Apollo Global Management, Inc. (APO) 2026 Q1 法說會逐字稿

Good morning, and welcome to Apollo Global Management's first quarter 2026 earnings conference call. (Operator Instructions) This conference is being recorded. This call may contain forward-looking statements and projections, which do not guarantee future events or performance. Please refer to Apollo's most recent SEC filings for risk factors related to these statements. Apollo will be discussing certain non-GAAP measures on this call, which management believes are relevant in assessing the financial performance of the business.

各位早安，歡迎參加阿波羅全球管理公司（Apollo Global Management）2026 年第一季財報電話會議。（接線員指示）本次會議將被錄音。本通話可能包含前瞻性陳述與預測，並不保證未來事件或績效。請參閱 Apollo 最新的 SEC 申報文件，以了解與此等陳述相關的風險因素。Apollo 將在本通話中討論若干非 GAAP 指標，管理層認為這些指標有助於評估公司業務的財務表現。

These non-GAAP measures are reconciled to GAAP figures in Apollo's earnings presentation, which is available on the company's website. Also note that nothing on this call constitutes an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to purchase an interest in any Apollo fund. I would now like to turn the call over to Noah Gunn, Global Head of Investor Relations.

這些非 GAAP 指標已在 Apollo 的財報簡報中與 GAAP 數字進行調節（reconcile），該簡報可於公司網站取得。另請注意，本通話中的任何內容均不構成出售或招攬購買任何 Apollo 基金權益之要約。我現在把電話交給全球投資人關係主管 Noah Gunn。

Great. Thanks, operator, and welcome again, everyone, to our call this morning. Joining me to discuss our results and the momentum we're seeing across the business are Marc Rowan, CEO; Jim Zelter, President; and Martin Kelly, CFO. Earlier this morning, we published our earnings release and financial supplement on the Investor Relations portion of our website. As you can see, our first quarter results set a strong tone for the year.

很好。謝謝接線員，也再次歡迎各位今天早上參加我們的電話會議。與我一同討論本季業績以及我們在各項業務中所看到動能的有：執行長 Marc Rowan、總裁 Jim Zelter，以及財務長 Martin Kelly。今天稍早，我們已在官網投資人關係專區發布財報新聞稿與財務補充資料。如各位所見，我們第一季的表現為今年奠定了強勁的基調。

We generated record fee-related earnings of $728 million or $1.17 per share, spread related earnings of $719 million or $1.15 per share and total earnings or adjusted net income of $1.2 billion or $1.94 per share. We also declared a common dividend at our new higher rate annualizing to $2.25 per share and reflecting a 10% growth rate year-on-year. Lastly, I would flag that we published several presentations on Athene's website last Friday, that provide in-depth insightful information about the asset portfolio. This effort highlights our continued commitment to lead with transparency and be responsive to market feedback. And with that, I'll turn the call over to Marc.

我們創下費用相關盈餘（FRE）新高，達 7.28 億美元或每股 1.17 美元；利差相關盈餘（SRE）為 7.19 億美元或每股 1.15 美元；總盈餘或調整後淨利為 12 億美元或每股 1.94 美元。我們也宣布普通股股利，採用新的較高配息水準，年化為每股 2.25 美元，年增率為 10%。最後提醒各位，我們上週五在 Athene 的網站發布了數份簡報，提供對資產投資組合深入且具洞見的資訊。此舉凸顯我們持續以透明度領先並回應市場回饋的承諾。接下來把電話交給 Marc。

Thanks, Noah. Let me start where Noah ended. Strong results set a tone for a strong year. FRE of $728 was up 30% year-over-year and 6% quarter-over-quarter. ACS fees, $246 million for the quarter, the fourth straight quarter over $200 million and just to spend a second there, ACS fees being strong means origination has been strong, not just in the quantity of origination but in the quality of origination. No one pays a fee for a normal core CLO, which many people count as origination.

謝謝你，Noah。我先從 Noah 的結語開始：強勁的結果為強勁的一年定下基調。FRE 7.28 億美元，年增 30%，季增 6%。本季 ACS 費用為 2.46 億美元，已連續第四季超過 2 億美元；我想在此多說一句：ACS 費用強勁代表我們的資產創造（origination）很強，不僅量大，品質也高。沒有人會為一個一般核心 CLO 付費，但很多人卻把那也算作創造。

Origination for us comes from our syndication activities which is also how we expand our client base and many of our syndication partners turn into management fee over time once they see repeatable transactions. We continue to build businesses on this basis and use ACS fees and origination as a diagnostic of just how strong the business is. SRE of $719 at our long-term Altreturn of 11% would have been $907.

對我們而言，創造主要來自我們的聯貸／分銷（syndication）活動，這也是我們擴大客戶基礎的方式；而許多聯貸夥伴在看到可重複的交易後，隨著時間推移會轉為支付管理費。我們持續以此為基礎建立業務，並將 ACS 費用與創造視為衡量業務強度的診斷指標。SRE 為 7.19 億美元；若以我們長期 11% 的 Altreturn 計算，則本應為 9.07 億美元。

On that basis, 2% quarter-over-quarter, 6% year-over-year, strong organic growth and in-line core spreads, the alts portfolio, low for the quarter, but doing exactly what it is supposed to do. The quarter -- S&P was off 17%. The Russell was off 16%. Levered equity, private equity, which is the strategy that most of our industry uses in their alts portfolio would have been worse down north of 20%. We were up 6% for the quarter.

以此為基礎，季增 2%、年增 6%，有機成長強勁，核心利差符合預期；另類投資（alts）投資組合本季偏低，但正如其設計目的般運作。本季標普下跌 17%，羅素下跌 16%。若是槓桿股權、私募股權——也就是我們產業多數公司在其 alts 投資組合中採用的策略——跌幅可能會更糟，超過 20%。而我們本季上漲 6%。

While this is not in line with our long-term expectations, this is not a miss. This is entirely how we invest. AAA, which continues to constitute the vast majority of Athene's alts portfolio is now the largest fund at Apollo, north of $27.5 billion, 12% net returns since inception. We are, in short, exactly where we want to be. We're seeing momentum across the business.

雖然這不符合我們的長期預期，但這不是失誤（miss）。這完全就是我們的投資方式。AAA（持續構成 Athene 的 alts 投資組合之絕大部分）如今已成為 Apollo 規模最大的基金，規模超過 275 億美元，自成立以來淨報酬 12%。簡言之，我們正處於我們希望的位置。我們在各項業務上都看到動能。

Origination for the quarter was a particularly high quality, $71 billion. Based on the pipeline we see, I expect origination in Q2 to be even stronger. Recall that our record quarter for origination ever has been $97 billion. Whether we get all the way there or not will depend on how hard the team works, but I think we have a shot doing something very close to that. Origination is not just about numbers, it's about spread.

本季創造的品質特別高，達 710 億美元。根據我們看到的案源管線（pipeline），我預期第二季創造會更強。回想一下，我們歷史上創造的單季紀錄是 970 億美元。能否達到那個水準，取決於團隊有多努力，但我認為我們有機會做到非常接近的成績。創造不只是數字，更關乎利差。

Here, origination for the quarter was 350 basis points over treasuries with an average rating of BBB, and I'm sure Jim will spend more time on that in his remarks. Capital formation also really strong, $115 billion for the quarter, of which $50 billion was organic and $65 billion was the closing of the Pension Investment Corp. transaction for Athora.

在這方面，本季創造相對美國公債的利差為 350 個基點，平均評等為 BBB；我相信 Jim 在他的發言中會花更多時間說明。資本募集（capital formation）同樣非常強勁，本季達 1,150 億美元，其中 500 億美元為有機成長，650 億美元來自為 Athora 完成 Pension Investment Corp. 交易的結案（closing）。

To break down the organic, asset management was $30 billion, Athene $20 billion. Based on what we're seeing for the first quarter and what we see in the pipeline for the year, we're reaffirming our 26% outlook of 20% FRE growth and 10% SRE growth, and the business trends continue to be highly favorable.

若拆解有機部分，資產管理為 300 億美元，Athene 為 200 億美元。基於我們第一季的表現以及今年管線所見，我們重申 2026 年展望：FRE 成長 20%、SRE 成長 10%；而業務趨勢仍高度有利。

The business, of course, is dependent on the macro environment. and the macro environment, notwithstanding the noise of what's happening geopolitically continues to be consistent with how we view the business over the past few years. Jim and I, each of us have now worked more than 40 years and for the vast, vast majority of that time, we have seen and managed our business and managed our investments with the notion that 95% of the outcomes will occur on the playing field and not outside the sidelines.

當然，業務取決於總體環境。而總體環境儘管地緣政治雜音不斷，整體仍與我們過去幾年對業務的看法一致。Jim 和我各自都已工作超過 40 年；在絕大多數時間裡，我們在經營業務與管理投資時都抱持一個觀念：95% 的結果會發生在球場上，而不是在場邊之外。

And sometimes, we like what's on the playing field and sometimes we don't in terms of rates and economic cycle, but we know how to navigate that. And we never spent much time thinking about the small chance of out-of-box results because if I go through at least my career, 1987, 1990, 1997, 2000, 2001, 2008 and COVID.

有時我們喜歡球場上的情況，有時不喜歡——例如利率與景氣循環——但我們知道如何因應。我們也從未花太多時間去思考小機率的「框外」結果（out-of-box results），因為若回顧至少我的職涯：1987、1990、1997、2000、2001、2008，以及 COVID。

Almost every out-of-the-box event was unpredictable, uncorrelated and not something you could have spent your time preparing for. We have a little bit different situation today where I don't know, 65-35, 70-30 , we just have a much greater chance, in our opinion, of out of sideline results. Everything we see in front of us is actually quite strong. Everyone has a job. Employment stats are good.

幾乎每一次「框外」事件都是不可預測、彼此不相關，也不是你能事先花時間準備的事情。今天我們面臨的情況有些不同：我不知道是 65-35、70-30——但在我們看來，出現「場邊之外」結果的機率明顯更高。我們眼前看到的一切其實都相當強勁。每個人都有工作，就業統計良好。

CapEx cycle is awesome. Government policy, incredibly accommodative. Capital markets, wide open. Why do we think that we have a greater than average chance of out-of-the-box results? Well, geopolitical reset is taking place around the globe, not just talking about what's happening with Iran, it's a total geopolitical reset.

資本支出（CapEx）循環非常好。政府政策極度寬鬆。資本市場全面開放。那為什麼我們認為出現「框外」結果的機率高於平均？首先，全球正在發生地緣政治重置（reset），不只是伊朗的情勢，而是全面性的地緣政治重置。

Again, maybe much needed. But nonetheless, has the potential to cause out-of-line results? Second, almost everything we're doing, whether intentional or not, has the potential to be inflationary at least in the short term. restricting the supply of goods, restricting the supply of labor and the free movement of goods and labors, maybe for good and valid reasons that need to be done are all inflationary in the short term, even if we are not seeing signs of it. Third, we are seeing the most comprehensive tech cycle we have ever seen or certainly I've ever seen in my career.

再次強調，也許這是非常必要的。但它仍可能導致偏離常態的結果。第二，我們幾乎正在做的每一件事——不論是否出於本意——至少在短期內都有可能推升通膨：限制商品供給、限制勞動供給，以及限制商品與勞動的自由流動；即便這些措施可能基於良好且正當的理由而必須推行，短期內仍具通膨性，即使我們尚未看到明顯跡象。第三，我們正在經歷我們所見過最全面的科技循環，至少是我職涯中所見最全面的一次。

This will be very, very far reaching. Almost every job will be enhanced or replaced. We're going to see, in our opinion, a complete flip of blue collar ascendancy and white collar stress. The political and other consequences of that, I just think, are unknown. And finally, consumers and businesses are actually in great shape.

其影響將非常、非常深遠。幾乎每一份工作都將被強化或被取代。我們認為，藍領崛起與白領承壓將出現完全翻轉。其政治與其他後果，我認為仍是未知數。最後，消費者與企業其實狀況非常好。

Governments, not so much. And this is not just a US what is the natural reaction to this higher percentage of out-of-the-box results? Well, for us, it's to be defensive and continue to be defensive. That doesn't mean we're not investing, but it means we're investing with an eye toward protecting our capital and making sure that we are here to ride through cycles if there are corrections, which we quite frankly expect.

政府則不然。而且這不只是美國的問題。面對「框外」結果機率提高的自然反應是什麼？對我們而言，就是保持防禦並持續防禦。這不代表我們不投資，而是代表我們投資時會以保護資本為出發點，並確保若出現修正——坦白說我們確實預期會有修正——我們能夠安然度過景氣循環。

That leaves us positioned well and ready to play offense. How does that play out in practice? Well, look at our equity business. In our equity business, whether it is the Private Equity business or the Hybrid Equity business, 0 exposure to software. Hybrid value results for the last 12 months plus 16%; private equity results Fund 10 -- 20% net IRR, 0.4 DPI versus 0 for the industry.

這使我們處於有利位置，並已準備好轉守為攻。這在實務上如何展現？那就看看我們的股權業務。在我們的股權業務中，無論是私募股權業務或混合股權業務，對軟體的曝險為 0。混合價值策略過去 12 個月報酬率超過 +16%；私募股權方面，第 10 號基金——淨 IRR 20%，DPI 0.4，而產業為 0。

In equity, again, that's how this defensive posture plays out. In credit, almost everything we've done recently is upmarket, moving more toward investment grade, moving more towards structure, moving more toward protection. Recall that better than 80% of what we originated last year was investment grade. If you look across the entirety of our credit business, sub-2% software exposure, all buckets of credit up 8% to 11% LTM, credit AUM is now vast majority investment grade. Let me flip now to discuss private credit.

在股權方面，再次說明，這就是這種防禦姿態如何體現。在信貸方面，我們最近做的幾乎所有事情都在往上移，更多轉向投資級，更多轉向結構化，更多轉向保護。回想一下，我們去年發起的資產中，超過 80% 是投資級。若放眼我們整體信貸業務，軟體曝險低於 2%，各信貸分項過去 12 個月（LTM）上漲 8% 至 11%，信貸 AUM 現在絕大多數為投資級。接下來我轉而討論私募信貸。

The market, actually, the press remains fixated on a $2 trillion slice of this market, which properly should be called levered lending. Most of the financial press treats this as if it is the entire story of what's happening in private markets, and it is far from it.

市場——其實是媒體——仍然緊盯著這個市場中規模 2 兆美元的一塊，嚴格來說應稱為槓桿貸款（levered lending）。大多數財經媒體把它當作私募市場正在發生之事的全部故事，但事實遠非如此。

The investment-grade private credit market, which is being driven by the global industrial renaissance is a $38 trillion market. Therefore, the total opportunity in private credit is some $40 trillion. The obsession with this very narrow corner of the market, this $2 trillion slice, levered lending, is frankly a failure of imagination.

投資級私募信貸市場由全球工業復興所驅動，規模達 38 兆美元。因此，私募信貸的總機會約為 40 兆美元。對這個市場極狹窄角落——2 兆美元的槓桿貸款——的迷戀，坦白說，是缺乏想像力。

Credit in any economy only comes from one of two places. It comes from the banking system or the investment marketplace. There is no third choice. If levered lending is risky, do we want it as a policy matter inside the banking system or do we want it in the investment marketplace? I think the market has spoken, I think regulators have spoken.

任何經濟體中的信貸只會來自兩個地方之一：銀行體系或投資市場。沒有第三種選擇。如果槓桿貸款有風險，那麼從政策角度，我們希望它留在銀行體系內，還是希望它在投資市場中？我認為市場已經表態，監管機構也已經表態。

Does that mean that risk has been transferred to investors? I don't think so. What has happened in our marketplace and the growth of levered lending, particularly exposure to BDCs is a rational move by investors who are looking to derisk. Why do I say derisk? Because most of the funds, investors have invested in levered lending have come from the sale of their equity portfolio.

這是否意味著風險已被轉移給投資人？我不這麼認為。我們市場中發生的事情，以及槓桿貸款的成長，特別是對 BDC 的曝險，是投資人為了降低風險而做出的理性選擇。為什麼我說是降風險？因為投資人投入槓桿貸款的大多數資金，來自於出售其股票投資組合。

Investors rationally have decided that they can earn equity-like returns from first lien risk rather than by holding equity for a portion of their more speculative exposures. This is not people who have taken their treasury portfolio or their investment-grade portfolio and gone into levered lending. This is people who have sold their equities to go into levered lending. The notion that alone is somehow riskier because it wasn't originated by a bank is not a coherent argument. Private credit is just credit.

投資人理性地認為，相較於持有股權以承擔部分更具投機性的曝險，他們可以透過第一順位擔保（first lien）風險獲得類似股權的報酬。這不是把國庫券投資組合或投資級投資組合拿去做槓桿貸款；而是賣出股票去做槓桿貸款。僅僅因為不是由銀行發起就說它更風險，這種說法並不自洽。私募信貸就是信貸。

You underwrite it well and it performs. You underwrite it poorly and it doesn't. If you are concentrated in one industry and you are seeking very high returns and you do things other than first lien, and you do things that are highly pick and highly structured with smaller companies, you will suffer losses in pursuit of higher returns.

你承作（underwrite）得好，它就會表現良好；你承作得差，它就不會。如果你集中在單一產業、追求非常高的報酬、做的不是第一順位擔保，並且對較小公司做高度挑選且高度結構化的交易，你就會在追逐更高報酬的過程中承受損失。

If you run a large cap only, first lien only, cash pay only, less levered credit book on a fully diversified basis, you will not suffer losses absent a massive credit cycle, in which case credit everywhere in the economy will be affected. The origination channel is relevant, the jockey, not the horse.

如果你經營的是僅大型企業（large cap）、僅第一順位擔保、僅現金付息（cash pay）、槓桿較低且完全分散的信貸投資組合，那麼除非出現大規模信貸循環，否則你不會遭受損失；而一旦出現那種情況，經濟體中各處的信貸都會受到影響。發起通路固然重要，但關鍵在騎師，不在馬。

All of this is about risk management, and Jim will reinforce this and discuss ADS, our flagship, including recent performance. But the cycle we've been through in the press and the cycle we've been through explaining actually reinforces something that we've been doing over the past few years, which have not always made us popular in our industry. Trust and reputation, now more than ever, necessitates greater transparency on fund pricing for fund investors.

這一切都關乎風險管理，Jim 會進一步強調並討論我們的旗艦產品 ADS，包括近期表現。但我們在媒體中經歷的這一輪循環，以及我們在解釋過程中經歷的這一輪循環，實際上強化了我們過去幾年一直在做的事情——這些做法並不總是讓我們在業界受歡迎。信任與聲譽在當下比以往任何時候都更需要對基金投資人提供更高的基金定價透明度。

New buyers particularly want more transparency around private assets. Last year, we launched the notion of estimated daily value as a pilot for our investment-grade fixed income suite of products, and we validated our asset pricing methodology for our platform, which is the largest private credit platform in the world by 6:30, our investors will have daily pricing for all corporate investment-grade fixed income assets.

新的買方尤其希望私募資產有更高透明度。去年，我們在投資級固定收益產品套組中，以試點方式推出「估計每日價值」（estimated daily value）的概念，並驗證了我們平台的資產定價方法；我們的平台是全球最大的私募信貸平台。到 6:30，我們的投資人將能取得所有公司投資級固定收益資產的每日定價。

By 9:30, all investors will have daily pricing for direct lending and asset-backed finance also. That essentially means the totality of our credit business will be 100% daily pricing by 9:30, 100% daily pricing by 9:30. How does this work in practice? And what have we been doing to date? Because technique and process vary across our industry.

到 9:30，所有投資人也將能取得直接放貸與資產擔保融資（asset-backed finance）的每日定價。這基本上意味著到 9:30，我們整個信貸業務將達到 100% 每日定價——到 9:30，100% 每日定價。這在實務上如何運作？以及我們迄今做了什麼？因為我們業界的技術與流程各不相同。

If I take our direct lending business, our levered lending business, ADS, even in this market, we are focused on transparency and consistency, and we run a rigorous process with discipline. When public markets reprice, private markets should too. In ADS' case, the rules of the road are as follows, if we hold a position with anyone else, we take the lowest mark always whether we agree with that mark or not because that is indicative of where someone might sell the position, and therefore, we market to the lowest price. We map the entirety of our ADS book to the broadly syndicated loan index industry by industry. If any sector of the broadly syndicated loan industry is down more than 2.5%.

以我們的直接放貸業務、槓桿貸款業務、ADS 為例，即使在這樣的市場中，我們仍專注於透明度與一致性，並以紀律執行嚴謹流程。當公開市場重新定價時，私募市場也應該重新定價。以 ADS 為例，我們的基本規則如下：如果我們與其他任何人共同持有某個部位，我們一律採用最低估值（lowest mark），不論我們是否同意該估值，因為那代表有人可能出售該部位的價格，因此我們以最低價格進行估值。我們將 ADS 全部投資組合逐產業對應到廣泛銀團貸款指數（broadly syndicated loan index）。如果廣泛銀團貸款市場的任何一個產業板塊下跌超過 2.5%。

At a minimum, we reflect 50% of the value, but it causes us to reanalyze 100% of our exposure in that. There are layers of analysis here about fundamentals, cost of capital, public comps and market trades and we marked to current information, not to hope.

至少，我們會反映其中 50% 的價值變動，但這也會促使我們對該部分 100% 的曝險重新分析。這裡有多層次的分析，包括基本面、資金成本、公開市場可比公司（public comps）與市場成交（market trades），我們依據當前資訊進行估值，而不是依據希望。

Whether we agree or not with these marks, just as we sometimes agree or disagree with public marks, we reflect them because private markets need to move when public markets move to the extent they reflect a broader consensus of spread or risk or other things. Another place we've seen noise in private markets is the noise around day one markups and secondaries, particularly on some of the calls for some of our peers. Let me address this directly in how we think.

不論我們是否同意這些估值——就像我們有時同意或不同意公開市場的估值一樣——我們都會反映它們，因為當公開市場變動且在更廣泛層面反映利差、風險或其他因素的共識時，私募市場也需要隨之調整。我們在私募市場看到的另一個雜音，是關於第一天加價估值（day one markups）與次級市場（secondaries）的雜音，特別是在一些同業的電話會議上。讓我直接說明我們的看法。

From our point of view in an evergreen format, this practice makes no sense. This leads to mispricing on a short-term basis, which was not that important in institutional funds where investors were not coming and going, but turns out to be very important in funds on an evergreen basis where investors have the opportunity to receive at least a portion of liquidity on a quarter-by-quarter basis.

以我們的觀點，在常青（evergreen）架構下，這種做法毫無意義。它會在短期造成錯誤定價；在機構型基金中，因投資人不會頻繁進出，這並不那麼重要，但在常青基金中卻變得非常重要，因為投資人有機會按季獲得至少部分流動性。

Across the totality of our $1 trillion platform, secondaries that have been marked up round to zero. To give you a sense of revenue for 2025 as a result of this markup for the year 2025, revenue was sub-$3 million. We're not sure this accounting practice makes sense, although it is what is currently demanded by the marketplace.

在我們總計 1 兆美元的平台中，次級資產因加價估值所帶來的影響四捨五入後幾乎為零。讓你了解一下：就 2025 年而言，因這項加價估值在 2025 年帶來的收入低於 300 萬美元。我們不確定這種會計做法是否合理，儘管目前市場確實要求如此。

And we are part of a group seeking to bring common sense and common sense marketing to this practice because we believe that this reflects reality. Market Making is another part of transparency. The continued convergence of public and private assets ultimately requires more liquidity. We have never seen a market where enhanced liquidity and enhanced transparency does not result in tremendous growth for the asset class. Last year, we started really pushing on Market Making in private markets.

我們也是一個團體的一員，正尋求以常識與更符合常識的行銷方式來改善這項做法，因為我們相信這更能反映現實。做市（Market Making）是透明度的另一部分。公私資產的持續趨同最終需要更高的流動性。我們從未見過一個市場：流動性提升與透明度提升不會為該資產類別帶來巨大的成長。去年，我們開始大力推動私募市場的做市。

From a cold start, we are now north of $13 billion of traded assets. This quarter was exceptionally strong, particularly as fund managers now recognize that we are the leading source of liquidity and for private market assets, particularly credit assets. On top of that, our venture with ICE will bring greater transparency and consistency of data to this market. Every private asset in the Apollo portfolio going forward will have an ICE ID, possibly in addition to CUSIP. This is the beginning of standardization across this marketplace.

從零起步，我們目前的交易資產規模已超過 130 億美元。本季表現格外強勁，特別是當基金經理人如今認知到，我們是私募市場資產——尤其是信貸資產——的主要流動性來源。此外，我們與 ICE 的合資將為這個市場帶來更高的資料透明度與一致性。未來，Apollo 投資組合中的每一項私募資產都將擁有一個 ICE ID，可能還會另外搭配 CUSIP。這是這個市場走向標準化的開端。

It also gives us a tremendous amount of information on real-time pricing and helps inform our estimated daily values across our credit portfolio in particular. Enough on asset management for the moment, let's flip to Retirement Services.

這也讓我們能取得大量即時定價資訊，並有助於我們特別是在信貸投資組合中推算估計每日價值。資產管理先談到這裡，接下來我們轉到退休服務（Retirement Services）。

It is clear to us that there is significant demand for guaranteed lifetime income and for retirement income in all forms. The global retirement crisis gets clearer day by day, and we believe this is one of the biggest secular opportunities out there. Against that backdrop, we tap a portion of this market through Athene.

我們很清楚，市場對於保證終身收入以及各種形式的退休收入有顯著需求。全球退休危機日益明朗，我們相信這是當前最大的長期結構性機會之一。在此背景下，我們透過 Athene 切入這個市場的一部分。

'25, as you know, was a record year with $82 billion of organic origination, and we expect and plan to do more of that in '26. In Q1, we did see lots of competition in our view, irrational competition of people putting business on the books at ridiculously low spreads.

如你所知，'25 年是創紀錄的一年，有機起源（organic origination）達 820 億美元，而我們預期並計畫在 '26 年做得更多。第一季我們確實看到大量競爭，在我們看來，這是非理性的競爭——有人以荒謬地低的利差把業務放進帳上。

We did the business we wanted to do and not anymore. Fortunately, we had a very strong and rich origination pipeline, which allowed us to continue to preserve spread against this competitive backdrop. Cash now in the Athene ecosystem is circa $40 billion, along with our treasury and our agency portfolio.

我們只做我們想做的業務，不多做。所幸我們有非常強勁且充沛的起源管線，使我們能在這樣競爭的背景下持續維持利差。Athene 生態系統內目前的現金約 400 億美元，另加上我們的財資與機構（agency）投資組合。

This gives us a significant amount of dry powder, along with a robust origination pipeline tells me that we are on a better trajectory. Lots of noise around the industry, particularly with the words private credit. This is not about PE-backed insurers, it's about insurers. For us, no Cayman, no collateral loans, no games, just straightforward business. What we are doing is totally transparent, no guess work is required.

這讓我們擁有大量可動用的資金（dry powder），再加上強健的起源管線，讓我相信我們正走在更好的軌道上。產業裡有很多雜音，特別是圍繞「私募信貸（private credit）」這個詞。這不是關於 PE 支持的保險公司，而是關於保險公司本身。對我們而言，不用開曼、不做抵押貸款、不玩花樣，只做直接、簡單的業務。我們所做的一切完全透明，不需要任何猜測。

As Noah mentioned, we put out three decks consistent with our policy of providing the greatest degree of transparency in our industry. If you find that we have not met that standard, please give Noah a ring. I don't know of any other insurer or any other financial institution that puts out the kind of data that we do, whether it is liability data for granular data on our asset portfolio. We have the luxury of doing this because we are not concerned about transparency. We have amassed the second largest capital base in our industry, some $35 billion, and we are committed to pursuing our AA rating.

如 Noah 所提到的，我們發布了三份簡報，符合我們在業界提供最高透明度的政策。如果你覺得我們沒有達到這個標準，請打電話給 Noah。我不知道還有哪一家保險公司或任何金融機構，會像我們一樣發布這種程度的資料——無論是負債端資料，或是我們資產投資組合的細緻資料。我們能這麼做，是因為我們不擔心透明度。我們已累積了業界第二大的資本基礎，約 350 億美元，並致力於追求 AA 評級。

Why are we focused on rating? Well, because not everyone in our industry is doing what they should do. Not everyone runs their business the way we have run our business. We do worry about contagion. And again, this is not about PE-backed insurers.

為什麼我們聚焦在評級？因為我們產業裡並不是每個人都在做他們應該做的事。不是每個人都像我們一樣經營業務。我們確實擔心傳染效應（contagion）。再次強調，這不是關於 PE 支持的保險公司。

This is about insurers. Some of the more egregious practices we have seen across our industry do not come from some of the new players. They come from incumbents. What we can do is be transparent, be committed to higher ratings, build our capital base and run the business for the long term like principles because we are. Anyone out there pedaling false narratives about Athene.

這是關於保險公司。有些我們在業界看到更惡劣的作法，並不是來自某些新進者，而是來自既有業者（incumbents）。我們能做的是保持透明、承諾更高的評級、建立資本基礎，並以長期原則經營業務，因為我們就是這樣的公司。任何在外面兜售關於 Athene 的錯誤敘事的人。

You now have all the information that you need. Athene has a fortress balance sheet with 95% fixed income, of which 90% is investment grade. Our exposure to levered lending, which people sometimes call private credit is de minimis, rounds closer to 0 than to 1%, Cayman in at 0.4%. Our exposure to software, 0.1%. Less asset impairment than our peer group, full transparency on related party affiliate and Apollo originated assets.

你現在已擁有你所需要的所有資訊。Athene 擁有如堡壘般的資產負債表：95% 為固定收益，其中 90% 為投資級。我們對槓桿貸款（levered lending）的曝險——有人有時稱之為私募信貸——微乎其微，更接近 0% 而不是 1%；開曼相關為 0.4%。我們對軟體的曝險為 0.1%。資產減損少於同業群，並對關係人/關聯方（related party affiliate）以及 Apollo 起源資產提供完全透明的揭露。

We celebrate Apollo originated assets because that means we are controlling the risk and controlling the spread. Full transparency on top holdings with case studies, full transparency on credit quality and ratings. Interesting statistics in the materials that we've done on ratings. People can now draw conclusions as to whether any of the rating agencies are more or less leaned I challenge you to come to a conclusion that any one rating agency is better or worse with respect to credit quality than another rating agency. Public ratings and private ratings, these are the same analysts at the same firms in the same team, rating in many instances, the same company.

我們樂於看到 Apollo 起源資產，因為這代表我們在控制風險並控制利差。對於前十大持倉與案例研究完全透明，對信用品質與評級也完全透明。我們在資料中做了一些關於評級的有趣統計。現在大家可以自行判斷，是否有任何一家評級機構更偏寬鬆或更偏嚴格。我挑戰你得出結論：在信用品質方面，任何一家評級機構比另一家更好或更差。公開評級與私下評級，其實是同一家公司、同一團隊、同一批分析師；在許多情況下，他們評的是同一家公司。

There is no difference that we have seen between public and private ratings other than whether they are publicly available and most times, they are not publicly available. It is at the request of the issuer. In every instance we hand, we're in the process of going back and getting a second rating for places that we only have one rating that are private and continue to think this is best practice for the industry and challenge anyone find what we have yet to disclose or anyone in the industry who's doing better than we are doing with respect to disclosure.

我們所看到的公開評級與私下評級之間沒有差異，差別只在於是否對外公開；而多數時候並不公開，這是發行人要求的。在我們手上的每一個案例中，我們正在回頭為那些目前只有一個私下評級的部位再取得第二個評級；我們也持續認為這是業界最佳實務，並挑戰任何人指出我們尚未揭露的內容，或指出業界有誰在揭露方面做得比我們更好。

The same risk off defensive mentality that we talked about in our Asset Management business applies to our retirement services business. One of the ways we earned excess spread over a really long period of time, were the investment-grade tranches of CLOs going back 17-plus years. Investment-grade tranches of CLOs have outperformed investment-grade corporate bonds with respect to defaults and recoveries for the last 26 years.

我們在資產管理業務中談到的同樣「避險、防禦」心態，也適用於我們的退休服務業務。我們長期賺取超額利差的一個方式，是投資於 CLO 的投資級分層（tranches），這可追溯到 17 年以上。過去 26 年，CLO 的投資級分層在違約與回收率方面的表現，優於投資級公司債。

That is not a widely understood fact, but it is -- in fact -- a fact. They have also offered excess return because of a perception that somehow structured products are more risky. We had, at one point, on Athene's balance sheet, north of $40 billion of investment-grade tranches of CLOs, some 11% of Athene's balance sheet, by the way, 99.8% investment grade. What we saw, the market began to see.

這並不是廣為人知的事實，但它——確實——是事實。由於市場認為結構型產品似乎更具風險，它們也提供了超額報酬。Athene 的資產負債表曾一度持有超過 400 億美元的 CLO 投資級分層，約占 Athene 資產負債表的 11%；順帶一提，其中 99.8% 為投資級。我們看到的，市場也開始看到。

And over time, the spread available on CLOs vis-a-vis corporate bonds became challenged and declined. We have, as a result, run off our book and CLO exposure is now down below 8%, and we expect it to be even lower in the coming quarters. Recall that this book has an average life of less than three years in current market environment, and we expect the vast majority of this book to repay simply in the normal course. And to AMAPS.

隨著時間推移，CLO 相對於公司債可取得的利差開始受到擠壓並下滑。因此我們讓這個部位自然到期/縮減（run off），目前 CLO 曝險已降至 8% 以下，且我們預期未來幾季會更低。請記得，在目前市場環境下，這個部位的平均存續期不到三年，我們預期其中絕大多數會在正常情況下自然償還。以及 AMAPS。

We are in the business of innovation and continuing to originate AMAPS, Apollo multi-asset prime securities essentially takes the benefit of CLO and adds greater number of issuers, less leverage better structure for investors with a FIC single A tranche versus a skinny single A tranche and 40% to 50% investment-grade assets.

我們的業務在於創新，並持續起源（originate）AMAPS。Apollo 多資產優先證券（Apollo multi-asset prime securities）本質上是保留 CLO 的優點，同時加入更多發行人、更低槓桿、對投資人更好的結構：以 FIC 的單 A 分層取代較薄的單 A 分層，並配置 40% 到 50% 的投資級資產。

We believe, again, this is risk reduction. Oh, by the way, greater spread than the A tranche of a CLO. The way we view this is we are taking the 0 to 75 risk, which is equivalent in a CLO to AAA and AA and getting paid more than A pricing for a more diverse, more highly rated structure simply because it is new. Athene now has $11 billion of investment-grade exposure or 3% of the portfolio, essentially making up the decline of our CLOs. We would expect this to double over the coming months.

我們再次認為，這是在降低風險。順帶一提，其利差還高於 CLO 的 A 分層。我們的看法是：我們承擔 0 到 75 的風險（在 CLO 中相當於 AAA 與 AA），卻能拿到高於 A 定價的報酬；原因在於它是新的、更分散、評級更高的結構。Athene 目前有 110 億美元的投資級曝險，約占投資組合的 3%，基本上用來彌補我們 CLO 部位下降的缺口。我們預期未來幾個月這個數字會翻倍。

as our CLO exposure comes down. You can see in real time us derisking the portfolio while preserving spread, and we are also seeing increased demand for this product across the marketplace as other insurers and other investment-grade accounts begin to appreciate a new structure, but new structures always take time, and we will garner the lion's share of this asset for the foreseeable future.

隨著我們的 CLO 曝險下降。你可以即時看到我們在保留利差的同時降低投資組合風險；同時我們也看到市場對此產品的需求增加，因為其他保險公司與其他投資級帳戶開始欣賞這種新結構。但新結構總是需要時間，我們在可預見的未來將取得這類資產的大部分份額。

Innovation is not just about assets, innovation at Athene is about liabilities. Recall that new markets, which was a very small contributor to volume in 2025, less than $1 billion. We expect to be north of $5 billion this year and ultimately to make up as much as half of Athene's new business.

創新不僅關於資產；Athene 的創新也關於負債端。回想一下，新市場在 2025 年對承保量的貢獻非常小，不到 10 億美元。我們預期今年將超過 50 億美元，並最終可能占 Athene 新業務的一半。

In Q1, it exceeded $1 billion for the first time in terms of liability generation from new markets and momentum is building, and we expect this to go up over time. Retirement is not just an issue in the U.S., retirement and retirement income and the need for it. is as much an issue in Europe. Athora this month closed the Pension Investment Corp. transaction.

第一季，新市場在負債生成（liability generation）方面首次超過 10 億美元，動能正在累積，我們預期會隨時間上升。退休不只是美國的議題；退休、退休收入以及對其的需求，在歐洲同樣是重大議題。Athora 本月完成了 Pension Investment Corp. 的交易。

Pension Investment Corp. doubled Athora's assets to $125 billion, and also presents us another market of organic growth in addition to the Dutch market. In connection with this purchase, another EUR3.5 billion of equity was raised for PIC. Total common equity inside Athora today is in excess of EUR9 billion. And just like Athene, focused our energy around originating investment-grade product denominated in dollars appropriate for a US regulated balance sheet.

Pension Investment Corp. 使 Athora 的資產規模倍增至 1,250 億美元，並且除了荷蘭市場之外，也為我們帶來另一個有機成長市場。與此收購相關，PIC 另外募集了 35 億歐元的股權。目前 Athora 內部的普通股權益總額已超過 90 億歐元。並且就像 Athene 一樣，我們把精力聚焦在起源以美元計價、適用於美國監管資產負債表的投資級產品。

PIC in addition to the other assets within other franchises within Athora now requires us to expand our efforts to generate pound-denominated assets that are appropriate for UK regulated balance sheets. Let me now bring it home. We've been leading our industry into the future.

PIC 除了 Athora 旗下其他特許經營中的其他資產之外，現在也要求我們擴大努力，以產生適用於英國受監管資產負債表的英鎊計價資產。讓我現在把話題拉回到我們自身。我們一直在引領本產業走向未來。

Not everyone is doing what we're doing. Most of our industry started life as private equity firms. They then branched out into real estate and infrastructure and even private credit, but still in the structure of private credit for -- private equity firms inside of funds in relatively slow-moving businesses where money was raised by investors in fund format and now evergreen fund format. We are revolutionizing how and where capital, wealth building and retirement solutions are delivered. As we scale, which is a difficult thing, it is crucial to define and maintain what makes Apollo, Apollo.

並不是每個人都在做我們正在做的事。我們產業中的大多數公司起初是私募股權公司，之後擴展到不動產與基礎建設，甚至私募信貸，但仍然維持在——私募股權公司在基金架構內的私募信貸——相對節奏較慢的業務中；資金以基金形式向投資人募集，如今則是常青基金（evergreen fund）形式。我們正在革新資本、財富累積與退休解決方案的交付方式與交付場域。隨著我們擴張規模（這是一件困難的事），定義並維持「是什麼讓 Apollo 成為 Apollo」至關重要。

Some of the most important work Jim and I and the team have done is now on our website under our employment pages that's now been downloaded either on LinkedIn or from our website nearly 100,000 times, defining what makes Apollo, Apollo. This is our way of explaining to new hires and to new partners who have joined us, not just what the business norms are here, but what the cultural norms.

Jim、我以及團隊所做的一些最重要的工作，如今已放在我們網站的招募頁面上，並已在 LinkedIn 或我們網站上被下載將近 100,000 次，用以界定是什麼讓 Apollo 成為 Apollo。這是我們向新進同仁以及新加入的合作夥伴說明的方式：不僅是這裡的業務規範是什麼，還包括文化規範是什麼。

As the world changes and as we are all confronted with new technologies and new ways of doing business, it is, in our opinion, the strongest cultures that are going to survive and adapt. We now have everything we need in front of us to achieve our 2029 targets to keep our edge and continue winning, we need to be uncompromising about who we are. We are now focusing our energies on building what comes after 2029.

隨著世界改變，且我們都面臨新技術與新的經營方式，在我們看來，最強大的文化將能存續並適應。我們現在眼前已具備達成 2029 年目標所需的一切；要保持優勢並持續勝出，我們必須對「我們是誰」毫不妥協。我們現在正把精力聚焦在打造 2029 年之後的下一階段。

And we are purpose built for exactly this kind of environment, and we are leaning in. And with that, I'll turn the call over to Jim.

而我們正是為了這種環境而量身打造，我們也正全力投入。接下來，我把電話會議交給 Jim。

Thanks, Marc. Let me take a step back and start with the big picture. Apollo sits at a unique intersection, what I like to call the intersection of first in Maine. On one side, we're fueling the historic capital needs of the global industrial renaissance such as AI, energy transition, defense and holistic infrastructure. On the other, we're providing retirees around the globe with retirement income solutions they need to fund the next chapter of their lives.

謝謝，Marc。讓我退一步，先從大局談起。Apollo 位於一個獨特的交會點，我喜歡稱之為「緬因州第一（first in Maine）」的交會點。一方面，我們正在為全球工業復興的歷史性資本需求提供動能，例如 AI、能源轉型、國防與整體性基礎建設；另一方面，我們也在為全球退休族群提供他們所需的退休收入解決方案，以資助人生下一個篇章。

And Apollo sits at this intersection delivering capital to where it's needed and generating returns for people who depend on them. Our scale and expertise on both sides of this intersection is unparalleled making our model more relevant than ever. We find ourselves in the middle of more conversations with CEOs, CFOs and CIOs than at any point in our history.

Apollo 就在這個交會點上，將資本導向最需要的地方，並為仰賴這些回報的人創造報酬。我們在交會點兩端的規模與專業無可比擬，使我們的模式比以往任何時候都更具相關性。我們正處於與 CEO、CFO 與 CIO 對話的中心，其頻率高於我們歷史上的任何時點。

Through close collaboration with our partners internally, we are pushing scale and transparency, driving innovation and reimagining how our industry delivers value. Our 35-plus year franchise is built on trust and reputation, and that, combined with our capital and our creativity is our moat.

透過與內部合作夥伴的緊密協作，我們正在推動規模與透明度、帶動創新，並重新想像本產業如何交付價值。我們 35 年以上的特許經營建立在信任與聲譽之上，而這一點再加上我們的資本與創造力，就是我們的護城河。

It's what allows us to deliver quality at scale, and you can see it in the momentum across origination and capital formation this quarter. Origination activity totaled $71 billion, representing 25% growth year-over-year and driving total volume of nearly $325 billion over the latest 12 months. Our activity in the quarter was $61 billion of debt comprised approximately 75% investment grade with an average A rating and 25% sub-investment grade with an average rating of B.

這使我們能以規模交付高品質，你也能從本季在承作（origination）與資本募集（capital formation）上的動能看見。承作活動合計 710 億美元，年增 25%，並帶動最近 12 個月的總量接近 3,250 億美元。本季我們的活動中，有 610 億美元為債務，其中約 75% 為投資等級，平均評等為 A；25% 為非投資等級，平均評等為 B。

With respect to spreads in the quarter, our investment-grade origination, we generated excess spread of 290 basis points over treasuries or approximately 210 basis points over comparably rated corporates. On sub-IG origination, we generated excess spread of 470 basis points over treasuries or approximately 170 over comparably rated high-yield corporate indexes.

就本季利差而言，在投資等級承作上，我們相對於美國公債取得 290 個基點的超額利差，或相對於同等評等公司債約 210 個基點。在非投資等級承作上，我們相對於美國公債取得 470 個基點的超額利差，或相對於同等評等高收益公司債指數約 170 個基點。

We continue to observe stable spreads consistent with recent quarters and noteworthy in an environment where public market spreads remain near multi-decade tights. Maintaining excess spread and quality at scale is not only made possible by the breadth and selectivity of our embedded proprietary origination ecosystem. I'd like to mention two recent transactions that demonstrate this scale.

我們持續觀察到與近幾季一致的穩定利差；值得注意的是，在公開市場利差仍接近數十年來最緊的環境下仍能如此。能在規模下維持超額利差與品質，不僅仰賴我們嵌入式專有承作生態系的廣度與選擇性。我想提兩筆近期交易來展現這樣的規模。

First, we provided a $19 billion bridge commitment in support of Paramount's acquisition of Warner Bros. This transaction reflects the sheer capital and scale that we've been able to provide in support of large-scale M&A and our ability to partner with banks to meet the needs of the marketplace.

第一，我們提供了 190 億美元的過橋承諾，以支持 Paramount 收購 Warner Bros.。這筆交易反映了我們在支援大型併購方面所能提供的龐大資本與規模，以及我們與銀行合作以滿足市場需求的能力。

Secondly, in February and April, we led two AI-related financings totaling more than $8 billion to support a client's acquisition and lease of data center infrastructure to a large investment-grade counterparty. These types of franchise transactions for next-gen AI infrastructure not only highlight our leadership role in providing flexible capital solutions they showcase our principal versus agent mindset that underpins our patient approach.

第二，在 2 月與 4 月，我們主導了兩筆與 AI 相關的融資，合計超過 80 億美元，以支持某客戶收購並將資料中心基礎設施出租給一家大型投資等級交易對手。這類針對下一代 AI 基礎設施的旗艦型交易，不僅凸顯我們在提供彈性資本解決方案上的領導地位，也展現了支撐我們耐心作法的「以自營（principal）而非代理（agent）」心態。

While others may have rushed to print their marquee AI infra transaction, we have been methodical on structure, partner selection and underwriting risk. We are at the forefront of opening up a new funding market that is financing the picks and shovels going into data centers and doing so with IG counterparty risk and amortizing structures. Across the five primary hyperscalers, CapEx investment of AI infrastructure is estimated to exceed $800 million this year and almost $1 trillion next year.

當其他人可能急著推出他們的招牌 AI 基礎設施交易時，我們在結構設計、合作夥伴選擇與承保風險方面一直很有章法。我們正站在開啟一個新融資市場的最前線，該市場為投入資料中心的「鐵鎚與鏟子」（picks and shovels）提供融資，並以投資等級交易對手風險與攤還式結構來完成。在五大主要超大規模雲端業者（hyperscalers）之中，AI 基礎設施的資本支出（CapEx）投資估計今年將超過 8 億美元，明年則接近 1 兆美元。

Against this back up of enormous and historic CapEx spend, we have a variety of touch points with this ecosystem, including data centers, powers and chips and it's clear for us to private capital has a major role to play in this ecosystem.

在如此龐大且具歷史性的資本支出浪潮之下，我們與這個生態系有多種接觸點，包括資料中心、電力與晶片；對我們而言很清楚的是，私募資本在這個生態系中將扮演重要角色。

High-grade capital solutions has become a critical piece of our origination toolkit. We've led the creation of the structure and to name more than 150 transactions and $80 billion in volume since 2020. And our current pipeline is broader and deeper than the totality of what we've done to date. Intel and AB InBev are two examples that have gone full cycle from origination to repayment.

高評等資本解決方案已成為我們承作工具箱中的關鍵一環。自 2020 年以來，我們主導創建了該結構，並完成超過 150 筆交易、累計 800 億美元的量能。而我們目前的案源管線（pipeline）在廣度與深度上，都超過我們迄今為止所做的總和。Intel 與 AB InBev 是兩個已從承作到償還走完完整週期的例子。

On Intel specifically, they came to us with a need, we solved it as principal. And as their financial position evolved, they repaid the financing, netting a $3 billion gain for us and our clients. This is our model working. And in these types of situations, we are able to provide critical tailored capital that can be paid off as the client needs grow and evolve in time. In return, we get access to attractive investment-grade opportunities that offer excess spread.

以 Intel 為例，他們帶著需求來找我們，我們以自營身分解決了問題。隨著其財務狀況演變，他們償還了融資，為我們與客戶帶來 30 億美元的收益。這就是我們的模式在運作。在這類情境下，我們能提供關鍵且量身打造的資本，並可在客戶需求隨時間成長與演進時被償還。作為回報，我們得以取得具吸引力、能提供超額利差的投資等級機會。

Turning to capital formation. As Marc mentioned, we generated $115 billion of total inflows in the quarter, including $65 billion from the acquisition of the PIC. Of the $50 billion of organic inflows in the quarter, Asset Management delivered $30 billion, while Athene added $20 billion of the $30 billion of inflows in Asset Management during the quarter, approximately 75% went to credit-oriented strategies and 25% to equity-oriented strategies supported by strong demand across client types and geography.

接著談資本募集。如 Marc 所提，本季我們的總流入達 1,150 億美元，其中包括收購 PIC 帶來的 650 億美元。本季 500 億美元的有機流入中，資產管理貢獻 300 億美元，而 Athene 在資產管理本季 300 億美元流入中貢獻了 200 億美元；其中約 75% 流向以信貸為導向的策略，25% 流向以股權為導向的策略，並受到跨客戶類型與地理區域的強勁需求所支撐。

And as Marc highlighted, we have been active in the marketplace with the creation of the maps structured solution and the product continued to grow successfully during the quarter, generating $5 billion of inflows. Our institutional business had a very strong quarter as well. with hybrid value, in particular highlight, closing on a $1.5 billion in the quarter to reach a final close of $6.5 billion, exceeding its target.

此外，如 Marc 強調，我們在市場上也很活躍，推出了 maps 結構型解決方案，該產品本季持續成功成長，帶來 50 億美元的資金流入。我們的機構業務本季也非常強勁。尤其是 hybrid value 表現亮眼，本季完成 15 億美元的募集，使其最終結募達到 65 億美元，超越目標。

It's worth noting that approximately one third of those of that capital came from new investors a clear sign that demand for hybrid offerings, the sweet spot between debt and equity is attracting greater interest in client portfolios. I'll also mention that (inaudible) also hit a final close of $1.9 billion, and Athora closed $3.5 billion of new equity commitments with strong institutional support in the purchase of PIC. Importantly, what we're seeing on the ground right now as the institutional investors are not pulling back.

值得注意的是，其中約三分之一的資金來自新投資人，清楚顯示混合型產品——介於債與股之間的甜蜜點——正吸引客戶投資組合中更高的興趣。我也要提到，（聽不清）也完成最終結募，規模為 19 億美元；此外，Athora 在收購 PIC 的交易中，在強勁的機構支持下完成了 35 億美元的新股權承諾。重要的是，我們目前在第一線看到的是，機構投資人並沒有縮手。

And if anything, the volatile backdrop is drawing interest in institutions actively looking to deploy in a variety of precincts in credit and the level of engagement remains high globally. Our Global Wealth business had a solid quarter against a particularly challenging backdrop with fundraising totaling $4 billion, only modestly lower quarter-over-quarter.

甚至可以說，波動的背景正吸引機構的興趣；機構正積極尋求在信貸的各種領域部署資金，而全球的互動程度仍然很高。我們的全球財富業務在特別具挑戰性的背景下仍有穩健表現，募資合計 40 億美元，僅較前一季小幅下降。

And consistent with industry trends within BDCs, we saw an uptick in redemption requests at ADS, though it's worth noting that 94% of the fund's investors did not submit a redemption request. The fund had net flat flows for the quarter and performance remained strong with preliminary April performance indicating of approximately 80 basis points. Beyond ADS, our diverse suite of semi-liquid and drawdown offerings continue to resonate as inflows remain consistent with recent quarters in aggregate.

且與BDC產業趨勢一致，我們在ADS看到贖回申請有所上升；不過值得注意的是，該基金有94%的投資人並未提出贖回申請。該基金本季資金流入流出淨額大致持平，表現仍然強勁，初步的4月績效顯示約為80個基點。除ADS之外，我們多元的半流動性與分期提領（drawdown）產品組合持續獲得市場青睞，整體資金流入與近幾季大致一致。

Looking ahead, the long-term wealth opportunity over a long cycle remains unchanged. What has changed is that we're entering a period where selectivity, underwriting discipline and origination quality are going to matter far more they did during the long, low volatile period that preceded.

展望未來，跨越長週期的長期財富機會仍未改變。改變的是，我們正進入一個「選擇性、承作（underwriting）紀律與承作來源（origination）品質」將比先前那段長期、低波動時期更為重要的階段。

Previously, the primary way to differentiate one's product in the channel was dividend yield and some stretch to achieve this with higher leverage, more pick and moving down the capital structure and diversify -- higher exposure rather than diversified exposure. We expect that we will see dispersion across managers and believe investors now see who has been managing portfolios prudently for the long-term risk-adjusted returns. We see this as an opportunity for differentiation and share gains for our franchise.

過去，在該通路中區隔產品的主要方式是股利殖利率，並且為了達成這點，會透過更高槓桿、更偏向承擔風險、往資本結構下移，以及所謂的「分散」——也就是提高曝險而非真正分散曝險。我們預期管理人之間將出現更明顯的分化，並相信投資人如今能看出誰是在長期風險調整後報酬的角度下審慎管理投資組合。我們將此視為我們平台差異化與提升市占的機會。

At Athene, inflows in the quarter totaled $20 billion, driven by activities across retail, flow reinsurance and funding agreements. And as Marc noted, new markets volumes are gaining early momentum, led by stable value and structured settlements. We continue to observe the broader demographic trend tailwind is real, demand for retirement income solutions is global and growing structurally around the globe and Athene remains well positioned to grow. The strength that we are seeing in our capital formation is being fueled by 6 diverse sources of demand. One, fixed income replacement.

在Athene方面，本季流入資金合計200億美元，主要由零售、流量型再保（flow reinsurance）與資金協議（funding agreements）等活動帶動。正如Marc所提到的，新市場的成交量正於早期累積動能，主要由穩定價值（stable value）與結構性和解（structured settlements）帶領。我們持續觀察到更廣泛的人口結構趨勢所帶來的順風確實存在，退休收入解決方案的需求在全球範圍內結構性成長，而Athene仍具備良好條件持續擴張。我們目前看到的資本形成力道，來自6個多元的需求來源。第一，固定收益替代。

Two, the wealth channel. Third, third-party insurance. Four, traditional asset managers. Five, the DC 401k or the Department of proposals helps pave the road for private assets in a greater manner and importantly, the traditional alts buckets with institutions are historic strength. The momentum is real, it's diversified and it's accelerating. Martin will now walk you through the financials.

第二，財富通路。第三，第三方保險。第四，傳統資產管理人。第五，DC 401k或相關部門的提案，有助於以更大的程度為私募資產鋪路；而且重要的是，機構投資人的傳統另類資產配置（alts buckets）一直是我們的歷史強項。這股動能是真實的、是多元分散的，而且正在加速。接下來Martin將帶各位看財務表現。

Good morning, everyone. Thanks, Jim. Clearly, it's busy around here. I'll try to be brief and touch on the key points. In Asset Management, AUM and fee gen AUM grew by 31% and 40% year-over-year, respectively. And as you know, total AUM close to $1 trillion. Clearly, a significant milestone in the context of trust that our clients continue to place in us as we provide excess return per unit of risk at an even greater scale.

各位早安。謝謝你，Jim。顯然這裡非常忙碌。我會盡量簡短，聚焦重點。在資產管理方面，管理資產規模（AUM）與可收費AUM分別年增31%與40%。如各位所知，總AUM接近1兆美元。這顯然是一個重要里程碑，反映客戶持續對我們的信任，因為我們能以更大的規模，提供每單位風險的超額報酬。

You heard the fee-related earnings of $728 million in the quarter reached a new high of 30% on the year and 6% on the quarter. And within that, we saw a 24% year-over-year growth in management fees, driven by third-party fundraising across credit and equity strategies, strong capital deployment and continued growth from Athene. Capital Solutions fees reached a new high and we're the fourth consecutive quarter above $200 million, as you heard, with contributions from approximately 90 discrete transactions in the quarter.

各位也聽到，本季與費用相關的盈餘（FRE）為7.28億美元，年增30%，季增6%，創新高。其中，管理費年增24%，主要由信貸與股權策略的第三方募資、強勁的資本部署，以及Athene的持續成長所帶動。資本解決方案（Capital Solutions）費用亦創新高，且連續第四季高於2億美元；如各位所聽到的，本季約90筆獨立交易均有貢獻。

Activity this quarter was led by opportunistic credit with the mix driven approximately 80-20 credit to equity and that compares with our three-year average of approximately 60-40 across those two segments. While there's directional alignment between the volume and our capital solutions fee mix, the quality and mix of activity matters.

本季活動以機會型信貸為主，組合約為信貸對股權80/20；相較之下，我們過去三年的平均約為60/40。雖然交易量與我們資本解決方案費用的組合方向一致，但活動的品質與組合更為關鍵。

And this quarter, we saw strong contributions from hybrid capital solutions as well as structured finance, both high-quality origination channels. Fee-related performance fees grew 19% year-over-year, reflecting continued growth across diversified Global Wealth products, including bridge and perpetual capital vehicles. This was sequentially lower in the quarter due to the absence of certain crystallizations which benefited Q4.

本季我們也看到混合型資本解決方案以及結構性融資（structured finance）的強勁貢獻，兩者皆屬高品質的承作來源通路。與費用相關的績效費（performance fees）年增19%，反映多元的全球財富產品持續成長，包括橋接（bridge）與永久資本工具。本季較前一季下降，原因是缺少部分在第四季帶來助益的結算（crystallizations）。

Lastly, 27% growth in fee-related expenses reflects predominantly the addition of bridge as well as continued investment to support the firm's strategic growth initiatives. Our FRE margin reached 58% in the quarter, expanding approximately 50 basis points year-over-year, reflecting positive operating leverage on record quarterly fee-related revenue and expense discipline.

最後，與費用相關的費用年增27%，主要反映新增bridge業務，以及持續投入以支持公司策略性成長計畫。本季FRE利潤率達58%，年增約50個基點，反映在創紀錄的單季與費用相關收入下，正向營運槓桿與費用紀律。

In terms of our compensation philosophy, we firmly believe in the benefits of utilizing stock as an alignment tool within the TAM. In the first quarter, stock-based comp increased resulting from the vesting for several long-tenured employees who are retiring from the firm and the industry as well as the impact of seasonal annual grants. We manage comp on an after stock-based comp expense basis and expect the annual stock-based comp impact to continue to approximate 10% of fee-related revenues, well below the industry average of 15%.

就我們的薪酬理念而言，我們堅信在TAM內使用股票作為一致性（alignment）工具的好處。第一季，股票基礎薪酬增加，原因包括數位任職多年的員工歸屬（vesting）後退休、離開公司與產業，以及季節性的年度授予（annual grants）影響。我們以扣除股票基礎薪酬費用後的基礎來管理薪酬，並預期年度股票基礎薪酬影響將持續約為與費用相關收入的10%，明顯低於同業平均的15%。

On the revenue outlook, we expect Athora's PIK acquisition to begin contributing in the second quarter at an annualized rate of approximately 20 basis points initially. We're excited by the opportunity ahead for Athora given its scale and strong positioning in the UK market.

在收入展望方面，我們預期Athora的PIK收購將於第二季開始貢獻，初期以年化約20個基點的速度。我們對Athora未來的機會感到振奮，因其具備規模優勢，且在英國市場定位強勁。

Our Asset Management business continues to execute at a high level, and we are reaffirming our 20%-plus FRE growth outlook as you heard this morning. Underpinning this view are expected strong inflows and a robust origination pipeline, broadening across all parts of our business, both of which will benefit our ACS business.

我們的資產管理業務持續以高水準執行，並如各位今早所聽到的，我們重申FRE成長20%以上的展望。支撐此觀點的是預期強勁的資金流入與穩健的承作來源管線，且正擴展至我們業務的各個部分，兩者都將有利於我們的ACS業務。

And as an example, we are increasingly providing multiple draw financing solutions, which create better line of sight to future ACS revenues beyond the current pipeline. Moving to Retirement Services briefly, Athene's net investment assets grew 14% year-over-year to $300 million, and we generated $719 million of SRE for the quarter. The alternative investment portfolio return for the quarter was 6%, strong in the context of an exceptionally weak market backdrop.

例如，我們愈來愈多提供多次提領（multiple draw）的融資解決方案，這能在現有管線之外，提升對未來ACS收入的可見度。簡要談到退休服務（Retirement Services），Athene的淨投資資產年增14%至3億美元，本季我們創造7.19億美元的SRE。另類投資組合本季報酬率為6%，在市場背景異常疲弱的情況下仍屬強勁。

AAA, which is approximately 80% of the portfolio, delivered a positive annualized return in line with this level. The return on our alts portfolio would have been even stronger were it not for Atlas' recognition of an idiosyncratic impairment and Athora's capital raise associated with the PIC acquisition, which resulted in a flat mark quarter-over-quarter.

AAA（約占投資組合的80%）提供了與此水準一致的正向年化報酬。若非Atlas認列一項特定（idiosyncratic）的減損，以及Athora因PIC收購相關的增資導致本季評價較上季持平，我們的另類投資組合報酬本可更強。

The combination of these two items, which we do not expect to repeat, approximated 3.5-percentage-points to 4-percentage-points of annualized return in the quarter. The blended net spread across Athene's portfolio was 97 basis points versus the 120 basis points in the prior quarter. When considering our 11% return expectation on the alternatives portfolio, the net spread in the first quarter would have been 25 basis points higher.

這兩項因素合計（我們預期不會重複發生）使本季年化報酬約減少3.5至4個百分點。Athene投資組合的加權淨利差（net spread）為97個基點，低於前一季的120個基點。若納入我們對另類投資組合11%報酬的預期，第一季的淨利差本可高出25個基點。

Adjusting for this, the net spread is in line with the 120 to 125 basis point outlook that we provided for the year. We continue to originate new organic business consistent with our long-term ROE targets and in line with historical averages.

在此調整後，淨利差與我們對全年提供的120至125個基點展望一致。我們持續承作新的有機業務，符合我們長期ROE目標，亦與歷史平均水準一致。

As we progress through the year, we continue to expect net spread stabilization as headwinds from asset prepayments continue to dissipate and the roll-off of profitable post-COVID businesses also dissipates, all in line with our update last November.

隨著今年推進，我們仍預期淨利差將趨於穩定，因資產提前償還帶來的逆風持續消退，而疫情後高獲利業務的到期退出（roll-off）影響也將逐步減弱，皆與我們去年11月的更新一致。

As we execute on our 2026 plan, we do so with tangible momentum across our retirement services business, and we are reaffirming our previously communicated guide of 10% SRE growth, assuming an 11% alts return. With that, I'll hand the call back to the operator. We appreciate your time, and we welcome your questions.

在執行我們的2026年計畫之際，我們的退休服務業務各面向皆展現明確動能；我們重申先前溝通的指引：在另類投資報酬率為11%的假設下，SRE成長10%。接下來我把電話交回給接線員。感謝各位撥冗參與，也歡迎各位提問。

(Operator Instructions)

（接線員指示）

Alex Blostein, Goldman Sachs.

Alex Blostein，高盛。

Hey, good morning, everybody. Thank you for the question. I was hoping we could start with some comments on the durability of the origination volumes and the transaction fees you guys are seeing. So obviously, a record quarter in what's been a volatile and tough backdrop for the market broadly.

各位早安。謝謝讓我提問。我想先請教你們對承作來源量能（origination volumes）以及你們看到的交易費用之持續性的看法。很明顯地，在整體市場波動且艱困的背景下，你們仍繳出創紀錄的一季。

So maybe talk a little bit about how your sourcing is evolving between different origination platforms? How is the syndicate composition changing as well? And I know you mentioned that the second quarter is likely to be strong as well, so maybe you could expand on that a bit as well.

所以也許請談談，你們在不同承作來源平台之間的案源取得（sourcing）如何演變？承銷團（syndicate）的組成也有哪些變化？另外我知道你們提到第二季可能也會很強，是否也能再多延伸說明一下？

Yeah, Alex, I think when you take a step back, I think the growth and the momentum you're going to see is going to be in a variety of originations directly happening from the Apollo ecosystem rather than the platforms per se.

是的，Alex，我認為當你退一步來看，你將看到的成長與動能，會來自多元的起源（origination），而且是直接發生在 Apollo 生態系之中，而不一定是來自各個平台本身。

Even this week when you saw the numbers on the hyperscalers, I mentioned, $800 billion and you go through the numbers and the source and uses has been well documented, a third is going to come from cash flow of the company, a third from the IG market and there's a large gap of funding, that's the private credit IG market that we are primarily focused on.

即使是本週你看到超大規模雲端業者（hyperscalers）的數字，我提到的 8,000 億美元，你把數字、資金來源與用途（sources and uses）逐一拆解，市場也已有充分記錄：三分之一將來自公司自身的現金流，三分之一來自投資級（IG）市場，而中間存在一個很大的資金缺口——那就是我們主要聚焦的投資級私募信貸（private credit IG）市場。

And so we were not a name of a financing source a decade ago. The last five years, hundreds of dialogues with these companies where this is not a recent phenomenon. So the brand is really focusing on that infrastructure across the board. And I think the comments that Marc made and I made, it really is going to be in this -- the picks and shovels of a variety of the CapEx of the AI infrastructure. It's not just going to be on the data center per se, but also in defense as well as broader infrastructure.

因此，十年前我們還不是一個融資來源的名字。過去五年，我們與這些公司進行了數百次對話，這並不是最近才出現的現象。所以品牌確實是在全方位聚焦於這些基礎設施。我認為 Marc 和我所說的，重點會在於——各式 AI 基礎設施資本支出（CapEx）的「賣鏟子與鎬子」（picks and shovels）。不僅僅是資料中心本身，也包括國防以及更廣泛的基礎建設。

So the lessons and the history of what we did with Intel and AB InBev, the ability for those companies to actually redeem that when they got into a different situation. It's really happening on the Apollo side, but it's also happening in partnership with banks.

所以，從我們與 Intel、AB InBev 合作的經驗與歷史來看，這些公司在進入不同情境後，能夠實際把那種安排贖回（redeem）的能力。這件事確實正在 Apollo 這邊發生，但也同時在與銀行的合作中發生。

The activities we do, even though Paramount per se is not the type of transaction that we are involved with day in and day out, that puts us in a unique spot of being able to be a holistic solution provider in scale that really is unmatched today.

我們所做的活動，即使以 Paramount 而言，它本身並不是我們日常會參與的那類交易，但它讓我們處在一個獨特的位置：能以規模提供整體性的解決方案供應者（holistic solution provider），而這在今天幾乎無人能比。

Yeah, I would just add, this is not just an AI story. This is a global industrial renaissance story. This is infrastructure. This energy. This is energy transmission. This is energy transition. This is advanced manufacturing. This is defense and its AI and data. And it's not just a US story, this is a European story. The US clearly is out front. The recent week a number of us spent in Silicon Valley was informative. Here, we have the most prominent growth ecosystem anywhere in the planet and they have never been capital intensive before.

是的，我只想補充，這不只是 AI 的故事。這是一個全球工業復興的故事。這是基礎建設、能源、能源輸配（energy transmission）、能源轉型（energy transition）、先進製造、國防，以及 AI 與資料。而且這不只是美國的故事，這也是歐洲的故事。美國顯然走在前面。我們最近一週有幾位在矽谷的行程很有啟發性。在那裡，我們看到全球最突出的成長生態系，而他們過去從未是資本密集型（capital intensive）。

We are going to see the growth ecosystem dominate debt issuance over the next five years. Today, the 10 largest issuers of IG are mostly financial institutions. Going forward, probably be the five largest banks and the five largest growth companies. Europe is going to be on a percentage basis, in our opinion, the strongest investment-grade private market in the world. Europe needs to do everything that the US is doing. It's banking system, its capital markets are just not as developed.

未來五年，我們將看到成長型生態系主導債務發行。今天，投資級（IG）最大的 10 個發行人多半是金融機構。往後，可能會是最大的五家銀行加上最大的五家成長型公司。以比例來看，歐洲在我們看來將成為全球最強的投資級私募市場。歐洲需要做美國正在做的一切；它的銀行體系、資本市場都還不夠成熟。

And while there's historically been hostility towards private capital and private solutions, we find ourselves in dialogue with quasi governmental entities who are addressing fundamentals. How do we restart the Hinkley nuclear plant? How do we provide for a massive upgrade for our grid?

而且，雖然歷史上對私募資本與私募解決方案存在敵意，我們如今卻發現自己正在與準政府（quasi governmental）機構對話，這些機構正在處理基本面問題：我們要如何重啟欣克利（Hinkley）核電廠？我們要如何為電網進行大規模升級？

How do we provide inventory for our defense munitions and other things on a one-year annual budget cycle when we know these core munitions are going to be needed over decades. These are the questions we are helping answer. But keep in perspective, we are, at the end of the day, a relatively small player in the credit markets. The totality of assets under management just crossed $1 trillion, of which $800 billion is credit and about $600 billion-ish is investment grade. This is not even relevant in the scale of this marketplace.

我們要如何在一年期的年度預算循環下，為國防彈藥與其他項目提供庫存，明明我們知道這些核心彈藥將在未來數十年都會需要？這些就是我們在協助回答的問題。但也請保持視角：歸根結底，我們在信貸市場仍是相對小的參與者。整體資產管理規模剛跨過 1 兆美元，其中 8,000 億美元是信貸，約 6,000 億美元左右是投資級。以這個市場的規模來看，這甚至還談不上重要。

And when you talk at some of our public markets, peers who are $14 trillion and more, we have a long way to go here and we are mindful that our job is not to be the biggest. Our job is to grow profitably and to make sure we maintain underwriting discipline and spread.

當你談到一些公開市場的同業，他們的規模是 14 兆美元甚至更多，我們還有很長的路要走。我們也很清楚，我們的工作不是成為最大；我們的工作是有獲利地成長，並確保我們維持承銷紀律與利差（spread）。

Steven Chubak, Wolfe Research.

Steven Chubak，Wolfe Research。

Hi, good morning and thanks for taking my question. So I wanted to ask on the private credit marketplace. Given one of the bigger concerns on private credit relates to opacity of the asset class. I was hoping you could speak to how the launch of Delhi pricing later this year might change the perceived riskiness of private credit, your approach to validating the pricing is really like this whole market maker in terms of the breadth of assets you're hoping to price and how you might frame the revenue opportunity from this business as it continues to scale.

嗨，早安，謝謝讓我提問。我想問私募信貸市場。鑑於對私募信貸較大的疑慮之一在於這個資產類別的不透明性，我希望你能談談今年稍晚推出 Delhi 定價（pricing）可能如何改變市場對私募信貸風險性的觀感；你們如何驗證定價的方法——也就是你們作為某種「造市者」（market maker）的做法，涵蓋你們希望定價的資產廣度；以及隨著這項業務持續擴張，你們會如何界定其營收機會。

Let me start, and I'm sure Marc will add a few comments, but I think there's a threat here. I think Marc's comments about the private credit conversation being in a narrow corner, we just see it as a lack of imagination and it ties back to the prior question. The big growth in private credit is going to be in the IG universe. And interestingly, those investors are used to a bit more liquidity and certainly a lot more transparency. This is going to be driven by the investor universe.

我先開始，Marc 應該也會補充幾點，但我認為這裡存在一個威脅。我認為 Marc 對私募信貸討論只停留在狹窄角落的評論，我們看到的是缺乏想像力，而這也呼應前一題。私募信貸最大的成長將會發生在投資級（IG）領域。有趣的是，那些投資人習慣於更高一些的流動性，當然也習慣於更高的透明度。這將由投資人群體所驅動。

And we are -- whether it's our short duration vehicles, all of our fixed income asset classes that we've created a product suite for them to be able to allow private credit to be a major part, this is going to be standard operating procedure. And we've said consistently, the thread is the benefit of the larger spread is on your origination, not the fact that it is private and where it will be private for a while.

而我們——無論是我們的短存續期（short duration）工具，或是我們所建立的所有固定收益資產類別產品組合（product suite），都是為了讓他們能把私募信貸作為重要組成部分；這將成為標準作業程序。我們也一再強調，這條主線是：較大利差的好處來自你的起源（origination），而不是因為它是私募；而且它會在一段時間內維持私募。

Private does not also mean -- means it's market power forever. And so the infrastructure that we've created and the thread of the conversation being much more global, much more investment grade, that's the critical aspect. And again, I think you're seeing it tie through.

私募也不代表——就代表你永遠擁有市場力量。因此，我們所建立的基礎設施，以及這場對話變得更全球化、更投資級，才是關鍵面向。而且我認為你正在看到這條脈絡被串起來。

There's a reason why origination ACS capital formation, Marc's original comment. ACS has allowed us to take our 3,000 LPs and turn it into thousands upon thousands of conversations. That's the open architecture at work. That's how we're reinventing the business model. And certainly, that's what gives us the enthusiasm and excitement in terms of how the business all works in concert.

這也是為什麼起源（origination）、ACS 資本形成（capital formation）——也就是 Marc 最初的評論。ACS 讓我們能把 3,000 個 LP 轉化為成千上萬次的對話。這就是開放式架構（open architecture）在發揮作用。這就是我們如何重塑商業模式。當然，這也正是讓我們對整個業務如何協同運作感到熱情與興奮的原因。

So I'll give you a little more, and it's going to require a little bit of -- we fundamentally changed our financial system. And particularly the large banks, investment banks were encouraged to deemphasize market making. In our equity markets, we had four firms step forward, led by James Street and Citadel, who now provide liquidity. The New York Stock Exchange, the London Stock Exchange are buildings. They are not sources of liquidity.

我再多補充一些，這需要一點——我們從根本上改變了金融體系。尤其是大型銀行、投資銀行被鼓勵降低造市（market making）的比重。在股票市場，有四家公司挺身而出提供流動性，以 Jane Street 和 Citadel 為首。紐約證券交易所、倫敦證券交易所只是建築物；它們不是流動性的來源。

And we have real liquidity in our equity markets. In our fixed income markets, no one stepped forward to provide liquidity. Fixed income trading capital in the world is now 10% of what it was in 2008 and the market is 3x its size. The entirety of the market, whether you are investment grade or below investment grade is just not that liquid. It just appears liquid on good days.

而我們的股票市場確實有真正的流動性。但在固定收益市場，沒有人挺身而出提供流動性。全球固定收益交易資本如今只有 2008 年的 10%，但市場規模卻是當年的 3 倍。整個市場，不論你是投資級或非投資級，都沒有那麼流動；它只是在好日子看起來很流動。

We have already seen wholesale breakdowns in the liquidity of this marketplace during COVID and during UK LDI, and I expect that we will see this again. When you look at the quote of a piece of public fixed income, be it a bond or alone. Are you actually seeing liquidity? Or are you seeing dealer estimates?

我們已經在 COVID 期間以及英國 LDI 事件期間，看過這個市場流動性出現全面性失靈（wholesale breakdowns），而我預期未來還會再發生。當你看到一檔公開固定收益的報價，不論是債券或貸款（loan），你真的看到的是流動性嗎？還是你看到的是交易商的估值？

You're seeing a dealer estimate. The vast, vast majority of issues do not trade, have not traded and are quoted one by one or five by five, they're not quoting on a liquid basis. But yet, we sleep at night. This has never happened before in the private markets because private was not tradable and was not indicated. And so a year ago or more than a year ago now in connection with the support of State Street's product that mixed for the first time public and private investment grade, we began market making.

你看到的是交易商估值。絕大多數的發行並不交易、也一直沒有交易；報價是以一張一張或五張一組（one by one or five by five）來報，並不是以流動市場的方式報價。但我們仍然能安然入睡。這在私募市場過去從未發生，因為私募資產不可交易，也沒有指示性報價（indicated）。因此，大約一年前或更早，配合 State Street 的產品——首次把公開與私募投資級混合在一起——我們開始進行造市。

And we didn't just begin market making by holding on to the information. We created a data warehouse. We made that data available to all other dealers. We are not the only market maker. And what is going to happen is the same thing that happened in the levered lending market, the broadly syndicated market.

而且我們不只是開始造市、把資訊握在手上。我們建立了資料倉儲（data warehouse）。我們把資料提供給所有其他交易商。我們不是唯一的造市者。接下來將會發生的事，會和槓桿貸款市場、廣泛聯貸（broadly syndicated）市場曾經發生的事情一樣。

We've gotten the market going, but ICE IDs, data repositories, standardized data and ultimately, jealousy are going to cause market-making competition. No one wants to see Apollo earning widespread. You have already seen in other markets, other dealers come in anywhere we can get other dealers to come in, we will. I don't know exactly where we'll end up this year in terms of market making. But every quarter on quarter, it just gets bigger.

我們已經把市場帶動起來了，但 ICE ID、資料儲存庫、標準化資料，最終還有「眼紅」，都將引發做市競爭。沒有人想看到 Apollo 大賺特賺、到處賺。你們已經在其他市場看到了，只要我們能讓其他交易商進來的地方，他們就會進來。我不確定今年我們在做市方面最終會落在哪裡。但每一季相較上一季，規模都只會更大。

And we're starting to see third parties, other competitors make markets as well. Some in our industry are resisting this transparency. I just don't think that makes sense. And I think the recent press around marks is just driving us to the solution, and I expect regulatory interest to follow, which will also drive toward this solution. We use the same methodology that many public companies, many public asset managers use with respect to setting prices on a daily basis.

而且我們也開始看到第三方、其他競爭者也在做市。我們這個產業裡有些人正在抗拒這種透明化。我只是覺得那沒有道理。我認為近期媒體對估值（marks）的報導，正把我們推向解決方案，而我也預期監管機關的關注會跟上，這也會進一步推動走向這個解決方案。我們在每日定價方面採用的方法論，與許多上市公司、許多公開市場資產管理人用來定價的方法相同。

We observed trades. We observe comparables. We observe trades and other issuers of the same issues that are public. We look at general market trends, and we will produce a price. That is the same price in many instances that you see for public securities and every day, it gets better. That does not mean perfect, but our job is to try and make it better every single day, and we win in our opinion, if we have more transparency and more liquidity.

我們觀察成交。我們觀察可比標的。我們觀察成交，以及同一議題（issues）下其他公開發行人的交易。我們看整體市場趨勢，然後產出一個價格。在很多情況下，那個價格就是你在公開證券上看到的價格，而且每天都在變得更好。這不代表完美，但我們的工作就是每天都努力讓它更好；而在我們看來，如果透明度更高、流動性更好，我們就贏了。

Bill Katz, TD Cowen.

Bill Katz，TD Cowen。

Thank you very much. Marc, you mentioned in your prepared comments that you have everything you need to sort of meet your 2029 goals, which is great to hear. I guess the question is you also mentioned that you're sort of thinking now through the next decade.

非常感謝。Marc，你在事先準備的發言中提到，你已經具備達成 2029 年目標所需的一切，這很令人振奮。我想問的是，你也提到你現在開始在思考接下來十年的事情。

As you think about your footprint today, obviously, you had a lot of buyback this quarter against some of the elevated issuance. How are you prioritizing capital return from here? Should we assume you have enough organic growth to get there?

當你看你們目前的版圖時，顯然本季在一些較高的發行量之下，你們做了不少回購。接下來你們如何排序資本回饋的優先順序？我們是否可以假設你們有足夠的內生成長來達成目標？

Or do you need to now be a bit more acquisitive? Or could you start to return more capital to investors as you continue to scale the business.

還是說你們現在需要更積極地做併購？或者，隨著你們持續擴大業務規模，你們是否可以開始把更多資本回饋給投資人？

So we have a five-year plan and that five-year plan is the one we laid out in Investor Day. And when I reference the 2029, I'm talking about that five-year plan, which in round numbers gets us to $5 billion-plus asset management and a $5 billion retirement services business. The question Jim and I are asking ourselves is what comes next? Is it more of the same or is it something that is additive to that?

我們有一個五年計畫，而那個五年計畫就是我們在投資人日所提出的。我提到 2029 年時，指的就是那個五年計畫；以概略數字來說，會把我們帶到超過 50 億美元的資產管理規模，以及 50 億美元的退休服務業務。Jim 和我正在問自己的問題是：接下來是什麼？是延續同樣的路徑，還是有什麼能在此基礎上加成的事情？

I do not believe that we need to do anything from an acquisition point of view to meet our 2029 goals. Anything we choose to do will be accretive to the strategy and to the growth long-term because buying more of the same just doesn't do anything for us.

我不認為為了達成 2029 年目標，我們需要在併購面做任何事情。我們選擇做的任何事，都應該是對策略與長期成長具增益（accretive）的，因為買更多同質性的東西對我們並沒有幫助。

It actually creates noise and it makes integration harder at a point in time when we are going through this massive productivity change. And this is the backdrop that we're thinking. We have everyone in our firm can actually envision how the addition of technology is going to make their current job easier, faster, better, stronger, less expensive.

那反而會製造雜訊，並讓整合更困難，尤其是在我們正經歷這場巨大的生產力變革之際。這就是我們思考的背景。我們公司裡每個人其實都能想像，科技的加入將如何讓他們目前的工作更容易、更快、更好、更強、成本更低。

Most people. Can also envision how software and data going to free will allow them to evolve their current business into something that is more productive for serving their clients. Very few people can imagine that the cost of now building challenger businesses, particularly in areas where we have core strengths, has gone to zero. The bar for buying something is just really high.

大多數人也能想像，軟體與資料的釋放將如何讓他們把現有業務演進成更具生產力、能更好服務客戶的樣貌。很少人能想像的是：現在打造挑戰者業務（challenger businesses）的成本，特別是在我們具備核心優勢的領域，已經降到零。收購某個標的的門檻因此變得非常高。

Because the embedded value of existing franchises, unless they are truly unique and have unbelievable staying power, just doesn't add all that much to us. So we are mindful of our cost of capital and where our stock trades. We, as have a dividend policy where we go up half of the FRE growth of the business, which we've done over the past five years.

因為既有特許經營（franchises）的內含價值，除非它們真的非常獨特且具有驚人的持久力，否則對我們的增益其實不大。因此我們會留意我們的資本成本以及股價交易水準。我們有股利政策：股利增幅約為業務 FRE 成長的一半，而過去五年我們一直是這麼做的。

And when the market is in a risk-off mode, given that our business has not really cycled, we have been aggressive buyers of our stock. And we continue to think about it in that trade-off. If something is truly catalytic to a strategy and can be another $5 billion business for us, yes, we'll entertain that. But to do more, to integrate, to buy more asset management, I just don't think we have any.

而當市場處於避險（risk-off）模式時，鑑於我們的業務其實沒有真正隨景氣循環起伏，我們一直積極回購自家股票。我們也持續在這個取捨上思考：如果某件事對策略具有真正的催化作用，並且能為我們再打造一個 50 億美元的業務，是的，我們會考慮。但要做更多整合、再買更多資產管理業務，我只是覺得我們沒有那種——

Jealousy, any regret. We watch what's being purchased around our industry and we kind of shrug our shoulders and just say, like, did we miss it? And we haven't I don't think we've missed anything yet and the bar is really high for spending capital other than on stock.

——眼紅、任何後悔。我們看著產業裡大家在買什麼，往往只是聳聳肩說：我們是不是錯過了？但我不認為我們到目前為止錯過了任何東西；而且，除了買回股票之外，動用資本的門檻真的很高。

Glenn Schorr, Evercore ISI.

Glenn Schorr，Evercore ISI。

Thanks very much.I'm fascinated with the daily pricing thing. So I have a couple of very quick follow-ups. One, does -- how do you think that translates to anything in private equity and hybrid lands kind of get there to two, how does it inform how you build your secondaries business? And then three, the biggie is what does that mean for the illiquidity premium, your ability to produce alpha and ultimately charge fees for how this industry was built. Thanks, Marc.

非常感謝。我對每日定價這件事很著迷，所以我有幾個很快的追問。第一，你認為這如何轉譯到私募股權以及混合型（hybrid）領域，讓它們也能走到那一步？第二，這如何影響你們打造二級市場（secondaries）業務的方式？第三個也是最重要的：這對流動性溢價（illiquidity premium）、你們創造 alpha 的能力，以及最終對這個產業建立方式所依賴的收費能力，意味著什麼？謝謝，Marc。

Let me start again. I want to make sure we frame this -- what we're talking here. Whenever we talk about the journey of transparency and daily pricing, it starts with the investment-grade private credit universe, the $38 trillion. Somehow the headlines and the dialogue always then goes to the $1.7 trillion. We'll get to the $1.7 trillion, but I want to really focus on the $38 trillion first.

我再從頭說一次。我想確保我們把討論框架講清楚——我們在談透明化與每日定價的旅程時，起點是投資級私募信貸的宇宙，也就是 38 兆美元。不知為何，新聞標題與對話總是接著就轉到 1.7 兆美元。我們會談到那 1.7 兆美元，但我想先把重點放在 38 兆美元上。

And that's where if you go back to what Marc mentioned, go back to the bank loan mark in the early '90s. Many banks did not want the agent to provide that transparency. Evolution took over, education took over, more investors came in.

而在那裡，如果你回頭看 Marc 提到的例子，回到 90 年代初期的銀行貸款估值（bank loan mark）。當時很多銀行不希望代理行（agent）提供那種透明度。但演進接管了一切，教育接管了一切，更多投資人進來了。

So I do think, Bill, I think that again, it ties back this origination. The premium that you are able to extract is upon the origination because you're providing a holistic solution to an issuer in addition to what they can do day in and day out with a public IG issuance.

所以我確實認為，Bill，我覺得這又回到「起源／承作」（origination）。你能夠萃取的溢價是在承作時產生的，因為你提供給發行人的是一個整體性解決方案，這不只是他們日常能透過公開投資級（IG）發行做到的事。

You're going to see cap tables of very large established companies having public IG debt in the cap table along with a private originated IG transaction or tranche. It may be an asset, it may be a geography, it may be a subsidiary. That's what Intel and AB InBev.

你會看到一些非常大型、成熟公司的資本結構表（cap table）裡，同時有公開投資級債務，以及一筆或一段由私募承作的投資級交易或分層（tranche）。它可能對應某個資產、某個地理區域、或某家子公司。Intel 和 AB InBev 就是這樣。

Those companies had public and private origination and debt in their capital structure on the cap table. So we're going to start there, as Marc mentioned, we will evolve into the noninvestment-grade direct lending, leverage lending universe.

這些公司的資本結構表上，同時有公開與私募承作的債務。所以我們會先從這裡開始；如 Marc 所說，我們之後會演進到非投資級的直接放款（direct lending）、槓桿放款（leverage lending）領域。

But that's the prioritization in our view. But again, I go back, the premium that you're going to create is from the holistic solution you come as the provider of the capital in one fell swoop because most have to realize most origination that occurs in the leveraged loan market between high yield and leverage lending and IG is not on an underwritten basis. That's on an Asian basis. When we can act as principal, that's where it allows us to create that spread opportunity.

但在我們看來，這就是優先順序。不過我再回到一點：你能創造的溢價，來自於你作為資金提供者，一次到位（in one fell swoop）地提供整體解決方案。因為多數人必須理解：在槓桿貸款市場中，介於高收益（high yield）與槓桿放款以及投資級（IG）之間所發生的大多數承作，並不是以承銷（underwritten）方式進行，而是以代理（agency）方式進行。當我們能以自營（principal）身分行事時，這就讓我們能創造利差機會。

So I'm going to hit it on its head, maybe a little more. When we originate something in the private market, today, investors demand 150 basis points to 200 basis points. We end up with a management fee, and we end up sometimes where we don't manage the assets with an ACS fee.

所以我把話說得更直接一點。當我們在私募市場承作一筆交易時，今天投資人會要求 150 到 200 個基點。我們會收取管理費，而有時在我們不管理資產的情況下，還會有 ACS 費用。

The more liquidity and the more transparency, why will the premium always be 150 basis points to 200 basis points that investors demand. The originator should get to control more of the profit if, in fact, we are originating good risk. We do not view the illiquidity premium as the basis on which you get paid. It is what is currently demanded by investors for holding it.

流動性越高、透明度越高，為什麼投資人所要求的溢價就一定永遠是 150 到 200 個基點？如果我們承作的是良好的風險，承作方應該能掌控更多利潤。我們不把流動性溢價視為你獲得報酬的基礎；它只是投資人目前為了持有它所要求的補償。

And yes, for the broader market that does not control origination, I expect that there will be a narrowing of spread. And therefore, we have been consistent for the past 5 years, measuring our industry on AUM is imprecise at best and foolhardy at worst. We measure our capacity to generate investments that are worth doing because that is ultimately what has value.

而且是的，對於更廣泛、無法掌控承作來源的市場，我預期利差會收斂。因此我們過去五年一直很一致地認為：用 AUM 來衡量我們這個產業，往好聽說是不精確，往壞了說是魯莽。我們衡量的是我們產生值得做的投資的能力，因為那才是最終具有價值的東西。

The ability to get the entire firm focused on origination is how we run the business on a day-to-day basis. AUM is what follows as a result of having lots of good origination. Unlike a public asset manager that can buy everything that exists and can take any amount of money at any point in time, and therefore, AUM is a productive measure, AUM here and the chasing of AUM can be very degrading to a franchise if it exceeds your capacity to originate.

讓整個公司都聚焦在案源開發（origination）的能力，就是我們日常經營業務的方式。資產管理規模（AUM）是大量優質案源開發所帶來的結果。不同於公募資產管理人可以買下市場上存在的一切、並且在任何時間點都能接納任何規模的資金，因此AUM是一個具生產性的衡量指標；但在這裡，AUM以及追逐AUM，若超過你能夠開發案源的產能，反而可能嚴重侵蝕一家機構的特許經營價值。

And just to complete the thought because I want to say, Jim is right, we are at 6:30, 100% of our investment-grade corporate franchise, 9:30, the entirety of our credit franchise. I doubt in 2026, we're going to make progress around hybrid or private equity other than with respect to the techniques of valuation in the secondaries market.

另外我想把這個想法補完整，因為我想說，Jim說得對：我們在6:30已經做到我們投資級公司業務（investment-grade corporate franchise）的100%；在9:30則涵蓋了我們整個信用業務（credit franchise）。我懷疑在2026年，除了在次級市場估值技術（valuation in the secondaries market）方面之外，我們在混合型（hybrid）或私募股權（private equity）上不會有太多進展。

I believe the days of buying something at 70 and writing it up to par during an end. Ultimately, good investors should be able to make money in the secondaries market by superior underwriting and superior access to information. I'm not sure the day one pop is something that is ordained publically.

我認為那種以70買進、然後在期末把它寫回到面值（par）的日子已經過去了。歸根結底，優秀的投資人應該能夠透過更好的承銷（underwriting）與更優勢的資訊取得，在次級市場賺到錢。我不確定所謂的首日跳漲（day one pop）是某種被公開「注定」會發生的事。

Patrick Davitt, Autonomous Research.

Patrick Davitt，Autonomous Research。

Good morning, everyone. For PIC, how should we think about the incremental expense on that 20 basis points? And should we assume the 20 basis points trend upward as you reposition the portfolio into higher-yielding assets?

各位早安。關於PIC，我們應該如何看待那20個基點（basis points）的增量費用？另外，當你們把投資組合重新配置到更高收益資產時，我們是否應該假設這20個基點會呈上升趨勢？

I'd say, Patrick, it's one very small because we have an established ecosystem in Europe in London today that manages Athora and it's very scalable. And so I would not expect much, if any cost against that revenue pull through. And then in terms of revenue potential, yes, the 20 bps is a starting point. And the balance sheet will require pretty extensive repositioning, but that will take a bit of time. And so we're very focused on that.

Patrick，我會說第一點：費用非常小，因為我們目前在歐洲倫敦已經有一個成熟的生態系在管理Athora，而且具高度可擴展性。因此我不預期會有太多、甚至任何成本去抵消那部分收入的帶動效應（revenue pull through）。至於收入潛力，是的，20個基點只是起點。資產負債表需要相當大幅度的重新配置，但這需要一些時間，所以我們非常專注在這件事上。

But you should expect to see incremental management fee growth from here as we reposition that balance sheet. And that's all in accordance with PRA regulatory framework, which is quite distinct from the framework that's existed up until now for Athora being a EU balance sheet.

但隨著我們重新配置那張資產負債表，你應該會看到管理費（management fee）出現增量成長。而這一切都會依照PRA監管框架進行；該框架與Athora迄今作為歐盟資產負債表（EU balance sheet）所適用的框架相當不同。

Mike Brown, UBS.

Mike Brown，瑞銀（UBS）。

Great. Good morning. Thanks for taking my question. I want to ask on sure. You reiterated the 10% growth for the year. So I just wanted to think through the puts and takes to asset yields and also kind of the higher cost of funds as we move through '26. Maybe just expand on how we should think about the spread dynamics.

很好，早安。謝謝讓我提問。我想問一下，你們重申今年10%的成長目標。我想梳理一下資產收益率的利多利空，以及隨著我們走向2026年，資金成本上升的影響。能否再多談談我們應該如何看待利差（spread）的動態？

Can you still be in that $120 million to $125 million range. And then you mentioned, Marc, that the trajectory is improving. Can you just unpack that a little more, maybe just touch on annuities where the growth seems to be a bit tougher near term? And maybe could we see PRT coming back more in a bigger way in 2026?

你們是否仍能維持在1.20億到1.25億美元的區間？另外，Marc，你提到走勢正在改善。能否再拆解說明一下？也許談談年金（annuities），因為短期看起來成長似乎更具挑戰；以及我們是否可能在2026年看到退休金風險轉移（PRT）以更大規模回歸？

Mike, it's Martin. I'll hit the first point. So -- and I commented on this a bit in the prepared remarks. We're right in the middle of the range that we indicated last quarter for the year. And as far as the first quarter is concerned, we certainly expect that to be the case for the balance of the year.

Mike，我是Martin。我先回答第一點——我在事先準備的發言中也稍微提到。我們目前正處於上季對全年所指引區間的中間位置。就第一季而言，我們當然預期在今年剩餘期間也會維持這種狀況。

So $120 million, $125 million is the is the spread range assuming also 11%. As far as the quarter, we were pretty prescriptive last November in laying out the drivers of the spread progression over time. And if we look at what has happened in the quarter, it's very much in line with that. And so there's nothing -- there's no change to that. We continue to see some prepay headwinds, as expected, prepays, we believe, peaked in Q4.

所以在同時假設11%的情況下，1.20億到1.25億美元就是利差區間。至於季度表現，我們在去年11月相當明確地說明了利差隨時間推進的驅動因素。若看本季發生的情況，基本上與當時的說法非常一致，因此沒有任何——沒有任何改變。我們仍如預期看到一些提前償還（prepay）的逆風；我們認為提前償還在第四季達到高峰。

They were less in Q1. We expect that to dissipate over time, partly because of the CLO dynamic and the running off of that book. And then we are defensively positioned. We have -- between cash and treasuries on hand at the end of the quarter, we had close to $40 billion. And so that's an opportunistic sort of cost, if you like, to being ready to be more offensively positioned, partly in view of the market, probably in view of the pipeline of origination that we see in front of us.

第一季提前償還較少。我們預期它會隨時間消退，部分原因是CLO的動態以及該投資組合的自然到期/縮減（running off）。此外，我們採取防禦性配置——在季末，我們手上的現金與美國公債合計接近400億美元。因此可以說，為了隨時準備轉為更進攻性的配置（部分是考量市場、也可能是考量我們眼前看到的案源開發管線），這是一種機會成本。

Ken Worthington, JPMorgan.

Ken Worthington，摩根大通（JPMorgan）。

So we've mentioned the $40 billion of cash and treasuries that Athene a couple of times. So Athene is very liquid. Spreads widened out in March, they've narrowed a bit in April. Is the market environment we're seeing today attractive enough that you'd expect those cash levels to be falling you really earmarking the excess cash for more opportunistic opportunities and maybe we even see seen cash levels build as you await those opportunities?

你們已經提到Athen持有的400億美元現金與公債好幾次了，所以Athen的流動性非常充裕。利差在3月擴大、4月又收斂一些。以我們今天看到的市場環境來看，是否已經足夠有吸引力，讓你預期那些現金水位會下降？還是你們其實是把多餘現金預留給更具機會性的投資，甚至在等待機會時，現金水位可能還會再上升？

So it's Marc. I'd say almost all of the spread widening we saw take place, took place in the media and did not take place in the market with the exception of below investment-grade software and IG software to some extent, where we did see spread lining where we just do not have nor do we want meaningful exposure given the diverse set of outcomes that can happen with respect to credit. So I would say in the marketplace, we have not seen the kind of spread widening to be interesting for us to go all in. It is our job to create. And the pipeline that we see coming together is really, really strong.

我是Marc。我會說，我們看到的利差擴大幾乎都發生在媒體上，而不是發生在市場上；例外是非投資級（below investment-grade）的軟體，以及某種程度上的投資級（IG）軟體，我們確實看到利差變動，但我們既沒有、也不想有顯著曝險，因為就信用而言可能出現的結果非常多元。因此我會說，在市場上，我們並沒有看到那種足以讓我們覺得值得「全力投入」的利差擴大。我們的工作是去創造（機會）。而我們看到正在成形的管線非常、非常強。

Starting with the ARI commercial mortgage pipeline, moving into the AMAPS pipeline, as Tim said or I said earlier, we're $11 billion at Athene invested in AMAPS right now. We'll be double that by the end of the year. And that will, in part, be making up for CLO runoff, but part will be growth of the book. But we are holding cash and we do not account on the market bailing us out.

從ARI的商用不動產抵押貸款（commercial mortgage）管線開始，接著進入AMAPS管線。正如Tim或我先前提到的，我們目前在Athene已投資AMAPS約110億美元；到今年底會翻倍。這部分將在一定程度上彌補CLO縮減（runoff），但也有一部分會是投資組合的成長。不過我們確實在持有現金，而且我們不指望市場來拯救我們。

This is all about self-help and originating volumes of liabilities consistent with the origination volume that we are able to bring to Athene, again, IG, and I am very optimistic and -- confident in the second quarter and optimistic for the balance of the year that we have the kind of pipeline that is necessary to allow us to deliver on the targets that we have set out, both in terms of volumes and in terms of spreads.

這完全是靠自助（self-help），並且以我們能帶給Athene的案源開發量為基礎，去發行與之相匹配的負債規模；同樣地，聚焦投資級（IG）。我對第二季非常有信心——並且對今年剩餘期間保持樂觀——我們具備必要的管線，能讓我們達成所設定的目標，無論是在量（volumes）或利差（spreads）方面。

Michael Cyprys, Morgan Stanley.

Michael Cyprys，摩根士丹利（Morgan Stanley）。

Good morning. Thanks for taking the question. I wanted to come back, Marc, to your commentary on the technology cycle and your views around it being very far-reaching, whether it's throughout AI, blockchain tokenization and so forth.

早安，謝謝讓我提問。Marc，我想回到你對科技循環（technology cycle）的評論，以及你認為它影響非常深遠的看法，無論是AI、區塊鏈代幣化（blockchain tokenization）等等。

I was hoping you could talk about the positioning of Apollo how you're positioning Apollo to navigate, what challenges and risks do you see ahead? How do you think about insulating the business either through organic or inorganic steps as you look out? And what are some of the most exciting opportunities that you see for Apollo to capture in the midst of these developments?

我希望你能談談Apollo的定位：你們如何定位Apollo來因應？你看到哪些挑戰與風險？展望未來，你如何思考透過內生成長或外部併購（organic or inorganic）來為業務建立防護？以及在這些發展之中，你認為Apollo最令人興奮、可以掌握的機會是什麼？

That sounds like the whole call. Look, this is -- we are -- there are just so many angles to this, Michael. It starts with the impact on the portfolio. which is -- and I'll go back to what John Zito and others were saying 18 months ago. Software is the ground zero for issues around AI.

這聽起來像是整場電話會議的內容。你看，這件事——我們——這裡面有太多角度了，Michael。首先是對投資組合的影響。我會回到18個月前John Zito和其他人所說的：軟體是AI相關問題的「震央」（ground zero）。

That does not mean every software company is at risk. In fact, some may be enhanced. But our view was in the credit market, we are not paid to figure that out. The best you can do in credit is to get back your money and your interest on time in the amounts you've been agreed. And therefore, since there was no benefit to owning binary outcome software loans, who were bad, we sold them.

這不代表每一家軟體公司都有風險；事實上，有些可能因此受益。但我們的看法是，在信用市場裡，我們沒有拿到足夠報酬去判斷這些。做信用投資你能做到最好的，就是按時、按約定金額收回本金與利息。因此，既然持有這種二元結果（binary outcome）的軟體貸款沒有任何好處——而且結果可能很糟——我們就把它們賣掉了。

If you just discovered six or eight weeks ago that AI could impact enterprise software, what were you doing for the past two years? We don't know. And so it starts with asset selection. And obviously, it is not just enterprise software, it is other businesses that are vulnerable to services. It informs our underwrite of investment grade and where we choose to extend credit.

如果你在六到八週前才發現AI可能影響企業軟體（enterprise software），那你過去兩年都在做什麼？我們不知道。所以一切從資產選擇開始。當然，脆弱的不只是企業軟體，還有其他容易受到服務型業務衝擊的產業。這也會影響我們對投資級的承銷（underwrite），以及我們選擇在哪些領域延伸信用（extend credit）。

Jim focused on this notion of picks and shovels. There are those who have made big bets on the future value of compute, five and six and 10 years from now. And I have no doubt that some of those bets are going to pay off really handsomely. And some of those bets are going to be disastrous. We have appropriate -- not done single-asset bets.

Jim 專注於「賣鏟子與十字鎬」這個概念。有些人對未來算力在五年、六年、十年後的價值下了重注。我毫不懷疑，其中一些押注會帶來非常可觀的回報；也有一些押注會是災難性的。我們採取了適當的做法——沒有做單一資產的押注。

We have spread across with the right structures and the right protections with the right risk award to kind of create convex upsides while getting some amount of downside protection and some notion of our money back. This informs our underwrite.

我們透過適當的架構與適當的保護措施，搭配合適的風險報酬，來創造凸性的上行空間，同時取得一定程度的下行保護，以及某種程度的本金回收概念。這些都會影響我們的承作／核保判斷。

So this is the asset side of our business. Internally, I said on the last call, we are circa 4,000 people in asset management, circa 2,000 people in our retirement services business. I will be surprised if other than on a short-term basis, we end up has more than that.

所以這是我們業務的資產端。內部來說，我在上一次電話會議提到，我們資產管理大約有 4,000 人，退休服務業務大約有 2,000 人。除了短期情況之外，如果最終人數超過這個規模，我會感到意外。

Now I think that jobs are going to change, people are going to change. But the ability of our industry, which, for the first time, is at scale to not be so dependent on legacy systems that we can take advantage of new systems and new ways of doing things, I think, is extraordinary. Some of our industry will do this really aggressively.

我認為工作會改變、人也會改變。但我們這個產業第一次達到規模化，能夠不再那麼依賴傳統舊系統，而是利用新系統與新的做事方式，我覺得這非常了不起。我們產業中的一部分會非常積極地推動這件事。

We will be among them, and some will not because their business is just not demanding enough and it's a pain in the butt to do. So I do expect this will give us opportunity to redeploy margin, redeploy people and whether we choose to take that as additional margin or whether we invest that in growth in the business is a choice we'll make quarter-by-quarter as we think about what is best for the organization over the long term.

我們會是其中之一；也有一些不會，因為他們的業務需求沒那麼強，而且做起來很麻煩。因此我確實預期，這會帶來機會，讓我們重新配置利潤空間、重新配置人力；至於我們選擇把它當作額外利潤，或是把它投資在業務成長上，我們會按季度視情況決定，並思考長期而言什麼對組織最有利。

And then you've got to look politically. We are going to go through wholesale change. If you are an ideally graduate who's in the liberal arts and certain things, you're 10 years out of school, you're making $60,000. If you can level a concrete floor, you're making $250,000. That is a dynamic that we have to be really attentive to because we have no political history of blue-collar workers ascendant and white collar workers under pressure.

接著你還得從政治面來看。我們將經歷全面性的變化。若你是理想狀態下的文科畢業生之類，畢業 10 年後年薪 60,000 美元；但如果你能把混凝土地坪整平，你可能年薪 250,000 美元。這種動態我們必須非常留意，因為我們在政治史上從未出現藍領工人崛起、白領工作者承受壓力的情況。

And many of these white-collar jobs are going to be resident in blue cities. That's where the knowledge workers are. And so we expect some amount of political upheaval both here and in Europe as this transition takes place and as we see. And we are mindful of that in terms of our overall defensive posture. I don't know if you want to add.

而且許多這些白領工作會集中在「藍色城市」（偏民主黨的城市）。知識工作者就在那裡。因此，隨著這個轉型發生、以及我們所看到的情況，我們預期美國與歐洲都會出現一定程度的政治動盪。我們在整體防禦性布局上也會留意這點。我不知道你是否想補充。

I guess that's good.

我想這樣就很好。

Brennan Hawken, BMO Capital Markets.

BMO Capital Markets 的 Brennan Hawken。

Good morning. Thanks for taking my question. You spoke earlier on the spread in Retirement Services. I'm curious about the flow dynamic. I was a bit surprised that the funding agreement flows were so resilient given the spread dynamics in the quarter.

早安。謝謝讓我提問。你先前談到退休服務（Retirement Services）的利差。我想了解資金流向的動態。我有點意外的是，考量本季利差動態，資金協議（funding agreement）的資金流入竟然如此有韌性。

So curious about how you think about your expectations just from a volume perspective on the funding agreement side? And then also on the retail side, it's been a little lighter in the last few quarters.

所以想請教你們如何看待資金協議端、就量（volume）而言的預期？另外在零售端，過去幾季稍微偏弱。

We hear about the competition. You spoke to the cost side before, but just curious from a volume perspective, what your expectations are. Is this the right volume level if you think about retail as we go forward.

我們也聽到競爭的情況。你先前談到成本端，但我想從量的角度了解你們的預期。若看零售業務往後走，這樣的量是否就是合理的量級？

So Brennan, a couple of questions there. One is on the funding agreement side. We did no public funding agreements in the first quarter, given where spreads were. And given where spreads are today, they've come back in meaningfully from the wides, but they're still not the level. They're probably 15 basis points to 20 basis points wide of where they need to be, depending on the tenor for us to find that attractive.

Brennan，你這裡有幾個問題。第一個是資金協議端。第一季我們沒有做任何公開（public）的資金協議，因為當時利差水準不理想。以目前利差來看，雖然已從最寬的水準明顯收斂，但仍未達到我們認為合適的水準；依期限不同，可能仍比我們需要的水準寬約 15 到 20 個基點，才會讓我們覺得有吸引力。

We were, on the other hand, able to access private funding agreements in a way that compensated for that attractive spreads. So that's the funding agreement dynamic. The retail annuities is like -- as we've referenced a couple of times, the market has been competitive. That has eased somewhat and we had a stronger April. But I would expect sort of that to be a base level plus or minus relative to where we expect the immediate quarters to land.

不過另一方面，我們能以可補償、且利差具吸引力的方式取得私募（private）的資金協議。因此這就是資金協議的動態。至於零售年金（retail annuities），如同我們提過幾次，市場競爭激烈；近期稍有緩和，而且我們 4 月表現較強。但我預期大致會以這個水準作為基準，上下小幅波動，符合我們對接下來幾季落點的預期。

And so we think while PRT remains a channel which is not open, we're accessing the other channels, but we're balancing spread, and we're balancing return on equity and relative to the cost structure of the firm, which is a competitive advantage, clearly, and the origination capabilities that we have.

因此我們認為，在 PRT 仍然不是一個開放的通路之際，我們會透過其他通路來取得業務；同時我們會在利差、股東權益報酬率（ROE）之間取得平衡，並結合公司的成本結構（這顯然是競爭優勢）以及我們的承作／起源（origination）能力。

Crispin Love, Piper Sandler.

Piper Sandler 的 Crispin Love。

Thank you. I appreciate the question. I know it's the narrow corner of the market, but can you discuss the opportunity in direct lending today as well as some of the risks out there just cutting through some of the noise and headlines are you seeing increased interest from institutions, given some dislocations there? And then just on the retail side, how are the conversations with advisers and maybe more importantly, advisers and their end clients on the asset class and then confidence in adding alters exposure beyond just direct lending.

謝謝。我很感謝這個提問。我知道這是市場中相對狹窄的一角，但你能否談談目前直接放貸（direct lending）的機會，以及外部的一些風險——在排除雜訊與新聞標題後，你是否看到機構投資人因為某些錯位（dislocations）而提高興趣？另外在零售端，與理財顧問的對話如何？更重要的是，理財顧問及其終端客戶對這個資產類別的看法，以及除了直接放貸之外，對增加另類資產曝險（alternatives exposure）的信心如何？

Yes, I would say to the specific question, the area of pricing for new product in that direct lending market is a SOFR 450 product plus or minus. And I think many originators in light of the last activity the last couple of months with headlines were widening out indications to issuers. And the reality is the flow has been pretty light because of the strength of the broadly syndicated market and the high-yield market. And so that's an alternative financing vehicle and financing avenue.

是的，就你具體的問題而言，直接放貸市場新產品的定價大約是 SOFR+450（上下浮動）。我認為，鑑於過去幾個月的事件與新聞標題，許多承作方對發行人給出的指示性條件（indications）確實有放寬（widening）。但現實是，由於廣泛聯貸市場（broadly syndicated market）與高收益市場（high-yield market）表現強勁，整體資金流量其實相當清淡。因此那邊成為另一種融資工具與融資管道。

So from a product volume side, it's been a little bit lighter. But I would say many, many folks, including ourselves, for good quality direct loans that we believe, have robust business models, there's plenty of access. And it actually may result in industries or names that are not software or AI disruptable to trade actually a little bit of a tighter level. As we mentioned in our broad comments, institutions are looking at it as an opportunity to deploy even in bulk secondary opportunities or new primary mandates. Your third question is really about the adviser.

所以從產品量的角度來看，確實稍微偏淡。不過我會說，對於我們（以及很多很多同業）認為具備良好品質、且商業模式穩健的直接貸款，市場資金仍然相當充裕、取得資金的管道很多。這甚至可能使得某些產業或標的——不是軟體、也不容易被 AI 顛覆的——其交易水準反而略為收緊。正如我們在整體評論中提到的，機構投資人把這視為一個部署資金的機會，不論是大量的次級市場機會（bulk secondary opportunities）或新的初級委託（new primary mandates）。你第三個問題其實是關於理財顧問。

I think, listen, there's been a tremendous amount of dialogue and insight and the degree of education on portfolio construction is really coming home to light, and we are spending a tremendous amount of our time on that. To say when the redemption cues and the redemption volumes, we really won't know for the next four weeks or so -- or next two weeks internationally and then four weeks domestically. I mentioned our preliminary numbers for April are strong. That, at the end of the day, will rule the day in terms of the asset class performance over time. So I think the headlines have dissipated a little bit.

我認為，確實有大量的對話與洞見，而對投資組合建構（portfolio construction）的教育程度也真正被凸顯出來，我們在這上面投入了非常多時間。至於贖回排隊（redemption queues）與贖回量，我們接下來大概還要再觀察四週左右——國際市場大約兩週、國內市場大約四週——才會更清楚。我提到我們 4 月的初步數字很強；最終而言，這將決定這個資產類別隨時間的表現。因此我認為新聞標題的影響已稍微消退。

As we mentioned as well as a few of our peers, the redemption requests have not been wide across the investor universe. It's been a bit narrow based on a few distribution channels in a few geographies. But it's too early to tell exactly how that works in the next few weeks. But the reality is, this is a very robust asset class for 10-plus years, it returned plus 300 or so versus public safe, high-yield and leveraged loans.

如同我們以及一些同業所提到的，贖回申請並未在整個投資人群體中普遍擴散；相對而言較為集中，主要來自少數配銷通路與少數地理區域。但接下來幾週會如何發展，現在下定論仍太早。不過現實是，這是一個非常穩健的資產類別，過去 10 年以上，相對於公開市場的高收益債與槓桿貸款（leveraged loans），報酬大約高出 300 個基點左右。

So institutional investors have benefited. Global wealth investors have benefited from inception-to-date returns. And this is a period that we need to get through.

因此機構投資人受益，全球財富管理投資人也受益於自成立以來（inception-to-date）的報酬。這是一段我們需要度過的時期。

Wilma Burdis, Raymond James.

Raymond James 的 Wilma Burdis。

Good morning. Could you talk about the opportunity -- market opportunity in Japan. We know Apollo is very strong there, and there's fewer competitors. And we've definitely seen an uptick in activity with Aflac and Prudential doing some deals. So can you just talk about what we can expect there going forward and if there's a good amount of volume.

早安。你能談談日本的機會——市場機會嗎？我們知道 Apollo 在那裡非常強，而且競爭者較少。我們也確實看到 Aflac 與 Prudential 做了一些交易，活動有所升溫。你能否談談未來我們可以期待什麼，以及那邊是否會有相當的量？

We've been very public, broadly speaking, on our constructive approach to what's going on in Japan. We actually took all of our 190 partners there in January for our biannual partners off-site for a strategic review of our business, but did a deep dive in Japan. I break it down into three areas, private equity area. We've been active with four to five carve-outs that really plays into our business model of corporate carve-outs in industrialized companies. That's number one.

我們一直相當公開、也相當廣泛地表達我們對日本現況的建設性看法。事實上，我們在 1 月把當地 190 位合夥人全部召集起來，進行我們每兩年一次的合夥人場外會議（off-site），對業務做策略檢視，並且對日本做了深入分析。我把它拆成三個領域：第一是私募股權（private equity）領域。我們已經參與了 4 到 5 個分拆案（carve-outs），這非常符合我們在工業化企業進行企業分拆（corporate carve-outs）的商業模式。這是第一點。

Number two is the distribution of yield product into their insurance and other retirement products vehicles, which we've continued to add dramatically in that space. Third is working with a lot of banks and helping them augment their excess capital and that's excess reserves in dollar-based assets.

第二點是將收益型產品分銷到保險以及其他退休產品載體中，我們在該領域持續大幅增加。第三點是與許多銀行合作，協助他們強化其超額資本，也就是以美元計價資產形式持有的超額準備金。

And the fourth, as you said, mentioned about the insurance business, we typically to date have been a reinsurer, but a lot of activity going on to see how we can use our competitive asset management and origination capabilities to compete to a broader degree. I think it'd be inappropriate to talk about any one transaction. But we're excited about what we see broadly speaking.

第四點，如你所說，提到保險業務；截至目前我們通常是再保險人，但目前有很多活動在進行，看看我們如何運用具競爭力的資產管理與資產發起能力，以更廣泛的程度參與競爭。我認為談論任何單一交易都不恰當。但就整體而言，我們對所看到的機會感到振奮。

And I will add that we brought on a very senior individual to run our Asia business, our Asia Pac business based in Japan, Ueda-san, who after a long career at Goldman ran GPIF as a CIO for five years, so incredibly well positioned, and it's really a statement of our view on the opportunity set in that country in that region.

我再補充一點：我們延攬了一位非常資深的人士來負責我們的亞洲業務、亞太業務，常駐日本的上田先生（Ueda-san）。他在高盛有長期職涯，之後擔任GPIF的CIO五年，因此條件非常到位；這也確實表明了我們對該國、該區域機會集合的看法。

Bart Dziarski, RBC Capital Markets.

Bart Dziarski，RBC資本市場。

Great. Thanks for taking my question and good morning, everyone. I wanted to ask around Athene. So thanks for the enhanced disclosure. I do agree. I think it's the best disclosure out there for life insurance. And I wanted to ask sort of your view today on the regulatory temperature, if you will.

很好。謝謝讓我提問，大家早安。我想就Athene提一些問題。也謝謝你們加強揭露；我同意，我認為這是壽險業目前最好的揭露。我想請教你們對當前監管「溫度」（如果可以這麼說）的看法。

So the NAIC is looking at CLO capital charges sound manageable for you guys. And then last week, the UK PRA. So they're looking into Bermuda-based funded reinsurance transaction. So just curious how you guys are thinking about the regulatory environment as it's evolving.

NAIC正在檢視CLO的資本計提（capital charges），看起來對你們應該是可控的。然後上週英國PRA也在看，他們正在調查以百慕達為基礎的融資型再保險交易。所以想了解你們如何看待監管環境的演變。

Going to be -- going to be -- we'll see how you take this, it's going to be kind of an interesting dialogue. So we have been very engaged regulatory over a long period of time. We benefit from a good, robust set of rules that make sense. And the reason is that we are the largest factor in this industry. And like some of the largest, most dominant banks, we are indirectly responsible for the poor behavior of others.

這會是——會是——看看你怎麼看，可能會是一段挺有意思的對話。我們長期以來一直非常積極地與監管機構互動。我們受益於一套良好、健全且合理的規則。原因是我們是這個產業中最大的因素（largest factor）。而且就像一些最大、最具主導地位的銀行一樣，我們會因他人的不當行為而間接受到牽連。

Every once in a while, when someone does something silly, a bill is delivered to the industry, and we are the largest participant in the paying of that bill, and we are tired of writing $100 million and $150 million checks for the stupidity of others.

每隔一段時間，當有人做了蠢事，產業就會收到一張帳單；而我們是支付這張帳單的最大參與者。我們已經厭倦了因別人的愚蠢而開出1億美元、1.5億美元的支票。

And so we have been consistent with our regulatory focus, equal capital for equal risk. The CLO project is a project that we have supported and helped on for a long period of time. It is ultimately up to the regulators to do the work that they need to do, informed by data, to come to the notion of equal capital for equal risk as opposed to an inherent bias for or again structured or for or against corporate securities. So in that regard, we're happy to see it.

因此，我們在監管上的立場一貫是：同等風險、同等資本（equal capital for equal risk）。CLO專案是我們長期支持並協助推動的專案。最終仍由監管機構依據數據完成其需要做的工作，並形成「同等風險、同等資本」的結論，而不是對結構性產品或公司債券存在先天偏見——不論是偏好或反對。就這點而言，我們樂見其成。

The other thing that's going on is there is an increased focus on offshore jurisdictions. Let's start with the US -- the US understands that to the extent massive amounts of money are being moved to the Cayman Islands and the Caymans are not as transparent that the US system is on the hook.

另一個正在發生的事情是，對離岸司法管轄區的關注正在提高。先從美國談起——美國明白，若有巨額資金被移往開曼群島，而開曼的透明度又不足，那麼美國體系就得承擔風險。

Every one of them understands is there is heightened exposure around Cayman. And this is not to say that Cayman itself is a bad place, but in the current regime, without the same protections that places like Bermuda or otherwise have done, they are not reciprocal jurisdictions and are under intense scrutiny.

大家都明白，圍繞開曼的曝險正在升高。這並不是說開曼本身是不好的地方，但在現行制度下，若沒有像百慕達等地所提供的同等保護，它們並非互惠司法管轄區（reciprocal jurisdictions），因此正受到嚴格審視。

And it will not surprise me to see increased amounts of regulatory scrutiny and perhaps increased request for capital for those people who have made extensive use of Caymans, which, by the way, are not just new entrants. There are lots of established entrants who also have positions in the Caymans. With respect to the PRA, there is also a focus on offshore funded reinsurance.

我不會意外看到監管審查加強，甚至可能對那些大量使用開曼架構的人提出更高的資本要求。順帶一提，這些人不只是新進者；也有許多既有參與者在開曼同樣有部位。至於PRA，他們也在關注離岸融資型再保險（offshore funded reinsurance）。

I believe the rules or the proposed rules that have come from the PRA are beneficial to people who are actually running a proper business. I expect them to be helpful to what we're trying to do. I also expect the same to come from the Japanese marketplace.

我認為PRA提出的規則或擬議規則，對於真正把業務做扎實的人是有利的。我預期這些規則會有助於我們想做的事情。我也預期日本市場會出現類似的趨勢。

In Japan, we have seen, like in many other jurisdictions, companies make use of offshore funded reinsurance in some places with credit counterparties who are not quite where they should be. Just like for the PRA, this is a concern for the Japanese regulator, and I would not be surprised to see formal or informal pressure brought around that.

在日本，我們看到如同許多其他司法管轄區一樣，有些公司利用離岸融資型再保險，在某些情況下其信用交易對手並未達到應有水準。就像PRA一樣，這也是日本監管機構的關切；我不會意外看到因此而出現正式或非正式的壓力。

I come back to the competitive dynamic. Very few people have been able to amass the kind of capital base we have. The reason we've been able to do this is because we manage ROE, we write business that makes sense for us as principal and as a result, our investors allow us to retain the capital in the business and to compound that capital over time. Almost every other company in our industry pays out 90-plus percent of their earnings and does not grow their capital base. Over time, the ability to guarantee outcomes, we believe, is going to be more and more important.

我回到競爭動態。能夠累積到我們這種資本基礎的人非常少。我們之所以能做到，是因為我們管理ROE，承作對我們作為主體（principal）而言合理的業務；因此投資人允許我們把資本留在公司內，並隨時間複利增長。幾乎我們產業中的其他公司會把90%以上的盈餘配發出去，無法擴大其資本基礎。隨著時間推移，我們相信，能夠保證結果（guarantee outcomes）的能力將變得愈來愈重要。

We are not shying away from the guarantee business. We like the guarantee business. We just want to be paid appropriately for what we're doing and continue to manage the business around robust ROEs, and we welcome the regulatory intensity. When we produce the kinds of decks you've seen for Athene, every regulator has them. We asked the question that you would logically ask, why isn't everyone required to do this?

我們不會迴避保證型業務。我們喜歡保證型業務。我們只是希望能就我們所做的事情獲得適當報酬，並持續以穩健的ROE來管理業務；我們也歡迎監管強度提高。當我們製作你們在Athene看到的那種簡報（decks）時，每一位監管者都拿得到。我們問了一個你也會合理提出的問題：為什麼不是每個人都被要求做到這種程度？

And again, there should not be just a focus on new entrants. This is a problem for the established insurers as well. There are a number of really good companies out there. We do lots of business with them, and there are a number of people who are cutting corners, and I do not believe are ultimately good players and good participants in the industry in their current form.

而且，焦點不應只放在新進者。這對既有保險公司同樣是問題。市場上有不少非常優秀的公司，我們也與他們做很多生意；但也有一些人在偷工減料，我不認為他們以目前的樣貌，最終會是產業中的良好玩家與良好參與者。

Thank you. This brings us to the end of today's question-and-answer session. I would like to turn the floor back over to Mr. Gunn for closing comments.

謝謝。這也帶我們來到今天問答環節的結束。我想把時間交回給Gunn先生做結語。

Great. Well, we appreciate everyone's time and extended attention this morning. As always, if you have any follow-up, please feel free to reach out, and we look forward to speaking with you soon.

很好。我們感謝大家今天早上撥冗並長時間專注參與。一如往常，如果你們有任何後續問題，歡迎隨時聯繫，我們也期待很快再與各位交流。

Ladies and gentlemen, this concludes today's event. You may disconnect your lines at this time or log off the webcast and enjoy the rest of your day.

各位女士、先生，今天的活動到此結束。您現在可以掛斷電話線，或登出網路直播，祝您今天其餘時間愉快。