DoorDash Inc (DASH) 2022 Q2 法說會逐字稿

Good afternoon, and welcome to the DoorDash Quarter 2, 2022 Earnings Call. (Operator Instructions) And finally, I would like to advise all participants that this call is being recorded. Thank you.

下午好，歡迎來到 DoorDash 2022 年第 2 季度財報電話會議。 （操作員說明）最後，我想通知所有參與者，這個電話正在被錄音。謝謝你。

I would now like to hand over to Andy Hargreaves, Vice President, Finance and Investor Relations. Andy, please begin your call.

我現在想向財務和投資者關係副總裁安迪·哈格里夫斯 (Andy Hargreaves) 轉交。安迪，請開始你的通話。

Thank you very much. Good afternoon, and thanks, everybody, for joining us on our second quarter 2022 earnings call. I'm pleased to be joined today by Co-Founder, Chair and CEO, Tony Xu; and CFO, Prabir Adarkar. We'll be making forward-looking statements during today's call, including our expectations of our business and the Wolt business following our acquisition the macro academic environment, financial position and operating performance, our market and local commerce opportunities, future financial results and guidance, our strategies and investment approach. Forward-looking statements are subject to risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially from those described, and some risks are described in our risk factors including in our SEC filings, including Form 10-K and 10-Qs. You should not rely on our forward-looking statements as predictions of future events. We disclaim any obligation to update any forward-looking statements, except as required by law.

非常感謝。下午好，感謝大家加入我們的 2022 年第二季度財報電話會議。我很高興今天有聯合創始人、董事長兼首席執行官 Tony Xu 加入；和首席財務官 Prabir Adarkar。我們將在今天的電話會議中做出前瞻性陳述，包括我們在收購宏觀學術環境、財務狀況和經營業績、我們的市場和當地商業機會、未來財務業績和指導後對我們的業務和 Wolt 業務的預期，我們的策略和投資方法。前瞻性陳述受風險和不確定性的影響，可能導致實際結果與所描述的結果大不相同，我們的風險因素中描述了一些風險，包括我們提交給美國證券交易委員會的文件，包括表格 10-K 和 10-Q。您不應依賴我們的前瞻性陳述作為對未來事件的預測。除法律要求外，我們不承擔更新任何前瞻性陳述的義務。

During this call, we will also discuss certain non-GAAP financial measures. Information regarding our non-GAAP financial results, including a reconciliation of non-GAAP results to the most directly comparable GAAP financial measures may be found in our investor letter, which is available on our IR website. These non-GAAP measures should be considered in addition to our GAAP results and are not intended to be a substitute for our GAAP results.

在本次電話會議中，我們還將討論某些非公認會計原則的財務措施。有關我們的非 GAAP 財務結果的信息，包括非 GAAP 結果與最直接可比的 GAAP 財務指標的對賬，可以在我們的投資者信函中找到，該信函可在我們的 IR 網站上找到。除了我們的 GAAP 結果之外，還應考慮這些非 GAAP 措施，並且不能替代我們的 GAAP 結果。

Finally, this call in its entirety is being audio webcast on our IR website. An audio replay of the call will be available on our website shortly after the call ends. As in previous quarters, we'll go straight to questions. So with that, operator, please go ahead and take the first question.

最後，整個電話會議正在我們的 IR 網站上進行音頻網絡直播。通話結束後不久，我們的網站將提供通話的音頻重播。與前幾個季度一樣，我們將直接提出問題。因此，接線員，請繼續回答第一個問題。

(Operator Instructions) And your first question today comes from the line of Deepak Mathivanan from Wolfe Research.

（操作員說明）您今天的第一個問題來自 Wolfe Research 的 Deepak Mathivanan。

Maybe one for Tony and one for Prabir. Tony, given the state of the market and kind of competition, it feels like at least some levels of incentives has come out of the system. Maybe perhaps from smaller players in kind of niche categories. Can you talk about whether you're seeing any benefits from favorable operating environment, either on frequency or kind of customer acquisition right now?

也許一個給托尼，一個給普拉比爾。托尼，考慮到市場狀況和競爭類型，感覺至少有一定程度的激勵措施已經從系統中出來了。也許可能來自利基類別中的較小參與者。您能否談談您是否從有利的運營環境中看到了任何好處，無論是頻率還是客戶獲取類型？

And then maybe, Prabir, I know you don't want to guide for 2023 specifically yet. But maybe how should we think conceptually about the 2023 EBITDA band. As your profit ports become larger, do you still see kind of big investment areas that would maybe keep the profit bands at these levels? Or can it gradually edge up?

然後也許，Prabir，我知道你還不想專門指導 2023 年。但也許我們應該如何從概念上考慮 2023 年 EBITDA 波段。隨著您的利潤端口變得更大，您是否仍然看到可能將利潤範圍保持在這些水平的大型投資領域？還是可以逐漸上升？

Deepak, it's Tony. Yes. Look, on the first question, our business has been always very competitive ever since we founded the company 9 years ago. And I think that what's been very impressive to us is just how resilient our business has been, both in light of competitive activities, both recent and in the years that we've been building DoorDash, as well as just the macro environment as we do see some consumer spending softening, but largely, we've been not impacted by that downward pressure.

迪帕克，是托尼。是的。看，關於第一個問題，自從我們 9 年前成立公司以來，我們的業務一直非常具有競爭力。我認為給我們留下深刻印象的是我們的業務有多麼有彈性，無論是最近還是我們一直在構建 DoorDash 的競爭活動，以及我們所做的宏觀環境看到一些消費者支出走軟，但在很大程度上，我們沒有受到這種下行壓力的影響。

I really think that you see a lot of kind of the premise of your question reflected in our results. I mean, this is a quarter in which we beat top line as well as in bottom line, we grew results 25% GOV year-on-year and we beat quite handedly on the bottom line as well. And this is on top of a lot of the types of things that we're investing in. One that I will call out is that while we're not seeing any elevated pressures from certain types of incentives from competitors, what we are doing is we are taking care of our audiences.

我真的認為您在我們的結果中看到了很多問題的前提。我的意思是，這是我們在利潤和利潤上都超過了的一個季度，我們的業績同比增長了 25%，而且我們在利潤上也非常順利。這是我們正在投資的許多類型的事情之上。我要指出的是，雖然我們沒有看到來自競爭對手的某些類型的激勵措施帶來任何升高的壓力，但我們正在做的是我們正在照顧我們的觀眾。

We invested over $40 million alone in the second quarter just to make sure that the Dashers who are on the road doing the hard work, can keep the profits that they expect to keep given some of the rising cost of fuel. And so we're not seeing any of the elevated pressures. We're seeing fairly normal activity on that side. And I think, as a result, given our industry-leading retention and order frequency, you continue to see our growth and our share gains.

我們僅在第二季度就投資了超過 4000 萬美元，只是為了確保在路上努力工作的 Dashers 能夠在燃料成本不斷上漲的情況下保持他們期望保持的利潤。所以我們沒有看到任何升高的壓力。我們在那邊看到相當正常的活動。因此，我認為，鑑於我們行業領先的保留率和訂單頻率，您將繼續看到我們的增長和我們的份額增長。

Yes. And Deepak, on your second question around 2023, we're not providing quantitative 2023 guidance today. We will provide '23 guidance when we report Q4, which is on our normal cycle, but I will provide some sort of thematic context. The first thing I'd say is going into '23, we do expect our core U.S. restaurant business to grow and increase its contribution profit. At current course and speed, we plan to increase annual EBITDA by a modest amount. But note that this is after absorbing a full year of Wolt. So said differently, core DoorDash Wolt will expand into 2023, even though the consolidated EBITDA won't grow meaningfully. And the only caveat we'll make to this is just a change if we identify attractive growth opportunities, we continue to remain in investment mode and look for these opportunities that benefit our retention and order frequency. But at current course of speed, we would expect annual EBITDA to grow by a modest amount.

是的。迪帕克，關於 2023 年左右的第二個問題，我們今天不提供 2023 年的量化指導。當我們報告第四季度時，我們將提供 '23 指導，這是我們的正常週期，但我將提供某種主題背景。我要說的第一件事是進入 23 年，我們確實希望我們的核心美國餐廳業務能夠增長並增加其貢獻利潤。按照目前的進程和速度，我們計劃適度增加年度 EBITDA。但請注意，這是在吸收了一整年的 Wolt 之後。換種說法，核心 DoorDash Wolt 將擴展到 2023 年，即使合併後的 EBITDA 不會顯著增長。如果我們發現有吸引力的增長機會，我們將對此做出的唯一警告只是改變，我們將繼續保持投資模式並尋找這些有利於我們的保留和訂單頻率的機會。但按照目前的速度，我們預計年度 EBITDA 將適度增長。

Your next question comes of the line of Lloyd Walmsley from UBS.

您的下一個問題來自瑞銀的 Lloyd Walmsley。

Two, if I can. In the letter, you guys talked about being a logistics led marketplace, I guess, how much room do you all see over the next few years to reduce cost per order? What are some of the key drivers to kind of get there? And like where is the lowest hanging fruit?

二，如果可以的話。在信中，你們談到了成為一個以物流為主導的市場，我想，你們都認為未來幾年降低單筆訂單成本的空間有多大？到達那裡的一些關鍵驅動因素是什麼？就像最低的果實在哪裡？

And then second one would just be you've talked in the past about how you don't try to beat EBITDA, you really try to kind of come in, in the range. And if you beat it, it's because there just weren't attractive investment -- like was there like something changing in the marketing landscape or any reason you guys let it flow through or just a function of some of the kind of inflation coming through as a surprise and you didn't have time to reinvest it. Anything you can share there would be great.

然後第二個就是你過去曾談到你如何不試圖擊敗 EBITDA，你真的試圖在這個範圍內進入。如果你打敗了它，那是因為沒有有吸引力的投資——比如營銷環境是否發生了變化，或者你們讓它通過的任何原因，或者只是某種通貨膨脹的函數一個驚喜，你沒有時間再投資它。你可以在那里分享的任何東西都會很棒。

Lloyd, it's Tony. I'll take the first question and maybe Prabir can take the second part of the question. With respect to efficiency gains from logistics. I think this has been a hallmark of the DoorDash story and also of the Wolt story now that we've officially closed that partnership, in which if you think about the game that we're playing or the business that we're in, we're really in the game of building a minimum-efficient scale business. That's the type of business when you're talking about a hyper local business where order density is the most important metric. And in order to achieve that, you kind of have to do 2 things. One of the things you talked about in your question, which is really around high-quality logistics efficiency. And the other is high-quality retention and order behavior from customers without discounting and that sort of activity.

勞埃德，是托尼。我會回答第一個問題，也許 Prabir 可以回答問題的第二部分。關於物流的效率收益。我認為這一直是 DoorDash 故事和 Wolt 故事的一個標誌，因為我們已經正式結束了這種合作關係，如果你想想我們正在玩的遊戲或我們從事的業務，我們'真的是在建立一個最低效率的規模業務。當您談論訂單密度是最重要指標的超本地業務時，這就是這種業務類型。為了實現這一點，你必須做兩件事。您在問題中談到的一件事，實際上是圍繞高質量的物流效率。另一個是客戶的高質量保留和訂單行為，沒有打折等活動。

And DoorDash has really achieved both. And on the part around gaining extra logistics efficiency, we continue to find areas of opportunity. I mean, we've certainly been leaders in our space up to this point. But I still see massive room to keep increasing the selection on our platform and improve the logistics quality on our platform, the affordability of our service and certainly, our customer service levels. On logistics more specifically, whether it's working on efficiency improvements at the store as well as how we think about how we ought to assign orders, especially now that we're entering multiple categories of deliveries in addition to restaurant deliveries, I think there's a long room to go, and we're seeing that both in our numbers in the most recent quarter as well as in the quarters leading up to this point.

而 DoorDash 確實做到了這兩點。在提高物流效率方面，我們繼續尋找機會領域。我的意思是，到目前為止，我們肯定是我們領域的領導者。但我仍然看到巨大的空間來繼續增加我們平台上的選擇，提高我們平台上的物流質量、我們服務的可負擔性，當然還有我們的客戶服務水平。更具體地說，在物流方面，無論是提高商店的效率，還是我們如何考慮我們應該如何分配訂單，尤其是現在我們除了餐廳送貨外，還輸入了多個類別的送貨，我認為還有很長的時間還有很大的空間，我們在最近一個季度的數據以及截至目前的季度數據中都看到了這一點。

And Lloyd, on the second part of your question. First, I'll talk about Q2 and then I'll talk about sort of general philosophy. In terms of the Q2 performance and EBITDA, it was really a matter of 2 factors. The first is subtotals as we described in the letter as a result of consumer price inflation, our sub totals were higher because of higher item prices. And that then translates into higher commission dollars as well as higher service fees, both of which benefited revenue and drop through to EBITDA. So that's what drove the upside in Q2 in terms of EBITDA.

Lloyd，關於你問題的第二部分。首先，我會談談第二季度，然後我會談談一般哲學。就第二季度的業績和 EBITDA 而言，這實際上是兩個因素的問題。第一個是小計，正如我們在信中所描述的，由於消費價格上漲，我們的小計更高，因為項目價格更高。然後轉化為更高的佣金和更高的服務費，這兩者都使收入受益並下降到 EBITDA。這就是推動第二季度 EBITDA 上漲的原因。

In terms of general philosophy, I'd say EBITDA is a function of really 2 things. First, it's the margin expansion that we continue to drive in our U.S. restaurant business. That's one. And the second is the level of investment we make which is discretionary, by the way, the level investment we make in our new verticals and in our international businesses. That level of investment varies from quarter-to-quarter based on the signals we see. And you can see that volatility in our historical trends where some quarters will produce more EBITDA than others because depending on what we see in terms of retention and order frequency, we might invest more or less. And so our EBITDA range is really meant as a guardrail, but where we land within that range based depending on the level of investment.

就一般哲學而言，我會說 EBITDA 是真正的兩件事的函數。首先，這是我們在美國餐飲業務中繼續推動的利潤率擴張。那是一個。第二個是我們進行的投資水平，順便說一下，我們在新的垂直領域和國際業務中進行的投資水平。根據我們看到的信號，這種投資水平因季度而異。您可以看到我們歷史趨勢的波動性，其中某些季度產生的 EBITDA 會比其他季度更多，因為根據我們在保留率和訂單頻率方面看到的情況，我們可能會或多或少地投資。因此，我們的 EBITDA 範圍實際上是一種護欄，但我們在該範圍內的位置取決於投資水平。

Your next question comes from the line of Youssef Squali from Truist Securities.

您的下一個問題來自 Truist Securities 的 Youssef Squali。

Congrats on a really impressive quarter, all things considered. My question is around Wolt contribution. Can you maybe speak to the contribution that you are baking in into the 2022 top and bottom line, how do you think about growth there considering kind of what's going on in Europe? And just broadly speaking, maybe Tony, can you address the issue about how do you kind of take kind of a relatively subscale business in Europe that's across multiple geographies and kind of grow it meaningfully for it to become a big part of the business. Your position in the U.S. has been quite the opposite. You've been market leader, market dominant in the single market. So any help there would be great.

恭喜你取得了令人印象深刻的季度，考慮到所有因素。我的問題是關於 Wolt 的貢獻。您能否談談您對 2022 年收入和利潤的貢獻？考慮到歐洲正在發生的事情，您如何看待那裡的增長？從廣義上講，也許托尼，您能否解決一個問題，即您如何在歐洲開展一種跨越多個地區的相對較小規模的業務，並使其有意義地發展，使其成為業務的重要組成部分。你在美國的情況正好相反。你一直是市場領導者，在單一市場中佔據主導地位。所以那裡的任何幫助都會很棒。

Maybe I'll start and then Tony can chime in. I mean the Wolt business grew over 50% year-on-year, and that's in stark contrast to what we've seen with other companies that operate in the similar geographic region. And really, it all comes back down to 2 things. The fundamentals of the Wolt business in terms of its industry-leading retention and growing order frequency. And what we've seen is as long as you create a product that has high retention and order frequency, ultimately translates into better growth because you're retaining your customers better and that benefit compounds versus alternatives where you end up losing customers because of poor retention.

也許我會開始，然後托尼可以插話。我的意思是 Wolt 業務同比增長超過 50%，這與我們在類似地理區域運營的其他公司所看到的形成鮮明對比。真的，這一切都歸結為兩件事。 Wolt 業務在其行業領先的保留率和不斷增長的訂單頻率方面的基本面。我們所看到的是，只要您創造出具有高保留率和訂單頻率的產品，最終會轉化為更好的增長，因為您可以更好地留住您的客戶，並且與您最終因糟糕而失去客戶的替代品相比，這有利於復合保留。

And where we're at in terms of the investment cycle, the Wolt markets are relatively new, both in terms of merchant adoption as well as user adoption. As an example, even in its oldest markets, adoption levels are less than 10% of the population. And that says, there's a lot of room to grow just as you grow your footprint within these countries as well as you go to the merchant selection and grow the consumer base. And so that's driving the investment we're making. We'll continue investing as long as we see strong signal on retention and order frequency.

在投資週期方面，Wolt 市場相對較新，無論是在商家採用率還是用戶採用率方面。例如，即使在其最古老的市場，採用率也不到人口的 10%。這就是說，正如您在這些國家/地區擴大足跡以及進入商家選擇並擴大消費者群一樣，還有很大的增長空間。所以這推動了我們正在進行的投資。只要我們看到保留率和訂單頻率的強烈信號，我們就會繼續投資。

Yes. And on the second part of the question, I think it's important to start with maybe some historical context and go down memory lane not just a few years ago, DoorDash was certainly not the market leader. And DoorDash especially 5, 6 years ago was quite capital constrained relative to any of its peers by a pretty far margin. And so how was it possible that a "subscale" company was able to rise to market leadership. Well, it really was mastering the order level execution of the business. And again, this is a hyper local business for order density and achieving minimum efficient scale through leading retention order frequency, which is really measured in whether or not you built a superior product of selection quality, price and service.

是的。關於問題的第二部分，我認為重要的是從一些歷史背景開始，沿著記憶之路走下去，而不僅僅是幾年前，DoorDash 肯定不是市場領導者。與任何同行相比，DoorDash 尤其是 5、6 年前的資本受到了相當大的限制。那麼，一家“小規模”公司怎麼可能成為市場領導者。嗯，它確實是掌握了業務的訂單級執行。再一次，這是一個超本地化的業務，通過領先的保留訂單頻率來實現訂單密度和實現最低有效規模，這實際上取決於您是否構建了選擇質量、價格和服務的卓越產品。

And then on the other end, whether or not you have the most capital-efficient logistics operations. And I think when I look at the elements that caused DoorDash to rise to market leadership, I find very similar kind of characteristics in the Wolt business, which is what excited us about the business not only today, as Prabir mentioned, far outgrowing some of their European peers. But maybe much more excited are we in their potential? Because when I compare the foundation of what they've built, and I look at the opportunity ahead of them, I mean, even in their oldest markets, Wolt is less than 10% penetrated. On a global basis, both DoorDash and Wolt in our non-U.S. markets are less than 5% of restaurant sales and outside of restaurants, less than 1% of nonfood spend. And so when I compare the foundation that Wolt has built on one hand. And on the other hand, compared it to the opportunity ahead, it's exactly what Prabir said, which is that it's absolutely the right time to invest. And I think you already see evidence of this as Wolt has become a market leader in many of their markets already.

另一方面，無論您是否擁有最具資本效率的物流運營。而且我認為，當我查看導致 DoorDash 成為市場領導者的因素時，我發現 Wolt 業務具有非常相似的特徵，正如 Prabir 所提到的，這不僅讓我們對這項業務感到興奮，而且遠遠超過了一些他們的歐洲同行。但也許我們更興奮的是他們的潛力？因為當我比較他們所建立的基礎，並看到他們面前的機會時，我的意思是，即使在他們最古老的市場中，Wolt 的滲透率也不到 10%。在全球範圍內，DoorDash 和 Wolt 在我們非美國市場的銷售額均不到餐廳銷售額的 5%，而在餐廳以外，則不到非食品支出的 1%。因此，當我比較 Wolt 一方面建立的基礎時。另一方面，將其與未來的機會進行比較，這正是 Prabir 所說的，這絕對是投資的正確時機。我認為你已經看到了這方面的證據，因為 Wolt 已經成為他們許多市場的市場領導者。

That's great. And Prabir, did you quantify the contribution to that $51 billion to $53 billion in GOV from Wolt.

那太棒了。 Prabir，您是否量化了 Wolt 對 GOV 的 510 億至 530 億美元的貢獻。

We don't break out the guidance between Wolt and DoorDash, but when we do report earnings, we will split out organic versus Wolt's contribution.

我們沒有打破 Wolt 和 DoorDash 之間的指導，但是當我們報告收益時，我們將區分有機貢獻和 Wolt 的貢獻。

Your next question comes from the line of Bernie McTernan from Needham.

您的下一個問題來自 Needham 的 Bernie McTernan。

We've noticed a lot of grocers in the marketplace doing delivery and online ordering in-house in addition to being opened up to third-party marketplaces like yourself. So they're a competitor but also a partner. Can you talk about some of the advantages that you have for customer acquisition and retention relative to them? And then also with the 50% growth in Wolt this past quarter for GOV, 50% higher probably than some of the other European delivery operators. Can you just remind us whether it's market growth or just pure market share gains in terms of what's driving this growth?

我們注意到市場上的許多雜貨商除了向像您這樣的第三方市場開放外，還在內部進行送貨和在線訂購。所以他們是競爭對手，也是合作夥伴。您能談談您在獲取和保留客戶方面相對於他們的一些優勢嗎？此外，在上個季度，GOV 的 Wolt 增長了 50%，可能比其他一些歐洲交付運營商高出 50%。您能否提醒我們是市場增長還是純粹的市場份額增長，是什麼推動了這種增長？

Sure. Maybe I'll take the first question, and I'll let Prabir take the second question. So I'm not sure this touches exactly the spirit of your question, but we view all merchants, including grocers as partners. I mean if you think about the mission of the company, is to, on one hand, build the largest local commerce marketplace, where we're driving incremental demand to all of these retailers, whether they be restaurants, grocers, convenience stores, other types of retail stores. And then on the other hand, build the largest local commerce platform where we give the tools, whether it's logistics as a service in the form of DoorDash drive or ordering of the service in the form of DoorDash Storefront all of these retailers so that they can build their own digital operations. So we really view in equal parts, our mission to help grow on one hand, which is to bring that incremental demand. And on the other hand, empower them to do it on their own.

當然。也許我會回答第一個問題，我會讓 Prabir 回答第二個問題。因此，我不確定這是否完全符合您的問題的精神，但我們將包括雜貨商在內的所有商家視為合作夥伴。我的意思是，如果您考慮公司的使命，一方面是建立最大的本地商業市場，我們正在推動所有這些零售商的增量需求，無論是餐館、雜貨店、便利店還是其他零售店的類型。然後另一方面，建立最大的本地商業平台，我們提供工具，無論是以 DoorDash 驅動器形式的物流即服務，還是以 DoorDash Storefront 形式的服務訂購，所有這些零售商都可以建立自己的數字業務。因此，我們確實平等地看待我們的使命，一方面是幫助增長，即帶來增量需求。另一方面，授權他們自己做。

In fact, we see these customers on these different channels to be quite different. I mean if you think about it, if a customer is quite used to and knows exactly what they want to order from a particular retailer, it probably makes quite a lot of sense for them on that occasion to actually order directly from the retailer. But on the greatest privilege that we have in this business is that people eat 20 to 25 times a week, and they shop even more times than that on top of that when you consider their nonfood spend. And so for other occasions, maybe when they're not exactly sure what it is that they're looking for, but they want to buy something from the neighborhood, that's where the DoorDash marketplace really comes in hand. And so we really view the retailer, the merchants, whether it's a grocer or other type of store as our partner, and we have 2 ways in which we help them.

事實上，我們看到這些不同渠道上的這些客戶大相徑庭。我的意思是，如果您考慮一下，如果客戶非常習慣並且確切地知道他們想從特定零售商那裡訂購什麼，那麼他們在那種情況下直接從零售商那裡實際訂購可能很有意義。但我們在這項業務中擁有的最大特權是人們每週吃 20 到 25 次，而且當你考慮到他們的非食品支出時，他們購物的次數甚至更多。所以對於其他場合，也許當他們不確定他們在尋找什麼，但他們想從附近購買東西時，這就是 DoorDash 市場真正發揮作用的地方。因此，我們真正將零售商、商家，無論是雜貨店還是其他類型的商店視為我們的合作夥伴，我們有兩種方式可以幫助他們。

And Bernie, on your second question around GOVs growth, it's really driven by 2 things. It's MAU growth that was aided by some customer acquisition, but also by just by higher retention compared to the other players in the market. And then second, order frequency growth, as Wolt brings on more selection, both in the restaurant as well as the non-restaurant category. We're seeing some of the same things that we saw in the U.S. where order frequency at a cohort level has continued to grow. And both of those things, particularly in the face of some of the more extreme COVID reversion version that you saw in Europe have led to the 50% year-on-year growth that you cited.

伯尼，關於 GOV 增長的第二個問題，它實際上是由兩件事驅動的。 MAU 增長得益於一些客戶獲取，但也得益於與市場上其他參與者相比更高的保留率。其次，訂單頻率增長，因為 Wolt 在餐廳和非餐廳類別中都帶來了更多選擇。我們看到了一些與在美國看到的相同的情況，在美國，隊列級別的訂單頻率持續增長。這兩件事，特別是面對你在歐洲看到的一些更極端的 COVID 回歸版本，導致你提到的同比增長 50%。

Your next question comes from the line of Brian Nowak from Morgan Stanley.

您的下一個問題來自摩根士丹利的 Brian Nowak。

I have 2. Just the first one, the gross margins in the quarter were a little weaker than we thought, at least. Could you just sort of talk to us about some of the puts and takes on gross margins of the business? And how should we think about the gross margins of the Wolt business sort of going into the back half and maybe even longer term 2023.

我有 2 個。至少是第一個，本季度的毛利率比我們想像的要弱一些。您能否與我們談談該業務的一些看跌期權和毛利率？以及我們應該如何考慮 Wolt 業務的毛利率進入後半部分，甚至可能是 2023 年的更長期。

Brian, it's Prabir. Let me start on both of your questions. So first, our cost of sales increase that we saw on a year-on-year basis was only driven by 2 things: the DashMart and insurance costs. on DashMart, as we've launched more and more DashMart, the costs associated with those orders impacts cost of sales. So roughly half of the increase in cost of sales as a percentage of GOV is driven by DashMart. The other half roughly is driven by an increase in insurance costs, which was in line with our expectations. I'll point you to our comments from last quarter where we said, we experienced an increase in insurance reserves due to the outside impact of a few large claims. And we began to take actions to improve the safety on our platform starting last quarter. But it takes a while for these changes to reflect on our claims data. And so as we previously discussed, we expect insurance costs to increase in the near term.

布賴恩，是普拉比爾。讓我從你的兩個問題開始。首先，我們看到的銷售成本同比增長僅受兩件事驅動：DashMart 和保險成本。在 DashMart 上，隨著我們推出越來越多的 DashMart，與這些訂單相關的成本會影響銷售成本。因此，大約一半的銷售成本增加佔 GOV 的百分比是由 DashMart 驅動的。另一半大致是由保險成本增加推動的，這符合我們的預期。我將向您指出我們上個季度的評論，我們說，由於一些大額索賠的外部影響，我們經歷了保險準備金的增加。從上個季度開始，我們開始採取行動提高我們平台的安全性。但是這些變化需要一段時間才能反映在我們的索賠數據上。正如我們之前所討論的，我們預計短期內保險成本會增加。

On the whole note, both the DashMart cost increase as well as the insurance costs, is reflected in the guidance we've provided. And so it's not incremental to the guidance. So it's already reflected in that. In terms of gross margin for Wolt, really Wolt a combination of, as I view it, so 3 distinct pieces, there's investments that are going into Japan and Germany. These are brand-new markets that we launched less than 2 years ago were to get the flywheel going in terms of selection and quality and price. You've got investments in Wolt markets, which is the equivalent of our DashMart Wolt first-party distribution business. And then you've got the rest, what I call core food delivery. Core food delivery has had consistent increase in gross margin levels. And as we continue driving efficiency and order density at the local level, you start seeing the same type of efficiency in terms of Dashers costs kick in to produce increasing levels of gross margin. Japan and Germany and Wolt markets remain in investment mode and we continue to work on coverage selection quality and price side.

總的來說，DashMart 的成本增加和保險成本都反映在我們提供的指導中。因此，它不是對指導的增量。所以它已經反映在這方面了。就 Wolt 的毛利率而言，在我看來，Wolt 確實是三個不同部分的組合，有投資進入日本和德國。這些是我們在不到 2 年前推出的全新市場，旨在讓飛輪在選擇、質量和價格方面發揮作用。您在 Wolt 市場進行了投資，這相當於我們的 DashMart Wolt 第一方分銷業務。然後你就得到了剩下的，我稱之為核心食品配送。核心食品配送的毛利率水平持續增長。隨著我們繼續在地方層面提高效率和訂單密度，您開始看到在 Dashers 成本方面的相同類型的效率開始提高毛利率水平。日本和德國以及 Wolt 市場仍處於投資模式，我們將繼續致力於覆蓋選擇質量和價格方面。

Your next question comes from the line of Eric Sheridan from Goldman Sachs.

您的下一個問題來自高盛的 Eric Sheridan。

Maybe 2, if I can. First, Tony, I know you're talking a lot in the shareholder letter about not seeing anything yet on the consumer spending behavior patterns. But I think one of the questions we all get a lot from investors is, you're seeing some large companies already say how they would run their business differently, if the consumer spending environment did change. Is there any sense you can give us on how you're sort of game planning out different economic scenarios for the business and how you might change investment philosophies or growth philosophies for the company if you did hit a rougher patch in terms of consumer spending and went through the platform? And then maybe question on grocery and convenience at some of the new categories. Can you give us a little bit of sense of folks who use multiple products across the platform, what that might mean in terms of LTV how you're thinking about leaning in and promoting different category expansion on a per customer basis what that might do for the unit economics longer term?

也許2，如果可以的話。首先，托尼，我知道你在股東信中說了很多關於尚未看到任何關於消費者支出行為模式的信息。但我認為我們從投資者那裡得到的很多問題之一是，你會看到一些大公司已經表示，如果消費者支出環境確實發生了變化，他們將如何以不同的方式經營他們的業務。如果您確實在消費者支出和通過平台？然後可能會質疑一些新類別的雜貨和便利性。您能否讓我們了解一下跨平台使用多種產品的人，這在 LTV 方面可能意味著什麼，您如何考慮在每個客戶的基礎上傾斜和促進不同類別的擴展這可能會做什麼長期的單位經濟學？

Eric, it's Prabir. Maybe I'll start with the first one around how we're going to manage the business and EBITDA impact of growth versions and Tony can talk about the impact from some of the new categories. So maybe the first place to start is our core U.S. restaurant business is growing and continues to generate significant cash flow. And historically, we've taken that cash flow and invested the vast majority of it in order to grow our scale in the large and underpenetrated categories in which we operate. Again, as I said earlier, these investments are discretionary. And so that means the reason we're investing is because we continue to see strong signals of product market fit as well as improving unit economics.

埃里克，是普拉比爾。也許我會從第一個開始，討論我們將如何管理增長版本的業務和 EBITDA 影響，托尼可以談談一些新類別的影響。因此，也許首先要開始的是我們的核心美國餐廳業務正在增長並繼續產生可觀的現金流。從歷史上看，我們已經利用該現金流並投資了其中的絕大部分，以便在我們經營的大型和未充分滲透的類別中擴大我們的規模。同樣，正如我之前所說，這些投資是可自由支配的。這意味著我們投資的原因是因為我們繼續看到產品市場契合的強烈信號以及改善單位經濟。

Just to give you an example, if I -- on any given day, if I look at the top 10 stores on DoorDash in terms of sales, DashMart shows up there, and that's a strong signal product market fit. To the extent that we don't see continued improvements in terms of unit economics or continued improvements in retention and order frequency, we will alter the pace of our investment. We've been very disciplined in terms of capital allocation so far and we'll continue to do so going forward.

舉個例子，如果我 - 在任何一天，如果我查看 DoorDash 上銷售額排名前 10 位的商店，DashMart 就會出現在那裡，這是產品市場契合度的強烈信號。如果我們沒有看到單位經濟方面的持續改善或保留率和訂單頻率的持續改善，我們將改變我們的投資步伐。到目前為止，我們在資本分配方面一直非常自律，我們將繼續這樣做。

Yes. And I think if there's add a little bit in terms of just my view on the macro environment. And then I'll hit your second question about the multi-category customers. So obviously, we've been looking, right, in terms of how the tough macroeconomic headwinds that I think is hitting a lot of industries, how that might apply to us. We've been searching for this for many quarters now. And I think so far, the reason why largely we've been less impacted is because, well, one, our product is dynamic. It's been constantly improving. If you look at selection, for instance, in the 12 months leading up to the end of the second quarter, we've added 80,000 net new stores onto the platform. made improvements to many quality metrics in terms of our delivery experiences, whether it's speed or accuracy and other types of improvements. We've made many improvements to the shopping experience, so lower the friction for consumers. And so I think that's one point.

是的。而且我認為，如果僅就我對宏觀環境的看法而言，是否有一些補充。然後我會回答你關於多類別客戶的第二個問題。很明顯，我們一直在尋找，對，我認為宏觀經濟逆風如何影響許多行業，這可能如何適用於我們。我們已經為此尋找了很多個季度。而且我認為到目前為止，我們受到的影響較小的原因是，首先，我們的產品是動態的。它一直在不斷改進。例如，如果你看一下選擇，在第二季度末之前的 12 個月裡，我們在平台上新增了 80,000 家淨新店。在我們的交付體驗方面對許多質量指標進行了改進，無論是速度還是準確性以及其他類型的改進。我們對購物體驗進行了許多改進，從而降低了消費者的摩擦。所以我認為這是一點。

The second point is, I think we still have to remember that relative, especially to other maybe categories of commerce or e-commerce. We are still very early in our penetration even as the market leader just take the U.S. as one example, we're less than 8% of total restaurant industry sales. If you compare that to other categories of commerce, it is much earlier in its evolution. And then the final thing I would just add is just if you study macro, as we've been looking at macroeconomics, I think there's only been a couple of years in history in which food spend has actually declined due to challenging macroeconomic pressures. And I think that because it is less of a discretionary spend relative to other categories of spend. But that said, to Prabir's point, we're equal opportunity growth investors that are very disciplined. DoorDash historically hasn't had a lot of resources. And so we take very seriously every dollar of spend. And as you saw in the second quarter, if we don't think that there is a great investment to be made over the same time period to generate a great return. We're not going to make that investment. And so that's true with all new projects. That's true with marketing investments. That's true with engineering and product investments. That's true with headcount. That's really true for every line item in the P&L.

第二點是，我認為我們仍然必須記住這一點，尤其是對於其他可能類別的商業或電子商務。即使市場領導者僅以美國為例，我們的滲透率仍處於早期階段，我們在餐飲業總銷售額中的佔比不到 8%。如果將其與其他商業類別進行比較，它的發展要早得多。然後我要補充的最後一件事是，如果你研究宏觀，正如我們一直在研究宏觀經濟學，我認為歷史上只有幾年的時間，由於宏觀經濟壓力的挑戰，食品支出實際上下降了。我認為這是因為與其他類別的支出相比，它的可自由支配支出較少。但話雖如此，就普拉比爾而言，我們是機會均等的增長投資者，非常自律。 DoorDash 歷來沒有太多資源。因此，我們非常重視每一美元的支出。正如您在第二季度看到的那樣，如果我們不認為在同一時期內進行大量投資以產生巨大回報。我們不會進行這項投資。所有新項目都是如此。營銷投資也是如此。工程和產品投資也是如此。人數確實如此。損益表中的每個行項目都是如此。

All right. So moving on to your second question, which I think was about the impact of consumer shopping in multiple categories. Well, one, this is just part of the mission of the company is to make sure we bring everything inside the neighborhood, not just from restaurants. And two, the last disclosure we made was, I think, in the fourth quarter, where we said that about 14% of our customers are now shopping in these non-restaurant categories. And we are seeing higher retention and order frequency activity from these customers who are engaging in multiple categories. I think this makes quite a lot of sense, as we're solving now different jobs and tasks for the customer. But that said, look, we still have to earn every inch. We have a long ways to go in terms of the product experience in each one of these categories before we'd be satisfied with that behavior.

好的。所以繼續你的第二個問題，我認為這是關於消費者購物對多個類別的影響。嗯，一個，這只是公司使命的一部分，即確保我們把所有東西都帶到附近，而不僅僅是從餐館。第二，我認為，我們最後一次披露是在第四季度，我們說大約 14% 的客戶現在在這些非餐廳類別中購物。我們看到這些從事多個類別的客戶的保留率和訂單頻率更高。我認為這很有意義，因為我們現在正在為客戶解決不同的工作和任務。但話雖如此，看，我們仍然必須賺取每一寸。在我們對這種行為感到滿意之前，我們還有很長的路要走，就這些類別中的每一個類別的產品體驗而言。

Your next question comes from the line of Andrew Boone from JMP Securities.

您的下一個問題來自 JMP 證券公司的 Andrew Boone。

I know you guys talked earlier about the logistics benefits that you guys are running through the platform, but can you double-click on the drivers of Dasher cost savings that you guys highlighted in the letter. And then we haven't talked about drive in a while. Can you provide an update there? Is there any change that you're seeing in terms of enterprise adoption now that we're kind of beyond peak COVID?

我知道你們之前談到了你們通過平台運行的物流優勢，但是你們能否雙擊你們在信中強調的 Dasher 成本節約的驅動因素。然後我們有一段時間沒有談論驅動器了。你能在那裡提供更新嗎？既然我們已經超出了 COVID 的高峰期，您在企業採用方面是否看到了任何變化？

Andrew, maybe I'll start with the Dasher cost question, and then Tony can take the one on our Platform Services. So in terms of Dasher cost, I mean, at the end of the day, right, there's multiple components of this, including as Tony alluded to earlier, how stores operations in terms of how quickly they get the Dasher in and out. So there's opportunities to continue optimizing that there's opportunities to continue dispatching from closer and closer Dashers, which by the way, as the density of your network increases as you get more orders occurring within a certain neighborhood within a certain store, you've got the ability to not just batch, but you've got the ability to get the Dasher to the store quicker than you otherwise might have.

Andrew，也許我會從 Dasher 成本問題開始，然後 Tony 可以在我們的平台服務上回答這個問題。因此，就 Dasher 成本而言，我的意思是，歸根結底，這有多個組成部分，包括托尼早些時候提到的，商店如何以多快的速度進出 Dasher。因此，有機會繼續優化，有機會繼續從越來越近的 Dashers 發貨，順便說一下，隨著網絡密度的增加，隨著您在某個商店的某個社區內發生更多訂單，您已經獲得了不僅可以批量處理，而且您還可以比其他方式更快地將 Dasher 送到商店。

And so there's really -- if you think about the sources of opportunities really reducing the amount of time it takes for Dasher to get to the store and reducing the amount of time that Dasher spends in the store, and we continue to work both those levers and that's what resulted in the improvement in terms of Dasher costs that we're seeing. The second thing I'll say, which is really just to clarify, last year was anomalous in terms of Dasher cost. Because we were operating in a very expensive labor environment that's fueled by fiscal stimulus. So in some ways, Dasher cost this year just at least in my mind, normalizing back to historical levels was ending incremental. So last year was elevated this year isn't.

所以真的 - 如果你考慮機會的來源，真的會減少 Dasher 到達商店所需的時間，並減少 Dasher 在商店里花費的時間，我們將繼續利用這兩個槓桿這就是我們看到的 Dasher 成本改善的原因。我要說的第二件事，實際上只是為了澄清，去年在 Dasher 成本方面是異常的。因為我們在一個由財政刺激推動的非常昂貴的勞動力環境中運營。因此，在某些方面，至少在我看來，Dasher 今年的成本只是正常化回到歷史水平正在結束增量。所以去年有所提升，今年沒有。

Yes. And with respect to the second question around our platform services products such as Drive, we see continued excitement for the stores. But I mean, in many ways, our Platform Services business experiences similar seasonality in our marketplace business where the second and third quarters are generally more muted in activity. And that's mostly because as customers are back out, many of whom are taking advantage of the good weather as well as perhaps lost vacations from the 2 years of COVID and now eating out again or visiting retail stores again that these stores have to make sure that their in-store activity is protected and taken care of and the customer service levels are exceptional before they invest aggressively in their off-premise business.

是的。關於圍繞我們的平台服務產品（例如 Drive）的第二個問題，我們看到商店持續興奮。但我的意思是，在許多方面，我們的平台服務業務在我們的市場業務中經歷了類似的季節性，第二季度和第三季度的活動通常更加平靜。這主要是因為隨著顧客的退出，他們中的許多人正在利用好天氣以及可能因 2 年的 COVID 而失去假期，現在再次外出就餐或再次光顧零售店，這些商店必須確保他們的店內活動受到保護和照顧，並且在他們積極投資於他們的場外業務之前，客戶服務水平非常出色。

So while there's some seasonal kinds of activity happening in that business, I think the COVID highs in terms of the excitement to invest and continue to accelerate the momentum behind e-commerce for all of these retailers across any category remains just as high as ever. And so that's something that we expect to continue to help grow our Platform Services business, whether they're large merchants like some of the ones you mentioned who participate with products like DoorDash Drive or smaller merchants that really need help getting online for the first time and growing their kind of same-store sales off-premise with products like DoorDash Storefront. And so our focus right now is making sure that those products can be easier to use and that we can build products to help teach the playbooks that we've used to build a successful digital marketplace in our own right such that these businesses can do it other out.

因此，儘管該行業發生了一些季節性活動，但我認為 COVID 的高點在投資的興奮性和繼續加速任何類別的所有這些零售商的電子商務背後的勢頭方面仍然與以往一樣高。這就是我們希望繼續幫助發展我們的平台服務業務的事情，無論他們是像您提到的一些參與 DoorDash Drive 等產品的大型商家，還是第一次真正需要幫助的小型商家並通過 DoorDash Storefront 等產品在場外增加同店銷售。因此，我們現在的重點是確保這些產品更易於使用，並且我們可以構建產品來幫助教授我們用來建立自己的成功數字市場的劇本，以便這些企業能夠做到其他出來。

Your next question comes from the line of Ron Josey from Citi.

您的下一個問題來自 Citi 的 Ron Josey。

Maybe 2, please. The chart in the note in the letter that talks about existing consumer order rates. 2022 is trending higher than previous years and suggesting that these users in 2022 are more engaged. I'm sure -- can you just talk about the drivers here? Is it greater repeat rates, adoption of newer verticals, impacted DashPass, I'm sure it's all of the above. And so maybe the bigger question is just are these newer users, this newer cohort of users, talk about how that compares to the prior cohorts? Are they just doing more?

也許2，拜託。信中說明中的圖表討論了現有的消費者訂單率。 2022 年的趨勢高於往年，這表明 2022 年這些用戶的參與度更高。我敢肯定——你能在這裡談談驅動程序嗎？是更高的重複率、採用更新的垂直行業、影響了 DashPass，我敢肯定以上都是。所以也許更大的問題是這些新用戶，這個新的用戶群體，談論與之前的群體相比如何？他們只是做得更多嗎？

And then maybe Prabir as a quick as a quick follow-up. You mentioned just a strong cash flow generated from the U.S. restaurant business. Any way to provide some guideposts or insight in terms of that profitability of that U.S. restaurant business?

然後也許 Prabir 就像快速跟進一樣快速。您剛剛提到美國餐飲業務產生的強勁現金流。有什麼方法可以就美國餐館業務的盈利能力提供一些指導或見解？

Ron. So on -- let me start with the second one first. On the U.S. restaurant profitability, we're not actually -- we haven't provided any disclosure to break that out other than to say that continues generating more contribution profit and has improved both in terms of its net revenue margins as well as its contribution profit as a percentage of GOV on a year-on-year basis. So we're happy with the progress there.

羅恩。等等——讓我先從第二個開始。關於美國餐廳的盈利能力，我們實際上並沒有 - 我們沒有提供任何披露來打破這一點，只是說繼續產生更多的貢獻利潤並且在其淨收入利潤率和貢獻方面都有所改善年利潤佔 GOV 的百分比。所以我們對那裡的進展感到滿意。

And as we've said previously, it's a valuable funding source that we used to make investments in these new categories that we're growing.

正如我們之前所說，這是我們用來對我們正在發展的這些新類別進行投資的寶貴資金來源。

In terms of your question on the order rate chart, really by the way, the purpose of that chart was to demonstrate the fact that the order rate trends were similar to what we've seen historically. And to make the point that increased inflation as well as potentially weakening consumer spending has not had an adverse impact relative to old cohort. And so it's hard for us to untangle the impact of consumer spending from ordinary cohort seasonality. But taking a step back in terms of the 2022 cohorts, we're happy with the quality so far. Remember, we run our sales and marketing to a payback period, and we've been operating within the same payback period for quite some time now. So what's driving that is not just enhanced order frequency, which has continued growing on a year-on-year basis as a result of improvements in selection, quality and price as well as the new categories that we're adding, but also improvements in terms of the core margin structure of the product. And so the core product has gotten more profitable, in part, due to sub totals, but also in part because of improvements in terms of Dasher cost the quality of our orders, which improves our customer support costs and so on. And that, coupled with the order frequencies contributed to better LTVs and roughly the same payback.

關於您對訂單率圖表的問題，順便說一句，該圖表的目的是證明訂單率趨勢與我們歷史上看到的相似。並且要指出，相對於老一代而言，通脹上升以及潛在的消費者支出減弱並沒有產生不利影響。因此，我們很難將消費者支出的影響與普通隊列季節性因素分開。但是在 2022 年的隊列方面退一步，我們對迄今為止的質量感到滿意。請記住，我們將銷售和營銷運行到一個投資回收期，並且我們已經在相同的投資回收期內運營了相當長的一段時間。因此，推動這不僅僅是提高了訂單頻率，由於選擇、質量和價格的改進以及我們正在添加的新類別，訂單頻率繼續同比增長，而且在產品的核心利潤結構方面。因此，核心產品獲得了更多的利潤，部分原因是小計，部分原因是 Dasher 成本方面的改進提高了我們的訂單質量，從而提高了我們的客戶支持成本等等。而且，再加上訂單頻率，有助於提高 LTV 和大致相同的回報。

Your next question comes from the line of Ross Sandler from Barclays.

您的下一個問題來自巴克萊銀行的羅斯桑德勒。

Two for me. Prabir, the 30% retention stat for Wolt, is that comparable to the 48% for core DoorDash? I know they don't have a subscription business built out yet and some of their markets are a little bit younger, so could you just walk us through that? And how does that 30% compare to some of the EU competitors that they face in their home markets? And do you think the gap is as wide between that 30% and the competition as it is between the 48% and your U.S. competition?

兩個給我。 Prabir，Wolt 的 30% 保留率統計數據，與核心 DoorDash 的 48% 相當嗎？我知道他們還沒有建立訂閱業務，而且他們的一些市場還比較年輕，所以你能告訴我們嗎？這 30% 與他們在本國市場面臨的一些歐盟競爭對手相比如何？您認為這 30% 與競爭對手之間的差距是否與 48% 與您的美國競爭對手之間的差距一樣大？

And then the second question is just you guys gave a good overview of how the consumer is holding up. I'm just curious, is the frequency for DashPass kind of stand-alone holding up as well as non-DashPass? I know there's a mix shift towards DashPass, which is driving up frequency. But could you just talk about those 2 kind of separately.

然後第二個問題是你們對消費者的表現進行了很好的概述。我只是好奇，DashPass 的頻率是一種獨立的保持方式以及非 DashPass 嗎？我知道有一個向 DashPass 的混合轉變，這正在提高頻率。但是你能不能分別談談這兩種。

Yes. Ross, maybe I'll start and Tony can chime in. So first, on the 30% retention, I'm not sure what the 48% is that you're referring to. The 30% is month 12 retention. And if you actually compare that to DoorDash versus Wolt on an apples-to-apples basis, it's pretty comparable depending on some markets, it's even higher. So we feel good about the retention stats certainly compared to our data. And when you look at our data using third-party sources, we understand that our retention is better than everybody else in the category.

是的。羅斯，也許我會開始，托尼可以插話。首先，關於 30% 的留存率，我不確定你指的 48% 是什麼。 30% 是第 12 個月的留存率。而且，如果您實際上將其與 DoorDash 與 Wolt 進行逐個比較，則根據某些市場，它具有相當的可比性，甚至更高。因此，與我們的數據相比，我們對留存統計數據感到滿意。當您使用第三方來源查看我們的數據時，我們知道我們的保留率比該類別中的其他所有人都要好。

In terms of the European competitors, there isn't an exact apples-to-apples source right that compares market to market. But based on what we're seeing in terms of competitors in the U.K. and other markets that are covered, the 30% actually compares favorably.

就歐洲競爭對手而言，沒有一個確切的蘋果對蘋果的來源權來比較市場與市場。但根據我們在英國和所涵蓋的其他市場的競爭對手方面所看到的情況，30% 的競爭對手實際上比較有利。

On the question of DashPass, DashPass frequency as well as all the figures on our classic product, you really need to look at it on a cohort level. Yes, you've got a mix shift between as you get more DashPass subscribers, the blended order frequency grows. But even on a cohort level, underlying order frequency has continued to grow. And what's driving that is these new categories. We're seeing people adopt new categories, Tony referred to the 14% adoption rate at the end of Q4, which has continued to grow in Q1 and Q2, and that's driving order frequency growth at the cohort level.

關於 DashPass、DashPass 頻率以及我們經典產品上的所有數據的問題，您確實需要在隊列層面上看待它。是的，隨著您獲得更多 DashPass 訂閱者，混合訂單頻率會增加。但即使在同類群組層面，潛在訂單頻率也在持續增長。這些新類別的驅動力是什麼。我們看到人們採用新的類別，Tony 提到第四季度末 14% 的採用率，在第一季度和第二季度繼續增長，這推動了隊列級別的訂單頻率增長。

Your next question comes from the line of Jason Helfstein from Oppenheimer.

您的下一個問題來自 Oppenheimer 的 Jason Helfstein。

I just want to dig a bit more into DashPass. With the economy reopening and kind of return to work progressing in a certain direction and increased use of ridesharing. Is it making it customer acquisition of DashPass, any less efficient or more challenging?

我只是想深入了解 DashPass。隨著經濟的重新開放和某種程度的恢復工作朝著某個方向發展，以及拼車的使用增加。是不是讓 DashPass 的客戶獲取效率更低或更具挑戰性？

And then secondly, I think you said that you pointed out Dashers costs are down this year versus last year, but specifically and perhaps this month and last month, are you seeing the cost to acquire new Dashers come down even further?

其次，我認為您說過您指出今年 Dashers 的成本與去年相比有所下降，但具體而言，也許本月和上個月，您是否看到購買新 Dashers 的成本進一步下降？

Jason, so first on the DashPass front, what I should say is would not observe any impact on our DashPass signups, as a result of people going back to the office or increased ridesharing or anything like that. In fact, our DashPass subs have continued to grow both on a year-on-year basis as well as on a quarter-on-quarter basis to a record high. So we feel good that DashPass is a key component of driving better affordability for our consumers and the growth has been consistent and reliable. So that's great.

傑森，所以首先在 DashPass 方面，我應該說的是不會觀察到對我們的 DashPass 註冊的任何影響，因為人們回到辦公室或增加拼車或類似的事情。事實上，我們的 DashPass 訂閱量同比和環比都在持續增長，創下歷史新高。因此，我們覺得 DashPass 是為我們的消費者提高可負擔性的關鍵組成部分，並且增長一直持續且可靠。那太好了。

In terms of Dasher costs, the reduction in Dasher was really driven by 2 things. There's the Dasher cost per order, which I mentioned earlier was really a normalization from the elevated levels last year because of increased fiscal stimulus. There also was, if you recall, last year, increased advertising costs because everyone is competing for Dashers. And that environment has gotten a little bit better, which has driven lower Dasher cost in Q2, and those dasher cost continue to remain where they were in the last couple of months of the quarter.

就 Dasher 成本而言，Dasher 的減少實際上是由兩件事推動的。還有每筆訂單的 Dasher 成本，我之前提到過，由於財政刺激措施的增加，去年的高水平實際上是正常化的。如果您還記得，去年還增加了廣告成本，因為每個人都在爭奪 Dashers。而且這種環境已經有所好轉，這推動了第二季度的 Dasher 成本降低，而這些 dasher 的成本繼續保持在本季度最後幾個月的水平。

Your next question comes from the line of Douglas Anmuth from JPMorgan.

您的下一個問題來自摩根大通的 Douglas Anmuth。

I just wanted to circle back on profitability and just the EBITDA guide for the full year. Should we think about the increase at the low end there. Should we think about that as the same dynamics that you suggested in 2Q in terms of driven mostly by inflation? And is that all coming on the Dash side of the business? Or is -- are we seeing any improvement perhaps in your outlook there for Wolt?

我只是想回顧一下盈利能力和全年的 EBITDA 指南。我們是否應該考慮那裡的低端增加。我們是否應該將其視為與您在第二季度建議的主要由通脹驅動的動態相同的動態？這一切都來自 Dash 業務嗎？或者——我們是否看到您對 Wolt 的看法有任何改善？

Doug, can you clarify, are you talking about Q3 or Q4?

道格，你能澄清一下，你說的是第三季度還是第四季度？

The full year outlook for EBITDA.

EBITDA 的全年展望。

Yes. The full year outlook of EBITDA, I mean, we're bringing it up because we've made progress here in the business, both in terms of overall scale has increased relative to our expectations at the beginning of the year. If you remember our guidance at the beginning of the year was -- I think it was [$49 billion or $50 billion] at the top end. So that's gone up. Second, we are seeing positive benefits in terms of sub totals, which we talked about earlier, which results in more revenue and EBITDA. Third, Dasher costs are trending slightly better, and that's been driven by 2 things as product changes that have helped drive increased retention of our Dashers as well as some of the macro factors such as rising cost of living and declining consumer savings that are helping increase the retention of our existing fleet. So it's these various factors that have given us a little more confidence on EBITDA, as a result of which, we have increased the low end of our guidance. And it's really a commitment to say that we're going to stay above breakeven.

是的。我的意思是，我們之所以提出 EBITDA 的全年展望，是因為我們在業務方面取得了進展，無論是就整體規模而言，都相對於我們年初的預期有所增加。如果你還記得我們在年初的指導是——我認為它是 [490 億美元或 500 億美元] 在高端。所以就漲了。其次，我們在小計方面看到了積極的好處，我們之前談到過，這會帶來更多的收入和 EBITDA。第三，Dasher 成本的趨勢略有好轉，這是由兩件事推動的，即產品變化有助於提高我們的 Dasher 的保留率，以及一些宏觀因素，例如生活成本上升和消費者儲蓄下降，這有助於增加保留我們現有的機隊。因此，正是這些不同的因素讓我們對 EBITDA 更有信心，因此，我們提高了指導的低端。說我們將保持在盈虧平衡之上，這確實是一種承諾。

Your next question comes from the line of Nikhil Devnani.

您的下一個問題來自 Nikhil Devnani。

Just on the Q3 guide, if we take Wolt out, it looks like GOV is set to kind of step down sequentially for core DoorDash. Just wondering if you get there with the assumption that the July trends kind of hold roughly flattish through the quarter? Or is there some further kind of softness embedded in that outlook?

就在 Q3 指南中，如果我們將 Wolt 剔除，看起來 GOV 將按順序降級以用於核心 DoorDash。只是想知道您是否假設 7 月份的趨勢在整個季度大致持平？還是在這種前景中嵌入了某種更柔軟的東西？

And then as a second question, just given all the macro concerns, have you seen any indications that consumers are trading down here in the types of restaurants that they order from? And any kind of color you can provide on the demographics of the customer base would be helpful.

然後作為第二個問題，考慮到所有宏觀問題，您是否看到任何跡象表明消費者在他們訂購的餐廳類型中進行了交易？您可以根據客戶群的人口統計數據提供的任何顏色都會有所幫助。

Sure. Maybe I'll take a crack at that. So the first thing I'd say is our consumer metrics remain healthy. So if you look at what happened in Q2, our MAUs grew by double digits year-on-year, order frequency grew, our pace of consumer acquisition continued to remain healthy. And these signals provide a solid foundation for growth in the long term.

當然。也許我會對此有所了解。所以我要說的第一件事是我們的消費者指標保持健康。因此，如果您查看第二季度發生的情況，我們的 MAU 同比增長兩位數，訂單頻率增加，我們的消費者獲取速度繼續保持健康。這些信號為長期增長提供了堅實的基礎。

With respect to the second half specifically, we expect normal course seasonality this year. So in general, we've experienced growth in Q4 and Q1. Sequential growth in Q2 and Q3 is usually muted as a result of summer seasonality. In fact, if you look at our Q2 to Q3 growth last year, you'll see that our GOV dipped a little bit, and we're baking that in into the guide.

具體到下半年，我們預計今年的課程季節性正常。所以總的來說，我們在第四季度和第一季度經歷了增長。由於夏季的季節性，Q2 和 Q3 的連續增長通常較為緩慢。事實上，如果你看看我們去年第二季度到第三季度的增長，你會發現我們的 GOV 略有下降，我們正在將其納入指南。

The second point I'll make is the macro environment continues to remain uncertain. And so we haven't seen any impact from weakening consumer spend, at least so far in Q2 but we're accounting for that uncertainty because it could have an impact on normal course seasonality in the bounce back that you see in Q4. And so that's what we're baking into our guidance. And then can you repeat the question on macro?

我要說的第二點是宏觀環境仍然不確定。因此，至少在第二季度到目前為止，我們還沒有看到消費者支出疲軟帶來的任何影響，但我們正在考慮這種不確定性，因為它可能會對您在第四季度看到的反彈中的正常季節性季節性產生影響。所以這就是我們在我們的指導中烘焙的內容。然後你能重複一下宏的問題嗎？

Yes. Just any indication that consumers might be trading down in the types of restaurants they order from? And just a reminder what your demographics look like for the customer base.

是的。是否有任何跡象表明消費者可能會在他們訂購的餐廳類型中進行交易？並且只是提醒您的人口統計數據對於客戶群的看法。

Yes. What I'll say on that point is at least based on the data we've seen so far, we haven't seen anything that would point to a particular income peer or people shifting from certain types of restaurants to another. In fact, I think we said in the letter, the sub totals increased because of higher item prices. But that was offset by fewer items per order as consumers responded to inflation. So it's less that they're shifting away and adjusting their buying behavior from other restaurants. They just -- they're spending the same amount, just buying a few things. And that just goes to show you how resilient the category is. Convenience and delivery and dining in has become a stable part of people's lives and you're seeing that in the data.

是的。在這一點上我要說的至少是基於我們迄今為止看到的數據，我們還沒有看到任何指向特定收入同行或人們從某些類型的餐館轉移到另一種餐館的東西。事實上，我想我們在信中說過，小計增加是因為商品價格上漲。但隨著消費者對通貨膨脹的反應，這被每筆訂單的商品減少所抵消。因此，他們從其他餐廳轉移並調整他們的購買行為的可能性較小。他們只是——他們花同樣的錢，只是買了一些東西。這只是向您展示了該類別的彈性。便利、送貨和就餐已經成為人們生活中穩定的一部分，你可以在數據中看到這一點。

Your next question comes from the line of Michael McGovern from Bank of America.

您的下一個問題來自美國銀行的 Michael McGovern。

I wanted to dig a little bit into the gas rewards program. just curious, I noticed you listed gas the program as one of the contributing factors to Dasher cost per order actually being down. So I was wondering, is there a potential impact on Dasher supply or Dasher cost per order when the gas rewards program ends?

我想深入了解一下汽油獎勵計劃。只是好奇，我注意到您將該計劃列為導致 Dasher 每個訂單成本實際下降的因素之一。所以我想知道，當 Gas 獎勵計劃結束時，是否會對 Dasher 供應或每筆訂單的 Dasher 成本產生潛在影響？

And then secondly, is there a chance that, that could be extended beyond August 31, if there is a potential supply impact from that? And are the savings from that ending in August currently being baked into guidance for Q3 and for the full year?

其次，如果有潛在的供應影響，是否有可能延長至 8 月 31 日之後？ 8 月結束時節省的資金目前是否已納入第三季度和全年的指導？

Michael, it's Prabir. Maybe I'll take a your question. Yes, we spent over $40 million on the gas savings program, and we see very positive feedback from Dashers. You are the commentary I think you're referring to is it's not a Dasher cost per order reduced, but what ended up happening is the retention of our existing fleet improved. And that the improvement in that retention of the existing fleet was driven by 3 things, is the product changes that will need in order to help attention, it's the gas rewards program that frankly displays the increase in fuel costs for Dashers and third, the macro factors that we talked about around declining consumer savings and rising inflation. And so it's the combination of these 3 things that we believe improved the retention of our existing fleet that then resulted in us needing fewer new Dashers, and therefore, acquiring a greater portion of our Dashers organically than we otherwise would. That then translate into lower [tax] costs. In terms of renewing the program, it's too early to say right now. We have assume that we will -- we continue to operate the current dasher program to the end of August, and we'll make a call depending on where gas prices are high as well as other things. At the end of the day, it might be a cheaper way to obtain Dashers, what we'll see as we need progress here in the quarter.

邁克爾，是普拉比爾。也許我會回答你的問題。是的，我們在節省氣體計劃上花費了超過 4000 萬美元，我們看到來自 Dashers 的非常積極的反饋。你是我認為你所指的評論是不是每筆訂單的 Dasher 成本降低，但最終發生的是我們現有機隊的保留得到改善。現有機隊保留率的提高是由三件事推動的，即需要改變產品以引起關注，坦率地顯示 Dashers 燃料成本增加的是汽油獎勵計劃，第三，宏觀我們談到了圍繞消費者儲蓄下降和通脹上升的因素。因此，我們認為正是這三件事的結合提高了我們現有機隊的保留率，從而導致我們需要更少的新 Dashers，因此，我們有機地獲得了比我們原本想要的更大比例的 Dashers。然後轉化為更低的[稅收]成本。就更新計劃而言，現在說還為時過早。我們已經假設我們會 - 我們將繼續運行當前的 dasher 計劃到 8 月底，我們將根據汽油價格高的地方以及其他情況來打電話。歸根結底，這可能是獲得 Dashers 的一種更便宜的方式，我們將看到這一點，因為我們需要在本季度取得進展。

Your next question comes from the line of Mark Mahaney from Evercore ISI.

您的下一個問題來自 Evercore ISI 的 Mark Mahaney。

I wanted to ask about whether you're seeing any pressure from competitors in nonurban markets, either on the restaurant supply, acquisition side or consumer incentives? And since the Amazon-Grubhub deal was sort of announced, does that show up in any of the metrics that you track?

我想問一下您是否看到非城市市場的競爭對手在餐廳供應、收購方面或消費者激勵方面施加了壓力？自從宣布了 Amazon-Grubhub 交易以來，這是否顯示在您跟踪的任何指標中？

I can that lead off and then feel free to chime in here, Prabir. So far, we haven't seen impact whether it's recent competitor announcements or moves to invest in certain types of geographies versus other types of geographies in the numbers, but obviously, we're taking stock of what's happening. But I think it's important to remember, regardless of what's happening in the external environment, that our focus is making sure that we continue building the best products. I mean, at the end of the day, the customer, whether it's for our platform or someone else's, they're going to judge all of us on the combination of the selection of places we deliver from the quality of that delivery experience in terms of speed, timeliness and accuracy, the affordability of the platform and the customer service level.

我可以先引開，然後隨時在這裡插話，Prabir。到目前為止，無論是最近的競爭對手公告還是投資某些類型的地區與其他類型的地區相比，我們都沒有看到影響，但顯然，我們正在評估正在發生的事情。但我認為重要的是要記住，無論外部環境發生什麼，我們的重點是確保我們繼續打造最好的產品。我的意思是，歸根結底，客戶，無論是為了我們的平台還是其他人的平台，他們都會根據我們交付的地點的選擇結合交付體驗的質量來判斷我們所有人速度、及時性和準確性、平台的可負擔性和客戶服務水平。

And it's that combination, I think, that so far has been evidenced or performance with leading retention and order frequency that has separated us from the pack. And we have to just keep making sure that we stay ahead on that dimension. At the end of the day, it's that combination that ultimately is going to judge us or anyone else, and even if you offer the product for free, if that combination isn't where it needs to be for the customer, I'm not sure it's going to matter.

我認為，到目前為止，正是這種組合已經得到了證明，或者俱有領先的保留率和訂單頻率的表現使我們與眾不同。我們必須繼續確保我們在這個維度上保持領先。歸根結底，這種組合最終將評判我們或其他任何人，即使您免費提供產品，如果這種組合不是客戶需要的，我不會肯定會很重要。

Thank you. This concludes today's conference call. I would like to thank our speakers, and thank you all for joining us today. This now concludes the call. You may now disconnect.

謝謝你。今天的電話會議到此結束。我要感謝我們的演講者，感謝大家今天加入我們。現在結束通話。您現在可以斷開連接。