Doordash, Inc. (DASH) 2023 Q2 法說會逐字稿

Good afternoon, and welcome to the DoorDash Second Quarter 2023 Earnings Call. My name is Briana, and I will be your conference operator today. Please note that this call is being recorded. (Operator Instructions)

各位下午好，歡迎參加 DoorDash 2023 年第二季財報電話會議。我是 Briana，今天將擔任會議接線員。請注意，本次通話將被錄音。（接線員指示）

I will now turn the call over to Andy Hargreaves, you may begin your conference.

我現在把電話交給 Andy Hargreaves，您可以開始會議。

Thanks, Briana. Good afternoon, everyone, and thanks for joining us for our second quarter 2023 earnings call. I'm very pleased to be joined today by Co-Founder, Chair and CEO, Tony Xu; and CFO, Ravi Inukonda.

謝謝你，Briana。各位下午好，感謝大家參加我們 2023 年第二季財報電話會議。我很高興今天與我們的共同創辦人、董事長兼執行長 Tony Xu，以及財務長 Ravi Inukonda 一同出席。

We'll be making forward-looking statements during today's call, including our expectations for business, financial position, operating performance, our market guidance, strategies, our investment approach, alignment with merchants and dashers and the consumer spending environment. Forward-looking statements are subject to risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially from those described. Many of these uncertainties are described in our SEC filings, including Form 10-Ks and 10-Qs. You should not rely on our forward-looking statements as predictions of future events. We disclaim any obligation to update any forward-looking statements, except as required by law.

在今天的電話會議中，我們將作出前瞻性陳述，包括我們對業務、財務狀況、營運表現、市場指引、策略、投資方法、與商家及外送員（Dashers）的協同，以及消費支出環境的預期。前瞻性陳述存在風險與不確定性，可能導致實際結果與所述內容出現重大差異。許多不確定性已在我們向 SEC 提交的文件中說明，包括 10-K 與 10-Q。您不應將我們的前瞻性陳述視為對未來事件的預測。除法律要求外，我們不承擔更新任何前瞻性陳述的義務。

During this call, we will discuss certain non-GAAP financial measures. Information regarding our non-GAAP financial measures, including a reconciliation of such non-GAAP measures to the most directly comparable GAAP financial measures, may be found in our earnings press release, which is available on our IR website. These non-GAAP measures should be considered in addition to our GAAP results and are not intended to be a substitute for our GAAP results.

在本次電話會議中，我們將討論若干非 GAAP 財務衡量指標。關於我們的非 GAAP 財務衡量指標之資訊（包括將該等非 GAAP 指標與最直接可比的 GAAP 財務指標進行調節的對照表），可在我們的財報新聞稿中查閱，該新聞稿已發布於我們的投資人關係（IR）網站。這些非 GAAP 指標應與我們的 GAAP 結果一併考量，並非用來取代 GAAP 結果。

Finally, this call is being audio webcasted on our IR website. An audio replay of the call will be available shortly after the call ends. Briana, I'll pass it back to you, and we can take our first question.

最後，本次電話會議將在我們的 IR 網站進行音訊網路直播。電話會議結束後不久，將提供音訊重播。Briana，我把電話交還給你，我們可以開始第一個提問。

(Operator Instructions) Your first question comes from Deepak Mathivanan with Wolfe Research.

（接線員指示）您的第一個問題來自 Wolfe Research 的 Deepak Mathivanan。

Great. Maybe one for Tony and one for Ravi. Tony, can you give a little more color on what categories drove the acceleration in U.S. nonrestaurant verticals in 2Q? Are there any that is sort of at an inflection point of the S-curve where we can expect healthy contribution to growth over the next few quarters?

很好。也許一個問題問 Tony、另一個問 Ravi。Tony，你能否更具體說明一下，第二季美國非餐飲垂直品類加速成長主要由哪些品類帶動？是否有任何品類正處於 S 曲線的拐點，我們可望在未來幾季對成長有健康的貢獻？

And then maybe one for Ravi. The illustrative Excel calc was very helpful. And can I ask maybe if you kind of like think about DASH in the context of that, where the company currently is, do you think you're in year 2 or year 4 in the chart? Or maybe asked another way, are you at a place right now where the rate of profitability increase in many different businesses is kind of offsetting the rate of losses in a view, which could lead to sort of sustained profitability improvement? Or is this sort of a transitory period in which you're looking for signals before you scale investments in many other products? Any context you can add would be great.

然後也許一個問題問 Ravi。你們提供的示意性 Excel 計算非常有幫助。我想問，如果把 DASH 放在那個框架下來看，以公司目前所處的位置，你覺得在圖表中是第 2 年還是第 4 年？或者換個問法：你們現在是否已經到了這樣的階段——多個業務的獲利提升速度，正在抵消某些業務的虧損速度，從而可能帶來較為持續的獲利改善？還是說這只是過渡期，你們在擴大對其他產品的投資之前，仍在尋找訊號？任何補充脈絡都會很有幫助。

Deepak, it's Tony. I'll take the first one on growth outside of restaurants. I mean, hopefully, you all saw in our June update, when we celebrated 10 years as a company, we actually rolled out one of our biggest product updates this year. And that really -- one of the featured things that we shipped was actually the launch of both our grocery and retail tabs. And I think there's another good example of how we do product development in a very disciplined way, which kind of, I think, aligns a bit to the sentiments behind your second question, where everything effectively is stage-gated and we give maximum exposure or investment once we see that they are ready for prime time.

Deepak，我是 Tony。我先回答餐飲以外的成長問題。我想希望大家在我們 6 月的更新中有看到，當我們慶祝公司成立 10 週年時，我們其實推出了今年最大的一次產品更新之一。而其中一個重點功能，就是我們同時上線了雜貨（grocery）與零售（retail）分頁。我認為這也是我們以非常嚴謹方式進行產品開發的另一個好例子；這也在某種程度上呼應你第二個問題背後的想法：所有事情基本上都有階段性關卡（stage-gated），只有在我們看到它們已準備好面向大眾（prime time）時，才會給予最大的曝光或投資。

And I think when it comes to a lot of these categories outside of restaurants, I think you saw a lot of that growth for us happen in the first couple of years with the pandemic in which we launched with third-party convenience retailers, whether they be the likes of Walgreens, CVS, 711 and many, many others. But then over the last 2.5 years, we've built a multibillion-dollar grocery business from scratch and it was really ready for prime time exposure. And that's one of the things that you saw as we now have more non-restaurant stores on the platform in North America versus any other platform. We're growing faster than every other platform and gaining share dramatically in virtually all categories and certainly -- and very specifically also in grocery.

我認為在許多餐飲以外的品類上，你們看到我們的成長有很大一部分發生在疫情的前幾年，當時我們與第三方便利零售商合作上線，例如 Walgreens、CVS、7-Eleven，以及許多其他夥伴。但在過去 2.5 年裡，我們從零開始打造了一個數十億美元規模的雜貨業務，並且確實已準備好在主流市場獲得更大曝光。這也是你所看到的：我們現在在北美平台上的非餐飲門店數量已超過任何其他平台。我們的成長速度快於所有其他平台，並在幾乎所有品類中大幅提升市占，當然——也非常明顯地在雜貨品類中。

You also see this in retail. We've seen a lot of growth in categories that is even outside of food, whether that be in sporting goods with Dick's sporting goods or office supplies with Office Depot and OfficeMax or the pet category with PetSmart and Petco or the health and beauty category with Sephora. So a lot of this is happening and we found ourselves in a position where not only were we seeing very resilient growth in the core U.S. restaurants category at all-time high frequencies, which gives us just more shots on goal to introduce a lot of these new categories, but we also saw the readiness in terms of product market fit, from a selection, quality of service and affordability perspective, when it came to our grocery and our retail offerings, and that's why we made the announcement and why we shipped the features that we did in June.

你也能在零售中看到這點。我們在甚至不屬於食品的品類中也看到大量成長，例如運動用品（Dick’s Sporting Goods）、辦公用品（Office Depot 與 OfficeMax）、寵物品類（PetSmart 與 Petco），或健康與美妝品類（Sephora）。因此，很多事情正在發生，而我們也處於一個位置：不僅美國核心餐廳品類在歷史高頻次下仍展現非常有韌性的成長，讓我們有更多機會去導入這些新類別；同時，就我們的雜貨與零售供給而言，從選品、服務品質與可負擔性（affordability）的角度來看，我們也看到了產品市場契合（product-market fit）的成熟度。這就是為什麼我們做出該項宣布，以及為什麼我們在 6 月推出了那些功能。

Deepak, to your second point, maybe taking a step back, like what you're seeing in the business is a combination of a couple of things. One, the growth in the business continues to be very strong. In fact, in Q2, growth actually accelerated compared to Q1. Given the business is positive on a unit economic basis, that's driving some of the upside in EBITDA that you're seeing in the business. At the same time, our core restaurants business is continuing to improve in terms of overall profitability as well as both new verticals as well as international are also becoming efficient when you look at the unit economics year-on-year. That's driving the underlying EBITDA upside that you're seeing in the business.

Deepak，針對你的第二點，或許先退一步看：你在業務中看到的是幾個因素的組合。第一，業務成長仍然非常強勁。事實上，第二季的成長相較第一季還加速。由於我們在單位經濟（unit economics）基礎上是正向的，這推動了你在 EBITDA 中看到的一部分上行。同時，我們的核心餐廳業務在整體獲利能力上也持續改善；而新垂直業務以及國際業務，從年對年（year-on-year）的單位經濟來看，也正在變得更有效率。這些因素共同推動了你在 EBITDA 中看到的基本面上行。

But for us, as you know, it's always important that we are constantly looking to reinvest back in the business. We did that in Q2 as well, which drove some of the upside in growth as well as the category share gains that Tony talked about. Two, as I look forward, our goal is to constantly reinvest because our goal is to build the largest local commerce business possible. And referring back to the chart, right, ideally, the chart goes on forever because we're always looking to manage efficiently. We're always looking to reinvest back in the business to build the largest local commerce business possible.

但對我們而言，如你所知，持續把資金再投資回業務中始終很重要。我們在第二季也這麼做了，這也帶動了部分成長上行，以及 Tony 所提到的品類市占提升。第二，展望未來，我們的目標是持續再投資，因為我們的目標是打造盡可能最大的在地商務（local commerce）企業。回到那張圖表，理想情況下，圖表應該可以一直延伸下去，因為我們會持續追求高效率的管理，也會持續把資金再投資回業務中，以打造盡可能最大的在地商務企業。

Your next question comes from Mark Mahaney with Evercore.

您的下一個問題來自 Evercore 的 Mark Mahaney。

Okay. Let me try 2 questions. One high-level question for you, Tony. You talked about solving big problems for local commerce. So could you just sketch out what you think are some of those big problems that you've not yet fully or not yet partially addressed like logistics and marketing? Like when you think about those problems beyond that, what do you think are the biggest problems for local commerce? And then would you provide any color on -- just talk about Wolt, the acquisition we are year on in? How do you think that's fared, has it gone according to plan, better than plan, the year on in, the positive and the negative surprises you've come across?

好的。我試著問兩個問題。第一個是給你的一個高層次問題，Tony。你談到為在地商務解決重大問題。你能否概述一下，你認為有哪些重大問題你們尚未完全解決、或尚未部分解決，例如物流與行銷？當你想到超出這些之外的問題時，你認為在地商務最大的問題是什麼？第二個問題，你能否提供一些補充說明——談談 Wolt，我們收購後已滿一年。你覺得整體表現如何？是否符合計畫、優於計畫？在這一年中，你們遇到哪些正面與負面的意外？

Mark, I'll take both of those questions. On the first one, with respect to large problems to solve, I mean first, I think this probably goes without saying, but I think it's worth repeating just given the resilience or continued resilience, I should say, of the strength of the restaurant delivery business. And even though that business has achieved a great deal, it's still single-digit percentage representation of the restaurant industry in terms of total sales.

Mark，我來回答這兩個問題。第一個，關於要解決的大型問題，我想這可能不言自明，但鑑於餐廳外送業務的韌性——或者說持續的韌性——以及其強勁表現，我覺得值得再重申一次。即便這項業務已取得很大成就，但就餐飲產業總銷售額而言，它仍僅占個位數百分比。

So I think I don't want to just skip over some of the businesses that we do run today versus just talk exclusively about the invention of new businesses or solving new problems. So I think there's still a lot to solve in our core business, which, I believe, has many, many years of runway in it. And when we talk about some of these new categories, that's obviously almost starting just many years behind given the fact that we launched a lot of these new businesses about 2.5 years ago. So I want to start with that as context.

所以我想，我不想只是略過我們今天正在經營的一些業務，而只專注談論新業務的發明或解決新問題。我認為在我們的核心業務中仍有很多需要解決的地方；我相信它還有很多很多年的成長跑道。而當我們談到一些新類別時，鑑於我們大約在 2.5 年前才推出許多這些新業務，顯然幾乎是落後了很多年才起步。所以我想先以此作為背景。

But I think when you talk about a lot of local commerce, I mean, let's think about it. I mean the pandemic in many ways was a very alarming and aggressive wake-up call for every business to be an omnichannel business. And I think for period of time, it forced physical retailers to exclusively invest in online because that was the only channel available to them. But I think that as we now kind of -- especially as e-commerce goes back into a bit of the steady-state curve of adoption, I think there's a lot of problems that are to solve.

但我認為，當你談到很多在地商務時，我的意思是，讓我們想一想。疫情在很多方面都是一個非常令人警醒且強烈的警鐘，讓每一家企業都必須成為全通路企業。我認為在一段時間內，它迫使實體零售商只能投資線上，因為那是他們唯一可用的通路。但我認為，當我們現在某種程度上——尤其是當電商回到較為穩態的採用曲線時——我認為仍有很多問題需要解決。

I think that there's -- the world only tends to want to go faster. Customer expectations tend to only go in one direction when it comes to something like delivery, whether that's with food or other types of items beyond food, that is only going to happen at a greater and greater rate. And if you're a physical retailer, you need to think about how you're going to participate in that. And so there's lots of logistical problems we have to solve in order to do that. And we're investing quite tremendously in building up certainly these partnerships, but also in a lot of infrastructure so that we can create the tooling with products like DashMart such that we can work concurrently with all of these retailers so that they can actually compete, I think, at the highest scales with global ambitions.

我認為——世界往往只想更快。就像配送這件事，不論是食物或食物以外的其他品項，客戶期待通常只會朝一個方向走，那就是越來越快，而且只會以更高、更高的速度發生。如果你是實體零售商，你需要思考你要如何參與其中。因此，為了做到這點，我們必須解決許多物流問題。我們正在大幅投資，一方面是建立這些合作夥伴關係，另一方面也投入大量基礎設施，讓我們能透過像 DashMart 這樣的產品打造工具，使我們可以與所有這些零售商同步合作，讓他們實際上能以我認為最高的規模、並帶著全球企圖心來競爭。

So I think that's a big part of still making sure that last mile delivery can be true, not just for a handful of retailers, but for every retailer, small, medium and large.

所以我認為其中很大一部分，仍是要確保最後一哩配送能夠成真，不只是為少數零售商，而是為每一家零售商——小型、中型與大型。

Second and beyond this, there's a lot of tools that now local businesses need to invent. I think a lot of times people think, oh, e-commerce, that's just a website or that's just a mobile app and you're done. Well, actually, everything needs to be rethought of, right? For example, if you used to take care of customer support request inside your store, whether it's a shopping request or a dining request, well, you can't do that anymore if the orders are happening through your digital channel. You're going to have to invent customer service in a different way. If you're used to being once very successful buying real estate at the right locations at the right prices, and effectively using that as a way to market. Well, that's no longer good enough and there's going to be many ways in which you're going to have to think about not only attracting customers but building repeat relationships with all of the customers that you do have.

第二點，除此之外，現在在地商家需要發明很多工具。我認為很多時候人們會想，喔，電商不就是一個網站或一個行動 App，做完就好了。但其實所有事情都需要重新思考，對吧？例如，如果你過去是在店內處理客服需求，不論是購物需求或用餐需求，那麼當訂單透過你的數位通路發生時，你就不能再那樣做了。你必須用不同的方式發明客服。如果你過去曾經非常成功地在對的地點、以對的價格買到不動產，並有效地把它當作行銷方式——那現在已經不夠了，你將必須在很多方面思考，不僅要如何吸引顧客，還要如何與你現有的所有顧客建立重複往來的關係。

And so I think there's lots of problems to solve. But whether that's in logistics, whether that's in customer service, whether that's in, honestly, every part of what you do now needs to turn from physical to digital. That's what all businesses need to do. So there's a lot of work and the road map ahead is quite lengthy.

因此我認為有很多問題要解決。不論是在物流、不論是在客服，坦白說，你現在做的每一個環節都需要從實體轉為數位。這是所有企業都需要做的事。所以還有很多工作要做，前方的路線圖也相當漫長。

Your second question was about Wolt. In short, Wolt is meeting our expectations, which are really high to start with. I mean in general, we tend to have very high expectations of ourselves. And I think when you look at the Wolt performance or the thesis, I should say, starting a couple of years ago before we closed the partnership a year ago, it was really betting on a world-class team that has achieved the highest retention and order frequency. In other words, built the best product in the world and whether or not we can keep growing those geographies, which had long runways for growth as well as take some of their exceptional management and run a global portfolio. And so those are kind of the 2 theses involved a couple of years ago.

你的第二個問題是關於 Wolt。簡而言之，Wolt 符合我們的期待，而我們一開始的期待就非常高。我的意思是，一般來說，我們對自己往往有非常高的期待。我認為當你看 Wolt 的表現或我應該說當初的論點——從幾年前、在我們一年前完成合作之前開始——其實是在押注一個世界級團隊，他們達成了最高的留存率與下單頻率。換句話說，打造了世界上最好的產品，以及我們是否能持續擴張那些同樣擁有長期成長跑道的地理市場，並且把他們卓越的管理能力用來經營一個全球投資組合。所以這大概就是幾年前涉及的兩個論點。

And on the first point of whether or not we can keep growing. I mean, I think you kind of see it in the growth rates. We are growing at multiples of what anyone else is growing internationally, and we are also improving our unit economics at the same time. And so I think from a business perspective, that's really meeting the bar.

而在第一點——也就是我們是否能持續成長——我的意思是，我認為你從成長率就能看出來。我們在國際市場的成長速度是任何其他人的數倍，同時我們也在改善單位經濟效益。因此我認為從商業角度來看，這確實達到了門檻。

The second is more of a management perspective. And what you see there is that, well, actually, Micky and the team actually runs all of DoorDash's markets outside of the U.S. And so I think we're seeing a very strong side on that front as well as that team now is taking up a bigger geography and we now get to split the management bandwidth in the right way so that we can give international, which is a huge investment area for us, the right single-threaded focus and do the same for our U.S. business as well.

第二點更偏向管理層面的觀點。你看到的是，嗯，事實上，Micky 和團隊目前負責營運 DoorDash 在美國以外的所有市場。因此我認為我們在這方面也看到非常強的表現；同時該團隊現在負責更大的地理範圍，而我們也能以正確的方式分配管理帶寬，讓國際業務——這是我們非常重要的投資領域——得到適當的單線專注（single-threaded focus），同時也能讓我們的美國業務同樣如此。

Your next question comes from Nikhil Devnani with Bernstein.

你的下一個問題來自 Bernstein 的 Nikhil Devnani。

I had one on the investment framework as well in the letter. So you mentioned kind of a 6-year period of investment and $1 billion spent on U.S. restaurants before it started to generate some cash. When you look at the investment areas you have today, do you expect them to take longer to return and cost more because they might be more operationally complex so there's more incumbents? Or do you expect the return to actually be quicker because you've already built a strong network of consumers and Dashers?

我也有一個關於信中投資框架的問題。所以你提到大概有 6 年的投資期，並且在美國餐廳上花了 10 億美元，之後才開始產生一些現金。當你看你們今天的投資領域時，你是否預期它們需要更久才能回收、成本也更高，因為它們在營運上可能更複雜、而且既有競爭者更多？還是你預期回收其實會更快，因為你們已經建立了強大的消費者與 Dashers 網路？

And then maybe a second question. Tony, you've talked about people eating 20 to 25x a week as the opportunity. What's the ceiling you think on frequency for your business and kind of the primary constraints between bridging the gap to that point?

然後也許第二個問題。Tony，你談過人們每週吃 20 到 25 次作為機會。你認為你們業務在頻率上的天花板是什麼？以及在把差距縮小到那個程度之間，主要的限制因素是什麼？

Yes. All right. Well, Nikhil, maybe I'll take both of those. I think the first is on the, how we think about investments and the second is really around where we are on frequency and where it can go. On the first -- let me just say, we kind of offered a quantitative framework in the shareholder letter on how we thought about things. But it was meant as a guide, not as something that is just a formula that always can be applied, right? I mean, sometimes these things take judgment and -- and so the answer to your question about are time lines or investment dollars going to be larger or longer or shorter or I guess, less, it really depends on the problem at hand, right?

是的。好。嗯，Nikhil，也許我兩個都回答。我認為第一個是關於我們如何看待投資，第二個則是關於我們在頻率上的現況以及它能走到哪裡。先談第一個——我先說，我們在股東信中提供了一個量化框架，說明我們如何思考這些事情。但它的用意是作為指引，而不是一個永遠都能套用的公式，對吧？我的意思是，有時候這些事情需要判斷——所以你問到時間線或投資金額會更大、更長、更短，或我想是更少，答案其實取決於眼前要解決的問題，對吧？

I mean, obviously, we have a benefit of having the largest local commerce audience that has the greatest frequency, which gives us the most shots on goal. But that doesn't mean that we just win de facto. I mean we have to still build the best-in-class product for each problem that we're trying to solve and then I think the benefit of the scale will actually -- really translate in a way that makes productive sense for all of the audiences and frankly, generate a great return for everybody.

我的意思是，顯然我們的優勢在於擁有最大的在地商務受眾、且具備最高的使用頻率，這讓我們有最多的出手機會。但這不代表我們就會自動獲勝。我們仍然必須針對每一個要解決的問題打造同級最佳（best-in-class）的產品，然後我認為規模的好處才會——真正以對所有受眾都有生產力意義的方式轉化，並且坦白說，為每個人帶來很好的回報。

And so I don't think there's necessarily one way to think about this. We try our best to apply first principles approach to each problem. We obviously want to take advantage where we can. But the way we tend to think about this is, first and foremost, how do we solve a problem that -- in a way that is significantly better than how incumbents are doing it today? Make sure that we are very disciplined in both the product investment as well as the dollar investment in which we stage gate those investments because precious resources, whether it's the attention we can give in our distribution or the dollars that we have in our budget or frankly, the people that we have working at the company, that's a big consideration.

因此我不認為這件事必然只有一種思考方式。我們會盡力對每個問題採用第一性原理的方法。我們當然希望在能利用優勢的地方加以利用。但我們通常的思考方式是：第一也是最重要的，我們要如何以顯著優於既有競爭者目前做法的方式來解決問題？並確保我們在產品投資與資金投資上都非常自律，透過階段性關卡（stage gate）來管理這些投資，因為資源很珍貴——不論是我們在分發上能投入的注意力、預算中的資金，或坦白說，公司裡實際投入的人力——這都是很重要的考量。

And then the final consideration is whether or not we see an efficient path towards strong long-term economics. And so that's just, in general, how we think about it, but I wouldn't over-rotate necessarily on that being the exact formula that we have to repeat over and again.

然後最後一個考量是，我們是否看得到一條通往強勁長期經濟效益的有效路徑。總之，這大致上就是我們的思考方式，但我也不會過度強調這就是我們必須一再重複的精確公式。

Your second question, I think, had to do with frequency and its long-term potential. The short answer is we continue to see the numbers grow, right? And I think, on the one hand, there's a few ways to look at this. I think in your question, I think you're kind of saying, well, there's 20 to 25 leading opportunities via shopping opportunities on top of that per week, we're talking about north of 100 occasions a month. That's certainly, I think, theoretically max. And I think -- that's one way to look at it.

你的第二個問題，我想是關於使用頻率及其長期潛力。簡短的答案是：我們持續看到數字在成長，對吧？我認為，一方面，有幾種看法。我想在你的問題裡，你有點在說，嗯，每週有 20 到 25 個主要的購物機會，再加上其他購物機會，我們談的是每月超過 100 次的使用情境。那當然，我認為在理論上已經接近上限了。而我想——這是一種看法。

We also can look at it from just what some of our power users or top decile users are actually doing today. So it's not even a theoretical number. And we think that we can keep growing much, much bigger, I guess, is the short answer. I mean, our top decile users are using our service, a very large number of double-digit times, I guess, is what I would say. And so for us, it's thinking about, well, how do we actually graduate people to that? And the answer is there isn't a silver bullet here, right? It's the combination of the selection of stores, the affordability of the program, the quality of the service and making sure that we get the efficient -- we can deliver the efficient frontier for each individual user, each individual occasion. And if we can do that, these numbers will continue moving up.

我們也可以從一些重度使用者或前十分位使用者今天實際在做什麼來看。所以這甚至不是一個理論數字。我想簡短的答案是：我們認為還能持續成長到大得多。我是說，我們的前十分位使用者使用我們服務的次數非常多，應該可以說是兩位數的次數。而對我們來說，思考的是：我們要如何讓更多人提升到那個層級？答案是這裡沒有什麼一招致勝的方法，對吧？而是門市選擇、方案可負擔性、服務品質的組合，並確保我們能為每一位使用者、每一次使用情境，提供有效率的前緣（efficient frontier）。如果我們能做到，這些數字就會持續上升。

And just to add to what Tony said, right, like our goal is to target -- track our teams for both unit economics as well as volume. We are comfortable with the time frame as long as we are making progress across both of those. And if you look at the results of both of our investment areas, we are growing quite nicely as well as the unit economics continue to improve. We obviously want to run these businesses efficiently. We are happy with the progress we've made so far.

再補充 Tony 說的，我們的目標是——讓團隊同時以單位經濟（unit economics）以及量（volume）為追蹤與管理重點。只要我們在這兩方面都有進展，我們就對時間框架感到安心。若你看我們兩個投資領域的成果，我們的成長相當不錯，同時單位經濟也持續改善。我們當然希望有效率地經營這些業務，也對目前為止的進展感到滿意。

Your next question comes from Ron Josey with Citi.

你的下一個問題來自花旗（Citi）的 Ron Josey。

Maybe to Tony, I think you mentioned this earlier as well, but just the frequencies at all-time highs and what's traditionally a slower quarter, 2Q. Just talk about the drivers here in the here and now, I guess, more is this DashPass, users having greater impact, newer cohorts ramping faster, the revamped app, as we talked about. I'm sure it's all of the above, if there's anything to call out, though, that would be interesting on frequency.

也許問 Tony：我想你先前也提到過，但目前使用頻率創下歷史新高，而第二季（2Q）傳統上是較慢的一季。能否談談當下的驅動因素？我想更具體地說，是 DashPass、使用者影響更大、新的用戶群（cohorts）爬坡更快、我們提到的改版 App？我相信可能是以上皆是，但如果有什麼特別值得點出的、關於頻率的因素，會很有意思。

And then, Ravi, on contribution profit, I think the press release talked about U.S. restaurant marketplace generating annualized $2.4 billion in contribution profit this quarter. So can you just talk about -- and that's essentially all contribution profit for the company. So talk about the margins across nonfood? I think convenience are we sustainably positive there? Talk about grocery, Wolt. Any insights there would be helpful.

然後 Ravi，關於貢獻利潤（contribution profit），我想新聞稿提到本季美國餐廳市集年化貢獻利潤達 24 億美元。所以你能否談談——而那基本上就是公司幾乎全部的貢獻利潤。那麼非食品（nonfood）的毛利/利潤率如何？我想便利（convenience）那邊我們是否能持續維持正貢獻？再談談雜貨（grocery）、Wolt。任何洞見都會有幫助。

Yes. So on the first question, in terms of where the growth is coming from, I mean, we're seeing mainly in 2 big areas, right? One is users and the other is the frequency. And you're right, in that, there is no one individual driver of this. I mean DashPass did have a record quarter. So it continues to achieve on highs. So you're right, as one of the assumptions that, that was one of the drivers. But we're also just seeing stronger and stronger cohorts.

好的。第一個問題，關於成長來自哪裡，我的意思是，我們主要看到兩大面向，對吧？一個是使用者，另一個是使用頻率。而你說得沒錯，這裡沒有單一的驅動因素。DashPass 的確創下了單季新高，所以它持續達到高點。因此你說得對，作為其中一個假設，那確實是驅動因素之一。但我們也只是看到用戶群（cohorts）越來越強。

I think that this is a question at the -- certainly at the beginning of the pandemic, and certainly at the beginning of the reopening or the first reopening in 2021. But I think what you've seen now for 8 to 10 straight quarters in addition to the output metrics, GOV, the revenue, the input metrics we're seeing are stronger and stronger cohort retention and growth. And that's a combination of offering the best selection, quality, affordability. The new use cases, to your point, around nonrestaurants certainly adds to it. But there's also improvements in the core restaurants business as well. So I think all of these things is adding to it. But the short answer to your question, what's driving the growth, it's users and frequency.

我認為這個問題——當然在疫情初期，以及 2021 年開始解封或第一次解封初期——大家都會問。但我想你現在看到的是，連續 8 到 10 個季度，除了產出指標（output metrics）如 GOV、營收之外，我們看到的投入指標（input metrics）是：用戶群留存與成長越來越強。這是提供最佳選擇、品質、可負擔性的綜合結果。你提到的非餐廳新使用情境（new use cases）當然也有加成。但核心餐廳業務本身也在改善。所以我認為這些因素都在推動。簡短回答你：驅動成長的是使用者與頻率。

Yes, Ron, just a couple of points there on your second question. I mean, the $2.4 billion contribution that was the U.S. restaurants contribution from Q3 of last year. Obviously, that has grown substantially since that point. What we're seeing in the business is as we continue to improve the underlying product, whether it's adding more selection, improving the quality of the product, that's driving efficiency of all lines of business. What we saw this past quarter, like I mentioned earlier, core restaurants improved in terms of unit economics as well as profitability are both new verticals and international areas improved in terms of unit economics.

是的，Ron，針對你的第二個問題補充幾點。24 億美元的貢獻指的是去年第三季（Q3）美國餐廳的貢獻。很顯然，自那之後已大幅成長。我們在業務上看到的是，隨著我們持續改善底層產品，不論是增加更多選擇、提升產品品質，都在推動各條業務線的效率。就像我先前提到的，本季我們看到核心餐廳在單位經濟以及獲利能力上都有改善；新垂直（new verticals）與國際區域在單位經濟方面也有所改善。

More specifically, when I look at the new verticals area, last year, we mentioned that third-party convenience was positive on a unit economic basis. It has continued to grow from that point, both grocery as well as DashMart, there's been a step change improvement in the unit economics compared to last year. International business accelerated in the quarter as well as unit economics improved. Again, all of the unit economic improvement we are seeing is being driven by product innovation. We've driven leverage on Dasher costs. We've driven leverage across credits and refunds as well as sales and marketing.

更具體來說，當我看新垂直領域，去年我們提到第三方便利（third-party convenience）在單位經濟基礎上已轉正。從那之後它持續成長；雜貨（grocery）以及 DashMart 的單位經濟相較去年也出現了階躍式（step change）的改善。國際業務在本季也加速成長，同時單位經濟改善。再次強調，我們看到的所有單位經濟改善，都是由產品創新所驅動。我們在 Dasher 成本上取得槓桿效益；在補貼（credits）與退款（refunds）以及銷售與行銷上也取得槓桿效益。

Your next question comes from Lloyd Walmsley with UBS.

你的下一個問題來自瑞銀（UBS）的 Lloyd Walmsley。

Two questions, if I can. Just first, just following up on Mark's question earlier. Can you maybe give us a sense of some of the interesting greenfield investment areas? It might be interesting to you all. It seems like maybe there's -- you're open to things that are perhaps less directly adjacent than some of what we've seen already like advertising or otherwise. Am I misreading that? Anything you can share there?

如果可以的話兩個問題。第一個，延續你先前對 Mark 問題的回覆，你能否讓我們了解一些有趣的綠地（greenfield）投資領域？這對你們可能也很有意思。看起來你們可能對一些不那麼直接相鄰的事情也持開放態度，而不只是我們已經看到的像廣告之類。我是不是解讀錯了？你能分享些什麼嗎？

And then the second one is just -- it seems like we're in a sweet spot getting healthy growth and good margins. Clearly, core restaurant business firing on all cylinders and good progress on unit economics of the investment areas. But as you showed in your letter, sometimes unit economics are improving a lot, but as you fuel investment behind that, it could be like a headwind on an absolute basis. Where are we in that cycle with some of these investment areas? Like should we expect while unit economics are getting a lot better, just a step-up in investment behind that, that may mute the flow through of that? Like anything you can share on the kind of medium-term outlook for where we are in that cycle there on existing growth investments.

第二個是——看起來我們正處在一個甜蜜點：成長健康、利潤率也不錯。顯然核心餐廳業務火力全開，投資領域的單位經濟也有良好進展。但如你們在信中所示，有時單位經濟改善很多，但當你加大投資推進時，從絕對值來看可能會形成逆風。就這些投資領域而言，我們目前處在那個循環的哪個階段？也就是說，當單位經濟大幅改善的同時，我們是否應預期投資會再上台階，從而抑制（mute）改善向損益表的傳導？關於現有成長投資在中期展望、以及我們在該循環中的位置，你能分享些什麼嗎？

Yes. Maybe I'll take a shot at the first one and maybe say a few things on the second one, too, and then I'll add -- and ask Ravi to jump in on the second one as well. I think on the first one, I mean, you're right in saying that there is no like exact formula of what are the exact adjacent problems to solve when it comes to unlocking local commerce, right? I mean I think if you think about today, even e-commerce is still a minority of overall retail.

好的。也許我先嘗試回答第一個，第二個也說幾點，然後我再——也請 Ravi 一起補充第二個。我想第一個，你說得對：在解鎖本地商務（local commerce）時，並沒有一個精確公式來界定哪些是要解決的「相鄰」問題，對吧？我的意思是，如果你看今天，即便是電商，在整體零售中仍然只占少數。

And then when you look within local commerce, so the small, medium and large physical businesses off-line that are trying to come online and kind of compete against maybe digital only or kind of traditional e-commerce players, I mean, they're even further behind, right? And so our mission has always been to grow and to empower these businesses. So we have to, on the one hand, build a marketplace that can drive incremental demand at profitable sales. And on the other hand, we have to give them tools. And so some of these tools are related. But at the end of the day, it's just what does it take to solve the customers' problems.

然後當你在本地商務內部再看，也就是那些線下的中小型與大型實體商家，正試圖上線並與可能是純數位、或傳統電商玩家競爭，我的意思是，他們落後得更遠，對吧？因此我們的使命一直是成長並賦能這些商家。所以一方面，我們必須建立一個能以具獲利性的銷售帶來增量需求的市集；另一方面，我們必須提供他們工具。而其中一些工具彼此相關。但歸根結底，就是要看解決客戶問題需要什麼。

And we think that local businesses can solve a lot of the problems when it comes to consumption that traditional e-commerce businesses solve. And so we have to just make sure that we can build the tooling to allow them to do that, both through their own channel as well as through ours.

我們認為，在消費這件事上，本地商家其實可以解決許多傳統電商所解決的問題。因此，我們必須確保能打造相應的工具，讓他們能做到這一點，無論是透過他們自己的渠道，還是透過我們的渠道。

I think on the second question, I think one of the important things here is we certainly -- there's kind of like 2 thoughts I have on your question. The first is, we don't get to control when product market fit occurs, right? And so a lot of the -- even though we would love to have prescribed organizational time lines set around every project with a perfect formula that's exactly replicable across all projects, that's not exactly what the customer cares about. The customer is going to vote with their activity, whether or not we've done a good enough job.

我想就第二個問題而言，這裡有一個很重要的點——當然，我對你的問題大概有兩個想法。第一，我們無法控制產品市場契合（product-market fit）何時出現，對吧？因此，很多事情——即使我們很希望能為每個專案都設定一套可規劃的組織時間表，並且有一個完美公式能在所有專案間完全複製，但客戶其實不在乎這些。客戶會用他們的行為來投票，決定我們做得是否足夠好。

And so for us, sometimes these things are you move 1 step forward, a couple of step sideways, 1 step backwards, 3 steps forward. And I think that while what we demonstrated in our restaurants business as well as these investment areas is that when you step back and take a look holistically over a multiyear horizon, you get this nice looking up into the right graph, that's not usually what happens in real life, right? So I think it's pretty hard sometimes when you're just making investments during the period, especially as you're searching for product market fit to have any prescribed time lines.

所以對我們來說，有時候這些事情就是：前進一步、橫向走幾步、後退一步、再前進三步。我認為，雖然我們在餐廳業務以及這些投資領域所展現的是：當你退一步、以多年期的視角整體來看，你會看到一張漂亮、向右上方走的曲線圖，但現實生活通常不是這樣，對吧？因此，我認為有時候在投資期間，尤其是在尋找產品市場契合的過程中，要訂出任何既定時間表是相當困難的。

But on the flip side, it doesn't mean that you have to bet at all in that period of time either, right? I think a lot of what we're trying to explain in our shareholder letter is just our investment philosophy that we're not just betting at all costs. We're betting when we see signal. And when we see that signal, do we actually scale? This is true in our product development. We didn't release the grocery -- we didn't release maximum exposure to our grocery product until very recently after 2.5 years, we didn't do that for our retail categories either. And we don't do that from a dollars and cents perspective on the P&L either.

但反過來說，這也不代表在那段期間你就必須不計代價地下注，對吧？我想我們在股東信裡試圖說明的，主要是我們的投資理念：我們不是不惜一切代價地下注；我們是在看到訊號時才下注。而當我們看到訊號時，我們是否真的擴大規模？這在我們的產品開發上也是如此。我們在 2.5 年後直到最近才讓雜貨產品獲得最大程度的曝光；在零售品類上我們也沒有這麼做。而且從損益表（P&L）的金錢投入角度來看，我們也不會這麼做。

So I think when it comes to time line, I think judgment is quite important. And I think the most important thing to take away from the shareholder letter is that with a disciplined way in thinking about how to make these investments.

所以我認為談到時間表時，判斷力非常重要。我覺得股東信最重要的重點是：以一種有紀律的思維方式來思考如何進行這些投資。

And Lloyd, just to add to what Tony talked about, right, like your second question. For us, we don't focus on the absolute level of investment in terms of the quantum of dollars. Our philosophy has always been, we goal our teams, we goal our lines of business on 2 metrics, which is demand in terms of volume growth as well as unit economics. As long as both of those are progressing in the right direction according to plan, we are happy to continue to invest because the most important thing in our business is scale, and we've seen that in our restaurants business, we've seen that in our third-party convenience business. Our goal is as long as we're seeing success in terms of volume and the unit economics are continuing to improve, we're going to invest behind our investment areas.

Lloyd，我補充一下 Tony 談到的，也就是你的第二個問題。對我們來說，我們不會把焦點放在投資的絕對水準、也就是投入金額的多寡。我們的理念一直是：我們用兩個指標來設定團隊與各條業務線的目標——一是需求（以量的成長來衡量），二是單位經濟效益（unit economics）。只要這兩者都依照計畫朝正確方向推進，我們就樂於持續投資，因為我們業務中最重要的事情是規模。我們在餐廳業務看到了這點，在第三方便利業務也看到了這點。我們的目標是：只要我們在量的表現上看到成功、且單位經濟效益持續改善，我們就會在這些投資領域加碼投入。

Your next question comes from Douglas Anmuth with JPMorgan.

下一個問題來自 JPMorgan 的 Douglas Anmuth。

A couple just on the Dashers side. Can you just talk about the drivers of lower-than-expected acquisition costs in 2Q? And then what makes you think those efficiencies may not continue in the back half? And then with the update recently, any thoughts, early thoughts I know, but on the flexible pay model for Dashers and perhaps any discussion around unit economics for you guys?

有幾個問題想問 Dasher 端。你能談談第二季（2Q）招募成本低於預期的驅動因素嗎？另外，為什麼你認為這些效率在下半年可能無法延續？再者，最近的更新——我知道可能還很早——對於 Dasher 的彈性薪酬模式（flexible pay model）有什麼初步看法？以及你們是否有就單位經濟效益做過一些討論？

Yes, Doug, I'll take both of those. The Dasher acquisition cost itself, in any given quarter, there's some volatility in our Dasher acquisition costs, so I wouldn't read too much into it. Let me give you a few examples. In Q1, we under-forecasted volume. So we had to ramp our Dasher actual acquisition spend in the quarter. That's what we saw in Q1. In Q2, we saw a couple of things, right? First, the underlying product improvements we made that helped us in terms of Dasher retention. Number two, we also benefited from seasonality where you have college kids come back during summer. And we see this every single summer.

好的，Doug，這兩個我都來回答。Dasher 的招募成本在任何一個季度都會有一些波動，所以我不會過度解讀。我舉幾個例子。第一季（Q1）我們低估了交易量，因此我們必須在該季度提高 Dasher 的實際招募支出，這就是我們在 Q1 看到的情況。第二季（Q2）我們看到幾件事：第一，我們做的一些底層產品改進，幫助我們提升 Dasher 留存。第二，我們也受惠於季節性因素，因為暑假期間大學生會回來。我們每個夏天都會看到這種情況。

What we said in our letter is we expect the product improvements to continue to bear fruit in the second half, but we don't expect the same level of benefit or efficiency from seasonality. But again, I won't read too much into the quarter-to-quarter movement because there's some inherent volatility in Dasher acquisition.

我們在信中提到，我們預期這些產品改進在下半年會持續帶來成效，但我們不預期季節性因素能帶來同樣程度的助益或效率。不過，同樣地，我不會太解讀季度之間的變動，因為 Dasher 招募本身就存在一定的內在波動性。

And to your second point, the Dasher product changes we've made, that was not a financial move for us. For us, it was mostly about offering choice, offering flexibility to Dashers. If you think about our Dashers, right, like Dashers are at different parts of their journey. Some Dashers are new to the platform where they just want to hit the button go and start earning. There's others who are more experienced, they do want to pick and choose the orders that they want to go after. For us, it was truly about giving a choice to Dashers to continue to engage with us on the platform depending on where they are in their journey, less so about a financial move for us. Hopefully, that helps.

至於你的第二點，我們對 Dasher 產品所做的變更，對我們而言並不是出於財務考量。對我們來說，主要是提供選擇、提供彈性給 Dashers。你想想我們的 Dashers——Dashers 在不同的旅程階段。有些 Dasher 是新加入平台的，他們只想按下按鈕就開始接單賺錢；也有一些更有經驗的，他們確實想挑選自己想接的訂單。對我們而言，這真的是在於讓 Dashers 能依照他們所處的階段，選擇如何在平台上持續與我們互動，而不是我們的財務操作。希望這能解答你的問題。

Your next question comes from Brian Nowak from Morgan Stanley.

下一個問題來自 Morgan Stanley 的 Brian Nowak。

Maybe 2. The first one, can I just talk about your 10-year old sort of the oldest, the core U.S. restaurant business. As you sort of think about customers voting with their activity, talk to us about sort of how you break down the forward growth and what you have to invest in to kind of continue to grow that core U.S. restaurant business from here across users, frequency, spend per transaction? How do you continue to get customers to devote more in that core oldest business?

我有兩個問題。第一個，想談談你們在美國、已經營運 10 年、算是最老也最核心的餐廳業務。當你們提到客戶會用行為投票時，能否談談你們如何拆解未來的成長，以及你們需要投資哪些面向，才能從現在開始持續推動這個核心美國餐廳業務的成長——例如用戶數、使用頻率、每筆交易的消費金額？你們要如何讓客戶在這個最成熟的核心業務上投入更多？

And then the second one on the grocery nonrestaurant piece in the U.S. recognize the new app design is having an impact. When do you think about sort of increasing your marketing to bring new users into the funnel for grocery first? Has that started yet? Or is that something to think about in the back half or in '24?

第二個問題是關於美國的雜貨、非餐廳那一塊。我知道新的 App 設計正在產生影響。你們什麼時候會考慮加大行銷，把新用戶先導入雜貨的漏斗（funnel）？這件事已經開始了嗎？還是要等到下半年或 2024 年再來思考？

Yes. Maybe I can take a shot at those. I think on the first question of growing the U.S. restaurants business. Well, I wish it was just one lever that we'd have to pull. But I mean, we continuously have to work on selection, the quality of the service, the affordability of the programs and our customer support, right? I mean this is one of these businesses where I think it's really easy to make surface level comments about the business, but really the execution happens at the order level. And you have to be better on each one.

好的，我來嘗試回答。我想先談第一個問題：如何成長美國餐廳業務。嗯，我希望只需要拉動一個槓桿就好，但其實不是。我們必須持續在選擇（品項/商家覆蓋）、服務品質、方案的可負擔性，以及客戶支援上努力，對吧？我的意思是，這是一種很容易在表面上評論的業務，但真正的執行其實發生在每一筆訂單的層級，你必須在每一筆上都做得更好。

And for us, I think the criteria to be better, it really goes back to the hallmarks of how we have achieved the scale that we have in the restaurants business in the first place, which is offering the best combination of selection, quality, affordability and service. And so there's certainly a lot of things that we have in the books planned for each one of these areas, but that's really how we always think about building a better product. And we can measure whether or not we're making progress based on our retention and order frequency. And we continue to have the highest retention in order frequency rates amongst any other platform.

對我們而言，要做得更好的標準，其實回到我們一開始在餐廳業務能達到如今規模的關鍵特徵：提供在選擇、品質、可負擔性與服務之間的最佳組合。因此，我們在這些領域各自都有很多已規劃的事項，但這就是我們一貫思考如何打造更好產品的方式。我們也可以透過留存率與下單頻率來衡量是否正在取得進展。而且我們持續在所有平台中擁有最高的留存與下單頻率表現。

The second question. I mean, in some ways, some of this is already happening, where we have, to your point, customers may be finding out about DoorDash for the first time through a nonrestaurant category whether that's groceries or pets or flowers or some of the retail categories that we discussed earlier. Already outside of the restaurant category, we attract more of new customers that are ordering from these nonrestaurants for the first time in the industry than any other platform. And I think that's pretty remarkable, given that a lot of these categories for us, when we started about 2.5 years ago, which suggests that some of this activity is actually already happening organically. Of course, we're investing in some marketing behind this for sure, and especially as I think we are making the evolution of -- from being a restaurant delivery product to something that delivers your entire city.

第二個問題。我是說，從某些角度來看，其中一些其實已經在發生了；正如你所說，客戶可能會透過非餐廳品類第一次認識 DoorDash，不論是雜貨、寵物、鮮花，或是我們先前討論過的一些零售品類。事實上，在餐廳品類之外，我們吸引到的「首次在產業內從這些非餐廳商家下單」的新客戶數量，比任何其他平台都多。我認為這相當了不起，因為我們很多這些品類大約是 2.5 年前才開始做的，這也顯示其中一部分活動其實已經在自然地發生。當然，我們確實也在這方面投入一些行銷資源，尤其是當我認為我們正在從「餐廳外送產品」演進為「能把整座城市送到你手上」的服務。

We're not there yet. Obviously, we have a long ways to go on the selection, the quality and affordability. But I think it's encouraging to see that we already attract more new customers into this field than anyone else and that a lot of customers are coming to us for the first time are not for restaurants.

我們還沒到那一步。顯然，在選擇性、品質與可負擔性方面，我們還有很長的路要走。但我覺得令人鼓舞的是，我們已經在這個領域吸引到比任何人都更多的新客戶，而且很多第一次來到我們平台的客戶並不是為了餐廳。

I'd just like to what Tony talked about, right? What we saw in the quarter was growth in both users as well as order frequency. Order frequency hit an all-time high, it's growing year-on-year. User growth has also been very strong. The way at least we think about it is, if you think about our platform, we have roughly over 30 million active shoppers on the platform any given month. But if you look at that number over the course of the last year, that number is multiples higher. It's just a fraction of the overall users using the platform, right? That tells you the scope of the opportunity on the user growth side.

我想補充一下 Tony 剛才談到的，對吧？我們在本季看到的是用戶數與下單頻率都在成長。下單頻率創下歷史新高，且年對年持續成長。用戶成長也非常強勁。至少我們的思考方式是：如果你看我們的平台，每個月大約有超過 3,000 萬名活躍消費者在平台上。但如果你把這個數字拉長到過去一年來看，那個數字會是好幾倍之多。也就是說，這只是整體使用平台用戶中的一小部分，對吧？這告訴你在用戶成長面向上，機會的規模有多大。

Order frequency again, very similar. The blended order frequency across the platform is mid-single digits off of the base of more than 100 usable movements. So when I look at both of those, the scope of the opportunity in front of us is large. The good news is, again, what moves both is largely the same. It's improving selection, improving quality, making the product more affordable. So when I look ahead, as we are continuing to innovate on the product, I'm confident that we'll drive growth both across users as well as order frequency.

下單頻率也是非常類似。平台整體的混合下單頻率是中個位數，且是建立在超過 100 次可用行為的基礎之上。所以當我看這兩者時，我們面前的機會規模很大。好消息是，推動這兩者成長的因素大致相同：提升選擇性、提升品質、讓產品更可負擔。因此展望未來，隨著我們持續在產品上創新，我有信心能同時推動用戶數與下單頻率的成長。

Your next question comes from Eric Sheridan with Goldman Sachs.

下一個問題來自高盛（Goldman Sachs）的 Eric Sheridan。

In reading the letter and some of the answers so far in the call, I just wanted to come back to this concept of signal. If you think about the mix between being a marketplace and being more of a first-party player yourself in local commerce. And what signal you might be looking for when you think about a business like DashMart and thinking about growing geographic footprint or SKU, diversification inside that business as a potential area for investment over the medium to long term to be a larger, more scaled one key player against the local commerce opportunity?

在閱讀股東信以及目前電話會議中的一些回答後，我想回到「訊號（signal）」這個概念。如果你思考在本地商務中，我們作為一個市集平台（marketplace）與我們自己更像第一方（1P）參與者之間的組合。那麼，當你看像 DashMart 這樣的業務，並思考在中長期是否要把它作為投資領域、擴大地理覆蓋範圍或 SKU、以及在該業務內做更多元化時，你會在尋找什麼樣的訊號，來判斷它是否可能成為把握本地商務機會的一個更大、更具規模的關鍵玩家？

Yes. So Eric, I'll take that. I think it's important to start with the context of why we even are investing in some of our 1P efforts in the first place, which really comes back to this capability point of making sure that we can enable every small, medium and large physical business to compete effectively and efficiently in the digital world.

好的。Eric，我來回答。我認為重要的是先從我們為什麼一開始要投資一些 1P 業務的背景談起，這其實回到「能力」這個重點：確保我們能讓每一家小型、中型與大型的實體商家，都能在數位世界中有效率且有效地競爭。

And at the end of the day, what we're trying to build ultimately is a product that can deliver you everything from your city exactly what you ordered and at around the same price that you would have paid yourself to do that service. But today, that's not where status quo is, right, in terms of, I think, any product, that delivers anything outside of restaurants for sure. And so that's kind of why we invested in DashMart in the first place.

歸根結底，我們最終想打造的是一個產品：能把你在城市裡訂購的任何東西，準確地送到你手上，而且價格大致接近你自己去買、自己完成這項服務所需支付的成本。但就現況而言，這還不是常態，對吧？我認為任何能配送餐廳以外商品的產品更是如此。因此，這就是我們一開始投資 DashMart 的原因。

And so it's always in concert of -- in partnership, excuse me, with our merchant partners of how to make sure that something like DashMart can be a useful service for them. It's not necessarily a signal of, oh, is our 1P now going to take a bigger portion. It's actually instead learning how to do it really well, such that when we work with these third parties and think about inventing some products for the future that this could be one capability set in our back pocket.

因此，這一直都是與我們的商家夥伴協同——更正，是以合作的方式——來思考：如何確保像 DashMart 這樣的服務能對他們有用。這不一定是一個訊號，表示「喔，我們的 1P 現在要占更大的比重」。相反地，這更像是在學習如何把這件事做得非常好，如此一來，當我們與這些第三方合作、並思考為未來發明一些產品時，這就會成為我們口袋裡的一組能力。

Your next question comes from Ross Sandler with Barclays.

下一個問題來自巴克萊（Barclays）的 Ross Sandler。

First of all, shout out to Andy or Ravi's idea was to put the SBC table at the bottom of the letter. I appreciate that. But my question, Tony, is about DashPass. So you guys were, I think, the first in the industry to roll out subscription, and it obviously drives a huge amount of value. But now we're at the point in the industry where it's maturing and there's a lot of other subscription services from folks that compete with you guys in grocery, folks that compete with you guys in restaurant, e-commerce companies that compete with you guys.

首先，向 Andy 或 Ravi 致意——把 SBC 表格放在信件底部這個點子很棒，我很感謝。我的問題是關於 DashPass。你們我認為是業界最早推出訂閱制的公司之一，而且它顯然帶來了巨大的價值。但現在我們來到一個產業逐漸成熟的階段，出現了很多其他訂閱服務：有些在雜貨領域與你們競爭，有些在餐飲領域與你們競爭，還有電商公司也在與你們競爭。

So as you look out into the future of DashPass, do you feel like selection -- in your advantage in selection is enough to continue to differentiate? Or do you think you'll need to add different things to the bundle whether that be like physical retail or, I don't know, digital services, et cetera, to continue to differentiate DashPass? Any thoughts on that?

所以當你展望 DashPass 的未來時，你覺得「選擇性」——也就是你們在選擇性上的優勢——足以持續形成差異化嗎？還是你認為需要在組合包裡加入不同的內容，例如實體零售、或我不知道，數位服務等等，來持續讓 DashPass 差異化？你有什麼想法嗎？

Yes. So there's -- I mean customer expectations always go in one direction, right? I think I've said this plenty of times, and I think that goes for subscription programs, too. But the other thing that goes for subscription programs is the most important thing is usage, right? You want subscription programs that are really successful or those that get used the most often, which is what drives the value, right? And sometimes that's measured in dollars and cents, sometimes that's measured in time spent on the service and time saved from the service and et cetera, right?

是的。我的意思是——客戶期待永遠只會往一個方向走，對吧？我已經說過很多次了，我認為訂閱方案也是如此。但訂閱方案還有另一個重點：最重要的是使用率（usage），對吧？真正成功的訂閱方案，是那些被最頻繁使用的方案，因為那才會驅動價值，對吧？而這個價值有時用金錢衡量，有時用在服務上花的時間、以及因服務而節省的時間等等來衡量，對吧？

And so for us, I don't think it's necessarily one advantage, right? I wish if it were just one advantage, then it actually be quite easy to invest from a product perspective. But it's always been thinking about the selection, the quality, the affordability of the program such that we can drive the north star of usage. And so we're going to always have to invest to make sure that our products are getting used the most. I think the benefit for us is that the category that we started in eating, which we've talked about on this call for a bit, is the largest and most frequent, which means that it does have the largest usage from both I think how people think about spending their discretionary income to just what they do physically to survive.

因此對我們來說，我不認為只是單一優勢，對吧？如果真的只有一個優勢，那從產品投資角度其實會容易很多。但我們一直以來的思考都是：在方案的選擇性、品質與可負擔性上持續投入，以推動我們的北極星指標——使用率。因此我們會一直投資，確保我們的產品被使用得最多。我認為我們的優勢在於，我們起步的品類是「吃」這個領域，我們在這通電話會議也談了不少；它是最大且最頻繁的品類，這意味著它在使用率上最高——不論是人們如何思考可支配所得的支出，或是人們為了生存所必須做的事情。

And so I think that was a very natural candidly reason why we started in the restaurant delivery category. But as we expand and try to be more useful to the cities that we operate in and all of the different types of categories of retail that we participate with, we're going to have to keep thinking about investing more into things that will continue to drive the usage of our subscription programs, which is ultimately what will drive the value of DashPass.

所以坦白說，這也是我們為什麼很自然地從餐廳外送品類起步。但隨著我們擴張，並試圖對我們營運的城市更有用、也與各種我們合作參與的零售品類一起成長，我們必須持續思考投資更多能進一步推動訂閱方案使用率的內容，而這最終將驅動 DashPass 的價值。

And Ross, just to add to what Tony said, right, like what you're seeing in the business is as we are continuing to improve the selection and the quality of the business, that's driving MAUs. These MAUs are retaining at a higher rate. They're ordering more. As they order more, they habituate on the platform and graduate to DashPass. In fact, if you look at Q2, DashPass had a record quarter where subscribers grew not just quarterly but on an annual basis, it was one of the best quarters ever for DashPass for us.

Ross，我再補充 Tony 的說法，對吧？你在業務上看到的是：當我們持續改善選擇性與業務品質時，這會推動 MAU 成長。這些 MAU 的留存率更高、下單更多。當他們下單更多時，就會在平台上形成習慣，並進一步升級成 DashPass。事實上，如果你看第二季（Q2），DashPass 創下紀錄的一季，訂閱者不僅季對季成長，年對年來看也是我們史上表現最好的季度之一。

Your next question comes from Michael McGovern with Bank of America.

下一個問題來自美國銀行（Bank of America）的 Michael McGovern。

Just maybe a couple for Ravi on guidance. It looks like even at the upper end of guidance for Q3, we're expecting a little bit of a quarter-on-quarter drop in GOV. So I'm just curious, is that just seasonality or anything else to point out there for the quarter-on-quarter drop?

我可能有幾個關於指引的問題想請教 Ravi。看起來即使在第三季指引的上緣，我們也預期 GOV 會出現一些季對季下滑。所以我想請問，這只是季節性因素，還是還有其他原因可以解釋這個季對季下滑？

And then second question, if I take the upper end of guidance between Q3 and the full year, looks like Q4's EBITDA profit and margin will be higher in Q4 than at any other point in the year. So just in that upside scenario hitting the upper end of guidance, what are some of the factors that contribute to that?

第二個問題，如果我把第三季與全年指引的上緣拿來看，似乎第四季的 EBITDA 利潤與利潤率會高於今年任何其他時點。所以在這種上行情境、也就是達到指引上緣的情況下，有哪些因素會促成這一點？

Mike, I'll take both of those, right? On the guidance point itself, I mean, what we are seeing in the business is, a, obviously, consumer spending continues to be strong, the underlying cohorts continue to be very stable. That's what's giving us confidence to, first of all, bump up the GOV guide for the rest of the year. What you're noticing in Q3 is normal seasonality that we largely see every year. There's nothing more to that outside of seasonality.

Mike，這兩個我都來回答，好嗎？就指引本身而言，我們在業務上看到的是：第一，顯然消費者支出仍然強勁，底層客群（cohorts）也持續非常穩定。這些讓我們有信心，首先把今年剩餘期間的 GOV 指引上調。你在第三季看到的，是我們幾乎每年都會看到的正常季節性。除了季節性之外，沒有其他特別原因。

In terms of EBITDA guidance, I mean, again, like I said earlier, right, the combination of continued improvement in growth for us, the overall business is positive on an economic basis, Q4 growth is higher than Q3. You're going to see some upside and EBITDA flow through. Number two, the product improvements that we are making has continued to drive efficiency. But again, important to remember, right, like we're constantly looking to reinvest back in the business. And if we have good opportunities to invest, we're going to continue to drive efficient growth as long as we can stay within our discipline parameters.

至於 EBITDA 指引，我的意思是，再次如我先前所說，對我們而言，持續改善的成長動能，加上整體業務在經濟基礎上是正向的，而且第四季成長高於第三季。你會看到一些上行空間並反映到 EBITDA 上。第二，我們正在進行的產品改善持續帶來效率提升。但同樣重要的是要記得，我們一直在尋找把資源再投資回業務的機會。如果有好的投資機會，只要能維持在我們的紀律參數之內，我們就會持續推動高效率的成長。

Our next question comes from Youssef Squali with Truist.

下一個問題來自 Truist 的 Youssef Squali。

Excellent. So maybe, Tony, going back to the investment letter and the framework that you're putting out there. Outside of customers and Dashers and the network that, that creates, which arguably is super powerful. Can you maybe talk about core competencies that you believe that you're kind of leveraging just better than anybody else out there that kind of gives you this potential unfair competitive advantage that's allowing you to grow so much faster? And then, Ravi, I think you talked or you mentioned that your GOV, your GOV accelerated year-on-year. Was that -- is that statement true for U.S. GOV as well?

很好。那麼 Tony，回到投資信與你提出的框架。除了客戶、Dashers 以及由此形成的網路（這點可以說非常強大）之外，你能否談談你認為你們有哪些核心能力，是你們比其他任何人都更善於運用的，從而帶來某種潛在的不公平競爭優勢，讓你們能成長得更快？另外 Ravi，我想你提到你們的 GOV 年對年加速。這個說法對美國的 GOV 也成立嗎？

Yes. So on the first question, I think there's basically like a time line or sequencing, if you will, almost of how to arrive at the answer to your question, which is, first, when it comes to building a product from the very beginning, the -- what allows that product to grow faster relative to someone else's is whether or not we solve the customer's problems better, right?

是的。關於第一個問題，我認為基本上有一條時間線或順序，幾乎可以說是如何推導出你問題答案的過程：首先，當我們從一開始打造產品時，讓該產品相較於別人的產品成長更快的關鍵，在於我們是否能更好地解決客戶的問題，對吧？

And I think what's hard to see in this business is that it's really a combination of things that a customer is asking us to solve. They're asking us to make sure we can get the right stores and the right items from those stores at the right price point, at the right service level. And obviously, if things go south, that we fix it. And there is no shortcut in many ways and kind of betting on any one of these factors, you kind of have to be better at the combination. And I think that if you can achieve that, then you can have this time line where after a certain point of scale, it translates into a few structural benefits.

我認為這個業務中比較難看清的一點是：客戶要我們解決的其實是一組問題的組合。他們希望我們能以合適的價格區間、合適的服務水準，從合適的商店提供合適的商品。當然，如果事情出狀況，我們也要把它修好。很多方面其實沒有捷徑；如果你只押注其中任何一個因素，都很難成功，你必須在這些因素的組合上都做得更好。我認為如果你能做到這點，那麼在達到一定規模之後，就會沿著這條時間線轉化為一些結構性的優勢。

One of those benefits is recall customers kind of come to us first at the eating app. We're working on that to make that true in every country. But in the United States, that's certainly the starting point. And again, when eating is the starting place where you have the most shots on goal, and Ravi talked about the multiples of the 30 million monthly active shoppers who shop with us once a year. I mean there's an even bigger number than that, that comes and just opens the app who doesn't shop at all. And so in many ways, we don't have to acquire any more new customers from external channels. We can just go within our own ecosystem because we started with the largest one, which -- when it comes to consumption, which is eating.

其中一個優勢是品牌心佔（recall）：客戶會先想到我們這個「吃飯」的 App。我們正在努力讓這在每個國家都成為事實。但在美國，這確實是起點。而且再說一次，當「吃飯」是起點時，你就有最多的出手機會（shots on goal）。Ravi 談到每月 3,000 萬活躍購物者中，有些人一年只跟我們買一次；其實還有一個更大的數字，是那些只打開 App、但完全沒有下單的人。所以在很多方面，我們不需要再透過外部渠道去獲取更多新客戶；我們可以在自己的生態系內部轉化，因為我們是從最大的消費場景開始的——也就是吃飯。

Other benefits come from the scale logistics components that you talked about, right, knowing how to operate that really efficiently is something that continues to compound in terms of giving a natural funding source for other types of investments that we want to make. So I think the way I think about this is always the execution starts first, making sure that we can solve a problem better than someone else can so that we can create the best product. That's what generates the growth. And then structurally, over time, what are the things that actually -- can we actually use the product advantage that we built to generate a structural advantage?

其他優勢來自你提到的規模化物流組件：知道如何把這套系統運作得非常高效，會持續複利式地累積，並為我們想做的其他類型投資提供一個天然的資金來源。所以我看待這件事的方式一直是：執行先行，先確保我們能比別人更好地解決問題，從而打造最好的產品。這會帶來成長。然後在結構面上，隨著時間推移，我們能否把已建立的產品優勢，轉化為結構性的優勢？

And I think you're seeing that in both instances, which is why you've seen the resilience in the growth in the core restaurant business. It's why you've seen faster growth and share gains in these non-restaurant businesses as well as improving -- or very, very quickly improving unit economics. And that's why we're continuing to invest.

我認為你在兩個層面都看到了這點，這也是為什麼你會看到核心餐廳業務的成長具備韌性；也為什麼你會看到非餐廳業務的更快成長與市佔提升，以及單位經濟（unit economics）的改善——或者說非常、非常快速的改善。這也是為什麼我們會持續投資。

Youssef, on your second question, orders accelerated from Q1 to Q2, not GOV. And if I break it down by the different lines of business, core U.S. restaurants, even at our scale, the order growth was stable. Both new verticals, International, as Tony just mentioned, they both accelerated from Q1 to Q2.

Youssef，關於你的第二個問題，是訂單量（orders）從第一季到第二季加速，而不是 GOV。如果我按不同業務線拆解，在我們這樣的規模下，美國核心餐廳業務的訂單成長是穩定的。至於兩個新垂直業務與國際業務，正如 Tony 剛提到的，它們都從第一季到第二季加速。

In the interest of time, there will be no further questions. With that, we will conclude today's conference call. Thank you for joining us. You may now disconnect.

為了節省時間，我們將不再接受其他提問。至此，我們結束今天的電話會議。感謝各位參與。您現在可以斷線。