DoorDash Inc (DASH) 2021 Q4 法說會逐字稿

Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for standing by, and welcome to the DoorDash Fourth Quarter Fiscal 2022 Earnings Call. (Operator Instructions) After the Thank you.

女士們，先生們，感謝您的支持，歡迎參加 DoorDash 2022 財年第四季度財報電話會議。 （操作說明）後謝謝。

Andy Hargreaves, Vice President of Investor Relations, you may begin your conference.

Andy Hargreaves，投資者關係副總裁，您可以開始您的會議了。

Thanks. So hello, everybody, and thanks for joining us for our fourth quarter 2021 earnings call. I'm pleased to be joined today by Co-Founder, Chair and CEO, Tony Xu; and CFO, Prabir Adarkar.

謝謝。大家好，感謝您加入我們的 2021 年第四季度財報電話會議。我很高興今天有聯合創始人、董事長兼首席執行官 Tony Xu 加入；和首席財務官 Prabir Adarkar。

We'd like to remind everyone that we'll be making forward-looking statements during this call, including our expectations of our business, future financial results and guidance, strategy and statements regarding the recently announced acquisition of the Wolt's transaction result.

我們想提醒大家，我們將在本次電話會議期間發表前瞻性陳述，包括我們對我們業務的預期、未來財務業績和指導、戰略以及關於最近宣布收購 Wolt 交易結果的聲明。

Forward-looking statements are subject to risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially from those described in forward-looking statements, and some such risks are described in our risk factors, including in our SEC filings, including Form 10-K. You shouldn't rely on our forward-looking statements as predictions of future events. We disclaim any obligation to update any forward-looking statements, except as required by law.

前瞻性陳述受風險和不確定性的影響，可能導致實際結果與前瞻性陳述中描述的結果存在重大差異，我們的風險因素中描述了一些此類風險，包括我們向美國證券交易委員會提交的文件，包括表格 10-K。您不應依賴我們的前瞻性陳述作為對未來事件的預測。除法律要求外，我們不承擔更新任何前瞻性陳述的義務。

During this call, we will discuss certain non-GAAP financial measures. Information regarding our non-GAAP financial results, including a reconciliation of non-GAAP results to the most directly comparable GAAP financial measures may be found in our investor letter, which is available on our IR site. These non-GAAP measures should be considered in addition to our GAAP results and are not intended to be a substitute for our GAAP results.

在本次電話會議中，我們將討論某些非公認會計準則財務措施。有關我們的非 GAAP 財務結果的信息，包括非 GAAP 結果與最直接可比的 GAAP 財務指標的對賬，可以在我們的投資者信函中找到，該信函可在我們的 IR 網站上找到。除了我們的 GAAP 結果之外，還應考慮這些非 GAAP 措施，並且不能替代我們的 GAAP 結果。

Finally, this call, in its entirety, is being audio webcast on our Investor Relations website. An audio replay of the call will be available on our website shortly after the call ends.

最後，本次電話會議的全部內容將在我們的投資者關係網站上進行網絡音頻廣播。通話結束後不久，我們的網站將提供通話的音頻重播。

And with that, we can go straight to questions.

有了這個，我們可以直接提問。

(Operator Instructions) Your first question comes from the line of Douglas Anmuth with JPMorgan.

（操作員說明）您的第一個問題來自摩根大通的 Douglas Anmuth。

I know you're focused on maximizing the long-term profit dollars. Just hoping you could provide some more color on how to think about the near-term investment and loss levels in some of the new categories just relative to the profit and cash generation that you mentioned in the core restaurant business.

我知道您專注於最大化長期利潤。只是希望你能提供更多關於如何考慮一些新類別的近期投資和損失水平的信息，這與你在核心餐廳業務中提到的利潤和現金產生有關。

Doug, thanks for the question. Yes, that's right. We are focused on maximizing scale. And the reason for that is because we operate in very large categories that are underpenetrated today. What I'll say is we're not breaking out the margins of the investments in our new categories other than to say that the U.S. business is growing nicely and has an increase in contribution margins, both on a quarter-on-quarter and a year-on-year basis. So that increase in profit is what we're funding into these investments. And we're watching for core signals around retention and order frequency to make sure that they hit our term thresholds.

道格，謝謝你的提問。是的，這是正確的。我們專注於擴大規模。其原因是因為我們經營的品類非常大，而今天這些品類的滲透率很低。我要說的是，我們並沒有透露新類別的投資利潤率，只是說美國業務增長良好並且貢獻利潤率有所增加，無論是環比還是同比。因此，利潤的增加就是我們為這些投資提供的資金。我們正在關注有關保留和訂單頻率的核心信號，以確保它們達到我們的期限閾值。

Your next question comes from the line of Youssef Squali with Truist Securities.

您的下一個問題來自 Truist Securities 的 Youssef Squali。

Two questions from me, please. One, did you guys see any benefits from Omicron during the quarter? And how has January and early February trended versus your expectations?

請教我兩個問題。一，你們在本季度看到了 Omicron 的任何好處嗎？與您的預期相比，1 月和 2 月初的趨勢如何？

And second, can you maybe speak to recent trends in the competitive landscape? And do you believe as your main competitor has been talking about that you guys may have lost some share in the U.S.? And if so, maybe just if you can flesh that out for us in terms of geos and product types where you feel you need to maybe regain some share?

其次，您能否談談競爭格局的最新趨勢？您是否認為作為您的主要競爭對手一直在談論你們可能在美國失去了一些份額？如果是這樣，也許只是你可以在你認為需要重新獲得一些份額的地理和產品類型方面為我們充實這一點？

So maybe I'll start the Omicron question, and then Tony can chime in with the competitive landscape. On Omicron specifically, the impact in Q4, even January, has been relatively muted, it's not significant that I would call it out. And certainly, not significant when compared to the impact we saw from COVID in -- early in Q2. In fact, with every sort of successive variant, the impact on our business has basically diminished. And so the Q4 outperformance, I wouldn't attribute that to Omicron.

所以也許我會開始 Omicron 的問題，然後 Tony 可以加入競爭格局。特別是在 Omicron 上，第四季度，甚至 1 月份的影響相對較小，我認為這並不重要。當然，與我們在第二季度初看到的 COVID 影響相比，這並不顯著。事實上，隨著每一種連續的變體，對我們業務的影響基本上已經減弱了。因此，第四季度的出色表現，我不會將其歸因於 Omicron。

And Tony, if you want to comment on the competitive landscape and all.

還有托尼，如果你想評論競爭格局等等。

Yes. Youssef, we actually haven't noticed any share loss in any time period recently in the fourth quarter or for the year of 2021. And I think when you think about maybe why this is, it really just breaks out into, I think, basic math, right? On new customers, we continue to be the leading acquirer of all customers that come into the industry for the first time. And then when you think about the possibility of new customer acquisition, especially just given how deep some of these channels are, they're really deeper than any other possible channel in which you can acquire new customers into the industry.

是的。優素福，我們實際上在最近的第四季度或 2021 年的任何時間段內都沒有註意到任何股票虧損。我認為，當您考慮這可能是為什麼時，我認為它真的只是爆發為基本數學，對吧？在新客戶方面，我們繼續成為所有首次進入該行業的客戶的領先收購者。然後，當您考慮獲得新客戶的可能性時，特別是考慮到其中一些渠道的深度，它們確實比您可以在行業中獲得新客戶的任何其他可能渠道更深。

I think the second part of how you can gain share, certainly, is just what is the retention and order frequency of these customers. And we continue to have leading retention and order frequency in the category. And this has always been our focus, by the way, which is to make sure that we build the best product, which you can see as demonstrated through these leading both new customer acquisition as well as retention metrics.

我認為如何獲得份額的第二部分當然就是這些客戶的保留率和訂購頻率。我們繼續在該類別中保持領先的保留率和訂單頻率。順便說一句，這一直是我們關注的重點，即確保我們打造最好的產品，您可以通過這些領先的新客戶獲取和保留指標看到這一點。

And as a result, when I think about just it -- this ties a little bit to, I think, the previous question that Doug was asking, just how large the core business opportunity is in U.S. restaurants, the fact that even as the share leader and continuing to be the fastest-growing part of the industry, we're only 5% of U.S. industry sales.

因此，當我考慮到這一點時，我認為這與 Doug 之前提出的問題有點關聯，即美國餐館的核心商機有多大，即使份額領導者並繼續成為行業中增長最快的部分，我們僅占美國行業銷售額的 5%。

And I think when you look at all of our active users, while we had a record quarter of 25 million monthly active consumers, we're a single-digit percentage of the populations that we serve. And certainly, as you start adding into some of these new categories as well as international geographies, and there's the platform side of what we do with products like Drive and Storefront. I mean we are a tiny, tiny, tiny fraction of the opportunity in front of us, and that's why we're very excited in investing.

而且我認為，當您查看我們所有的活躍用戶時，雖然我們擁有創紀錄的 2500 萬每月活躍消費者的四分之一，但我們在我們所服務的人群中只佔個位數的百分比。當然，當您開始添加到其中一些新類別以及國際地區時，還有我們對 Drive 和 Storefront 等產品所做的平台方面。我的意思是，我們只是擺在我們面前的機會的一小部分，這就是為什麼我們對投資感到非常興奮的原因。

But that said, in terms of how we view the future, besides staying disciplined in terms of how we make investments, it first and foremost starts with making sure that we have the best product, which is going to offer the best combination of selection, quality, affordability and service. And so long as we continue doing that, I think the scoreboard will continue taking care of itself.

但話雖如此，就我們如何看待未來而言，除了在投資方式上保持自律外，首先要確保我們擁有最好的產品，這將提供最佳的選擇組合，質量、可負擔性和服務。只要我們繼續這樣做，我認為記分牌將繼續照顧自己。

And just to add to Tony's point, Youssef, to answer your question directly, over the last 12 months, we've gained 2 points of share -- over 2 points of share on the third-party data sources. And specifically, with respect to Q4, we believe we've gained shares. We grew faster than our peers based on their publicly reported numbers for their U.S. businesses.

只是為了補充托尼的觀點，優素福，直接回答你的問題，在過去的 12 個月裡，我們獲得了 2 分的份額——超過 2 分的第三方數據源。具體來說，就第四季度而言，我們相信我們已經獲得了份額。根據他們公開報告的美國業務數據，我們的增長速度超過了同行。

Your next question comes from Ross Sandler with Barclays.

您的下一個問題來自巴克萊銀行的羅斯桑德勒。

Two questions. So is there anything unique about the experience thus far in Canada and Australia that gives you confidence that once Wolt comes into the fray that you'll be able to run the same playbook successfully? I think there's some skepticism in the investment community that what you see in the U.S. is replicable in the international countries. So maybe just talk a little bit about that.

兩個問題。那麼，到目前為止，在加拿大和澳大利亞的經歷是否有什麼獨特之處，讓您相信一旦 Wolt 加入戰鬥，您將能夠成功地運行相同的劇本？我認為投資界有些人懷疑你在美國看到的東西是否可以在國際國家複製。所以也許只是談談這個。

And then Prabir, your sales and marketing expense was actually down a bit quarter-on-quarter in contrast to GOV being up nicely. So I think the letter mentioned customer acquisition being a little bit more efficient. Can you just elaborate a little bit on that? Is that some of that retention you're talking about kicking in? Or is that anything else on marketing efficiency?

然後是 Prabir，您的銷售和營銷費用實際上環比下降了一點，而 GOV 的增長很好。所以我認為這封信提到客戶獲取更有效率。你能詳細說明一下嗎？這就是你所說的保留的一部分嗎？或者這與營銷效率有關嗎？

Yes. Why don't I take the first question on some of our performance and progress internationally, and then I'll have Prabir take the second question on the sales and marketing expenses. With respect to our international progress, I mean, we're super excited in what we've seen, and that's why we're only continuing to invest more there. And again, it starts with how do we find product market fit, and then how do we actually scale up our investments appropriately given what we're seeing.

是的。為什麼我不就我們在國際上的一些業績和進展提出第一個問題，然後我將讓 Prabir 回答關於銷售和營銷費用的第二個問題。關於我們的國際進步，我的意思是，我們對我們所看到的感到非常興奮，這就是為什麼我們只會繼續在那裡進行更多投資。再次，它從我們如何找到適合市場的產品開始，然後我們如何根據我們所看到的情況適當地擴大我們的投資。

And what we see is increased selection that we're offering customers, better quality of experience, more -- greater and greater affordability levels, especially with our investments through programs like DashPass, and better service levels. As a result, we're seeing higher order frequencies, higher retention, increased engagement with some of our new categories as well in these countries. And so, that's really what we're seeing from customers, and frankly, their voice as well as their -- how they choose to spend their dollars is really what informs us and guides us.

我們看到的是我們為客戶提供的更多選擇、更好的體驗質量、更多——越來越高的可負擔性水平，尤其是通過我們通過 DashPass 等計劃進行的投資，以及更好的服務水平。因此，我們看到更高的訂單頻率、更高的留存率，以及在這些國家/地區與我們的一些新類別的互動增加。因此，這確實是我們從客戶那裡看到的，坦率地說，他們的聲音以及他們選擇如何花錢的方式確實為我們提供了信息和指導。

And so we're only seeing progress there. And I think those inputs are what has translated into certain outputs such as our revenue growth, order growth, category share growth, all of these things. So I think once we've nailed these inputs, that's why you're seeing the growth of the investments behind them. And that's why we're also really excited about the Wolt partnership because we'll get to do this on a bigger scale across over 20 countries.

所以我們只看到那裡的進展。我認為這些投入已經轉化為某些產出，例如我們的收入增長、訂單增長、類別份額增長等等。所以我認為一旦我們確定了這些投入，這就是為什麼你會看到它們背後的投資增長。這就是為什麼我們也對 Wolt 的合作夥伴關係感到非常興奮，因為我們將在 20 多個國家/地區進行更大規模的合作。

And Prabir, you want to take the sales topic?

Prabir，你想討論銷售話題嗎？

Yes. And just to finish up that point, I mean there's obviously been category share growth that Tony alluded to. But in addition, I mean, we stay super disciplined when it comes to these investments. That's what's allowed us to grow the U.S. business, and we're applying the same rigor to whether it's new categories or international, and we are seeing margin improvement. And so that then allows us to invest more with greater confidence. So let me just conclude that point.

是的。為了結束這一點，我的意思是顯然托尼提到的類別份額增長。但此外，我的意思是，在這些投資方面，我們保持超級自律。這就是使我們能夠發展美國業務的原因，無論是新品類還是國際業務，我們都採用同樣的嚴謹態度，而且我們看到了利潤率的提高。這樣一來，我們就可以更有信心地進行更多投資。所以讓我總結一下這一點。

And on your question on sales and marketing. The reason why sales and marketing declined was because our driver acquisition, our Dasher acquisition costs were lower quarter-on-quarter. As we've said in earlier quarters, we've fixed the undersupply situation that we faced earlier in Q2, and we find ourselves well supplied, and we expect to be well supplied in 2022. And the big reason for that is because the people that generally become Dashers are a very different audience than the types of people that the other gig economy compete -- companies are competing for.

關於您關於銷售和營銷的問題。銷售和營銷下降的原因是我們的司機採購、Dasher 採購成本環比下降。正如我們在前幾個季度所說的那樣，我們已經解決了我們在第二季度早些時候面臨的供應不足情況，我們發現自己供應充足，我們預計 2022 年供應充足。主要原因是人們通常成為 Dashers 的觀眾與其他零工經濟競爭的人群類型截然不同——公司正在競爭。

So specifically, I think we had said over 90% of Dashers had -- really, they have no plans to drive for rideshare and only 4% say they prefer to drive rideshare compared to food delivery. And so the reasons for that is because you don't need a car to Dash. You can Dash on a scooter, you can Dash on a bike. It tends to be safer because you're not sharing your personal space with another human being.

所以具體來說，我認為我們已經說過超過 90% 的 Dashers 有 - 實際上，他們沒有計劃駕駛拼車服務，只有 4% 的人表示與送餐相比，他們更喜歡駕駛拼車服務。所以這樣做的原因是因為你不需要一輛車來 Dash。您可以在踏板車上沖刺，也可以在自行車上沖刺。它往往更安全，因為您不會與另一個人共享您的個人空間。

So as a result of that, it's a very different audience that we can go after. And because we find ourselves well supplied, those Dashers acquisition costs and resulting sales and marketing costs declined quarter-on-quarter.

因此，我們可以追求的是非常不同的受眾。由於我們發現自己供應充足，Dashers 的購置成本以及由此產生的銷售和營銷成本環比下降。

Your next question comes from the line of Deepak Mathivanan with Wolfe Research.

您的下一個問題來自 Wolfe Research 的 Deepak Mathivanan。

Two questions from us. So first, Tony, in 2021, you guys launched a lot of new offerings and expanded across many verticals. The pace of innovation was pretty strong. But as we think about '22 and maybe even '23, what are 1 or 2 main initiatives you feel is ready to graduate and kind of become more meaningful on financial KPIs in the next, like, 12 to 24 months?

我們提出了兩個問題。所以首先，托尼，在 2021 年，你們推出了許多新產品並擴展到許多垂直領域。創新步伐相當強勁。但是，當我們考慮到 22 年甚至 23 年時，您認為哪些 1 或 2 項主要舉措已經準備好畢業並在接下來的 12 到 24 個月內對財務 KPI 變得更有意義？

And then second question, maybe for Prabir. It seems like MAU was up 20% last year, and frequency was also up pretty nicely. But as we think about your guidance, 19% GOV growth at the high end for full year, how should we think about the assumptions for MAU growth frequency and AOV for this year?

然後是第二個問題，也許是針對 Prabir。去年 MAU 似乎上升了 20%，頻率也上升得相當不錯。但是，當我們考慮您的指導時，全年 GOV 的高端增長率為 19%，我們應該如何考慮對今年 MAU 增長頻率和 AOV 的假設？

Deepak, on the first question, I appreciate the comments on product innovation. We're always trying to accelerate that, especially when we hear signals from how we can serve customers better, whether they be consumers, merchants or Dashers. And so we're constantly trying to increase the pace when we see that opportunity, and only until we find product market fit do we actually scale them into fairly large businesses. And I think we've had a track record of doing this now, whether it's certainly our core U.S. restaurants business, then building products on our platform like DoorDash Drive as well as Storefront.

Deepak，關於第一個問題，我很欣賞關於產品創新的評論。我們一直在努力加快這一進程，尤其是當我們聽到如何更好地為客戶服務的信號時，無論他們是消費者、商家還是 Dashers。因此，當我們看到這個機會時，我們一直在努力加快步伐，只有在我們找到適合市場的產品之前，我們才會真正將它們擴展到相當大的業務中。而且我認為我們現在已經有這樣做的記錄，無論是我們的核心美國餐館業務，然後在我們的平台上構建產品，比如 DoorDash Drive 和 Storefront。

We're the leading category player in the convenience category, in the pickup category. We've taken businesses pretty much from scratch in these new categories of convenience, grocery and other categories from 0 into now $1 billion-plus scale businesses that 14% of our monthly active users spend time in. And so I think there's been a lot of progress, to your point.

我們是便利類別和皮卡類別的領先類別參與者。我們已經將便利、雜貨和其他新類別的業務從零開始發展到現在超過 10 億美元的規模業務，我們 14% 的月度活躍用戶都花時間在這些業務上。所以我認為有很多進展，到你的意思。

In terms of just focusing on 1 or 2 things, what we tend to do is our investment philosophy is really it starts with building the best product. And so long as we like what we're seeing from a product market fit perspective, and we're constantly trying to make every detail right within each one of these categories, then do we stage gate further investment into growing these, whether it be into new geographies, into more merchants. We doubled the number of nonrestaurant partners, for example, in our marketplace in 2021.

就只關註一兩件事而言，我們傾向於做的是我們的投資理念實際上是從打造最好的產品開始。只要我們喜歡我們從產品市場契合的角度看到的東西，並且我們不斷嘗試在這些類別中的每個類別中製作每個細節，那麼我們是否會進一步投資以發展這些類別，無論是進入新的地域，進入更多的商家。例如，我們在 2021 年的市場中將非餐廳合作夥伴的數量翻了一番。

But we have a lot of work to do. And so the way I think about it is so long as we stick to our investment philosophy of making sure that we build the best possible product as measured by our retention and order frequency and we stay disciplined in how we can scale them, not just with capital, but frankly with the right leaders placed in these initiatives as well as the right team allocated to those leaders, we'll be in a great spot.

但是我們有很多工作要做。因此，我的想法是，只要我們堅持我們的投資理念，即確保我們根據留存率和訂單頻率來衡量我們構建最好的產品，並且我們在如何擴展它們方面保持自律，而不僅僅是通過資本，但坦率地說，在這些舉措中安排了合適的領導者，並為這些領導者分配了合適的團隊，我們將處於一個很好的位置。

And then, Deepak, on your question around the '22 and obviously, the longer-term outlook, look, at its simplest, the goal is to increase MAUs and to continue driving up order sequences. We don't run the business on a 1-year clock. And we think about planting seeds for many, many years in the future. So the way to think about it is these categories in the food categories to be underpenetrated. In that core business at our current run rate, we're less than -- still middle -- to 5% of total restaurant sales.

然後，Deepak，關於你關於 22 年的問題，顯然是長期前景，看看最簡單的目標是增加 MAU 並繼續推動訂單序列。我們不會以 1 年的時鐘運行業務。我們考慮在未來很多很多年播種。所以思考的方式是食品類別中的這些類別未被充分滲透。在我們目前的運行速度下，在該核心業務中，我們不到 - 仍然是中等 - 到餐廳總銷售額的 5%。

And so even in core food, there's significant room for continued adoption and engagement increases. Now you add to that these other categories that we've made initial foray into, right, whether it's convenience, grocery, alcohol, pet food, retail and so on. These are massive markets that are also in lower -- lesser penetrated compared to the food category.

因此，即使在核心食品中，繼續採用和增加參與度也有很大的空間。現在，您將添加到我們最初涉足的其他類別中，對，無論是便利、雜貨、酒精、寵物食品、零售等。與食品類別相比，這些市場的滲透率也較低——滲透率也較低。

So we put these 2 things together, it's an exciting opportunity set ahead. And based on these signals that we are seeing in terms of early adoption and engagement as we transition from being a food delivery app to basically all of your -- serving all of your local commerce needs. It gives us confidence that we will sustain a healthy growth rate for a long period of time.

所以我們把這兩件事放在一起，這是一個令人興奮的機會。並且基於我們在早期採用和參與方面看到的這些信號，因為我們從一個食品配送應用程序轉變為基本上你所有的 - 服務你所有的本地商業需求。這讓我們有信心在很長一段時間內保持健康的增長率。

Your next question comes from the line of Andrew Boone with JMP Securities.

您的下一個問題來自 JMP 證券公司的 Andrew Boone。

Two, please. One, can you just update on your progress on advertising? And can that contribute to 2022? Or is it a longer-term initiative?

兩個，請。一，你能更新一下你在廣告方面的進展嗎？這可以為 2022 年做出貢獻嗎？或者這是一個長期的舉措？

And then secondly, on nonrestaurant verticals. Where are you seeing traction with consumers? Is it grocery? Is it alcohol? Can you be a little bit more specific there?

其次，在非餐廳垂直領域。您在哪裡看到了消費者的吸引力？是雜貨嗎？是酒精嗎？你能說得更具體一點嗎？

Yes. Sure. I'll take both of those, and feel free to add Prabir. On the first question around advertising, we're seeing tremendous excitement pretty much actually from all of the stakeholders, from advertisers, from retailers, from restaurants, from consumers. And to me, what's really important is making sure that we can achieve 2 objectives, which sometimes can come at odds with one another. One is that we offer the best return in -- advertiser return in terms of their return on spend. And the second is how do we make sure that we certainly not degrade but ideally improve the consumer shopping experience. And these are the 2 things that we're constantly focused on. And so we're in no rush to monetize, although we're really excited by what we're seeing.

是的。當然。我會接受這兩個，並隨時添加Prabir。關於廣告的第一個問題，我們實際上看到所有利益相關者、廣告商、零售商、餐館和消費者都非常興奮。對我來說，真正重要的是確保我們能夠實現兩個目標，這兩個目標有時會相互矛盾。一是我們提供最好的回報——廣告客戶的支出回報率。第二個是我們如何確保我們肯定不會降級，而是理想地改善消費者的購物體驗。這些是我們一直關注的兩件事。所以我們並不急於通過貨幣化，儘管我們對我們所看到的感到非常興奮。

But these are kind of our objective functions, if you will, when it comes to advertising. It's doing really well. It's off to a tremendous start. There is extraordinary demand. But I think staying disciplined on, again, building the best possible product to allow us to have these long-term sustained periods of growth is what -- is how we think about this.

但如果你願意的話，這些是我們在廣告方面的目標函數。它做得很好。這是一個巨大的開始。有非同尋常的需求。但我認為，再次保持紀律性，打造最好的產品，讓我們擁有這些長期持續的增長期，這就是我們對此的看法。

With respect to, I think, the new categories, we're actually seeing traction within each category. And I think in some regard, this is probably not a surprise. I mean, just think about some of these categories, whether it's things that you're stocking up in your pantry or grocery shopping or everything in between. I mean, these are the highest frequency possible categories when it comes to consumer spend. And all we're really doing is, I think, adding to the incremental demand on one side by making sure that customers can get things delivered in minutes, not hours or days. And then on the other side, we're enabling these retailers and merchants to be able to do it through their own channels, their own apps, their own websites.

我認為，關於新類別，我們實際上在每個類別中都看到了牽引力。我認為在某些方面，這可能並不令人意外。我的意思是，想想這些類別中的一些，無論是你在食品儲藏室或雜貨店購物的東西還是介於兩者之間的東西。我的意思是，在消費者支出方面，這些是可能出現頻率最高的類別。我認為，我們真正在做的只是增加一方面的增量需求，確保客戶可以在幾分鐘內而不是幾小時或幾天內交付東西。另一方面，我們讓這些零售商和商家能夠通過他們自己的渠道、他們自己的應用程序、他們自己的網站來做到這一點。

And so I think for those reasons, that's why we're seeing this growth. I mean, I think as you saw in our shareholder letter, on an aggregate basis, about 14% of our monthly active shoppers have shopped in a category outside of restaurants. But that number is substantially higher than that in hundreds of markets already. And so -- and this is pretty universal across categories.

所以我認為出於這些原因，這就是我們看到這種增長的原因。我的意思是，我認為正如您在我們的股東信中看到的那樣，總體而言，我們每月活躍的購物者中約有 14% 的購物者是在餐館以外的類別中購物的。但這個數字已經大大高於數百個市場的數字。所以 - 這在各個類別中非常普遍。

And Andrew, just on your -- just to go back to the advertising question, we are expecting advertising revenues to grow in 2022, but we will invest those incremental profits in the growth initiatives with the aim of maximizing long-term profit dollars.

安德魯，就你的問題 - 回到廣告問題，我們預計廣告收入將在 2022 年增長，但我們會將這些增量利潤投資於增長計劃，以最大限度地提高長期利潤。

Your next question comes from the line of Eric Sheridan with Goldman Sachs.

您的下一個問題來自高盛的 Eric Sheridan。

Maybe just dovetailing with some of what we've talked about so far. As you move into more categories and you think about more product evolution over the long term, I think in the shareholder letter, there was a comment about retention and frequency and LTV. How should we be thinking about long-term margin structure or the long-term LTV-to-CAC in this business now versus maybe the prepandemic period when you IPO-ed a couple of years ago? And how would you frame what you've learned over the last couple of years with respect to that thing?

也許只是與我們迄今為止所討論的一些內容相吻合。隨著您進入更多類別並考慮長期的更多產品演變，我認為在股東信中，有關於保留率、頻率和 LTV 的評論。我們現在應該如何考慮該業務中的長期利潤率結構或長期 LTV 到 CAC，而不是幾年前您首次公開募股時的疫情前時期？你會如何描述你在過去幾年中學到的關於這件事的知識？

Thanks for the question. Just to -- let me take that question. The first thing I'd say is what we shared in the letter was meant to be a framework for how we think about how we manage the business. So today, we're not managing the business to a certain margin. We're not trying to increase margins quarter-on-quarter. We're not trying to manage to an absolute amount of EBITDA. Instead, what we do is we invest. And we invest in areas. We start small, and we look for signals along 2 dimensions. The first is product market fit. So we alluded to the fact that 14% of our MAUs use verticals outside of food. That's a signal of product market fit. We're looking for the frequency signals.

謝謝你的問題。只是——讓我回答這個問題。我要說的第一件事是我們在信中分享的內容旨在成為我們如何思考我們如何管理業務的框架。所以今天，我們沒有將業務管理到一定的利潤。我們並不是要按季度提高利潤率。我們並不試圖管理絕對數量的 EBITDA。相反，我們所做的就是投資。我們投資的領域。我們從小處著手，沿著 2 維尋找信號。首先是產品市場契合度。因此，我們提到了一個事實，即我們 14% 的 MAU 使用食品以外的垂直行業。這是產品市場契合的信號。我們正在尋找頻率信號。

We're looking for the impact of initiatives and actions we take on retention on the core platform, whether it's relative to the core platform. If we see product market fit signals, that's one criteria that's been met. The second is are we making progress on unit economics. So we have a view for each business what target unit economics need to be in order to meet our return threshold. And so we're looking for steady progress. When we see both of these things, like we have with our new verticals, like we have with our international business and with our platform business, that's when we start scaling up our investments. And so that's the framework we generally use versus trying to target a certain margin.

我們正在尋找我們採取的舉措和行動對核心平台上的保留的影響，無論它是否與核心平台相關。如果我們看到產品市場契合信號，那就是滿足的一個標準。第二個是我們在單位經濟學方面取得了進展。因此，我們對每個企業都有一個目標單位經濟需要達到我們的回報門檻的看法。因此，我們正在尋求穩步進展。當我們看到這兩種情況時，就像我們在新的垂直領域看到的那樣，就像我們在國際業務和平台業務中看到的那樣，這就是我們開始擴大投資的時候。這就是我們通常使用的框架，而不是試圖以一定的利潤為目標。

The reason we included that example in the shareholder letter was to provide a case study of how we think about it. Because if you were trying to grow margins period-on-period, a product like DashPass would never come to be. It just wouldn't because on each order, DashPass has a lower unit margin. But as we said from the beginning, if you're optimizing for long-term profit dollars, and we have confidence in the increasing order frequency of the DashPass program, as a result, the total dollars we can generate per user on the platform are higher compared to the alternatives. And so I'm not avoiding the question legitimately because we aren't running the business to certain target margins, but we're happy with the progress we're making on maximizing long-term profit dollars.

我們在股東信中包含該示例的原因是提供一個案例研究來說明我們如何看待它。因為如果你試圖逐期增加利潤，那麼像 DashPass 這樣的產品永遠不會出現。只是不會，因為在每個訂單上，DashPass 的單位利潤都較低。但是正如我們從一開始就說過的，如果您正在為長期利潤進行優化，並且我們對 DashPass 程序不斷增加的訂單頻率有信心，因此，我們可以在平台上為每個用戶產生的總收入是與替代品相比更高。因此，我並沒有合理地迴避這個問題，因為我們沒有將業務運營到某些目標利潤率，但我們對我們在最大化長期利潤方面取得的進展感到滿意。

The one thing that gives me further confidence or sort of room for upside is the advertising opportunity, where the advertising opportunity only grows as our users and our engagement grows. And today, compared to a year ago, we've got 40% more MAUs. Compared to several years ago, we're 3x, 4x the size of our business. And these individuals are engaging with us, not just in the restaurant vertical because all of these different other verticals and over multiple services within the app, which then gives us a tremendous opportunity to not just create new business lines, but also generate advertising revenue with a healthy ROAS.

給我更多信心或上升空間的一件事是廣告機會，其中廣告機會只會隨著我們的用戶和參與度的增長而增長。而今天，與一年前相比，我們的 MAU 增加了 40%。與幾年前相比，我們的業務規模是 3 倍、4 倍。這些人正在與我們互動，不僅僅是在餐廳垂直領域，因為所有這些不同的其他垂直領域以及應用程序內的多種服務，這為我們提供了巨大的機會，不僅可以創建新的業務線，還可以通過以下方式產生廣告收入健康的 ROAS。

And so I think of that as upside to the model. It's not something that you should bake in certainly in the near term because we need to be very careful about how we, not just enable our advertising ROAS, but do so in a way that doesn't degrade the consumer experience.

所以我認為這是模型的優勢。這不是你應該在短期內確定的事情，因為我們需要非常小心我們如何實現我們的廣告 ROAS，但要以不會降低消費者體驗的方式這樣做。

The only thing I'd add to what Prabir said is really, I think the latter part of the question around what have we learned kind of during the pre-COVID kind of post-COVID era of behavior is just the resilience of the category and how I think we've put to rest, I think, this question of what happens to demand as diners go back and eat inside restaurants? Well, I think, clearly, takeout and delivery, as shown by our performance not just in the fourth quarter, but also in 2021, just in an aggregate is that they're complementary. It's very possible to eat inside of a restaurant and get delivery because we eat 3 times or more maybe per day, and that's over 100 shopping moments per month.

我唯一要補充的是 Prabir 所說的話，我認為問題的後半部分是關於我們在 COVID 之前和 COVID 之後的行為時代學到了什麼，這只是類別的彈性和我認為我們如何解決這個問題，當食客回到餐廳內用餐時，需求會發生什麼？嗯，我認為，很明顯，外賣和外賣，正如我們在第四季度和 2021 年的表現所表明的那樣，總的來說，它們是互補的。很有可能在餐廳內用餐並獲得外賣，因為我們每天可能吃 3 次或更多次，每月購物時間超過 100 次。

And then you start adding in these other categories, and you just ask yourself the question, "Well, is it complementary to go inside shopping malls or other types of stores and maybe get it delivered online or over the Internet." And I think that's kind of what we've seen certainly in the restaurant delivery business, and we're starting to see that in all of our other categories.

然後你開始添加這些其他類別，你只是問自己一個問題，“嗯，進入購物中心或其他類型的商店並可能通過在線或互聯網交付它是否是互補的。”我認為這是我們在餐廳外賣業務中肯定看到的，我們開始在所有其他類別中看到這一點。

Your next question comes from the line of Bernie McTernan with Needham & Company.

您的下一個問題來自於 Needham & Company 的 Bernie McTernan。

I've seen examples on the app when I ordered dinner, for example, it might push me to order ice cream from another local store. I imagine new categories like grocery and alcohol and convenience are probably incrementally less time-sensitive. So there's probably even a greater opportunity for Dashers to go to multiple stores for the same customer. But is that a substantial opportunity, either from a cost efficiency perspective or higher GOV or maybe some potential advertising opportunity?

當我點晚餐時，我在應用程序上看到了一些例子，例如，它可能會促使我從另一家當地商店訂購冰淇淋。我想像雜貨、酒類和便利這樣的新品類可能對時間不敏感。因此，Dashers 可能有更大的機會為同一客戶前往多家商店。但這是否是一個巨大的機會，無論是從成本效率的角度還是更高的 GOV 或一些潛在的廣告機會？

It's Tony. I'll take the question. I think it's a really good point. And I think this kind of really is very exciting for us because it's a thesis we've had since really day 1 at the company, which is this business, anything last mile and local commerce is really about building greatest order density. That's why we started with restaurants, right? It has the highest count of stores across every category of local retail restaurants, that is.

是托尼。我會回答這個問題。我認為這是一個很好的觀點。而且我認為這對我們來說真的非常令人興奮，因為這是我們從公司第一天開始就有的論文，這是一項業務，任何最後一英里的事情和本地商業實際上都是關於建立最大的訂單密度。這就是我們從餐館開始的原因，對吧？也就是說，它在當地零售餐廳的各個類別中擁有最多的商店。

And it has the highest frequency of use, which is what gives you the possibility for the highest order density. And if you can start with the highest order density, then you have a lot of optionality to do some of the things that you described of bringing other types of things. And I think, hopefully, being useful to consumers and different kinds of merchants, which therefore provides more flexible work opportunities for Dashers.

它具有最高的使用頻率，這為您提供了最高階密度的可能性。如果你可以從最高階密度開始，那麼你就有很多選擇權來做一些你描述的帶來其他類型的事情的事情。我認為，希望對消費者和不同類型的商家有用，從而為 Dashers 提供更靈活的工作機會。

It also provides opportunities to do, I think, some of the things you described around logistics efficiency. But to us, it's just -- again, it goes back to, how do we become more and more useful in people's lives, right? How do we solve more jobs for a consumer as we think about every shopping occasion they have. And again, while we have impressive order frequency, it's a small fraction of actually how much shopping that actually takes place, right?

我認為，它還提供了一些機會來做你所描述的關於物流效率的一些事情。但對我們來說，這只是 - 再次，它可以追溯到，我們如何在人們的生活中變得越來越有用，對吧？當我們考慮消費者的每一個購物場合時，我們如何為消費者解決更多的工作。再說一次，雖然我們有令人印象深刻的訂單頻率，但這只是實際發生的購物量的一小部分，對吧？

So we have a lot of work to do, I think, to solve even more jobs. And I think the same is true for merchants, and not only in helping them build their channels, but doing other types of jobs for them. That's why we have our Platform Services business. And I think together, if we can do these 2 things, we'll provide the greatest number of work opportunities for Dashers as well. And so you're absolutely right, and I think a lot of the assumptions behind the question. But to us, it just starts with how do we build the best possible experience in solving the most number of jobs.

所以我們有很多工作要做，我認為，要解決更多的工作。我認為商家也是如此，不僅幫助他們建立渠道，還為他們做其他類型的工作。這就是我們擁有平台服務業務的原因。我認為，如果我們能做到這兩件事，我們也會為 Dashers 提供最多的工作機會。所以你是絕對正確的，我認為這個問題背後有很多假設。但對我們來說，這只是從我們如何在解決最多的工作方面建立盡可能好的經驗開始。

Your next question comes from Michael McGovern with Bank of America.

您的下一個問題來自美國銀行的 Michael McGovern。

I was just wondering if you could dig a little bit more into the chart about DashPass order mix versus contribution profit per active consumer. I thought it was pretty surprising and interesting to see that there's such a wide variance of DashPass order mix and also the contribution dollars. So I was wondering what causes some cohorts to lag? And then is it kind of just a function of time to get those lagging cohorts up to that close to $25 mark of contribution profit per active consumer?

我只是想知道您是否可以更深入地了解 DashPass 訂單組合與每位活躍消費者的貢獻利潤的圖表。我認為看到 DashPass 訂單組合和捐款金額的差異如此之大是非常令人驚訝和有趣的。所以我想知道是什麼導致了一些隊列滯後？那麼，讓那些落後的群體達到每個活躍消費者的貢獻利潤接近 25 美元大關，這只是時間的函數嗎？

Thanks for the question, Mike, and it's a good opportunity to explain exactly what the chart is because we got a few questions ahead of the call. So each dot on the chart is a quarterly cohort. So each -- the quarterly cohort starting from 2019 all the way through to the third quarter of 2021. And along the X-axis is the percentage of the orders from that cohort that are DashPass orders. On the Y-axis is the in-quarter, the Q4 2021 contribution profit per active user in that quarter for each of these cohorts.

謝謝邁克的提問，這是一個很好的機會來準確解釋圖表是什麼，因為我們在電話會議之前有幾個問題。所以圖表上的每個點都是一個季度隊列。因此，每個季度——從 2019 年一直到 2021 年第三季度的季度隊列。沿 X 軸是來自該隊列的 DashPass 訂單的百分比。 Y 軸是季度內，即 2021 年第四季度每個活躍用戶在該季度對每個這些群組的貢獻利潤。

And as you can see, this positive correlation where the higher the DashPass order mix, the higher the contribution profit per MAU. And this goes back to the answer I gave to Eric to his question, which is with DashPass, we're making a trade-off to accept lower unit margins in exchange for significantly higher order frequency. And so as the order frequency increases, you generate more orders and those orders translate into greater cumulative contribution profit for each user.

正如你所看到的，這種正相關性，DashPass 訂單組合越高，每個 MAU 的貢獻利潤就越高。這可以追溯到我對 Eric 的問題的回答，即關於 DashPass，我們正在權衡以接受較低的單位利潤以換取明顯更高的訂單頻率。因此，隨著訂單頻率的增加，您會產生更多訂單，這些訂單會轉化為每個用戶更大的累積貢獻利潤。

Now to your question around what drives the variance, it's largely time. On the left side of this chart are basically newer cohorts, the right side of the chart are the older cohorts. And so generally, as time goes by, people -- consumers get increasingly habituated. They started using the product. And DashPass starts making financial sense because once you start placing more than 2, 2.5 orders, the product pays for itself. And so what you see is over time, as you -- as consumers save more money, they start using and they're opting DashPass that then further drives up their order frequency.

現在關於你關於是什麼驅動差異的問題，主要是時間。這張圖表的左側基本上是較新的群組，圖表的右側是較舊的群組。所以一般來說，隨著時間的推移，人們——消費者越來越習慣。他們開始使用該產品。 DashPass 開始具有財務意義，因為一旦您開始下超過 2、2.5 個訂單，產品就會收回成本。因此，隨著時間的推移，您所看到的會隨著消費者節省更多的錢，他們開始使用並選擇 DashPass，從而進一步提高他們的訂購頻率。

Got it. That's really helpful. And I guess one quick follow-up on order frequency. I was just wondering, and on the 14% of customers that are now trying nonrestaurant ordering for the first time, or excuse me, just using it, do you expect that restaurant and nonrestaurant can exhibit similar order frequency trends long term? Or do you think that eating and ordering from restaurants is fundamentally a higher order frequency kind of market?

知道了。這真的很有幫助。我猜想對訂單頻率進行快速跟進。我只是想知道，在 14% 的客戶中，他們是第一次嘗試非餐廳點餐，或者對不起，只是使用它，您是否認為餐廳和非餐廳可以長期表現出相似的點餐頻率趨勢？或者你認為從餐廳吃飯和點餐從根本上說是一種更高頻率的市場？

In general, people's activity on our app resembles how they operate in their daily lives, right? So if you think about -- this question came up sort of a few quarters ago when we went public around the mix between national brand restaurants versus local restaurants. And frankly, it replicates what you see in the industry. Similarly, with areas such as convenience and grocery and alcohol and pet food, essentially, over time, as people's awareness of DoorDash builds and as our selection builds in the neighborhoods that they live in, their behavior offline and online will converge.

一般來說，人們在我們的應用程序上的活動類似於他們在日常生活中的操作方式，對吧？因此，如果您考慮一下 - 這個問題出現在幾個季度前，當時我們圍繞民族品牌餐廳與本地餐廳之間的組合進行了公開。坦率地說，它複製了你在行業中看到的東西。同樣，在便利、雜貨、酒精和寵物食品等領域，隨著時間的推移，隨著人們對 DoorDash 意識的增強以及我們在他們居住的社區中的選擇，他們的線下和線上行為將趨同。

Today, it's lower because that level -- we're still making progress in terms of the selection quality, affordability paradigm in order to hit the sweet spots that more and more consumers start becoming aware of DoorDash as an on-demand way to actually get access to these verticals that are adjacent to food delivery and the ones that they use. So short answer to your question is, over time, I expect the order frequency to basically limit how people shop in their daily lives.

今天，它更低是因為那個水平——我們仍在選擇質量、可負擔性範式方面取得進展，以達到越來越多的消費者開始意識到 DoorDash 是一種按需獲取的最佳方式。訪問這些與食品配送相鄰的垂直領域以及他們使用的垂直領域。對您的問題的簡短回答是，隨著時間的推移，我預計訂單頻率基本上會限制人們在日常生活中購物的方式。

Your next question comes from the line of Lloyd Walmsley with UBS.

您的下一個問題來自瑞銀集團的勞埃德·沃姆斯利 (Lloyd Walmsley)。

I have a couple, if I can. First, just thanks for sharing the updated cohort data. If we just focus on maybe the narrower subset of users added during the pandemic, do you see consistent frequency and retention on those newer cohorts compared to older cohorts and in particular, in markets that have reopened more than others? And anything you can kind of share on how you think that's going to play out over the rest of this year in terms of the cohort behavior and what's embedded in the guidance?

如果可以的話，我有一對。首先，感謝您分享更新的同類群組數據。如果我們只關注可能在大流行期間添加的較小的用戶子集，您是否看到與舊群組相比，這些新群組的頻率和留存率一致，特別是在重新開放的市場比其他市場更多？以及您認為今年餘下時間在隊列行為和指南中嵌入的內容方面將如何發揮作用的任何內容？

And then secondly, on grocery at the time of the IPO, I think there were still some question marks around the unit economics and scalability of grocery. As you guys have progressed and learned in that category, how do you feel today about your ability to generate attractive unit economics and kind of how is that informing how you go to market on the grocery side?

其次，在首次公開募股時的雜貨店，我認為雜貨店的單位經濟性和可擴展性仍然存在一些問號。隨著你們在該類別中的進步和學習，您今天如何看待您創造有吸引力的單位經濟的能力，以及這對您如何在雜貨店進行市場營銷有何影響？

Great. So the first thing let me just say is that the retention pre-COVID versus COVID, right, we were in the middle of COVID in 2020, retention spiked. It was at all-time highs, right? And then from there on, in 2021, we started to see a slow normalization to retention, especially as vaccination rates increased and in-store dining resumed. We're at a point now where in -- and by the way, in 2021, early on in 2021, we were bolstered by the effect of stimulus payments that had an upward impact on both retention and order frequency.

偉大的。所以我想說的第一件事是，COVID 之前的留存率與 COVID 之前的對比，對，我們在 2020 年處於 COVID 的中間，留存率飆升。這是歷史最高點，對吧？然後從那時起，到 2021 年，我們開始看到保留率緩慢正常化，尤其是隨著疫苗接種率的提高和店內用餐的恢復。我們現在正處於一個點——順便說一句，在 2021 年，在 2021 年初，我們受到刺激支付的影響，這對保留率和訂單頻率都有上行影響。

Where we're at today is still better than pre-pandemic levels. But the retention has now normalized where it's slightly above pre-pandemic levels, but not substantially. Order frequency is substantially higher compared to pre-pandemic levels as well as 2020 levels, but that's because of continued improvements to order frequency, both within the DashPass cohorts as well as the non-DashPass cohorts.

我們今天所處的位置仍然好於大流行前的水平。但現在，留存率已經正常化，略高於大流行前的水平，但幅度不大。與大流行前水平和 2020 年水平相比，訂單頻率要高得多，但這是因為 DashPass 群組和非 DashPass 群組中的訂單頻率不斷提高。

Yes. Well, on the second question around grocery. I mean, here's like the way we think about it, right? I mean when you look at our portfolio of priorities, we have the U.S. core business of restaurant delivery. We have these new categories, one of which you're referencing, grocery, platform services, international and advertising. The way we think about them is really, how are we doing against their life stage, right?

是的。好吧，關於雜貨店的第二個問題。我的意思是，這就像我們思考它的方式，對吧？我的意思是，當您查看我們的優先事項組合時，我們擁有美國的核心餐廳外賣業務。我們有這些新類別，其中一個是您所引用的，雜貨、平台服務、國際和廣告。我們對他們的看法實際上是，我們如何對抗他們的生命階段，對吧？

Obviously, a lot of these businesses performed actually quite recently. A product like grocery, for example, is only about 12 to 14 months old. We love the trajectory of the business, both top and bottom line, but it's still in its earliest innings. And so right now, the focus continues to be making sure that we keep improving the product experience, the selection of partners that we can bring on and the inventory from these partners, the quality of the experience itself, the affordability of these deliveries as well as the service levels. And so that's really the focus right now on grocery.

顯然，這些業務中的許多實際上是最近才進行的。例如，像雜貨這樣的產品只有大約 12 到 14 個月大。我們喜歡業務的發展軌跡，無論是頂線還是底線，但它仍處於早期階段。所以現在，重點仍然是確保我們不斷改進產品體驗、我們可以帶來的合作夥伴的選擇以及這些合作夥伴的庫存、體驗本身的質量、這些交付的可負擔性作為服務水平。所以這真的是現在雜貨店的重點。

And again, like, the way we think about making these investments is in a fairly disciplined way of making sure that we find product market fit before we actually scale these things out. And so when we do scale these things out, they tend to already have very, very robust unit economics and cohort performance.

同樣，我們考慮進行這些投資的方式是一種相當有紀律的方式，以確保我們在實際擴大這些東西之前找到適合市場的產品。因此，當我們將這些東西擴大規模時，它們往往已經具有非常非常強大的單位經濟和隊列表現。

Your next question comes from the line of James Lee with Mizuho.

您的下一個問題來自 James Lee 與 Mizuho 的對話。

My question is on DashMart. Maybe can you guys talk about the expansion plan maybe for FY '22? And what are the key learnings so far? And just curious, what do you need to see for this business to scale? Will you consider M&A or partnership to expand this segment?

我的問題是關於 DashMart。也許你們能談談22財年的擴張計劃嗎？到目前為止，主要的學習是什麼？只是好奇，您需要看到什麼才能使這項業務擴大規模？您會考慮通過併購或合作來擴大這一領域嗎？

James, it's Tony. So on DashMart, we really like what we see. Again, like this is another one of these newer initiatives about 1.5 years old. And what we're learning, I think, are benefits really for -- starting with a couple of audiences, and I'll talk about how it translates into the third audience. So first, for consumers, a lot of these DashMarts just bring selection of inventory into geographies where, frankly, didn't previously exist, whether literally it never existed or the hours of operation has now opened pretty wide to 24/7 now, which is a big improvement for what consumers are seeking.

詹姆斯，是托尼。所以在 DashMart 上，我們真的很喜歡我們所看到的。同樣，這是這些新舉措中的另一個，大約有 1.5 年的歷史。我認為，我們正在學習的內容真正有益於——從幾個觀眾開始，我將討論它如何轉化為第三個觀眾。因此，首先，對於消費者而言，許多 DashMart 只是將庫存選擇帶到了以前不存在的地區，無論是從字面上看，還是從字面上看不存在，或者現在營業時間已經開放到 24/7，這對消費者所尋求的東西來說是一個很大的改進。

I think with respect to merchants, this is a critical infrastructure for a lot of them, either to expand into new geographies or to increase into different hours of operations. And so what we see is really, DashMart's on a fairly long investment time horizon. Again, staying disciplined around finding product market fit before we choose to scale these things out. But what we're seeing is quite a lot of demand for them. And I think it really speaks to, again, what we're trying to create at DoorDash, which is really the largest local commerce app or marketplace where we're bringing incremental demand and the largest local commerce platform, where we're building tools and infrastructure, obviously, starting with delivery with products like DoorDash Drive.

我認為對於商家來說，這是一個關鍵的基礎設施，對於他們中的很多人來說，要么擴展到新的地區，要么增加不同的營業時間。所以我們看到的是，DashMart 的投資時間跨度相當長。同樣，在我們選擇擴展這些東西之前，要在尋找適合市場的產品方面保持紀律。但我們看到的是對它們的大量需求。而且我認為這確實再次說明了我們在 DoorDash 嘗試創建的內容，這確實是我們帶來增量需求的最大本地商務應用程序或市場，以及我們正在構建工具的最大本地商務平台顯然，基礎設施和基礎設施從交付諸如 DoorDash Drive 之類的產品開始。

But if you think about all the other products and services that merchants need to build in order to compete digitally in today's economy, well, it certainly expands far beyond just logistics. And so DashMarts are really a form of infrastructure to store inventory to possibly enter new geographies and certainly expand their hours of service. And so we plan on investing in this line of work for a really long time for those reasons. And obviously, if we can build both a marketplace and a platform with DashMart, I think it will provide tremendous work opportunities for Dashers.

但是，如果您考慮商家為了在當今經濟中進行數字化競爭而需要構建的所有其他產品和服務，那麼它肯定會遠遠超出物流。因此，DashMarts 確實是一種存儲庫存的基礎設施形式，可能會進入新的地區，並且肯定會延長其服務時間。因此，出於這些原因，我們計劃在很長一段時間內投資於這項工作。很明顯，如果我們可以與 DashMart 一起建立市場和平台，我認為它將為 Dashers 提供巨大的工作機會。

But again, the investment philosophy stays the same, given how young DashMarts are, it's making sure that we have great product market fit and then we'll continue to scale them.

但同樣，投資理念保持不變，考慮到 DashMarts 的年輕程度，它確保我們擁有出色的產品市場契合度，然後我們將繼續擴大規模。

And 1 quick follow-up question, Tony, here. When you look at the nonrestaurant business, in general -- 2 parts to this question. When you look at user behavior, do they tend to be more recurring in nature? Are they more impulsive? And also second, for your nonrestaurant business in general, can you be profitable over time without advertising?

和 1 個快速跟進問題，Tony，在這裡。當您查看非餐廳業務時，一般來說 - 這個問題的兩個部分。當您查看用戶行為時，他們是否傾向於更頻繁地出現？他們更衝動嗎？其次，對於您的非餐廳業務，您能否在沒有廣告的情況下長期盈利？

So on the nonrestaurant category, what we're seeing is pretty much quite a lot of different kinds of use cases. Are there people who just shop for impulse purchases for whatever the occasion might be? Yes. But predominantly, we're seeing people come back for, I think, a lot of use cases. I mean, where the recurring behavior is looking for that middle of the week run now being solved by somebody else, right? That's really the job that we're solving for a lot of these customers, right?

因此，在非餐廳類別中，我們看到的幾乎是很多不同類型的用例。有沒有人在任何場合都只是為了衝動購物？是的。但主要是，我們看到人們回來是為了很多用例。我的意思是，反復出現的行為正在尋找周中的運行現在正在被其他人解決，對嗎？這確實是我們正在為這些客戶解決的工作，對吧？

Like, when you think about the items near pantry that get consumed the earliest or the items in your refrigerator that maybe perish the earliest, those are the things that actually -- those are the types of things where you have to go back every single week, no matter how much you buy on a weekly basis, right? And those are the jobs where people have to do every single week. And so we are seeing certainly both, although more of the behavior is recurring.

就像，當你想到食品儲藏室附近最早消耗的物品或冰箱裡可能最早腐爛的物品時，實際上這些東西 - 這些是你每週必須回去的東西，不管你每週買多少，對吧？這些是人們每週都必須做的工作。所以我們肯定會看到兩者，儘管更多的行為正在重複發生。

And then I'll let Prabir take, I think, your second question, which is really around, I think, the business model.

然後我讓 Prabir 回答你的第二個問題，我認為這實際上是關於商業模式的。

And James, we have not disclosed anything about the business model around nonrestaurant verticals. And so no comment on that question.

詹姆斯，我們還沒有透露任何關於非餐廳垂直業務模式的信息。所以不對這個問題發表評論。

Your next question comes from the line of Mark Mahaney with Evercore ISI.

您的下一個問題來自與 Evercore ISI 的 Mark Mahaney。

Two questions. When you think about the number of DashPass members now, you have it at over 10 million out of, whatever, 25 million MAUs, what do you think are the obstacles to getting that penetration higher? I know it's high, 40%. But I would think given the value prop and the frequency of the activity that, that could get into 60%, 70% maybe long term. So what's -- what are the biggest things you have to solve for in order to get that penetration higher?

兩個問題。當您考慮現在 DashPass 會員的數量時，您擁有超過 1000 萬，無論如何，2500 萬 MAU，您認為提高滲透率的障礙是什麼？我知道它很高，40%。但我認為考慮到價值支撐和活動的頻率，這可能會達到 60%，可能是長期的 70%。那麼，為了提高滲透率，您必須解決的最大問題是什麼？

And then any quick updated comments on Prop 22? And I know there was the AG reversed or challenged the judge's decision earlier this month. Any updated thoughts on how that's going to play out or when we'll know.

然後對 22 號提案有任何快速更新的評論嗎？我知道本月早些時候，總檢察長推翻或質疑了法官的決定。關於這將如何發揮作用或我們何時知道的任何更新想法。

Yes. Prabir, do you want to take the first?

是的。普拉比爾，你想拿第一嗎？

Yes. I think -- why don't I take the first one, and you take the second one. Okay. So Mark, on your question on the 10 million out of 40 million, yes, the 10 million was a milestone. We're happy with 40% of our MAUs. There's a lot of runway here, right? I mean, as you think about -- with 25 million MAUs, we're a small fraction of the U.S. population.

是的。我想——為什麼我不拿第一個，你拿第二個。好的。所以馬克，關於你關於 4000 萬中的 1000 萬的問題，是的，1000 萬是一個里程碑。我們對 40% 的 MAU 感到滿意。這裡有很多跑道，對吧？我的意思是，正如你所想的那樣——擁有 2500 萬月活躍用戶，我們只是美國人口的一小部分。

Now add in the other countries we operate in, whether it's Canada, Australia, Japan, Germany, and we have access to over 500 million people, right? And so in the context of that 500 million people, I mean even if you adjust for that for adults and so on, the 10 million membership size is a small fraction. So the path to get there is going to be back to the basics of selection, quality and affordability. So in selection, as we keep adding these new categories and new stores into these neighborhoods, that cross-sell percentage, the 14% will start creeping up, and order frequency in these new verticals will increase.

現在加上我們經營的其他國家，無論是加拿大、澳大利亞、日本、德國，我們都可以接觸到超過 5 億人，對嗎？因此，在這 5 億人的背景下，我的意思是，即使您針對成年人等進行調整，1000 萬會員規模也只是一小部分。因此，實現這一目標的途徑將回到選擇、質量和可負擔性的基礎上。因此，在選擇方面，隨著我們不斷將這些新類別和新商店添加到這些社區，交叉銷售百分比將開始上升，14% 將開始攀升，這些新垂直領域的訂單頻率將增加。

Remember the point I made earlier about purchase behavior on our platform ultimately mimicking or reflecting how human beings operate in their daily lives. So over time, as that order frequency increases, the savings opportunity increases, and DashPass starts making sense. So even if it's someone that doesn't order enough restaurant delivery today, over time, DashPass may end up making sense for them because they use DashPass to order their convenience goods, or their grocery goods or their liquid purchases or their pet food or retail and so on and so forth.

請記住我之前關於我們平台上的購買行為最終模仿或反映人類在日常生活中的運作方式的觀點。因此，隨著時間的推移，隨著訂單頻率的增加，節省的機會也會增加，而 DashPass 開始變得有意義。因此，即使有人今天沒有訂購足夠的餐廳外賣，隨著時間的推移，DashPass 最終可能對他們有意義，因為他們使用 DashPass 訂購便利商品、雜貨或液體購買、寵物食品或零售等等等等。

So there's opportunity in that front and there's opportunity for -- to continue improving quality. Today, we've made consistent improvements, but still a reasonable number of deliveries are defective. And so we've got a bunch of work to do to make the product reliable 100% of the time so that if you're a DashPass member, the experience truly feels special.

因此，在這方面有機會，並且有機會 - 繼續提高質量。今天，我們進行了持續改進，但仍有合理數量的交付存在缺陷。因此，我們有很多工作要做，以使產品 100% 可靠，因此，如果您是 DashPass 會員，體驗真的很特別。

Mark, with respect to your second question on Prop 22, nothing has changed. I mean, we still think we're absolutely right on the law here. In fact, I think even the California Attorney General has supported us in this regard that 58% to 59% of the state population and voting population are saying that they pass something into law, that, that should be legalized. I think it's just common sense that that's the right legal answer.

馬克，關於你關於 22 號提案的第二個問題，沒有任何改變。我的意思是，我們仍然認為我們在這裡的法律是絕對正確的。事實上，我認為即使是加州總檢察長也在這方面支持我們，58% 到 59% 的州人口和投票人口說他們通過了一些法律，這應該合法化。我認為這是正確的法律答案只是常識。

But I think even more importantly than this, just more broadly speaking, we feel the same way about this issue anywhere in the sense that drivers in this type of economy ought to be able to pick wherever they want to work, whenever they want to work, and that flexibility is critical. I mean that's where Prop 22 stands for, while giving them the protections that they deserve. And we, whether it's in the state of California or, frankly, any geography globally, that's what we stand for, which is to support the Dasher. And the voters of California believe in this, the drivers believe in this and the California Attorney General believes in this.

但我認為比這更重要的是，更廣泛地說，我們對這個問題在任何地方都有同樣的看法，因為這種經濟類型的司機應該能夠選擇他們想工作的地方，無論何時他們想工作，而這種靈活性至關重要。我的意思是這就是 Prop 22 所代表的地方，同時給予他們應得的保護。而我們，無論是在加利福尼亞州，還是坦率地說，在全球任何地區，這都是我們所代表的，即支持 Dasher。加州的選民相信這一點，司機們相信這一點，加州總檢察長也相信這一點。

Your next question comes from the line of Brad Erickson with RBC Capital Markets.

您的下一個問題來自 RBC Capital Markets 的 Brad Erickson。

Just a couple, I guess. First, between the different categories, all the different categories you have going here in the U.S. and then obviously, Wolt coming on here later this year, hopefully, and then Canada and Australia, does all of that expansion, I guess, right in front of you probably keep you from, say, exploring other international expansion? Or should we assume other markets are sort of always under exploration?

我猜只有一對。首先，在不同的類別之間，你在美國的所有不同類別，然後很明顯，沃爾特今年晚些時候來到這裡，希望如此，然後是加拿大和澳大利亞，我猜，所有的擴張都在前面你們中的一些人可能會阻止你們，比如說，探索其他國際擴張？或者我們應該假設其他市場總是在探索中？

And then second, you think about the regulatory work likely to occur, if not -- in the future, if not already in your -- a lot of these international markets. Talk about just kind of how prepared you feel you are in terms of personnel and the associated expense necessary to kind of support those works and hopefully, constructive dialogues.

其次，您考慮可能會發生的監管工作，如果不是 - 在未來，如果不是已經在您的 - 很多這些國際市場。談談您在人員方面的準備情況以及支持這些工作所需的相關費用，並希望進行建設性對話。

Yes, it's Tony. I'll take both of those questions. With respect to the first, I think you're certainly right in saying that we have quite a lot on our plates, and we're constantly, again, trying to invent the best possible products. And again, when you think about the portfolio of initiatives of U.S. restaurants, new categories or platform services, international markets and advertising, there's a lot of work to go around. So we always believe that we have to earn the right to serve customers in a second way by doing an excellent job in the first way. And so that's really what we're focused on.

是的，是托尼。我會回答這兩個問題。關於第一個，我認為你說我們的盤子裡有很多東西當然是正確的，而且我們一直在不斷地嘗試發明最好的產品。同樣，當您考慮美國餐館、新類別或平台服務、國際市場和廣告的舉措組合時，還有很多工作要做。所以我們始終認為，我們必須通過第一種方式的出色工作來贏得第二種方式為客戶服務的權利。這才是我們真正關注的重點。

But look, I mean, it doesn't mean that we're not scanning for opportunities. We're always looking for opportunities regardless, especially when we have such a robust core business that's producing positive cash flow, and with a very healthy balance sheet, it gives us lots of opportunities to be opportunistic and go on the offensive.

但是，我的意思是，這並不意味著我們沒有在尋找機會。無論如何，我們一直在尋找機會，特別是當我們擁有如此強大的核心業務，產生正現金流，並且資產負債表非常健康時，它為我們提供了很多機會主義和進攻的機會。

I think with respect to your second question around regulatory preparation, yes. I mean I think this has been something that's been a part of DoorDash really since 2013 when the company was founded. And this is -- these beliefs that we've had since day 1 of making sure that workers should be able to have this new standard where they get the flexibility that they're telling us over and over again with their words as well as with their feed, and also the protections that we believe they deserve. And frankly, just like expired -- outdated laws that deserve to be expired.

我認為關於你關於監管準備的第二個問題，是的。我的意思是，我認為自 2013 年公司成立以來，這一直是 DoorDash 的一部分。這就是我們從第一天開始就有的信念，即確保工人應該能夠擁有這個新標準，讓他們獲得他們一遍又一遍地用他們的言語和語言告訴我們的靈活性他們的飼料，以及我們認為他們應得的保護。坦率地說，就像過期的一樣——應該過期的過時法律。

And we think the productive way in doing this is that governments and businesses such as ourselves should work together across any geography to make sure that this actually happens from the perspective of the worker, not from any other perspective. And so that's what we're working really hard on, and we have best-in-class teams to get that work done.

我們認為，這樣做的有效方式是政府和像我們這樣的企業應該在任何地區共同努力，以確保從工人的角度而不是從任何其他角度真正做到這一點。這就是我們真正努力的方向，我們擁有一流的團隊來完成這項工作。

Your next question comes from the line of Brian Fitzgerald with Wells Fargo.

您的下一個問題來自富國銀行的 Brian Fitzgerald。

A couple of questions. On the marketplace side of things, nonrestaurant partners doubled '21. Clearly, you have a lot of runway there. And you have a focus on product market fit before scaling, but how do you think about ways to grow partners on a platform? And then any dynamics to call out with respect to the different commission points you launched earlier in '21, 15%, 25%, 30%, as cohorts of partners experience or use that model, or are they moving up to the different commission points.

幾個問題。在市場方面，非餐廳合作夥伴在 21 年翻了一番。顯然，那裡有很多跑道。在擴展之前，您會關注產品市場契合度，但是您如何考慮在平台上發展合作夥伴的方法？然後是關於您在 21 年早些時候推出的不同佣金點的任何動態，15%、25%、30%，因為合作夥伴群體體驗或使用該模型，或者他們是否正在提升到不同的佣金點.

Yes. I'll take the first question, and maybe Prabir can take the second on the kind of different tiers of commission points. With respect to the first, of adding more selection in these new categories, a lot of it is just doing the work quite candidly. I think what has been really attractive to all of these customers is, well, I mean look at what we're bringing. We're bringing the largest on-demand audience for local commerce that has the highest frequency of shopping. That's an incremental use case, both from their physical activities, their own digital activities and other -- any other previous digital partnerships that they've signed. And so as a result of that, actually, we're seeing quite a lot of excitement where people are starting to think of DoorDash not just as lunch and dinner, but really everything inside the neighborhood. So we're actually seeing quite a lot of progress.

是的。我會回答第一個問題，也許 Prabir 可以就不同等級的佣金點回答第二個問題。關於第一，在這些新的類別中增加更多的選擇，很多只是坦誠地做著工作。我認為對所有這些客戶真正有吸引力的是，我的意思是看看我們帶來了什麼。我們正在為購物頻率最高的本地商業帶來最大的按需受眾。這是一個增量用例，包括他們的身體活動、他們自己的數字活動和其他——他們之前簽署的任何其他數字合作夥伴關係。因此，實際上，我們看到了很多令人興奮的地方，人們開始認為 DoorDash 不僅僅是午餐和晚餐，而是社區內的所有東西。所以我們實際上看到了很大的進步。

And -- but that doesn't mean that there isn't work to be done. I mean, we have to build a lot of products now that make sense for categories outside of restaurants, right? Everything from the catalog to the in-store shopping process to how we think about customer support to think about how do we support people not just again on our channel, but also their own channel. So there's a lot of work to be done. But I would say that the excitement from partners has been tremendous. I think some of those names you've seen in the press and things like this, and we expect adding a lot more partners to come.

而且——但這並不意味著沒有工作要做。我的意思是，我們現在必須製造很多對餐廳以外的類別有意義的產品，對吧？從目錄到店內購物流程，再到我們如何考慮客戶支持，再到考慮我們如何不僅在我們的渠道上再次為人們提供支持，而且在他們自己的渠道上支持他們。所以有很多工作要做。但我想說，合作夥伴的興奮是巨大的。我認為您在媒體上看到的一些名字以及類似的事情，我們預計會增加更多的合作夥伴。

Brian, on the question about the pricing tiers. Just as a reminder, this was aimed at SMB restaurants, not larger restaurants and predominantly, those that are coming through our self-serve channel. So a small fraction of those have actually opted in to the pricing tiers versus the prior pricing. And of the number there that opted in, the majority have picked the 2 higher tiers, which was in line with what we expected and kind of makes sense given the value that we drive at the higher pricing tiers.

Brian，關於定價層的問題。提醒一下，這針對的是 SMB 餐廳，而不是大型餐廳，主要是那些通過我們的自助渠道進入的餐廳。因此，其中一小部分實際上選擇了定價層而不是先前的定價。在選擇加入的人數中，大多數人選擇了 2 個更高的層級，這符合我們的預期，並且考慮到我們在更高定價層級驅動的價值，這是有道理的。

Your next question comes from the line of Jim Sanderson with Northcoast Research.

您的下一個問題來自 Northcoast Research 的 Jim Sanderson。

Just wanted to follow up a little bit more on DashPass, and wondering if you could help us to understand how the new DashPass members were recruited. If this is primarily through credit card marketing programs. And then going forward, as you try to expand these types of programs internationally, if your client acquisition strategy for DashPass is going to have to adjust away from credit cards. Just a little bit more texture on how that growth has developed.

只是想進一步了解 DashPass，並想知道您是否可以幫助我們了解新 DashPass 成員是如何招募的。如果這主要是通過信用卡營銷計劃。再往前走，當你試圖在國際上擴展這些類型的項目時，如果你的 DashPass 客戶獲取策略將不得不調整遠離信用卡。關於這種增長如何發展的更多信息。

The vast majority of the DashPass members are through our own channels, and the minority are through credit card channels.

DashPass 會員絕大多數是通過我們自己的渠道，少數是通過信用卡渠道。

And then are the percentage or share of DashPass members that pay full membership, is that changing over time?

然後是支付正式會員費用的 DashPass 會員的百分比或份額，是否會隨著時間而變化？

No, it's relatively consistent. But again, it depends on -- you'll remember that one of the ways we get people activated on DashPass is through a free trial period. So depending on the intensity of our marketing efforts, that free -- the trial versus paid mix changes, but they are fairly consistent.

不，它是相對一致的。但同樣，這取決於 - 你會記得我們讓人們在 DashPass 上激活的方法之一是通過免費試用期。因此，根據我們營銷工作的強度，免費 - 試用與付費組合會發生變化，但它們相當一致。

There are no further questions. This does conclude today's conference call, and thank you for your participation. You may now disconnect.

沒有進一步的問題。今天的電話會議到此結束，感謝您的參與。您現在可以斷開連接。