DoorDash Inc (DASH) 2022 Q1 法說會逐字稿

Good afternoon, and thanks for joining us for our first quarter 2022 earnings call. I'm pleased to be joined today by Co-Founder Chair and CEO, Tony Xu; and CFO, Prabir Adarkar.

下午好，感謝您加入我們的 2022 年第一季度財報電話會議。我很高興今天有聯合創始人主席兼首席執行官 Tony Xu 加入；和首席財務官 Prabir Adarkar。

We'd like to remind everyone that we'll be making forward-looking statements during this call, including our expectations of our business, financial position and operating performance, future results and guidance, our investment approach, strategy and statements regarding our acquisition of Wolt. Forward-looking statements are subject to risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially from those described in the forward-looking statements, and some such risks are described in our risk factors, including in our SEC filings, including Form 10-Ks and 10-Qs. You should not rely on our forward-looking statements as predictions of future events. We disclaim any obligation to update any forward-looking statements, except as required by law.

我們想提醒大家，我們將在本次電話會議期間做出前瞻性陳述，包括我們對我們的業務、財務狀況和經營業績、未來結果和指導、我們的投資方法、戰略和關於我們收購的聲明的預期沃爾特。前瞻性陳述受風險和不確定性的影響，可能導致實際結果與前瞻性陳述中描述的結果存在重大差異，我們的風險因素中描述了一些此類風險，包括我們的 SEC 文件，包括表格 10-Ks和 10-Qs。您不應依賴我們的前瞻性陳述作為對未來事件的預測。除法律要求外，我們不承擔更新任何前瞻性陳述的義務。

During this call, we will discuss certain non-GAAP financial measures. Information regarding our non-GAAP financial results, including a reconciliation of such non-GAAP results to the most directly comparable GAAP financial measures, may be found in our investor letter, which is available on our IR website. These non-GAAP measures should be considered in addition to our GAAP results and are not intended to be a substitute for our GAAP results.

在本次電話會議中，我們將討論某些非公認會計準則財務措施。有關我們的非 GAAP 財務結果的信息，包括此類非 GAAP 結果與最直接可比的 GAAP 財務指標的對賬，可以在我們的投資者信函中找到，該信函可在我們的 IR 網站上找到。除了我們的 GAAP 結果之外，還應考慮這些非 GAAP 措施，並且不能替代我們的 GAAP 結果。

Finally, this call in its entirety is being audio webcast on our IR website. An audio replay of the call will be available on our site shortly after the call ends.

最後，整個電話會議正在我們的 IR 網站上進行音頻網絡直播。通話結束後不久，我們的網站將提供通話的音頻重播。

As in previous quarters, we'll go straight into the Q&A portion. So with that, operator, please take the first question.

與前幾個季度一樣，我們將直接進入問答部分。因此，接線員，請回答第一個問題。

(Operator Instructions) Your first question comes from the line of Ross Sandler from Barclays.

（操作員說明）您的第一個問題來自 Barclays 的 Ross Sandler。

Tony, Prabir, I just had one high level and then one kind of more near term. So in the letter, I really like how you laid out the philosophy around investing proceeds from the U.S. restaurant profit pools into these new areas with precision. And I think some folks on the line here are a little worried that after Wolt closes and that philosophy holds up, you're just going to have a lot more areas by which you can reinvest those profit pools across all of Europe. So can you just maybe just talk about how that philosophy might change post-Wolt?

托尼，普拉比爾，我剛剛有一個高水平，然後是一種更近期的水平。所以在信中，我真的很喜歡你如何將美國餐館利潤池的收益精確地投資到這些新領域的理念。而且我認為這裡的一些人有點擔心，在 Wolt 關閉並且這種理念成立之後，您將擁有更多的領域，您可以通過這些領域在整個歐洲再投資這些利潤池。所以你能不能談談這種哲學在沃爾特之後會如何改變？

And then the second question is based on the revenue margin and the overall commentary on take rate, it looks like you're having no problems navigating supply, and fuel inflation doesn't seem to be an issue. But any noticeable changes from all the inflation out there on Dash or cost per order either kind of in the first quarter or anything we should expect looking ahead?

然後第二個問題是基於利潤率和對採取率的總體評論，看起來你在供應方面沒有問題，燃料通脹似乎不是問題。但是，Dash 上的所有通貨膨脹或第一季度的每筆訂單成本或我們應該期待的任何未來的任何明顯變化？

Ross, it's Tony. I'll take the first one, and I'll let Prabir take the second one. So on the first one -- well, I would say 2 parts. First is just our investment strategy with Wolt, and then secondly, just our investment philosophy in general. Our aspiration is to build the largest global local commerce business. And we want to do that by building 2 assets. We want to build the largest local commerce marketplace where we're bringing everything inside the neighborhood to you. And we also want to build the largest local commerce platform where we're giving tools to the physical businesses so that they each can become their own digital powerhouses. And that's really why we're excited about teaming up with Wolt because they share that same vision to build that truly global local commerce business as well.

羅斯，是托尼。我會拿第一個，我會讓 Prabir 拿第二個。所以關於第一個——好吧，我會說兩部分。首先是我們與 Wolt 的投資策略，其次是我們總體上的投資理念。我們的願景是打造全球最大的本地商業企業。我們想通過構建 2 個資產來做到這一點。我們希望建立最大的本地商業市場，將社區內的一切都帶給您。我們還希望建立最大的本地商業平台，在這個平台上，我們為實體企業提供工具，以便他們每個人都可以成為自己的數字化強國。這就是為什麼我們對與 Wolt 合作感到興奮的原因，因為他們擁有同樣的願景，即建立真正的全球本地商業業務。

And from our perspective, it's really going to take a similar investment philosophy in terms of how we've built everything else. So in the investment shareholder letter, we gave an example of how we built effectively a new business from scratch in the last couple of years in the convenience category and kind of outline how we always start by first making sure that we build the best product possible, especially measured in terms of retention and order frequency. We have a maniacal focus on the unit map to get the unit economics to work, and then we start considering efficient ways to actually scale that business.

從我們的角度來看，就我們如何構建其他一切而言，它確實會採用類似的投資理念。因此，在投資股東信中，我們舉了一個例子，說明過去幾年我們如何在便利類別中從頭開始有效地建立新業務，並概述了我們如何始終首先確保我們盡可能打造最好的產品，尤其是在保留率和訂單頻率方面。我們瘋狂地關注單位地圖以使單位經濟學發揮作用，然後我們開始考慮有效的方法來實際擴展該業務。

So while we are aggressive in how we run these experiments to be able to achieve those input outcomes, we're very disciplined about how we think about how to scale these businesses. And it's going to be no different as we think about the opportunity to team up with Wolt. We think the opportunity obviously is immense.

因此，雖然我們在如何進行這些實驗以實現這些輸入結果方面非常積極，但我們對如何擴展這些業務的思考方式非常自律。當我們考慮與沃爾特合作的機會時，這也不會有所不同。我們認為機會顯然是巨大的。

I mean if you look at this opportunity globally in the restaurants category in the U.S. where even as the market leader, only 6% of total restaurant industry sales. If you extend that into these other categories of restaurants or convenience or retail, we're a significantly smaller percentage. If we add in the countries now that Wolt adds on top of that, which gets us to a combined portfolio of about 26 countries, we're almost unnoticeable percentage. And then even if you combine the -- and then if you add on top of that the digitization that's happening on the merchant's websites and apps themselves, many of which we power through products like the DoorDash Drive or Storefront as well as other products, we're in the earliest innings.

我的意思是，如果你在全球範圍內看待美國餐廳類別中的這個機會，即使作為市場領導者，也僅佔餐飲業總銷售額的 6%。如果您將其擴展到這些其他類別的餐廳或便利店或零售店，我們的比例要小得多。如果我們現在添加 Wolt 在此基礎上添加的國家/地區，這使我們擁有約 26 個國家/地區的組合投資組合，我們幾乎是微不足道的百分比。然後，即使你結合了 - 然後如果你再加上商家網站和應用程序本身發生的數字化，其中許多我們通過 DoorDash Drive 或 Storefront 等產品以及其他產品提供支持，我們'在最早的一局。

But the investment philosophy remains the same where there's a maniacal focus on building the best-in-class products, a maniacal focus on getting laser-sharp on the unit map so that, that's actually positive before we scale globally.

但投資理念保持不變，瘋狂地專注於打造一流的產品，瘋狂地專注於在單位地圖上獲得銳利的激光，因此，在我們全球擴張之前，這實際上是積極的。

And just to add to that point before I move on to the second part of your question. If you recall, when we announced Wolt, one of the things that we were excited about was their unit economics and their retention. And so Wolt gives us a more efficient engine through which we can invest internationally. And that's why what we had communicated was even after integrating Wolt, we expect our EBITDA expectations for the year to be materially unchanged because we're essentially now redeploying capital that we would have deployed but through the Wolt engine, which is actually more efficient. So hopefully, that gets to the crux of your question.

在我繼續你問題的第二部分之前，只是補充一點。如果您還記得，當我們宣布 Wolt 時，我們感到興奮的一件事是他們的單位經濟和他們的保留。因此，Wolt 為我們提供了一個更高效的引擎，我們可以通過它進行國際投資。這就是為什麼我們所傳達的信息是，即使在整合 Wolt 之後，我們預計我們對這一年的 EBITDA 預期將基本保持不變，因為我們現在基本上正在重新部署我們本來可以部署但通過 Wolt 引擎部署的資本，這實際上更有效。因此，希望這可以解決您問題的癥結所在。

On your supply question, we have not experienced supply shortages, and we feel good about our supply position looking ahead. Some stats to share with you, our Dasher cost as a percentage of our GOV were lower both quarter-on-quarter as well as year-on-year. Recall -- if you recall last year in Q1, we were undersupplied due to bad weather as well as fiscal stimulus, and we began investing over the course of last year as well as this quarter, frankly, to continue to build a supply base so that we can address the demand that we had anticipated.

關於您的供應問題，我們沒有經歷過供應短缺，我們對未來的供應狀況感到滿意。與您分享的一些統計數據，我們的 Dasher 成本占我們 GOV 的百分比均低於季度環比和同比。回想一下——如果你回想去年第一季度，由於天氣惡劣和財政刺激，我們供應不足，坦率地說，我們在去年和本季度開始投資，以繼續建立供應基礎，因此我們可以解決我們預期的需求。

The second point, this is a little bit of a nuanced one. Our batch rates are down both quarter-on-quarter and year-on-year. And the reason I point to that is because in some occasions, if we find ourselves undersupplied, you may see batch rates go up. As a matter of fact, we actually had lower batch rates today than we were a year ago or even last quarter.

第二點，這有點微妙。我們的批次率環比和同比均有所下降。我指出這一點的原因是，在某些情況下，如果我們發現自己供應不足，您可能會看到批量生產率上升。事實上，我們今天的批次率實際上比一年前甚至上個季度都要低。

And then the last point I'll make is our cost to acquire new Dashers, so our cost to acquire new Dasher is the lowest it's been in the last 4 quarters. So all that to say, we feel really good from a supply standpoint, not just because we invest in advance in order to address this demand, but because we don't compete with rideshare for Dasher. This is a completely different pool of people.

然後我要說的最後一點是我們購買新 Dasher 的成本，所以我們購買新 Dasher 的成本是過去 4 個季度中最低的。綜上所述，從供應的角度來看，我們感覺非常好，不僅僅是因為我們提前投資以滿足這一需求，還因為我們不與拼車競爭 Dasher。這是一個完全不同的人群。

Your next question comes from Youssef Squali from Truist Securities.

您的下一個問題來自 Truist Securities 的 Youssef Squali。

So just a couple of questions for me. One, could you maybe just talk about -- I know you haven't closed on Wolt yet. But considering their geographic footprint, et cetera, can you maybe just talk about how that business has performed just given the war headwinds, et cetera, and how has it been tracking relative to your own growth?

所以我有幾個問題。一，你能不能談談 - 我知道你還沒有關閉 Wolt。但是考慮到他們的地理足蹟等等，你能不能只談談在戰爭逆風等情況下該業務的表現如何，以及它相對於你自己的增長是如何跟踪的？

And then in the letter, Tony, you talked about how you guys continue to see opportunities to increase contribution margin as a percentage of marketplace GOV in the U.S. marketplace, I think. Just -- can you just help us think through how much higher can these get over time, say, over the next year or 2 as you keep -- as you need that money to invest in all these new initiatives that you're -- you've highlighted in the letter?

然後在信中，托尼，你談到了你們如何繼續看到提高邊際貢獻的機會，作為美國市場中市場 GOV 的百分比，我認為。只是 - 你能不能幫助我們想想隨著時間的推移，這些可以提高多少，比如說，在你保持的未來一年或兩年內 - 因為你需要這筆錢來投資你所從事的所有這些新舉措 -你在信中強調了嗎？

Thanks for the question, Youssef. So on the Wolt question specifically, the deal is on track to close in the second quarter. We can't comment on Wolt's performance before the deal is closed. But in connection with the closing of the transaction, we'll provide more detail when we come back to the Street with specifics. So stay tuned for that.

謝謝你的問題，優素福。因此，特別是在 Wolt 問題上，該交易有望在第二季度完成。在交易完成之前，我們無法評論沃爾特的表現。但在交易結束時，我們將在回到華爾街時提供更多細節。所以請繼續關注。

Now on your question around U.S. contribution margins, we haven't disclosed exact contribution margin in the U.S. restaurant business, but let me try to answer your question in sort of qualitative terms, which is the first thing is we have driven increasing margins in the U.S. restaurant business while growing category share. And the reason that's important is because it's easy to do one or the other, which is either grow margins or grow category share. But what's remarkable is the progress that we've made in actually growing both.

現在關於你關於美國邊際貢獻的問題，我們沒有披露美國餐飲業的確切邊際貢獻，但讓我試著從定性的角度回答你的問題，首先是我們推動了美國餐飲業的利潤率增長美國餐飲業務在增加品類份額的同時。這很重要的原因是因為很容易做到其中之一，即增加利潤率或增加類別份額。但值得注意的是，我們在兩者的實際增長方面取得了進展。

And looking into the future, there's multiple levers that are available to continue doing so without hurting growth. First, as we continue to drive up the efficiency of the logistics network, that will help our margin structure in the U.S. Second, as we continue improving the quality of the delivery experience, that will help with customer support costs as well as refunds. And then finally, there's leverage in certain parts of cost of sales as well as sales and marketing, which will help the margin structure.

展望未來，有多種槓桿可以繼續這樣做而不損害增長。首先，隨著我們繼續提高物流網絡的效率，這將有助於我們在美國的利潤結構。其次，隨著我們繼續提高交付體驗的質量，這將有助於降低客戶支持成本和退款。最後，在銷售成本以及銷售和營銷的某些部分存在槓桿作用，這將有助於利潤率結構。

Now beyond this, as our ads business scales, this is an incremental tailwind to the margin structure. So all of these things will come together to help the margins for the U.S. restaurant business grow and fund not just other things, but reinvestment in that -- in the core U.S. restaurant business because our objective is we're not running the U.S. restaurant business to harvest margins. We're still investing in U.S. restaurants in order to build scale and continue to grow category share.

現在除此之外，隨著我們的廣告業務規模擴大，這是對利潤率結構的增量順風。因此，所有這些東西將共同幫助美國餐飲業務的利潤增長，並不僅為其他事情提供資金，而且在美國核心餐飲業務中進行再投資，因為我們的目標是我們不經營美國餐飲業務收穫利潤。我們仍在投資美國餐廳，以擴大規模並繼續增加品類份額。

Your next question comes from the line of Steven Fox from Fox Advisors.

您的下一個問題來自 Fox Advisors 的 Steven Fox。

I was just wondering, since you talked -- mentioned the unit economic changes on the convenience business and some of the other categories you're going into, can you compare and contrast those sort of unit economic curves looking at maybe using the U.S. restaurants as a baseline and how maybe some of these new categories could be different as you sort of reach some ideal scale?

我只是想知道，既然你談到了 - 提到便利業務的單位經濟變化以及你要進入的其他一些類別，你能否比較和對比那些可能使用美國餐館的單位經濟曲線一個基線，當你達到某種理想的規模時，這些新類別中的一些可能會有所不同嗎？

Yes. I mean you have to remember that these are -- it's like comparing a 2-year old to a 10-year old. So it's kind of hard to compare that apples-to-apples. But I'll say that in a matter of 2 years, given that we've got line of sight to at least breakeven unit economics in our 3P convenience business, it's quite remarkable. And you may pair that with the fact that we are #1 in the convenience space, and this is just in a matter of 2 years.

是的。我的意思是你必須記住這些是——就像比較一個 2 歲的孩子和一個 10 歲的孩子。因此，很難將蘋果與蘋果進行比較。但我會說，在 2 年內，鑑於我們在 3P 便利業務中至少可以實現盈虧平衡的單位經濟學，這是非常了不起的。您可以將其與我們在便利空間中排名第一的事實相結合，而這僅是 2 年的時間。

Over time, there's things that we will do to continue driving up those margins. So I don't want to provide a forecast to where the margin structure gets to because you've got to walk, crawl, run. And so we're right now at the walk stage. We're getting to breakeven. And then in the future, we'll continue driving up margins.

隨著時間的推移，我們將採取一些措施來繼續提高這些利潤率。所以我不想提供保證金結構的預測，因為你必須走路、爬行、跑步。所以我們現在處於步行階段。我們正在收支平衡。然後在未來，我們將繼續提高利潤率。

Today, the vast majority of the margin comes from the U.S. restaurant business. Other areas are sort of margin consumers, so to speak. But over time, as they hit maturity, you start to see us generate more and more profits from these other areas.

如今，絕大部分利潤來自美國餐飲業。可以這麼說，其他領域是某種邊際消費者。但隨著時間的推移，隨著它們的成熟，你開始看到我們從這些其他領域產生越來越多的利潤。

Your next question comes from the line of Lloyd Walmsley from UBS.

您的下一個問題來自瑞銀的 Lloyd Walmsley。

Great. I have 2. First, kind of sticking to the unit economic question. In the letter, you talked about convenience looking to generate a positive variable profit in the second half. Can you just help us contextualize that? And is this a big flip over the last year or so? And what is -- actually, what you see driving that flip to variable profit contribution in the second half?

偉大的。我有2個。首先，有點堅持單位經濟問題。在信中，您談到了希望在下半年產生正的可變利潤的便利。你能幫我們把它背景化嗎？這是過去一年左右的重大轉變嗎？什麼是 - 實際上，您認為是什麼推動了下半年的可變利潤貢獻？

And then the second one, there were some press reports about slowing hiring at DoorDash recently. Is this accurate? Can you talk about what you're seeing causing you to slow hiring or maybe just shifting priorities ahead of Wolt? Anything you could share there would be great.

然後是第二個，最近有一些關於 DoorDash 招聘放緩的新聞報導。這是準確的嗎？您能否談談您所看到的導致您招聘緩慢的原因，或者可能只是在 Wolt 之前轉移了優先事項？你可以在那里分享的任何東西都會很棒。

Great. Maybe I'll take the first one and Tony can take the second, Lloyd. So on the question around 3P convenience, you have to remember when we started this category, it was a -- we knew there was demand for it because we saw what consumers were searching for, right? And that demand was further amplified by COVID. But what we didn't completely appreciate was exactly how different and unique this area as compared to restaurants. And so that's the learning curve we've been on that has now gone to the other side of as we turn the curve and profitability.

偉大的。也許我會拿第一個，托尼可以拿第二個，勞埃德。所以關於 3P 便利性的問題，你必須記住，當我們開始這個類別時，它是一個 - 我們知道有需求，因為我們看到了消費者在搜索什麼，對吧？ COVID進一步放大了這種需求。但我們沒有完全欣賞的是，與餐館相比，這個地區有多麼不同和獨特。這就是我們一直在學習的曲線，隨著我們扭轉曲線和盈利能力，現在已經走到了另一邊。

So simple things like our Dashers need to go into stores to pick and pack. We need a different way to understand the inventory position inside the store and how do you guide the Dasher when they're inside the store. The basket sizes tend to be lower. So this is where our operational sort of execution focus and product-focused muscle really shine because it allowed us to take this problem that look unique relative to restaurants and actually create products around it in order to make the math work even with lower basket sizes and picking and packing requirements. So that's what I'd say now. There's certainly a lot more we can do in terms of further sales as well as other things, including advertising attached, by the way, to drive up the unit economics. And we're super early given that it's only 2 years old.

像我們的 Dashers 這樣簡單的東西需要去商店挑选和包裝。我們需要一種不同的方式來了解商店內的庫存位置，以及當 Dasher 在商店內時如何引導它們。籃子尺寸往往較小。因此，這就是我們的運營類型的執行重點和以產品為中心的肌肉真正發揮作用的地方，因為它使我們能夠解決這個相對於餐廳而言看起來獨特的問題，並實際圍繞它創建產品，以便即使在較小的籃子尺寸和揀貨和包裝要求。這就是我現在要說的。在進一步的銷售和其他方面，我們當然可以做更多的事情，包括附帶的廣告，順便提一下，以提高單位經濟效益。鑑於它只有 2 年曆史，我們非常早。

Yes. I think the other thing I'd add before I take the question, Lloyd, on hiring is just -- I think it's important to realize, especially when you're talking about the immense opportunity in something like convenience or grocery, which is a hundreds of billions of dollars -- more than $1 trillion opportunity globally, it's a very long runway in terms of how we think about this.

是的。我想在我回答問題之前我要補充的另一件事，勞埃德，關於招聘，我認為認識到這一點很重要，尤其是當你談論便利或雜貨等方面的巨大機會時，這是一個數千億美元——全球超過 1 萬億美元的機會，就我們如何看待這一點而言，這是一條很長的路。

To be candid, I was very impressed by how our teams were able to do all the things that Prabir said, and on top of that, build new catalog that is item-based that has tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands of items per store instead of hundreds of items inside of a restaurant menu, rebuild search into an item-based experience first before a store-based experience. I mean there's a lot of things that the team built, and they were able, in parallel, to move the unit economics. And I think it's a huge testament to the team in terms of the work that they did in both moving the top and the bottom line of building a better product that customers would be using over and again and then also making moves on the profitability front.

坦率地說，我對我們的團隊如何能夠完成 Prabir 所說的所有事情印象深刻，最重要的是，建立基於商品的新目錄，每家商店有數万到數十萬件商品在基於商店的體驗之前，首先將搜索重建為基於項目的體驗，而不是餐廳菜單中的數百個項目。我的意思是團隊構建了很多東西，他們能夠同時推動單位經濟。而且我認為，就團隊所做的工作而言，這是一個巨大的證明，他們在構建更好的產品的頂線和底線方面所做的工作，客戶將一遍又一遍地使用它，然後也在盈利能力方面採取行動。

On hiring, I guess the first thing I would say is you got to be careful with what you read because it's probably either not in context or just not accurate. We're hiring at actually still very aggressive rates, multiples in fact of what I believe has been reported. But in general, let me talk a little bit about hiring maybe in the context of just our investment philosophy because it's very similar.

在招聘時，我想我要說的第一件事是你必須小心你閱讀的內容，因為它可能不是上下文或不准確。我們正在以實際上仍然非常激進的速度招聘，實際上是我認為已經報導的倍數。但總的來說，讓我談談招聘可能只是在我們的投資理念的背景下，因為它非常相似。

If you look at the history of DoorDash or how perhaps or where we came from and maybe how we have enabled this continuous, efficient process of inventing and in a disciplined way of scaling the business, it really came from the fact that we had a lot of constraints early on in the business. I mean for the first 6 to 6.5 years of the business, we had a fraction of the financing of some of our peers. And so there is no ability to hire huge teams or spend a lot on marketing, spend anything on discounts or subsidies. We had to invent and win by building a superior product. Gain profitability in the right way, it's not by doing unnatural things that hurt the customer experience, but by doing the things that would increase selection, that would improve the service quality of our deliveries, that would offer more value in the form of DashPass and other programs and improve our customer support.

如果你看看 DoorDash 的歷史，或者我們是如何或從哪裡來的，也許我們是如何實現這種持續、高效的發明過程並以一種有紀律的方式擴展業務的，它真的來自這樣一個事實：我們有很多業務早期的限制。我的意思是，在業務的前 6 到 6.5 年，我們只獲得了一些同行融資的一小部分。因此，沒有能力僱傭龐大的團隊或在營銷上花費大量資金，也無法在折扣或補貼上花費任何費用。我們必須通過打造卓越的產品進行發明並贏得勝利。以正確的方式獲得盈利，不是通過做不自然的事情來損害客戶體驗，而是通過做可以增加選擇的事情，提高我們交付的服務質量，以 DashPass 的形式提供更多價值和其他計劃並改善我們的客戶支持。

All of these things is what led us to have industry-leading retention, which has yielded, I think, some of the numbers that we've shown in the shareholder letter, all-time highs in our monthly active users, even as, thankfully, customers are now finally returning back inside restaurants, all-time highs in our DashPass subscriber base, all-time highs in our order frequency across cohorts. So building the best product as well as gaining efficiencies from operations and scale economies from marketing, that's really how the business has been built.

所有這些都是使我們擁有行業領先的留存率的原因，我認為，這已經產生了我們在股東信中顯示的一些數字，我們的月活躍用戶數創下歷史新高，儘管值得慶幸的是，客戶現在終於回到餐廳，我們的 DashPass 用戶群創下歷史新高，我們在同類群組中的訂單頻率創下歷史新高。因此，打造最好的產品並從運營中獲得效率並從營銷中獲得規模經濟，這就是企業的真正建立方式。

Now when I apply that same investment philosophy towards something like hiring, it can't just be to hire aggressively. It has to also be to invest in systems of how we can reapply systems that we've built for one category and make that -- give us leverage into categories B, C, D, E, F and all of these ways of how we actually architect a system designed towards building the best customer experience and having the most efficient P&L.

現在，當我將同樣的投資理念應用於招聘等事情時，不能只是積極招聘。它還必須投資於我們如何重新應用我們為一個類別構建的系統並實現它的系統——讓我們利用 B、C、D、E、F 類以及所有這些我們如何實際上構建了一個旨在構建最佳客戶體驗並擁有最有效損益的系統。

Your next question comes from the line of Doug Anmuth from JPMorgan.

您的下一個問題來自摩根大通的 Doug Anmuth。

I have 2. First, I was just hoping you could talk about whether the inflationary pressures seen by your restaurant partners are changing the way they interact with or utilize DoorDash.

我有 2 個。首先，我只是希望您能談談您的餐廳合作夥伴看到的通脹壓力是否正在改變他們與 DoorDash 互動或使用的方式。

And then second, also I was hoping you could talk about the response from Dashers to your Dash rewards program. And any commentary kind of way of framing how much that's costing you?

其次，我也希望你能談談 Dashers 對你的 Dash 獎勵計劃的反應。以及任何評論方式來描述你花了多少錢？

Doug, maybe I'll start with the first here. Our average order values have increased slightly as a result of inflation. Obviously, we pass on the large portion of that to our merchants, so they benefit as well, given that they're experiencing price increases and the cost of the food. And all else being equal, this would also have a positive impact on our margins.

道格，也許我會從這裡的第一個開始。由於通貨膨脹，我們的平均訂單價值略有增加。顯然，我們將其中的很大一部分轉嫁給了我們的商家，因此他們也受益，因為他們正在經歷價格上漲和食品成本。在其他條件相同的情況下，這也會對我們的利潤率產生積極影響。

Now the one thing I'll say is the reality is we've seen food cost inflation for over a year now, right, with chicken prices and other things. And so it's hard to tell exactly what impact inflation is having on order volume and on consumer engagement specifically because we don't have the counterfactual. Having said that, when you step back and you look at the results in the quarter and the fact that monthly active users are at all-time highs, the fact that DashPass members are at all-time highs and order frequency is at all-time highs, it speaks to the resilience of the platform. And the fact that the product has consistently gotten better and better and better in terms of selection, in terms of quality, in terms of affordability, and that leads to more consumer adoption, habituation and an increasing usage over time.

現在我要說的一件事是現實是我們已經看到食品成本上漲一年多了，對，雞肉價格和其他東西。因此，很難準確地說出通貨膨脹對訂單量和消費者參與度的影響，因為我們沒有反事實。話雖如此，當您退後一步並查看本季度的結果以及每月活躍用戶處於歷史最高水平的事實時，DashPass 會員處於歷史最高水平並且訂單頻率處於歷史最高水平的事實高點，它說明了平台的彈性。事實上，該產品在選擇、質量、可負擔性方面一直在變得越來越好，這導致更多的消費者採用、習慣和隨著時間的推移越來越多的使用。

And then on your -- sorry. Tony, do you want to add something to that?

然後在你的 - 對不起。托尼，你想補充點什麼嗎？

Yes. So Doug, I'll just chime in. I think your question was also if we're seeing any behavior on the merchant and the Dasher front. I would say a couple of things. Inflation is definitely a concern we certainly are taking very seriously, and we're doing that by making sure that all of our audiences are taken care of first. And that -- and one of the things we've been fortunate to see -- I'll echo a little bit of what Prabir said, and I'll take your question on merchants and Dashers, which is just the resiliency of the core business of U.S. restaurants where I think it's because when I take a look at all of the possible areas where consumers could spend and consume, eating is still the one of the largest and certainly the highest frequency categories where people eat 3 times a day, 90 times a month. If you start looking at some of the other categories we now participate in, that's well over 100 shopping occasions per month.

是的。所以道格，我會插話。我認為你的問題也是我們是否看到商人和 Dasher 前線的任何行為。我想說幾件事。通貨膨脹絕對是我們非常重視的一個問題，我們這樣做是通過確保首先照顧到我們所有的觀眾來做到這一點的。那——也是我們有幸看到的一件事——我會回應一下普拉比爾所說的，我會回答你關於商人和 Dashers 的問題，這只是核心的彈性我認為這是因為當我查看消費者可以消費和消費的所有可能領域時，飲食仍然是人們每天吃 3 次的最大且肯定是頻率最高的類別之一，90一個月。如果您開始查看我們現在參與的其他一些類別，那麼每月的購物機會超過 100 次。

And when we have built the largest marketplace with the most retained and also the most engaged user base, it just gives us the most shots on goal in the face of something like inflation. And when they translate that into our other 2 audiences, merchants and Dashers, merchants, they continue to see DoorDash as a way to actually gain sales even though consumers are going inside their stores, which is fantastic. And that's because dining-in is very complementary to actually ordering delivery. I mean when you're dining in, you're looking for that experience to maybe see people you haven't seen in a while in person, and that's very complementary to ordering delivery because, again, you eat multiple times a day, 20 to 25 times a week.

當我們建立了最大的市場，擁有最多的保留和最活躍的用戶群時，它只會讓我們在面對通貨膨脹等問題時獲得最多的射門機會。當他們將其轉化為我們的其他 2 個受眾，商家和 Dashers，商家時，他們繼續將 DoorDash 視為一種實際獲得銷售的方式，即使消費者進入他們的商店，這太棒了。那是因為就餐與實際訂購外賣非常互補。我的意思是，當你在餐廳用餐時，你正在尋找那種體驗，也許可以見到你已經有一段時間沒見過的人了，這與訂購外賣非常相輔相成，因為同樣，你一天吃多次，20每週25次。

And then on the Dasher front, what we've done is we definitely recognize that inflation is impacting Dasher earnings. And that's really what we wanted to solve for. It was the right thing for us to do given that we had a very fortunate position as having a U.S. restaurants business that's not only grown 250% over the last couple of years, but that have materially also increased its profitability such that we can choose to reinvest those cash flows into serving all of the audiences. And that's what we did.

然後在 Dasher 方面，我們所做的是我們明確認識到通貨膨脹正在影響 Dasher 的收入。這正是我們想要解決的問題。鑑於我們非常幸運地擁有一家美國餐館業務，這對我們來說是正確的做法，該業務不僅在過去幾年中增長了 250%，而且還大大提高了其盈利能力，因此我們可以選擇將這些現金流再投資於服務所有受眾。這就是我們所做的。

We gave out 2 programs. One was a 10% cash back on fuel expenses, and the other was a bonus program that was tied to the distance in which Dashers would be driving. And the results so far have been very, very satisfying where 90% of Dashers are really, really excited about the benefits that we've offered so far.

我們發出了2個節目。一個是燃油費用的 10% 現金返還，另一個是與 Dashers 駕駛距離相關的獎勵計劃。到目前為止，結果非常非常令人滿意，90% 的 Dashers 對我們迄今為止提供的好處感到非常非常興奮。

And just to offer a little more color to what Tony just described, Doug. Look, we chose to absorb the cost of these Dasher benefits in order to preserve earnings. We could have chosen to pass on the cost to consumers, and that would have had an impact on growth due to consumer price elasticity. But instead, we chose to absorb the program costs.

為了給托尼剛剛描述的內容提供更多色彩，道格。看，我們選擇吸收這些 Dasher 福利的成本以保持收益。我們本可以選擇將成本轉嫁給消費者，由於消費者價格彈性，這將對增長產生影響。但相反，我們選擇承擔項目成本。

So let me explain why we did that. When we keep consumer prices unchanged and if we ensure that Dasher earnings are preserved, that enables us to maximize growth because having adequate supply ensures that the consumer quality is preserved, which then drives the growth flywheel in a slightly different way, right?

所以讓我解釋一下我們為什麼這樣做。當我們保持消費者價格不變，並且如果我們確保 Dasher 的收入得以保留，這使我們能夠最大化增長，因為充足的供應可以確保保持消費者質量，然後以稍微不同的方式驅動增長飛輪，對嗎？

So then there's a question of, well, how do you fund it? And as Tony pointed out, the U.S. restaurant business is very profitable, and we use the profits from the restaurant business for 2 things. First, as we previously talked about, to invest in new areas and international and so on. The second is to reinvest back in the core restaurant business. So we're growing scale and generating growth in our core restaurant business.

那麼問題來了，你如何資助它？正如托尼指出的那樣，美國的餐飲業務非常有利可圖，我們將餐飲業務的利潤用於兩件事。首先，正如我們之前談到的，投資新領域和國際化等等。二是對核心餐飲業務進行再投資。因此，我們正在擴大規模並在我們的核心餐廳業務中實現增長。

Historically, we've taken these efficiencies, and we have used them to lower consumer prices, lower merchant commissions, increase Dash earnings. Today, because of gas prices, there's this unique need for Dashers. And so we're allocating more investment to actually help increase Dash earnings. If gas prices revert in the future, we'll revisit that. So in short, absorbing these costs is basically net-neutral to our EBITDA expectations.

從歷史上看，我們利用了這些效率，並利用它們來降低消費者價格、降低商家佣金、增加 Dash 收入。今天，由於汽油價格的原因，對 Dashers 有這種獨特的需求。因此，我們正在分配更多投資以實際幫助增加 Dash 收益。如果未來汽油價格回升，我們將重新審視這一點。所以簡而言之，吸收這些成本對我們的 EBITDA 預期基本上是淨中性的。

Your next question comes from the line of Michael McGovern from Bank of America.

您的下一個問題來自美國銀行的 Michael McGovern。

I wanted to see if you would double-click into the metric that Q1 '22 was the largest quarter for new consumer acquisition since Q1 last year despite lower sales and marketing as a percent of revenue. What's driving this? And are these -- I was curious if these customers are still primarily coming from the restaurant category? Or are they more -- are they coming more frequently from nonrestaurant for the first time?

我想看看你是否會雙擊這個指標，即 22 年第一季度是自去年第一季度以來新消費者獲取的最大季度，儘管銷售和營銷佔收入的百分比有所下降。是什麼驅動了這一切？這些 - 我很好奇這些客戶是否仍然主要來自餐廳類別？還是他們更多——他們是不是第一次更頻繁地來自非餐廳？

Yes. Thanks, Michael. Let me take this question. Yes. So if you look back, Q1 '21, so Q1 last year was elevated in terms of customer acquisition as a result of fiscal stimulus. Ignoring that quarter, if you look at every other quarter up to Q1 '22, we've acquired more customers than we did. And that just speaks to the fact that we're still underpenetrated in this category, and there's more customers to be acquired.

是的。謝謝，邁克爾。讓我來回答這個問題。是的。因此，如果您回顧一下，21 年第一季度，由於財政刺激，去年第一季度在客戶獲取方面有所提升。忽略該季度，如果您查看截至 22 年第一季度的每隔一個季度，我們獲得的客戶比我們做的要多。這只是說明我們在這一類別中的滲透率仍然不足，而且還有更多的客戶需要獲得。

And then the last thing I'll say is the majority of our business is the restaurant business. And so a lot of these customers join and place their first order on restaurants, but we're seeing an interesting mix change where now we've got a decent number of customers joining to actually use some of our other categories, not just restaurants. And so it's too early because these are small percentages we're talking about. But over time, as DoorDash gets known for being your destination for all things local commerce, that the source of what product these customers use when they first joined DoorDash will undoubtedly change.

然後我要說的最後一件事是我們的大部分業務是餐廳業務。因此，很多這些客戶加入並在餐廳下訂單，但我們看到了一個有趣的組合變化，現在我們有相當數量的客戶加入實際使用我們的其他一些類別，而不僅僅是餐廳。所以現在還為時過早，因為這些只是我們正在談論的一小部分。但隨著時間的推移，隨著 DoorDash 以成為所有本地商務的目的地而聞名，這些客戶在首次加入 DoorDash 時使用的產品來源無疑會發生變化。

Your next question comes from the line of Deepak Mathivanan from Wolfe.

您的下一個問題來自 Wolfe 的 Deepak Mathivanan。

Two questions from us. First, maybe can you unpack the drivers of sustained frequency gains? DashPass adoption and the nonfood convenience categories is very strong. But how does it look between subscribers versus nonsubscribers? Now with consumers kind of going back to break over lifestyles, are you seeing differences in maybe the type of orders in terms of time when it's placed and basket sizes?

我們提出了兩個問題。首先，也許你能解開持續頻率增益的驅動因素嗎？ DashPass 的採用和非食品便利類別非常強大。但是訂閱者與非訂閱者之間的情況如何？現在隨著消費者重新開始打破生活方式，您是否看到訂單類型在放置時間和購物籃大小方面的差異？

And then, Prabir, just a financial question. Can you elaborate on the insurance reserves impact on first quarter cost of revenues? Is that some kind of accrual adjustment? Or is there any change in underlying unit economics?

然後，Prabir，只是一個財務問題。您能否詳細說明保險準備金對第一季度收入成本的影響？這是某種應計調整嗎？或者基礎單位經濟學是否有任何變化？

Yes, I'll take the first question, Deepak, and then Prabir will handle the question on insurance. The reason for the frequency gains are really coming from the improvements in our product. I mean there's certainly -- in part, some of the order frequency gains came from increasing contributions from our DashPass subscriber base.

是的，我會回答第一個問題，Deepak，然後 Prabir 將處理有關保險的問題。頻率增益的原因實際上來自我們產品的改進。我的意思是肯定 - 部分訂單頻率的增加來自我們 DashPass 用戶群的貢獻增加。

But if you -- when you step back, I think a couple of points still are very, very important. Number one, dining-in and ordering delivery are very complementary. In fact, we saw this at almost every phase of the pandemic. There were various geographies in various parts of the world, including the U.S., where certain states had reopened more aggressively perhaps than some others, where we saw that in the past couple of years, and certainly, we're still seeing that in the first quarter of this year and even currently where people are not substituting eating in with eating out.

但如果你——當你退後一步時，我認為有幾點仍然非常非常重要。第一，堂食和外賣是互補的。事實上，我們幾乎在大流行的每個階段都看到了這一點。包括美國在內的世界各地都有不同的地區，某些州可能比其他一些州更積極地重新開放，我們在過去幾年中看到了這種情況，當然，我們仍然在第一時間看到了這種情況今年的四分之一，甚至目前人們都沒有用外出就餐代替進餐。

The second point I would say is we're constantly making improvements to the product. So we're constantly increasing selection. Whether that's restaurants, grocery stores, convenience stores, pharmacy stores, alcohol stores, resell stores, et cetera, we're increasing the quality of the deliveries by maniacally getting rid of defects where improving affordability, part of which is coming from DashPass, and we're continuously investing in customer support to make sure that we always can delight customers and meet their increasing expectations. So that's really why order frequencies are growing.

我要說的第二點是我們不斷改進產品。因此，我們不斷增加選擇。無論是餐館、雜貨店、便利店、藥店、酒類店、轉售店等等，我們都在通過瘋狂地消除提高可負擔性的缺陷來提高交付質量，其中一部分來自 DashPass，並且我們不斷投資於客戶支持，以確保我們始終能夠取悅客戶並滿足他們日益增長的期望。所以這就是訂單頻率不斷增長的真正原因。

And specifically, Deepak, on the DashPass, user order frequency has grown and you've also got an increase in mix towards DashPass. So those 2 things sort of act in concert with each other.

具體來說，Deepak 在 DashPass 上，用戶訂購頻率有所增加，而且 DashPass 的組合也有所增加。所以這兩件事是相互協調的。

And on your question on insurance reserves, we experienced an increase in the average claim amount driven by the outsized impact of a few very large claims. As a result, we adjusted our reserves both for existing claims as well as for future claims by $35 million, which had about a 30 basis point impact to cost of sales. Even though the insurance costs increase, it's a relatively small portion of our cost of sales certainly compared to other line items like payment processing or customer support and is lower than what you might see in rideshare. And so long of saying this is an area where we haven't -- because it's been a small cost, we haven't focused on it, but it also represents an opportunity where we have begun now to put in place new processes to control these costs in the long term.

關於你關於保險準備金的問題，由於一些非常大的索賠的巨大影響，我們經歷了平均索賠額的增加。因此，我們將現有索賠和未來索賠的準備金調整了 3500 萬美元，這對銷售成本產生了約 30 個基點的影響。儘管保險成本增加了，但與支付處理或客戶支持等其他項目相比，它在我們的銷售成本中所佔的比例肯定相對較小，並且低於您在拼車中看到的。這麼長時間以來，我們一直在說這是一個我們沒有的領域——因為這是一個很小的成本，我們沒有專注於它，但這也代表了一個機會，我們現在已經開始實施新的流程來控制從長遠來看，這些成本。

The last thing I would say is in the near term, we expect insurance costs to remain elevated in the near term because it takes a while for these changes to reflect in our claims data, but we're going to manage within the EBITDA range.

我要說的最後一件事是在短期內，我們預計短期內保險成本將保持高位，因為這些變化需要一段時間才能反映在我們的索賠數據中，但我們將在 EBITDA 範圍內進行管理。

Your next question comes from the line of Brian Nowak from Morgan Stanley.

您的下一個問題來自摩根士丹利的 Brian Nowak。

I have 2. The first one, Tony, I know you always put a maniacal focus on efficiency and improving the process. Maybe just sort of qualitatively, could you talk to us about a couple of the biggest low-hanging fruit areas you still see room for improvement in the core U.S. restaurant delivery business? That's the first one.

我有 2 個。第一個，托尼，我知道你總是瘋狂地關注效率和改進流程。也許只是定性的，你能和我們談談你仍然認為美國核心餐廳外賣業務有改進空間的幾個最大的低垂水果領域嗎？那是第一個。

Then the second one, the point about 3P convenience reaching positive variable contribution, was that sort of in line with what you all thought at the start of the year? Or is that ahead of schedule? And if it is ahead of schedule, any reason why we're not raising full year EBITDA? Is it just too small? Are you going to reinvest? Can you tell us about that a little bit?

然後第二個，關於 3P 便利性達到正變量貢獻的觀點，這是否符合年初大家的想法？還是提前了？如果它提前了，我們為什麼不提高全年 EBITDA 的原因是什麼？是不是太小了？你打算再投資嗎？你能告訴我們一點嗎？

Yes. Brian, there's still a large room to go in terms of finding more and more efficiency. And really, there's kind of 2 general ways I think about this. The first is how do we just find the next level of product market fit, which certainly would grow our retention and order frequency even further, thereby give us even more leverage on the sales and marketing side of the P&L -- overall P&L.

是的。布賴恩，在尋找越來越高的效率方面還有很大的空間。真的，我有兩種一般的想法。首先是我們如何才能找到下一個級別的產品市場契合度，這肯定會進一步提高我們的保留率和訂單頻率，從而使我們在損益表的銷售和營銷方面——整體損益表——獲得更大的影響力。

And then the second is really efficiency from operations. Take, for example, the wait times we still see at stores, I mean, especially given some of the labor challenges that you're seeing at whether it's restaurants or whether it's grocery stores or convenience stores, everyone in the service industry is certainly feeling this. That makes wait times as well as inventory management have higher variance. Being able to manage that variance and being able to lower those wait times and increase or improve the accuracy, I should say, of the inventory management, I think, are all areas.

第二個是真正的運營效率。以我們仍然在商店看到的等待時間為例，我的意思是，特別是考慮到你在餐館、雜貨店或便利店看到的一些勞動力挑戰，服務行業的每個人肯定都感到這。這使得等待時間和庫存管理具有更高的差異。能夠管理這種差異並能夠減少等待時間並增加或提高準確性，我應該說，我認為庫存管理都是領域。

But really, you can find efficiency in every line item. And -- but the 2 general approaches I generally think of this is how do we build the next level of product such that our consumers love it even more, which gives us lots of sales and marketing leverage. And then on the other side, it's really finding efficiency on the cost front.

但實際上，您可以在每個訂單項中找到效率。而且 - 但我通常認為的兩種通用方法是我們如何構建下一個級別的產品，以便我們的消費者更加喜歡它，這為我們提供了很多銷售和營銷槓桿。另一方面，它確實在成本方面尋找效率。

And then on your question, Brian, on 3P convenience and why not raise the guide, it's a small portion right now. And secondly, any profits we generate, as I mentioned earlier, we reinvest and try to drive scale and growth so that we maximize long-term profit dollars.

然後關於你的問題，Brian，關於 3P 的便利性以及為什麼不提高指南，現在只是一小部分。其次，正如我之前提到的，我們產生的任何利潤，我們都會進行再投資並嘗試推動規模和增長，以便我們最大化長期利潤。

Your next question comes from the line of Ronald Josey from Citi.

您的下一個問題來自花旗銀行的 Ronald Josey。

I wanted to ask maybe a bigger picture on DashPass just given the importance in greater overall frequency of usage. And we're seeing more categories being added here and available on the service, and that talks to the value. But I want to understand a little bit more how do you prove the value here to members? In surveys that we've run, one of the best parts of why people order or have DashPass is because it saves money. The same amount of folks on the other side say it's too expensive. So can you talk to us a little bit about the value on DashPass and marketing there?

考慮到更高的整體使用頻率的重要性，我想問一下關於 DashPass 的更大圖景。我們看到這裡添加了更多類別並在服務上可用，這與價值有關。但我想多了解一點，你如何向會員證明這裡的價值？在我們進行的調查中，人們訂購或擁有 DashPass 的最佳部分之一是因為它可以節省資金。另一邊同樣數量的人說它太貴了。那麼你能和我們談談 DashPass 的價值和那裡的營銷嗎？

And then in the letter, Tony, you talked about first-party commerce and underpenetration here. Wanted to hear a little bit more about what you're doing in terms of drive and how that might help answer those questions.

然後在信中，托尼，你在這裡談到了第一方商業和滲透不足。想听聽更多關於你在驅動方面所做的事情以及這如何有助於回答這些問題。

Sure. I can start and feel free, Prabir, if you want to chime in on some of these. But I think the first question around DashPass and value, I kind of take this in 2 parts. One part, you kind of answered, I think, in your question, which really came in the form of savings, right? And I think that makes a lot of sense, especially for users that are discovering our product multiple times a month or possibly multiple times a week. I think -- and we'll continue to make those investments.

當然。 Prabir，如果你想加入其中的一些，我可以開始並感到自由。但我認為關於 DashPass 和價值的第一個問題，我將其分為兩部分。有一部分，我認為，在你的問題中，你的回答是真正以儲蓄的形式出現的，對吧？我認為這很有意義，特別是對於每月多次或可能每週多次發現我們產品的用戶而言。我認為 - 我們將繼續進行這些投資。

But the other thing I would say is that we also want to improve the product for DashPass itself by making sure that we can offer either exclusive or preferred types of product experiences that are only made available through DashPass as well as the fact that we're introducing so many more categories. I know that, overall, customers who've ordered -- who are ordering outside of our restaurants category. The last number we announced is around 14% in Q4. But in certain markets, that number is much, much higher than that, and you see a lot of that coming from DashPass buyers and subscribers.

但我要說的另一件事是，我們還想改進 DashPass 本身的產品，確保我們可以提供僅通過 DashPass 提供的獨家或首選類型的產品體驗，以及我們是引入更多類別。我知道，總的來說，已經訂購的顧客——他們在我們的餐廳類別之外訂購。我們公佈的最後一個數字是第四季度的 14% 左右。但在某些市場，這個數字遠遠高於這個數字，你會看到很多來自 DashPass 買家和訂閱者。

And remind me your second question again.

並再次提醒我你的第二個問題。

Actually, before you move on to the second question, Tony, just a couple of things to add, Ron. I mean you're exactly right. So far, the program has been about delivering savings to consumers. And that's fine because we had to start somewhere, and that's naturally a place to start. Over time, now that we've got the program at scale and it's something that both merchants and consumers recognize the value, you can start layering in benefits that extend beyond just dollar savings, right?

實際上，在您繼續討論第二個問題之前，Tony，您需要補充幾件事，Ron。我的意思是你完全正確。到目前為止，該計劃一直在為消費者節省開支。這很好，因為我們必須從某個地方開始，這自然是一個開始的地方。隨著時間的推移，既然我們已經大規模實施了該計劃，並且商家和消費者都認識到了它的價值，那麼您就可以開始享受不僅僅是節省美元的好處了，對吧？

So think of that as exclusive items. The restaurant wants to market something specifically to these consumers. We can do exclusive items with DashPass. We can provide exclusive access to certain restaurants that might be more farther away compared to restaurants that are in your vicinity. We can do segmented offerings. We've launched our DashPass student plan, and this is a way of tailoring the benefits to a certain segment of the population to make it more interesting for them. We can add selection so that maybe you don't eat from restaurants today. And as a result, the savings opportunity isn't available to you. But if we add in grocery and convenience stores, now you might have other use cases for which DashPass is actually beneficial. So there's things we can do within DashPass in order to tailor the benefit depending on who the audience is, and we're just getting started.

因此，將其視為獨家項目。這家餐廳想專門向這些消費者推銷一些東西。我們可以用 DashPass 做獨家項目。與您附近的餐廳相比，我們可以提供對某些可能更遠的餐廳的獨家訪問權。我們可以做細分產品。我們推出了 DashPass 學生計劃，這是一種為特定人群定制福利的方式，讓他們更感興趣。我們可以添加選擇，這樣您今天就不會在餐館吃飯了。因此，您無法獲得儲蓄機會。但是，如果我們添加雜貨店和便利店，現在您可能還有其他用例，而 DashPass 實際上是有益的。因此，我們可以在 DashPass 中做一些事情，以便根據受眾群體定制收益，而我們才剛剛開始。

And Ron, I think your second question was actually about Drive and kind of the digitization of kind of the first-party experience, right? And so you asked -- first of all, the premise is absolutely right. I mean I think if there's any positive from COVID, it's that every physical business was effectively forced or compelled to become a digital operations almost somewhat overnight. And as a result, I think the major lesson everyone learned is that digital sales can complement their in-store business and in-store activity. And in fact, those who've invested very aggressively in their e-commerce operations, I think, have really, really benefited and continue to have shown strength. And so that -- and that's what we're seeing in terms of the merchants demand and willingness to work with us to effectively transform their business models into becoming digital operations.

Ron，我認為你的第二個問題實際上是關於 Drive 和第一方體驗的數字化，對吧？所以你問了——首先，前提是絕對正確的。我的意思是，我認為如果 COVID 有任何積極意義，那就是每個實體企業幾乎在一夜之間實際上被迫或被迫成為數字業務。因此，我認為每個人都學到的主要教訓是數字銷售可以補充他們的店內業務和店內活動。事實上，我認為，那些在電子商務業務上進行了非常積極投資的人，真的、真的受益匪淺，並且繼續表現出實力。所以——這就是我們看到的商家需求和願意與我們合作以有效地將他們的商業模式轉變為數字化運營的情況。

And so Drive obviously has played a big part of that where it's effectively now diversified from starting with large enterprise restaurants only to now serving everyone from nonrestaurants, convenience stores, pet stores, liquor stores, grocery stores, retail stores, and it has a large runway both in the U.S. as well as globally, but it also has a big runway in serving small businesses as well. And that's really why we've built Storefront because a lot of these small businesses aren't even able right now to have online ordering systems that will talk or seamlessly integrate into their back of the house systems, and Storefront really does that.

因此，Drive 顯然在其中發揮了重要作用，它現在有效地多樣化，從僅從大型企業餐廳開始，到現在為非餐館、便利店、寵物店、酒類店、雜貨店、零售店的所有人提供服務，而且它擁有一個龐大的跑道在美國和全球範圍內，但它在服務小企業方面也有很大的跑道。這就是我們建立 Storefront 的真正原因，因為許多這些小型企業現在甚至無法擁有可以對話或無縫集成到其後台系統的在線訂購系統，而 Storefront 確實做到了。

And our latest product that we've introduced as part of our platform services business, actually, it was an acquisition called Bbot. That product really helps manage the in-store operation that becomes a bit of the operating system inside these restaurants. And so there's a lot of work we have to do in order to build an end-to-end system to really power the first-party digital operations of these businesses, but it's an opportunity that you're absolutely right exist within restaurants, outside of restaurants and globally.

我們作為平台服務業務的一部分推出的最新產品實際上是一項名為 Bbot 的收購。該產品確實有助於管理成為這些餐廳內部操作系統的店內操作。因此，我們需要做很多工作才能建立一個端到端的系統，真正為這些企業的第一方數字化運營提供動力，但這是一個絕對正確的機會，存在於餐廳內外餐廳和全球。

Your next question comes from the line of Andrew Boone from JMP Securities.

您的下一個問題來自 JMP 證券公司的 Andrew Boone。

I have 2, please. So the first is from the letter, it feels like convenience is starting to get to scale. The question is really, what's the next category that you guys are really excited about that you think can -- that you can lean into and invest behind and kind of get to that same kind of variable contribution margin breakeven and kind of velocity?

我有2個，請。所以第一個來自信，感覺就像便利開始擴大規模。問題是真的，你們認為可以的下一個類別是什麼，你們真的很興奮——你可以依靠和投資，並達到同樣的可變貢獻邊際盈虧平衡和速度？

And then the second question is more bigger picture. Understood that as you guys see larger opportunities, you're investing there, but can you just remind us in terms of the framework of how you think about allowing margin expansion to flow through to the model just overall? So how do you think about kind of growth versus profitability?

然後第二個問題是更大的圖景。明白了，當你們看到更大的機會時，你們正在那裡投資，但你能否提醒我們你如何考慮讓利潤率擴張流向整個模型的框架？那麼，您如何看待增長與盈利能力？

It's Tony. I'll take the first question and maybe Prabir can take the question on the economics and how we can reinvest those back into the model. On the first, look, all of these categories are pretty enormous, right? Restaurants in the U.S. is $800 billion. I mean if you look at grocery and convenience, they add to over $1 trillion in the U.S. Outside of the U.S., it's much larger than that. And then if you include the other categories of pets, alcohol, pharmacy, retail, we get to an even larger number.

是托尼。我會回答第一個問題，也許 Prabir 可以回答關於經濟學的問題，以及我們如何將這些問題重新投資到模型中。首先，看，所有這些類別都非常龐大，對吧？美國的餐館是 8000 億美元。我的意思是，如果你看看雜貨店和便利店，它們在美國增加了超過 1 萬億美元。在美國以外，它比這要大得多。然後，如果您包括其他類別的寵物、酒類、藥房、零售，我們會得到更大的數字。

And so I think when the opportunity is that large, we don't think that much about which one of them is going to get there first. We instead just think about what's the right amount to invest and when to do it, right? And that really goes back to the investment philosophy that we kind of outlined from how we launched businesses in the first place, which -- and this is true for all of the businesses at DoorDash, whether it was the restaurants marketplace, the platform business with products like Drive or Storefront or the convenience business or all the ads business that we're launching, the international markets, which really is how do we build the best possible product to actually meet or ideally exceed the customer expectations and keep doing that and then how do we actually line by line work down the costs so that we can achieve positive unit math before we consider.

所以我認為，當機會如此之大時，我們不會過多考慮他們中的哪一個會先到達那裡。相反，我們只考慮合適的投資金額以及何時投資，對嗎？這真的可以追溯到我們最初從如何開展業務中概述的投資理念，這對 DoorDash 的所有業務都是如此，無論是餐廳市場，還是平台業務Drive 或 Storefront 之類的產品或便利業務或我們正在推出的所有廣告業務，國際市場，這實際上是我們如何構建最好的產品以實際滿足或理想地超出客戶期望並繼續這樣做，然後我們如何實際逐行降低成本，以便在考慮之前獲得正的單位數學。

Yes. And on the margin flow-through question, we're running the business with the objective of maximizing scale so that in the long term, we maximize profit dollars, right? And so as Tony alluded to, these categories that we're operating in, they're very large, they're very underpenetrated today, and that's why we're investing to build scale. And what we look for is this combination of strong signals of product market fit as well as a path to attract unit economics.

是的。在利潤流動問題上，我們以最大化規模為目標經營業務，以便從長遠來看，我們最大化利潤，對吧？正如托尼所提到的，我們經營的這些類別非常龐大，今天它們的滲透率非常低，這就是我們投資擴大規模的原因。我們尋找的是產品市場契合的強烈信號以及吸引單位經濟的途徑的組合。

So let me give you an example. We cited the third-party convenience example. If you look at our DashMarts today and look at all the stores on DoorDash on any given day the most popular stores in terms of orders, off the top 10, the majority are DashMarts. That's a signal of strong product market fit because that's the customer speaking, right? And you see that in the data. And so these signals of product market fit, coupled with progress that we see in unit economics, this is what gives us confidence to continue investing because the belief is that it will lead to solid growth for many years to come.

所以讓我給你舉個例子。我們引用了第三方便利示例。如果您今天查看我們的 DashMarts，並查看任何一天在 DoorDash 上的所有商店，就訂單而言，最受歡迎的商店在前 10 名之外，大多數是 DashMarts。這是產品市場契合度高的信號，因為這是客戶說話，對吧？你在數據中看到了這一點。因此，這些產品市場契合的信號，再加上我們在單位經濟學方面看到的進步，這讓我們有信心繼續投資，因為我們相信這將導致未來許多年的穩健增長。

Now the core U.S. restaurant business is profitable. It's growing, and the profit margins continue increasing. And we're using those profits from that core business to make these investments. So said differently, we're not trying to manage the business to increase margins or even the dollar amount of EBITDA because we're essentially reinvesting those profits in order to grow these other areas.

現在，美國的核心餐飲業務已經盈利。它在增長，利潤率也在不斷提高。我們正在利用該核心業務的利潤進行這些投資。換種說法，我們並沒有試圖管理業務以增加利潤率甚至 EBITDA 的美元金額，因為我們本質上是在將這些利潤再投資以發展這些其他領域。

Now to the extent we don't see the right progress, whether it's product market fit indicators or the right progress from a margin perspective or a unit economics perspective for these new areas, we scale back. And that's the discipline that we'll run the core U.S. business with up to this point that allowed us to build a profitable core U.S. business.

現在，如果我們看不到正確的進展，無論是產品市場契合度指標，還是從利潤角度或單位經濟角度來看這些新領域的正確進展，我們都會縮減規模。到目前為止，這就是我們經營美國核心業務的紀律，這使我們能夠建立一個有利可圖的美國核心業務。

And so we will flex and adjust depending on the signals we see, but the intent right now is to reinvest these profits, provided the signals are there, that we can drive growth for many years to come.

因此，我們將根據我們看到的信號進行靈活調整，但現在的目的是對這些利潤進行再投資，只要信號存在，我們就可以推動未來許多年的增長。

Your next question comes from the line of Eric Sheridan from Goldman Sachs.

您的下一個問題來自高盛的 Eric Sheridan。

Two, if I could. Tony, maybe a bigger picture question. Obviously, you haven't been a public company for very long, and you see periods like this where valuation gets compressed very quickly and capital becomes a little bit more constrained broadly in growth industries. How are you thinking about the capital you have on the balance sheet as elements are playing offense and maybe accelerated things from the buy versus build decision and where you want to take the platform longer term versus using capital as a sort of fortress to sort of shore up and think about broader industry structures over the medium to long term? I'd love your perspective on that given the broader market environment we find ourselves in.

二，如果可以的話。托尼，也許是一個更大的問題。顯然，你成為一家上市公司的時間不長，你會看到這樣的時期，估值很快就會被壓縮，資本在成長型行業中受到更多的限制。您如何看待資產負債表上的資本，因為要素正在進攻，並且可能會加速購買與構建決策的速度，以及您希望將平台長期用於何處而不是將資本用作某種堡壘的某種支撐起來思考更廣泛的中長期行業結構？鑑於我們所處的更廣泛的市場環境，我希望您能對此提出看法。

And then maybe to ask Ron's question a little bit differently, given the current labor environment for delivery folks, do you see companies that have been more reluctant to maybe embrace platforms like you either wanting to partner either directly on the platform or utilizing Drive? And we saw this in different hotel cycles with the OTAs over the years where periods of time of demand or labor constraint can lead people to make partnerships in digital. Could we see partners that have historically been reluctant to partner with you maybe come back and think about platform dynamics to fulfill their business needs?

然後也許要問羅恩的問題有點不同，考慮到目前送貨人員的勞動環境，你是否看到公司更不願意接受像你這樣的平台，要么直接在平台上合作，要么利用 Drive？多年來，我們在與 OTA 的不同酒店週期中看到了這一點，需求或勞動力限制的時期可能會導致人們在數字領域建立合作夥伴關係。我們是否可以看到一直不願與您合作的合作夥伴可能會回來考慮平台動態來滿足他們的業務需求？

Eric, yes, thanks for the questions. On the first one, I think the best way to always grow is from your own cash flows, right? And that's why we're in a very privileged position where we have a very cash-generating business in our U.S. restaurant marketplace that really allow us to make most of our investments. And we also have a cash balance north of $4 billion, which, to your point, gives us quite a lot of flexibility.

埃里克，是的，謝謝你的提問。在第一個方面，我認為始終保持增長的最佳方式是利用自己的現金流，對嗎？這就是為什麼我們處於非常優越的地位，我們在美國餐飲市場擁有非常賺錢的業務，這確實使我們能夠進行大部分投資。我們還有超過 40 億美元的現金餘額，就您而言，這給了我們很大的靈活性。

But I think it's really important to know when to use capital to your advantage and maybe when not to use capital to your advantage. I think from a building businesses and products perspective, I think it's really important that we have to achieve product market fit first, right, before we deploy capital to actually scale those businesses. In fact, I'd argue we have to first find product market fit, then find efficient ways to grow that are unique to that product and then consider deploying capital to very, very aggressively scale that business. And that's kind of how we think about deploying capital from an organic perspective.

但我認為知道何時利用資本為自己謀利以及何時不利用資本為自己謀利是非常重要的。我認為從建立業務和產品的角度來看，我認為在我們部署資金來實際擴展這些業務之前，我們必須首先實現產品市場契合是非常重要的。事實上，我認為我們必須首先找到適合市場的產品，然後找到該產品獨有的有效增長方式，然後考慮部署資本以非常非常積極地擴展該業務。這就是我們從有機角度考慮部署資本的方式。

I think from an inorganic perspective, I think the bar is just really high, right? M&A, as I'm sure you know, it does not have a historical track record for success. And I think for us, we keep that bar very, very high and only really consider acting upon it if we see 2 things. One, obviously, if it's accretive to our business in terms of giving us the advantage of investing more efficiently in an area that we find very attractive for years to come; and secondly, if we find a team that we think is not only aligned on building the same thing in the long run, but how we actually build it, right?

我認為從無機的角度來看，我認為門檻真的很高，對吧？併購，我相信你知道，它沒有成功的歷史記錄。而且我認為對我們來說，我們保持這個標準非常非常高，只有當我們看到兩件事時才會真正考慮採取行動。一，很明顯，如果它能夠增加我們的業務，使我們能夠更有效地投資於我們認為未來幾年非常有吸引力的領域；其次，如果我們找到一個我們認為不僅在長期構建相同的東西上一致的團隊，而且我們實際上如何構建它，對嗎？

And this really is reflected in the example of Wolt, which, again, should close the first half of this year, where we saw in their business world-class retention and order rate metrics that show that they built a product that is best in class and loved by really all of their audiences. And they did it with an incredibly capital-efficient P&L in many geographies, including very-difficult-to-operate geographies. And they had a team that very similarly to how we wanted to build for the long run and what it is that we actually wanted to build.

這確實反映在 Wolt 的例子中，該公司應該再次在今年上半年結束，我們在他們的商業世界級保留率和訂單率指標中看到，這表明他們構建了一流的產品並受到所有觀眾的喜愛。他們在許多地區實現了令人難以置信的資本效率損益表，包括非常難以運營的地區。他們的團隊與我們想要建立的長期建設方式以及我們真正想要建立的團隊非常相似。

And so I think that's really how we think about making these investments, whether it's organic or inorganic, but I really do think there are times where capital certainly is a privilege we have now given the fact that we built a cash flow positive business as well as have a lot of money on the balance sheet with no debt. But when we deploy is a very, very important decision that we take seriously.

所以我認為這就是我們真正考慮進行這些投資的方式，無論是有機的還是無機的，但我確實認為有時候資本肯定是我們現在擁有的特權，因為我們也建立了一個現金流積極的業務就像資產負債表上有很多錢，沒有債務一樣。但是，當我們部署是一個非常非常重要的決定時，我們會認真對待。

Your next question comes from the line of Mark Mahaney...

你的下一個問題來自 Mark Mahaney 的台詞……

Prabir -- sorry, I don't think we answered Eric's second question. Prabir, are you going to take that?

Prabir——抱歉，我認為我們沒有回答 Eric 的第二個問題。普拉比爾，你會接受嗎？

Yes. Yes, the second question was really around partnerships. I mean just given the scale of our business now, whether it's the marketplace side or in the platform services side and the fleet that we have and the size of that fleet, with products such as Drive, they're getting more and more interesting, particularly in this area when the labor market is tight, particularly when it comes to the delivery space because everyone -- Tony alluded to this in an earlier question around interest in Drive, it began simply with restaurants. And now it's sort of -- it's all these different categories beyond restaurants that are all looking to reach customers on the same day, in fact, the same hour basis.

是的。是的，第二個問題實際上是關於夥伴關係的。我的意思是考慮到我們現在的業務規模，無論是市場方面還是平台服務方面，以及我們擁有的車隊和車隊的規模，使用 Drive 等產品，它們變得越來越有趣，尤其是在勞動力市場緊張的這一領域，尤其是在交付空間方面，因為每個人——托尼在早些時候關於 Drive 的興趣的問題中提到了這一點，它只是從餐館開始的。現在有點——除了餐廳之外，所有這些不同的類別都希望在同一天，事實上，在同一小時的基礎上吸引顧客。

And this is particularly relevant outside of the U.S. where these options don't exist was actually unique -- it's a unique customer experience. So we are seeing the success with Drive as well as the greater secular shift towards convenience. Drive increased conversations with partners outside of the restaurant category, in different categories that are actually interested in embracing same-day fulfillment.

這在美國以外尤其重要，因為這些選項不存在實際上是獨一無二的——這是一種獨特的客戶體驗。因此，我們看到了 Drive 的成功以及向便利性的更大長期轉變。推動與餐廳類別之外的合作夥伴的對話，這些合作夥伴在實際上有興趣接受當日履行的不同類別中。

Yes. The only thing I'd add, Eric, is just that I think just as consumers are exhibiting the behavior where they're going back inside restaurants and seeing friends again and families again and eating together, and they're also ordering delivery at the same time. Restaurants are noticing that, too. And as a result, I think the argument of incrementality, not just in terms of incremental customers, but actually incremental orders is really starting to sink in.

是的。埃里克，我唯一要補充的是，我認為就像消費者表現出他們回到餐廳，再次見到朋友和家人並一起吃飯的行為一樣，他們也在點外賣。同時。餐館也注意到了這一點。因此，我認為增量的論點，不僅僅是在增量客戶方面，而且實際上增量訂單真的開始下沉。

Next question comes from the line of Mark Mahaney from Evercore ISI.

下一個問題來自 Evercore ISI 的 Mark Mahaney。

Could you just touch on latest thoughts on ad revenue or -- yes, over time? And I think that's still very early stages, but anything on timing?

您能否談談關於廣告收入的最新想法，或者——是的，隨著時間的推移？我認為這仍然是非常早期的階段，但有什麼時間安排嗎？

And then on the average order frequency reaching a new high, can you provide any detail on how wide of a gap you're seeing between average order frequency for people who just start and then they will become DashPassers and then they become mature, they've been on DashPass for 6 months, 12 months, et cetera? Like how wide is that gap? Maybe help us think about the curve of usage in the future.

然後在平均訂單頻率達到新高時，您能否提供任何細節，說明您看到的平均訂單頻率之間的差距有多大，這些人剛開始，然後他們將成為 DashPassers，然後他們變得成熟，他們'已經使用 DashPass 6 個月、12 個月等？比如這個差距有多大？也許可以幫助我們思考未來的使用曲線。

Sure. So first on ad revenue, we haven't disclosed the size of that business. It's still young and nascent, and there's a lot -- there's room for it to grow. Yes, I will say it is an attractive opportunity for us just given the size of our user base, the frequency of interactions on our platform as well as the number of services that are available. And we said that we've not been in a rush to monetize. Our focus, we need to make sure we balance delivering an appropriate return to advertisers with the consumer experience. It would be a negative if consumer experience is impacted or conversions impact in any way.

當然。首先，關於廣告收入，我們沒有透露該業務的規模。它還很年輕，而且還有很多——它還有成長的空間。是的，考慮到我們的用戶群規模、平台上的交互頻率以及可用服務的數量，我會說這對我們來說是一個有吸引力的機會。我們說我們並不急於貨幣化。我們的重點是，我們需要確保在向廣告商提供適當的回報與消費者體驗之間取得平衡。如果消費者體驗受到影響或轉化以任何方式受到影響，那將是負面的。

And certainly, over the coming time periods, I mean, as this business scales, we will use these incremental profits to invest into growth and to strengthen the core U.S. business as well as our other initiatives beyond restaurants.

當然，在接下來的時間段內，我的意思是，隨著這項業務的規模擴大，我們將利用這些增量利潤來投資增長，並加強美國的核心業務以及我們在餐廳以外的其他舉措。

On your question regarding order frequency, it's a tough question to answer because we're continuing to see growth across cohorts. So let's take DashPass as an example. Once the user joins DashPass, over time, their order frequency for that cohort just has continued increasing. So that spread just continues to widen. And so I'm not trying to avoid the question. It's an imprecise question. It will be a different story if these order frequencies remain static, but the reality is you've got growth taking place at a cohort level.

關於您關於訂單頻率的問題，這是一個很難回答的問題，因為我們繼續看到各群組的增長。所以讓我們以 DashPass 為例。一旦用戶加入 DashPass，隨著時間的推移，他們對該群組的訂購頻率就會繼續增加。因此，這種價差只會繼續擴大。所以我不想迴避這個問題。這是一個不精確的問題。如果這些訂單頻率保持不變，那將是另一回事，但現實情況是，您已經在同類群組級別上實現了增長。

Your next question comes from the line of Brian Fitzgerald from Wells Fargo.

您的下一個問題來自富國銀行的 Brian Fitzgerald。

A couple of quick ones. DashMarts, essentially, the micro-fulfillment centers, I think last time we checked, they were carrying around 2,000 SKUs. Can you talk about the kind of trajectory of growth in terms of locations or SKU base that you're running at DashMarts?

幾個快速的。 DashMarts，本質上是微型配送中心，我想上次我們檢查時，他們攜帶大約 2,000 個 SKU。您能談談您在 DashMarts 運營的地點或 SKU 基礎方面的增長軌跡嗎？

And then we just got back from marketing around Europe, and we got asked every meeting how is the U.S. -- North American consumer versus European. Looking at Wolt versus North America, any dynamics to call out there with respect to the strength or the price sensitivity of the consumer geographically?

然後我們剛從歐洲各地的市場營銷回來，每次會議我們都被問到美國的情況如何——北美消費者與歐洲消費者的對比。看看 Wolt 與北美，在地理上消費者的實力或價格敏感性方面是否有任何動態？

Brian, it's Tony. I'll take the question on DashMarts, and then maybe Prabir can follow on the second question around kind of geographic differences in terms of what we're noticing.

布萊恩，是托尼。我會回答關於 DashMarts 的問題，然後也許 Prabir 可以就我們注意到的地理差異提出第二個問題。

On DashMart, the way I think about this is the problem to solve isn't how many SKUs to offer inside of a DashMart or whether to build DashMart. The problem really to solve is how do we actually build the best convenience and grocery delivery experience. And when you look at where the penetration levels are today and just take, for example, the U.S. relative to where they could be, I think there's a massive gap. If anything, the penetration levels today in convenience and grocery delivery is fairly low and has largely stagnated post-COVID. And I think that suggests that the customer actually prefers perhaps either buying online, picking up in store or perhaps just shopping inside the store altogether.

在 DashMart 上，我認為要解決的問題不是在 DashMart 內部提供多少 SKU 或是否建立 DashMart。真正要解決的問題是我們如何真正建立最佳的便利和雜貨配送體驗。當你看看今天的滲透水平並以美國為例，相對於它們可能達到的水平，我認為存在巨大差距。如果有的話，今天在便利和雜貨配送方面的滲透率相當低，並且在 COVID 之後基本上停滯不前。而且我認為這表明客戶實際上可能更喜歡在線購買，在商店取貨，或者可能只是在商店內購物。

And so what we're trying to solve is how do we build an experience that can work for both consumers, grocers, retailers as well as Dashers. And the way we think about it is for consumers, how do we build an experience that can give them exactly what they ordered, that can do it at a price point that matches their expectations with greater convenience. And if we can figure that out, which is going to require lots of invention such as figuring out inventory management built from the ground up as well as merchandising, getting the right SKUs and selection to the point of your question as well as doing it more conveniently, then I think that, that's a service that grocers and retailers alike will want as well.

因此，我們試圖解決的是我們如何建立一種對消費者、雜貨商、零售商和 Dashers 都有效的體驗。我們考慮的方式是針對消費者，我們如何建立一種體驗，可以準確地為他們提供他們所訂購的東西，並且能夠以符合他們期望的價格點和更大的便利性來做到這一點。如果我們能弄清楚這一點，這將需要大量的發明，例如從頭開始構建庫存管理以及商品推銷，獲得正確的 SKU 和選擇以解決您的問題以及做更多的事情方便的話，我認為這也是雜貨商和零售商都想要的服務。

And that's something that we can help them with as they think about how can they add effectively another use case to their already very successful buy online, pick up in store use case and make that incremental for them and have these warehouses that are actually optimized for delivery. So that's really what we're trying to do with DashMarts.

這是我們可以幫助他們的事情，因為他們考慮如何有效地為他們已經非常成功的在線購買添加另一個用例，在商店中提取用例並為他們增加增量，並讓這些倉庫實際上針對交貨。所以這就是我們試圖用 DashMarts 做的事情。

And then on your international question, I know that's in that -- at Europe, but just as a point of reference, I'm not sure the price sensitive question, to be honest to you. At least based on our analysis, if you look at outside the U.S. and exclude U.K. for a second, the levels of penetration in terms of food delivery are quite low, right, whether it's European countries, whether it's Australia, Japan or whatever. And the reason for that is because it was -- a couple of things. One is the number of restaurants that are available are low. So it's a selection problem, first and foremost. Second, the quality of the experience is iffy.

然後關於你的國際問題，我知道在歐洲，但作為一個參考點，老實說，我不確定價格敏感問題。至少根據我們的分析，如果你看看美國以外的地區並排除英國，那麼無論是歐洲國家、澳大利亞、日本還是其他國家，食品配送方面的滲透率都相當低。這樣做的原因是因為它是- 幾件事。一是可用的餐館數量很少。所以這首先是一個選擇問題。其次，體驗的質量是不確定的。

And what I mean by that is some of these countries, food delivery is essentially lead gen, which means that it's the restaurant that's actually fulfilling the order and consumers don't have visibility into whether the order is going to be delivered, who to call if it's late. And that just leads to poor consumer experience that then ultimately leads to lower adoption.

我的意思是在這些國家中，送餐本質上是領先一代，這意味著實際上是餐廳在履行訂單，而消費者不知道訂單是否會送達，該打電話給誰如果晚了。這只會導致糟糕的消費者體驗，最終導致採用率降低。

So I think the opportunity is there as long as we address these fundamental building blocks of selection, quality and affordability in these countries, whether it's Europe or Australia or Japan. That is very early in terms of their development along these dimensions.

所以我認為，只要我們在這些國家（無論是歐洲、澳大利亞還是日本）解決這些選擇、質量和可負擔性的基本組成部分，機會就在那裡。就它們在這些方面的發展而言，這還很早。

There are no further questions at this time. I turn the call back over to the DoorDash team.

目前沒有其他問題。我將電話轉回 DoorDash 團隊。

Thank you, Jewel, and thank you, everybody, for the questions and your time today. We look forward to being in touch with many of you soon. Have a good evening.

謝謝你，Jewel，謝謝大家今天的問題和時間。我們期待很快與你們中的許多人取得聯繫。祝你有個美好的夜晚。

This concludes today's conference call. You may now disconnect.

今天的電話會議到此結束。您現在可以斷開連接。