Doordash, Inc. (DASH) 2023 Q3 法說會逐字稿

Thank you for standing by, and welcome to the DoorDash's Q3 2023 Earnings Call. I would now like to welcome Andy Hargreaves, VP of Investor Relations to begin the call. Andy, over to you.

感謝各位耐心等候，歡迎參加 DoorDash 2023 年第三季財報電話會議。現在我想請投資人關係副總裁 Andy Hargreaves 開始本次會議。Andy，交給你。

Thank you very much. Good afternoon, everybody, and thanks for joining us for our Q3 2023 earnings call.

非常感謝。各位下午好，感謝大家參加我們 2023 年第三季財報電話會議。

I'm very pleased to be joined today by Co-Founder, Chair, and CEO, Tony Xu; and CFO, Ravi Inukonda.

我很高興今天與我們的共同創辦人、董事長暨執行長 Tony Xu，以及財務長 Ravi Inukonda 一同出席。

We'll be making forward-looking statements during today's call, including our expectations for our business, financial position, operating performance, our guidance, strategies, our investment approach, and the consumer spending environment.

在今天的電話會議中，我們將作出前瞻性陳述，包括我們對業務、財務狀況、營運表現的預期，我們的指引、策略、投資方式，以及消費者支出環境的看法。

Forward-looking statements are subject to risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially from those described. Many of these uncertainties and risks are described in our SEC filings, including Form 10-Ks and 10-Qs. You should not rely on our forward-looking statements as predictions of future events. We disclaim any obligation to update any forward-looking statements, except as required by law.

前瞻性陳述存在風險與不確定性，可能導致實際結果與所述內容有重大差異。許多此類不確定性與風險已在我們向 SEC 提交的文件中說明，包括 10-K 與 10-Q。您不應將我們的前瞻性陳述視為對未來事件的預測。除法律要求外，我們不承擔更新任何前瞻性陳述的義務。

During this call, we will discuss certain non-GAAP financial measures. Information regarding our non-GAAP financial measures, including a reconciliation of such non-GAAP measures to the most directly comparable GAAP financial measures may be found in our earnings release, which is available on our Investor Relations website. These non-GAAP measures should be considered in addition to our GAAP results and are not intended to be a substitute for our GAAP results.

在本次電話會議中，我們將討論若干非 GAAP 財務衡量指標。關於我們的非 GAAP 財務衡量指標之資訊（包括將該等非 GAAP 指標與最直接可比的 GAAP 財務衡量指標進行調節），可在我們的財報新聞稿中找到；該新聞稿可於我們的投資人關係網站取得。這些非 GAAP 指標應與我們的 GAAP 結果一併考量，並非用以取代 GAAP 結果。

Finally, this call is being audio webcasted on our Investor Relations website, and an audio replay of the call will be available on our website shortly after the call ends.

最後，本次電話會議將在我們的投資人關係網站進行音訊網路直播，且在會議結束後不久，我們的網站將提供音訊重播。

Operator, I will pass it back to you, and we will begin taking questions.

接線員，我把時間交還給你，我們將開始接受提問。

(Operator Instructions) Our first question comes from the line of Nikhil Devnani with Bernstein.

（接線員指示）我們的第一個問題來自 Bernstein 的 Nikhil Devnani。

I had a 2-parter on the U.S. marketplace. So everyone is obviously worried about a variety of headwinds and a softening consumer, yet your business is accelerating in the U.S. Can you comment on, one, what drove that acceleration? And then as a follow-on, I think the perception is your marketplace is highly discretionary, but given all the data you see in how consumers actually use your service, would you agree with that assessment? And how do you think about the sensitivity of demand?

我有兩個關於美國市場的問題。大家顯然都在擔心各種逆風與消費者走弱，但你們在美國的業務卻在加速成長。你們能否評論一下：第一，這個加速是由什麼驅動的？接著延伸來看，我認為外界的觀感是你們的平台屬於高度可選擇性（非必需）的消費，但基於你們掌握的消費者實際使用服務的數據，你們同意這個評估嗎？你們如何看待需求的敏感度？

Nikhil, it's Tony. Maybe I'll start and Ravi, feel free to chime in. On the first part of the question, I mean you're absolutely right. I think we saw a phenomenal quarter where frankly, every line of business has accelerated in growth and improved in its unit economics. And that's impressive, especially given the fact that we're a lot larger today than we were a quarter ago and certainly a year ago.

Nikhil，我是 Tony。也許我先回答，Ravi 也歡迎補充。關於問題的第一部分，你說得完全沒錯。我們這一季表現非常出色，坦白說，每一條業務線的成長都在加速，且單位經濟效益也有所改善。這點尤其令人印象深刻，因為我們今天的規模比上一季大得多，當然也比一年前大得多。

In terms of the U.S. restaurant business or the marketplace in general, I mean, a few phenomenon are going on, but really it's the result of product improvements we've made. Whether you look a quarter ago or a year ago, we've added selection to the platform on the restaurant side, and we've added a lot of selection on the non restaurants front, literally going from 0 nearly 3 years ago to a multibillion-dollar business that's at scale now growing fast and contributing quite significantly. And we have over 100,000 stores on the platform that are outside of restaurants.

就美國餐廳業務或整體平台而言，確實有幾個現象同時發生，但本質上是我們所做的產品改進所帶來的結果。無論你看的是一季前或一年前，我們在餐廳端為平台增加了更多選擇；同時在非餐廳端也增加了大量選擇，幾乎從約三年前的 0 起步，發展成如今已具規模、成長快速、且貢獻相當顯著的數十億美元業務。我們平台上餐廳以外的商店已超過 100,000 家。

And when you look outside of restaurants and into the convenience or grocery or alcohol segments, almost half of new customers that come into the industry in the U.S. come to DoorDash first. And so that's certainly adding in terms of the selection. Second, we've continued to improve the quality of service, whether it's our timeliness, our speed, our accuracy. Third, we've improved the affordability of the programs, both for our non-DashPass members as well as for our DashPass cohorts.

當你把視角從餐廳延伸到便利商店、雜貨或酒類等品類時，在美國，幾乎有一半進入這個產業的新客戶會先選擇 DoorDash。因此，這在選擇性方面確實帶來增量。第二，我們持續提升服務品質，包括準時性、速度與準確性。第三，我們提升了方案的可負擔性，無論是非 DashPass 會員或 DashPass 會員族群。

And fourth, we've improved customer support all along the way. And so it's really the result of many years of work on the fundamentals and mastery of that and continuing to see opportunities to continue improving the product, both in terms of efficiencies and just product's quality to the customer that's leading to the growth of all of the lines of business in the U.S., and that's what you kind of saw culminate in some of the numbers that we reported in Q3.

第四，我們一路以來也改善了客戶支援。因此，這其實是多年來在基本功上的投入與精進所累積的成果；我們也持續看到進一步改善產品的機會，無論是在效率面或是對客戶的產品品質面，進而帶動美國各條業務線的成長，而你在第三季所看到的數字，某種程度上就是這些努力的集中呈現。

I think with respect to the second question, it's -- I think our business has always been very dynamic in terms of all of the headwinds and tailwinds it's faced in the 10 years that we've been building DoorDash. And that's certainly been true in the last 3 years. Obviously, we lived through a global pandemic. We lived through peak pandemic. We have lived through peak inflation. We've lived through lots of other macro factors, including some of the ones impacting us today. And I think it's important to remind ourselves of a few things.

至於第二個問題，我認為我們的業務一直都非常動態，因為在打造 DoorDash 的這 10 年間，我們面對過各種逆風與順風。過去 3 年尤其如此。我們經歷了全球疫情、疫情高峰；也經歷了通膨高峰；還有許多其他總體因素，包括一些目前仍在影響我們的因素。我認為有幾點值得提醒自己。

While it's virtually impossible to estimate or isolate the quantum impact of any one of these macro factors, I think it's a lot easier to think about things that we do control. And as mentioned in the answer to the previous question, we've continued to improve our product. And that's certainly within our control and as dynamic, if not more dynamic, than some of the macro changes that we face.

雖然幾乎不可能估算或分離任何單一總體因素的量化影響，但更容易的是去思考我們能控制的事情。如同前一題的回答所提到的，我們持續改善產品。這確實在我們的掌控之中，而且其變動性不亞於、甚至可能比我們面對的某些總體變化更為動態。

I think second, we benefit from the fact that our first category, the restaurants category, stems in the sense that while sure, maybe not every meal has to be eaten when it comes to delivery or takeout, but when you think about every category that lends itself towards convenience, and we all know that convenience only lends itself towards the direction of greater convenience. Food is the most resilient and highest frequency category. I mean, this is true in every line of e-commerce.

第二，我們受惠於第一個品類——餐廳品類——的特性。雖然確實不是每一餐都必須透過外送或外帶來解決，但當你思考所有與「便利」相關的品類時，我們都知道便利只會朝著更便利的方向發展。食物是最具韌性、且使用頻率最高的品類。這在所有電商領域都是如此。

In fact, if you look at our cohort performance, which we talked a little bit about in our shareholder letter this quarter, you see that virtually every single cohort, including those that just joined our platform a couple of months ago are doing way better than any of the cohorts even during the pandemic. And so I think as you see that behavior across every line of -- every segment of customers, every cohort across time, I think you start to gain a different picture of just the fact of the product improvements as well as the number of shots on goal that we get to take relative to others in capturing that customer.

事實上，如果你看我們的同批客戶（cohort）表現——我們在本季股東信中也稍微談到——你會看到幾乎每一個 cohort，包括幾個月前才加入我們平台的 cohort，表現都遠優於疫情期間的任何 cohort。因此，當你在每一條業務線——每一個客戶區隔、跨時間的每一個 cohort——都看到這樣的行為時，你會對產品改進的效果，以及相較於其他業者我們在爭取客戶時所能嘗試的機會數（shots on goal），形成不同的理解。

And the final comment I'd make is, in spite of our performance and our market leadership, we're still a tiny fraction of what's addressable. I mean in the U.S. restaurants category, as one example, we're less than double-digit percentage sales of the industry. I think you looked globally within restaurants, we're a much tinier single-digit percentage. And if we included all the other categories that we now entered, we're barely noticeable.

最後我想補充的是，儘管我們表現良好且具市場領導地位，但相對於可觸及的總市場，我們仍只占很小的一部分。以美國餐廳品類為例，我們占整體產業銷售額的比例仍不到兩位數百分比。若放眼全球餐廳市場，我們占比更小，僅為個位數百分比。而如果把我們現在已進入的其他所有品類都算進來，我們幾乎還不太顯眼。

And so I think we have a long runway left. We have a lot more work to do to get our product to where we would like it to be. But I think the product improvements that we've made in the years leading up to these moments have certainly helped us build a product that endures.

因此，我認為我們仍有很長的成長跑道。我們還有很多工作要做，才能把產品做到我們希望的樣子。但我認為，我們在這些時刻到來之前多年所做的產品改進，確實幫助我們打造出一個能夠長期持續的產品。

Our next question comes from the line of Ross Sandler with Barclays.

我們的下一個問題來自 Barclays 的 Ross Sandler。

If I can ask 3 quick ones, that would be great. First, Tony, on the international footprint. We're now into -- well past the year into the Wolt integration. How do you feel about that? And are there any geographies that you think might be interesting from an M&A perspective in the future for international?

如果我可以快速問三個問題就太好了。第一個，Tony，關於國際版圖。我們現在已經——嗯——Wolt 整合已經超過一年了。你對此感覺如何？另外，未來在國際市場方面，是否有任何你認為可能從併購（M&A）角度值得關注的地理區域？

Second question is we keep getting this one a lot from the investment community. Maybe you guys can clear the air on the GLP-1 diet drugs. Is there any way to think about how that might impact your business in the future? It's obviously not impacting it now.

第二個問題是，我們從投資社群那邊常常收到這題。也許你們可以釐清一下關於 GLP-1 減重藥物的疑慮。有沒有什麼方式可以思考它未來可能如何影響你們的業務？顯然它目前還沒有造成影響。

And then lastly, Instacart is now there as a public company. Just curious to get any milestones on grocery GOV as we sit here at the end of '23 from you guys?

最後，Instacart 現在也已成為一家上市公司。想請教你們，在我們坐在這裡、站在 23 年底這個時間點，能否分享一下雜貨 GOV 方面的任何里程碑？

Great. Ross, I'll do my best to take them the first 2 in order and maybe I'll let Ravi take the third one. So I think the first question was around international. I mean you're absolutely right. We're very excited about our execution on the international front. We continue to grow at multiples of what we see around the world, virtually across any geography. That doesn't mean that we're pleased yet with where our product is. We still have a lot of room left to go. But I think it does stem from why our outperformance has occurred, which is I think the hallmarks at any great marketplace have the fundamental characteristics of great retention order frequency and unit economics.

很好。Ross，我會盡力依序先回答前兩個問題，第三個可能讓 Ravi 來回答。我想第一個問題是關於國際市場。你的看法完全正確。我們對於在國際市場的執行表現感到非常振奮。我們持續以遠高於全球各地所見的倍數在成長，幾乎涵蓋任何地理區域。這並不代表我們已經對產品現況感到滿意；我們仍有很大的進步空間。但我認為這確實源自於我們之所以能夠超越表現的原因：任何偉大的市集平台，其核心特徵在於優異的留存、下單頻率與單位經濟效益。

And I think when you look at our international business or our new categories business or a restaurant business, you see all of these characteristics present. And that's why we've been very interested in leaning in and making the investments that we have at size, at scale, because of what we see.

而我認為，當你看我們的國際業務、新品類業務或餐廳業務時，你會看到這些特徵都存在。也正因如此，基於我們所看到的機會，我們一直很有興趣加大投入，並以相當的規模與量體進行投資。

And the international business continues to see those points of execution. I think if we remind ourselves even a couple of years ago of the investment thesis behind our partnership with Wolt, it really centered on 2 big pieces. One of which was here is a business that has leading world-class retention and order frequency, and the question is, can we invest behind that in a concentrated way and hopefully add to the excellent execution that they've already seen. And so far, the answer has been yes to that.

國際業務也持續展現這些執行面的成果。我想如果我們回想一下，甚至就在幾年前，我們與 Wolt 合作的投資論點，主要聚焦在兩大部分。其中之一是：這是一個在留存與下單頻率方面領先、世界級的業務；問題在於，我們能否以更集中的方式在其背後投入資源，並希望在他們既有的優秀執行之上再加分。到目前為止，答案是肯定的。

In fact, Micky and the team now runs our entire portfolio, certainly the Wolt portfolio as well as the DoorDash portfolio outside of the United States. And the second part of the thesis was that there is a long runway for growth in a lot of these countries, and we continue to see that, too. In the 27 countries outside of the U.S. that we operate in, we're in some ways behind where the U.S. is from a penetration perspective and also product adoption perspective.

事實上，Micky 與團隊現在負責我們整個投資組合，當然也包括 Wolt 的投資組合，以及美國以外的 DoorDash 投資組合。論點的第二部分是：在許多國家仍有很長的成長跑道，而我們也持續看到這一點。在我們於美國以外營運的 27 個國家中，從滲透率與產品採用的角度來看，我們在某些方面仍落後於美國。

There just is a lot more population we have to address. There are more merchant partners we've yet to partner with. There's a lot more customer problems given the fact that some of these places are a little bit behind from a technology footprint.

我們還有更多人口族群需要觸及；還有更多尚未合作的商家夥伴；而且由於其中一些地區的科技基礎建設相對落後，客戶端也存在更多待解決的問題。

And so there's a lot of work to do, but it also means that there's a lot of runway ahead. And I think that's why you've seen continued momentum, and it's adding now to the overall growth of the company.

因此還有很多工作要做，但也意味著前方有很長的成長跑道。我認為這就是你所看到的持續動能的原因，而這股動能現在也正在為公司的整體成長做出貢獻。

I think your second question was around some of the recent discussions externally around a certain class of drugs. First and foremost, I hope that they actually work, these drugs. As a former scientist, I'm a big believer, whenever a great science can actually meet the challenges of its time and I do think that they're solving a worthy problem. So first and foremost, for the patients, I hope that they work for the long term.

我想你的第二個問題是關於近期外界對某一類藥物的討論。首先也是最重要的，我希望這些藥物真的有效。作為一名前科學家，我非常相信當一項偉大的科學能夠回應其所處時代的挑戰；而我也確實認為它們正在解決一個值得解決的問題。所以第一優先，為了病患，我希望它們能在長期上有效。

Second, we don't see any immediate or noticeable impacts in the business relative to, I guess, what the commentary may be out there about this class of drugs. And I think this kind of goes a little bit to the first question that was asked, which is it's been really hard to size any one macroeconomic factor, whether it's a headwind, a tailwind, a side wind. I think instead, what we focused on is just continued improvement on our product velocity, product quality and execution. And I think that the dynamic changes we make in our product can outweigh many of the macro factors that may be at play.

第二，我們並未在業務上看到任何立即或明顯的影響，至少相對於外界對這類藥物的評論而言。我認為這也有點呼應第一個問題：要量化任何單一的總體經濟因素究竟是逆風、順風或側風，一直都很困難。相反地，我們專注的是持續提升產品迭代速度、產品品質與執行力。我認為我們在產品上做出的動態調整，能夠抵消許多可能存在的宏觀因素影響。

Ross, on your third question around grocery. I mean, look, we're really pleased with the performance of the grocery business. Our focus over the last couple of years has been how do we increase the usage? How do we increase the adoption of not just our grocery business, but really, in fact, the entire new verticals, all of the categories that we operate in? What we're seeing in the business today is a couple of things, right? One is more number of users are ordering from both restaurants as well as new verticals. And that's driving 2 things. We are seeing the new verticals business overall accelerate from the prior quarter. As well as when you look at the grocery business itself on the GOV to the specific question you asked, our GOV has doubled year-on-year.

Ross，關於你第三個雜貨的問題。你看，我們對雜貨業務的表現非常滿意。過去幾年我們的重點是：如何提升使用率？如何提升採用度——不只是雜貨業務，而是整個新垂直品類，也就是我們所營運的所有品類？我們目前在業務中看到幾件事。第一，有更多用戶同時從餐廳以及新垂直品類下單。這帶來兩個結果：我們看到整體新垂直品類業務相較上一季加速；另外，就你問到的雜貨業務本身的 GOV 而言，我們的 GOV 年對年已翻倍。

If you look at that paired with the efficiency that we've seen in the business, we've driven a ton of efficiency across the business. In fact, when I look at the unit economics, there's been a dramatic improvement in unit economics. You have to realize we have a strategic advantage because we have a network of consumers. We have a network of Dashers already built out, and that's allowing us to improve unit economics at a much faster pace. For us, the way we operate the business is we look at signals around retention. We look at signals around order frequency. We look at signals around unit economics. We continue to be very pleased with the improvement across all 3.

如果把這點與我們在業務中看到的效率提升放在一起看，我們在整體業務上推動了大量效率。事實上，當我看單位經濟效益時，單位經濟效益已有顯著改善。你必須理解，我們有一個策略優勢：我們已經建立起消費者網路，也已經建立起 Dasher 的網路，這讓我們能以更快的速度改善單位經濟效益。對我們而言，我們的營運方式是觀察留存的訊號、下單頻率的訊號，以及單位經濟效益的訊號。我們對這三者的改善都持續感到非常滿意。

Our goal is to continue to invest behind improving selection, improving the product quality because our strong belief is that this is going to be a strong long-term ROI generating business for us.

我們的目標是持續投資於提升選品、提升產品品質，因為我們堅信這將會是我們一項能在長期產生強勁 ROI 的業務。

Our next question comes from the line of Deepak Mathivanan with Wolfe Research.

下一個問題來自 Wolfe Research 的 Deepak Mathivanan。

Just wanted to ask a couple of ones. So first, I wanted to ask about the product initiatives for 2024. You entered into a lot of categories and new markets in 2022. And 2023 was more of a year of execution and sort of like a refinement that helped profitability, obviously, as an incremental driver. What are the big business opportunities for '24? Or should we view it as another year of execution and refinement of existing businesses? That's the first question.

我想問幾個問題。第一，我想問 2024 年的產品計畫。你們在 2022 年進入了很多品類與新市場，而 2023 年更像是執行與某種程度的精煉之年，顯然也帶動了獲利能力作為增量驅動因素。那麼 24 年有哪些重大的業務機會？或者我們應該把它視為又一個針對既有業務的執行與精煉之年？這是第一個問題。

And then second one, the acceleration in the order frequency at this scale in the core restaurant business is pretty impressive. Are you seeing some of the maybe less common use cases, I don't know, maybe breakfast orders or corporate orders or anything that's helping incrementally in the recent quarters? Can you help unpack the trends in use cases a little bit?

第二，在核心餐廳業務中，以這樣的規模仍能看到下單頻率加速，令人印象深刻。你們是否看到一些可能較不常見的使用情境——我不確定，比如早餐訂單、企業訂單，或任何在最近幾季帶來增量的因素？你能否協助拆解一下使用情境的趨勢？

Sure. Deepak, maybe I can start and take the questions and then Ravi, feel free to chime in. The first question, which stems on '24 and some of the initiatives that we're thinking about. First, our goal is to grow and to empower local economies. So we're always looking for problems to solve and jobs to be done. And obviously, we want to make sure that we have a strong point of view where we can do it at least 10x better than, however, the problem is currently being solved. And so when we looked at, if we rewound the clock for instance, to 2019, we were thinking quite a lot about what other problems we could solve. And many of the problems that we actually heard came from our customers directly.

當然。Deepak，也許我先開始回答這些問題，Ravi 也歡迎隨時補充。第一個問題是關於 24 年以及我們正在思考的一些計畫。首先，我們的目標是成長並賦能在地經濟。因此我們一直在尋找要解決的問題與要完成的工作（jobs to be done）。而且很明顯地，我們希望確保自己有一個強而有力的觀點：我們至少能把目前的解法做得好 10 倍。當我們回顧時鐘、例如回到 2019 年，我們當時就在思考還有哪些問題可以解決。而我們實際聽到的許多問題，確實是直接來自客戶。

I'll give a few examples. When I came to consumers, a lot of the challenges that we had heard were really making sure that we can help solve their other problems. Again, because we started in the restaurants category, which has the highest frequency of activity and the fact that we would show up to many consumers' doors many times a week, I think consumers started asking the question, well, what else can you do for me? And similarly for merchants, I think there were many questions that they wanted our help with, this is even well before the pandemic of how can they become an omnichannel business.

我舉幾個例子。當我與消費者交流時，我們聽到的許多挑戰，都是希望我們能協助解決他們其他的問題。同樣地，因為我們從餐廳品類起家——這是活動頻率最高的品類——而且我們每週會多次出現在許多消費者家門口，我認為消費者開始問：那你還能為我做什麼？對商家也是類似的情況。我認為他們有很多問題希望我們協助，甚至早在疫情之前就有：他們要如何成為一個全通路（omnichannel）的商家。

And that's why we certainly made further investments into products like DoorDash Drive, but also started the creation of DoorDash Storefront, which has continued to serve various merchant cohorts and segments. And we continue to build further services as we think about how can we help a merchant build their first-party channel as much as we help build their third-party channel of DoorDash.

因此我們確實進一步加大了對 DoorDash Drive 等產品的投資，同時也開始打造 DoorDash Storefront，而它也持續服務各種商家族群與細分市場。隨著我們思考如何協助商家建立其第一方通路（first-party channel），就如同我們協助建立其 DoorDash 第三方通路（third-party channel）一樣，我們也持續建置更多服務。

And as I kind of keep thinking along the years, I mean, advertising came in that way as well. Many merchants as well as advertisers that are new to our ecosystem kind of approached us and said, hey, it looks like you have a high-frequency setup with the largest number of local commerce business where you can measure everything very, very closely and directly. Is there a way in which you can be more useful, I think, to all of the audiences?

而且當我回顧這些年一路思考時，我的意思是，廣告也以同樣的方式進入了。我們生態系中許多商家以及新加入的廣告主也會來找我們，說，嘿，看起來你們擁有一個高頻的運作模式，涵蓋最多的在地商業商家，能夠非常、非常緊密且直接地衡量一切。有沒有什麼方式，讓你們能對所有受眾更有幫助？

And that's kind of how we thought about all of the different problems. When I think about '24 or '25 or '26, that's generally how we think about things, too, where we start with certainly our core set of businesses, which today is 5 businesses, where in 2019, it was closer to 1 business.

這大概就是我們思考各種不同問題的方式。當我想到 '24、'25 或 '26，我們通常也是這樣思考：先從我們的核心業務組合開始——今天是 5 個業務，而在 2019 年時更接近只有 1 個業務。

And so it's a little bit more varied now and complicated in terms of thinking about all the different opportunities because we believe each one of these 5 businesses are still actually in their earliest innings, even the U.S. restaurants business. But we're also looking at opportunities to always solve more problems. And I hope that as we listen to our audiences more deeply and can get and operate at a lower level of detail, we'll actually be able to pick up new problems to solve.

所以現在在思考各種機會時，面向更為多元、也更複雜，因為我們相信這 5 個業務其實都仍處於非常早期的階段，甚至包括美國餐廳業務也是如此。但我們也在尋找機會，持續解決更多問題。我希望，當我們更深入地傾聽受眾、並能在更細的細節層級上取得並運作時，我們其實會找到新的問題可以去解決。

Now we always do this in a fairly disciplined way. Again, I think at DoorDash, we really believe in investing appropriately towards the stage of the project. And so usually, when we're solving these problems and we have many of these experiments going on, we tend to take fairly small bets. And it's only until we believe that we've nailed product market fit as well as finding an efficient way to grow, do we actually concentrate behind that bet and go all in for it. And so that's how we're thinking about '24 in that way, too.

現在我們一向以相當自律的方式來做這件事。再說一次，我認為在 DoorDash，我們非常相信要依照專案所處階段來做適當投資。因此通常在解決這些問題、同時進行許多實驗時，我們傾向先下相對小的注。只有當我們相信已經找到產品市場契合（product-market fit），並且也找到有效率的成長方式時，我們才會把資源集中到那個下注上、全力投入。所以我們在思考 '24 時也是用同樣的方式。

I think your second question was around the continued growth in engagement and frequency of our customer base in restaurants even at our current scale. Well, I think there's a lot of things that drive this. I think sometimes when we think about businesses like our oldest business, the U.S. restaurants business, we tend to think that perhaps it's closer to the ninth inning of progress versus the third inning of progress. And I tend to think, at least when I talk to our customers, that we're way closer towards the third inning than the ninth inning.

我想你的第二個問題是關於：即使在我們目前的規模下，餐廳客群的互動與下單頻率仍持續成長。嗯，我認為有很多因素在驅動。有時候當我們想到像我們最老的業務——美國餐廳業務——我們會以為它可能更接近進展的第九局，而不是第三局。但至少就我和客戶交流的感受，我反而覺得我們離第三局更近，而不是第九局。

And we just have a lot more work to do in terms of making improvements to the product. There isn't one single thing that we're doing that's yielding, I think, some of the improvements that you're seeing in the results. But really, it's years of working on the selection, the quality of service, the affordability of the program, the added value to our DashPass members as well as improved customer support, that's producing some of the results today. It will be really hard candidly to look backwards and say, "Hey, in which year did the product work actually be to the results that led to this quarter's efforts".

而且在產品改進方面，我們還有很多工作要做。並不是某一件單一的事情帶來了你在結果中看到的一些改善；真正的原因是多年來在選擇（品類/供給）、服務品質、方案的可負擔性、對 DashPass 會員的附加價值，以及更好的客戶支援等方面持續投入，才產生了今天的一些成果。坦白說，要回頭去看並說「到底是哪一年做的哪些產品工作，帶來了本季的成果」會非常困難。

But I think instead, what we do is, we're always trying to make continued improvement. And I think whenever we've taken that focus, we've surprised ourselves to the upside of how much more there is to go as well as the compounding effects that can happen over time.

但我認為相反地，我們做的是持續追求不斷改進。我覺得每當我們把焦點放在這件事上，我們都會對於還有多少進步空間、以及隨時間推移可能產生的複利效應之大，感到驚喜。

Yes, Deepak, maybe just to add a couple of thoughts to what Tony talked about. Look, I mean we've had a phenomenal year so far, what we're seeing both on the top line as well as the bottom line. Part of that is, in fact, being driven by all the investments we made, whether it's on the product side or investments in new verticals as well as the investments we've made in international over the last couple of years. What we're seeing is we're seeing really strong growth across all lines of business that we operate in. These categories that we operate in are large, there's really lots of customer problems, as Tony talked about, that we need to continue to work on and improve.

是的，Deepak，我想補充幾點 Tony 剛才談到的內容。你看，我們今年到目前為止表現非常出色，無論是營收端還是獲利端。我們看到的部分表現，確實是由我們所做的各項投資所驅動——不管是產品端、對新垂直領域的投資，還是過去幾年在國際市場的投資。我們看到的是：我們所經營的所有業務線都呈現非常強勁的成長。我們所處的這些品類市場很大，而且如 Tony 所說，客戶問題非常多，我們需要持續投入、持續改善。

Our goal and philosophy is we will continue to invest as long as we see good signal on both volume as well as unit economics, because this is the blueprint for us to drive really strong free cash flow in the many years to come in our business.

我們的目標與理念是：只要我們在交易量以及單位經濟（unit economics）兩方面都看到良好訊號，我們就會持續投資，因為這就是我們在未來很多年推動業務產生強勁自由現金流的藍圖。

Our next question comes from the line of Ron Josey with Citi.

我們的下一個問題來自 Citi 的 Ron Josey。

Tony, I wanted to ask a little bit more about just take rates on a year-over-year basis. They continue to expand and roll down a little bit sequentially. Just talk just a little bit more on the progress you're making to keep and/or drive take rates higher. So progress around wait times, incentive spend, how you see advertising fit in there? Any insights on where take rates might go? And then we're now a quarter into DASH's new app and layout and heard some of the comments around grocery prior, but any change in behavior that you've seen from the new app now that we're a quarter in?

Tony，我想再多問一些關於 take rate（抽成率/變現率）年對年的情況。它持續擴張，但在季對季上又稍微回落。請再多談談你們為了維持及/或推動 take rate 走高所取得的進展，例如等待時間、補貼/激勵支出，以及你們如何看待廣告在其中的角色？對 take rate 未來可能走向有什麼洞見？另外，我們也已經進入 DASH 新 App 與版面配置的第一個季度，之前也聽到一些關於雜貨的評論；在新 App 上線一季之後，你們有觀察到任何行為上的改變嗎？

Let me take the first one on take rate and then I'll let Tony chime in on the second one. Look, I mean, we are not managing the business to a specific margin target, let alone a margin across any line of the P&L. What you're seeing on the take rate side is, if you actually look at the underlying drivers of the business across the various lines of business, the net revenue margin has actually increased sequentially as well as year-on-year. What you're seeing on the output is really the mix shift of various lines of business. If you recall the comments that we made earlier, new verticals, our international business is actually growing faster than our restaurant business. And you're really seeing the mix shift of those 2 businesses, which are still early in terms of their journey starting to take impact from an overall take rate perspective.

我先回答第一個關於 take rate 的問題，然後再請 Tony 回應第二個。你看，我們並不是以某個特定的利潤率目標來管理公司，更不用說 P&L 的任何一條線的利潤率。你在 take rate 端看到的情況是：如果你看我們在各條業務線上的底層驅動因素，淨營收利潤率（net revenue margin）其實無論季對季或年對年都在提升。你在表面輸出上看到的，主要是各業務線組合（mix）變化所造成的。如果你還記得我們先前的評論，新垂直領域與國際業務的成長速度其實快於餐廳業務。你看到的正是這兩個仍處於早期旅程的業務，其組合變化開始從整體 take rate 的角度產生影響。

That said, our goal is always how do we find efficiencies across every line of the P&L and using that efficiency to continue to reinvest back in the business to drive growth. And we did that exactly the same in this quarter, right. We found a lot of efficiencies as was a good contributor to the revenue upside that you're seeing in the business, we use that to continue to drive efficient growth, which gave a result of some of the accelerated growth that you're seeing in the business.

話雖如此，我們的目標一直是：如何在 P&L 的每一條線上找到效率，並把這些效率再投入回業務以推動成長。我們在本季也是完全同樣地做。對，我們找到了很多效率，這也對你看到的營收超預期（revenue upside）有很大貢獻；我們再用這些效率去推動更有效率的成長，因此帶來了你在業務中看到的一些加速成長結果。

And in terms of your second question about consumer behavior, given some of the app changes that we announced earlier this summer. I mean we continue to see, I guess, more confirmatory evidence that consumers really like the changes. And I think it's usually pretty rare to see this because whenever you make a pretty sizable change like the one that we made to our consumer app, you tend to get a, who moved my cheese reaction. And I think instead, we actually saw behavior that suggested the opposite where customers are naturally shopping across different categories.

至於你第二個關於消費者行為的問題，考量到我們在今年夏天稍早宣布的一些 App 變更。我們持續看到更多、我想可以說是更具確認性的證據，顯示消費者真的喜歡這些改動。我覺得這其實很少見，因為每當你對消費者 App 做出像我們這次這麼大的改動時，通常會出現一種「誰動了我的起司」的反應。但我們看到的行為反而顯示相反：客戶很自然地在不同品類之間購物。

And I think one of the drivers of this was that we actually made sure that our progress within each vertical was fairly robust in terms of the level of product market fit that we wanted to achieve before we actually redesigned the entire app experience such that we weren't reorienting consumers to something that we were pushing upon them, but rather it was meeting them where they want it to be given that they were pulling us in terms of the demand that they naturally suggested and showed across each line of business.

我認為其中一個驅動因素是：在我們重新設計整體 App 體驗之前，我們確保每個垂直領域的進展都相當扎實，達到我們希望的產品市場契合程度。如此一來，我們不是把消費者重新導向到我們硬推給他們的東西；相反地，我們是在他們想要的位置與他們相遇，因為他們在各條業務線上自然展現並暗示了需求，把我們「拉」向那個方向。

So we are seeing, as I mentioned before, customers continuing to cross-shop across different categories quite naturally and those numbers continue to increase. We're seeing many -- for many consumers, the first interaction with DoorDash actually tends to be sometimes outside of the restaurant category. And I think these are some of the factors that have contributed to the fact that when you look outside of restaurants and you look at the convenience, grocery, alcohol segments, customers that are adopting e-commerce in these categories for the first time. About half of them are coming to DoorDash first.

所以如我先前提到的，我們確實看到客戶持續且相當自然地在不同品類之間交叉購物，而這些數字也持續增加。我們也看到，對許多消費者而言，他們與 DoorDash 的第一次互動，有時其實是在餐廳品類之外。我認為這些因素也促成了這樣的結果：當你把視角放到餐廳以外、看便利商店、雜貨、酒類等區隔時，那些第一次在這些品類採用電商的客戶，大約有一半是先來到 DoorDash。

Our next question comes from the line of Eric Sheridan with Goldman Sachs.

我們的下一個問題來自高盛（Goldman Sachs）的 Eric Sheridan。

Maybe just one on a broader topic. We've seen a ruling in New York City on compensation and investors continue to ask a lot about how the Department of Labor might play out. Any updated thoughts on the regulatory environment overall? And how are you thinking about aligning investments against that potential for nuance in the regulatory environment in the quarters ahead?

也許就一個較宏觀的議題。我們看到紐約市就薪酬方面有一項裁決，而投資人也持續大量詢問美國勞工部（Department of Labor）後續可能如何發展。對整體監管環境有沒有更新的看法？以及在接下來幾個季度，你們如何思考讓投資配置與監管環境可能出現的細微差異相對齊？

Yes. Eric, it's Tony. I'll start and feel free, Ravi, to chime in. I think in general, we have the same point of view on the regulatory landscape today as we had shockingly even 10 years ago, which is that, by and large, governments, lawmakers, regulators, they actually want to work productively with companies like ourselves to really co-create, I think, what the future of work and future of labor will be. And if you think about it, the reason why tens of millions of Dashers have come to the DoorDash platform over time or millions come to our platform every single month or the fact that the DoorDash Dasher app is actually one of the most downloaded consumer apps on the Apple iTunes store is because they simply don't earn enough they come from the full-time jobs that they do have.

是的。Eric，我是 Tony。我先回答，Ravi 也歡迎補充。我認為整體而言，我們對當前監管版圖的看法，和令人驚訝地甚至 10 年前的看法其實相同：大體上，政府、立法者、監管機構其實希望能與像我們這樣的公司以具生產力的方式合作，共同打造——我想——未來的工作型態與未來的勞動樣貌。你若想想看，為什麼隨著時間推移有數千萬名 Dasher 加入 DoorDash 平台，或每個月有數百萬人來到我們的平台，或為什麼 DoorDash 的 Dasher App 其實是 Apple iTunes 商店下載量最高的消費者 App 之一，原因在於：他們在既有的全職工作中賺得不夠。

90% of our Dashers Dash fewer than 10 hours a week. The average Dasher does 3 to 4 hours a week, over 80-plus percent of them have full-time jobs. And so they're really seeing DoorDash as a bridge between what income they earn today and the income that they hope to earn to meet the cost of living. And so -- and I think that most regulators actually understand this point, but we -- our hypothesis 10 years ago and kind of our views updating to this day has always been that there might be a handful of jurisdictions, who probably don't want to work productively with businesses and support this new paradigm and instead, candidly create policy that's just bad policy that will achieve unintended consequences that go counter to their goals.

我們 90% 的 Dasher 每週送單少於 10 小時。平均每位 Dasher 每週送單 3 到 4 小時，其中 80% 以上都有全職工作。因此他們真的把 DoorDash 視為一座橋樑，連結他們今天所賺取的收入與他們希望能賺到、以因應生活成本的收入。所以——而我認為多數監管者其實理解這一點；但我們——10 年前的假設，以及一路更新至今的觀點一直是：可能會有少數司法管轄區，或許不想與企業進行具生產力的合作、也不支持這種新典範；相反地，坦白說，他們會制定不良政策，導致與其目標背道而馳的非預期後果。

And when we think the New York City legislation or proposed legislation is one of those bodies, we see similar activities in Seattle. But when you, again, count up all of the regulatory discussions, I think it still favors kind of our original hypothesis, which is outside of a handful of jurisdictions. Most governments, lawmakers, and regulators want to work productively with companies like DoorDash to do the right thing for Dashers.

當我們看待紐約市的立法或擬議立法時，我們認為它就是其中之一；我們也在西雅圖看到類似的動作。但如果你把所有監管討論加總來看，我認為仍然支持我們最初的假設：除了少數司法管轄區之外，多數政府、立法者與監管機構都希望能與像 DoorDash 這樣的公司以具生產力的方式合作，為 Dasher 做正確的事。

Eric, just to add to what Tony said, I look on the New York City, one, we've gotten a couple of questions about this as well. That is not live yet. We do expect 2 year back from the judge at any point, just like everybody else. Our goal and philosophy and how do we respond to some of these changes has always been, the first and foremost priority is to drive efficiency in every market that we operate in because our goal is to ensure we have sustainable unit economics. To the extent we are not able to meet our goals around unit economics, we do realize there's going to be increased cost in the system. Like Tony talked about, we don't think it's great because that just reduces the transaction activity across the ecosystem, which means lower sales for merchants as well as internal lower earnings for Dashers.

Eric，我補充 Tony 的說法。我看紐約市這件事，我們也收到幾個相關問題。那項規定目前尚未生效。我們預期法官隨時可能做出裁定，就像大家一樣。我們的目標與理念，以及我們如何回應這類變化，一直都是：首要且最優先的是在我們營運的每個市場推動效率，因為我們的目標是確保單位經濟（unit economics）可持續。若我們無法達成單位經濟的目標，我們也明白系統中的成本將會上升。如 Tony 所說，我們不認為那是好事，因為那只會降低整個生態系的交易活動，意味著商家的銷售更低，同時 Dasher 的收入也更低。

And from the financial impact perspective itself, any impact from New York City ruling in Q4, we've included that in our EBITDA guidance that we've given. Our goal is to manage the business to be within that range that we've talked about.

就財務影響本身而言，任何來自紐約市裁決在第四季（Q4）的影響，我們已納入我們所提供的 EBITDA 指引之中。我們的目標是把業務管理在我們所談到的那個區間內。

Our next question comes from the line of Doug Anmuth with JPMorgan.

我們的下一個問題來自摩根大通（JPMorgan）的 Doug Anmuth。

Recognize that product improvement factors are outweighing macro, but we have heard a number of companies call out some early 4Q volatility from either macro or geopolitical. Just curious if you can get anything has changed there at all into 4Q? And then, Ravi, can you talk a little bit more about your improvements to GAAP profitability and just how we should think about that path in upcoming quarters?

理解產品改善因素正在壓過宏觀因素，但我們聽到不少公司提到第四季初出現一些波動，可能來自宏觀或地緣政治。想請問進入第四季後，這方面是否有任何變化？另外 Ravi，你能否再多談一些你們在 GAAP 獲利能力上的改善，以及我們應如何看待未來幾季的路徑？

Sure. I can start on the first question, and Ravi, feel free to chime in and also take the second question. With respect to the macro dynamics, again, I think it's just really, really hard to size any one of these things. And I think when you sum it all up and as you mentioned, there's lots of things going on in the world today, with the economy, with other events across the globe. And there's certainly puts and takes, I think, to each one of these things. And I think that when -- it's not just the fact that we have product improvements that I think that has helped out way and helped execute very efficiently and continue to grow at higher rates even at our increased scale. It's also the fact that, when you look at every category of spend, food is one that everyone has to spend in.

好的。我先回答第一個問題，Ravi 也歡迎補充並回答第二個問題。就宏觀動態而言，我認為要量化任何單一因素的影響真的非常、非常困難。我想把所有因素加總來看，正如你提到的，當今世界有很多事情在發生：經濟、以及全球各地的其他事件。對每一項因素而言，確實都有利有弊。我認為——不只是我們有產品改善，我覺得這確實帶來幫助，使我們能非常有效率地執行，並在規模擴大後仍能以更高的成長率持續成長。也因為當你看每一個支出類別時，食物是每個人都必須花錢的項目。

Sure, one may argue that you don't have to spend it on delivery, but what we tend to see is that there's also the macro trend of convenience increasing in the direction of greater convenience. And so if someone has some dollars to spend, it tends to start with the category of the highest frequency where they also seek convenience. And there's just more opportunities to do that given that someone consumes food 20 to 25 times a week. So we're not seeing any of the activity perhaps that I think some other categories in commerce are seeing, but I think it's really multifaceted. There's the product improvements there's the fact that people have to spend on food, and it tends to, therefore, lend itself towards the category where for e-commerce, it's the most resilient and the highest frequency.

當然，有人可能會說你不一定要花在外送上，但我們通常看到的還有一個宏觀趨勢：便利性持續提升、朝向更高便利性的方向發展。因此如果有人有一些可支配的預算，往往會先從最高頻的類別開始，而他們也會在那裡追求便利。由於一個人每週會吃 20 到 25 次食物，這方面的機會其實更多。所以我們沒有看到某些其他商業類別可能正在看到的那種活動變化，但我認為這是多重因素共同作用：有產品改善、有大家必須花在食物上的支出，因此在電商中它往往是最具韌性、頻率最高的類別。

I mean, you can say this for the past 60 years, which obviously has a lot of macro dynamics as well. And you see that in only 2 out of the 60 years, I think, did the restaurant industry in the U.S., at least ever decline. And so I think it gives you a sense of the robustness of this category. And then I think the final point is we're still a lot earlier than people think in the category than perhaps our scale suggests. And that means that we're not where we need to be at in terms of where our selection of merchants are, whether it's restaurants or new categories, the affordability of the program, the quality of the service, and our customer support. We have to make improvements in all areas.

我的意思是，你可以把這套說法套用到過去 60 年——而這 60 年當然也有很多宏觀動態。你會看到在這 60 年中，我想美國的餐飲業只有 2 年出現下滑。因此我認為這能讓你感受到這個類別的強韌性。最後一點是：相較於我們的規模所呈現的樣子，我們在這個類別其實仍比大家想像得更早期。這意味著我們在許多方面仍未達到應有水準，包括商家選擇的豐富度（不論是餐廳或新類別）、方案的可負擔性、服務品質，以及客戶支援。我們必須在所有面向持續改善。

Doug, just a few more points to what Tony touched on, and then I'll talk about the second question that you asked. We obviously have a lot of signal in the business. I mean we watch this very closely. When I look at the underlying cohorts, I mean they're really strong. If you look at the performance of not just Q3, but actually the first 9 months of the year, cohorts continue to improve, and look at retention, it's very stable.

Doug，我再補充幾點 Tony 提到的內容，然後我會談你問的第二個問題。我們在業務中顯然有大量訊號可供觀察。我們確實非常密切地追蹤。當我看底層的 cohort（用戶分群）表現時，真的很強。如果你看不只是第三季（Q3），其實看今年前 9 個月，cohort 持續改善；再看留存（retention），也非常穩定。

Our users, in fact, at our scale are growing double digits. Order frequency, like we talked about earlier, continues to grow. So we're very pleased with the performance of the business and a lot of strength that we're seeing in the business.

事實上，在我們這樣的規模下，用戶仍以雙位數成長。下單頻率（order frequency）如同我們先前談到的，也持續成長。所以我們對業務表現非常滿意，也看到業務中展現出很多強勁動能。

To your second point around GAAP profitability itself. As we've mentioned before, GAAP net income in and of itself is not an explicit target that we are managing the business towards. Our financial North Star has always been how do we maximize the long-term free cash flow in the business. And what you're truly seeing in the business today is every single line of business is becoming more efficient. We've dramatically improved the unit economics across the restaurant business, new verticals as well as our international business. I do expect every business to be profitable over time. And as and when that happens, the overall business is going to get to be GAAP net income positive as well. But that's not an explicit target that we're driving the business towards.

至於你第二點關於 GAAP 獲利能力本身。如我們之前提過，GAAP 淨利本身並不是我們用來管理業務的明確目標。我們的財務北極星一直是：如何最大化公司長期的自由現金流（free cash flow）。而你今天在業務中真正看到的是：每一條業務線都在變得更有效率。我們已大幅改善餐廳業務、新垂直領域（new verticals）以及國際業務的單位經濟。我確實預期每一項業務最終都會隨時間推移而達到獲利。而當那發生時，整體公司也會達到 GAAP 淨利為正。但那不是我們推動業務所設定的明確目標。

Our next question comes from the line of Brian Nowak with Morgan Stanley.

我們的下一個問題來自摩根士丹利（Morgan Stanley）的 Brian Nowak。

Tony, I wanted to go back to one of the comments you made earlier where you talked about investing appropriately towards the stage of the product. So can we talk a little bit about grocery through that lens? So give us some examples of areas of investment that you made this year based on the state of the product that maybe you -- I would say, okay, 1 year later, we can do more of this in '24. I'm just trying to get an understanding for what are the areas you've pressed on hardest in investment in grocery? And what are the areas where you think that there could be more investment to come to really drive that business faster for longer in '24 and beyond?

Tony，我想回到你先前提到的一點，你談到要依照產品所處階段來做適當投資。所以我們能不能用這個角度來談談雜貨（grocery）？請你舉一些例子，說明你們今年基於產品狀態所做的投資；也許你會說，好，1 年之後，我們在 2024 年可以在這方面做得更多。我想了解的是：在雜貨業務上，你們投資最用力、最著力的領域是哪些？以及你認為在 2024 年及之後，還有哪些領域可能會有更多投資，以真正讓這個業務更快、更久地成長？

Sure. I mean -- okay, we can take many flavors of this question because, I mean, this is probably something that I spend the majority of my time on, which is initiative and product reviews, because I do think it's really hard to apply the correct judgment certainly correctly every time, depending on the phase of the project.

當然。我是說——好，我們可以用很多不同角度來回答這個問題，因為這大概是我花最多時間在做的事情：也就是各項計畫與產品的檢視（initiative and product reviews）。因為我確實認為，要在每一次都做出正確判斷非常困難，尤其是取決於專案所處的階段。

But take a few instances, right? For instance, we really didn't -- one of the first choices we made on grocery was, well, what's the right product to build. And I think there were many external beliefs of perhaps what you have to build in order to create a sustainable grocery business. But we took the view of what is the actual problems left to be solved, first and foremost, coming from our customers.

不過舉幾個例子，對吧？例如，我們在雜貨上最一開始做的選擇之一是：到底要打造什麼樣的正確產品。我想外界有很多看法，認為要建立一個可持續的雜貨業務，你可能必須打造某種特定的東西。但我們的觀點是：首先、最重要的是，從客戶出發，實際上還有哪些問題有待解決。

And one of the things that we heard, for example, was that while what's really frustrating about grocery delivery is that the items that either perish the fastest or that we consume as consumers the most frequently. So think about your berries or your milk or your eggs or your cereals or your coffees. It's really annoying in the middle of the week to have to go back into the store and somehow go and get it. Whereas for other types of shopping behavior, if I'm already out on the weekends anyway, and I'm buying other things for the week, maybe it's less of a big deal. And so the first product we've built was actually to solve a smaller basket (inaudible) use case, which really introduced ourselves to consumers and helping address a problem we heard.

例如，我們聽到的一件事是：雜貨配送最令人沮喪的地方在於，那些最容易腐壞、或是我們作為消費者最常消耗的品項——想想你的莓果、牛奶、雞蛋、穀片或咖啡——在一週中間用完時，你還得再跑回店裡想辦法補貨，真的很煩。相較之下，對其他類型的購物行為，如果我週末本來就會出門，順便把一週需要的其他東西一起買了，可能就沒那麼麻煩。所以我們打造的第一個產品，其實是為了解決一個較小的購物籃（inaudible）使用情境，藉此把我們介紹給消費者，並協助解決我們聽到的痛點。

And then I think had the byproduct of introducing ourselves to grocers, too, because this was a use case that they hadn't been investing that much into. And then I think it surprised everyone how large that opportunity occurred. So that's like one version of this, which is before we kind of just look at what everyone else is doing, that's first and foremost, start by building the correct product. And I think building the correct product has a lot of implications on do we use engineers and business people, and other functions correctly and therefore, get the most out of the team's potential. I think there's a version of that shows up.

接著我認為，這也帶來一個副產品：讓我們也能把自己介紹給雜貨商，因為這是一個他們過去投入不多的使用情境。然後我想，這個機會的規模之大讓所有人都感到意外。這就是其中一種版本：在我們去看別人都在做什麼之前，最優先的是先打造正確的產品。而打造正確的產品，對於我們是否能正確使用工程師、商務人員與其他職能，並因此最大化團隊潛力，有很多層面的影響。我覺得這就是其中一種呈現方式。

I think number two, another example would be, while we didn't really spend much on marketing when it came to building the grocery business. Now Ravi echoed some of the kind of reasons why because, well, one, we do have the largest audience of local customers coming to our app shopping as well as just coming to the app and including those that don't shop. And so we had a bit of a benefit there. But at the same instance, we also didn't want to invest in marketing because the product wasn't good enough yet. And so I think those are 2, I guess, examples I would call out where you have to make the right call on how to make the most efficient use of your resources.

第二個例子是：在建立雜貨業務時，我們其實沒有花太多在行銷上。Ravi 也呼應了一些原因：第一，我們的 App 本來就有最大的在地客群，不論是來 App 上購物的，或只是來使用 App（包含不購物的人）。所以我們在這方面有一些優勢。但同時，我們也不想投資行銷，因為產品還不夠好。所以我想這是兩個例子，說明你必須做出正確判斷，才能最有效率地使用資源。

And first and foremost, for us, it starts with solving the right customer problem correctly. And whenever we see something that's not being solved correctly, and we think there's an opportunity to build something 10x better, we're going to go for it. And then the question becomes, well, is there an efficient way to grow, then we're going to think about that and if we have an advantage there. And then finally, what's the path towards building a very large cash flow generating business that will maximize total profit dollars in the long run. And I think that's kind of the sequencing of how we thought about things. I think so far, we've made good decisions in grocery and a lot of these bets. I think you're seeing some of the combination or the middle of impact of the results in this quarter. But we've got a long ways to go and we have to keep making good decisions.

而對我們來說，最優先是把正確的客戶問題解對、解好。每當我們看到某件事沒有被正確解決，而我們認為有機會打造出好 10 倍的東西，我們就會去做。接著問題就變成：是否有一種有效率的成長方式？如果我們在那裡有優勢，我們就會去思考。最後，則是通往建立一個非常大、能產生現金流的業務之路，並在長期最大化總利潤金額。我想這就是我們思考事情的先後順序。到目前為止，我們在雜貨以及這些押注上做了不錯的決策。我想你在本季看到的結果，反映了其中一些組合或中段的影響。但我們還有很長的路要走，也必須持續做出好的決策。

Our next question comes from the line of Michael Morton with MoffettNathanson.

我們的下一個問題來自 MoffettNathanson 的 Michael Morton。

Two questions, if I can. One, start with for Tony and then the second for Ravi. On the advertising business, kind of following up to the prior question. How do you feel about your product's ability to serve some of the larger enterprises that goes for the QSRs, who kind of demand sophisticated solutions, but also now moving into the grocery business? In our conversations with CPGs, there's a concern about incrementality in advertising for grocery retail marketplace -- retail media networks because the fact that there's not a lot of unit growth there. So whoever can win the incrementality measurement kind of like wins the market for advertising. So curious to how you think about your product there.

如果可以的話我有兩個問題。第一個給 Tony，第二個給 Ravi。關於廣告業務，延續前一個問題：你如何看待你們產品服務一些大型企業客戶的能力——包括那些 QSR（快速服務餐廳），他們通常要求更精密的解決方案，但你們現在也在進入雜貨業務。在我們與 CPG（消費性包裝品）公司的對話中，他們對雜貨零售市集——零售媒體網路（retail media networks）的廣告「增量」（incrementality）有所擔憂，因為那裡的單位成長（unit growth）不多。所以誰能在增量衡量上勝出，就有點像是贏得廣告市場。想請教你如何看待你們在這方面的產品。

And then just second for Ravi. Really impressive levels of operating leverage. Just curious if maybe some details of the drivers behind it? Like is this like DASH might be hitting some type of maturity, natural like attrition in the employee base. And like if this is kind of a level we should think about going forward and how operating expenses philosophy could maybe change there?

第二個問題給 Ravi。營運槓桿的水準非常令人印象深刻。想請你分享一些背後的驅動因素細節？例如這是否代表 DASH 可能達到某種成熟度、員工基數出現自然流失（attrition）之類的情況？以及這是否是我們未來應該預期的水準，還有營運費用的理念是否可能因此有所改變？

So to your first question, I think I really agree with the premise of the customer research that you did, which is that incrementality obviously, is a huge driver of return on ad spend. And I think that's why, at least my view and our company's view on advertising is the most important thing about building a highly incremental advertising business is to build the biggest and most robust marketplace and not to confuse the sequence or the order of operations there.

針對你的第一個問題，我其實非常同意你所做客戶研究的前提：也就是「增量」顯然是廣告投資報酬（return on ad spend）的巨大驅動因素。我認為這也是為什麼——至少以我的看法以及我們公司的看法——要打造一個高度具增量的廣告業務，最重要的是先建立最大、最強健的市集（marketplace），而不要把順序或作業流程（order of operations）搞混。

And so when our grocery business is growing more than doubling year-on-year, I think that's a good start, especially relative to other choices in the marketplace from an advertiser's perspective. But look, I mean, there's a lot of work to be done. I think we have a long ways to go in building out our advertising product. We're super excited about, I think, the growth we've seen. We're even more excited about I think the amount of demand that is coming into the ecosystem for a product like ours, where I think they recognize in addition to our growth and especially at our scale, they also see the opportunity across different categories.

因此，當我們的雜貨業務年增成長超過一倍時，我認為這是一個好的開始，特別是相較於市場上其他選項、從廣告主角度來看。但你看，還有很多工作要做。我認為我們在打造廣告產品上還有很長的路要走。我們對目前看到的成長非常興奮；我們更興奮的是，我認為有大量需求正在進入這個生態系，尋找像我們這樣的產品——我想他們除了看到我們的成長、尤其是在我們這樣的規模下，也看到了跨不同品類的機會。

And so there's a lot of excitement both from enterprise merchants, whether it's in the restaurant category or in the non restaurant categories as well as from advertisers. And so we got a lot of work to do. We're not certainly pleased with where we are with the product that's usually how we feel about all of our products. But I think we've got a lot more to go. Certainly, in advertising, it's been a 2.5-year effort. I think it's already amongst, I think, some of the most desired online advertising platforms. Yes, I think we have a very, very long road ahead.

所以不論是企業級商家——不管是在餐廳品類或非餐廳品類——以及廣告主，都非常興奮。因此我們還有很多工作要做。我們當然不會對目前產品的狀態感到滿意；我們對所有產品通常都是這種感覺。但我認為我們還有更多要做。尤其在廣告方面，這是一個 2.5 年的努力。我認為它已經是一些最受青睞的線上廣告平台之一。是的，我認為我們前方還有非常、非常長的路。

Mike, on your second point on the efficiency and leverage that you're seeing in the business. I mean you're right. I mean really pleased with the performance. Really proud of the team's execution here. I think what you're seeing is a combination of a couple of things. One, I mean, look, I mean, Q3 was a really strong quarter for us, not just across the top line, but also across unit economics. Every single line of business has continued to outperform our expectations, both on volume as well as unit economics. A lot of the EBITDA upside that you're seeing in the business is being driven by that.

Mike，關於你第二點提到的效率與你在業務中看到的槓桿。我是說，你說得沒錯。我們對表現非常滿意，也為團隊在這裡的執行感到非常自豪。我認為你看到的是幾件事的組合。第一，我是說，你看，第三季對我們來說是非常強勁的一季，不只是營收端（top line），也包括單位經濟（unit economics）。每一條業務線都持續超出我們的預期，不論是在量（volume）或單位經濟上。你在業務中看到的 EBITDA 上行（upside）有很大一部分就是由此驅動。

Two, to your point, we've done a lot of things around operating expenses. Operating expenses, as you could see, have been relatively flat for the last 4 quarters in a row. The team has expressed a lot of discipline around the cost structure in general, while we've continued to grow revenue north of 25%, 30% over the same time frame. That said, there are also a couple of things that helped us in Q3. There was a onetime sales tax benefit that helped us in Q3 as well as the continuity of leverage that we're seeing across the board. But as I look ahead, our goal is to continue to drive further leverage in the business, whether it's improvement in unit economics or the fixed cost leverage that you're seeing in the business. And you can see that in the strong Q4 guide that we've given as well.

第二，回到你提到的重點，我們在營運費用方面做了很多工作。如你所見，營運費用在過去連續 4 個季度都相對持平。團隊在整體成本結構上展現了高度紀律，同時我們在相同期間仍持續把營收成長維持在 25%、30% 以上。不過，Q3 也有幾個因素對我們有利：有一筆一次性的銷售稅利益在 Q3 帶來助益，另外我們也看到全方位的槓桿延續。但展望未來，我們的目標是持續在業務中推動更進一步的槓桿，不論是單位經濟的改善，或是你在業務中看到的固定成本槓桿。你也可以從我們給出的強勁 Q4 指引中看出這一點。

Our next question comes from the line of Michael McGovern with Bank of America.

下一個問題來自美國銀行（Bank of America）的 Michael McGovern。

Just a couple on the cohort chart. If you look at some of these post-COVID cohorts, it seems as though the slope in trajectory for Marketplace GOV is a little bit lower than the steeper slope for pre-COVID cohorts even after the COVID spike. So I'm curious what gives you confidence that you can get the post-COVID cohorts to that same slope in growth? And then also curious what kind of contribution you're seeing from nonrestaurant in the newer cohorts versus older cohorts? Do you see newer users ordering more frequently from non restaurants?

我有幾個關於 cohort 圖表的問題。如果看一些後 COVID 的 cohorts，似乎 Marketplace GOV 的成長軌跡斜率，比起 COVID 前 cohorts（即使在 COVID 高峰之後）那種更陡的斜率要低一些。所以我想問的是，你們有什麼信心能讓後 COVID cohorts 的成長斜率回到同樣的水準？另外也想了解，在較新的 cohorts 中，非餐廳（nonrestaurant）相較於較舊 cohorts 的貢獻如何？你們是否看到新用戶更常從非餐廳下單？

Yes. Let me take both of those. I'll start with the cohort chart, right? Like the 2 big takeaways that at least on the cohort chart is one, I actually look at the annual cohorts going as back as 7 years. I mean, every single cohort still continues to grow. And the second one is, if you actually look at the 2023 cohorts. In fact, it's the second best cohort that we've ever had, second only to the Jan '20 cohort, which obviously had some impact from COVID. What you see in the underlying cohorts is as we are continuing to improve the selection as we're making the quality of the product better as the service levels continue to increase, we are seeing strength across all the cohorts that we operate in.

是的。我來回答這兩個問題。我先從 cohort 圖表開始，好嗎？就 cohort 圖表而言，我認為至少有兩個重點：第一，我其實會看回溯長達 7 年的年度 cohorts。我的意思是，每一個 cohort 都仍在持續成長。第二，如果你看 2023 年的 cohorts，事實上那是我們歷來第二好的 cohort，僅次於 2020 年 1 月的 cohort，而那個 cohort 顯然受到 COVID 的一些影響。你在底層 cohorts 看到的是，隨著我們持續改善選品、提升產品品質、服務水準不斷提高，我們在所有我們營運的 cohorts 上都看到強勁表現。

When I look at the newer cohorts from an order frequency perspective, in fact, the newer cohorts are starting out at a higher level than many of the older cohorts are starting out. And to your second point around what is the contribution from both restaurants as well as new verticals. The behavior that we've seen from user base is, the number of users that use both restaurants as well as new verticals, that number continues to increase every single quarter. The impact that's having on the business is that's lifting overall engagement of the cohorts up. We're starting to see that in the order frequency for the entire cohorts.

從下單頻率的角度看較新的 cohorts，事實上，新的 cohorts 一開始的水準就比許多較舊 cohorts 的起點更高。再回到你第二點關於餐廳與新垂直（new verticals）的貢獻：我們從用戶基礎看到的行為是，同時使用餐廳與新垂直的用戶數，每一季都在增加。這對業務的影響是把 cohorts 的整體互動度往上拉升。我們開始在整體 cohorts 的下單頻率中看到這一點。

Again, to be very clear, we're not trying to drive the order frequency of just restaurants or new verticals, the way we think about it is how do we bring more users back, which is helping us drive overall users at a double-digit rate.

再次強調，我們不是要只推動餐廳或新垂直其中一方的下單頻率；我們的思考方式是如何讓更多用戶回來，這也幫助我們以雙位數的速度推動整體用戶成長。

How do we get them to use the product more, which is what's being reflected in the overall order frequency going up. In fact, I mean, we're very pleased with the progress, and this is contributing to the strong growth that you've seen over the last couple of years.

以及如何讓他們更常使用產品，這也反映在整體下單頻率的提升上。事實上，我們對進展非常滿意，而這也促成了你在過去幾年看到的強勁成長。

Our next question comes from the line of Andrew Boone with JMP Securities.

下一個問題來自 JMP Securities 的 Andrew Boone。

I wanted to go back to operating expenses and specifically sales and marketing. It continues to be very efficient. I understood you guys called out Dasher acquisition costs in the letter. But is there anything you can share on customer acquisition costs just as DoorDash's awareness continues to be higher? And then for my second question, I wanted to ask about the elasticity of grocery delivery costs. Tony, you've mentioned the customer cost out a couple of times in your past responses. What are the largest levers you have to pull to make grocery delivery cheaper for the consumer?

我想回到營運費用，特別是銷售與行銷。它持續非常有效率。我理解你們在信中提到 Dasher 的獲取成本。但隨著 DoorDash 的品牌認知度持續提高，你們能否分享一些關於客戶獲取成本（customer acquisition costs）的情況？第二個問題，我想問雜貨配送成本的彈性。Tony，你在先前的回覆中提過幾次客戶成本（customer cost）。你們能用來讓雜貨配送對消費者更便宜的最大槓桿是什麼？

Let me take the first one on sales and marketing. And Tony, if you were to take the second one. Yes, you're right. I mean, we've seen a ton of leverage on the sales and marketing in general. One of the biggest areas where we've driven a ton of leverage is Dasher. For us, whenever we think about efficiency in the business, it always starts with product. We've done a ton on the logistics side over the last couple of years. We've redesigned the Dasher app. We have given Dashers the opportunity to both own by time as well as own by effort. The combination of both of those things, what that does is it improves retention, it improves order frequency on the dasher side. We're seeing retention on Dashers go up. We're seeing engagement levels go up.

我先回答第一個關於銷售與行銷的問題。Tony，如果你來回答第二個。是的，你說得對。我們在整體銷售與行銷上看到了很大的槓桿。我們推動大量槓桿的最大領域之一是 Dasher。對我們而言，每當我們思考業務效率時，永遠都是從產品開始。過去幾年我們在物流端做了很多事。我們重新設計了 Dasher app。我們也讓 Dashers 有機會同時以時間（by time）以及以努力（by effort）的方式來接單。這兩者的組合能提升留存，也能提升 Dasher 端的接單頻率。我們看到 Dashers 的留存上升，互動程度也在上升。

The effect that's having on the P&L is we're seeing leverage on both Dasher pay as well as the Dasher acquisition cost. Second, to your specific point around consumer acquisition, when we operate the business to a payback period, we are seeing healthy unit economics. We are seeing the unit economics continue to grow. As long as we are comfortable with the payback period, our goal is to continue to drive new user adoption. In fact, automotive is driving the overall growth in MAUs is they're continuing to see still healthy levels of user acquisition.

這對損益表（P&L）的影響是：我們在 Dasher 薪酬以及 Dasher 獲取成本兩方面都看到了槓桿。第二，針對你提到的消費者獲取，當我們以回收期（payback period）來營運業務時，我們看到健康的單位經濟（unit economics），而且單位經濟仍在持續改善。只要我們對回收期感到滿意，我們的目標就是持續推動新用戶採用。事實上，推動 MAUs 整體成長的動能是——我們仍持續看到健康水準的用戶獲取。

With respect to your second question about lowering the cost of grocery delivery. I mean I think there's -- there are quite a few dimensions. I probably won't be able to share in much detail about all of the initiatives we're working on. But it starts with, obviously, how do you create the lowest possible cost structure for everybody involved. If you can do that, I think we can all agree that we all have then the choice of to what degree we actually want to lower the cost of the program. And obviously, we always want to continuously lower the cost of the program, so that we can drive greater and greater adoption and engagement in a way that still makes sense for the business, especially when it comes to maximizing total profit dollars in the long run.

至於你第二個問題：如何降低雜貨配送的成本。我認為這裡——有相當多面向。我可能無法非常詳細地分享我們正在推進的所有計畫，但起點顯然是：如何為所有參與方建立盡可能低的成本結構。如果能做到這點，我想我們都同意，接下來我們就能選擇要在多大程度上降低方案成本。而且很明顯，我們總是希望持續降低方案成本，讓我們能以仍符合商業合理性的方式推動更高的採用與互動，特別是在長期最大化總利潤金額（total profit dollars）方面。

But I think there's other things, too. And so you should expect to see us continue to work on co-creating interesting products that haven't yet been built together with grocers and really just continue to solve all of the different challenges that they have. And hopefully, it won't just lower the cost of delivery for grocers on DoorDash, but also for grocers through their first-party channels and their in-store businesses as well.

但我認為還有其他事情也是如此。因此你應該會看到我們持續與雜貨商共同打造一些有趣、過去尚未一起建立的產品，並且持續解決他們面臨的各種挑戰。希望這不僅能降低雜貨商在 DoorDash 上的配送成本，也能降低雜貨商透過其第一方渠道（first-party channels）以及其門市業務（in-store businesses）的成本。

There are no further questions at this time. I'd like to thank our speakers for today's presentation, and thank you all for joining us. This now concludes today's call. You may now disconnect.

目前沒有其他問題。我要感謝我們的講者今天的分享，也感謝各位的參與。本次電話會議到此結束。各位現在可以掛線。