我們也開始在所有其他類別中看到同樣的現象。

Your next question comes from the line of Bernie McTernan with Needham & Company.

下一個問題來自 Needham & Company 的 Bernie McTernan。

I've seen examples on the app when I ordered dinner, for example, it might push me to order ice cream from another local store. I imagine new categories like grocery and alcohol and convenience are probably incrementally less time-sensitive. So there's probably even a greater opportunity for Dashers to go to multiple stores for the same customer. But is that a substantial opportunity, either from a cost efficiency perspective or higher GOV or maybe some potential advertising opportunity?

我在 App 上看過一些例子，例如我點晚餐時，它可能會推播我去另一家本地店家買冰淇淋。我想像像雜貨、酒類、便利商店這些新類別，可能在時間敏感度上相對更低一些。因此，Dashers 可能有更大的機會為同一位顧客跑多家店。但這是否是一個很可觀的機會——不論是從成本效率、更高的 GOV，或是某些潛在的廣告機會角度？

It's Tony. I'll take the question. I think it's a really good point. And I think this kind of really is very exciting for us because it's a thesis we've had since really day 1 at the company, which is this business, anything last mile and local commerce is really about building greatest order density. That's why we started with restaurants, right? It has the highest count of stores across every category of local retail restaurants, that is.

我是 Tony。我來回答這個問題。我覺得這點說得很好。而且我認為這對我們來說確實非常令人興奮，因為這其實是我們從公司第一天起就有的一個論點：這個業務——任何最後一哩與本地商務——本質上就是在建立最高的訂單密度（order density）。這也是為什麼我們從餐廳開始，對吧？在本地零售的各個類別中，餐廳擁有最多的店點數。

And it has the highest frequency of use, which is what gives you the possibility for the highest order density. And if you can start with the highest order density, then you have a lot of optionality to do some of the things that you described of bringing other types of things. And I think, hopefully, being useful to consumers and different kinds of merchants, which therefore provides more flexible work opportunities for Dashers.

而且它的使用頻率最高，這也讓你有可能達到最高的訂單密度。如果你能從最高的訂單密度開始，那麼你就有很大的選擇空間去做你所描述的那些事情，把其他類型的商品也帶進來。我也希望這能對消費者與不同類型的商家都有用，進而為 Dashers 提供更有彈性的工作機會。

It also provides opportunities to do, I think, some of the things you described around logistics efficiency. But to us, it's just -- again, it goes back to, how do we become more and more useful in people's lives, right? How do we solve more jobs for a consumer as we think about every shopping occasion they have. And again, while we have impressive order frequency, it's a small fraction of actually how much shopping that actually takes place, right?

它也提供了機會去做——我想——你所描述的、關於物流效率的一些事情。但對我們而言，這只是——再一次——回到一個問題：我們如何在人們的生活中變得越來越有用，對吧？當我們思考消費者每一次購物情境時，我們如何為他們解決更多「任務」。而且再說一次，雖然我們的訂單頻率令人印象深刻，但相較於實際發生的整體購物量，仍然只是一小部分，對吧？

So we have a lot of work to do, I think, to solve even more jobs. And I think the same is true for merchants, and not only in helping them build their channels, but doing other types of jobs for them. That's why we have our Platform Services business. And I think together, if we can do these 2 things, we'll provide the greatest number of work opportunities for Dashers as well. And so you're absolutely right, and I think a lot of the assumptions behind the question. But to us, it just starts with how do we build the best possible experience in solving the most number of jobs.

所以我認為我們還有很多工作要做，去解決更多任務。我也認為商家也是如此——不僅是幫助他們建立通路，還要替他們做其他類型的工作。這就是為什麼我們有 Platform Services 業務。我認為如果我們能把這兩件事一起做好，也將為 Dashers 提供最多的工作機會。所以你說得完全正確，我也認同這個問題背後的許多假設。但對我們而言，一切都從：我們如何打造最佳體驗、解決最多任務開始。

Your next question comes from Michael McGovern with Bank of America.

下一個問題來自美國銀行（Bank of America）的 Michael McGovern。

I was just wondering if you could dig a little bit more into the chart about DashPass order mix versus contribution profit per active consumer. I thought it was pretty surprising and interesting to see that there's such a wide variance of DashPass order mix and also the contribution dollars. So I was wondering what causes some cohorts to lag? And then is it kind of just a function of time to get those lagging cohorts up to that close to $25 mark of contribution profit per active consumer?

我想請問你們是否可以再深入說明一下那張關於 DashPass 訂單組合（order mix）相對於每位活躍消費者的貢獻利潤（contribution profit）的圖表。我覺得看到 DashPass 訂單組合以及貢獻金額存在這麼大的差異，既令人驚訝也很有趣。所以我想知道，為什麼有些同群（cohorts）會落後？另外，是否基本上只是時間的函數，讓那些落後的同群最終提升到接近每位活躍消費者 25 美元的貢獻利潤水準？

Thanks for the question, Mike, and it's a good opportunity to explain exactly what the chart is because we got a few questions ahead of the call. So each dot on the chart is a quarterly cohort. So each -- the quarterly cohort starting from 2019 all the way through to the third quarter of 2021. And along the X-axis is the percentage of the orders from that cohort that are DashPass orders. On the Y-axis is the in-quarter, the Q4 2021 contribution profit per active user in that quarter for each of these cohorts.

謝謝你的問題，Mike，這也是一個很好的機會來解釋這張圖表到底在呈現什麼，因為我們在電話會議前就收到幾個相關問題。圖上的每一個點代表一個季度同群。也就是——從 2019 年一路到 2021 年第三季的各季度同群。X 軸是該同群訂單中屬於 DashPass 訂單的百分比。Y 軸則是 2021 年第四季當季（in-quarter）的貢獻利潤：也就是在該季度中，每個同群的每位活躍用戶所貢獻的利潤。

And as you can see, this positive correlation where the higher the DashPass order mix, the higher the contribution profit per MAU. And this goes back to the answer I gave to Eric to his question, which is with DashPass, we're making a trade-off to accept lower unit margins in exchange for significantly higher order frequency. And so as the order frequency increases, you generate more orders and those orders translate into greater cumulative contribution profit for each user.

如你所見，這裡存在正向相關：DashPass 訂單組合越高，每 MAU 的貢獻利潤就越高。這也呼應我先前回答 Eric 的問題：透過 DashPass，我們是在做一個取捨——接受較低的單位毛利（unit margins），以換取顯著更高的下單頻率。因此，當下單頻率提高時，你會產生更多訂單，而這些訂單會轉化為每位用戶更高的累積貢獻利潤。

Now to your question around what drives the variance, it's largely time. On the left side of this chart are basically newer cohorts, the right side of the chart are the older cohorts. And so generally, as time goes by, people -- consumers get increasingly habituated. They started using the product. And DashPass starts making financial sense because once you start placing more than 2, 2.5 orders, the product pays for itself. And so what you see is over time, as you -- as consumers save more money, they start using and they're opting DashPass that then further drives up their order frequency.

至於你問到是什麼驅動這種差異，主要是時間因素。圖表左側基本上是較新的同群，右側是較舊的同群。一般而言，隨著時間推移，消費者會越來越習慣使用。他們開始使用產品，而 DashPass 也開始在財務上變得划算，因為一旦你下單超過 2 次、2.5 次，這個產品就能回本。因此你看到的是，隨著時間推移，當消費者省下更多錢，他們就會開始使用並選擇 DashPass，進而進一步推升他們的下單頻率。

Got it. That's really helpful. And I guess one quick follow-up on order frequency. I was just wondering, and on the 14% of customers that are now trying nonrestaurant ordering for the first time, or excuse me, just using it, do you expect that restaurant and nonrestaurant can exhibit similar order frequency trends long term? Or do you think that eating and ordering from restaurants is fundamentally a higher order frequency kind of market?

了解。這很有幫助。我想再快速追問一下下單頻率。我想知道，對於現在有 14% 的客戶第一次嘗試非餐廳訂購——或更正，是正在使用非餐廳訂購——你們是否預期長期來看，餐廳與非餐廳能呈現類似的下單頻率趨勢？還是你們認為外食、從餐廳訂購在本質上就是一個下單頻率更高的市場？

In general, people's activity on our app resembles how they operate in their daily lives, right? So if you think about -- this question came up sort of a few quarters ago when we went public around the mix between national brand restaurants versus local restaurants. And frankly, it replicates what you see in the industry. Similarly, with areas such as convenience and grocery and alcohol and pet food, essentially, over time, as people's awareness of DoorDash builds and as our selection builds in the neighborhoods that they live in, their behavior offline and online will converge.

一般來說，人們在我們 App 上的活動會反映他們在日常生活中的運作方式，對吧？所以如果你回想——這個問題在幾個季度前、我們上市時曾被提到，當時談的是全國連鎖品牌餐廳與在地餐廳之間的組合。坦白說，那其實就是你在產業中看到的樣子。同樣地，在便利商店、雜貨、酒類、寵物食品等領域，基本上，隨著時間推移，當人們對 DoorDash 的認知提升、以及我們在他們居住的社區中建立起更完整的選擇，他們線下與線上的行為會逐漸趨於一致。

Today, it's lower because that level -- we're still making progress in terms of the selection quality, affordability paradigm in order to hit the sweet spots that more and more consumers start becoming aware of DoorDash as an on-demand way to actually get access to these verticals that are adjacent to food delivery and the ones that they use. So short answer to your question is, over time, I expect the order frequency to basically limit how people shop in their daily lives.

目前之所以較低，是因為我們仍在推進——在選擇品質與可負擔性（affordability）這個範式上持續進步——以便命中甜蜜點，讓越來越多消費者開始意識到 DoorDash 是一種隨叫隨到（on-demand）的方式，能實際取得這些與外送餐飲相鄰的垂直品類，以及他們會使用的那些品類。所以對你問題的簡短回答是：隨著時間推移，我預期下單頻率基本上會受限於人們在日常生活中的購物方式。

Your next question comes from the line of Lloyd Walmsley with UBS.

下一個問題來自瑞銀（UBS）的 Lloyd Walmsley。

I have a couple, if I can. First, just thanks for sharing the updated cohort data. If we just focus on maybe the narrower subset of users added during the pandemic, do you see consistent frequency and retention on those newer cohorts compared to older cohorts and in particular, in markets that have reopened more than others? And anything you can kind of share on how you think that's going to play out over the rest of this year in terms of the cohort behavior and what's embedded in the guidance?

如果可以的話我有兩個問題。第一，謝謝你們分享更新後的同群數據。如果我們只聚焦在疫情期間新增的、較窄的一部分用戶，你們是否看到這些較新同群在下單頻率與留存（retention）方面，與較舊同群相比仍然一致？特別是在重新開放程度高於其他地區的市場？另外，你們能否分享一下，你們認為今年剩餘時間這些同群行為會如何發展，以及在指引（guidance）中已反映了哪些假設？

And then secondly, on grocery at the time of the IPO, I think there were still some question marks around the unit economics and scalability of grocery. As you guys have progressed and learned in that category, how do you feel today about your ability to generate attractive unit economics and kind of how is that informing how you go to market on the grocery side?

第二個問題是關於雜貨（grocery）。在 IPO 的時候，我記得對於雜貨的單位經濟（unit economics）與可擴展性（scalability）仍有一些疑問。隨著你們在這個品類的推進與學習，現在你們如何看待自己產生具吸引力單位經濟的能力？以及這如何影響你們在雜貨端的市場進入策略（go-to-market）？

Great. So the first thing let me just say is that the retention pre-COVID versus COVID, right, we were in the middle of COVID in 2020, retention spiked. It was at all-time highs, right? And then from there on, in 2021, we started to see a slow normalization to retention, especially as vaccination rates increased and in-store dining resumed. We're at a point now where in -- and by the way, in 2021, early on in 2021, we were bolstered by the effect of stimulus payments that had an upward impact on both retention and order frequency.

很好。第一點我先說，疫情前（pre-COVID）與疫情期間（COVID）的留存——對吧——我們在 2020 年正處於疫情中，留存大幅攀升，達到歷史高點。然後從那之後，在 2021 年，我們開始看到留存緩慢回歸常態，特別是隨著疫苗接種率提高、以及內用恢復。現在我們所處的狀況是——順帶一提，在 2021 年、尤其是 2021 年初，我們也受到紓困金（stimulus payments）效果的支撐，這對留存與下單頻率都有向上的影響。

Where we're at today is still better than pre-pandemic levels. But the retention has now normalized where it's slightly above pre-pandemic levels, but not substantially. Order frequency is substantially higher compared to pre-pandemic levels as well as 2020 levels, but that's because of continued improvements to order frequency, both within the DashPass cohorts as well as the non-DashPass cohorts.

我們目前的表現仍然優於疫情前水準。但留存現在已經常態化，略高於疫情前，但並非大幅高於。下單頻率相較於疫情前以及 2020 年水準都顯著更高，但那是因為我們持續改善下單頻率——不論是在 DashPass 同群內，或是非 DashPass 同群內。

Yes. Well, on the second question around grocery. I mean, here's like the way we think about it, right? I mean when you look at our portfolio of priorities, we have the U.S. core business of restaurant delivery. We have these new categories, one of which you're referencing, grocery, platform services, international and advertising. The way we think about them is really, how are we doing against their life stage, right?

好的。那第二個關於雜貨的問題。我的意思是，我們的思考方式是這樣的，對吧？當你看我們的優先事項組合時，我們有美國核心業務——餐廳外送。我們有這些新類別，其中之一就是你提到的雜貨，還有平台服務、國際業務與廣告。我們看待它們的方式其實是：它們各自處於什麼生命週期階段（life stage），我們做得如何？

Obviously, a lot of these businesses performed actually quite recently. A product like grocery, for example, is only about 12 to 14 months old. We love the trajectory of the business, both top and bottom line, but it's still in its earliest innings. And so right now, the focus continues to be making sure that we keep improving the product experience, the selection of partners that we can bring on and the inventory from these partners, the quality of the experience itself, the affordability of these deliveries as well as the service levels. And so that's really the focus right now on grocery.

顯然，這些業務中有不少其實都是相當近期才開始表現。例如雜貨這個產品，大約只有 12 到 14 個月的歷史。我們很喜歡這項業務在營收與獲利（top and bottom line）上的發展軌跡，但它仍處於非常早期的階段。因此目前的重點仍然是確保我們持續改善產品體驗、我們能引入的合作夥伴選擇，以及來自這些合作夥伴的庫存（inventory）、體驗本身的品質、這些配送的可負擔性，以及服務水準。所以這就是目前在雜貨上的重點。

And again, like, the way we think about making these investments is in a fairly disciplined way of making sure that we find product market fit before we actually scale these things out. And so when we do scale these things out, they tend to already have very, very robust unit economics and cohort performance.

再說一次，我們在進行這些投資時的思考方式，是以相當有紀律的方法，確保在真正擴張之前先找到產品市場契合（product market fit）。因此當我們確實去擴張時，這些業務往往已經具備非常、非常強健的單位經濟與同群表現。

Your next question comes from the line of James Lee with Mizuho.

您的下一個問題來自 Mizuho 的 James Lee。

My question is on DashMart. Maybe can you guys talk about the expansion plan maybe for FY '22? And what are the key learnings so far? And just curious, what do you need to see for this business to scale? Will you consider M&A or partnership to expand this segment?

我的問題是關於 DashMart。你們能否談談可能在 2022 財年（FY '22）的擴張計畫？以及到目前為止的關鍵學習是什麼？另外也好奇，這項業務要達到可規模化，你們需要看到哪些條件？你們會考慮透過併購（M&A）或合作夥伴關係來擴大這個領域嗎？

James, it's Tony. So on DashMart, we really like what we see. Again, like this is another one of these newer initiatives about 1.5 years old. And what we're learning, I think, are benefits really for -- starting with a couple of audiences, and I'll talk about how it translates into the third audience. So first, for consumers, a lot of these DashMarts just bring selection of inventory into geographies where, frankly, didn't previously exist, whether literally it never existed or the hours of operation has now opened pretty wide to 24/7 now, which is a big improvement for what consumers are seeking.

James，我是 Tony。關於 DashMart，我們非常喜歡目前看到的成果。再說一次，這是另一個較新的計畫，約 1.5 年的時間。我們的學習，我認為，主要是帶來的效益——先從兩個受眾開始，我也會談談它如何延伸到第三個受眾。首先，對消費者而言，許多 DashMart 把商品選擇帶進一些地理區域，而坦白說，以前並不存在——不論是字面上從未存在，或是營業時間現在大幅延長到 24/7，這對消費者所追求的需求而言是很大的改善。

I think with respect to merchants, this is a critical infrastructure for a lot of them, either to expand into new geographies or to increase into different hours of operations. And so what we see is really, DashMart's on a fairly long investment time horizon. Again, staying disciplined around finding product market fit before we choose to scale these things out. But what we're seeing is quite a lot of demand for them. And I think it really speaks to, again, what we're trying to create at DoorDash, which is really the largest local commerce app or marketplace where we're bringing incremental demand and the largest local commerce platform, where we're building tools and infrastructure, obviously, starting with delivery with products like DoorDash Drive.

我認為就商家而言，這對許多商家來說是關鍵的基礎設施，無論是擴展到新的地理區域，或是延伸到不同的營業時段。因此我們看到的是，DashMart 的投資時間視野相當長。同樣地，我們會保持紀律，在選擇擴大規模之前，先找到產品市場契合度（product-market fit）。但我們看到對它們的需求相當大。我認為這也再次呼應我們在 DoorDash 想打造的——也就是最大的在地商務 App 或市集（marketplace），我們在其中帶來增量需求；以及最大的在地商務平台（platform），我們在其中建立工具與基礎設施，當然是從配送開始，透過像 DoorDash Drive 這樣的產品。

But if you think about all the other products and services that merchants need to build in order to compete digitally in today's economy, well, it certainly expands far beyond just logistics. And so DashMarts are really a form of infrastructure to store inventory to possibly enter new geographies and certainly expand their hours of service. And so we plan on investing in this line of work for a really long time for those reasons. And obviously, if we can build both a marketplace and a platform with DashMart, I think it will provide tremendous work opportunities for Dashers.

但如果你想想商家在當今經濟中要以數位方式競爭所需要建立的所有其他產品與服務，那確實遠不止物流。因此 DashMart 本質上是一種基礎設施，用來存放庫存、可能進入新的地理區域，並且確實能延長他們的服務時段。基於這些原因，我們計畫在這條業務線上投入很長一段時間。顯然，如果我們能透過 DashMart 同時建立市集與平台，我認為這也將為 Dashers 提供大量的工作機會。

But again, the investment philosophy stays the same, given how young DashMarts are, it's making sure that we have great product market fit and then we'll continue to scale them.

但同樣地，鑑於 DashMart 還很年輕，我們的投資理念不變：確保我們有很好的產品市場契合度，然後我們會持續擴大規模。

And 1 quick follow-up question, Tony, here. When you look at the nonrestaurant business, in general -- 2 parts to this question. When you look at user behavior, do they tend to be more recurring in nature? Are they more impulsive? And also second, for your nonrestaurant business in general, can you be profitable over time without advertising?

Tony，我這裡有一個簡短的追問。當你看非餐飲業務時——這個問題有兩個部分。第一，從使用者行為來看，他們是否更偏向重複性（recurring）？還是更偏向衝動型？第二，對你們整體非餐飲業務而言，長期來看在沒有廣告的情況下，你們能否實現獲利？

So on the nonrestaurant category, what we're seeing is pretty much quite a lot of different kinds of use cases. Are there people who just shop for impulse purchases for whatever the occasion might be? Yes. But predominantly, we're seeing people come back for, I think, a lot of use cases. I mean, where the recurring behavior is looking for that middle of the week run now being solved by somebody else, right? That's really the job that we're solving for a lot of these customers, right?

關於非餐飲品類，我們看到的是相當多不同類型的使用情境。是否有人會因為某個場合而進行衝動購買？是的。但主要而言，我們看到人們會回來使用，因為我認為有很多使用情境。也就是重複性行為在於：現在把「週中補貨跑一趟」這件事交給別人解決，對吧？這正是我們為許多客戶解決的工作（job），對吧？

Like, when you think about the items near pantry that get consumed the earliest or the items in your refrigerator that maybe perish the earliest, those are the things that actually -- those are the types of things where you have to go back every single week, no matter how much you buy on a weekly basis, right? And those are the jobs where people have to do every single week. And so we are seeing certainly both, although more of the behavior is recurring.

例如，當你想到儲藏室附近最先被消耗完的物品，或是冰箱裡可能最先腐壞的食材，那些其實——那類東西就是你每週都得再去買的，無論你每週一次買多少，對吧？而那些就是人們每週都必須做的事。因此我們確實同時看到兩者，雖然更多的行為是重複性的。

And then I'll let Prabir take, I think, your second question, which is really around, I think, the business model.

接著我讓 Prabir 來回答我想是你的第二個問題，也就是關於商業模式的部分。

And James, we have not disclosed anything about the business model around nonrestaurant verticals. And so no comment on that question.

James，我們尚未披露任何關於非餐飲垂直領域（nonrestaurant verticals）的商業模式資訊。因此對那個問題不予置評。

Your next question comes from the line of Mark Mahaney with Evercore ISI.

您的下一個問題來自 Evercore ISI 的 Mark Mahaney。

Two questions. When you think about the number of DashPass members now, you have it at over 10 million out of, whatever, 25 million MAUs, what do you think are the obstacles to getting that penetration higher? I know it's high, 40%. But I would think given the value prop and the frequency of the activity that, that could get into 60%, 70% maybe long term. So what's -- what are the biggest things you have to solve for in order to get that penetration higher?

兩個問題。當你想到目前 DashPass 會員數，你們說已超過 1,000 萬，對比大約 2,500 萬月活躍用戶（MAUs），你認為要把滲透率提高的障礙是什麼？我知道這已經很高了，40%。但我會認為，考量價值主張與使用頻率，長期來看可能可以到 60%、70%。所以——要把滲透率提高，你們需要解決的最大問題是什麼？

And then any quick updated comments on Prop 22? And I know there was the AG reversed or challenged the judge's decision earlier this month. Any updated thoughts on how that's going to play out or when we'll know.

另外，對 Prop 22 有沒有任何快速更新的評論？我知道本月稍早州檢察長（AG）推翻或挑戰了法官的裁決。對於接下來會如何發展、或我們何時會知道結果，你們有沒有更新的看法？

Yes. Prabir, do you want to take the first?

是的。Prabir，你要回答第一個嗎？

Yes. I think -- why don't I take the first one, and you take the second one. Okay. So Mark, on your question on the 10 million out of 40 million, yes, the 10 million was a milestone. We're happy with 40% of our MAUs. There's a lot of runway here, right? I mean, as you think about -- with 25 million MAUs, we're a small fraction of the U.S. population.

好。我想——不如我回答第一個，你回答第二個。好。Mark，關於你問的 1,000 萬（會員）在 4,000 萬（人）之中，是的，1,000 萬是一個里程碑。我們對 MAUs 的 40% 感到滿意。這裡還有很大的成長空間，對吧？我的意思是，當你想到——以 2,500 萬 MAUs 來看，我們只占美國人口的一小部分。

Now add in the other countries we operate in, whether it's Canada, Australia, Japan, Germany, and we have access to over 500 million people, right? And so in the context of that 500 million people, I mean even if you adjust for that for adults and so on, the 10 million membership size is a small fraction. So the path to get there is going to be back to the basics of selection, quality and affordability. So in selection, as we keep adding these new categories and new stores into these neighborhoods, that cross-sell percentage, the 14% will start creeping up, and order frequency in these new verticals will increase.

再把我們營運的其他國家加進來，無論是加拿大、澳洲、日本、德國，我們可觸及超過 5 億人，對吧？因此在這 5 億人的脈絡下，即使你再針對成年人等因素做調整，1,000 萬的會員規模仍然只是一小部分。所以要走到那裡的路徑，會回到基本功：選擇（selection）、品質（quality）與可負擔性（affordability）。在選擇方面，隨著我們持續把新類別與新店家加入這些社區，交叉銷售比例（cross-sell percentage）——也就是 14%——會開始逐步上升，而這些新垂直領域的下單頻率也會提高。

Remember the point I made earlier about purchase behavior on our platform ultimately mimicking or reflecting how human beings operate in their daily lives. So over time, as that order frequency increases, the savings opportunity increases, and DashPass starts making sense. So even if it's someone that doesn't order enough restaurant delivery today, over time, DashPass may end up making sense for them because they use DashPass to order their convenience goods, or their grocery goods or their liquid purchases or their pet food or retail and so on and so forth.

記得我先前提到的一點：我們平台上的購買行為，最終會模仿或反映人們在日常生活中的運作方式。因此隨著時間推移，當下單頻率提高，省錢的機會就增加，DashPass 就開始變得合理。所以即使某個人今天餐飲外送下單不夠多，隨著時間推移，DashPass 也可能對他有意義，因為他用 DashPass 來訂購便利商品、雜貨、飲品、寵物食品、零售等諸如此類。

So there's opportunity in that front and there's opportunity for -- to continue improving quality. Today, we've made consistent improvements, but still a reasonable number of deliveries are defective. And so we've got a bunch of work to do to make the product reliable 100% of the time so that if you're a DashPass member, the experience truly feels special.

因此那方面有機會，另外也有機會持續改善品質。今天我們已經持續改進，但仍有相當比例的配送是有瑕疵的。因此我們還有很多工作要做，讓產品在 100% 的時間都可靠，這樣如果你是 DashPass 會員，體驗才會真正感覺特別。

Mark, with respect to your second question on Prop 22, nothing has changed. I mean, we still think we're absolutely right on the law here. In fact, I think even the California Attorney General has supported us in this regard that 58% to 59% of the state population and voting population are saying that they pass something into law, that, that should be legalized. I think it's just common sense that that's the right legal answer.

Mark，關於你第二個有關 Prop 22 的問題，沒有任何改變。我的意思是，我們仍然認為在法律上我們絕對是正確的。事實上，我認為連加州州檢察長也在這方面支持我們：有 58% 到 59% 的州人口與投票人口表示他們把某件事透過投票納入法律，那就應該合法化。我認為常識上這就是正確的法律答案。

But I think even more importantly than this, just more broadly speaking, we feel the same way about this issue anywhere in the sense that drivers in this type of economy ought to be able to pick wherever they want to work, whenever they want to work, and that flexibility is critical. I mean that's where Prop 22 stands for, while giving them the protections that they deserve. And we, whether it's in the state of California or, frankly, any geography globally, that's what we stand for, which is to support the Dasher. And the voters of California believe in this, the drivers believe in this and the California Attorney General believes in this.

但我認為比這更重要的是，更廣泛地說，我們在任何地方對這個議題的看法都一樣：在這類型的經濟中，駕駛（drivers）應該能夠選擇他們想在哪裡工作、何時工作，而這種彈性至關重要。我的意思是，這就是 Prop 22 所代表的，同時也給予他們應得的保障。而我們——無論是在加州，或坦白說在全球任何地理區域——我們所堅持的就是支持 Dasher。加州選民相信這一點，駕駛相信這一點，加州州檢察長也相信這一點。

Your next question comes from the line of Brad Erickson with RBC Capital Markets.

您的下一個問題來自 RBC Capital Markets 的 Brad Erickson。

Just a couple, I guess. First, between the different categories, all the different categories you have going here in the U.S. and then obviously, Wolt coming on here later this year, hopefully, and then Canada and Australia, does all of that expansion, I guess, right in front of you probably keep you from, say, exploring other international expansion? Or should we assume other markets are sort of always under exploration?

我想問兩個問題。第一，在不同類別之間，你們在美國這邊推進的各種不同類別，然後很顯然今年稍晚 Wolt 也希望能加入，另外還有加拿大與澳洲，面對這些擴張，我想問這是否會讓你們無暇去探索其他國際擴張？還是我們應該假設其他市場一直都在評估之中？

And then second, you think about the regulatory work likely to occur, if not -- in the future, if not already in your -- a lot of these international markets. Talk about just kind of how prepared you feel you are in terms of personnel and the associated expense necessary to kind of support those works and hopefully, constructive dialogues.

第二，談到未來（如果不是已經在你們許多國際市場中）可能會出現的監管工作。請談談你們在人員配置以及為了支援這些工作、並希望能進行具建設性對話所需的相關費用方面，你們覺得自己準備得如何。

Yes, it's Tony. I'll take both of those questions. With respect to the first, I think you're certainly right in saying that we have quite a lot on our plates, and we're constantly, again, trying to invent the best possible products. And again, when you think about the portfolio of initiatives of U.S. restaurants, new categories or platform services, international markets and advertising, there's a lot of work to go around. So we always believe that we have to earn the right to serve customers in a second way by doing an excellent job in the first way. And so that's really what we're focused on.

是的，我是 Tony。我來回答這兩個問題。就第一個問題而言，我認為你說得沒錯，我們確實手上有相當多事情要做，而且我們也一直在努力打造最好的產品。再者，當你想到我們的各項計畫組合——美國餐廳、新類別或平台服務、國際市場以及廣告——要做的事情很多。因此，我們一直相信，必須先把第一種服務做到非常出色，才能贏得以第二種方式服務客戶的權利。所以這就是我們真正專注的重點。

But look, I mean, it doesn't mean that we're not scanning for opportunities. We're always looking for opportunities regardless, especially when we have such a robust core business that's producing positive cash flow, and with a very healthy balance sheet, it gives us lots of opportunities to be opportunistic and go on the offensive.

不過你看，這並不代表我們不在掃描機會。我們始終在尋找機會，尤其是當我們擁有一個非常強健、能產生正向現金流的核心業務，以及非常健康的資產負債表時，這讓我們有很多機會可以把握時機、主動出擊。

I think with respect to your second question around regulatory preparation, yes. I mean I think this has been something that's been a part of DoorDash really since 2013 when the company was founded. And this is -- these beliefs that we've had since day 1 of making sure that workers should be able to have this new standard where they get the flexibility that they're telling us over and over again with their words as well as with their feed, and also the protections that we believe they deserve. And frankly, just like expired -- outdated laws that deserve to be expired.

至於你第二個關於監管準備的問題，是的。我認為這其實自 2013 年公司成立以來就一直是 DoorDash 的一部分。我們從第一天起就秉持這些信念：確保工作者能有一個新的標準——既能擁有他們一再用言語以及實際行為告訴我們他們想要的彈性，也能擁有我們認為他們應得的保障。坦白說，也包括那些應該被淘汰的過時法律。

And we think the productive way in doing this is that governments and businesses such as ourselves should work together across any geography to make sure that this actually happens from the perspective of the worker, not from any other perspective. And so that's what we're working really hard on, and we have best-in-class teams to get that work done.

我們認為更具建設性的做法是，各地政府與像我們這樣的企業應該跨越不同地理區域合作，確保這件事真正從工作者的角度落實，而不是從任何其他角度出發。因此，這就是我們非常努力在推動的方向，我們也有業界一流的團隊來完成這項工作。

Your next question comes from the line of Brian Fitzgerald with Wells Fargo.

您的下一個問題來自 Wells Fargo 的 Brian Fitzgerald。

A couple of questions. On the marketplace side of things, nonrestaurant partners doubled '21. Clearly, you have a lot of runway there. And you have a focus on product market fit before scaling, but how do you think about ways to grow partners on a platform? And then any dynamics to call out with respect to the different commission points you launched earlier in '21, 15%, 25%, 30%, as cohorts of partners experience or use that model, or are they moving up to the different commission points.

我有幾個問題。就市集（marketplace）而言，非餐廳合作夥伴在 2021 年翻倍成長，顯然你們還有很大的成長空間。你們在擴張前會先專注於產品與市場契合度（product-market fit），但你們如何看待在平台上擴大合作夥伴的方式？另外，想請問你們在 2021 年初推出的不同抽成點（commission points）——15%、25%、30%——是否有任何值得注意的動態？例如，當不同批次（cohorts）的合作夥伴體驗或使用該模式後，他們是否會往不同的抽成點位上移？

Yes. I'll take the first question, and maybe Prabir can take the second on the kind of different tiers of commission points. With respect to the first, of adding more selection in these new categories, a lot of it is just doing the work quite candidly. I think what has been really attractive to all of these customers is, well, I mean look at what we're bringing. We're bringing the largest on-demand audience for local commerce that has the highest frequency of shopping. That's an incremental use case, both from their physical activities, their own digital activities and other -- any other previous digital partnerships that they've signed. And so as a result of that, actually, we're seeing quite a lot of excitement where people are starting to think of DoorDash not just as lunch and dinner, but really everything inside the neighborhood. So we're actually seeing quite a lot of progress.

是的。我先回答第一個問題，至於不同抽成層級的第二個問題，也許 Prabir 可以回答。就第一個問題、在這些新類別中增加更多選擇而言，坦白說很大一部分就是把該做的工作做好。我認為對這些客戶而言非常有吸引力的是——你看我們帶來的是什麼：我們帶來的是本地商務中最大的即時（on-demand）受眾，而且購物頻率最高。這對他們來說是一個增量使用情境，不論相較於他們的實體活動、他們自己的數位活動，或是他們先前簽署的任何其他數位合作關係。也因此，我們確實看到相當多的興奮與期待，人們開始把 DoorDash 不只是當作午餐和晚餐，而是把它視為社區裡的一切。因此我們其實看到相當多的進展。

And -- but that doesn't mean that there isn't work to be done. I mean, we have to build a lot of products now that make sense for categories outside of restaurants, right? Everything from the catalog to the in-store shopping process to how we think about customer support to think about how do we support people not just again on our channel, but also their own channel. So there's a lot of work to be done. But I would say that the excitement from partners has been tremendous. I think some of those names you've seen in the press and things like this, and we expect adding a lot more partners to come.

但——這並不代表沒有工作要做。我們現在必須打造許多適用於餐廳以外類別的產品，對吧？從商品目錄（catalog）到店內採購流程（in-store shopping process），到我們如何思考客戶支援，再到我們如何支援商家不只是透過我們的渠道，也包括他們自己的渠道。要做的事情很多。但我會說，合作夥伴的熱情非常高。你們在媒體上看到的一些品牌名稱等等，我們也預期會加入更多合作夥伴。

Brian, on the question about the pricing tiers. Just as a reminder, this was aimed at SMB restaurants, not larger restaurants and predominantly, those that are coming through our self-serve channel. So a small fraction of those have actually opted in to the pricing tiers versus the prior pricing. And of the number there that opted in, the majority have picked the 2 higher tiers, which was in line with what we expected and kind of makes sense given the value that we drive at the higher pricing tiers.

Brian，關於定價層級的問題。提醒一下，這是針對中小型（SMB）餐廳，而不是大型餐廳，而且主要是透過我們的自助式（self-serve）渠道加入的商家。因此，實際選擇加入定價層級、而非沿用先前定價的商家只占其中一小部分。而在選擇加入的那部分商家中，多數選擇了較高的兩個層級，這與我們的預期一致，也符合我們在較高定價層級所帶來的價值。

Your next question comes from the line of Jim Sanderson with Northcoast Research.

您的下一個問題來自 Northcoast Research 的 Jim Sanderson。

Just wanted to follow up a little bit more on DashPass, and wondering if you could help us to understand how the new DashPass members were recruited. If this is primarily through credit card marketing programs. And then going forward, as you try to expand these types of programs internationally, if your client acquisition strategy for DashPass is going to have to adjust away from credit cards. Just a little bit more texture on how that growth has developed.

我想再追問一下 DashPass，想請你們協助我們理解新的 DashPass 會員是如何招募而來的。這是否主要透過信用卡行銷方案？另外，未來當你們嘗試在國際上擴展這類方案時，你們的 DashPass 客戶獲取策略是否需要從信用卡渠道轉向其他方式？想多了解一些這段成長是如何發展的。

The vast majority of the DashPass members are through our own channels, and the minority are through credit card channels.

絕大多數 DashPass 會員是透過我們自己的渠道而來，少數則是透過信用卡渠道。

And then are the percentage or share of DashPass members that pay full membership, is that changing over time?

那麼，支付全額會費的 DashPass 會員比例或占比，是否會隨時間改變？

No, it's relatively consistent. But again, it depends on -- you'll remember that one of the ways we get people activated on DashPass is through a free trial period. So depending on the intensity of our marketing efforts, that free -- the trial versus paid mix changes, but they are fairly consistent.

沒有，整體而言相對一致。不過，這也取決於——你會記得，我們讓用戶啟用 DashPass 的方式之一是提供免費試用期。因此，視我們行銷投入的強度而定，免費試用與付費的組合會有所變化，但整體相當一致。

There are no further questions. This does conclude today's conference call, and thank you for your participation. You may now disconnect.

目前沒有其他問題。今天的電話會議到此結束，感謝各位的參與。您現在可以掛線。