英國石油 (BP) 2002 Q3 法說會逐字稿

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  • Operator

    Operator

  • Welcome to the BP Third quarter Results Conference Call. I will now hand the call over to Vice President of Investor Relations, Mr. Fergus McLeod. Please go ahead, sir.

    歡迎參加 BP 第三季業績電話會議。現在我將把電話交給投資人關係副總裁 Fergus McLeod 先生。先生,請開始。

  • Fergus McLeod - Investor Relations

    Fergus McLeod - Investor Relations

  • Ladies and Gentlemen, Good afternoon in Europe and good morning to all listeners in the United States. My name is Fergus McLeod from BP Investor Relations and I would like to welcome you to our Third quarter 2002 Conference Call and Webcast. I am joined today by John Browne, our Group Chief Executive, John Buchanan, our Chief Financial Officer, Byron Grote, CFO Designate and currently Chief Executive of our Chemicals Business, Andy Ingles, Group Vice President and Commercial Director of our Upstream Business, and Mike Starkey, our Chief Accounting Officer.

    各位女士、各位先生,歐洲的各位午安,也向美國所有聽眾道早安。我是 BP 投資人關係部的 Fergus McLeod,歡迎各位參加我們 2002 年第三季電話會議與網路直播。今天與我一同出席的有:集團執行長 John Browne、財務長 John Buchanan、候任財務長(目前為化學事業執行長)Byron Grote、集團副總裁暨上游事業商務總監 Andy Ingles,以及首席會計官 Mike Starkey。

  • Before we begin, I would like to draw your attention to two items. First, today’s call refers to slides that we will be using during the Webcast. If you are listening on the telephone, the slides are available to download from the Investor Centre on our website: bp.com.

    在開始之前,我想請各位注意兩點。第一,今天的電話會議會引用我們在網路直播中使用的投影片。若您透過電話收聽,投影片可至我們網站 bp.com 的 Investor Centre 下載。

  • Second, I must draw your attention to this disclaimer. We may make forward-looking statements which are identified by the use of the words, “will”, “expect” and similar phrases. Actual results may differ materially, depending on a number of factors as indicated on this slide. I should also point out that our and your words will be recorded so that the information can be made available on our website.

    第二,我必須提醒各位注意以下免責聲明。我們可能會作出前瞻性陳述,通常可由「將」、「預期」等字眼及類似措辭辨識。實際結果可能因本投影片所示的多項因素而出現重大差異。我也要指出,我們與各位的發言都將被錄音,以便將資訊提供於我們的網站。

  • Before we go on to talk about Third quarter results, I would like to hand over to John Browne, Group Chief Executive who will make some introductory remarks. We will then hand over to John Buchanan who will talk about the highlights of the Third quarter and the current position of our financial framework. We will then open the call to your questions.

    在我們繼續討論第三季業績之前,我想先把時間交給集團執行長 John Browne,請他做一些開場說明。接著我們將交由財務長 John Buchanan,說明第三季重點以及我們財務架構目前的狀況。之後我們將開放各位提問。

  • John Browne - Group Chief Executive

    John Browne - Group Chief Executive

  • Thank you Fergus. Good afternoon, Ladies and gentlemen. Although, I would not normally join you to discuss Third quarter results, I have joined the Call today for three reasons. First, to recognize John Buchanan whose retirement was announced today. Second, to talk about the issue of performance shortfalls and our Upstream business and the steps that we are taking to remedy them. And third, to briefly touch on where this leaves the overall performance potential of the company.

    謝謝你,Fergus。各位女士、各位先生,午安。雖然我通常不會參與第三季業績的討論,但我今天加入這通電話會議有三個原因。第一,向今天宣布即將退休的 John Buchanan 致意。第二,談談我們上游事業的績效落差問題,以及我們正在採取的補救措施。第三,簡要說明這對公司整體績效潛力意味著什麼。

  • I begin by paying tribute to John Buchanan whose forthcoming retirement as CFO was announced today. John has served BP for six years as CFO and has played a vital role in shaping, perhaps the most exciting transformation in BP’s history. It is difficult to believe that John is now in his sixtieth year, and I am sure that you will join me in thanking him for the enormous contribution that he has made to our success and in wishing him every happiness for the future.

    我先向即將退休、且今天已宣布將卸任財務長的 John Buchanan 致上敬意。John 擔任 BP 財務長六年,在塑造 BP 歷史上或許最令人振奮的轉型中扮演了關鍵角色。很難相信 John 現在已邁入六十歲;我相信各位會與我一同感謝他對我們成功所做出的巨大貢獻,並祝福他未來一切順心如意。

  • The financial framework which BP uses today and which ensures that the cash flows, spending, gearing and dividend payments remain in a sustainable balance is largely John’s creation, and is a source of strength to our shareholders in turbulent times. This financial framework will be an enduring legacy of John Buchanan’s tenor as CFO and should stand BP in good stead for many years to come. John will be succeeded by Byron Grote in November. Byron is a former Group Treasurer, and in him you will gain a CFO with deep experience in all main business areas supported again by the unchanged and excellent finance team in BP.

    BP 目前所採用的財務架構,確保現金流、支出、槓桿比率與股利支付能維持在可持續的平衡之中,這在很大程度上是 John 的創建;在動盪時期,這也是我們股東的力量來源。這套財務架構將成為 John Buchanan 擔任財務長期間的長久遺產,並應能在未來多年讓 BP 受益良多。John 將於 11 月由 Byron Grote 接任。Byron 曾任集團司庫;在他身上,各位將迎來一位在各主要業務領域皆具深厚經驗的財務長,並同樣由 BP 不變且優秀的財務團隊提供支持。

  • The second reason that I have joined the Call today is to talk about our Upstream business. The past nine months have not been happy ones for this part of our operations. We had hoped to grow our production by 5.5% this year, but we have failed to do so.

    我今天加入電話會議的第二個原因,是要談談我們的上游事業。過去九個月對這部分營運而言並不愉快。我們原本希望今年產量成長 5.5%,但我們未能達成。

  • Let me explain ... Let me begin by explaining why this has occurred. As we indicated in our Trading Update of October 2, production growth in 3Q 2002 compared to 3Q 2001 was close to 4%, less than planned earlier, primarily due to performance problems in the North Sea, Alaska and North America, and unusually severe storm patterns in the Gulf of Mexico. The primary North Sea events included the problem with the Schiehallion Floating Production System, the unexpected shutdown of the gas inter connector into Europe, as well as slower than expected turnarounds at the Bruce, Forties and Andrew Fields in Alaska, which chose to shut in 150 wells to assure operational safety following the explosion of one well at Prudhoe Bay in August. In North America Gas, we continue to see transportation bottlenecks out of the Rockies and San Juan areas which hit both volumes and pricing.

    讓我說明一下……我先解釋為何會發生這種情況。如同我們在 10 月 2 日的交易更新中所指出,2002 年第三季相較 2001 年第三季的產量成長接近 4%,低於先前規劃,主要原因是北海、阿拉斯加與北美的營運表現問題,以及墨西哥灣異常嚴重的風暴型態。北海的主要事件包括 Schiehallion 浮式生產系統的問題、通往歐洲的天然氣互聯管線意外停運,以及阿拉斯加 Bruce、Forties 與 Andrew 油田的歲修(turnaround)進度慢於預期;此外,阿拉斯加在 8 月 Prudhoe Bay 一口井發生爆炸後,為確保作業安全而選擇關閉 150 口井。在北美天然氣業務方面,我們仍持續看到從落磯山脈與 San Juan 地區外運的運輸瓶頸,影響了產量與價格。

  • As well as these performance shortfalls, we saw a reduction of around 20,000 barrels a day for 2002, compared to a normal year, due to storm-related impacts. The cumulative effect of this year’s storm pattern in the Gulf of Mexico has been significantly greater by a factor of more than five times than we have experienced in recent years and exceeded the normal five-day allowance that we make in our plans for weather-related disruptions to production in the Gulf. These disruptions continued into the fourth quarter, both impacting current production, as operations took some time to return to normal, following tropical storms Isadora and Lilly, and delaying the start up of some of our new projects. The five of these performing shortfalls and the magnitude of the storm-related effects were greater than we had first expected. I do not wish to make excuses for our performance. It is our job to make judgments, and on this matter we would have wished to do better.

    除了這些績效落差之外,與正常年度相比,我們也因風暴相關影響而在 2002 年減少了約每日 20,000 桶。今年墨西哥灣風暴型態的累積影響,顯著高於近年經驗,幅度超過五倍,並超出我們在計畫中對墨西哥灣天候造成生產中斷所預留的正常五天額度。在熱帶風暴 Isadora 與 Lilly 之後,作業需要一些時間才能恢復正常,這些中斷延續到第四季,既影響當期產量,也延後了我們部分新專案的啟動。這些績效落差以及風暴相關影響的幅度,都比我們最初預期更大。我不希望為我們的表現找藉口。做出判斷是我們的工作,而在這件事上,我們本希望能做得更好。

  • Let me now take a moment to look at how our goals for production volumes in 2002 as a whole have been affected by this series of events. This slide shows how expectations for average 2002 productions have developed since our presentation in July. On the left-hand side of the chart, the green bar represents 2001 production. The first two bars represent our plans as they stood at the start of 2002. Organic growth from new project start-ups was expected to contribute around 235,000 barrels a day. As I will explain, we are 25,000 barrels a day below this plan due to project delays, a managed decline in our existing production base of around 50,000 barrels a day, with some improvement in operational efficiency offsetting underlying fields decline rate. This is, as expected.

    現在讓我花點時間看看,這一連串事件如何影響我們對 2002 年全年產量目標的達成。這張投影片顯示自我們 7 月簡報以來,對 2002 年平均產量的預期如何演變。圖表左側的綠色長條代表 2001 年產量。前兩個長條代表我們在 2002 年初的計畫。我們原預期新專案投產帶來的有機成長可貢獻約每日 235,000 桶。如我將說明的,我們因專案延遲而較此計畫少了每日 25,000 桶;同時,我們既有產量基礎出現約每日 50,000 桶的管理式下降,部分營運效率提升抵消了油氣田自然遞減率。這符合預期。

  • The five bars to the right represent the changed plans and disappointments of 2002 in roughly the order in which they occurred. 30,000 barrels a day due to lower than expected gas liftings due to mild weather in the first quarter and OPEC cutbacks. An extra contribution of around 40,000 barrels from inorganic growth, mainly the increase in our interest in Sedanco in Russia. 50,000 barrels a day due to the shortfalls in the North Sea, Alaska and elsewhere in the second half of 2002. 20,000 barrels a day due to greater disruptions by storms in the Gulf of Mexico that had been allowed for in our forecast, both in 3Q and continuing into 4Q. 25,000 barrels a day due to project delay. The net impact is that we now expect production growth of around 3% in 2002. This is disappointing.

    右側的五個長條代表 2002 年計畫變更與令人失望之處,順序大致依其發生先後排列。第一,因第一季天候溫和以及 OPEC 減產,天然氣提取量低於預期,減少每日 30,000 桶。第二,來自非有機成長的額外貢獻約每日 40,000 桶,主要是我們在俄羅斯 Sedanco 權益的增加。第三,因 2002 年下半年北海、阿拉斯加及其他地區的落差,減少每日 50,000 桶。第四,因墨西哥灣風暴造成的中斷高於我們在預測中所預留的幅度,第三季並延續至第四季,減少每日 20,000 桶。第五,因專案延遲,減少每日 25,000 桶。

  • What I am sure you are really interested in, is what we are going to do about all this. Can we make up for the income shortfall from lower production? What degree of headroom due we have and do we need in our forecast? and what is the right rate of volume growth to target to achieve the highest returns for our shareholders? It is clear from the experience of 2002 that we lacked a degree of headroom in our plan that would allow us to absorb problems of the type and on the scale that we have encountered this year. We believe that this loss of headroom has happened for three important reasons.

    我確信各位真正感興趣的是,我們打算如何應對這一切。我們能否彌補因產量下降而造成的收入缺口?我們在預測中擁有並需要多少緩衝空間(headroom)?以及為了為股東創造最高回報,我們應鎖定的正確產量成長率是多少?從2002年的經驗可以清楚看出,我們的計畫缺乏足夠的緩衝空間,無法吸收我們今年所遭遇這類型、且達到這種規模的問題。我們認為,這種緩衝空間的流失有三個重要原因。

  • The first, if and since we originally set our 5.5% to 7% average compound growth rate of 2000 to 2005 production, we have progressively reallocated capital than sustaining our base production, the longer-term growth project where we see better returns. We have reallocated around $1bln a year of capital from the base to growth projects that should contribute to the organic growth that we expect in 2005 and beyond. By putting that capital in the base we could have held output from the base flat. We have chosen not to do so and to allow base production to decline by around 50,000 to 70,000 barrels per day each year.

    第一個原因是,自從我們最初設定2000年至2005年產量5.5%至7%的平均複合成長率以來,我們已逐步將資本從維持基礎產量,重新配置到我們認為可帶來更佳回報的長期成長專案。我們每年約將10億美元的資本從基礎業務轉向成長專案,這些專案應可貢獻我們預期在2005年及其後的有機成長。若將該資本投入基礎業務,我們本可使基礎產量維持持平。我們選擇不這麼做,而是讓基礎產量每年約下降每日50,000至70,000桶。

  • We are convinced that this has been the right economic decision, that $1bln should produce more volume and higher returns in the future. It has, however, deprived us of the flexibility in meeting short time production goals when unexpected events occur, which has turned out to be a problem in 2002. We took that decision in the belief that we had sufficient headroom to meet our goals, despite the reallocation of capital. This has turned out not to be the case.

    我們深信這是正確的經濟決策:10億美元在未來應能帶來更大的產量與更高的回報。然而,當突發事件發生時,這也使我們在達成短期產量目標方面失去彈性,而這在2002年已證明成為一個問題。我們做出該決策時相信,即使重新配置資本,我們仍有足夠的緩衝空間來達成目標。結果證明並非如此。

  • The second reason for the loss of headroom is project delays. As you know, there have been delays for some of our projects, for example, in Angola, due to government timing preferences. The third reason for the loss of headroom has been that high oil prices over the past two years have made it much less attractive to upgrade the portfolio with minor acquisition and property purchases. In fact, we have chosen to be net sellers of barrels in a high oil price environment, as seen by the decision not to retain favors 170,000 barrels a day of production and to dispose of our interest in [Altura] and so on. We will not retain or acquire barrels just to meet a production goal when there is more value to a third party.

    第二個導致緩衝空間流失的原因是專案延宕。如各位所知,我們部分專案出現延遲,例如安哥拉的專案,係因政府在時程上的偏好所致。第三個原因是,過去兩年高油價使得透過小型併購與資產購置來升級投資組合的吸引力大幅降低。事實上,在高油價環境下,我們選擇成為淨賣方;這可從我們決定不保留每日170,000桶的產量,以及處分我們在[Altura]等項目中的權益看出。若第三方能提供更高價值,我們不會僅為了達成產量目標而保留或收購產量。

  • What does this loss of near-term headroom mean for our longer-term forecasts? We start with a strategy that is in good shape. The reserves that we need to deliver our growth are in place and are being booked. This slide shows that our average organic reserve replacement ratio of 156% over the past three years comfortably exceeds that of our major competitors. We expect to record reserves replacement in 2002 at a similar level. The barrels are there. As a result, if we chose to do so, we have the resources to increase our production by 20% in today’s 3.5 million barrels a day to 4.2 million barrels a day by the end of 2005 or during 2006 at the latest, but it would require more capital spending on the base than we have chosen to put in this year by around $1bln a year, but it could be done. If we were to commit this additional spending, we could retain roughly our existing production targets.

    那麼,短期緩衝空間的流失對我們較長期的預測意味著什麼?我們從一個狀況良好的策略出發。我們實現成長所需的儲量已到位,且正在入帳。本頁投影片顯示,我們過去三年的平均有機儲量替代率為156%,明顯高於主要競爭對手。我們預期2002年的儲量替代率也將記錄在相近水準。產量資源是存在的。因此,若我們選擇這麼做,我們有資源將目前每日350萬桶的產量提高20%,在2005年底或最遲於2006年達到每日420萬桶;但這將需要在基礎業務上的資本支出高於我們今年所選擇的水準,每年約多投入10億美元,不過是可行的。若我們承諾這筆額外支出,我們大致可以維持現有的產量目標。

  • The key question we now asking ourselves is: should we? What is the optimum way to monetize the resource base that we built up to our exploration success and acquisitions of the last decade? What should we do in order to optimize the economic returns from these barrels? What is the optimum pace of development?

    我們現在問自己的關鍵問題是:我們是否應該這麼做?對於我們在過去十年因勘探成功與併購所建立的資源基礎,最佳的變現方式是什麼?為了使這些桶數的經濟回報最佳化,我們應該做什麼?最佳的開發節奏為何?

  • We are very clear what our goal is: to extract the maximum value from our portfolio on behalf of our shareholders. The question is: how, while maintaining the right balance of returns and growth. To answer the question, we are taking a number of steps and we will rely on our business model to guide our actions. We are examining the organic investment in our Upstream portfolio from the bottom up. We are questioning how much we want to invest in each area based on the detailed assessment of risk, growth prospects, declined rates, cost, returns and margins. We are asking ourselves about high grading the portfolio. We assets will be monetized by sale rather than continued operation or development? We are examining future investment and its distribution to get the most efficient deployment of capital, including the optimum pace, and this is in line with our strategy that every part of our Upstream business must be fit for a $16.00 oil price world. And we are looking at efficiency, in particular, at the costs which we carry above the field. Field level costs are under effective control, but the question is the overheads that we carry above them.

    我們非常清楚我們的目標是什麼:代表股東從我們的投資組合中提取最大價值。問題在於:如何在維持回報與成長之間適當平衡的同時做到這一點。為了回答這個問題,我們正在採取多項措施,並將依靠我們的商業模式來引導行動。我們正自下而上檢視上游(Upstream)投資組合中的有機投資。我們根據對風險、成長前景、遞減率、成本、回報與利潤率的詳細評估,重新檢視在各領域希望投入多少資金。我們也在思考如何對投資組合進行「優選」(high grading)。哪些資產應透過出售變現,而非持續營運或開發?我們正在檢視未來投資及其配置,以達到最有效率的資本部署,包括最佳節奏;這也符合我們的策略:上游業務的每一部分都必須能適應每桶16.00美元油價的世界。同時我們也在檢視效率,特別是我們在油田之上的成本。油田層級成本已受到有效控制,但問題在於我們在其上承擔的管理費用(overheads)。

  • We want more headroom in our forecasts so that our future targets are robust against the realities of managing performance. We have too much complexity. We will address this. After three years of high oil prices, it is perhaps inevitable the cost in many areas have crept up and are higher than they need to be. We need to deal with them. These are tough steps, but it is important that the owners of our business know that we are taking action. This review is part of our annual planning process. It is too soon to tell you what the conclusions will be. I expect that we will be able to tell you more about this and our plans for the rest of the group at the time of our full-year results in February.

    我們希望在預測中保有更多緩衝空間,使未來目標能更能抵禦績效管理的現實挑戰。我們的複雜度過高。我們將加以處理。在連續三年高油價之後,許多領域的成本有所上升、且高於其應有水準,或許是難以避免的。我們必須處理這些問題。這些都是艱難的措施,但重要的是,公司的所有者要知道我們正在採取行動。這項檢討是我們年度規劃流程的一部分。現在就告訴各位結論還為時過早。我預期在2月公布全年業績時,我們將能就此以及集團其餘部分的計畫提供更多資訊。

  • The third and final issue which I want to talk to you about is where the 2002 Upstream performance and our review of plans for the future leads the performance potential for the group as a whole?

    我想與各位討論的第三個也是最後一個議題是:2002年上游表現以及我們對未來計畫的檢討,對整個集團的整體績效潛力意味著什麼?

  • As far as volumes are concerned, I have already explained that we have the potential to reach 4.2 million barrels a day by late 2005 or during 2006, but that we are reassessing the optimum growth rate from a value perspective, balancing returns, investments and the potential for divestment.

    就產量而言,我已經說明我們有潛力在2005年末或2006年期間達到每日420萬桶,但我們正從價值角度重新評估最佳成長率,在回報、投資與可能的資產剝離之間取得平衡。

  • As regard specific 2003 production guidance, we will stick to our practice of not giving a specific goal for the forthcoming year until we announce the 2002 results in February. It is too soon to give that specific guidance today due to uncertainty over how quickly we can recover from our 2002 poor performance because of lack of clarity on the timing of partner-operated project and because we have yet to finalize either the pattern of 2003 investments or the level of headroom that we require in future forecasts.

    至於2003年具體的產量指引,我們將維持一貫做法:在2月公布2002年結果之前,不對來年提出具體目標。由於我們尚不清楚能以多快速度從2002年不佳表現中恢復(部分原因在於合夥方營運專案的時程仍不明朗),且我們尚未最終確定2003年投資配置的模式,以及未來預測所需的緩衝空間水準,因此今天要提供具體指引仍為時過早。

  • As far as our financial performance is concerned, however, the picture is absolutely clear. In July 2000, we set a three-year goal of increasing sustainable mid-cycle earnings per share at around a double-digit rate, on average, over the period 2001 to 2003, and of paying a dividend based on around 60 % of those earnings. We stand by that goal. The mix of means of delivering it has evolved and will continue to evolve as external circumstances change and we upgrade and learn more about our portfolio. The shortfall in Upstream performance this year will require us to take tough steps to offset its impact, notably by closer attention to our costs. Our aim is to do what is necessary to protect the interest of our shareholders.

    然而,就我們的財務表現而言,情況絕對清楚。2000年7月,我們設定了一項三年目標:在2001年至2003年期間,將可持續的中周期每股盈餘平均以約兩位數的速度成長,並以約60%的該等盈餘作為股利發放基礎。我們仍然堅持這項目標。達成目標的手段組合已經演變,並將隨著外部情勢變化以及我們對投資組合的升級與學習而持續演變。今年上游業務表現的不足,將要求我們採取艱難措施以抵銷其影響,尤其是更密切地關注成本。我們的目標是採取必要行動,以保障股東的利益。

  • In concluding, let me summarize. One, the near-term for headroom, or margin for error above our existing production targets, has been progressively eroded. Two, reserves, both in our base and in our growth projects, are there as planned. The issue is how best to monetize them. Three, the long term value-driven bias in our pattern of Uupstream investment is lengthening our growth profile beyond 2005. Four, our short-term production profile, from now to 2005, now looks as if it might require more capital than we had previously thought to meet our existing production goal. Five, we are currently testing what is the right mix of organic growth and investment, divestment and portfolio high grading, capital and cost to maximize value for shareholders from our Upstream business. Six, as far as the groups existing financial goals are concerned, we have other levers to pull and other actions we can take, particularly on costs, that can compensate for any short-term shortfall in upstream performance delivery whilst these issues are being address.

    最後,讓我做個總結。第一,短期內的「餘裕」,亦即在既有產量目標之上的容錯空間,已逐步被侵蝕。第二,無論是我們的基礎儲量或成長專案中的儲量,都如計畫般存在。問題在於如何以最佳方式將其變現。第三,我們上游投資模式中長期、價值導向的偏重,正把我們的成長曲線延伸至2005年以後。第四,我們從現在到2005年的短期產量曲線,如今看來為了達成既有產量目標,可能需要比先前預期更多的資本。第五,我們目前正在測試:在有機成長與投資、撤資與投資組合汰弱留強、資本與成本之間,何種組合才是正確的,才能使上游業務為股東創造的價值最大化。第六,就集團既有的財務目標而言,我們仍有其他槓桿可用、也有其他行動可採取,特別是在成本方面;在這些問題被處理期間,這些措施可以補償上游績效交付的任何短期不足。

  • Now, thank you for your attention. I will of course be happy to answer any of your questions, but first, I would like to hand back to John Buchanan who will talk about the third quarter results in detail. John.

    現在,感謝各位的聆聽。我當然很樂意回答各位的任何問題,但首先,我想把時間交還給John Buchanan,他將詳細說明第三季的業績。John。

  • John Buchanan - CFO

    John Buchanan - CFO

  • Thank you John, and thank you for your kind remarks. As usual, I would like to begin by talking about the trading environment. This has remained broadly similar to the second quarter. I realized liquid prices in the third quarter of this year rose by around 7%, or about $1.60 a barrel. However, the benefit of high oil prices was partially offset by an 8%, or about $0.20 per million cubic feet reduction in global gas realizations caused by weaker spot prices and widening regional differentials in North America.

    謝謝你,John,也謝謝你的美言。照例,我想先談談交易環境。整體而言,這與第二季大致相同。今年第三季,我們實現的液體價格上升約7%,約每桶增加1.60美元。然而,高油價帶來的好處,部分被全球天然氣實現價格下滑8%(約每百萬立方英尺減少0.20美元)所抵銷;其原因是現貨價格走弱,以及北美地區價差擴大。

  • In our Downstream businesses, we saw a retreat from the improvements experienced in 2Q. Refining indicated margins were squeezed for much of the quarter by rising crude prices with actual realized margins suffering more than the decline in indicated margins would have suggested. There were also signs of weakening demand growth and intensified competition, but especially towards the end of the quarter.

    在我們的下游業務中,我們看到相較於第二季的改善有所回落。在本季大部分時間,煉油指標利差因原油價格上升而受到擠壓;而實際實現利差的受損程度,甚至超過指標利差下滑所暗示的幅度。此外,也出現需求成長轉弱與競爭加劇的跡象,尤其是在季末。

  • Chemicals margins have risen slightly from the second quarter that remain weak. Volumes and Chemicals also gave some indication of an economic slowdown towards the end of the quarter. Overall then, compared to the second quarter, weaker downstream and natural gas markets offset improved oil prices to leave us broadly at mid-cycle, on aggregate only slightly better than the second quarter.

    化學品利差較第二季略有上升,但仍然疲弱。銷量與化學品業務也在季末顯示出經濟放緩的一些跡象。因此,與第二季相比,較弱的下游與天然氣市場抵銷了油價改善,使我們整體大致處於中周期水準,僅略優於第二季。

  • The next chart shows our key bottom line measures, earnings and cash, for the third quarter and the first nine months of the year. For the third quarter our pro forma result of $2.3bln was down 13% from the same quarter of last year. The reported result of $0.8bln, including one-time items and purchase accounting impacts of Arco and Castrol, were down 61%.

    下一張圖表顯示我們第三季以及今年前九個月的關鍵底線指標:盈餘與現金。第三季,我們的備考(pro forma)結果為23億美元,較去年同期下降13%。已申報(reported)結果為8億美元,包含一次性項目以及Arco與Castrol的購買會計影響,較去年同期下降61%。

  • Cash flow from operations of $4.4bln remains robust, down 13% from the third quarter of last year. At $0.06 a share, our third quarter dividend is up 9% on the third quarter of last year, reflecting the trend of underlying performance improvement. Our dividend payout ratio was around 60%, in line with the target payout ratio from our mid-cycle earnings and reflecting that environmental conditions were close to mid-cycle.

    營運活動現金流為44億美元,仍然強勁,較去年第三季下降13%。以每股0.06美元計,我們第三季股利較去年第三季增加9%,反映基礎表現改善的趨勢。我們的股利支付率約為60%,符合以中周期盈餘為基礎的目標支付率,也反映當時環境條件接近中周期。

  • For the first nine months, both pro forma and reported results were down compared to the results achieved under the particularly favorable Downstream conditions experienced in 2001. Once more, cash flow from operations looks strong at $13.1bln, down 22% against the first nine months of last year. Our return of average capital employed calculated on a pro forma basis was 13% for the first nine months, compared to a 22% in the same period last year. This decline reflects the below mid-cycle conditions experienced earlier in the year compared with the well above mid-cycle conditions last year. This contrast is especially prominent in the Downstream businesses. However, the robust pro forma results and cash flow, despite the decline in Downstream, indicates that underlining performance improvements are coming through. Overall, these results demonstrate continuing robust financial performance in the face of challenging marketing conditions.

    就前九個月而言,無論備考或已申報結果,均較2001年在下游特別有利的環境下所達成的結果為低。同樣地,營運活動現金流仍顯強勁,為131億美元,較去年前九個月下降22%。以備考基礎計算的平均投入資本報酬率為13%,而去年同期為22%。此一下降反映今年稍早所經歷的低於中周期的環境,相較之下去年則遠高於中周期。這種對比在下游業務中特別明顯。然而,儘管下游下滑,備考結果與現金流仍然強勁,顯示基礎表現改善正在顯現。整體而言,這些結果顯示在充滿挑戰的行銷環境下,我們仍持續展現強健的財務表現。

  • I would now like to look at our performance in 3Q, stream by stream, and compare it to the second quarter, starting the upstream.

    接下來我想按業務流(stream by stream)檢視我們第三季的表現,並與第二季比較,先從上游開始。

  • This slide shows that we generated pro forma replacement cost operating results adjusted for special items of $3.05bln, with increase of $161mln on 2Q. The blue bars on the slide represent factors which had a positive impact on our results, while the orange represent negative variances. The environment, contributing around $100mln was the biggest contributor to the increase. Liquids realizations higher by $1.60 benefiting the operating result by some $240mln. This was somewhat offset by weaker gas realizations, especially in the US, where these realizations were $0.42 per million cubic feet lower than 2Q, contributing to a negative impact on our result of some $140mln.

    這張投影片顯示,我們產生了經特殊項目調整後、以重置成本(replacement cost)計的備考營運結果為30.5億美元,較第二季增加1.61億美元。投影片中的藍色長條代表對結果有正面影響的因素,橘色則代表負面差異。環境因素是增幅的最大貢獻者,貢獻約1億美元。液體實現價格上升1.60美元,使營運結果受益約2.4億美元。但這部分被較弱的天然氣實現價格所部分抵銷,尤其在美國,實現價格較第二季每百萬立方英尺低0.42美元,對我們結果造成約1.4億美元的負面影響。

  • As John has explained, operational difficulties and a number of our producing fields impacted us, and together with normal seasonal factors and a series of unusually severe storms in the Gulf of Mexico, resulted in volume being down around 100 million barrels all equivalent per day, versus the second quarter, impacting operating profit negatively by $85mln dollars. Exploration expense on the other hand was down some $100mln in 3Q, reflecting a return to normal expense levels compared with 2Q, which included the write-off of the Neptune prospect.

    如John所說,營運上的困難以及我們若干生產油氣田的狀況對我們造成影響;再加上正常的季節性因素,以及墨西哥灣一連串異常嚴重的風暴,導致產量較第二季下降約每日1億桶油當量,對營運利潤造成8,500萬美元的負面影響。另一方面,第三季的探勘費用下降約1億美元,反映費用水準回歸正常;相較之下,第二季包含Neptune探勘前景的沖銷。

  • I would now like to focus on the Downstream and Chemicals parts of our business. Our Downstream business continued to experienced a very difficult Refining and marketing margin environment. I have already mentioned that our site-specific Refining margins declined by more than commonly used industry indicator margins might have suggested. As this slide shows, the Downstream pro forma replacement cost operating result declined from $685mln in 2Q to $522mln. Refining margins remained under pressure in 3Q, particularly in the US and on the West Coast. An overhang of product stocks, continued pressure from higher crude prices and general weakness in the global economy were the primary reasons for the decline.

    接下來我想聚焦於我們業務中的下游與化學品部分。我們的下游業務持續面臨非常艱困的煉油與行銷利差環境。我先前已提到,我們各據點的煉油利差下滑幅度,超過業界常用指標利差所暗示的程度。如本投影片所示,下游以重置成本計的備考營運結果由第二季的6.85億美元下降至5.22億美元。第三季煉油利差仍承受壓力,尤其在美國與西岸地區。產品庫存高企、原油價格上升帶來的持續壓力,以及全球經濟普遍疲弱,是下滑的主要原因。

  • While marketing margins were essentially comparable to 2Q, they weakened at the end of the quarter, especially in the US. The fourth quarter has begun with a recovery in Refining margins, but a difficult environment for marketing continues as competitive pressures remain intense. One-off factors also had a significant impact on our Downstream result.

    雖然行銷利差基本上與第二季相當,但在季末走弱,尤其是在美國。第四季一開始煉油利差已出現回升,但由於競爭壓力仍然激烈,行銷業務仍面臨艱困環境。一次性因素也對我們的下游業績造成了顯著影響。

  • [break in audio]

    [音訊中斷]

  • ... program during the second half of the year. Lastly, and on a positive note, Chemicals. The stream delivered a pro forma operating result of $272mln up $26mln versus the second quarter, despite a tough environment. The environment impacted the stream positively overall, with strength in the early part of the quarter giving way to pressure later, due to high feedstock and energy costs in September limiting up-sided in margins. The most significant contribution to the chemical result, however, came from costs, largely due to the benefits of restructuring starting to flow through and lower scheduled maintenance activities.

    ……計畫在下半年進行。最後,且值得正面一提的是化工業務。該業務線在嚴峻環境下仍交出按備考口徑計算的營運結果2.72億美元,較第二季增加2,600萬美元。整體而言,外部環境對該業務線的影響偏正面:季度前段表現強勁,但後段轉為承壓,原因是9月高昂的原料與能源成本限制了利差上行空間。然而,化工業績最顯著的貢獻來自成本面,主要是重組效益開始逐步反映,以及計畫性維修活動減少。

  • I will now move on to discuss the year so far. This chart provides further perspective of the change in our after-tax pro forma results for the first nine months of the year. As you can see, deteriorating trading conditions have impacted performance significantly year-on-year. 60 % of the total $4.5bln decline coming from lower oil and gas prices, and the remainder from weaker margins in our Downstream business. Despite this, we have improved our underlying performance by around $800mln in the first nine months of the year, or around $600mln after tax. That takes us around three quarters of the way to delivering our goal of double-digit underlying earnings per share growth.

    我現在將轉而討論今年迄今的情況。此圖表進一步呈現我們今年前九個月稅後備考結果的變動。如各位所見,惡化的交易條件使得績效較去年同期受到顯著影響:總計45億美元下滑中,有60%來自油氣價格下跌,其餘則來自我們下游業務利差走弱。儘管如此,我們在今年前九個月將基礎表現提升約8億美元,或稅後約6億美元。這使我們距離達成「基礎每股盈餘雙位數成長」目標約完成了四分之三。

  • Now, I would like to look at our underlying improvements for the year and why we are confident that we can deliver underlying improvement growth required to underpin double-digit earning growth ... I’m sorry ... double-digit growth and earnings. We have had some adverse developments which have made it more difficult to achieve our total underlying performance goal. Notably, the impact of lower Upstream volumes and weaker demand growth in the Downstream. Despite these difficulties, we have increased our underlying mid-cycle pre-tax profits by the approximately $800mln already mentioned. These improvements have come from all streams, but especially from Chemicals and increasing from costs and synergies from labor in the downstream.

    現在,我想看看我們今年的基礎改善,以及為何我們有信心能交付支撐雙位數獲利成長所需的基礎改善成長……抱歉……雙位數成長與獲利。我們出現了一些不利發展,使得達成整體基礎績效目標更為困難。尤其是上游產量下降,以及下游需求成長轉弱的影響。儘管有這些困難,我們仍將基礎的中週期稅前利潤提高了前述約8億美元。這些改善來自所有業務線,但特別是化工,以及下游的人力成本與協同效益所帶來的成本改善。

  • Performance potential. This slide shows our latest view of the likely scale and sources of underlying performance improvement in 2002. As usual, the likely outcome for the year is showing a different pattern from our view when the year began. This was true in 2000 and 2001 as well. The $800mln on underlying performance improvement delivered by the end of 3Q gives us confidence in achieving the $1.2bln required to underpin our core goal of sustainable double- digit earnings growth on a mid cycle basis. Although the external environment is increasingly challenging, our higher goal of underlying performance improvement of around $1.4bln for the year remains our target, and we are taking new steps, particularly on costs, to offset the shortfall in Upstream volumes.

    績效潛力。本投影片顯示我們對2002年基礎績效改善可能規模與來源的最新看法。如同往常,年度最可能的結果呈現出與年初看法不同的樣貌。2000年與2001年亦是如此。截至第三季末已交付的8億美元基礎績效改善,使我們有信心達成支撐核心目標所需的12億美元——亦即在中週期基礎上實現可持續的雙位數獲利成長。儘管外部環境愈發具挑戰性,我們全年約14億美元的更高基礎績效改善目標仍維持不變,並正採取新的措施,特別是在成本方面,以抵消上游產量不足所造成的缺口。

  • Special and exceptional items. We measure year-on year-improvement based on sustainable performance by removing the distortions caused by non-recurring items, such as restructuring costs and gains or losses from selling assets. We disclose these non recurring items as exceptional items as require by UK GAAP or as special items. This chart shows our track record of these special and exceptional items on a pre-tax basis from the three years before and after the BP Amoco merger, as well as an indication of our full-year 2002 expectation.

    特殊與例外項目。我們以可持續績效為基礎衡量年對年改善,方法是剔除非經常性項目造成的扭曲,例如重組成本,以及出售資產的收益或損失。依英國一般公認會計原則(UK GAAP)之要求,我們將這些非經常性項目揭露為例外項目,或列為特殊項目。此圖表顯示BP Amoco合併前後各三年的特殊與例外項目(稅前口徑)紀錄,並提供我們對2002年全年預期的指示。

  • In July, we indicated that the sale of [Rogas] in 3Q would more than offset the total first half charges. This is indeed the case, as the [Rogas] sale is now complete, and the gain from that transaction was $1.6bln. As part of our normal practices, we have reviewed our portfolio and have tested our assets against our associated developed and potential economic reserves. As a result, we have taken special impairment charges against several poorly-performing assets, mainly in the Upstream, totaling $0.7bln for the third quarter. In addition, we have accelerated the acquisition amortization on some former Arco assets totaling $0.4bln.

    7月時,我們指出第三季出售[Rogas]將足以抵銷上半年全部費用。確實如此,因為[Rogas]出售現已完成,該交易收益為16億美元。依我們的例行作法,我們已檢視投資組合,並以相關的已開發及潛在經濟可採儲量對資產進行測試。因此,我們對數項表現不佳的資產(主要在上游)提列特殊減損費用,第三季合計7億美元。此外,我們也加速攤銷部分前Arco資產的收購溢價攤銷,合計4億美元。

  • Now to cash flow. We plan and run our business to balance cash sources and uses in accordance with our well-established and disciplined financial framework. This slide compares sources and uses of cash in the first nine months of 2001 and 2002. Cash flow remains strong despite the weaker external environment, as discussed earlier, with a reduction of around 22 % compared to 2001. Disposals have increased versus the same period last year, reflecting the sale of mostly [Vabors] Upstream assets following that acquisition, and the more recent sale of our interest in [Rogas]. On balance, sources of cash have slightly increased versus the same period last year. We have seen an increased level of investment versus the same period last year, due to an increased acquisition spend, primarily labor. Our organic CAPEX outlook for the year remains towards the top end of the $12bln to $13bln bank.

    接著談現金流。我們依循既有且嚴謹的財務框架來規劃與營運業務,以平衡現金來源與用途。本投影片比較2001年與2002年前九個月的現金來源與用途。如先前所述,儘管外部環境轉弱,現金流仍維持強勁,較2001年約減少22%。與去年同期相比,資產處分增加,反映在收購後出售多數[Vabors]上游資產,以及近期出售我們在[Rogas]的權益。整體而言,現金來源較去年同期略有增加。我們的投資水準較去年同期提高,原因是收購支出增加,主要為勞務相關。我們對全年有機資本支出(CAPEX)的展望仍接近120億至130億美元區間的上緣。

  • The next slide sums up our position on investment and capital expenditure. Organic CAPEX for the nine months of 2002 was around $9.3bln. The outlook for organic CAPEX is the upper end of the target range. Increased disposals in 3Q including the [Rogas] transaction have balanced inorganic investment for the year so far. [Weightings] of disposals means that net investment for the year is likely to be around $12bln, above the $8bln to $10bln range previously indicated, but with a balance of the disposal program made up in 2003.

    下一張投影片總結我們在投資與資本支出方面的立場。2002年前九個月的有機資本支出約為93億美元。有機資本支出的展望位於目標區間上緣。第三季增加的資產處分(包括[Rogas]交易)已使今年迄今的非有機投資獲得平衡。由於處分的[權重/比重],全年淨投資可能約為120億美元,高於先前所指引的80億至100億美元區間,但處分計畫的餘額將在2003年補足。

  • The financial framework. The increased investment levels in 2002 have been made within the boundaries of our financial framework, with our gearing level ending the third quarter at a touch under 29%, below the centre of our target bank. This has been achieved during a nine-month period when we have been on balance below mid-cycle, demonstrating the strength of our cash generation capacity. Our third quarter dividend of $0.06 per UK share, or $0.36 per US ADR, is up 9% on the third quarter of 2001. The growth rate for the first nine months of the year is also 9%. This dividend increase is based on our policy of paying out around 60% of our mid-cycle earnings and reflects continued underlying performance improvement. In addition, we brought back around $750mln worth of shares during a quarter.

    財務框架。2002年投資水準的提高仍在我們財務框架的界限內;第三季末的槓桿比率略低於29%,低於目標區間的中位數。這是在我們九個月期間整體處於中週期以下的情況下達成,顯示我們強勁的現金創造能力。我們第三季股利為每股英國股票0.06美元,或每股美國ADR 0.36美元,較2001年第三季增加9%。今年前九個月的成長率亦為9%。此次股利增加係基於我們約支付中週期盈餘60%的政策,並反映基礎績效持續改善。此外,我們在單一季度內回購了約7.5億美元的股份。

  • In closing, I would like to just remind you of the [call] target we laid before you in July 2000. Our goal is to live a growth in underlying earnings per share around a double-digit rate over 2001 to 2003, with a dividend growing in line. That is what we continue to do.

    最後,我只想提醒各位我們在 2000 年 7 月向各位提出的[電話會議]目標。我們的目標是在 2001 至 2003 年期間,使基本每股盈餘以約兩位數的速度成長,並使股利同步成長。這正是我們持續在做的事。

  • In closing, let me briefly offer a few personal remarks. This event, marks my twenty-fifth quarter of helping prepare and communicate BP results as CFO. In my six years as CFO, it has been both a pleasure and a privilege to work as part of the BP team under John Browne’s leadership and to engage in discussion and debate with so many of you in the investment community, in calls such as this and particularly in the one on one meetings. I offer you and the BP team my very best wishes for the future. I may well have contact with some of you in my future non-Executive roles. Thank you for your attention.

    最後,讓我簡短地說幾句個人的話。這次活動,標誌著我以財務長身分協助準備並對外溝通 BP 業績的第 25 個季度。在我擔任財務長的六年裡,能在 John Browne 的領導下作為 BP 團隊的一員工作,並在像這樣的電話會議、尤其是一對一會議中,與投資界的許多各位進行討論與辯論,既是樂事也是榮幸。我向各位以及 BP 團隊致上對未來最誠摯的祝福。在我未來擔任非執行職務的角色中,我很可能仍會與各位中的一些人有所接觸。感謝各位的聆聽。

  • We will now be happy to take any questions you may have.

    我們現在很樂意回答各位可能提出的任何問題。

  • Operator

    Operator

  • If you would like to ask a question you may do so by pressing *1. To cancel your question press *2.

    若您想提問,請按 *1。若要取消提問,請按 *2。

  • John Browne - Group Chief Executive

    John Browne - Group Chief Executive

  • Ladies and gentlemen, it’s the question and answer period. What I would like to do is ask John Buchanan to chair this so that I am better able to listen to your questions and answer any you have for me. So John over to you.

    各位女士先生,現在進入問答時間。我想請 John Buchanan 主持,讓我能更專心聆聽各位的問題,並回答各位對我提出的任何問題。那麼 John,交給你了。

  • John Buchanan - CFO

    John Buchanan - CFO

  • Thank you John. Richard Franklin, Richard.

    謝謝你,John。Richard Franklin,Richard。

  • Richard Franklin

    Richard Franklin

  • I want to ask two questions actually, the first is on your [Rcorp] improvement time for this year. Particularly the elements from Refining and marketing and Chemicals which amount to $1bln. To what extent is that target in anyway external environment related as regards volumes and therefore potentially at risk in Q4. So, to what extent can we access any risk of your missing that billion dollar delivery at the end of the year, that’s my first question. The second one is just to try and get some color on the [underling]declining rate assumptions you are taking for 2002 and beyond and whether or not you’ve made any changes compared to what perhaps you had this time last year?

    我其實想問兩個問題,第一個是關於你們今年的 [Rcorp] 改善時程。特別是來自煉油與行銷以及化學品的部分,合計為 10 億美元。就銷量而言,該目標在多大程度上與外部環境相關,因此在第四季可能面臨風險。所以,就年底交付這 10 億美元而言,我們在多大程度上可以評估你們未達成的風險?這是我的第一個問題。第二個問題是想更了解你們對 2002 年及之後所採用的 [underling]遞減率假設,以及相較於大約去年此時,你們是否做了任何調整?

  • John Buchanan - CFO

    John Buchanan - CFO

  • Let me take the first and I’ll invite John to comment on the second. In terms of underlying performance improvement for the balance of the year, we looked at this very carefully. Looking at the performance record of the downstream businesses so far, in particularly Chemicals success with their restructuring, we have a good confidence level of achievement across the rest of the year. John

    我先回答第一個,第二個我會請 John 補充說明。就今年剩餘期間的基本績效改善而言,我們已非常仔細地檢視。從下游業務迄今的表現紀錄來看,尤其是化學品事業重整成功,我們對於今年其餘時間能夠達成目標有相當高的信心。John。

  • John Browne - Group Chief Executive

    John Browne - Group Chief Executive

  • Richard, underlying decline rate. First it’s not an assumption of course it’s a part of a detailed build up from the bottom of the company. The decline rate of our historic assets which we call the base is really a function of two things -- three things I would say -- first the quality of the resorvious and their has been no change to that. Secondly, the level of investment we put into the reserves that are behind pipe right now. Thirdly and very importantly as part of the base, it is the amount we put in to [ ] very close end exploration buying the lease next door and doing all that sort of stuff.

    Richard,關於基本遞減率。首先,這當然不是一個假設,而是從公司基層逐項建立的詳細推導結果。我們歷史資產(我們稱之為基礎盤/base)的遞減率,基本上是兩件事——我會說三件事——的函數:第一是儲層的品質,而這方面沒有任何改變。第二,是我們對目前管線後方(behind pipe)的儲量所投入的投資水準。第三,而且非常重要的是,作為基礎盤的一部分,是我們投入到[ ]非常近端的勘探、購買隔壁的租約,以及做各種這類事情的金額。

  • Now as I said in my remarks in order to keep the base flat, we would need to put in about $1bln more per year than we’re doing at the moment otherwise the decline rate of the base is between 50-70 thousand barrels a day. A [rights] level of decline, the [right] level of decline is something that we are looking at the moment and it is dependent upon the length of investment we wish to make in the growth portfolio -- how much we spend in that -- for production which is clearly going to occur way beyond 2005. The second, is what assets do we actually work on that is to say, are we going to the divest some and we’re still looking at that. Thirdly then is what is the right [suite] spot to get in the historic legacy assets. I want to make one point clear because all that sounds as if it really is work in progress and a lot of studies and indeed there are a lot of studies and because this has to be done bottom up, it can’t be done by [ ] top down, it takes time. We’re going to leave a very clear message for you today and it’s this, I want to repeat again what I’ve said because I’m sure this will be a question from many of you. We clearly retain the option to increase reported production to 4.2 million barrels per day by late 2005 early 2006 with a clear shape to the production profile. It’s an equivalent to an above 5% annual average growth rate 2000-2005 or slightly to 2006. So, we grew by 5.5% in 2001, we grow by 3% this year, we’ll grow between 3-4% next year, between 4-5% next year, over 7% for the following years. But this, in order to achieve that, it is our estimation that we will have to put $1bln in more than we are doing at the moment per year. This would nonetheless grow cash margins and barrels through the period but the profit margins will be flat in the short-term, growing only at the end of the period. Now, if we choose to do it we could do that but at the moment what we are saying is so, that’s the back stop but actually is it the right way to develop the optimal value from these assets and that’s something we’re looking at. Because, if I can just add two other points to this to make the length of the answer quite long. One, it seems to us that while our production target is important it cannot be exclusive. To single-mindedly drive a production unit on the basis of production target would be to actually do things which potentially are strategically inaccurate and inappropriate to deny value. It’s all very well having a production target when you’ve got plenty of headroom because then there is plenty of degrees of freedom. As I pointed out to you the head room is gone because of this progressive decision to drive for value so, we want to look at that.

    正如我在發言中所說,為了讓基礎盤維持持平,我們每年需要比目前多投入約 10 億美元,否則基礎盤的遞減率將介於每日 5 萬至 7 萬桶。一個[適當]的遞減水準、[正確]的遞減水準,是我們目前正在檢視的,並取決於我們希望在成長投資組合上投入的投資期限——也就是我們在那上面花多少——以支撐顯然會在 2005 年之後很久才發生的產量。第二,是我們實際要運作哪些資產,也就是說,我們是否要出售一些資產,我們仍在評估。第三,是在歷史遺留資產中,應該在哪個[最佳]點位切入。我想把一點說清楚,因為聽起來這些都像是在進行中的工作、很多研究,而確實也有很多研究;而且因為這必須自下而上完成,不能由[ ]自上而下完成,所以需要時間。我們今天要給各位一個非常清楚的訊息,就是:我想再次重申我說過的話,因為我確信這會是許多各位的問題。我們顯然仍保有選項,可在 2005 年底至 2006 年初將報告產量提高到每日 420 萬桶,且產量曲線輪廓清晰。這相當於 2000-2005 年(或略延至 2006 年)年均成長率超過 5%。因此,我們在 2001 年成長 5.5%,今年成長 3%,明年將成長 3-4%,再下一年成長 4-5%,其後幾年超過 7%。但要達成這點,我們估計每年必須比目前多投入 10 億美元。儘管如此,這將在期間內提升現金邊際與產量,但短期內利潤率將持平,僅在期末才會成長。如果我們選擇這麼做,我們可以做到;但目前我們的說法是:那是底線(back stop),但實際上,這是否是從這些資產中發展出最優價值的正確方式,這正是我們正在研究的。另外,如果我再補充兩點,讓回答稍微長一些。第一,我們認為,雖然產量目標很重要,但不能是唯一目標。若只以產量目標為基礎一意孤行地推動產量單位,實際上可能會做出在策略上不精確且不恰當、並且損害價值的事情。當你有充足的餘裕(headroom)時,設定產量目標當然沒問題,因為那時有很大的操作自由度。但如我向各位指出的,因為這種逐步以價值為導向的決策,餘裕已經消失,所以我們希望重新檢視。

  • Secondly, these production targets are based on what I call reasonability that is to say that they are basically what the assets we have can do may be with some little [ ] for acquisitions, little divestments. What they are not however, is things that should be dressed up or achieved by buying lots of barrels, that is out of the question. That’s a very different game and buying barrels is all about value for the barrels you’ve bought not to achieve a production target.

    第二,這些產量目標是基於我所稱的合理性,也就是說,它們基本上是我們現有資產所能做到的,或許再加上一點[ ]收購、一些小幅處分。然而,它們不是那種應該透過買進大量桶數來包裝或達成的目標,那是不可能的。那是完全不同的玩法;買桶數的重點在於你所買到桶數的價值,而不是為了達成產量目標。

  • I hope I’ve given a comprehensive answer and I’m quite prepared to do it again.

    我希望我已給出一個全面的回答,而且我也很願意再做一次。

  • Richard Franklin

    Richard Franklin

  • That is very comprehensive, thank you very much indeed.

    這非常全面,真的非常感謝。

  • J J Trainer

    J J Trainer

  • A couple of questions, looking back to the time when you set these volume targets back in 2000. You talked a bit about head room but are there any other lessons that perhaps you have learnt from the experiences that you’ve had this year with respect to those 2000 targets. Secondly, I think the second target was set in July 2000 was double-digit earnings growth out of the end of 2003. What assumptions were made in that, again is there enough head room in that target so that you will still be able to hit it in 2003 with the volume short falls that you’re now indicating for next year.

    有幾個問題,回到你在2000年設定這些產量目標的時候。你談到了一些緩衝空間(headroom),但就2000年那些目標而言,除了緩衝空間之外,是否還有其他你可能從今年的經驗中學到的教訓。第二,我想第二個目標是在2000年7月設定的,也就是到2003年底達成兩位數的盈餘成長。當時做了哪些假設?同樣地,那個目標是否有足夠的緩衝空間,使你在2003年仍能達成,儘管你現在指出明年將出現產量短缺。

  • John Browne - Group Chief Executive

    John Browne - Group Chief Executive

  • JJ let me answer the question. It’s always great to look back and ask yourself what lessons we’ve learnt from target setting. I would make this point, that we’ve made these targets and that is as it were if I could say we’ve made our bed and we have to sleep in it. That cannot just be expunged by saying wouldn’t it be nice if we did something different. I don’t believe this is what the style of this company is nor should it ever be. I think two things, one is it’s wrong to let one target be more important than any other target. The production targets become a tortum. It becomes something which I think people are focused on but of course like all targets there are conditions attached to it. We’ve never drive the company just to get the production and that’s resulted in the loss of headroom. We’re there to generate value, to do sensible things to check that we are value accretive, what we do, that it adds NPV and that it’s the right thing for the long-term as well as the short-term. I suppose the big lesson learnt here is to make sure that no one target gets out of proportion with the suite of targets which says actually you have to balance all these things, you have to balance and that is very important and if I may compliment you and may be one or two others, that’s exactly the point that you make in your notes. That it is more than one thing that you have to focus on. So, that’s the big lesson learnt.

    JJ,讓我來回答這個問題。回頭檢視並問自己從目標設定中學到了什麼教訓,總是很有意義。我想強調一點:我們已經訂下這些目標,可以說如果我這樣講,我們已經鋪好床了,就得躺上去。不能只是抹去它,然後說如果我們做得不一樣不是更好嗎。我不認為這是本公司的風格,也不應該是。我認為有兩點:第一,錯誤在於讓某一個目標比其他任何目標都更重要。生產目標會變成一種束縛。它會變成我認為大家聚焦的東西,但當然,像所有目標一樣,它是附帶條件的。我們從來不是為了達到產量而去驅動公司運作,結果導致緩衝空間的流失。我們的目的是創造價值,做合理的事,確認我們所做的是增值的、能增加NPV(淨現值),並且對長期與短期都是正確的選擇。我想這裡學到的最大教訓,是要確保沒有任何一個目標在一整套目標中被放大到失衡;這套目標其實是在說你必須平衡所有這些事情,你必須取得平衡,而這非常重要。若我可以稱讚你以及可能一兩位其他人,你們在筆記中提出的正是這一點。也就是你必須聚焦的不止一件事。所以,這就是最大的教訓。

  • Second point for double-digit earning growth on average and I do stress that when we set this target it was the average of 01, 02, 03 not each year in particular. Of course we would have to take some action to make sure that if the short-fall in production continue in 2003 that we are secure in delivery of this on average double-digit earning growth. We are pretty clear that we can do that and we are very clear that we have a series of actions that we can take to do this. Some will be tough actions but this is what we intend to do, the actions we take let me say will not be at the expense of the long-term either. Neither in the quality of operation of our assets, their safety, their operational integrity nor robbing the future to pay for today, we wouldn’t do that.

    第二點,關於平均兩位數的盈餘成長,我要強調的是,當我們設定這個目標時,指的是01、02、03三年的平均,而不是特別要求每一年都達成。當然,如果2003年的產量短缺仍然持續,我們就必須採取一些行動,以確保平均兩位數盈餘成長的交付是穩妥的。我們相當清楚我們可以做到,而且我們也很清楚我們有一系列可採取的行動來達成。其中一些會是艱難的行動,但這就是我們打算做的;我想說,我們採取的行動不會以犧牲長期為代價。不會犧牲我們資產運作的品質、安全、營運完整性,也不會透支未來來支付今天,我們不會那樣做。

  • J J Trainer

    J J Trainer

  • That’s an interesting answer, can I just add on to it. I think one of the reasons why volumes have taken on such an enormous significance for every body in the market is that frankly it’s a very easy way for us to track your performance and if we’re now in a mode of emphasizing other things over and above volumes then it does bring us back to this question of how do we externally track the financial performance of the company. I wonder if you’ve got any plans to perhaps put forward other trackers for us and think about what those might be.

    這是個有意思的回答,我可以再補充一下嗎。我想市場上之所以讓產量對每個人都具有如此巨大的重要性,其中一個原因坦白說是:這對我們而言是一個非常容易追蹤你們表現的方法;如果我們現在進入一種模式,強調除產量之外的其他事項,那就會把我們帶回到這個問題:我們如何在外部追蹤公司的財務表現。我想知道你們是否有任何計畫,可能提出其他可供我們追蹤的指標,並思考那些可能是什麼。

  • Participant

    Participant

  • Can I just first say, [fully understand us] and I also believe that there are many proposals in the market some of which are very sensible about what we should put out as indicators, guidance if you will about how to attract [ ]. At the moment we don’t find any individual one of these satisfactory. My sense is and this is simply in the way of trying to entertain a debate and I believe we should have this debate. Is I think we have to separate out operational things from financial things very clearly. There are some operational indicators after all the bulk of the operation of the company deal with things like cost above their operation. They deal with cost to the site or field. They deal with maximizing margin in the market facing businesses and maximizing volume subject to value in the production businesses. We need I think to look at that and say what can we do which is very clear to people that doesn’t require them to go into very complicated analyses in order to get the answer. We do complicated analyses because we like to try and genuinely find out what’s happening to the underlying performance of the company and we believe we do that on a pretty consistent basis internally.

    我先說一句,[完全理解我們],而且我也相信市場上有許多提案,其中一些對於我們應該提供哪些指標、或你可以稱之為指引,以便吸引[ ],是很合理的。目前我們覺得其中沒有任何單一方案是令人滿意的。我的感覺是——這只是為了促成討論——而且我相信我們應該進行這個討論。我認為我們必須非常清楚地把營運面的事情與財務面的事情區分開來。畢竟有一些營運指標,公司大部分的營運都在處理像是成本高於其營運的事情。也包括場址或油田的成本。也包括在面向市場的業務中最大化利潤率,以及在生產業務中在價值約束下最大化產量。我認為我們需要檢視這些,並問:我們能做什麼,讓大家非常清楚,而且不需要進行非常複雜的分析就能得到答案。我們做複雜分析,是因為我們希望真正了解公司底層績效發生了什麼變化,而且我們相信在內部我們相當一致地這麼做。

  • As for volume, it is of course again something which you and others have pointed out is not every barrel is equal and so even volume is not necessarily a good indicator. Barrels do depend on their cost, their tax and their location and I think it’s only a good comparative indicator if everyone had just about the same portfolio but they clearly don’t. So, I would say that this is work in progress. I fully appreciate as I believe my whole team does that one has to be transparent but not comprehensive, clear about the limits to accuracy of indicators and be clear that indicators don’t inadvertently drive strategy in the wrong direction but give indications of how the strategy is actually developing.

    至於產量,當然你和其他人也指出,並不是每一桶都相同,因此即使是產量也未必是好的指標。每桶油取決於其成本、稅負以及所在地,我認為只有在每個人都擁有幾乎相同的資產組合時,它才是好的可比指標,但顯然並非如此。所以我會說,這是一項進行中的工作。我完全理解——我相信我的整個團隊也理解——我們必須透明但不必面面俱到;要清楚說明指標精確度的限制,並且要清楚,指標不應在無意間把策略推向錯誤方向,而應提供策略實際如何發展的訊號。

  • John Buchanan - CFO

    John Buchanan - CFO

  • Thanks John, let’s move across to the US, Paul [T ]

    謝謝你,John,我們把焦點轉到美國,Paul [T ]。

  • Paul

    Paul

  • First of all John Buchanan I just want to wish you warmest wishes in your future endeavors. Two questions please, first of all on the [ ] I’m looking at a particular slide, slide 5 which talks about the difference between [ ] tool production guidance and the current production guidance including factors such as project delays, storm related incidents and OPEC cuts. I’m wondering for your future production guidance, are you going to be more inclusive of those kind of contingencies as difficult as it may be and could production projection be inherently optimistic. That’s the first question, second one is more of a number oriented. Performance improvement, if you’re still going to have a target of 1.4 that will imply a fairly significant performance improvement in the fourth quarter. Can you explain to us whether there is going to be some new activities, new programs that you’re planning to put in place?

    首先,John Buchanan,我只想祝福你未來一切順利。兩個問題:第一個是關於[ ],我在看一張特定的投影片,第5頁,談到[ ]工具產量指引與目前產量指引之間的差異,並包含例如專案延遲、風暴相關事件以及OPEC減產等因素。我想問的是,對於你們未來的產量指引,你們是否會更全面地納入這類應變因素,儘管這可能很困難?而且產量預測是否可能本質上偏樂觀。這是第一個問題;第二個比較偏數字。績效改善方面,如果你們仍然維持1.4的目標,這將意味著第四季需要相當顯著的績效改善。你能否向我們說明,是否會有一些新的活動、新的計畫,準備推行?

  • John Buchanan - CFO

    John Buchanan - CFO

  • Thank you Paul, I’ll answer both of them. On a volume issue I want to go back to my discussion of headroom. When we set the targets in 2000 we had an awful lot of head room above, even the upper envelope of the target we set, the 7% growth rate. I think that you should expect and we should set targets for a company like this so that we know very well that not everything works right every year, it just doesn’t. It’s close to impossible to get everything right every year. We should not be construed at this time of making excuses about why we haven’t produced the volumes, these are not excuses, the simple thing is we haven’t. There are reasons so to illustrate to you what actually went on we should be having enough headroom to make sure that a company of our scale takes care of performance management issues without breeching the target.

    謝謝你,Paul,我會兩個都回答。在產量問題上,我想回到我對緩衝空間(headroom)的討論。當我們在2000年設定目標時,即使在我們所設定目標的上緣(upper envelope)之上,也就是7%的成長率之上,我們仍有非常大的緩衝空間。我認為你應該期待——而且我們也應該為像這樣的公司設定目標——因為我們非常清楚,不是每一年所有事情都會順利,事實就是不會。要每一年把所有事情都做對,幾乎是不可能的。此刻我們不應被解讀為在為何未能產出這些產量找藉口;這些不是藉口,簡單的事實是我們沒有做到。確實有原因;因此為了向你說明實際發生了什麼,我們應該要有足夠的緩衝空間,以確保像我們這種規模的公司能處理績效管理問題,而不致突破目標。

  • I think actually if I may say so, it’s a small amount. The storms in the Gulf of Mexico have genuinely at least for our assets been very significantly more severe than the last 10 years. We’ve used the meterological data of the last 10 years to set our allowance for this sort of storm. That would be slightly unusual but again it’s a small number and in the whole we should be taking care of it. So, we will be looking at that as I indicated as one of the five things we’re looking at in terms of saying what should we do next. As to the 1.4bln dollar performance improvement we’ve given a range of 1.2-1.4. I think what actions we’re taking will not have a great impact in 2002, it simply takes time to see the consequence of what we are going to do and I would expect them to come through in 2003. There are some things that will improve performance notably this if I could just tell everyone, of the total compensation of the top, actually quite a large number of executives in BP [getting to] 1000 of them, is performance related. Total comp is performance related, we clearly haven’t performed so therefore compensation is down and therefore this will add to shareholder retained earnings, it will not be distributed to executives.

    我想其實如果我可以這麼說,這是一個小數目。墨西哥灣的風暴,至少就我們的資產而言,確實比過去10年嚴重得多。我們使用過去10年的氣象資料來設定我們對這類風暴的準備金。這可能稍微不尋常,但同樣地這是個小數字,整體而言我們應該能妥善處理。因此,正如我所指出的,我們會把這件事作為我們正在檢視的五件事情之一,來思考接下來應該怎麼做。至於我們提出的14億美元績效改善,我們給的區間是12億到14億。我認為我們正在採取的行動在2002年不會有很大的影響,因為要看到我們將要做的事情所帶來的結果需要時間,我預期會在2003年反映出來。有些事情會改善績效,尤其是如果我可以告訴大家,在BP高階管理層的總薪酬中,實際上相當多的主管——多達1000人——是與績效掛鉤的。總薪酬與績效相關;我們顯然沒有達到績效,因此薪酬下降,因而這將增加股東留存盈餘,而不會分配給主管。

  • Paul

    Paul

  • Thanks for the insight I appreciate that

    謝謝你的見解,我很感激。

  • John Browne Thank you Paul and thank you for your remarks. Lesley LaFaye from the buy side

    John Browne:謝謝你,Paul,也謝謝你的評論。來自買方的Lesley LaFaye。

  • Lesley LaFaye

    Lesley LaFaye

  • John I would like to clarify, there is a comment that you made suggesting that the short-term production profile to 2005 now looks to need about $1bln more capital than you had originally anticipated. Are we to understand then that if the production growth targets to ’05 come down to day 3-3.5% there will be no commensurate change in the E&P [CAP] expense?

    John,我想澄清一下,你有一段話暗示到2005年的短期產量曲線,現在看起來需要比你原先預期多約10億美元的資本。那麼我們是否可以理解為:如果到2005年的產量成長目標下修到每天3%到3.5%,勘探與生產(E&P)的資本支出不會相應調整?

  • John Browne - Group Chief Executive

    John Browne - Group Chief Executive

  • Lesley it’s too early to tell, if I can say. You’re asking a question now which requires a lot of work to get to the optimization point. I repeat it again that we do have the option to maintain the 7.5% growth profile that I’ve just read out but we have to look I think at the mix of capital, retained assets, disposed assets and the focus on [pacing] in order to come up with the capital allocation in the company. Broadly I would say this without giving any answer at all that is this -- in the oil and gas business in BP in particular, we come back to this question of balancing investment and cash generation at $16 per barrel and other [suites] of assumptions. This is very important because no one can tell where the price of oil will go and therefore it is very unwise to extent yourself too far.

    Lesley,現在還太早,容我這麼說。你現在問的問題需要做大量工作才能達到最佳化點。我再重申一次,我們確實有選項維持我剛剛讀出的7.5%成長曲線,但我認為我們必須檢視資本組合、保留資產、處分資產,以及對[節奏]的聚焦,才能在公司內提出資本配置方案。大體上我可以這麼說(但不給出任何明確答案):在BP的油氣業務中,我們回到一個問題——在每桶16美元以及其他一系列假設下,如何平衡投資與現金創造。這非常重要,因為沒有人能說油價會走向何方,因此把自己拉得太緊是非常不明智的。

  • Mark

    Mark

  • A couple of questions of I could please. Are there any oil and gas implications of the impairments which are indicated in this period?

    如果可以的話我有幾個問題。本期所提到的減損,對油氣業務有任何影響嗎?

  • John Buchanan - CFO

    John Buchanan - CFO

  • I’ll ask Andy Ingles to answer that question.

    我請Andy Ingles來回答這個問題。

  • Andy Ingles - Group VP and Upstream

    Andy Ingles - Group VP and Upstream

  • Yes, in [ ] it’s around 180 million barrels.

    是的,在[ ]方面大約是1.8億桶。

  • Mark

    Mark

  • Reduction I assume? Can I assume that’s a reduction or downward revision in reserves?

    我想是減少?我可以假設那是儲量的減少或下修嗎?

  • Andy Ingles - Group VP and Upstream

    Andy Ingles - Group VP and Upstream

  • It is 180 million barrels and this is a downward revision of reserves.

    是1.8億桶,這是儲量的下修。

  • Mark

    Mark

  • So the comments you made previously regarding the fact that production outlook is influenced by reserve levels, reservoir quality and things of that sort, this 180 million barrel reduction certainly adds a bearing on it does it not.

    那麼你先前提到產量展望會受到儲量水準、油藏品質等因素影響,這次減少1.8億桶當然也會對此產生影響,對吧?

  • John Browne - Group Chief Executive

    John Browne - Group Chief Executive

  • Not really Mark because actually if you look at the detail of these things, first Algeria REB basically wasn’t producting, secondly Venezuela, the [Borrocan] wasn’t producing and thirdly [Badamie] was only producing a tiny amount so this is actually not changing the reserves I would say that are accessible to production. Put another, if you look at the data this is 1% of the reserves. I don’t think that this a material change to the accessible reserves in the legacy assets.

    不太是,Mark,因為如果你看這些事項的細節:第一,阿爾及利亞REB基本上並未生產;第二,委內瑞拉的[Borrocan]沒有生產;第三,[Badamie]也只生產了極少量,所以我會說這其實並未改變可供生產動用的儲量。換句話說,如果你看數據,這只占儲量的1%。我不認為這對既有資產中可動用的儲量構成重大變化。

  • Mark

    Mark

  • With respect to the BP [ ] portion of that, I know the release listed a number of [Arco] assets are there any BP assets that were subjected to this impairment?

    就其中BP[ ]的部分而言,我知道新聞稿列出了一些[Arco]資產;是否有任何BP資產也受到這次減損影響?

  • John Browne - Group Chief Executive

    John Browne - Group Chief Executive

  • There are.

    有。

  • Mark

    Mark

  • Can you identify the significant ones?

    你能指出其中較重要的項目嗎?

  • John Buchanan - CFO

    John Buchanan - CFO

  • Thank you Mark let’s move on. Rod McClean, CSFB. Let’s try again, back in the UK.

    謝謝你,Mark,我們繼續下一位。CSFB的Rod McClean。我們再試一次,回到英國。

  • [Break in audio]

    [音訊中斷]

  • Rod McClean - Analyst

    Rod McClean - Analyst

  • to the underlying double-digit earnings growth in 2003, I know you aren’t really willing to talk about E&P, can you say where you see potential and the opportunity either downstream or in chemical to deliver either volume or incremental cost performance next year for most [ ]. A second, this is specific to the baseline E&P production, can you where specifically you see problems justifying incremental and best [ ] baseline. Is it across the board or are there specific areas like Alaska in the North Sea that can justify that incremental investment there?

    關於2003年基礎的兩位數盈餘成長,我知道你們不太願意談E&P;你能否說明你們在哪些地方看到潛力與機會——無論是在下游或化學品——能在明年帶來銷量或額外的成本績效改善,對大多數[ ]而言?第二個問題,這是針對E&P基礎產量:你能否具體說明你們在哪些地方看到問題,使得難以合理化額外投資以及最佳[ ]基準?是全面性的問題,還是有特定區域(例如阿拉斯加或北海)可以合理化在那裡增加投資?

  • John Browne - Group Chief Executive

    John Browne - Group Chief Executive

  • Let’s mix this one around a bit, underpinning performance as we go forward. Let’s start with Ken’s, Byron.

    我們把這題稍微調整一下,談談我們往前走的績效支撐。先從Ken的部分開始,Byron。

  • Byron Grote - CFO Designate

    Byron Grote - CFO Designate

  • Thank you for the question. In Chemicals we’ve made a big step jump improvement this year. It was as a result of the basics of taking the operational capacity and using it more effectively, that’s about volume and with a focus towards driving out cost on all of the fronts at the operations level and as John Browne was referring to it in his remarks at the level above the plant and we’ve made a big headway in that across this year but there is just much more work to be done and on top of this we are looking to reduce the overall focus of our chemical streams activities. We will see on the back of that as fitting out of some parts of our portfolio small bits here and there but focusing the attention to a few which will open up yet greater opportunities to reduce cost and improve efficiency.

    謝謝你的提問。在化學品業務方面,我們今年有一個很大的躍升式改善。這是因為我們回到基本面:把既有的營運產能拿來更有效地使用——這關乎量;同時在營運層面各個面向聚焦於降低成本,而正如John Browne在他的談話中提到的,也包括在工廠之上的管理層級。我們今年在這方面取得很大進展,但仍有更多工作要做;此外,我們也在尋求降低我們化學品產品線活動的整體聚焦範圍。在此基礎上,我們會對投資組合中的某些部分做一些剝離,零星地處理一些小項目,但把注意力集中在少數幾個領域,這將帶來更大的機會以降低成本並提升效率。

  • John Buchanan - CFO

    John Buchanan - CFO

  • On the downstream business again similar to Chemicals, looking at all elements of portfolio volume and cost with flat CAPEX the attention will go on productivity and performance drive. A bit like Kens again, this one looks at the performance of retail this year, the question is asked, how do you lower the breakeven point of such a tough business. So this will be our main focus as we go forward. In addition of course in the down stream we’ve got all the benefits to come from further synergies through the integration of [Vaber]. Andy what about the upstream.

    在下游業務方面,同樣類似於化學品:在資本支出持平的情況下,檢視投資組合的所有要素——量與成本——重點將放在生產力與績效提升。有點像Ken剛才說的:今年零售業績的表現引出一個問題——在如此艱難的業務中,如何降低損益兩平點?因此,這將是我們未來的主要聚焦。此外,當然在下游方面,我們還將透過整合[Vaber]而獲得更多協同效益。Andy,上游呢?

  • Andy Ingles - Group VP and Upstream

    Andy Ingles - Group VP and Upstream

  • The upstream as John has said, we are looking very hard at the whole deployment of capital into the base. I think there are opportunities in Alaska, the North Sea and North America gas. I think it’s important that we drive that investment such that brings the best economic return and that’s the basis of the exercise that we’re doing so we have opportunities, the important thing to do is ensure that we optimize injection of the capital.

    上游方面,如John所說,我們正非常仔細地檢視把資本投入基礎業務的整體配置。我認為在阿拉斯加、北海以及北美天然氣方面都有機會。重要的是,我們要推動投資以帶來最佳的經濟回報,這就是我們正在進行的這項工作的基礎;因此我們有機會,而關鍵是確保我們把資本注入最佳化。

  • John Browne - Group Chief Executive

    John Browne - Group Chief Executive

  • Mark I would like to add a couple of things. Obviously with the increased taxation in the North Sea and we are still awaiting whether or not in reality royalty will be removed. We haven’t heard anything about that yet. We have to look very, very carefully at the cost function in the North Sea and indeed what is the right distribution of assets there. In addition right across the legacy base we have to make I think some very clear distinctions about just producing what’s behind [pipe] and making sure that we don’t let opportunities go from detailed [close-in]exploration and potential leasing of next door blocks and things like that. This has now where we’re looking at to make sure that we neither over invest nor actually under invest.

    Mark,我想再補充幾點。顯然,隨著北海稅負提高,而我們仍在等待是否在實務上會取消權利金(royalty)。我們目前還沒有聽到任何相關消息。我們必須非常、非常仔細地檢視北海的成本結構,以及那裡資產的正確配置應該是什麼。此外,在整個既有資產基礎上,我認為我們必須做出一些非常清楚的區分:一方面是僅僅生產「管線後面」的產量,另一方面是確保我們不會錯失來自更細緻的近場勘探(close-in exploration)以及可能承租隔壁區塊等機會。我們現在正在檢視,以確保我們既不會過度投資,也不會投資不足。

  • John Buchanan - CFO

    John Buchanan - CFO

  • To finish of on this, outside the direct business control we are putting under the microscope all the other overheads. Have we got it right, have we got clarity of accountability, have we got overlap as a result of these mergers and acquisitions, by region, by function etc. By regional offices, all of those things will be on the agenda for 2003.

    最後補充一點,在直接業務控制之外,我們正把所有其他間接費用都放到顯微鏡下檢視。我們是否做對了?責任歸屬是否清楚?因併購而在區域、職能等方面是否出現重疊?各區域辦公室等所有這些事項,都將列入 2003 年的議程。

  • Right let’s turn to Jeremy Eldom.

    好,接下來我們轉到 Jeremy Eldom。

  • Jeremy Eldom

    Jeremy Eldom

  • I just have two questions, firstly on your strategic decision to shift $1bln a year of CAPEX from the base to the longer-term projects. I’m sure that when you originally sketched out your capital plans, you had done an analysis of where best to spend the capital, can you give us an overview of what has changed to make it more attractive now to spend on the longer-term projects rather than the near term. Secondly on a point of understanding, you mentioned that you still had the capacity if you so choose to deliver 4.2 million barrels per day by the end of 05 or maybe into 06. I had thought that the 4.2 million was an average for 05, was I wrong in that?

    我只有兩個問題。第一個是關於你們的策略決策:每年把 10 億美元的資本支出(CAPEX)從基礎項目轉向較長期的專案。我相信你們在最初規劃資本計畫時,已經分析過資本應該投向何處最合適;你能否概述一下,現在有哪些變化,使得把資本投入長期專案比投入近期專案更具吸引力?第二個是理解上的問題:你提到如果你們選擇這麼做,仍有能力在 05 年底或可能延到 06 年達到每日 420 萬桶。我原本以為 420 萬桶是 05 年的平均值;我理解錯了嗎?

  • John Browne - Group Chief Executive

    John Browne - Group Chief Executive

  • Thank you let me answer the questions first. The 4.2 was an average rate which comes out of the 5.5 annual average growth rate. I think in the light of all we’ve seen Jeremy, that it’s possible that we can do it not I think on average over 05 but at the end of 05 we may have to go into 06 if we choose to do this. Our reason is very simple, it’s more on timing changes on projects, we have a significant number of projects coming on stream in 05 so they may flip from one part of the year to the other part of the year.

    謝謝,我先回答這些問題。420 萬桶是平均產量,這是由 5.5% 的年度平均成長率推導出來的。Jeremy,根據我們所看到的一切,我認為如果我們選擇這麼做,可能不是在 05 年的全年平均達到,而是在 05 年底達到;但我們可能必須延到 06 年。原因很簡單,主要是專案時程的變動:我們有相當多的專案會在 05 年投產,因此它們可能會從一年中的某個時點移到另一個時點。

  • Secondly, the decision to go longer in investment, I think was primarily driven by the performance of these new seals $16 per barrel. They all seem to have better economics and seem to drive the investment in the short to the long term. We have to consider that very carefully.

    第二,延長投資期限的決策,我認為主要是受到這些新(項目)在每桶 16 美元時的表現所驅動。它們看起來都有更好的經濟性,並且似乎推動投資從短期轉向中長期。我們必須非常審慎地考量這一點。

  • Jeremy Eldom

    Jeremy Eldom

  • I would expect they had the better economics but I wonder was there something that changed about your view of the economics as you seem them now compared with as your saw them two years ago.

    我原本就預期它們的經濟性會更好,但我想知道,你們對經濟性的看法是否有任何改變——也就是你們現在看到的,和兩年前看到的相比。

  • John Browne - Group Chief Executive

    John Browne - Group Chief Executive

  • I sense Jeremy it was a bounce back. If I could just remind you of 2001, in 2001 we said that we felt that we’d over invested in the base by some amount partly because we were drive by the very high oil and gas prices at the time and we took action, the upstream took action to counter balance that and perhaps it went just a bit to far.

    Jeremy,我的感覺是這是一種反彈(回調)。如果我提醒你回到 2001 年:在 2001 年我們說過,我們覺得在基礎項目上投資過度了一些,部分原因是當時油氣價格非常高,推動了我們的投資;我們採取了行動,上游部門也採取了行動來做平衡,但也許做得稍微過頭了一點。

  • Jeremy Eldom

    Jeremy Eldom

  • That’s great thank you very much.

    很好,謝謝你。

  • John Buchanan - CFO

    John Buchanan - CFO

  • Thank you Jeremy, let’s try Doug Carrison.

    謝謝你,Jeremy,我們來試試 Doug Carrison。

  • Doug Carrison

    Doug Carrison

  • Good afternoon. Best wishes to you John in your future endeavors to start of with. My question is to John Browne and performance objectives. John within the context of maximization of value which I suspect is of utmost importance to everyone. There seems to be great emphasis on portfolio management activities maybe forthcoming which has been a pretty important area of value for BP in the past. So, my question is while it may be too early to answer this questions, and this ties in with Richard’s question early, are there specific geographical regions or particular places that you feel stand out as areas in need of remedial action. Second, why you did exchange your cost production in E&P in 2001, could you highlight some of the areas that may cause unit cost to come in lower than the 6% target earlier in the year. Again John Buchanan pointed out this may not happen but can you provide some thoughts and guidance in that area as well?

    午安。首先祝福你,John,未來一切順利。我的問題是問 John Browne,關於績效目標。John,在價值最大化的脈絡下——我想這對每個人都是最重要的——你們似乎非常強調投資組合管理活動,可能接下來會有一些動作;而這在過去一直是 BP 創造價值相當重要的領域。所以我的問題是:雖然現在回答可能還太早,而且這也呼應 Richard 先前的問題,你是否覺得有特定地理區域或特定地點特別突出,屬於需要補救行動的地方?第二,你們在 2001 年確實降低了勘探與生產(E&P)的生產成本;你能否指出一些可能使單位成本低於年初 6% 目標的領域?同樣地,John Buchanan 指出這可能不會發生,但你能否也提供一些想法與指引?

  • John Browne - Group Chief Executive

    John Browne - Group Chief Executive

  • I’m very reluctant, of course, to speculate on where our portfolio activity will take. But I would say this: the bulk of the [break in audio] ...

    當然,我非常不願意臆測我們的投資組合活動會走向何處。但我會這麼說:大部分的 [音訊中斷] ...

  • John Buchanan - CFO

    John Buchanan - CFO

  • As for the costs this year, they’re not going to come in at 6% because these are lifting costs, and they’re units. And if the production’s down, then the unit lifting costs will not come down as fast as they were expected to. They’ll come down [a small bit].

    至於今年的成本,它們不會以 6% 的幅度下降,因為這些是舉升成本(lifting costs),而且是以單位計算的。如果產量下降,那麼單位舉升成本下降的速度就不會像原先預期的那麼快。它們會下降一些。

  • Doug Carrison

    Doug Carrison

  • Okay. Can you provide some geographical color, or can we assume, you know, the broad-based comment is [applicable] here as well?

    好的。你能否提供一些地理區域方面的說明?或者我們可以假設,你剛才那個廣泛性的評論在這裡也同樣適用?

  • John Browne - Group Chief Executive

    John Browne - Group Chief Executive

  • For which part of the question?

    你指的是問題的哪一部分?

  • Doug Carrison

    Doug Carrison

  • The cost structure.

    成本結構。

  • John Browne - Group Chief Executive

    John Browne - Group Chief Executive

  • Cost structure, I think, is right across the board. I mean, I think in a case like Alaska is pretty well track. Most of the North Sea is actually on track. North Sea has done pretty well in the bulk of it, pretty well on forecast. So, the rest is by deference.

    成本結構,我認為是全面性的。我的意思是,像阿拉斯加這樣的案例,基本上是按計畫進行。北海的大部分其實也在軌道上。北海在大多數部分做得相當好,基本符合預測。所以,其餘部分就相對而言。

  • Doug Carrison

    Doug Carrison

  • Okay. Thanks a lot, guys.

    好的。非常感謝,各位。

  • John Buchanan - CFO

    John Buchanan - CFO

  • Thanks, Doug, and thanks for your remarks. Let’s go to the web. There’s a question from Paul Spelling that is on outlook. Doesn’t shifting the investment program the base to growth increase the degree of oil price risk? Isn’t a near-term barrel in the hand worth two longer-term barrels in the bush??. John, it sounds like your sort of question.

    謝謝你,Doug,也謝謝你的發言。我們來看網路提問。Paul Spelling 有一個關於展望(outlook)的问题。把投資計畫從基礎轉向成長,是否會提高油價風險的程度?近期到手的一桶油,難道不比灌木叢裡兩桶長期的油更有價值嗎?John,聽起來這像是你的問題。

  • John Browne - Group Chief Executive

    John Browne - Group Chief Executive

  • Well, Paul, I think this is a question that has been discussed by many people for a very long time. Of course, it is the trade-off between net present value and current running return, and it very much depends on what basis are we looking at it. Are we looking at it at our so-called mid-cycle, which we use for financing our measurement? Or do we look at it at the spot? Spot, of course, changes. So, it seems to me that there’s always a balance here, as a reasonable business basis, a reasonable balance when you have to take all these things into account.

    Paul,我認為這個問題很多人討論了很長一段時間。當然,這是在淨現值與當期經常性回報之間的取捨,而這很大程度取決於我們用什麼基礎來看。我們是用所謂的中周期(mid-cycle)假設——我們用它來做融資與衡量——來看?還是用即期(spot)價格來看?即期價格當然會變動。所以在我看來,這裡永遠需要取得平衡;以合理的商業基礎而言,當你必須把所有這些因素都納入考量時,就需要一個合理的平衡。

  • John Buchanan - CFO

    John Buchanan - CFO

  • Right. Back to the UK. Neil Perry. Are you there, Neil?

    好的。回到英國。Neil Perry。Neil,你在線嗎?

  • Neil Perry

    Neil Perry

  • Thank you. I just want to go back to an earlier question, first of all, and say, if we?re putting volume growth on the back burner, as way of judging [explorated] oil companies, which I welcome, can you tell us what you look at when you?re screening all your products and you?re looking at the appropriate rate of growth? How are you screening it? How are you deciding what the appropriate rate of growth is? What indicator are you using? And on a similar subject, the returns on capital were 14.3% in the quarter. Your mid-cycle target is 15%. And given the higher-than-expected net investment and that slightly slower underlying earnings growth, slower volume growth into next year, what direction can we expect those returns to go in? Are you prepared to restate your 15% target?

    謝謝。我首先想回到先前的一個問題:如果我們把產量成長先放一邊,作為評估(勘探與生產)石油公司的方式——我對此表示歡迎——你能否告訴我們,在你篩選所有產品、並尋找適當的成長率時,你看的是什麼?你是如何進行篩選的?你如何決定什麼是適當的成長率?你使用的是什麼指標?另外在類似的議題上,本季資本報酬率為14.3%。你們的中週期目標是15%。考量到高於預期的淨投資,以及略慢的基礎盈餘成長、明年產量成長也較慢,我們可以預期這些報酬率會往哪個方向走?你們是否準備重新表述你們15%的目標?

  • John Browne - Group Chief Executive

    John Browne - Group Chief Executive

  • Well, Neil, first, we don’t actually know what the mix is next year, so I think it’d be wrong to assume that we’re going to have higher net investments and so forth. So, we need, I think, to give you guidance on that when we’ve done our planning. We normally do that anyway at the fourth quarter results. Secondly, I would say ... I’ve suddenly forgotten your first question, which I think is the number of criteria we look at screening. I think we look at the quality of projects, their sustainability, their returns based on standardized measures, their risks and the overall decline, and critically the level of capital intensity, because this says something about how fast we have to work to get the money back. So, we tend to look at it internally as something that is built up from the bottom, and then we try and optimize the pattern of investment to get the best value for money, if can put it like that: returns versus growth, capital in versus cash out. Those are the criteria we look at.

    嗯,Neil,首先,我們其實還不知道明年的組合會是什麼,所以我認為假設我們會有更高的淨投資等等是不對的。因此,我想我們需要在完成規劃後再給你指引。我們通常也會在第四季業績公布時這麼做。第二,我會說……我突然忘了你第一個問題是什麼了,我想是關於我們在篩選時看的多項準則。我想我們會看專案品質、其永續性、以標準化衡量方式計算的報酬、其風險與整體遞減情況,並且關鍵是資本密集度的水準,因為這反映出我們必須多快把錢收回來。所以,我們內部傾向於自下而上建立評估,然後嘗試最佳化投資配置的型態,以取得最佳的資金效益——如果可以這麼說:報酬相對於成長、資本投入相對於現金流出。這些就是我們看的準則。

  • Neil Perry

    Neil Perry

  • Okay. Could I ask you just to go back to that returns question and give us an indication of where you think returns will be heading, given the updates you’ve given us today?

    好的。我可以請你回到資本報酬率那個問題,並根據你今天提供的更新,給我們一個你認為報酬率將往哪個方向走的指引嗎?

  • John Browne - Group Chief Executive

    John Browne - Group Chief Executive

  • Well, we’ve said that our target, we’ve never actually said what the return is to be. It is to grow them, or at least keep them flat. And that’s what we’re going to be targeting.

    嗯,我們已經說過,我們的目標——我們其實從未明確說過報酬率要到多少。目標是讓它們成長,或至少維持持平。而這就是我們將要努力達成的。

  • Neil Perry

    Neil Perry

  • Thank you.

    謝謝。

  • John Buchanan - CFO

    John Buchanan - CFO

  • Thank you, Neil. Rod McLane, are you still there, Rod?

    謝謝你,Neil。Rod McLane,你還在線嗎,Rod?

  • Rod McLane

    Rod McLane

  • Yes, I am. Can you hear me? I have just two fairly basic questions. At the time of the second quarter results, there was a ... you showed a couple of slides which suggested improving returns in the Upstream over the sort of 2002-2006 period. And I suppose my question is, if you decide to retain your growth targets and invest toward the 4.2 million barrels a day target, which you’re suggesting is going to cost you $1bln more, can you still improve returns through that period, or are we looking now at a sort of situation where Upstream returns might be flat, at best, or possibly even declining if you decide to stick with the growth targets? Second question is somewhat different. This year’s been a rather strange year. If you look at your realizations for the nine months, they’re significantly, certainly for oil prices, ahead of your mid-cycle assumptions. And yet, you’ve had two quarters, the first two quarters, where your earnings were below mid-cycle. Third quarter, your earnings were in line with mid-cycle. Does that give you, sort of, cause for concern? Does it lead you to reconsider the sort of asset allocation across the various Upstream and Downstream and Chemicals businesses? Or you do you just put 2002 down as a rather unusual year?

    是的,我在。你聽得到我嗎?我只有兩個相當基本的問題。在第二季業績公布時,你展示了幾張投影片,顯示上游業務在2002到2006年期間的報酬率將改善。我想問的是,如果你決定維持成長目標,並朝每日420萬桶的目標投資——你表示這將多花10億美元——你仍能在那段期間改善報酬率嗎?還是我們現在看到的是,上游報酬率充其量持平,甚至如果你決定堅持成長目標,可能還會下滑?第二個問題有點不同。今年是相當奇特的一年。如果你看前九個月的實現價格,尤其是油價,明顯高於你們的中週期假設。然而,你們有兩個季度——前兩季——盈餘低於中週期。第三季盈餘與中週期一致。這是否讓你有些擔憂?是否會促使你重新考慮在上游、下游與化學品等各業務之間的資產配置?或者你只是把2002年視為相當不尋常的一年?

  • John Browne - Group Chief Executive

    John Browne - Group Chief Executive

  • Let me have [look] a the second question first. It’s certainly true that oil and gas prices have been above mid-cycle but, of course, as you think you infer from what you say, there’s more to it than that, which is that the Refining margin and the Chemicals margin. Recall that Refining margins were much higher last year. I think it’s very clear that they are quite volatile. And so, it says, but through the cycle, they look exactly where we put them at the moment, which is neither aggressive nor pessimistic. As to Chemicals, we have taken significant strategic action to make sure that the Chemicals portfolio is fit to be highly competitive, is reduced in costs, reduced in capital inputs. And, of course, at this present time, it’s producing very low returns. But, again, we would expect, at some stage, the cycle to turn. I think if we found the cycle never turning ... we are very low at the moment ... then we’d have to rethink. But, at the moment, the Chemicals industry is adding no capacity additions at all, and yet growth is actually taking place. So, I think this is something which, over a period, and I won’t call which year, may well get to mid-cycle and above. And mid-cycle isn’t actually very much higher than where we are at the moment. It’s about $20 a tonne ... $20 to $25 a tonne, which seems like a lot when you’re running a Chemicals business ... are looking [not too great] at the moment. That’s the second question.

    我先回答第二個問題。油氣價格確實高於中週期,但當然,正如你所暗示的,事情不只如此,還包括煉油利差與化學品利差。請記得去年煉油利差高得多。我認為很清楚它們相當波動。因此,從週期角度來看,它們看起來正好落在我們目前設定的位置,既不激進也不悲觀。至於化學品,我們已採取重大的策略行動,確保化學品組合具備高度競爭力,降低成本、降低資本投入。當然,就目前而言,它的報酬率非常低。但同樣地,我們預期在某個階段週期會反轉。我想如果我們發現週期永遠不反轉……我們目前確實非常低……那我們就必須重新思考。但就目前而言,化學品產業完全沒有新增產能,但需求成長其實正在發生。所以我認為,隨著時間推移——我不會說是哪一年——它很可能回到中週期甚至高於中週期。而中週期其實並沒有比我們目前高很多。大約是每噸20美元……每噸20到25美元,當你在經營化學品業務時,這看起來很多……但目前的情況看起來並不太好。這就是第二個問題。

  • I’m sorry. I’ve forgotten what the first part of your question was.

    抱歉。我忘了你問題的第一部分是什麼。

  • Rod McLane

    Rod McLane

  • Yeah, John, the first part was just back to the improving returns statement that you made at the time of the second quarter results from 2002 to 2006. I was just wondering, you know, can you still deliver that sort of performance if you decide, indeed, to retain ...

    是的,John,第一部分是回到你在第二季業績時所說的,2002到2006年報酬率將改善的說法。我只是想知道,你知道的,如果你確實決定維持……

  • John Browne - Group Chief Executive

    John Browne - Group Chief Executive

  • The answer is ?yes?. We can, but it would only grow towards the end of the period. It wouldn’t be a smooth progression.

    答案是「可以」。我們可以做到,但只會在那段期間的後期才逐步成長。不會是平滑的進展。

  • Rod McLane

    Rod McLane

  • Okay. Thank you.

    好的。謝謝。

  • John Buchanan - CFO

    John Buchanan - CFO

  • Thank you, Rod. Back to the US. Steve Pheipher. Are you there, Steve?

    謝謝你,Rod。回到美國。Steve Pheipher。Steve,你在線嗎?

  • Steve Pheipher

    Steve Pheipher

  • Yes. Good afternoon, gentlemen. Two questions: just drilling into one of the issues of base production levels. Could you talk a little bit about US gas, in terms of what you may be changing, in terms of your view of that? Is it a change in the reserve potential? Is it a change in the cost? Is it a change in just the pipeline constraints? What perhaps has changed in your view of the base, as it relates to North America gas? And my second question is related to the asset reductions that you recognize in the quarter. Was this part of a comprehensive review that you conducted? If at this point you have reviewed all of your projects, what specifically was it that triggered the asset reduction?

    是的。各位先生,下午好。兩個問題:我想更深入追問其中一個關於基礎產量水準的議題。能否談談美國天然氣方面,就你們可能會做出的調整、以及你們對此的看法?這是儲量潛力的改變嗎?是成本的改變嗎?還是僅僅是管線限制的改變?就北美天然氣而言,你們對基礎(產量/基礎盤)看法上,可能有哪些改變?第二個問題與你們本季認列的資產減損有關。這是否是你們所進行的一次全面性檢討的一部分?如果截至目前你們已檢視所有專案,究竟是什麼具體因素觸發了這次資產減損?

  • John Browne - Group Chief Executive

    John Browne - Group Chief Executive

  • Okay. Thank you. On the base production, on particular in gas. I mean, not much has changed, Steve. The reserves are clearly there. We have a pretty good position. Costs we look at continuously. It may be that we’ll conclude that the cost profile of some assets is not for us, but might be for other people. We have to see. So, that’s where we are on that. There have been some pipeline constraints, which have caused us to reduce volumes; they’re principally in the [San Juan] and the [Wampees], and things are being done about that right now. So, we should get rid of that pipeline constraint. Clearly, as you all know, in the industry, there is every indication that the reserve base in the lower-48 (states) is having a tough time keeping up with demands on it. I think our reserve base is pretty. We’ll have another go at it, looking at every piece very carefully, as we normally do.

    好的。謝謝。關於基礎產量,特別是天然氣。我的意思是,Steve,變化不大。儲量顯然是存在的。我們的部位相當不錯。成本我們一直持續檢視。也許我們會得出結論:某些資產的成本結構不適合我們,但可能適合其他人。我們還得再看看。所以,目前就是這樣。確實有一些管線限制,導致我們降低了產量;主要在[San Juan]和[Wampees],而且目前正在採取措施處理。因此,我們應該能排除這些管線限制。很明顯,如各位所知,業界有各種跡象顯示,美國本土48州(lower-48)的儲量基礎在滿足需求方面正面臨吃緊。我認為我們的儲量基礎相當不錯。我們會再重新檢視一次,像平常一樣,非常仔細地檢查每一個部分。

  • John Buchanan - CFO

    John Buchanan - CFO

  • John, shall I answer the second question? Asking about impairment and triggers to impairment, there are a number. We do this on a regular basis. We are particularly looking for any under-performing assets, not in one quarter, but over a period of time. And also, as reserve estimates proceed to improve, that too can trigger impairment. The Upstream part of the business had been examining the portfolio for a period, post all the merger and acquisition activity, just to put everything under review. And this is where they’ve got; it was a comprehensive review. Similarly, in other parts of the business, take Chemicals as an example, they too have been casting the net over all of their new asset base, and out of that process came Picky Penny. Picky Penny has been under the microscope for some time, but while there was the prospect of doing a wider rationalization in Indonesia, before those commercial negotiations were completed it would have been premature. Those commercial negotiations came to an end, so that’s what triggered that particular impairment.

    John,要不要我回答第二個問題?關於減損以及觸發減損的因素,有好幾種。我們會定期進行這項工作。我們特別會找出任何表現不佳的資產,不是看單一季度,而是看一段時間的表現。另外,隨著儲量估計的進展與改善,這也可能觸發減損。上游業務在完成所有併購活動之後,已經檢視投資組合一段時間,目的就是把所有項目納入審查。目前進展到這一步;這是一項全面性檢討。同樣地,在業務的其他部分,例如化學品部門,他們也把所有新增的資產基礎都納入廣泛檢視,而在這個過程中就出現了Picky Penny。Picky Penny一段時間以來一直在嚴密檢視之下,但在印尼更大範圍的合理化仍有可能進行之際,在商業談判完成之前就認列會為時過早。那些商業談判告一段落,因此這就是觸發該項減損的原因。

  • Right. Let’s move on. Let’s go back to the web. Irene Hermona has asked on performance: ?Is there much headroom left in terms of further material cost improvements? That is, to what extent can the company resort to further cost economies as a means of continuing to improve [receipts] in the face of a potential decision to live with somewhat lower volume growth??.

    好的。我們繼續。回到網路提問。Irene Hermona就績效提問:?在進一步實質性成本改善方面,還有多少空間?也就是說,若公司可能決定接受較低的產量成長,面對此情況,公司還能在多大程度上透過進一步節省成本,作為持續改善[receipts]的手段??。

  • John Browne - Group Chief Executive

    John Browne - Group Chief Executive

  • Irene, this is something that we’re presently looking at, but I’ll just give you some indications of the areas. First, of course, the costs of the company are a direct relation to the scale of the company. So, whenever you sell anything, you don’t just sell the asset, you sell the costs with it as well, or you get out the costs. Secondly, overheads always need to be looked at very, very carefully. Thirdly, the back office, it seems to me that our end-to-end processes are not designed in the shape they should be for the future. This will take time, but it is something which has great potential. So, I just mention a few points like this, that we’re looking at at the moment.

    Irene,這是我們目前正在研究的事情,但我先給你一些方向性的說明。首先,公司的成本當然與公司的規模直接相關。所以,當你出售任何東西時,你不只是出售資產,你也會把相關成本一併出售,或是把成本移除。第二,管理費用(overheads)總是需要非常、非常仔細地檢視。第三,後勤/後台(back office)方面,我覺得我們端到端的流程並沒有以未來所需的樣貌來設計。這需要時間,但它具有很大的潛力。所以,我就先提幾個我們目前正在看的重點。

  • John Buchanan - CFO

    John Buchanan - CFO

  • Right. Bert, are you there?

    好的。Bert,你在線上嗎?

  • Bert

    Bert

  • I hope you can hear me because I don’t hear you answer, but I suppose so. In view of the fact that you say that the œ1bln extra investment is now under review for the next few, say, four years, let’s assume that that makes the difference between a 5% and a 3% production growth. It still seems a rather low figure in view of the, say, 75 million extra barrels you get. Do you, sort of, implicitly suggest with decision that you see considerably lower oil prices in the years ahead? That’s my first question. My second question is regarding the impairments. Should we expect any of these impairments to return in the next quarters? How do you expect that to go forward, especially with regard to the Arco assets?

    我希望你們聽得到我,因為我聽不到你們的回答,但我想應該可以。鑑於你們說額外投資œ1bln現在正針對接下來大約四年進行檢討,我們假設這使產量成長率在5%與3%之間產生差異。但考慮到你們可增加約7,500萬桶,這個數字看起來仍然偏低。你們是否在某種程度上暗示,做出這個決定是因為你們預期未來幾年油價會顯著走低?這是我的第一個問題。第二個問題關於減損。我們是否應預期其中任何減損在接下來幾季會回轉(沖回)?你們預期後續會如何發展,特別是就Arco資產而言?

  • John Browne - Group Chief Executive

    John Browne - Group Chief Executive

  • Let me just answer the first part. I’ll ask John to answer the second part. Our review is not oil price-related. We look at the strategy of the Upstream and, therefore, the planning of the Upstream, based on our so-called $16 case. That, I think, is very important because it gives us, as it were, an agnostic view as to trying to pull the oil price in what is actually a very long time. That is to say, more than a quarter in what is a very volatile market. So, we have to do it that way. We obviously look at the details around each quarter, each half year, based on the oil price. I wouldn’t assume anything as a result of our review. I come back to saying what I said in answer to the first question, and I want to repeat it one more time. First, we do retain the option to increase reported production to 4.2bln a day by late 2005, early 2006, with clear shape to the production profile, and I gave you that. And that’s at around a capital cost of increase of about $1bln a year. This would actually deliver growing cash margins per barrel through period, flat profit margins in the short term, growing to 2005-2006. So, I believe that’s our [thank] stock case. The real question is: Can we improve that as we go forward? And this debate, this discussion is all about saying: And that is exactly what we’re trying to do.

    我先回答第一部分。我請John回答第二部分。我們的檢討並非與油價相關。我們檢視上游策略、因此也檢視上游規劃,是以我們所謂的16美元情境($16 case)為基礎。我認為這非常重要,因為它讓我們在某種程度上能以不可知論(agnostic)的角度,不去試圖預測油價在其實非常長的時間內會如何變動。也就是說,不只是單一季度;而是在一個非常波動的市場中。所以,我們必須用這種方式來做。當然,我們也會根據油價,檢視每一季、每個半年期的細節。我不會因為我們的檢討就做任何假設。我回到我在回答第一個問題時所說的話,我想再重申一次。第一,我們確實保留選項:在2005年底、2006年初之前,把對外報告的產量提高到每日42億桶(4.2bln a day),而且產量曲線的形狀很清楚,我也已經提供給各位。而這大約需要每年增加約10億美元($1bln a year)的資本支出。這實際上會在整個期間帶來每桶現金利潤率的成長,短期利潤率持平,並在2005-2006年走高。所以,我相信那是我們的[thank]基準情境。真正的問題是:我們能否在往前走的過程中把它做得更好?而這場辯論、這次討論,核心就在於:這正是我們試圖要做到的。

  • John Browne - Group Chief Executive

    John Browne - Group Chief Executive

  • Bert, on the second part of your question on impairments, barring some new event or series of events, unless there are specific impairment triggers ... that could be a review of reserves estimate, or some such event ... no, you will not see a succession of impairment reviews, quarter by quarter. This was a thorough review carried out, not just in the Upstream, as I?ve touched on, but elsewhere in the corporation as well.

    Bert,關於你問題中第二部分、也就是減損(impairments),在沒有某個新事件或一連串事件發生的情況下,除非出現特定的減損觸發因素……例如可能是對儲量估計的檢視,或諸如此類的事件……不,你不會看到一季接一季、逐季進行一連串的減損檢討。這次進行的是一次徹底的檢視,不僅是在上游業務(Upstream),如我剛才提到的,也涵蓋公司其他部分。

  • Bert

    Bert

  • Thank you very much.

    非常感謝。

  • John Browne - Group Chief Executive

    John Browne - Group Chief Executive

  • Right. Peter Nicholl, ABN Amro.

    好的。ABN Amro 的 Peter Nicholl。

  • Peter Nicholl - Analyst

    Peter Nicholl - Analyst

  • A couple of questions, if I may. You mentioned, I think if I heard you correctly John, talking about that your reserve replacement for the ... you know, as you indicate organic growth is right about 156% over the past few years. At the time of the 2Q, you were indicating that you were likely to be about 170% this year, whereas I think your comment this time was sort of similar levels. That doesn’t appear to equate to the 180 million barrels of reserve impairments, or am I reading too much into particular numbers? And the second one was, just changing the subject a little bit, you in recent weeks and months have been linked either with JNK directly or through mergers of Sodenco and JNK, and you’ve obviously in the past expressed your interest in expanding in Russia. I was just wondering if you could make any comment at all?

    如果可以的話,我有幾個問題。John,你提到——如果我沒聽錯的話——你談到你們的儲量替代率(reserve replacement),也就是如你所說,過去幾年有機成長大約是 156%。在第二季(2Q)時,你們表示今年可能會在 170% 左右,但這次你的說法似乎是差不多的水準。這看起來似乎無法對應到 1.8 億桶的儲量減損,還是我對個別數字解讀過度了?第二個問題是,稍微換個話題,最近幾週到幾個月,你們被傳出與 JNK 有關聯,可能是直接,或是透過 Sodenco 與 JNK 的合併;而且你們過去也明確表達過希望在俄羅斯擴張。我想請問你是否能做任何評論?

  • John Browne - Group Chief Executive

    John Browne - Group Chief Executive

  • Peter, I think you’ve read just a touch too much into what I said about reserve and replacement. I mean, quite technically, of course, we will be producing less than we had imagined this year. So, that’s one issue. And secondly, yes indeed, we’ve written down 180 million barrels, which is very tiny indeed in the full scheme of things. It’s about 15% of production. So, I take it I think in the spirit that it’s given, but it’s a similar level. I don’t want to be precise until we know actually what it is we’re going to do. Secondly, we’ve made no secret that, based on what we’ve learned about Sodenco, and the way in which we understand how they manage in Russia, that we would like to expand our position in Russia. And to expand our position in Russia, we’ll need for us to go through West Siberia in order to get to the future. So, that means we do have to take on West Siberian production to get to the future. We’ve, I think, learnt a lot about what to do in dealing with companies, in particular, the bad experiences we’ve had with Sodenco, as well as the good ones. But that’s all I’m prepared to say. We never comment on whether we’re in discussions with any company, on matters of acquisitions and divestitures, and I won’t break that rule just now.

    Peter,我想你對我剛才關於儲量與替代的說法,解讀得稍微多了一點。我的意思是,從相當技術性的角度來看,當然,我們今年的產量會比原先想像的少。這是一個因素。第二,沒錯,我們確實減記了 1.8 億桶,但在整體規模下其實非常小。大約相當於產量的 15%。所以,我理解你提問的用意,但大致上是相近的水準。在我們實際知道要做什麼之前,我不想把數字講得太精確。第二點,我們從未隱瞞:基於我們對 Sodenco 的了解,以及我們對其在俄羅斯管理方式的理解,我們希望擴大在俄羅斯的布局。而要擴大在俄羅斯的布局,我們需要穿越西西伯利亞(West Siberia)才能走向未來。因此,這表示我們確實必須承接西西伯利亞的產量,才能走向未來。我想,我們在與公司打交道方面學到了很多,特別是我們與 Sodenco 的不良經驗,以及好的經驗。但我只能說到這裡。我們從不評論是否正與任何公司就併購與資產處分進行討論,我現在也不會打破這個原則。

  • John Browne - Group Chief Executive

    John Browne - Group Chief Executive

  • Thanks, John. What I’d like to do is bring this to a close in about five minutes. So, we’ve got time for just a couple more questions. Jack Heiden, are you there in the US?

    謝謝你,John。我希望大約在五分鐘內結束。所以我們只剩下再問兩個問題的時間。Jack Heiden,你在美國那邊嗎?

  • Jack Heiden

    Jack Heiden

  • Yes, I’m here. I have two questions related to the ... sequentially. In the UK, your production is down sequentially about 67,000 barrels a day. In the US, 57,000 barrels a day. Could you elaborate a little bit. What percentage of that is decline, and what percentage of that is, you know, some unusual events? And the second question is: I’m a little bit puzzled that you had 150 wells in Alaska shut down. How could you miss something like that with all your people over there, and having a problem like that, you know, come up?

    是的,我在。我有兩個問題,依序來問。在英國,你們的產量按季(sequentially)下降約每日 67,000 桶。在美國是每日 57,000 桶。你能否再多說明一下?其中有多少比例是自然遞減(decline),又有多少比例是一些不尋常事件造成的?第二個問題是:我有點困惑,你們在阿拉斯加有 150 口井停產(shut down)。你們那邊有那麼多人,怎麼會漏掉這種事,讓這樣的問題突然冒出來?

  • John Browne - Group Chief Executive

    John Browne - Group Chief Executive

  • Jack, thank you for your questions. First, on Alaska, there 150-well shut in was a precautionary action. I do stress ... a precautionary action, deliberate, in order to make sure we hadn’t missed anything. I don’t believe we have missed anything, and I believe that they’re all coming back on pretty quickly. Andy ...

    Jack,謝謝你的提問。先談阿拉斯加,那次 150 口井停產(shut in)是預防性措施。我必須強調……是預防性措施,是刻意採取的行動,為了確保我們沒有漏掉任何事情。我不認為我們有漏掉什麼,而且我相信它們都會很快恢復生產。Andy……

  • Andy Ingles - Group VP and Upstream

    Andy Ingles - Group VP and Upstream

  • Yeah, I think, as John has said, it’s hugely important that we deal with this matter in the right way. And I think there are actually still about 80 wells that are being reviewed, John. So, some of them have come back, where it’s right to do, but we’re still taking a very cautious approach.

    是的,我想如 John 所說,我們以正確方式處理這件事非常重要。而且我想目前其實還有大約 80 口井正在檢視中,John。所以其中一些在適當的情況下已經恢復,但我們仍採取非常審慎的做法。

  • John Browne - Group Chief Executive

    John Browne - Group Chief Executive

  • Now, Jack, on the others, I see nothing unusual in the data. Setting aside these events, the UK is actually pretty well on track on its plan, and actually has been pretty well on track on its plan for quite a long time. In the US, most of this has to do with the Gulf of Mexico storms, the problem in Prudo Bay, and that’s pretty well it. So, nothing unusual I think in these numbers.

    至於其他部分,Jack,我在數據中看不出任何不尋常。撇開這些事件不談,英國的表現其實相當符合計畫,而且已經相當長一段時間都很符合計畫。在美國,主要與墨西哥灣風暴、普魯多灣(Prudo Bay)的問題有關,差不多就是這些。所以我認為這些數字沒有什麼不尋常。

  • John Buchanan - CFO

    John Buchanan - CFO

  • Thanks, John. Fred Leipher. Fred, are you there?

    謝謝你,John。Fred Leipher。Fred,你在嗎?

  • Fred Leipher

    Fred Leipher

  • Hello, John, can you hear me. First, John Buchanan, I want to wish you the best of luck in retirement. I have some three questions. The first is a numerical question. What were the Sodenco buy-ins from the third quarter? What were they in a year ago? And how much of the change was due to the change in your interest? Secondly, it’s not clear, John Brow, from your comments, what’s changed to cause you to re-evaluate your level of spending on the base production? And thirdly, John, in your remarks, you said that costs have crept up in this high oil price environment over the last three years. What costs are you referring to?

    你好,John,你聽得到我嗎?首先,John Buchanan,我祝你退休後一切順利、好運。我有三個問題。第一個是數字問題。第三季 Sodenco 的 buy-ins 是多少?一年前是多少?而其中變動有多少是因為你們持股/權益比例(interest)的變化?第二,John Brow,從你的評論來看,不太清楚是什麼改變,導致你重新評估在基礎產量(base production)上的支出水準?第三,John,你在發言中提到,在過去三年高油價環境下成本逐步上升。你指的是哪些成本?

  • John Browne - Group Chief Executive

    John Browne - Group Chief Executive

  • Right. Three parts. Sodenco volume, Andy, have you got that?

    好的。三個部分。Sodenco 的量,Andy,你有數字嗎?

  • Andy Ingles - Group VP and Upstream

    Andy Ingles - Group VP and Upstream

  • Thank you. The Sodenco volume in the third quarter was around 30,000 barrels a day, from the deepening. And the deal we’ve done in the second quarter averages out to around 35,000 barrels a day for the year.

    謝謝。第三季 Sodenco 的量大約是每日 30,000 桶,來自加深(deepening)。而我們在第二季完成的交易,換算全年平均大約是每日 35,000 桶。

  • Fred Leipher

    Fred Leipher

  • What was the change due to your change in the interest?

    其中的變動有多少是因為你們權益比例(interest)的變化?

  • John Buchanan - CFO

    John Buchanan - CFO

  • It was due to our change in ownership, yeah?

    這是因為我們的所有權變更,對吧?

  • Fred Leipher

    Fred Leipher

  • Is all of that due to the change in ownership, or is there some organic growth in there?

    這些全部都是因為所有權變更造成的,還是其中也有一些內生成長?

  • John Buchanan - CFO

    John Buchanan - CFO

  • Um, there’s a little bit of organic growth, but I think you should see that as primarily due to the change in ownership. [inaudible] ... Yeah, it’s growing at about 3% to 5%.

    嗯,有一點點內生成長,但我認為你應該把它主要視為所有權變更所致。[聽不清] ...是的,它大約以 3% 到 5% 的速度成長。

  • Fred Leipher

    Fred Leipher

  • Okay.

    好的。

  • John Browne - Group Chief Executive

    John Browne - Group Chief Executive

  • Second part, what’s changed to cause re-evaluation of the level of base? I think, Fred, it’s to do with what other things that we can do. The level of investment that we have going into the new growth projects. Clearly, they’re pretty big and robust, and so it’s a question then of: what is the right combination of things that we want to do? That’s the question. And so that is what we are re-evaluating. Secondly, what costs we’re referring to: these are primarily costs above the level of the business. That is to say, not the cost of operating a refinery, gas station or oil fields, but is the cost above the business. And I believe that those, net-net, have got too big.

    第二部分,是什麼改變導致要重新評估基礎水準?我想,Fred,這與我們還能做哪些其他事情有關。我們投入到新成長專案的投資水準。顯然,這些專案相當大且很扎實,因此問題就變成:我們想做的事情之間,正確的組合是什麼?這就是問題。所以這就是我們正在重新評估的部分。第二,我們所指的成本:主要是高於業務層級的成本。也就是說,不是營運煉油廠、加油站或油田的成本,而是業務之上的成本。而我認為那些,整體來看,已經變得太大了。

  • Fred Leipher

    Fred Leipher

  • Can you give us an example of what type of cost.

    你能舉個例子說明是哪一類成本嗎?

  • John Browne - Group Chief Executive

    John Browne - Group Chief Executive

  • I’m sorry.

    不好意思。

  • Fred Leipher

    Fred Leipher

  • Yeah, John, can you give us some examples of what costs you’re referring to, costs above the ...

    是的,John,你能舉一些例子說明你指的是哪些成本嗎?就是高於……的成本

  • John Browne - Group Chief Executive

    John Browne - Group Chief Executive

  • I did previously, first, they are the general overheads of the firm, the amount we spend in such things ?government and public affairs?, the cost of maintaining more than one office in the US, the cost of our treatment of medial benefit, of add-ons to salaries, the costs of the number of offices we have in London, the nature the organization in Europe, why we have to have national offices, why we have so many servers, why we have to have different business process for different parts of the firm ... I could carry on. Was that enough.

    我之前提過,首先,它們是公司的一般管理費用(general overheads),我們在例如「政府與公共事務」上的支出,在美國維持不只一個辦公室的成本,我們的醫療福利處理成本、薪資附加項目的成本,我們在倫敦擁有的辦公室數量成本,歐洲的組織架構性質,為什麼我們必須設立各國辦公室,為什麼我們有這麼多伺服器,為什麼公司不同部門必須有不同的業務流程……我還可以繼續說。這樣夠了嗎?

  • Fred Leipher

    Fred Leipher

  • Got it, thanks.

    了解,謝謝。

  • John Browne - Group Chief Executive

    John Browne - Group Chief Executive

  • I’m sure you’ve got it, Fred.

    我相信你已經了解了,Fred。

  • Fred Leipher

    Fred Leipher

  • I got it. Thank you very much.

    我了解了。非常感謝。

  • John

    John

  • One final question. Katie Thompson of Gartmore has been very patient. Katie, are you still on the line?

    最後一個問題。Gartmore 的 Katie Thompson 一直很有耐心。Katie,你還在線上嗎?

  • Katie Thompson - Analyst

    Katie Thompson - Analyst

  • Yeah, it’s a question actually on your cash. I was looking at that slide 19, with some ... and cash. And you did mention that you did do share buy-backs in the third quarter. I know that your policy is to buy back shares above mid-cycle. Can you maybe give an indication about, obviously it’s quite early in the quarter, but whether your policy has changed, just looking at the cash? Whether you have, how much flexibility you have to maintain buy-backs at the kind of third quarter rate, going forward?

    是的,這其實是關於你們的現金。我在看第 19 頁投影片,上面有一些……以及現金。你確實提到你們在第三季做了庫藏股回購。我知道你們的政策是在市場高於中周期(mid-cycle)時回購股份。你能否就現金狀況給個指引?當然現在才剛進入本季不久,但你們的政策是否有改變?以及往後你們有多大彈性,能以接近第三季那樣的回購速度持續進行?

  • John Browne - Group Chief Executive

    John Browne - Group Chief Executive

  • Right. Let me start. We will look positively at share back-back if the market stays above mid-cycle. It started well in the third quarter, having ended the second quarter strongly. We started the third quarter above mid-cycle ... clearly above mid-cycle, but it deteriorated, disappointingly. We’ll look at the fourth quarter and see what eventuates. At the moment, it’s a tricky call. But assuming we’re still in an open period, we’d look positively at some form of share buy-back.

    好的。我先說。如果市場維持在中周期之上,我們會正面看待股份回購。第三季開局不錯,因為第二季結束得很強勁。第三季開始時在中周期之上……明顯高於中周期,但之後令人失望地走弱。我們會看第四季的情況,看看最後會如何發展。目前這個判斷有點棘手。但假設我們仍在可交易的開放期(open period),我們會正面考慮某種形式的股份回購。

  • Katie Thompson - Analyst

    Katie Thompson - Analyst

  • Okay, thanks.

    好的,謝謝。

  • John Browne - Group Chief Executive

    John Browne - Group Chief Executive

  • Right. Thank you, everybody. Thank you for your patience. Sorry, apologies to the small number of folk we didn’t get to. But thank you for your patience. All the very best.

    好的。謝謝各位。感謝大家的耐心。抱歉,也向少數我們沒能回答到的朋友致歉。但仍然感謝大家的耐心。祝一切順利。