Doordash, Inc. (DASH) 2022 Q1 法說會逐字稿

Good afternoon, and thanks for joining us for our first quarter 2022 earnings call. I'm pleased to be joined today by Co-Founder Chair and CEO, Tony Xu; and CFO, Prabir Adarkar.

各位下午好，感謝各位參加我們 2022 年第一季財報電話會議。我很高興今天與我們的共同創辦人、董事長兼執行長 Tony Xu，以及財務長 Prabir Adarkar 一同出席。

We'd like to remind everyone that we'll be making forward-looking statements during this call, including our expectations of our business, financial position and operating performance, future results and guidance, our investment approach, strategy and statements regarding our acquisition of Wolt. Forward-looking statements are subject to risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially from those described in the forward-looking statements, and some such risks are described in our risk factors, including in our SEC filings, including Form 10-Ks and 10-Qs. You should not rely on our forward-looking statements as predictions of future events. We disclaim any obligation to update any forward-looking statements, except as required by law.

我們想提醒各位，在本次電話會議中我們將作出前瞻性陳述，包括我們對業務、財務狀況與營運表現的預期、未來結果與指引、我們的投資方法與策略，以及關於我們收購 Wolt 的相關陳述。前瞻性陳述受風險與不確定性影響，可能導致實際結果與前瞻性陳述所描述者存在重大差異；其中部分風險已在我們的風險因素中說明，包括我們向 SEC 提交的文件（包含 Form 10-K 與 10-Q）。您不應將我們的前瞻性陳述視為對未來事件的預測。除法律要求外，我們不承擔更新任何前瞻性陳述的義務。

During this call, we will discuss certain non-GAAP financial measures. Information regarding our non-GAAP financial results, including a reconciliation of such non-GAAP results to the most directly comparable GAAP financial measures, may be found in our investor letter, which is available on our IR website. These non-GAAP measures should be considered in addition to our GAAP results and are not intended to be a substitute for our GAAP results.

在本次電話會議中，我們將討論若干非 GAAP 財務衡量指標。關於我們的非 GAAP 財務結果之資訊（包括將該等非 GAAP 結果與最直接可比的 GAAP 財務衡量指標進行調節的對照表），可在我們的投資人信函中查閱，該信函可於我們的 IR 網站取得。這些非 GAAP 指標應與我們的 GAAP 結果一併考量，並非用以取代我們的 GAAP 結果。

Finally, this call in its entirety is being audio webcast on our IR website. An audio replay of the call will be available on our site shortly after the call ends.

最後，本次電話會議全程將在我們的 IR 網站進行音訊網路直播。電話會議結束後不久，我們的網站將提供音訊重播。

As in previous quarters, we'll go straight into the Q&A portion. So with that, operator, please take the first question.

如同前幾季，我們將直接進入問答環節。因此，接線員，請開始第一個問題。

(Operator Instructions) Your first question comes from the line of Ross Sandler from Barclays.

（接線員指示）第一個問題來自 Barclays 的 Ross Sandler。

Tony, Prabir, I just had one high level and then one kind of more near term. So in the letter, I really like how you laid out the philosophy around investing proceeds from the U.S. restaurant profit pools into these new areas with precision. And I think some folks on the line here are a little worried that after Wolt closes and that philosophy holds up, you're just going to have a lot more areas by which you can reinvest those profit pools across all of Europe. So can you just maybe just talk about how that philosophy might change post-Wolt?

Tony、Prabir，我有一個較高層次的問題，然後還有一個比較偏近期的問題。在股東信中，我很喜歡你們如何精準地闡述：把美國餐廳利潤池的收益投入到這些新領域的投資理念。我想線上有些人有點擔心，Wolt 交易完成後，如果這個理念仍然成立，你們在整個歐洲會有更多領域可以把這些利潤池再投資出去。所以你們能否談談，Wolt 併入後這個理念可能會如何改變？

And then the second question is based on the revenue margin and the overall commentary on take rate, it looks like you're having no problems navigating supply, and fuel inflation doesn't seem to be an issue. But any noticeable changes from all the inflation out there on Dash or cost per order either kind of in the first quarter or anything we should expect looking ahead?

第二個問題是，根據營收毛利率以及對整體抽成率（take rate）的評論，看起來你們在供給端的應對沒有問題，燃油通膨似乎也不是問題。但在第一季，或展望未來，通膨對 Dash 或每筆訂單成本是否有任何明顯變化？

Ross, it's Tony. I'll take the first one, and I'll let Prabir take the second one. So on the first one -- well, I would say 2 parts. First is just our investment strategy with Wolt, and then secondly, just our investment philosophy in general. Our aspiration is to build the largest global local commerce business. And we want to do that by building 2 assets. We want to build the largest local commerce marketplace where we're bringing everything inside the neighborhood to you. And we also want to build the largest local commerce platform where we're giving tools to the physical businesses so that they each can become their own digital powerhouses. And that's really why we're excited about teaming up with Wolt because they share that same vision to build that truly global local commerce business as well.

Ross，我是 Tony。我先回答第一個問題，第二個問題我讓 Prabir 來回答。關於第一個問題——我會分成兩部分。第一是我們與 Wolt 相關的投資策略；第二是我們整體的投資理念。我們的願景是打造全球最大的在地商務（local commerce）企業。我們希望透過打造兩項資產來達成：第一，我們要建立最大的在地商務市集，把社區裡的一切帶到你面前；第二，我們也要建立最大的在地商務平台，提供工具給實體商家，讓每一家都能成為自己的數位強者。這也是我們很期待與 Wolt 合作的原因，因為他們同樣共享這個願景——打造真正全球化的在地商務企業。

And from our perspective, it's really going to take a similar investment philosophy in terms of how we've built everything else. So in the investment shareholder letter, we gave an example of how we built effectively a new business from scratch in the last couple of years in the convenience category and kind of outline how we always start by first making sure that we build the best product possible, especially measured in terms of retention and order frequency. We have a maniacal focus on the unit map to get the unit economics to work, and then we start considering efficient ways to actually scale that business.

從我們的角度來看，這將需要一套相似的投資理念，就像我們過去打造其他業務一樣。在投資人股東信中，我們舉例說明了過去幾年如何在便利品類中幾乎從零開始打造一個新業務，並概述我們一貫的做法：首先確保打造出最好的產品，特別是以留存率與下單頻率來衡量；我們對單位地圖（unit map）有近乎偏執的專注，以確保單位經濟（unit economics）能夠成立；接著才會開始考量以有效率的方式擴大該業務規模。

So while we are aggressive in how we run these experiments to be able to achieve those input outcomes, we're very disciplined about how we think about how to scale these businesses. And it's going to be no different as we think about the opportunity to team up with Wolt. We think the opportunity obviously is immense.

因此，雖然我們在推動這些實驗以達成上述投入端成果時會很積極，但在思考如何擴大這些業務時，我們非常自律。當我們思考與 Wolt 合作的機會時，也不會有任何不同。我們認為這個機會顯然非常巨大。

I mean if you look at this opportunity globally in the restaurants category in the U.S. where even as the market leader, only 6% of total restaurant industry sales. If you extend that into these other categories of restaurants or convenience or retail, we're a significantly smaller percentage. If we add in the countries now that Wolt adds on top of that, which gets us to a combined portfolio of about 26 countries, we're almost unnoticeable percentage. And then even if you combine the -- and then if you add on top of that the digitization that's happening on the merchant's websites and apps themselves, many of which we power through products like the DoorDash Drive or Storefront as well as other products, we're in the earliest innings.

如果你看全球餐廳品類的機會：在美國，即使我們是市場領導者，也只占整體餐飲產業銷售額的 6%。若把範圍延伸到餐廳以外的其他品類，例如便利、零售，我們占比更小。再加上 Wolt 帶來的國家，使我們合併後的版圖約達 26 個國家，我們的占比幾乎微不足道。除此之外，若再把商家自有網站與 App 的數位化也納入考量——其中許多由我們透過 DoorDash Drive 或 Storefront 等產品以及其他產品提供支援——我們仍處於非常早期的階段。

But the investment philosophy remains the same where there's a maniacal focus on building the best-in-class products, a maniacal focus on getting laser-sharp on the unit map so that, that's actually positive before we scale globally.

但投資理念不變：我們會近乎偏執地專注於打造同級最佳（best-in-class）的產品，也會近乎偏執地把單位地圖做到極致精準，確保在全球擴張之前，這些指標已經是正向的。

And just to add to that point before I move on to the second part of your question. If you recall, when we announced Wolt, one of the things that we were excited about was their unit economics and their retention. And so Wolt gives us a more efficient engine through which we can invest internationally. And that's why what we had communicated was even after integrating Wolt, we expect our EBITDA expectations for the year to be materially unchanged because we're essentially now redeploying capital that we would have deployed but through the Wolt engine, which is actually more efficient. So hopefully, that gets to the crux of your question.

在我轉到你第二個問題之前，再補充一點。若你還記得我們宣布收購 Wolt 時，我們其中一個感到興奮的原因是他們的單位經濟與留存表現。因此，Wolt 讓我們能以更有效率的引擎來進行國際投資。這也是我們先前所傳達的：即使整合 Wolt 之後，我們預期今年的 EBITDA 展望將不會出現重大變動，因為我們本來就會部署這些資本，只是現在透過 Wolt 這個更有效率的引擎來重新配置。希望這能切中你的問題核心。

On your supply question, we have not experienced supply shortages, and we feel good about our supply position looking ahead. Some stats to share with you, our Dasher cost as a percentage of our GOV were lower both quarter-on-quarter as well as year-on-year. Recall -- if you recall last year in Q1, we were undersupplied due to bad weather as well as fiscal stimulus, and we began investing over the course of last year as well as this quarter, frankly, to continue to build a supply base so that we can address the demand that we had anticipated.

關於你提到的供給問題，我們沒有經歷供給短缺，且對未來的供給狀況感到樂觀。分享一些數據：我們的 Dasher 成本占 GOV 的比例，無論季對季或年對年都更低。回想去年第一季，由於惡劣天氣以及財政刺激，我們當時供給不足；因此我們在去年以及本季的過程中持續投入，建立供給基礎，以便能滿足我們所預期的需求。

The second point, this is a little bit of a nuanced one. Our batch rates are down both quarter-on-quarter and year-on-year. And the reason I point to that is because in some occasions, if we find ourselves undersupplied, you may see batch rates go up. As a matter of fact, we actually had lower batch rates today than we were a year ago or even last quarter.

第二點稍微比較細緻一些。我們的批次率（batch rates）無論季對季或年對年都下降。我之所以提到這點，是因為在某些情況下，如果我們發現供給不足，你可能會看到批次率上升。事實上，我們今天的批次率比一年前、甚至比上一季都更低。

And then the last point I'll make is our cost to acquire new Dashers, so our cost to acquire new Dasher is the lowest it's been in the last 4 quarters. So all that to say, we feel really good from a supply standpoint, not just because we invest in advance in order to address this demand, but because we don't compete with rideshare for Dasher. This is a completely different pool of people.

最後一點是我們取得新 Dasher 的成本；我們取得新 Dasher 的成本是過去 4 個季度以來最低。總結來說，從供給角度我們感覺非常良好，不僅因為我們會提前投資以因應需求，也因為我們在 Dasher 方面並不與叫車平台競爭；這是一個完全不同的人才池。

Your next question comes from Youssef Squali from Truist Securities.

下一個問題來自 Truist Securities 的 Youssef Squali。

So just a couple of questions for me. One, could you maybe just talk about -- I know you haven't closed on Wolt yet. But considering their geographic footprint, et cetera, can you maybe just talk about how that business has performed just given the war headwinds, et cetera, and how has it been tracking relative to your own growth?

我這邊只有幾個問題。第一個，你能否談一下——我知道你們還沒完成 Wolt 的交割。但考量到他們的地理覆蓋範圍等等，你能否談談在戰爭逆風等因素下，那項業務的表現如何？以及相較於你們自身的成長，它的追蹤表現如何？

And then in the letter, Tony, you talked about how you guys continue to see opportunities to increase contribution margin as a percentage of marketplace GOV in the U.S. marketplace, I think. Just -- can you just help us think through how much higher can these get over time, say, over the next year or 2 as you keep -- as you need that money to invest in all these new initiatives that you're -- you've highlighted in the letter?

另外在信中，Tony，你提到你們持續看到在美國市場（我想是美國平台）有機會把貢獻毛利率（contribution margin）提高到佔平台 GOV 的更高比例。能否幫我們理解一下，隨著時間推移，這些比例還能提高多少——例如在未來 1 到 2 年內，當你們需要這些資金去投資你們在信中強調的各項新計畫時？

Thanks for the question, Youssef. So on the Wolt question specifically, the deal is on track to close in the second quarter. We can't comment on Wolt's performance before the deal is closed. But in connection with the closing of the transaction, we'll provide more detail when we come back to the Street with specifics. So stay tuned for that.

謝謝你的問題，Youssef。就 Wolt 的問題而言，交易進度如期，預計在第二季完成交割。在交易完成之前，我們無法評論 Wolt 的表現。不過在交易完成之際，當我們帶著具體資訊回到資本市場時，我們會提供更多細節。所以請持續關注。

Now on your question around U.S. contribution margins, we haven't disclosed exact contribution margin in the U.S. restaurant business, but let me try to answer your question in sort of qualitative terms, which is the first thing is we have driven increasing margins in the U.S. restaurant business while growing category share. And the reason that's important is because it's easy to do one or the other, which is either grow margins or grow category share. But what's remarkable is the progress that we've made in actually growing both.

至於你關於美國貢獻毛利率的問題，我們尚未披露美國餐廳業務的確切貢獻毛利率，但我嘗試用較偏定性的方式回答。第一點是，我們在提升美國餐廳業務毛利率的同時，也在提升品類市佔。這點很重要，因為通常做其中一件事很容易——要嘛提高毛利率，要嘛提高品類市佔。但真正值得注意的是，我們在同時推進兩者方面取得的進展。

And looking into the future, there's multiple levers that are available to continue doing so without hurting growth. First, as we continue to drive up the efficiency of the logistics network, that will help our margin structure in the U.S. Second, as we continue improving the quality of the delivery experience, that will help with customer support costs as well as refunds. And then finally, there's leverage in certain parts of cost of sales as well as sales and marketing, which will help the margin structure.

展望未來，我們有多個槓桿可以在不傷害成長的情況下持續做到這點。第一，隨著我們持續提升物流網路效率，將有助於改善美國的毛利結構。第二，隨著我們持續改善配送體驗品質，將有助於降低客服成本以及退款。最後，在銷售成本的某些部分，以及銷售與行銷方面也存在槓桿，這些都將有助於毛利結構。

Now beyond this, as our ads business scales, this is an incremental tailwind to the margin structure. So all of these things will come together to help the margins for the U.S. restaurant business grow and fund not just other things, but reinvestment in that -- in the core U.S. restaurant business because our objective is we're not running the U.S. restaurant business to harvest margins. We're still investing in U.S. restaurants in order to build scale and continue to grow category share.

此外，隨著我們的廣告業務擴張，這會對毛利結構形成額外的順風。因此，這些因素將共同推動美國餐廳業務的毛利成長，並為不只是其他事項提供資金，也能支持對核心美國餐廳業務的再投資；因為我們的目標不是經營美國餐廳業務來「收割」毛利。我們仍在投資美國餐廳業務，以建立規模並持續提升品類市佔。

Your next question comes from the line of Steven Fox from Fox Advisors.

下一個問題來自 Fox Advisors 的 Steven Fox。

I was just wondering, since you talked -- mentioned the unit economic changes on the convenience business and some of the other categories you're going into, can you compare and contrast those sort of unit economic curves looking at maybe using the U.S. restaurants as a baseline and how maybe some of these new categories could be different as you sort of reach some ideal scale?

我想請教一下，既然你提到便利商店業務以及你們正在進入的其他一些品類的單位經濟（unit economics）變化，你能否以美國餐廳作為基準，對比說明這些單位經濟曲線？以及當你們逐步達到某個理想規模時，這些新類別可能會有哪些不同？

Yes. I mean you have to remember that these are -- it's like comparing a 2-year old to a 10-year old. So it's kind of hard to compare that apples-to-apples. But I'll say that in a matter of 2 years, given that we've got line of sight to at least breakeven unit economics in our 3P convenience business, it's quite remarkable. And you may pair that with the fact that we are #1 in the convenience space, and this is just in a matter of 2 years.

是的。我的意思是，你得記得這些——這就像拿 2 歲小孩跟 10 歲小孩比，所以很難做完全同質的比較。但我會說，在短短 2 年內，考量到我們已經能看見 3P 便利商店業務至少達到單位經濟損益兩平的可見度，這相當了不起。再加上我們在便利領域是第一名，而這也只是 2 年內做到的。

Over time, there's things that we will do to continue driving up those margins. So I don't want to provide a forecast to where the margin structure gets to because you've got to walk, crawl, run. And so we're right now at the walk stage. We're getting to breakeven. And then in the future, we'll continue driving up margins.

隨著時間推移，我們會做一些事情來持續推升那些毛利。因此我不想對毛利結構最終會到哪裡提出預測，因為你得先學會走、再學會爬、再學會跑。我們現在正處於「走」的階段：先達到損益兩平。未來我們會持續推升毛利。

Today, the vast majority of the margin comes from the U.S. restaurant business. Other areas are sort of margin consumers, so to speak. But over time, as they hit maturity, you start to see us generate more and more profits from these other areas.

目前，絕大多數的毛利來自美國餐廳業務。其他領域可以說是在消耗毛利。但隨著時間推移，當它們走向成熟，你會開始看到我們從這些其他領域產生越來越多的利潤。

Your next question comes from the line of Lloyd Walmsley from UBS.

下一個問題來自 UBS 的 Lloyd Walmsley。

Great. I have 2. First, kind of sticking to the unit economic question. In the letter, you talked about convenience looking to generate a positive variable profit in the second half. Can you just help us contextualize that? And is this a big flip over the last year or so? And what is -- actually, what you see driving that flip to variable profit contribution in the second half?

很好。我有兩個問題。第一個，延續單位經濟的問題。在信中你提到便利業務希望在下半年產生正的變動利潤（variable profit）。你能否幫我們把這件事放在脈絡中理解？這相較於過去一年左右是否是一個很大的翻轉？以及——實際上，你認為是什麼在推動下半年轉為變動利潤貢獻？

And then the second one, there were some press reports about slowing hiring at DoorDash recently. Is this accurate? Can you talk about what you're seeing causing you to slow hiring or maybe just shifting priorities ahead of Wolt? Anything you could share there would be great.

第二個，最近有一些媒體報導說 DoorDash 放緩招募。這是否屬實？你能否談談你們看到是什麼原因導致放緩招募，或是在 Wolt 交割前是否只是調整優先順序？任何你能分享的內容都很好。

Great. Maybe I'll take the first one and Tony can take the second, Lloyd. So on the question around 3P convenience, you have to remember when we started this category, it was a -- we knew there was demand for it because we saw what consumers were searching for, right? And that demand was further amplified by COVID. But what we didn't completely appreciate was exactly how different and unique this area as compared to restaurants. And so that's the learning curve we've been on that has now gone to the other side of as we turn the curve and profitability.

很好。Lloyd，也許我先回答第一個，Tony 來回答第二個（招募）問題。關於 3P 便利的問題，你得記得我們開始做這個品類時——我們知道有需求，因為我們看到消費者在搜尋什麼，對吧？而這個需求又因 COVID 而被進一步放大。但我們當時沒有完全理解的是，這個領域相較於餐廳到底有多不同、也多獨特。因此我們一直在走這條學習曲線，而現在已經走到另一側——我們正在把曲線轉向獲利。

So simple things like our Dashers need to go into stores to pick and pack. We need a different way to understand the inventory position inside the store and how do you guide the Dasher when they're inside the store. The basket sizes tend to be lower. So this is where our operational sort of execution focus and product-focused muscle really shine because it allowed us to take this problem that look unique relative to restaurants and actually create products around it in order to make the math work even with lower basket sizes and picking and packing requirements. So that's what I'd say now. There's certainly a lot more we can do in terms of further sales as well as other things, including advertising attached, by the way, to drive up the unit economics. And we're super early given that it's only 2 years old.

例如一些很基本的事情：我們的外送員（Dashers）需要進店拣貨與打包；我們需要不同的方法來理解店內庫存狀態，以及當外送員在店內時要如何引導他們。客單價（basket sizes）往往也較低。因此，我們在營運執行與產品能力上的優勢就非常突出，因為這讓我們能把這個相較餐廳更獨特的問題，透過打造相應產品來解決，讓即使在較低客單價以及需要拣貨打包的情況下，整體經濟模型仍然可行。這就是我目前想說的。當然，在進一步提升銷售以及其他事項上我們還能做很多，包括順帶一提，結合廣告來推升單位經濟。而且我們仍非常早期，畢竟這才 2 年。

Yes. I think the other thing I'd add before I take the question, Lloyd, on hiring is just -- I think it's important to realize, especially when you're talking about the immense opportunity in something like convenience or grocery, which is a hundreds of billions of dollars -- more than $1 trillion opportunity globally, it's a very long runway in terms of how we think about this.

是的。我想在我回答招募問題之前，還想補充一點——我認為很重要的是要意識到，尤其當你談到像便利或雜貨這樣的巨大機會時，這是數千億美元——在全球甚至超過 1 兆美元的機會；就我們的思考方式而言，這是一條非常長的跑道。

To be candid, I was very impressed by how our teams were able to do all the things that Prabir said, and on top of that, build new catalog that is item-based that has tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands of items per store instead of hundreds of items inside of a restaurant menu, rebuild search into an item-based experience first before a store-based experience. I mean there's a lot of things that the team built, and they were able, in parallel, to move the unit economics. And I think it's a huge testament to the team in terms of the work that they did in both moving the top and the bottom line of building a better product that customers would be using over and again and then also making moves on the profitability front.

坦白說，我對我們的團隊能做到 Prabir 所說的所有事情感到非常印象深刻；除此之外，他們還建立了新的商品目錄（catalog），以「單品」為基礎，每家店有數萬、甚至數十萬個品項，而不是餐廳菜單裡的幾百個品項；也把搜尋重建為先以單品為基礎的體驗，再到以店家為基礎的體驗。我的意思是，團隊打造了很多東西，而且他們同時也推動了單位經濟的改善。我認為這充分證明了團隊的工作成果：一方面推動營收端與成本端，打造客戶會一再使用的更好產品；另一方面也在獲利能力上採取行動。

On hiring, I guess the first thing I would say is you got to be careful with what you read because it's probably either not in context or just not accurate. We're hiring at actually still very aggressive rates, multiples in fact of what I believe has been reported. But in general, let me talk a little bit about hiring maybe in the context of just our investment philosophy because it's very similar.

關於招募，我想我首先會說的是，你得小心你讀到的內容，因為那很可能不是在正確脈絡下，或根本不準確。我們實際上仍以非常積極的速度在招募，事實上是我認為外界報導的好幾倍。不過整體而言，讓我從我們的投資理念脈絡來談談招募，因為兩者其實非常相似。

If you look at the history of DoorDash or how perhaps or where we came from and maybe how we have enabled this continuous, efficient process of inventing and in a disciplined way of scaling the business, it really came from the fact that we had a lot of constraints early on in the business. I mean for the first 6 to 6.5 years of the business, we had a fraction of the financing of some of our peers. And so there is no ability to hire huge teams or spend a lot on marketing, spend anything on discounts or subsidies. We had to invent and win by building a superior product. Gain profitability in the right way, it's not by doing unnatural things that hurt the customer experience, but by doing the things that would increase selection, that would improve the service quality of our deliveries, that would offer more value in the form of DashPass and other programs and improve our customer support.

如果你回顧 DoorDash 的歷史，或我們是如何、從哪裡起步，以及我們如何促成這種持續且高效率的創新流程，並以有紀律的方式擴張業務，其實源自於我們在早期面臨許多限制。我的意思是，在公司成立後的前 6 到 6.5 年，我們拿到的融資只有一些同業的一小部分。因此我們沒有能力去招募龐大的團隊，也不能在行銷上花很多錢，更不用說在折扣或補貼上花任何錢。我們必須透過打造更優秀的產品來創新並勝出。以正確的方式提升獲利，不是靠做一些不自然、會傷害客戶體驗的事，而是靠做那些能增加選擇、提升配送服務品質、透過 DashPass 與其他方案提供更多價值，並改善客服的事情。

All of these things is what led us to have industry-leading retention, which has yielded, I think, some of the numbers that we've shown in the shareholder letter, all-time highs in our monthly active users, even as, thankfully, customers are now finally returning back inside restaurants, all-time highs in our DashPass subscriber base, all-time highs in our order frequency across cohorts. So building the best product as well as gaining efficiencies from operations and scale economies from marketing, that's really how the business has been built.

所有這些事情讓我們擁有業界領先的留存率，並帶來我認為我們在股東信中所展示的一些數據：我們的月活躍用戶數創下歷史新高，即使（值得慶幸的是）顧客現在終於開始回到餐廳內用；我們的 DashPass 訂閱用戶基數創下歷史新高；各個用戶群組的下單頻率也創下歷史新高。因此，打造最好的產品，再加上從營運中取得效率、以及從行銷規模經濟中獲得效益，這就是這門生意一路建立起來的方式。

Now when I apply that same investment philosophy towards something like hiring, it can't just be to hire aggressively. It has to also be to invest in systems of how we can reapply systems that we've built for one category and make that -- give us leverage into categories B, C, D, E, F and all of these ways of how we actually architect a system designed towards building the best customer experience and having the most efficient P&L.

現在，當我把同樣的投資理念套用到像招募這樣的事情上，它不能只是「積極招人」而已。它也必須是投資於系統：我們如何把為某一個品類建立的系統重新應用，並讓它——讓我們在 B、C、D、E、F 等品類上取得槓桿；以及我們如何架構一個系統，目標是打造最佳的客戶體驗，同時擁有最高效率的損益表（P&L）。

Your next question comes from the line of Doug Anmuth from JPMorgan.

下一個問題來自 JPMorgan 的 Doug Anmuth。

I have 2. First, I was just hoping you could talk about whether the inflationary pressures seen by your restaurant partners are changing the way they interact with or utilize DoorDash.

我有兩個問題。第一，我想請你談談，你們餐廳合作夥伴所面臨的通膨壓力，是否正在改變他們與 DoorDash 互動或使用 DoorDash 的方式。

And then second, also I was hoping you could talk about the response from Dashers to your Dash rewards program. And any commentary kind of way of framing how much that's costing you?

第二，我也想請你談談 Dashers 對你們 Dash 獎勵計畫的反應。以及能否從某種角度說明一下，這大概讓你們付出了多少成本？

Doug, maybe I'll start with the first here. Our average order values have increased slightly as a result of inflation. Obviously, we pass on the large portion of that to our merchants, so they benefit as well, given that they're experiencing price increases and the cost of the food. And all else being equal, this would also have a positive impact on our margins.

Doug，我先從第一個問題開始。我們的平均訂單金額因通膨而略有上升。顯然，我們會把其中很大一部分轉給商家，因此在他們面臨食品成本與售價上漲的情況下，他們也能受益。在其他條件不變下，這也會對我們的利潤率帶來正面影響。

Now the one thing I'll say is the reality is we've seen food cost inflation for over a year now, right, with chicken prices and other things. And so it's hard to tell exactly what impact inflation is having on order volume and on consumer engagement specifically because we don't have the counterfactual. Having said that, when you step back and you look at the results in the quarter and the fact that monthly active users are at all-time highs, the fact that DashPass members are at all-time highs and order frequency is at all-time highs, it speaks to the resilience of the platform. And the fact that the product has consistently gotten better and better and better in terms of selection, in terms of quality, in terms of affordability, and that leads to more consumer adoption, habituation and an increasing usage over time.

不過我想說的是，現實是我們已經看到食品成本通膨超過一年了，對吧，像是雞肉價格和其他項目。因此很難精確判斷通膨究竟對訂單量與消費者參與度造成了什麼影響，特別是因為我們沒有反事實（counterfactual）可以比較。話雖如此，當你退一步看本季的結果，以及月活躍用戶創下歷史新高、DashPass 會員創下歷史新高、下單頻率創下歷史新高，這些都顯示平台的韌性。也顯示產品在選擇性、品質、可負擔性方面持續變得更好、更好、更好，進而帶來更多消費者採用、使用習慣的養成，以及隨時間推進而增加的使用量。

And then on your -- sorry. Tony, do you want to add something to that?

然後關於你的——抱歉。Tony，你要補充一下嗎？

Yes. So Doug, I'll just chime in. I think your question was also if we're seeing any behavior on the merchant and the Dasher front. I would say a couple of things. Inflation is definitely a concern we certainly are taking very seriously, and we're doing that by making sure that all of our audiences are taken care of first. And that -- and one of the things we've been fortunate to see -- I'll echo a little bit of what Prabir said, and I'll take your question on merchants and Dashers, which is just the resiliency of the core business of U.S. restaurants where I think it's because when I take a look at all of the possible areas where consumers could spend and consume, eating is still the one of the largest and certainly the highest frequency categories where people eat 3 times a day, 90 times a month. If you start looking at some of the other categories we now participate in, that's well over 100 shopping occasions per month.

好的。Doug，我補充一下。我想你的問題也包括我們是否在商家端與 Dasher 端看到任何行為變化。我會說幾點。通膨確實是一個我們非常、非常嚴肅看待的疑慮，而我們的做法是先確保我們所有受眾都被妥善照顧。並且——我們很幸運看到的一件事——我會呼應 Prabir 的部分說法，並從商家與 Dashers 的角度回答你的問題：也就是美國餐廳核心業務的韌性。我認為原因在於，當我看所有消費者可能花錢與消費的領域，吃飯仍然是最大、而且無疑是最高頻的品類之一，人們一天吃 3 次，一個月 90 次。如果你再看我們現在參與的其他品類，那每月的購物情境（shopping occasions）就遠遠超過 100 次。

And when we have built the largest marketplace with the most retained and also the most engaged user base, it just gives us the most shots on goal in the face of something like inflation. And when they translate that into our other 2 audiences, merchants and Dashers, merchants, they continue to see DoorDash as a way to actually gain sales even though consumers are going inside their stores, which is fantastic. And that's because dining-in is very complementary to actually ordering delivery. I mean when you're dining in, you're looking for that experience to maybe see people you haven't seen in a while in person, and that's very complementary to ordering delivery because, again, you eat multiple times a day, 20 to 25 times a week.

而當我們建立了最大的市集，擁有留存率最高、也最投入的用戶基礎時，面對像通膨這樣的情況，我們就擁有最多的「射門機會」。把這點延伸到另外兩個受眾——商家與 Dashers——商家方面，他們仍然把 DoorDash 視為一種實際提升銷售的方法，即使消費者正在回到店內，這非常棒。原因是內用其實與外送下單高度互補。我的意思是，當你內用時，你可能是為了那種體驗、為了親自見到許久未見的人；而這與外送下單是互補的，因為你一天會吃好幾次，一週 20 到 25 次。

And then on the Dasher front, what we've done is we definitely recognize that inflation is impacting Dasher earnings. And that's really what we wanted to solve for. It was the right thing for us to do given that we had a very fortunate position as having a U.S. restaurants business that's not only grown 250% over the last couple of years, but that have materially also increased its profitability such that we can choose to reinvest those cash flows into serving all of the audiences. And that's what we did.

至於 Dasher 端，我們所做的是：我們確實認知到通膨正在影響 Dasher 的收入，而這正是我們想要解決的問題。鑑於我們很幸運地擁有一個美國餐廳業務——不僅在過去幾年成長了 250%，而且其獲利能力也顯著提升——使得我們可以選擇把這些現金流再投資，用來服務所有受眾。這就是我們所做的。

We gave out 2 programs. One was a 10% cash back on fuel expenses, and the other was a bonus program that was tied to the distance in which Dashers would be driving. And the results so far have been very, very satisfying where 90% of Dashers are really, really excited about the benefits that we've offered so far.

我們推出了兩個方案。一個是燃油支出 10% 現金回饋，另一個是與 Dashers 行駛距離掛鉤的獎金方案。到目前為止的結果非常、非常令人滿意，因為有 90% 的 Dashers 對我們目前提供的福利感到非常、非常興奮。

And just to offer a little more color to what Tony just described, Doug. Look, we chose to absorb the cost of these Dasher benefits in order to preserve earnings. We could have chosen to pass on the cost to consumers, and that would have had an impact on growth due to consumer price elasticity. But instead, we chose to absorb the program costs.

Doug，為了讓 Tony 剛才的描述更具體一些：你看，我們選擇吸收這些 Dasher 福利的成本，以維持其收入。我們本可以選擇把成本轉嫁給消費者，但由於消費者價格彈性，那會對成長造成影響。相反地，我們選擇吸收該計畫成本。

So let me explain why we did that. When we keep consumer prices unchanged and if we ensure that Dasher earnings are preserved, that enables us to maximize growth because having adequate supply ensures that the consumer quality is preserved, which then drives the growth flywheel in a slightly different way, right?

我來解釋我們為什麼這麼做。當我們維持消費者價格不變，同時確保 Dasher 的收入得以維持，這能讓我們把成長最大化，因為充足的供給能確保消費者端的品質不受影響，進而以稍微不同的方式推動成長飛輪，對吧？

So then there's a question of, well, how do you fund it? And as Tony pointed out, the U.S. restaurant business is very profitable, and we use the profits from the restaurant business for 2 things. First, as we previously talked about, to invest in new areas and international and so on. The second is to reinvest back in the core restaurant business. So we're growing scale and generating growth in our core restaurant business.

接著問題就變成：那要怎麼出資？如 Tony 所指出，美國餐廳業務非常獲利，而我們把餐廳業務的利潤用在兩件事上。第一，如我們先前談到的，用於投資新領域、國際市場等等。第二，是再投資回核心餐廳業務。因此我們在核心餐廳業務上擴大規模並帶動成長。

Historically, we've taken these efficiencies, and we have used them to lower consumer prices, lower merchant commissions, increase Dash earnings. Today, because of gas prices, there's this unique need for Dashers. And so we're allocating more investment to actually help increase Dash earnings. If gas prices revert in the future, we'll revisit that. So in short, absorbing these costs is basically net-neutral to our EBITDA expectations.

從歷史上看，我們一直把這些效率用來降低消費者價格、降低商戶佣金、提高 Dash 收入。今天，由於油價上漲，對 Dashers 出現了這種獨特的需求。因此，我們正在分配更多投資，實際上是為了幫助提高 Dash 收入。如果未來油價回落，我們會再重新檢視。簡而言之，吸收這些成本基本上對我們的 EBITDA 預期是淨中性的。

Your next question comes from the line of Michael McGovern from Bank of America.

下一個問題來自美國銀行（Bank of America）的 Michael McGovern。

I wanted to see if you would double-click into the metric that Q1 '22 was the largest quarter for new consumer acquisition since Q1 last year despite lower sales and marketing as a percent of revenue. What's driving this? And are these -- I was curious if these customers are still primarily coming from the restaurant category? Or are they more -- are they coming more frequently from nonrestaurant for the first time?

我想請你們更深入說明一下這個指標：儘管銷售與行銷費用占營收比重較低，但 2022 年第一季仍是自去年第一季以來新消費者獲取最多的一季。這是由什麼驅動的？另外我也好奇，這些客戶是否仍主要來自餐廳品類？還是說——他們是否首次更常來自非餐廳品類？

Yes. Thanks, Michael. Let me take this question. Yes. So if you look back, Q1 '21, so Q1 last year was elevated in terms of customer acquisition as a result of fiscal stimulus. Ignoring that quarter, if you look at every other quarter up to Q1 '22, we've acquired more customers than we did. And that just speaks to the fact that we're still underpenetrated in this category, and there's more customers to be acquired.

是的，謝謝你，Michael。我來回答這個問題。是的，如果你回頭看，2021 年第一季，也就是去年第一季，由於財政刺激措施，客戶獲取在當時被推高。先不看那一季，如果你看從那之後到 2022 年第一季的每一季，我們獲取的客戶都比之前更多。這也反映出我們在這個品類的滲透率仍然不足，還有更多客戶可以獲取。

And then the last thing I'll say is the majority of our business is the restaurant business. And so a lot of these customers join and place their first order on restaurants, but we're seeing an interesting mix change where now we've got a decent number of customers joining to actually use some of our other categories, not just restaurants. And so it's too early because these are small percentages we're talking about. But over time, as DoorDash gets known for being your destination for all things local commerce, that the source of what product these customers use when they first joined DoorDash will undoubtedly change.

最後我想說的是，我們的大部分業務仍是餐廳業務。因此，很多客戶加入後的第一筆訂單會下在餐廳，但我們看到一個有趣的組合變化：現在有相當一部分客戶加入，是為了使用我們其他品類，而不只是餐廳。現在談這個還太早，因為我們說的是小比例。但隨著時間推進，當 DoorDash 被認知為你所有在地商務需求的目的地時，這些客戶在首次加入 DoorDash 時所使用的產品來源，無疑會改變。

Your next question comes from the line of Deepak Mathivanan from Wolfe.

下一個問題來自 Wolfe 的 Deepak Mathivanan。

Two questions from us. First, maybe can you unpack the drivers of sustained frequency gains? DashPass adoption and the nonfood convenience categories is very strong. But how does it look between subscribers versus nonsubscribers? Now with consumers kind of going back to break over lifestyles, are you seeing differences in maybe the type of orders in terms of time when it's placed and basket sizes?

我們有兩個問題。第一，能否拆解一下持續的下單頻次提升是由哪些因素驅動？DashPass 的採用以及非食品的便利品類表現非常強勁。但在訂閱者與非訂閱者之間的情況如何？現在消費者某種程度回到疫情前的生活型態，你們是否看到例如下單時間、以及客單價（basket sizes）等訂單類型上的差異？

And then, Prabir, just a financial question. Can you elaborate on the insurance reserves impact on first quarter cost of revenues? Is that some kind of accrual adjustment? Or is there any change in underlying unit economics?

第二個問題，Prabir，偏財務面。你能否說明保險準備金對第一季營收成本的影響？那是某種應計調整嗎？或是底層單位經濟（unit economics）有任何變化？

Yes, I'll take the first question, Deepak, and then Prabir will handle the question on insurance. The reason for the frequency gains are really coming from the improvements in our product. I mean there's certainly -- in part, some of the order frequency gains came from increasing contributions from our DashPass subscriber base.

是的，Deepak，我先回答第一個問題，然後 Prabir 會處理保險的問題。下單頻次提升的原因，主要來自我們產品的改善。當然——其中一部分的下單頻次提升，來自 DashPass 訂閱用戶基礎貢獻的增加。

But if you -- when you step back, I think a couple of points still are very, very important. Number one, dining-in and ordering delivery are very complementary. In fact, we saw this at almost every phase of the pandemic. There were various geographies in various parts of the world, including the U.S., where certain states had reopened more aggressively perhaps than some others, where we saw that in the past couple of years, and certainly, we're still seeing that in the first quarter of this year and even currently where people are not substituting eating in with eating out.

但如果你——退一步看，我認為有幾點仍然非常、非常重要。第一，內用與外送下單其實是高度互補的。事實上，我們在疫情的幾乎每個階段都看到了這一點。在世界各地的不同地區，包括美國，有些州可能比其他州更積極地重新開放；過去幾年我們就看到這種情況，而且我們在今年第一季、甚至目前仍看到，人們並不是用在家吃來取代外出用餐。

The second point I would say is we're constantly making improvements to the product. So we're constantly increasing selection. Whether that's restaurants, grocery stores, convenience stores, pharmacy stores, alcohol stores, resell stores, et cetera, we're increasing the quality of the deliveries by maniacally getting rid of defects where improving affordability, part of which is coming from DashPass, and we're continuously investing in customer support to make sure that we always can delight customers and meet their increasing expectations. So that's really why order frequencies are growing.

第二點是，我們持續在改進產品。所以我們不斷增加選擇——不論是餐廳、雜貨店、便利商店、藥局、酒類商店、轉售商店等等。我們也透過近乎偏執地消除缺陷來提升配送品質，同時改善可負擔性，其中一部分來自 DashPass；並且我們持續投資客戶支援，以確保我們總能讓客戶滿意並滿足他們不斷提高的期待。這就是訂單頻次成長的原因。

And specifically, Deepak, on the DashPass, user order frequency has grown and you've also got an increase in mix towards DashPass. So those 2 things sort of act in concert with each other.

而且具體來說，Deepak，就 DashPass 而言，用戶下單頻次已經成長，同時 DashPass 的占比也在提高。所以這兩件事某種程度上是相互配合、共同作用的。

And on your question on insurance reserves, we experienced an increase in the average claim amount driven by the outsized impact of a few very large claims. As a result, we adjusted our reserves both for existing claims as well as for future claims by $35 million, which had about a 30 basis point impact to cost of sales. Even though the insurance costs increase, it's a relatively small portion of our cost of sales certainly compared to other line items like payment processing or customer support and is lower than what you might see in rideshare. And so long of saying this is an area where we haven't -- because it's been a small cost, we haven't focused on it, but it also represents an opportunity where we have begun now to put in place new processes to control these costs in the long term.

至於你問到的保險準備金，我們的平均理賠金額上升，主要是少數幾筆非常大的理賠造成了不成比例的影響。因此，我們將既有理賠以及未來理賠的準備金合計調整了 3,500 萬美元，對銷售成本約造成 30 個基點的影響。即便保險成本上升，相較於付款處理或客戶支援等其他項目，它在我們銷售成本中仍占相對小的比例，也低於你在叫車平台可能看到的水準。總之，這是一個我們過去——因為成本不大而沒有特別聚焦的領域，但它也代表一個機會：我們現在已開始建立新的流程，以長期控制這些成本。

The last thing I would say is in the near term, we expect insurance costs to remain elevated in the near term because it takes a while for these changes to reflect in our claims data, but we're going to manage within the EBITDA range.

我最後想說的是，短期內我們預期保險成本仍會維持在較高水準，因為這些變更需要一段時間才會反映在理賠數據中，但我們會在 EBITDA 區間內進行管理。

Your next question comes from the line of Brian Nowak from Morgan Stanley.

下一個問題來自摩根士丹利（Morgan Stanley）的 Brian Nowak。

I have 2. The first one, Tony, I know you always put a maniacal focus on efficiency and improving the process. Maybe just sort of qualitatively, could you talk to us about a couple of the biggest low-hanging fruit areas you still see room for improvement in the core U.S. restaurant delivery business? That's the first one.

我有兩個問題。第一個，Tony，我知道你一直對效率與流程改善有近乎偏執的專注。能否從質性角度，談談你在美國核心餐廳外送業務中，仍看到哪些最大的「低垂果實」領域還有改善空間？這是第一個。

Then the second one, the point about 3P convenience reaching positive variable contribution, was that sort of in line with what you all thought at the start of the year? Or is that ahead of schedule? And if it is ahead of schedule, any reason why we're not raising full year EBITDA? Is it just too small? Are you going to reinvest? Can you tell us about that a little bit?

第二個，關於第三方（3P）便利品類達到正的變動貢獻（positive variable contribution），這是否符合你們年初的預期？還是進度超前？如果是超前，為什麼不提高全年 EBITDA？是因為規模太小？你們會再投資嗎？能否多談一點？

Yes. Brian, there's still a large room to go in terms of finding more and more efficiency. And really, there's kind of 2 general ways I think about this. The first is how do we just find the next level of product market fit, which certainly would grow our retention and order frequency even further, thereby give us even more leverage on the sales and marketing side of the P&L -- overall P&L.

是的，Brian，在尋找更多效率方面仍有很大空間。基本上，我會用兩個大方向來思考。第一是，我們如何找到下一層次的產品市場契合（product-market fit），這當然會進一步提升留存與下單頻次，從而在損益表（P&L）——整體 P&L 的銷售與行銷端帶來更大的槓桿。

And then the second is really efficiency from operations. Take, for example, the wait times we still see at stores, I mean, especially given some of the labor challenges that you're seeing at whether it's restaurants or whether it's grocery stores or convenience stores, everyone in the service industry is certainly feeling this. That makes wait times as well as inventory management have higher variance. Being able to manage that variance and being able to lower those wait times and increase or improve the accuracy, I should say, of the inventory management, I think, are all areas.

第二個方向則是營運面的效率。舉例來說，我們在門店仍看到等待時間——尤其在你看到的勞動力挑戰下，不論是餐廳、雜貨店或便利商店，服務業的每個人都確實感受到這點。這使得等待時間以及庫存管理的波動更大。能夠管理這種波動、降低等待時間，並提升——我應該說——庫存管理的準確性，我認為都是可以著力的領域。

But really, you can find efficiency in every line item. And -- but the 2 general approaches I generally think of this is how do we build the next level of product such that our consumers love it even more, which gives us lots of sales and marketing leverage. And then on the other side, it's really finding efficiency on the cost front.

但其實每一個費用項目都能找到效率。而——我通常用兩個總體方法來看：一方面是如何打造下一層次的產品，讓消費者更喜愛，從而帶來大量銷售與行銷槓桿；另一方面則是在成本端真正找到效率。

And then on your question, Brian, on 3P convenience and why not raise the guide, it's a small portion right now. And secondly, any profits we generate, as I mentioned earlier, we reinvest and try to drive scale and growth so that we maximize long-term profit dollars.

然後針對你的問題，Brian，關於 3P 便利（convenience）以及為什麼不提高指引，目前它只占很小一部分。其次，如我先前提到的，我們產生的任何利潤都會再投資，並嘗試推動規模與成長，以便最大化長期的利潤金額。

Your next question comes from the line of Ronald Josey from Citi.

下一個問題來自 Citi 的 Ronald Josey。

I wanted to ask maybe a bigger picture on DashPass just given the importance in greater overall frequency of usage. And we're seeing more categories being added here and available on the service, and that talks to the value. But I want to understand a little bit more how do you prove the value here to members? In surveys that we've run, one of the best parts of why people order or have DashPass is because it saves money. The same amount of folks on the other side say it's too expensive. So can you talk to us a little bit about the value on DashPass and marketing there?

我想從更宏觀的角度問一下 DashPass，考量到它對整體使用頻率提升的重要性。我們看到服務中新增並提供了更多品類，這也反映了其價值。但我想更進一步了解，你們如何向會員證明這裡的價值？在我們做的調查中，人們下單或使用 DashPass 的最大原因之一是因為它能省錢；但另一方面，同樣多的人表示它太貴了。你們能否談談 DashPass 的價值以及相關行銷？

And then in the letter, Tony, you talked about first-party commerce and underpenetration here. Wanted to hear a little bit more about what you're doing in terms of drive and how that might help answer those questions.

另外在信中，Tony，你談到第一方（first-party）商務以及目前的滲透率不足。想再多聽一些你們在推動方面做了什麼，以及這可能如何幫助回答那些問題。

Sure. I can start and feel free, Prabir, if you want to chime in on some of these. But I think the first question around DashPass and value, I kind of take this in 2 parts. One part, you kind of answered, I think, in your question, which really came in the form of savings, right? And I think that makes a lot of sense, especially for users that are discovering our product multiple times a month or possibly multiple times a week. I think -- and we'll continue to make those investments.

當然。我可以先開始，如果你想補充其中一些，Prabir，也歡迎加入。不過我認為第一個關於 DashPass 與價值的問題，我會分成兩部分來看。一部分其實你在問題裡已經回答了，我想主要就是以省錢的形式呈現，對吧？我認為這很合理，特別是對於每月多次、甚至每週多次使用我們產品的用戶。我想——我們也會持續做這些投資。

But the other thing I would say is that we also want to improve the product for DashPass itself by making sure that we can offer either exclusive or preferred types of product experiences that are only made available through DashPass as well as the fact that we're introducing so many more categories. I know that, overall, customers who've ordered -- who are ordering outside of our restaurants category. The last number we announced is around 14% in Q4. But in certain markets, that number is much, much higher than that, and you see a lot of that coming from DashPass buyers and subscribers.

但我還想說的是，我們也希望透過確保能提供僅透過 DashPass 才能取得的獨家或優先的產品體驗，來改善 DashPass 本身的產品；同時我們也在引入更多品類。我知道整體而言，在餐廳品類之外下單的客戶——我們上次公布的數字是第四季約 14%。但在某些市場，這個比例遠遠高於此，而你會看到其中很大一部分來自 DashPass 的買家與訂閱者。

And remind me your second question again.

再提醒我一下你的第二個問題是什麼。

Actually, before you move on to the second question, Tony, just a couple of things to add, Ron. I mean you're exactly right. So far, the program has been about delivering savings to consumers. And that's fine because we had to start somewhere, and that's naturally a place to start. Over time, now that we've got the program at scale and it's something that both merchants and consumers recognize the value, you can start layering in benefits that extend beyond just dollar savings, right?

其實在你進入第二個問題之前，Tony，我想補充幾點，Ron。你的看法完全正確。到目前為止，這個方案主要是在為消費者提供省錢的好處。這沒問題，因為我們必須從某個地方開始，而這自然是最好的起點。隨著時間推進，現在我們已經把方案做到了規模化，且商家與消費者都認可其價值，你就可以開始疊加不僅僅是金錢節省的其他福利，對吧？

So think of that as exclusive items. The restaurant wants to market something specifically to these consumers. We can do exclusive items with DashPass. We can provide exclusive access to certain restaurants that might be more farther away compared to restaurants that are in your vicinity. We can do segmented offerings. We've launched our DashPass student plan, and this is a way of tailoring the benefits to a certain segment of the population to make it more interesting for them. We can add selection so that maybe you don't eat from restaurants today. And as a result, the savings opportunity isn't available to you. But if we add in grocery and convenience stores, now you might have other use cases for which DashPass is actually beneficial. So there's things we can do within DashPass in order to tailor the benefit depending on who the audience is, and we're just getting started.

所以可以把它想成獨家商品。餐廳想針對這些消費者特別行銷某些東西，我們可以透過 DashPass 提供獨家品項。我們也可以提供對某些餐廳的獨家存取權，這些餐廳可能比你附近的餐廳更遠。我們可以做分眾（segmented）方案。我們推出了 DashPass 學生方案，這是一種針對特定族群量身打造福利、讓它對他們更有吸引力的方式。我們也可以增加選擇性，讓你今天可能不從餐廳用餐，因此省錢機會對你不可用；但如果我們加入雜貨與便利商店，現在你可能有其他使用情境，使得 DashPass 其實是有利的。因此，在 DashPass 內部我們可以做很多事，依據受眾是誰來調整福利，而我們才剛剛開始。

And Ron, I think your second question was actually about Drive and kind of the digitization of kind of the first-party experience, right? And so you asked -- first of all, the premise is absolutely right. I mean I think if there's any positive from COVID, it's that every physical business was effectively forced or compelled to become a digital operations almost somewhat overnight. And as a result, I think the major lesson everyone learned is that digital sales can complement their in-store business and in-store activity. And in fact, those who've invested very aggressively in their e-commerce operations, I think, have really, really benefited and continue to have shown strength. And so that -- and that's what we're seeing in terms of the merchants demand and willingness to work with us to effectively transform their business models into becoming digital operations.

Ron，我想你的第二個問題其實是關於 Drive，以及第一方體驗的數位化，對吧？你問——首先，這個前提完全正確。我是說，如果 COVID 有任何正面影響，那就是每一家實體企業幾乎都被迫或被推動在幾乎一夜之間成為數位化營運。結果我認為大家學到的主要教訓是，數位銷售可以補充他們的門市業務與門市活動。事實上，那些在電商營運上投入非常積極的企業，我認為確實獲益良多，並且持續展現韌性。因此——這也就是我們在商家端所看到的需求，以及他們願意與我們合作，來有效地把商業模式轉型為數位化營運。

And so Drive obviously has played a big part of that where it's effectively now diversified from starting with large enterprise restaurants only to now serving everyone from nonrestaurants, convenience stores, pet stores, liquor stores, grocery stores, retail stores, and it has a large runway both in the U.S. as well as globally, but it also has a big runway in serving small businesses as well. And that's really why we've built Storefront because a lot of these small businesses aren't even able right now to have online ordering systems that will talk or seamlessly integrate into their back of the house systems, and Storefront really does that.

因此 Drive 顯然在其中扮演了很大角色；它從一開始只服務大型連鎖餐廳，現在已經多元化，服務範圍涵蓋非餐飲、便利商店、寵物店、酒類商店、雜貨店、零售店等。它在美國以及全球都有很長的成長跑道，同時在服務小型商家方面也有很大的空間。這也正是我們打造 Storefront 的原因，因為許多小型商家目前甚至還無法擁有能與其後台系統對接或無縫整合的線上點單系統，而 Storefront 正是用來做到這件事。

And our latest product that we've introduced as part of our platform services business, actually, it was an acquisition called Bbot. That product really helps manage the in-store operation that becomes a bit of the operating system inside these restaurants. And so there's a lot of work we have to do in order to build an end-to-end system to really power the first-party digital operations of these businesses, but it's an opportunity that you're absolutely right exist within restaurants, outside of restaurants and globally.

而我們最新在平台服務業務中推出的產品，其實是透過一項收購而來，叫做 Bbot。這個產品能協助管理店內營運，某種程度上成為這些餐廳內部的作業系統。因此，我們還有很多工作要做，才能打造端到端的系統，真正為這些企業的第一方數位化營運提供動力；但你說得完全正確，這個機會不僅存在於餐廳內，也存在於餐廳之外，並且在全球範圍內皆然。

Your next question comes from the line of Andrew Boone from JMP Securities.

下一個問題來自 JMP Securities 的 Andrew Boone。

I have 2, please. So the first is from the letter, it feels like convenience is starting to get to scale. The question is really, what's the next category that you guys are really excited about that you think can -- that you can lean into and invest behind and kind of get to that same kind of variable contribution margin breakeven and kind of velocity?

我有兩個問題。第一個是，從信中看起來，便利（convenience）似乎開始達到規模。我的問題是，你們接下來最興奮、認為可以加大投入並投資、並且能達到類似的變動貢獻毛利（variable contribution margin）損益兩平與動能（velocity）的下一個品類是什麼？

And then the second question is more bigger picture. Understood that as you guys see larger opportunities, you're investing there, but can you just remind us in terms of the framework of how you think about allowing margin expansion to flow through to the model just overall? So how do you think about kind of growth versus profitability?

第二個問題更偏宏觀。我理解當你們看到更大的機會時會加大投資，但你們能否再提醒我們一下，你們在整體上如何看待讓利潤率擴張（margin expansion）流入模型的框架？也就是說，你們如何權衡成長與獲利？

It's Tony. I'll take the first question and maybe Prabir can take the question on the economics and how we can reinvest those back into the model. On the first, look, all of these categories are pretty enormous, right? Restaurants in the U.S. is $800 billion. I mean if you look at grocery and convenience, they add to over $1 trillion in the U.S. Outside of the U.S., it's much larger than that. And then if you include the other categories of pets, alcohol, pharmacy, retail, we get to an even larger number.

我是 Tony。我先回答第一個問題，關於經濟性以及我們如何把這些再投資回模型，或許 Prabir 可以回答。第一點，你看，這些品類都非常龐大，對吧？美國餐廳市場是 8,000 億美元。如果你看雜貨與便利，它們在美國加總超過 1 兆美元。在美國以外，規模更大。再加上寵物、酒精、藥局、零售等其他品類，我們會得到一個更大的數字。

And so I think when the opportunity is that large, we don't think that much about which one of them is going to get there first. We instead just think about what's the right amount to invest and when to do it, right? And that really goes back to the investment philosophy that we kind of outlined from how we launched businesses in the first place, which -- and this is true for all of the businesses at DoorDash, whether it was the restaurants marketplace, the platform business with products like Drive or Storefront or the convenience business or all the ads business that we're launching, the international markets, which really is how do we build the best possible product to actually meet or ideally exceed the customer expectations and keep doing that and then how do we actually line by line work down the costs so that we can achieve positive unit math before we consider.

因此我認為，當機會如此之大時，我們不會太去想哪一個會最先達到。我們反而只會思考該投入多少、以及何時投入，對吧？而這其實回到我們在最初推出業務時所概述的投資理念——而且這對 DoorDash 的所有業務都適用：不論是餐廳市集業務、像 Drive 或 Storefront 這類產品的平台業務、便利業務、我們正在推出的廣告業務、國際市場——核心都是：我們如何打造最好的產品，真正滿足或理想情況下超越客戶期望，並持續做到這點；接著我們如何逐項（line by line）降低成本，以便在我們考慮之前就能達到正向的單位經濟（unit math）。

Yes. And on the margin flow-through question, we're running the business with the objective of maximizing scale so that in the long term, we maximize profit dollars, right? And so as Tony alluded to, these categories that we're operating in, they're very large, they're very underpenetrated today, and that's why we're investing to build scale. And what we look for is this combination of strong signals of product market fit as well as a path to attract unit economics.

是的。關於毛利流轉（flow-through）這個問題，我們經營業務的目標是最大化規模，讓我們在長期能夠最大化利潤金額，對吧？因此，正如 Tony 所提到的，我們所處的這些品類規模非常大，而且目前滲透率仍然很低，這也是我們投資以建立規模的原因。而我們所尋找的是：強烈的產品市場契合（product market fit）訊號，以及能夠達成具吸引力的單位經濟效益（unit economics）的路徑，兩者的組合。

So let me give you an example. We cited the third-party convenience example. If you look at our DashMarts today and look at all the stores on DoorDash on any given day the most popular stores in terms of orders, off the top 10, the majority are DashMarts. That's a signal of strong product market fit because that's the customer speaking, right? And you see that in the data. And so these signals of product market fit, coupled with progress that we see in unit economics, this is what gives us confidence to continue investing because the belief is that it will lead to solid growth for many years to come.

我舉個例子。我們提到第三方便利商店的例子。如果你看我們目前的 DashMarts，再看 DoorDash 上任何一天所有商店中，以訂單量來看最受歡迎的店家，在前 10 名裡，多數都是 DashMarts。這就是強烈的產品市場契合訊號，因為那是顧客在發聲，對吧？而且你可以在數據中看到。因此，這些產品市場契合的訊號，再加上我們在單位經濟效益上看到的進展，正是讓我們有信心持續投資的原因，因為我們相信這將帶來未來多年穩健的成長。

Now the core U.S. restaurant business is profitable. It's growing, and the profit margins continue increasing. And we're using those profits from that core business to make these investments. So said differently, we're not trying to manage the business to increase margins or even the dollar amount of EBITDA because we're essentially reinvesting those profits in order to grow these other areas.

目前美國核心餐廳業務是獲利的。它在成長，而且利潤率持續提升。我們也正是用這個核心業務的利潤來進行這些投資。換句話說，我們並不是在管理業務以提高利潤率，甚至也不是為了提高 EBITDA 的金額，因為我們基本上是在把這些利潤再投資，用來推動其他領域的成長。

Now to the extent we don't see the right progress, whether it's product market fit indicators or the right progress from a margin perspective or a unit economics perspective for these new areas, we scale back. And that's the discipline that we'll run the core U.S. business with up to this point that allowed us to build a profitable core U.S. business.

如果在這些新領域，我們沒有看到正確的進展——不論是產品市場契合的指標，或是從毛利角度、或單位經濟效益角度的進展——我們就會縮減規模。而這正是我們迄今為止用來經營美國核心業務的紀律，讓我們得以建立一個獲利的美國核心業務。

And so we will flex and adjust depending on the signals we see, but the intent right now is to reinvest these profits, provided the signals are there, that we can drive growth for many years to come.

因此，我們會依據所看到的訊號進行彈性調整；但目前的意圖是，在訊號成立的前提下，把這些利潤再投資，以便推動未來多年持續成長。

Your next question comes from the line of Eric Sheridan from Goldman Sachs.

下一個問題來自高盛（Goldman Sachs）的 Eric Sheridan。

Two, if I could. Tony, maybe a bigger picture question. Obviously, you haven't been a public company for very long, and you see periods like this where valuation gets compressed very quickly and capital becomes a little bit more constrained broadly in growth industries. How are you thinking about the capital you have on the balance sheet as elements are playing offense and maybe accelerated things from the buy versus build decision and where you want to take the platform longer term versus using capital as a sort of fortress to sort of shore up and think about broader industry structures over the medium to long term? I'd love your perspective on that given the broader market environment we find ourselves in.

我有兩個問題，如果可以的話。Tony，先問一個更宏觀的問題。顯然你們成為上市公司時間還不長，而你會看到像現在這樣的時期：估值很快被壓縮，且在成長型產業中，資本整體變得更受限。你如何看待資產負債表上的資本——在某些面向上採取進攻，或許加速「買（buy）vs. 自建（build）」的決策，以及你希望平台長期走向何處——相較於把資本當作某種「堡壘」，用來鞏固自身並在中長期思考更廣泛的產業結構？在我們所處的整體市場環境下，我很想聽聽你的看法。

And then maybe to ask Ron's question a little bit differently, given the current labor environment for delivery folks, do you see companies that have been more reluctant to maybe embrace platforms like you either wanting to partner either directly on the platform or utilizing Drive? And we saw this in different hotel cycles with the OTAs over the years where periods of time of demand or labor constraint can lead people to make partnerships in digital. Could we see partners that have historically been reluctant to partner with you maybe come back and think about platform dynamics to fulfill their business needs?

另外，換個方式問 Ron 的問題：在目前外送人力的勞動市場環境下，你是否看到一些公司過去較不願意採用像你們這樣的平台，現在反而想要合作——不論是直接在平台上合作，或是使用 Drive？我們過去在不同的飯店景氣循環中，看到 OTA 的情況是：在需求或勞動受限的時期，會促使業者在數位端建立合作。那麼，我們是否可能看到一些歷來較不願意與你們合作的夥伴回來，重新思考平台動態以滿足其業務需求？

Eric, yes, thanks for the questions. On the first one, I think the best way to always grow is from your own cash flows, right? And that's why we're in a very privileged position where we have a very cash-generating business in our U.S. restaurant marketplace that really allow us to make most of our investments. And we also have a cash balance north of $4 billion, which, to your point, gives us quite a lot of flexibility.

Eric，是的，謝謝你的問題。第一個問題，我認為最好的成長方式永遠是來自自身的現金流，對吧？這也是為什麼我們處於非常有利的位置：我們在美國餐廳市場的業務具備很強的現金創造能力，讓我們能夠用它來支應大部分投資。我們也有超過 40 億美元的現金餘額，正如你所說，這給了我們相當大的彈性。

But I think it's really important to know when to use capital to your advantage and maybe when not to use capital to your advantage. I think from a building businesses and products perspective, I think it's really important that we have to achieve product market fit first, right, before we deploy capital to actually scale those businesses. In fact, I'd argue we have to first find product market fit, then find efficient ways to grow that are unique to that product and then consider deploying capital to very, very aggressively scale that business. And that's kind of how we think about deploying capital from an organic perspective.

但我認為非常重要的是，要知道何時運用資本來發揮優勢，以及何時不該運用資本。我認為從打造業務與產品的角度來看，我們必須先達到產品市場契合，對吧？在我們投入資本去擴大這些業務規模之前。事實上，我會主張我們必須先找到產品市場契合，接著找到對該產品而言獨特且有效率的成長方式，然後才考慮投入資本，以非常、非常積極地擴大該業務規模。這就是我們在有機（organic）面向部署資本的思考方式。

I think from an inorganic perspective, I think the bar is just really high, right? M&A, as I'm sure you know, it does not have a historical track record for success. And I think for us, we keep that bar very, very high and only really consider acting upon it if we see 2 things. One, obviously, if it's accretive to our business in terms of giving us the advantage of investing more efficiently in an area that we find very attractive for years to come; and secondly, if we find a team that we think is not only aligned on building the same thing in the long run, but how we actually build it, right?

從非有機（inorganic）的角度來看，我認為門檻就是非常高，對吧？併購（M&A），如你所知，歷史上並沒有很好的成功紀錄。我認為對我們而言，我們把門檻設得非常、非常高，只有在看到兩件事時才會真正考慮採取行動。第一，當然是它能對我們的業務帶來增益（accretive），例如讓我們能在一個我們認為未來多年都非常有吸引力的領域，更有效率地進行投資；第二，是我們找到一個團隊，不僅在長期要打造的方向上與我們一致，也在「如何打造」這件事上與我們一致，對吧？

And this really is reflected in the example of Wolt, which, again, should close the first half of this year, where we saw in their business world-class retention and order rate metrics that show that they built a product that is best in class and loved by really all of their audiences. And they did it with an incredibly capital-efficient P&L in many geographies, including very-difficult-to-operate geographies. And they had a team that very similarly to how we wanted to build for the long run and what it is that we actually wanted to build.

這也反映在 Wolt 的例子上。這筆交易同樣預計在今年上半年完成。我們看到他們的業務擁有世界級的留存率與訂單頻率指標，顯示他們打造出同級最佳、且幾乎受到所有受眾喜愛的產品。他們也在許多地區以極高的資本效率來經營損益表（P&L），包括一些非常難以營運的地區。同時，他們的團隊在長期建設方式上與我們非常相似，也與我們實際想打造的內容一致。

And so I think that's really how we think about making these investments, whether it's organic or inorganic, but I really do think there are times where capital certainly is a privilege we have now given the fact that we built a cash flow positive business as well as have a lot of money on the balance sheet with no debt. But when we deploy is a very, very important decision that we take seriously.

因此，我認為這就是我們看待這些投資的方式，不論是有機或非有機。我也確實認為，在某些時候，資本是一種我們目前擁有的特權，因為我們建立了一個現金流為正的業務，同時資產負債表上也有大量現金且沒有負債。但何時部署資本是一個非常、非常重要的決策，我們會嚴肅看待。

Your next question comes from the line of Mark Mahaney...

下一個問題來自 Mark Mahaney……

Prabir -- sorry, I don't think we answered Eric's second question. Prabir, are you going to take that?

Prabir——抱歉，我想我們沒有回答 Eric 的第二個問題。Prabir，你要回答那個問題嗎？

Yes. Yes, the second question was really around partnerships. I mean just given the scale of our business now, whether it's the marketplace side or in the platform services side and the fleet that we have and the size of that fleet, with products such as Drive, they're getting more and more interesting, particularly in this area when the labor market is tight, particularly when it comes to the delivery space because everyone -- Tony alluded to this in an earlier question around interest in Drive, it began simply with restaurants. And now it's sort of -- it's all these different categories beyond restaurants that are all looking to reach customers on the same day, in fact, the same hour basis.

是的。是的，第二個問題主要是關於合作夥伴關係。我的意思是，考量到我們現在的業務規模——不論是市場端（marketplace）或平台服務端（platform services），以及我們擁有的車隊與車隊規模——像 Drive 這樣的產品正變得越來越有吸引力，特別是在勞動市場緊俏的情況下，尤其是在外送領域，因為每個人——Tony 在先前關於 Drive 興趣的問題中也提到——一開始 Drive 只是從餐廳開始。現在則是——已經擴展到餐廳以外的各種不同品類，大家都希望能以當日、甚至當小時的方式觸達顧客。

And this is particularly relevant outside of the U.S. where these options don't exist was actually unique -- it's a unique customer experience. So we are seeing the success with Drive as well as the greater secular shift towards convenience. Drive increased conversations with partners outside of the restaurant category, in different categories that are actually interested in embracing same-day fulfillment.

這在美國以外尤其相關，因為那裡並不存在這些選項——這其實是一種獨特的顧客體驗。因此，我們看到 Drive 的成功，以及便利性（convenience）更大的長期結構性轉變（secular shift）。Drive 也增加了與餐廳品類以外夥伴的對話，在不同品類中，確實有業者有興趣採用當日配送（same-day fulfillment）。

Yes. The only thing I'd add, Eric, is just that I think just as consumers are exhibiting the behavior where they're going back inside restaurants and seeing friends again and families again and eating together, and they're also ordering delivery at the same time. Restaurants are noticing that, too. And as a result, I think the argument of incrementality, not just in terms of incremental customers, but actually incremental orders is really starting to sink in.

是的。Eric，我唯一想補充的是，我認為就像消費者正在展現的行為一樣：他們回到餐廳內用、再次見朋友與家人、一起用餐，同時也在下外送訂單。餐廳也注意到了這點。因此，我認為「增量」（incrementality）的論點——不只是增量顧客，甚至是增量訂單——真的開始被大家接受了。

Next question comes from the line of Mark Mahaney from Evercore ISI.

下一個問題來自 Evercore ISI 的 Mark Mahaney。

Could you just touch on latest thoughts on ad revenue or -- yes, over time? And I think that's still very early stages, but anything on timing?

能否談談你們對廣告營收的最新看法，或是——是的，隨著時間推進？我想這仍然非常早期，但在時程上有沒有任何資訊？

And then on the average order frequency reaching a new high, can you provide any detail on how wide of a gap you're seeing between average order frequency for people who just start and then they will become DashPassers and then they become mature, they've been on DashPass for 6 months, 12 months, et cetera? Like how wide is that gap? Maybe help us think about the curve of usage in the future.

另外，關於平均下單頻率創下新高，你能否提供一些細節，說明剛開始使用的人、之後成為 DashPass 會員、再到成熟會員（例如加入 DashPass 6 個月、12 個月等）之間的平均下單頻率差距有多大？這個差距有多寬？也許能幫助我們思考未來使用曲線會如何發展。

Sure. So first on ad revenue, we haven't disclosed the size of that business. It's still young and nascent, and there's a lot -- there's room for it to grow. Yes, I will say it is an attractive opportunity for us just given the size of our user base, the frequency of interactions on our platform as well as the number of services that are available. And we said that we've not been in a rush to monetize. Our focus, we need to make sure we balance delivering an appropriate return to advertisers with the consumer experience. It would be a negative if consumer experience is impacted or conversions impact in any way.

當然。先談廣告營收，我們尚未披露該業務的規模。它仍然年輕且處於萌芽階段，還有很大——成長空間。是的，我會說，考量到我們用戶基礎的規模、用戶在我們平台上的互動頻率，以及可提供的服務數量，這對我們而言是一個具吸引力的機會。我們也說過，我們並不急於變現。我們的重點是要確保在為廣告主帶來適當回報與消費者體驗之間取得平衡。如果消費者體驗受到影響，或轉換率以任何方式受到影響，那將是負面的。

And certainly, over the coming time periods, I mean, as this business scales, we will use these incremental profits to invest into growth and to strengthen the core U.S. business as well as our other initiatives beyond restaurants.

而且可以肯定的是，在接下來的期間，隨著這項業務擴大規模，我們會把這些增量利潤用於投資成長，並強化美國核心業務，以及我們在餐廳以外的其他計畫。

On your question regarding order frequency, it's a tough question to answer because we're continuing to see growth across cohorts. So let's take DashPass as an example. Once the user joins DashPass, over time, their order frequency for that cohort just has continued increasing. So that spread just continues to widen. And so I'm not trying to avoid the question. It's an imprecise question. It will be a different story if these order frequencies remain static, but the reality is you've got growth taking place at a cohort level.

關於你提到的下單頻率問題，這很難回答，因為我們持續看到各個同質群（cohort）都在成長。以 DashPass 為例，使用者一旦加入 DashPass，隨著時間推移，該同質群的下單頻率就持續上升。因此，那個差距就會持續擴大。我不是在迴避問題；而是這個問題本身不夠精確。如果這些下單頻率保持不變，那會是另一種情況，但現實是你看到的是在同質群層級發生的成長。

Your next question comes from the line of Brian Fitzgerald from Wells Fargo.

下一個問題來自 Wells Fargo 的 Brian Fitzgerald。

A couple of quick ones. DashMarts, essentially, the micro-fulfillment centers, I think last time we checked, they were carrying around 2,000 SKUs. Can you talk about the kind of trajectory of growth in terms of locations or SKU base that you're running at DashMarts?

兩個簡短問題。DashMarts，本質上是微型履約中心，我記得上次我們查看時，它們大約有 2,000 個 SKU。你能談談 DashMarts 在據點數量或 SKU 基礎方面的成長軌跡嗎？

And then we just got back from marketing around Europe, and we got asked every meeting how is the U.S. -- North American consumer versus European. Looking at Wolt versus North America, any dynamics to call out there with respect to the strength or the price sensitivity of the consumer geographically?

另外，我們剛從歐洲的行銷行程回來，每場會議都被問到美國——北美消費者相較於歐洲如何。從 Wolt 與北美來看，在不同地理區域上，消費者的強勁程度或價格敏感度方面，有沒有什麼動態值得指出？

Brian, it's Tony. I'll take the question on DashMarts, and then maybe Prabir can follow on the second question around kind of geographic differences in terms of what we're noticing.

Brian，我是 Tony。我先回答 DashMarts 的問題，然後也許 Prabir 可以接著回答第二個關於地理差異、我們觀察到的情況。

On DashMart, the way I think about this is the problem to solve isn't how many SKUs to offer inside of a DashMart or whether to build DashMart. The problem really to solve is how do we actually build the best convenience and grocery delivery experience. And when you look at where the penetration levels are today and just take, for example, the U.S. relative to where they could be, I think there's a massive gap. If anything, the penetration levels today in convenience and grocery delivery is fairly low and has largely stagnated post-COVID. And I think that suggests that the customer actually prefers perhaps either buying online, picking up in store or perhaps just shopping inside the store altogether.

談到 DashMart，我的看法是：要解決的問題不是在 DashMart 裡要提供多少 SKU，或是否要建 DashMart。真正要解決的問題是，我們如何打造最好的便利與雜貨配送體驗。當你看今天的滲透率，再以美國為例，相較於它可能達到的水準，我認為存在巨大的落差。若有什麼結論的話，就是目前便利與雜貨配送的滲透率相當低，而且在 COVID 之後大致停滯。我認為這暗示顧客實際上可能更偏好線上購買、到店取貨，或乾脆直接到店內購物。

And so what we're trying to solve is how do we build an experience that can work for both consumers, grocers, retailers as well as Dashers. And the way we think about it is for consumers, how do we build an experience that can give them exactly what they ordered, that can do it at a price point that matches their expectations with greater convenience. And if we can figure that out, which is going to require lots of invention such as figuring out inventory management built from the ground up as well as merchandising, getting the right SKUs and selection to the point of your question as well as doing it more conveniently, then I think that, that's a service that grocers and retailers alike will want as well.

因此，我們試圖解決的是：如何打造一個能同時適用於消費者、雜貨商、零售商以及 Dashers 的體驗。我們的思考方式是，對消費者而言，如何打造一種體驗，能讓他們拿到完全符合下單內容的商品，並以符合其預期的價格點、提供更高的便利性。如果我們能把這件事做出來——這將需要大量創新，例如從零開始建立的庫存管理，以及商品陳列（merchandising），把正確的 SKU 與選品做到位（呼應你的問題），並且讓流程更便利——那我認為這也會是一項雜貨商與零售商都會想要的服務。

And that's something that we can help them with as they think about how can they add effectively another use case to their already very successful buy online, pick up in store use case and make that incremental for them and have these warehouses that are actually optimized for delivery. So that's really what we're trying to do with DashMarts.

而且，當他們思考如何在既有非常成功的「線上購買、到店取貨」使用情境之外，有效增加另一個使用情境，並讓其成為增量貢獻，同時擁有真正為配送最佳化的倉儲時，我們可以在這方面協助他們。這就是我們透過 DashMarts 想要做的事情。

And then on your international question, I know that's in that -- at Europe, but just as a point of reference, I'm not sure the price sensitive question, to be honest to you. At least based on our analysis, if you look at outside the U.S. and exclude U.K. for a second, the levels of penetration in terms of food delivery are quite low, right, whether it's European countries, whether it's Australia, Japan or whatever. And the reason for that is because it was -- a couple of things. One is the number of restaurants that are available are low. So it's a selection problem, first and foremost. Second, the quality of the experience is iffy.

至於你的國際問題，我知道那是在——在歐洲，但作為參考，老實說我不太確定所謂價格敏感度的問題。至少根據我們的分析，如果你看美國以外、先把英國排除，外送在滲透率方面其實相當低，對吧，不論是歐洲各國、澳洲、日本等等。原因有——幾個因素。第一，可供選擇的餐廳數量偏少，所以首先是選擇（selection）問題。第二，體驗品質不穩定。

And what I mean by that is some of these countries, food delivery is essentially lead gen, which means that it's the restaurant that's actually fulfilling the order and consumers don't have visibility into whether the order is going to be delivered, who to call if it's late. And that just leads to poor consumer experience that then ultimately leads to lower adoption.

我的意思是，在其中一些國家，外送基本上是導流（lead gen），也就是由餐廳實際履行訂單，而消費者無法掌握訂單是否會送達、若延遲該找誰聯絡。這會導致糟糕的消費者體驗，最終造成較低的採用率。

So I think the opportunity is there as long as we address these fundamental building blocks of selection, quality and affordability in these countries, whether it's Europe or Australia or Japan. That is very early in terms of their development along these dimensions.

所以我認為，只要我們能在這些國家解決選擇、品質與可負擔性這些基本構件，不論是歐洲、澳洲或日本，機會就存在。而在這些面向上，它們目前仍處於非常早期的發展階段。

There are no further questions at this time. I turn the call back over to the DoorDash team.

目前沒有其他問題。我把電話交回 DoorDash 團隊。

Thank you, Jewel, and thank you, everybody, for the questions and your time today. We look forward to being in touch with many of you soon. Have a good evening.

謝謝你，Jewel，也謝謝各位今天的提問與撥冗參與。我們期待很快能與各位中的許多人保持聯繫。祝各位晚安。

This concludes today's conference call. You may now disconnect.

今天的電話會議到此結束。您現在可以掛線。