Affirm Holdings Inc (AFRM) 2023 Q1 法說會逐字稿

Good afternoon. Welcome to the Affirm Holdings First Quarter 2023 Earnings Conference Call. (Operator Instructions) As a reminder, this conference is being recorded, and a replay of the call will be available on our Investor Relations website for a reasonable period of time after the call.

下午好。歡迎參加 Affirm Holdings 2023 年第一季度收益電話會議。 （操作員說明）作為提醒，本次會議正在錄製中，電話會議的重播將在電話會議後的一段合理時間內在我們的投資者關係網站上提供。

I'd now like to turn the call over to Zane Keller, Director of Investor Relations. Thank you. You may begin.

我現在想把電話轉給投資者關係總監 Zane Keller。謝謝你。你可以開始了。

Thank you, operator. Before we begin, I'd like to remind everyone listening that today's call may contain forward-looking statements. These forward-looking statements are subject to numerous risks and uncertainties, including those set forth in our filings with the SEC, which are available on our Investor Relations website. Actual results may differ materially from any forward-looking statements that we make today. Forward-looking statements speak only as of today, and the company does not assume any obligation or intend to update them, except as required by law.

謝謝你，接線員。在開始之前，我想提醒大家，今天的電話會議可能包含前瞻性陳述。這些前瞻性陳述受到眾多風險和不確定性的影響，包括我們向美國證券交易委員會提交的文件中所述的風險和不確定性，這些文件可在我們的投資者關係網站上查閱。實際結果可能與我們今天做出的任何前瞻性陳述大不相同。前瞻性陳述僅在今天發表，公司不承擔任何義務或打算更新它們，除非法律要求。

In addition, today's call may include non-GAAP financial measures. These measures should be considered as a supplement to and not a substitute for GAAP financial measures. For historical non-GAAP financial measures, reconciliations to the most directly comparable GAAP measures can be found in our earnings supplement slide deck, which is available on our Investor Relations website.

此外，今天的電話會議可能包括非公認會計準則財務指標。這些措施應被視為對公認會計原則財務措施的補充而非替代。對於歷史非 GAAP 財務指標，與最直接可比的 GAAP 指標的對賬可以在我們的收益補充幻燈片中找到，該幻燈片可在我們的投資者關係網站上找到。

Before turning the call over, we want to briefly note our shift to a quarterly shareholder letter instead of a lengthy press release and prepared remarks. We believe that this format will enable us to spend more time answering questions from the investment community. As such, we encourage you to review the shareholder letter for commentary that we would typically include in our prepared remarks.

在轉交電話之前，我們想簡要說明一下我們轉向季度股東信函，而不是冗長的新聞稿和準備好的評論。我們相信，這種形式將使我們能夠花更多時間回答投資界的問題。因此，我們鼓勵您查看股東信中的評論，我們通常會在準備好的評論中包含這些評論。

In addition, we believe that the shareholder letter, when read in conjunction with our earnings supplement, will enhance our ability to communicate with the investment community. Both documents are available on our Investor Relations website. This change was also influenced by feedback that we received from investors. We hope you find the shareholder letter informative, and we welcome any feedback.

此外，我們相信股東信與我們的收益補充一起閱讀時，將增強我們與投資界溝通的能力。這兩份文件都可以在我們的投資者關係網站上找到。這一變化也受到我們從投資者那裡收到的反饋的影響。我們希望您能找到股東信中的信息，我們歡迎任何反饋。

Hosting today's call with me are Max Levchin, Affirm's Founder and Chief Executive Officer; and Michael Linford, Affirm's Chief Financial Officer.

主持今天的電話會議的是 Affirm 的創始人兼首席執行官 Max Levchin；和 Affirm 的首席財務官 Michael Linford。

With that, I'd like to turn the call over to Max to begin.

有了這個，我想把電話轉給 Max 開始。

Thank you, Zane. We appreciate everyone taking the time to join us. Our results reinforce the confidence we have in our strategy and Affirm's ability to capitalize on our opportunities. Two years ago, that was time we were preparing for a journey as a public company. We're now completing our eighth quarter as a publicly traded company, and it seems really good time to compare our results for the 12 months ending September 30, 2022, versus the 12 months ending December 31, 2020, which was the last calendar year as a private company for us.

謝謝你，贊恩。我們感謝大家抽出時間加入我們。我們的結果增強了我們對戰略的信心，以及 Affirm 把握機遇的能力。兩年前，那是我們為上市公司的旅程做準備的時候。我們現在正在完成作為一家上市公司的第八季度，現在是比較我們截至 2022 年 9 月 30 日的 12 個月與截至 2020 年 12 月 31 日的 12 個月（即最後一個日曆年）的業績的好時機作為我們的私人公司。

Since then, with comparison, we've more than tripled active consumers. We quintupled transactions almost. We grew transactions per active consumer 1.5x, per transaction frequency by 50%, and near tripled our trailing 12-month GMV. We have doubled our revenue and almost tripled revenue less transaction costs growing it up to $732 million. All while we've been in control of our credit results. Delinquencies and net charge-offs remain at or below pre-pandemic levels, very important to us.

從那時起，相比之下，我們的活躍消費者增加了兩倍多。我們的交易量幾乎翻了五倍。我們將每位活躍消費者的交易量增加了 1.5 倍，每筆交易頻率增加了 50%，接近過去 12 個月 GMV 的三倍。我們的收入翻了一番，減去交易成本後的收入幾乎翻了三倍，達到 7.32 億美元。一直以來，我們一直在控制我們的信用結果。拖欠和淨沖銷保持在或低於大流行前的水平，這對我們來說非常重要。

We remain focused in the long term while making sure to navigate the present macro volatility very thoughtfully. We're continuing to obsess over risk and transaction costs to maintain a strong unit economics. We will shift features that improve network scale and profitability like we always have. We're going to manage our OpEx carefully while investing in our highest conviction product opportunities.

我們仍然專注於長期，同時確保非常周到地應對當前的宏觀波動。我們將繼續關注風險和交易成本，以保持強勁的單位經濟性。我們將像往常一樣改變提高網絡規模和盈利能力的功能。我們將謹慎管理我們的運營支出，同時投資於我們最堅信的產品機會。

We're building deep connections with consumers and merchants who need us now more than ever before. Both sides of our network can navigate economic uncertainty and we see this as an opportunity to solidify our position as a trusted and reliable partner.

我們正在與比以往任何時候都更需要我們的消費者和商家建立深厚的聯繫。我們網絡的雙方都可以應對經濟不確定性，我們認為這是鞏固我們作為值得信賴和可靠合作夥伴地位的機會。

Back to you, Zane.

回到你身邊，贊恩。

Thank you, Max. With that, we will now begin our question-and-answer session. Operator, please open the line for our first question.

謝謝你，馬克斯。有了這個，我們現在將開始我們的問答環節。接線員，請打開我們的第一個問題的線路。

(Operator Instructions) Our first question comes from the line of James Faucette with Morgan Stanley.

（操作員說明）我們的第一個問題來自摩根士丹利的 James Faucette。

I want to talk first about this path to profits in 2023. Obviously, you reiterated that but, nevertheless, you're looking for little bit lower GMV and associated performance on the top line. How are you thinking about like the evolution of that timing and what you need to do to make sure you get to breakeven or profitability in 2023?

我想先談談 2023 年的盈利之路。顯然，您重申了這一點，但是，您正在尋找更低的 GMV 和相關的收入表現。您如何看待這個時機的演變以及您需要做些什麼來確保您在 2023 年實現盈虧平衡或盈利？

James, thanks for the question. Yes, we are still very much on time and on pace to achieve the profitability goal that we outlined, which just to recap everybody, we talked about getting to profitability starting in the first day of our fiscal '24. We said on a sustainable basis, meaning that we'll intend to do it repeatedly most of the time and looking at adjusted operating income.

詹姆斯，謝謝你的問題。是的，我們仍然非常準時並按時實現我們概述的盈利目標，這只是為了回顧每個人，我們談到從 24 財年的第一天開始實現盈利。我們在可持續的基礎上說，這意味著我們打算在大多數時間重複這樣做，並考慮調整後的營業收入。

And so for us, the challenge is some pretty simple math. We need our revenue less transaction costs to be greater than the adjusted operating expenses that we have below the transaction cost line. The key things for us then are making sure we're doing everything we can to maximize the unit economics in the business. And if you look at our back half of the year road map, we have a lot of focus on making sure we're doing all that we can and should do there as Max outlined in the letter. And we're going to be mindful about controlling our operating expenses. And to that, that means being very careful, in particular, on hiring, but also making sure that we're not having any pockets of waste in the business.

所以對我們來說，挑戰是一些非常簡單的數學。我們需要我們的收入減去交易成本大於我們在交易成本線以下的調整後的運營費用。對我們來說，關鍵的事情是確保我們正在盡我們所能最大限度地提高企業的單位經濟效益。如果你看一下我們下半年的路線圖，我們會非常關注確保我們正在盡我們所能和應該做的一切，正如 Max 在信中所概述的那樣。我們將注意控制我們的運營費用。對此，這意味著要非常小心，尤其是在招聘時，還要確保我們在業務中沒有任何浪費。

As we continue to scale the business and make the right investments, we also don't want to have dollars wasted in the system. If you look at our kind of guidance, the back half of the year and the adjusted operating expenses that are implied by that, we feel like we'll put this in a really fit shape so that we'd be exiting right where we want to be to achieve that goal for next year.

隨著我們繼續擴大業務規模並做出正確的投資，我們也不希望在系統中浪費資金。如果您查看我們的指導、下半年以及由此暗示的調整後的運營費用，我們覺得我們將把它放在一個非常合適的狀態，這樣我們就可以在我們想要的地方退出明年要實現這個目標。

And then on -- a lot of places we could go but let's start with -- starting with delinquencies. You mentioned in the prepared remarks that you're still a bit below where you were pre-pandemic. However, directionally, you're starting to get pretty close to those levels now. And just wondering how you're thinking about like managing that, especially since I would think that there would be an increasing number of repeat customers in that 2023 versus pre-pandemic, which if they repeat, you would think that they would tend to be better behaving in terms of at least delinquency, et cetera.

然後——我們可以去很多地方，但讓我們從犯罪開始。您在準備好的評論中提到，您仍然比大流行前的水平低一點。但是，從方向上講，您現在開始非常接近這些水平。只是想知道你是如何考慮管理的，特別是因為我認為與大流行前相比，2023 年的回頭客數量會越來越多，如果他們重複，你會認為他們會傾向於至少在犯罪等方面表現得更好。

So where should we think that you'll try to top those out at? How are you going to manage that? And what's the -- I guess, the prognosis for when you would do that and under what conditions?

那麼我們應該認為你會在哪裡嘗試超越這些呢？你將如何管理它？什麼是 - 我猜，你何時以及在什麼條件下這樣做的預測？

I'll start and I think Michael can probably help quantify second half of the question. So just to set the stage, the most important thing to take away from us, we are not just managing credit outcomes, we set them. The whole point of these ultra short-term 4.6 months weighted average life of every loan, every transaction is underwritten. We have full control of transactions requiring down payment, or not, we control the amount of down payment, et cetera, cetera.

我會開始，我認為邁克爾可能可以幫助量化問題的後半部分。因此，只是為了搭建舞台，從我們身上帶走的最重要的事情，我們不只是管理信貸結果，我們設置它們。這些超短期的4.6個月加權平均壽命，每筆貸款，每筆交易都有承保。我們完全控制需要首付的交易，或者不，我們控制首付的金額等等。

So we have lots of levers we use to control risk. We've said about -- talked about this many, many times, but never gets old. And that gives us a lot of very nimble controls over the actual credit outcomes. So we set a number we want to hit. Obviously, every week, we get a stack full of new formation going back to all the cohorts that are still active.

所以我們有很多用來控制風險的槓桿。我們已經談論過——談論過很多很多次，但永遠不會變老。這讓我們可以非常靈活地控制實際的信貸結果。所以我們設置了一個我們想要達到的數字。顯然，每週，我們都會收到一堆新陣型，這些陣型可以追溯到所有仍然活躍的隊列。

And we adjust credit that we have been now managing it quite actively to make sure that we get to the numbers that we require. Because the back book runs off very quickly, we have a lot of control. This compares pretty favorably with the rest of the industry that does things like credit card consolidation loans or personal loans that go back years and there's nothing you can do about it.

我們調整了我們現在非常積極地管理它的信用，以確保我們達到我們需要的數字。因為後面的書很快就用完了，我們有很多控制權。這與從事信用卡合併貸款或個人貸款等行業的其他行業相比相當有利，這些行業可以追溯到幾年前，而您對此無能為力。

So that's just a really important thing to understand. And again, I apologize for -- to those who from -- this sounds like just an old repeat, but this really is how this business works. And the reason our numbers are as strong as they are today, and you can see this in the letter, is not an accident. It's not as though the world hasn't changed. There's plenty of stress on the consumer, in the lower income brackets, lower credit quality. We're just good at managing, and we do underwrite every transaction, and therefore, we have a lot of control. So that's sort of the backdrop.

所以這只是理解的非常重要的事情。再一次，我向那些來自的人道歉——這聽起來只是一個老生常談，但這確實是這項業務的運作方式。我們的數字之所以像今天這樣強大，您可以在信中看到這一點，這並非偶然。世界似乎沒有改變。在低收入階層、較低的信用質量中，消費者面臨著很大的壓力。我們只是擅長管理，我們確實為每筆交易提供擔保，因此，我們有很多控制權。這就是背景。

The counterpoint to this is the demand for BNPL is increasing. We serve our consumers, we see demand in the application side of things. Generally speaking, people are turning -- not just BNPL, by the way. We looked at credit cards, people are starting to have more than they used to do. I mean we're not done in the higher income brackets spending through the pandemic stimulus, but they're getting closer, probably sometime mid next year is when we'll see the exhaustion of those savings. But today, the lower income groups are already done and they're trying to turn to various forms of debt.

與此相反的是對BNPL的需求正在增加。我們為消費者服務，我們看到了應用方面的需求。一般來說，人們正在轉向——順便說一句，不僅僅是BNPL。我們查看了信用卡，人們開始擁有比以往更多的東西。我的意思是，通過大流行的刺激，我們在高收入階層的支出還沒有結束，但它們越來越接近了，可能明年年中的某個時候，我們會看到這些儲蓄用完。但是今天，低收入群體已經結束了，他們正試圖轉向各種形式的債務。

We believe pretty firmly we have done the best alternative out there. We have 85% repeat transaction from existing consumers to prove that. And so you have enough demand, and we do have a lot. We have enough diversity of merchants where, as folks shift out of connected fitness and finance, or homewares, you go for big box, more commodity purchase, we are there to help them with all those things. And so demand is still quite strong. If we have control, as we do all of our credit outcomes, we can manage to the number that we need at once.

我們堅信我們已經做了最好的選擇。我們有 85% 的現有消費者重複交易來證明這一點。所以你有足夠的需求，而我們確實有很多。我們有足夠多樣化的商家，當人們從連接的健身和金融或家居用品中轉移出來時，你會選擇大盒子，購買更多商品，我們會在所有這些事情上為他們提供幫助。因此需求仍然相當強勁。如果我們有控制權，就像我們做所有的信用結果一樣，我們可以一次管理到我們需要的數量。

That's sort of how we're doing it. Michael can give you a little bit more data on exactly where we intend to run it. But again, this is a choice we have as opposed to a thing we have to contend with.

這就是我們的做法。 Michael 可以為您提供更多關於我們打算運行它的確切位置的數據。但同樣，這是我們的選擇，而不是我們必須應對的事情。

That's right. And it varies by product, and it varies by merchants that we're at. So I think your point is very well taken that we do see substantial improvements in credit quality as we see more repeat usage. And I'll note that we're still acquiring new users at a pretty good clip and thinking about the business is still feeling and we're not done with the acquisition side of the equation, certainly not on a gross basis.

這是正確的。它因產品而異，也因我們所在的商家而異。因此，我認為您的觀點非常正確，我們確實看到信用質量有了顯著改善，因為我們看到更多的重複使用。而且我會注意到，我們仍在以相當不錯的速度獲得新用戶，並且仍在考慮業務，我們還沒有完成等式的收購方面，當然不是在總體基礎上。

The additional disclosures that we've got now in the shareholder letter would really encourage folks to spend some time with them, both looking at the delinquency trends, which we now show 30, 60, 90 as well as we've got the cohortized net charge-off curves for our monthly loans and I've given you some trending that you can see on flip pay. And I think the biggest takeaway for all of those is that we are dialing in where these things are. It's going to be a week or a month that varies up or down, but we get to dial in where those losses are.

我們現在在股東信中獲得的額外披露真的會鼓勵人們花一些時間與他們在一起，看看拖欠趨勢，我們現在顯示 30、60、90 以及我們已經得到了隊列化網絡我們每月貸款的沖銷曲線，我給了你一些趨勢，你可以在翻轉工資中看到。我認為所有這些最大的收穫是我們正在撥入這些東西的位置。這將是一個上下變化的一周或一個月，但我們可以撥出這些損失的位置。

And that's such an important strategic piece of this business, that we can take that loss. Then we can have confidence in how we think about the credit losses with respect to our capital partners, we have confidence in how it affects our P&L and allows us to confidently go approve to a very deep level.

這是這項業務中如此重要的戰略部分，我們可以承擔這一損失。然後，我們可以對我們如何看待資本合作夥伴的信用損失充滿信心，我們對它如何影響我們的損益表充滿信心，並使我們能夠自信地批准到非常深的水平。

I think if you put us up against most of the people in the traditional financial institution world or most people who do unsecured consumer lending, our results are really good. And we feel like that is a real strength for us, and we're not going to treat it lightly. That's something we're going to continue to do, first and foremost, as it's an important aspect in everything that we do.

我認為，如果您將我們與傳統金融機構世界中的大多數人或大多數從事無擔保消費貸款的人進行對比，我們的結果非常好。我們覺得這對我們來說是一種真正的力量，我們不會掉以輕心。這是我們將繼續做的事情，首先也是最重要的，因為這是我們所做的一切的一個重要方面。

While waiting, just for what it's worth, I'm not the only person who looks at credit at this company. I'm one of the very significant number who does that. But when I look at our credit outcomes, I look at cohortized data basically performance by vintage.

在等待的時候，只是為了它的價值，我不是唯一一個在這家公司看信用的人。我是這樣做的非常重要的人之一。但是當我查看我們的信用結果時，我會查看隊列數據，基本上是按年份劃分的。

Strong plus 1 to Michael, please have a look at what we put out in the letter. We really wanted to communicate very clearly to our investors that this is the one piece of the business that matters to us, should matter for our investors, and we are in full control, and we look at these things on a cohort basis, as we think you should.

強加 1 給邁克爾，請看看我們在信中提出的內容。我們真的想非常清楚地與我們的投資者溝通，這是對我們很重要的一項業務，應該對我們的投資者很重要，而且我們完全可以控制，我們在一個群體的基礎上看待這些事情，因為我們認為你應該。

Our next question comes from the line of Moshe Orenbuch with Credit Suisse.

我們的下一個問題來自瑞士信貸的 Moshe Orenbuch。

Great. In the past couple of quarters, we've talked about the potential to change price to consumers. Does the fiscal '23 guide for revenue less transaction costs assume any pricing changes? And if not, what would it take to get you to start that process?

偉大的。在過去的幾個季度中，我們談到了改變消費者價格的潛力。 '23 財政年度收入減去交易成本指南是否假設任何定價變化？如果沒有，你需要什麼來啟動這個過程？

Excellent question. So the short answer is there's a number of mitigants across merchant, consumer pricing and the rest of our transaction cost line items that are not reflected in our guide. Those remain as upside and a little bit, if you will, how we think about the guidance. We want to be really careful to put in the guidance things that we are certain about as opposed to things that we hope will deliver and help close the gap. And that's why we, for example, look at the current forward curve. We don't have a proprietary house view of rates. And we try to look at the current shift and live features of the product.

很好的問題。因此，簡短的回答是，在我們的指南中沒有反映商家、消費者定價和我們其他交易成本項目的一些緩解措施。如果您願意的話，這些仍然是上行空間和一點點，我們對指導的看法。我們希望非常小心地提供我們確定的指導內容，而不是我們希望提供並幫助縮小差距的內容。這就是為什麼我們，例如，看看當前的遠期曲線。我們沒有專有的房屋價格視圖。我們嘗試著眼於產品的當前轉變和實時功能。

And so there is some aspect of higher APR, but the majority of the opportunity for higher APRs to consumers is not reflected in the guide as is the opportunity we have on the merchant side from a pricing perspective.

因此，較高的 APR 在某些方面存在，但是從定價的角度來看，我們在商家方面擁有的機會並沒有反映在指南中。

Great. And as a follow-up, given the funding stresses that you and others in the industry have seen this quarter, could you, and maybe Michael, talk a little bit about what your plans are, obviously, given going into a quarter where you're going to generate a lot of interest-bearing loans? Do you have an outlet for them? And you mentioned in some of the text here about the potential for lower gain on sale. Could you maybe put some numbers around that, how much lower, and how should we think about it?

偉大的。作為後續行動，鑑於您和業內其他人在本季度看到的資金壓力，您，也許邁克爾，能否談談您的計劃是什麼，很明顯，考慮到進入您所在的季度重新產生大量有息貸款？你有他們的出路嗎？您在此處的一些文本中提到了銷售收益較低的可能性。你能不能在這附近放一些數字，低多少，我們應該如何考慮？

Yes. The thing we're pointing out in the letter is that we think we'll be slightly above the 5% equity capital required, which as you know, we've been running substantially lower than that over the past several quarters. That does reflect what we think will be a higher usage of balance sheet, in particular, where health financing into this quarter.

是的。我們在信中指出的是，我們認為我們將略高於所需的 5% 股本，如您所知，我們在過去幾個季度中的運行率一直低於該水平。這確實反映了我們認為資產負債表的更高使用率，特別是本季度的醫療融資。

So let me answer the broader question for assuming all the way out. We have a lot of conviction and confidence in our ability to fund the business. I don't think we're worried about that at all. The question for us is going to be the shape of the P&L as it goes through the various funding models that we have. And it is the case that we will have slightly more on balance sheet, which means that as you see in the Q2 guide for that revenue less transaction costs, you have 2 factors that are really affecting that number in the quarter and the reason for the back half of the year acceleration. They are the late in the quarter origination, late November into December origination of interest-bearing loans that end up on the balance sheet. That creates a lot of vertical pressure, meaning the period Q2 results will be depressed on a percentage of GMV.

因此，讓我回答更廣泛的問題，以假設所有出路。我們對自己為業務提供資金的能力充滿信心和信心。我認為我們根本不擔心這一點。對我們來說，問題將是損益表的形狀，因為它通過我們擁有的各種融資模式。在這種情況下，我們的資產負債表會稍微多一些，這意味著正如你在第二季度指南中看到的那樣，收入減去交易成本，你有兩個因素真正影響了這個季度的數字，以及導致下半年提速。它們是在本季度末期，即 11 月下旬至 12 月的有息貸款發起，最終出現在資產負債表上。這造成了很大的垂直壓力，這意味著第二季度的業績將在一定百分比的 GMV 上受到抑制。

When you look out to the back half of the year, we're implying acceleration, a pretty meaningful one in revenue less transaction cost. That is an assumption of a material change in the economics of the business that's simply the stuff that we'll originate in Q2 flowing through the P&L in the back half of the year. The opportunities in that, again that you alluded to at the very top, those have actually just be on top of or in addition to the acceleration that we're currently going to do.

當你展望今年下半年時，我們暗示的是加速，這是一個非常有意義的收入減去交易成本。這是對業務經濟發生重大變化的假設，這只是我們將在第二季度產生的東西，在今年下半年通過損益表流動。其中的機會，同樣你在最頂層提到的，實際上只是在我們目前要做的加速之上或之外。

Our next question comes from the line of Ramsey El-Assal with Barclays.

我們的下一個問題來自巴克萊銀行的 Ramsey El-Assal。

I was wondering on the changes to guidance, if you could disaggregate the impact from Peloton, I think that you called out in the shareholder letter, versus other factors.

我想知道指導的變化，如果你可以分解 Peloton 的影響，我認為你在股東信中提到了其他因素。

Yes. So I think there's 2 drivers, and then there's some math you can do. The biggest drivers are Peloton, both and most acutely in our second quarter. So to give you some context, in our second quarter, we talk about a GMV growth rate that would be 40% instead of the guided to 31% in the second quarter. And we'd estimate that, on a revenue basis, we would be up 29% in the second quarter instead of 16%.

是的。所以我認為有 2 個驅動程序，然後你可以做一些數學運算。最大的驅動因素是 Peloton，這在我們的第二季度都是最強烈的。因此，為了給您一些背景信息，在我們的第二季度，我們談論的是 40% 的 GMV 增長率，而不是第二季度指導的 31%。我們估計，在收入的基礎上，我們將在第二季度增長 29%，而不是 16%。

Obviously, that's a very material headwind with respect to the top line measures in the business. Back half of the year, that starts to attenuate quite a bit. But in the back half of the year, we are modeling the impact of the movement in rates. And we talked a lot about there being roughly 30 basis points of headwind, of which we're mitigating roughly half of that in our guidance in terms of the RLTC take rate. And so those are the 2 biggest drivers.

顯然，相對於業務的頂線措施而言，這是一個非常重大的逆風。今年下半年，這種情況開始減弱很多。但在今年下半年，我們正在模擬利率變動的影響。我們談了很多關於大約有 30 個基點的逆風，我們在 RLTC 採取率方面的指導中減少了大約一半的逆風。所以這是兩個最大的驅動力。

It's important to talk about the cause -- those are the effects and the root causes. But one of the important things as we were just talking about is as we use the balance sheet a little bit more in Q2, you're going to, again, change the shape a little bit of that margin and that will continue on throughout the course of the year. But we think it's more of a onetime change in terms of the warehouse usage that we'll see next quarter. And we'll run the business at that level for the next couple of quarters, which will result in more revenue that we'll earn later for originations, and that trend will show up as you'd expect.

談論原因很重要——這些是影響和根本原因。但正如我們剛才所說的，其中一件重要的事情是，當我們在第二季度更多地使用資產負債表時，你將再次改變一點邊距的形狀，這將在整個一年的課程。但我們認為，就我們將在下個季度看到的倉庫使用情況而言，這更像是一次性的變化。在接下來的幾個季度中，我們將在這個水平上經營業務，這將帶來更多的收入，我們稍後將獲得更多的收入，並且這種趨勢將如您所料那樣出現。

Okay. And one follow-up for me. You also mentioned in the shareholder letter that your sensitivity to additional interest rate increases has decreased since you initially gave us a look at that in February. What are the drivers there? What is helping that number come down?

好的。對我來說是一個後續行動。您在股東信中還提到，自您在 2 月份最初向我們提供的情況下，您對額外加息的敏感度有所下降。那裡的司機是什麼？是什麼幫助這個數字下降？

Honestly, I think it's as much anything actually observing the impact that our counter-parties are flowing through rates. When we gave that initial framework back in February of this year, we were taking into account a lot of the potential first and second order effects. And obviously, we were doing it -- we gave you a framework to think about it as every 100 basis points, there's a second or third order effect, too, because the stickiness of the curve begins to affect decisions. And I think it's more just as we've observed and seen the impact, we're just updating the range for everybody.

老實說，我認為實際上觀察我們的對手方通過利率流動的影響同樣重要。當我們在今年 2 月給出最初的框架時，我們考慮了很多潛在的一階和二階效應。顯然，我們正在這樣做——我們給了你一個框架，讓你認為它每 100 個基點，也有一個二階或三階效應，因為曲線的粘性開始影響決策。而且我認為這更像是我們已經觀察到並看到了影響，我們只是在為每個人更新範圍。

Our next question comes from the line of Mike Ng with Goldman Sachs.

我們的下一個問題來自高盛的 Mike Ng。

I just have 2. First, Max, I was just wondering if you could give us an update on new product development for things like brand-sponsored promotions and whether or not the CFPB report and things like that change the product road map strategy at all. And then second for Michael. I was just wondering if you could talk about what GMV may have looked like, excluding Amazon. And I hear you loud and clear on the RLTC and AOI margin path for the rest of the year. As we go into the back half, is that improvement in margin really driven by, I guess, like gross take rates on interest income and then servicing income because of that late fiscal second quarter originations?

我只有 2 個。首先，Max，我只是想知道您是否可以向我們提供有關品牌贊助促銷等新產品開發的最新信息，以及 CFPB 報告之類的內容是否會改變產品路線圖策略.然後是邁克爾第二。我只是想知道您是否可以談論 GMV 的樣子，不包括亞馬遜。在今年餘下的時間裡，我清楚地聽到你在 RLTC 和 AOI 保證金路徑上的聲音。當我們進入後半部分時，我猜，利潤率的提高是否真的是由利息收入的毛利率以及由於第二季度末的財政收入而導致的服務收入推動的？

So probably the most important thing to respond to, the CFPB point. I don't know if you had a chance to read it. From my point of view, it's a great document describing the state of the industry. I think they did a pretty thorough job both interviewing and summarizing what the industry is doing. Gratifying to have my S1 letter quoted in the CFPB report, that was an interesting highlight. No, I don't think our road map has changed at all.

所以可能是最重要的回應，CFPB 點。我不知道你有沒有機會讀到它。在我看來，這是一份描述行業狀況的好文件。我認為他們在採訪和總結行業正在做的事情方面做得非常徹底。很高興我的 S1 信在 CFPB 報告中被引用，這是一個有趣的亮點。不，我認為我們的路線圖根本沒有改變。

In fact, if you look in many ways, the letter essentially highlights that there's lots of companies in the BNPL space. And there's one that's very different. And they didn't go as far as naming us, but we're the only ones who doesn't charge late fees, doesn't have all sort of other shenanigans that regulators really dislike. And so I feel pretty great about what I said there.

事實上，如果你從很多方面來看，這封信基本上強調了 BNPL 領域有很多公司。還有一個非常不同。他們並沒有說出我們的名字，但我們是唯一不收取滯納金的人，沒有監管機構真正不喜歡的所有其他惡作劇。所以我對我在那裡所說的話感覺非常好。

Probably the most interesting sort of material thing in their note is calling in the industry essentially to help consumers build their credit history and credit scores through the NPL loans. And we've been working pretty closely with the accredited reporting agencies and various other participants in the industry to help further that along. And so we'll definitely continue listening to what the regulators have to say in the matter and that's our own ideas, et cetera. But generally speaking, I felt that it was a very positive thing for the industry and certainly for Affirm.

可能他們筆記中最有趣的實質性內容是呼籲行業從本質上幫助消費者通過不良貸款建立他們的信用記錄和信用評分。我們一直在與認可的報告機構和行業中的其他各種參與者密切合作，以幫助進一步實現這一目標。因此，我們肯定會繼續聽取監管機構對此事的看法，這是我們自己的想法，等等。但總的來說，我覺得這對行業來說是一件非常積極的事情，當然對 Affirm 也是如此。

Our road map is not impacted. Brand-sponsored promotions are, I would say, you'll see more of them going forward. It has 2 components to it. One is the build-out of the -- what takes engineering -- the product has to be actually fully built and we are making pretty great progress there. I don't quite have all the building results that I want, but it's a thing that's live in a bunch of places. And then it becomes a matter of sales where you actually have to bring it to merchants and manufacturers and brands.

我們的路線圖不受影響。我想說，品牌贊助的促銷活動在未來會看到更多。它有 2 個組件。一個是構建——需要工程——產品必須真正完全構建，我們在這方面取得了相當大的進展。我並不完全擁有我想要的所有建築結果，但它存在於很多地方。然後它變成了一個銷售問題，你實際上必須把它帶給商家、製造商和品牌。

And so we're getting on that. Like everything else we do, these things will take time to build. I think we'll, at some point, break them out to sell off just how cool they are and how margin-rich they become, but that's probably a conversation for another time. I feel like I maybe answered the question. Was there more to it? Yes. No. Thank you. I think I covered it. I don't have anything to say more.

所以我們開始了。就像我們所做的其他事情一樣，這些事情需要時間來建立。我認為我們會在某個時候將它們分開，以出售它們有多酷以及它們變得多麼豐富，但這可能是另一次討論。我覺得我可能回答了這個問題。還有更多嗎？是的。不，謝謝。我想我覆蓋了它。我沒有什麼要說的了。

And then in terms of the kind of back half of the year. And I understand the question correctly, you're talking about that RLTC as a percentage of GMV, improving pretty meaningfully in the back half of the year. It's really just really simple math. As you put more interest-bearing loans on the balance sheet, you defer or you earn the revenue as those interest payments are made throughout the course of the loan. So if you take a 12-month loan that's originated on in December, for example, most of that income happened in the back half of the year.

然後是下半年的那種。我正確理解了這個問題，你說的是 RLTC 佔 GMV 的百分比，在今年下半年有相當大的改善。這真的只是非常簡單的數學。當您在資產負債表上放更多的計息貸款時，您會推遲或賺取收入，因為這些利息支付是在整個貸款過程中支付的。因此，例如，如果您從 12 月開始發放為期 12 個月的貸款，那麼大部分收入都發生在當年下半年。

What's important, though, is the provision for credit losses for those loans will happen upfront. And so that means is you get less revenue, less transaction costs in the period, even though those loans are very good and profitable for us throughout the year. But then more broadly, I think it's just really important to remember how early we are with these large partners and with the program overall. We talked about some mitigants earlier that are things that we're working on right now, but don't yet have reflected in the forecast. That's on top of the very long list of projects that we have that focus on the unit economics, as Max talked about in the letter. And that's the ordinary course of business. There's something special about that, but something that we would and will continue to do regardless.

不過，重要的是，這些貸款的信用損失準備金將提前發生。因此，這意味著您在此期間獲得的收入減少，交易成本減少，即使這些貸款全年對我們來說非常好並且有利可圖。但更廣泛地說，我認為記住我們與這些大型合作夥伴以及整個項目的合作有多早非常重要。我們之前談到了一些緩解措施，這些措施是我們目前正在處理的事情，但尚未反映在預測中。正如馬克斯在信中所說，這是我們關注單位經濟學的一長串項目的頂部。這就是正常的業務過程。這有一些特別之處，但無論如何我們都會並且將繼續做一些事情。

And those can range from settle optimizations that we have on the process play page, tweaks that we can make to how our app search feature work to really drive better revenue take in the period and the list goes on. And those optimizations and those opportunities represent for us a lot of the upside here. But the primary driver in the guidance is the flow-through of the larger balance sheet in experience.

這些範圍可以從我們在流程播放頁面上進行的優化，我們可以進行的調整到我們的應用搜索功能如何真正推動在此期間更好的收入，等等。這些優化和這些機會對我們來說代表了很多好處。但指南中的主要驅動力是經驗中更大的資產負債表的流動。

Our next question comes from the line of Andrew Jeffrey with Truist Securities.

我們的下一個問題來自 Truist Securities 的 Andrew Jeffrey。

This is Julian on for Andrew. Just want to talk -- go back to the credit side. I know you just mentioned that the provisioning would kind of, I guess, be more front half-weighted and then we'll see kind of it come down in the back half. Is that the right way to think about that?

這是安德魯的朱利安。只是想談談 - 回到信用方面。我知道你剛剛提到，我猜預配會更加前半部分加權，然後我們會看到它在後半部分下降。這是正確的思考方式嗎？

Yes. So we always provision at the time of purchase. Well, when we own it, strictly speaking. And so that's always the case. The difference is as we -- on the margin, we'll have less marginal growth dollars being sold versus place on the balance sheet, you'll just -- you'll actually carry the provision versus getting the gain on sale and on provision. And so like the income profile just changes a little bit as you think about those loans being on the balance sheet versus off.

是的。所以我們總是在購買時提供。好吧，當我們擁有它時，嚴格來說。所以情況總是如此。不同之處在於，在邊際上，與資產負債表上的位置相比，我們出售的邊際增長美元將更少，您將實際上進行準備金而不是獲得銷售和準備金收益.因此，當您考慮這些貸款在資產負債表上而不是在表外時，收入狀況只會發生一點變化。

Got it. Okay. And if I can just get one more in. Can you kind of quantify maybe the non-Amazon growth versus Amazon growth embedded in GMV this quarter? And then also, it seems like it's a pretty good 2Q guide, all things considered. So just kind of maybe quantify that a little bit.

知道了。好的。如果我能再加入一個。你能量化一下本季度 GMV 中嵌入的非亞馬遜增長與亞馬遜增長嗎？此外，考慮到所有因素，這似乎是一個非常好的 2Q 指南。因此，也許可以稍微量化一下。

Thank you. We can't quantify. We're not disclosing GMV by partner here. What I would point you to is we do disclose the near 500% or over 500% growth in the general merchandise category that does pick up a number of merchants, including Amazon, Walmart and Target. Those are big, all of which had growth and strong growth, but we're not breaking out GMV by part.

謝謝你。我們無法量化。我們不會在這裡按合作夥伴披露 GMV。我要指出的是，我們確實披露了日用商品類別接近 500% 或超過 500% 的增長，這確實吸引了包括亞馬遜、沃爾瑪和塔吉特在內的許多商家。這些都是大的，所有這些都有增長和強勁的增長，但我們沒有按部分打破 GMV。

And our next question comes from the line of Reggie Smith with JPMorgan.

我們的下一個問題來自摩根大通的雷吉史密斯。

You have a slide in your presentation that shows 30-day delinquencies. And I guess wanted some help kind of interpreting the data. So when I look at kind of pre-pandemic, it appears that DQs kind of declined as the year progresses. But when I look at '22, it increased as the year progressed. And so what conclusion should we draw from this charge? Should we expect things to kind of follow the arc of pre-pandemic? Is that what you're suggesting or are DQs going to continue to kind of increase? And I have a follow-up.

您的演示文稿中有一張幻燈片，其中顯示了 30 天的拖欠情況。我想需要一些幫助來解釋數據。因此，當我查看大流行前的情況時，似乎隨著時間的推移，DQs 有所下降。但是當我看 22 年時，它隨著時間的推移而增加。那麼我們應該從這個指控中得出什麼結論呢？我們是否應該期望事情會遵循大流行前的弧線？這是你的建議還是 DQ 會繼續增加？我有一個後續行動。

Yes. So there is a seasonal pattern to credit performance in our experience that relates to both the purchasing patterns consumers have as well as certain key cash flow milestones like, for example, the tax refund time lines. What you saw during the pandemic was pretty big surge of available monetary supply and liquidity given to consumers, which really did affect pretty substantially what was in the ordinary pattern that you'd expect to see.

是的。因此，在我們的經驗中，信貸表現存在季節性模式，這與消費者的購買模式以及某些關鍵的現金流里程碑（例如退稅時間線）有關。您在大流行期間看到的是可用貨幣供應量和提供給消費者的流動性大幅增加，這確實對您期望看到的普通模式產生了相當大的影響。

And so as we're kind of shedding all of that excess consumer liquidity, I think you're going to see a more normal pattern for consumer credit trends in terms of the seasonality. And that's why we're referencing back to the pre-pandemic period. And if you see on Page 10 of our letter, you'll see us sitting around on top of the FY '20 pre-pandemic trends, which we feel like is, again, right where we'd like the business to be.

因此，隨著我們正在擺脫所有過剩的消費者流動性，我認為您將看到消費者信貸趨勢在季節性方面的更正常模式。這就是為什麼我們要回到大流行前時期。如果您在我們信函的第 10 頁看到，您會看到我們坐在 20 財年大流行前趨勢的頂部，我們覺得這又是我們希望業務發展的地方。

Got it. That makes sense. There's another slide. I think you guys hinted at the potential of raising kind of merchant fees. Obviously, interest rates have gone up a lot this year, but you've held your 0 interest take rates relatively constant. Can you talk about, I guess, the process for raising those? Is it kind of like a bolt-on that goes out? Do you have a sense that there may be some merchant pushback? And everybody obviously recognizes that rates are higher, but how -- mechanically like how would that actually play out? And again, sensitivity, how sensitive do you think merchants are to higher 0 interest rates?

知道了。那講得通。還有一張幻燈片。我認為你們暗示了提高商業費用的潛力。顯然，今年的利率上升了很多，但你的 0 利率保持相對恆定。你能談談，我猜，提高這些的過程嗎？是不是有點像一個螺栓固定出去的？你有沒有感覺到可能會有一些商家的阻力？每個人顯然都承認利率更高，但是從機械上講，這實際上會如何發揮作用？再說一次，敏感性，你認為商家對更高的 0 利率有多敏感？

So you're right. We have not, generally speaking, moved prices on either consumers or merchants to date. I think everyone -- but everyone understands that our largest supplier increased their price threefold, as Michael put it the other day. And at some point, one does pass the cost on to their customers.

所以你是對的。一般來說，迄今為止，我們還沒有針對消費者或商家調整價格。我想每個人——但每個人都明白，正如邁克爾前幾天所說，我們最大的供應商將價格提高了三倍。在某些時候，確實會將成本轉嫁給他們的客戶。

The process with merchants is a little bit different based on the type of the partnership. So obviously, some of our largest merchant GMV segments come from platform partnerships like Shopify. Others are individual platform like entities Walmart and Amazon. And then there's a whole list of directly any folks that are either on the platform or not, but we have a direct relationship. There's no third-party platform involved.

根據合作夥伴的類型，與商家的流程略有不同。很明顯，我們一些最大的商家 GMV 部分來自 Shopify 等平台合作夥伴關係。其他是獨立平台，如實體沃爾瑪和亞馬遜。然後有一個直接列出平台上或不在平台上的任何人的完整列表，但我們有直接的關係。不涉及第三方平台。

Those are probably the buckets. In the case of fully directly integrated folks, it's a notification that there's different contractual time lines that we've committed to, to giving them notice change of price. Obviously, they have some ways of reacting, for example, like they fire us in some cases, in other cases, they can try to negotiate, et cetera, in the platform.

那些可能是水桶。對於完全直接整合的人員，這是一個通知，我們承諾有不同的合同時間表，以通知他們價格變化。顯然，他們有一些反應方式，例如，在某些情況下他們解僱我們，在其他情況下，他們可以嘗試在平台上進行談判等等。

And the really large quantity platform merchants, obviously, it's a little bit more of a conversation because they are responsible for a whole host of underlying merchants that have -- and have other financial relationships with those folks. So a lot of times, it depends a little bit on their schedule of raising their own prices, which they may or may not be thinking about.

而真正數量龐大的平台商家，顯然，這更像是一場對話，因為他們負責與這些人有並有其他財務關係的大量潛在商家。所以很多時候，這在一定程度上取決於他們提高自己價格的時間表，他們可能會或可能不會考慮。

And so the merchant side of the equation is a little bit slower moving. The consumer side, we obviously have quite a lot more control because, obviously, every transaction is underwritten and the price and it does change based on credit quality and what we're seeing, et cetera. And we have to follow their lending laws, so we can't change on one person or the other. So there's a fair amount of consideration there.

因此，等式的商家方面的移動速度有點慢。在消費者方面，我們顯然擁有更多的控制權，因為很明顯，每筆交易都是承保的，而且價格確實會根據信用質量和我們所看到的等等而變化。而且我們必須遵守他們的貸款法律，所以我們不能改變一個人或另一個人。所以那裡有相當多的考慮。

All that said, we've done this before. At the very beginning of the pandemic, we went to our merchants and told them that we have no idea what's going to happen next, but we expect our risk to go up very substantially. And therefore, we will price it in with them. At that time, I think exactly 0 merchants fired us or did anything but say, we get it, we're going to work with you because it's important for us to continue selling. So feel pretty strongly about our ability to command the price for our products and include the fluctuations that we see in our supply. But it's not an instant switch, but it's something that we've done before. I feel very confident we're able to execute on if we should decide to do so.

綜上所述，我們以前做過。在大流行一開始，我們就去找我們的商家，告訴他們我們不知道接下來會發生什麼，但我們預計我們的風險會大幅上升。因此，我們將與他們一起定價。那時，我認為正好有 0 個商家解雇了我們，或者除了說，我們明白了，我們將與您合作，因為繼續銷售對我們來說很重要。因此，我們對我們控制產品價格的能力以及我們在供應中看到的波動感到非常強烈。但這不是即時切換，而是我們以前做過的事情。如果我們決定這樣做，我感到非常有信心我們能夠執行。

And I would say that the tone from a lot of merchants right now, there's 2 pieces that are tagging around this conversation. One is a lot are focused on margin. And all of our merchant partners and, clearly, anything that's perceived as an additional cost is under a lot of scrutiny.

我想說的是現在很多商家的語氣，有兩件作品圍繞著這次談話進行了標記。一是很多人都專注於保證金。我們所有的商業合作夥伴，顯然，任何被認為是額外成本的東西都受到了嚴格的審查。

On the other hand, I think a lot of merchants are looking at their own outlook, the holiday season and to early part of next year and are looking for ways they can get back some of that growth in volume they had before. Those 2 things always net out to a good deal that allows us to the economics we need and drive the volume that we need to them. But it is unconstrained. Merchants do have real margin constraints right now.

另一方面，我認為很多商家都在關注他們自己的前景、假日季節和明年初，並正在尋找能夠恢復之前銷量增長的方法。這兩件事總是很划算，使我們能夠獲得所需的經濟性並推動我們需要的數量。但它不受約束。商家現在確實有真正的利潤限制。

Got it. Can I sneak one more in real quick?

知道了。我真的可以再偷偷一個嗎？

Yes. Go ahead.

是的。前進。

Got it. Perfect. So obviously, you guys report your reserve rate and it was down sequentially. Thinking about like how am I going to explain that to investors and the things that come to my mind are you've got more repeat customers, you got a better view of the customer. And then also your average life of your portfolio was only 9 months now. Is there anything else I'm missing there? Or what else can we add to maybe address concerns about a declining reserve rate?

知道了。完美的。所以很明顯，你們報告了你們的準備金率，它是依次下降的。想想我將如何向投資者解釋這一點，我想到的事情是你有更多的回頭客，你對客戶有更好的了解。然後你的投資組合的平均壽命現在只有 9 個月。還有什麼我想念的嗎？或者我們還可以添加什麼來解決對準備金率下降的擔憂？

Yes. Again, I would -- I'd start with, first, just how we think about the reserve. I think some financial institutions have a team of economists, who are thinking about the state of the consumer and trying to make a forecast with their reserves. If we did that by the time we got the answers from every tower, the loans would have paid back.

是的。再一次，我會 - 首先，我會從我們如何看待儲備開始。我認為一些金融機構有一個經濟學家團隊，他們正在考慮消費者的狀況並試圖用他們的儲備做出預測。如果我們在得到每個塔樓的答案時都這樣做了，那麼貸款就會償還。

And so instead what we do is we look at the actual performance of the loans, and we look at the Isaac score, the credit score that we get loans when they originated, and use those 2 things to indicate how those loans will perform. And then we look at whether or not those predictions of performance are holding up. And that's very math-driven. We're not sitting here with a lot of judgment up and down or prognostication about future trends and deterioration in credit. It's very math and model-driven.

因此，我們所做的是查看貸款的實際表現，我們查看 Isaac 評分，即我們在貸款發放時獲得的信用評分，並使用這兩件事來指示這些貸款的表現。然後我們看看這些性能預測是否成立。這是非常受數學驅動的。我們坐在這裡並沒有對未來趨勢和信貸惡化做出很多判斷或預測。這是非常數學和模型驅動的。

And if you look at, for example, again on Slide 11, our Page 11 of the letter, take our pay in 4 loan performance. You see pretty material reduction in the credit losses that we have for our pay-for-product. While it does turn over very fast, it isn't the biggest part of our allowance, it is all on the balance sheet and will continue to be and therefore has, as you improve the quality of losses in that product, you're obviously going to see less need for it. And similarly, I think a lot of the stress that we talked about starting to see in the end of our last fiscal year, the mitigants that we took resulted in us originating a higher quality asset going into this quarter and into the back half of this year. And that higher-quality asset would suggest it has a lower loss content. It's a good thing. It's not a bad thing. It's a very good thing that we estimate less losses in the loans that we're originating.

例如，如果您再次查看幻燈片 11，即我們的信函的第 11 頁，請在 4 筆貸款業績中支付我們的報酬。您會看到我們的按產品付費的信用損失大幅減少。雖然它的周轉速度非常快，但它不是我們津貼的最大部分，它都在資產負債表上，並將繼續存在，因此隨著您改善該產品的損失質量，您顯然是會看到對它的需求減少。同樣，我認為我們談到的很多壓力在上一財年末開始出現，我們採取的緩解措施導致我們在本季度和本季度後半段推出了更高質量的資產年。而更高質量的資產表明它的損失內容更低。這是一件好事。這不是一件壞事。這是一件非常好的事情，我們估計我們發起的貸款損失更少。

Our next question comes from the line of Chris Brendler with D.A. Davidson.

我們的下一個問題來自 Chris Brendler 和 D.A.戴維森。

I'll start with another one on the credit side. Can you quantify at all sort of, obviously, it's a more difficult environment across a number of issues. But for consumer credit and sort of the tightening you've done, the trends are really impressive just given all the concerns we hear about the consumer. But how much of an impact does that had on your growth forecast maybe for this year? I don't think you really changed your guidance that much on GMV. So is that a factor? Or is there enough demand that, that's offsetting the tighter product conditions?

我將從信用方面的另一個開始。顯然，您能否量化各種問題，這是一個涉及許多問題的更困難的環境。但是對於消費信貸和你所做的那種緊縮政策，考慮到我們聽到的關於消費者的所有擔憂，這些趨勢確實令人印象深刻。但這對您今年的增長預測有多大影響？我認為您在 GMV 上的指導並沒有真正改變太多。那麼這是一個因素嗎？還是有足夠的需求來抵消更緊的產品條件？

There's definitely an impact of credit on our volume. It's just nowhere near as substantial as I think some folks might think. The far bigger impact in the update in our guidance is the impact that we saw from Peloton. When you take a business that has a lot of headwind like that, we thought we were being pretty conservative in our outlook for that business this year. And I think that it's underperformed even where we had set that bar. And that's the biggest driver of the reduction in the guidance for the year. We haven't given a way to quantify it, but we don't take that, for example, the movement in the guidance is because we sequentially have tightened our view on credit.

信用肯定會對我們的交易量產生影響。它遠沒有我認為一些人想像的那麼重要。在我們的指導更新中，更大的影響是我們從 Peloton 看到的影響。當你選擇一個有很多逆風的業務時，我們認為我們今年對該業務的前景相當保守。而且我認為即使我們設定了標準，它的表現也不佳。這是今年指導減少的最大驅動力。我們沒有給出量化它的方法，但我們不認為，例如，指引中的變動是因為我們依次收緊了對信貸的看法。

Okay. Great. Super helpful. A follow-up on the areas of demand and on their side, competition. I have to believe, I think we've really heard some competitors are struggling a lot more than Affirm is. So are you seeing any benefits yet as you talk to merchants of the froth coming off in an improved competitive environment? And I'd love to hear sort of like your -- I guess, take your temperature on your ability or sort of the thinking as you talk to merchants. Is that going to be a conversation that you've already started? Or is that still one to come?

好的。偉大的。超級有幫助。對需求領域和競爭領域的跟進。我必須相信，我認為我們確實聽說過一些競爭對手比 Affirm 更苦苦掙扎。那麼，當您與商家談論在改善的競爭環境中出現泡沫時，您是否看到了任何好處？我很想听聽你的——我想，在你與商人交談時，對你的能力或想法進行評估。那會是你已經開始的對話嗎？或者那仍然是一個來的？

I'm going to try really hard not to sound glib and spike the football and take victory laps, et cetera, the short answer is yes. I've been saying this for a long time that we're about to quote about tide coming out and noticing that some people are swimming without trunks on.

我會非常努力地不讓自己聽起來油嘴滑舌，踢足球並取得勝利，等等，簡短的回答是肯定的。我已經說了很長時間了，我們即將引用關於潮汐出來的內容，並註意到有些人在游泳時沒有穿泳褲。

I wouldn't exactly classify our state of affairs as struggling, but I do believe some of our competitors are. And it is accretive to us. We have merchants coming in and saying, "Hey, would you guys consider side-by-side with a competitor?" And where in the past, we would come in and ask them will they consider it, and they'd say they were fine, the approvals are good, and now approvals are not. And ours are still doing quite well. So that just makes it that much easier to take share.

我不會將我們的狀況完全歸類為掙扎，但我確實相信我們的一些競爭對手是。它對我們來說是增值的。我們有商人進來說：“嘿，你們會考慮與競爭對手並肩作戰嗎？”過去，我們會進來問他們會考慮嗎，他們會說他們很好，批准很好，現在批准不行。我們的仍然做得很好。所以這只是讓分享變得更加容易。

Sometimes side by side, sometimes -- and probably could probably rattle off a number of brands that are turning to us on either instead of or alongside some of our esteemed competitors because they feel they need to continue driving their top line. And the competition no longer can approve as well as they used to. So yes, it's been quite helpful to us, so long as we continue hitting our numbers on credit, which we absolutely tend to do. And keep approvals high, which should give you a sense that all these quarters I've been promising that the curve is really steep, we need to move our GMV just a little bit to reduce our prospective losses by a lot. It seems to be working out the way we promised it. So long as it keeps going, we'll continue taking share.

有時並排，有時 - 並且可能會激怒一些品牌，這些品牌要么代替我們的一些尊敬的競爭對手，要么與我們並肩作戰，因為他們覺得他們需要繼續推動他們的收入。競爭不再像以前那樣獲得批准。所以，是的，這對我們很有幫助，只要我們繼續靠信用達到我們的數字，我們絕對傾向於這樣做。並保持較高的批准率，這應該讓您感覺到我一直承諾的所有這些季度曲線非常陡峭，我們需要稍微移動我們的 GMV 以減少我們的預期損失。它似乎正在按照我們承諾的方式進行。只要它繼續前進，我們就會繼續分享。

Awesome. And congrats on a tough environment. And also thanks for all the disclosures on the credit. It's really helpful.

驚人的。並祝賀艱難的環境。也感謝所有關於信用的披露。這真的很有幫助。

Our next question comes from the line of Kevin Barker with Piper Sandler.

我們的下一個問題來自 Kevin Barker 和 Piper Sandler。

I just wanted to follow up on -- considering your guidance, you've tightened underwriting, growth is slow to pay, but obviously a lot due to Peloton. When you look at 2023, are you assuming what the base case is for unemployment and whether it's slowing in spending? Or are you starting to put in place additional measures to assume that unemployment is going to spike or there's going to be something worse than what we expect beyond what most economists have in their forecast or the forward curve indicates? Is there something there that you're anticipating and managing for?

我只是想跟進-考慮到您的指導，您已收緊承銷，增長緩慢，但顯然很多要歸功於 Peloton。當您查看 2023 年時，您是否假設失業的基本情況是什麼，以及支出是否正在放緩？或者你是否開始採取額外措施來假設失業率將會飆升，或者會出現比我們預期的情況更糟的情況，超出大多數經濟學家的預測或遠期曲線所顯示的情況？你有什麼期待和管理的嗎？

I'll start on the credit side and Michael probably has comments on the rate side of things. So we are anticipating some degree of worsening on the credit side of things. That said, we really concern ourselves with the next 4.5 months of volume. That's just really, really important to mitigate.

我將從信貸方面開始，邁克爾可能對利率方面有意見。因此，我們預計信貸方面的情況會出現一定程度的惡化。也就是說，我們真的很關心未來 4.5 個月的交易量。這對減輕影響非常非常重要。

Our ability to manage credit to the numbers that we choose is a consequence of our ability to underwrite and get the data sources that we need and make it -- do it very quickly. But probably the single most important structural part of how we're different from everyone else in the market is we have very short-term product. We're not granting lines, which means that a credit decision we made today, even if it's erroneous, will be the last time we made that mistake. And we're able to deal with a lot more demand that we choose to lend.

我們管理對我們選擇的數字的信用的能力是我們有能力承保和獲取我們需要的數據源並做出來的結果——做的非常快。但可能我們與市場上其他人不同的最重要的結構部分是我們擁有非常短期的產品。我們不授予額度，這意味著我們今天做出的信用決定，即使它是錯誤的，也將是我們最後一次犯這個錯誤。而且我們能夠處理我們選擇放貸的更多需求。

And so as consumers feel more stretched, they come to us more often. That does not change that we apply the same level of diligence and care to every loan that we underwrite. And so we are primarily focusing on making sure that our data sources are fresh, that our models react correctly to the change in consumer behavior, which we have absolutely seen, given just over the last 5, 6 years of operating, including the last 6 months of the current macroeconomic volatility.

因此，當消費者感到更加緊張時，他們會更頻繁地來找我們。這並沒有改變我們對我們承保的每筆貸款都採用相同程度的勤勉和關懷。因此，我們主要專注於確保我們的數據源是新鮮的，我們的模型對消費者行為的變化做出正確反應，這是我們絕對看到的，在過去 5、6 年的運營中，包括過去 6 年當前宏觀經濟波動的幾個月。

So all of that is fed into how we underwrite. But our ability to weather whatever incoming storm might be headed our way is deeply rooted in the fact that we make very, very short-term, relatively speaking, credit decisions. And we have no shortage of demand for our product.

因此，所有這些都被納入了我們的承保方式。但是，我們能夠抵禦任何即將到來的風暴的能力深深植根於我們做出非常非常短期的相對而言的信貸決策這一事實。而且我們對我們的產品的需求並不短缺。

I'll pause there. I just want to had another point to make, but Michael has a few.

我會停在那裡。我只想說一點，但邁克爾有一些。

No, just, look, the way we approach it is always to take the current consensus, to take the forward curve or a rate assumption. We don't try to grow. And there's a number of scenarios that could play out very differently. As you point out, we could enter into a recession and have more employment. Of course, that would probably have come with less pressure on rates than we're probably currently modeling. And the flip side is the rate probably could get worse and employment could continue to be very robust.

不，只是，看，我們處理它的方式總是採用當前的共識，採用遠期曲線或利率假設。我們不試圖成長。並且有許多情況可能會大不相同。正如你所指出的，我們可能會陷入衰退並擁有更多的就業機會。當然，這對利率的壓力可能比我們目前可能建模的要小。另一方面，利率可能會變得更糟，就業可能會繼續非常強勁。

And I think we're trying to just be middle of the road here and be very close around when we're assuming that the current macro consensus is where the business is what will play out. Understanding that this forecast are always wrong, but we have to make something. And so just like we did when we gave our guidance at the beginning of the year, we're going to peg it to the rate curve. And as rates move, you should expect that to impact our businesses with the framework that we've given you.

而且我認為，當我們假設當前的宏觀共識是業務將在何處發揮作用時，我們正試圖在這里處於中間位置並非常接近。理解這個預測總是錯誤的，但我們必須做點什麼。因此，就像我們在年初給出指導時所做的那樣，我們將把它與利率曲線掛鉤。隨著利率的變化，您應該期望這會通過我們為您提供的框架影響我們的業務。

That's really helpful. And then I appreciate the short duration of the product. Obviously, very...

這真的很有幫助。然後我很欣賞產品的短暫持續時間。很顯然，很...

One last thing -- sorry, on that point, the point that I was going to make and blanked on. So one of the other things that we have because of the Adaptive Checkout, which we had the presence of wanting to launch about a year ago, the menu of terms the consumer will see is programmatically determined by us. And so we have enormous amount of control over this, 4.6% average. The product isn't just in of itself short, we also get to decide whether a particular credit quality applicant sees the longest or longer durations versus the shorter ones.

最後一件事——抱歉，在這一點上，我將要提出的觀點並沒有解決。因此，由於自適應結賬，我們擁有的其他東西之一是我們想要在大約一年前推出的，消費者將看到的術語菜單由我們以編程方式確定。所以我們對此有很大的控制權，平均為 4.6%。該產品不僅本身很短，我們還可以確定特定信用質量申請人是否看到最長或更長的持續時間而不是較短的持續時間。

And so one of the things that you could say we're preparing to do, although we don't have to act on it right now, if we felt that the unemployment is about to spike or starting to go up really rapidly, we would necessarily pull in terms and make the 4.6% average go down just to make sure there are fewer opportunities for our borrowers to default.

所以你可以說我們正在準備做的事情之一，雖然我們現在不必採取行動，如果我們覺得失業率即將飆升或開始迅速上升，我們會必須拉動條款並使 4.6% 的平均值下降，以確保我們的借款人違約的機會減少。

So that's another level of control that we have. And that typically corresponds very nicely just from research and past lives with the shift from luxury buying to general merchandise purchasing. People don't need to borrow quite as much, and therefore, shorter terms make more sense for the cash flow. So this actually should not have the real impact on our take rate on the consumer side but will reduce our risk.

所以這是我們擁有的另一個級別的控制。從研究和過去的生活來看，這通常與從奢侈品購買到普通商品購買的轉變非常吻合。人們不需要藉那麼多錢，因此，較短的期限對現金流更有意義。所以這實際上不應該對我們在消費者方面的接受率產生真正的影響，但會降低我們的風險。

Sorry, Max. Go ahead. Yes, I was just saying there's certainly quite a bit of advantage to having rapid velocity on your lending and being able to shift. When you think about the RTLC guide for the back half of the year implying quite a bit of improvement, do you feel like you could continue to hit that if things get worse? I mean obviously, maybe there's a little bit of slowing growth and tightening underwriting, but you're going to focus more on profitability? Or does that get pushed out a little further, but still remains something that you can see in the future, at least in the near term, on hitting some of those guidance?

對不起，馬克斯。前進。是的，我只是說快速放貸並能夠轉移肯定有很多優勢。當您考慮到今年下半年的 RTLC 指南暗示了相當多的改進時，您是否覺得如果情況變得更糟，您是否可以繼續實現這一目標？我的意思是很明顯，也許有一點增長放緩和承保收緊，但你會更多地關注盈利能力嗎？或者這是否會被推得更遠一點，但在達到其中一些指導時，至少在短期內，你仍然可以看到未來的東西？

I've tempted to make some sort of read-my-lips joke, but I will not. We will hit profitability on schedule. We are not pushing off profitability. The product we're focusing on are about creating more RLTC, creating -- mitigating some of the rate volatility. But ultimately, we feel very good about our schedule. We are not suffering from any need to post on our date with destiny. I think I'm not supposed to say that, but I like the alliteration.

我很想開一些讀我嘴唇的玩笑，但我不會。我們將如期實現盈利。我們不會推動盈利能力。我們關注的產品是關於創造更多的 RLTC，創造——減輕一些利率波動。但最終，我們對自己的日程安排感覺非常好。我們沒有任何需要發布與命運的約會的痛苦。我想我不應該這麼說，但我喜歡頭韻。

And look, last thing is we take our guidance really seriously, we build our product to it. And if our guidance moves it's because we think something has changed. And I think what you saw on the GMV outlook here, as we talked about, a pretty big impact of Peloton. And then, obviously, we're digesting a pretty big headwind in rate. There are certainly macro conditions that could make that goal and objective not come through, but we feel very confident as we sit here today.

看，最後一件事是我們非常認真地對待我們的指導，我們根據它來構建我們的產品。如果我們的指導發生變化，那是因為我們認為某些事情發生了變化。正如我們所討論的，我認為你在這裡看到的 GMV 前景對 Peloton 產生了相當大的影響。然後，顯然，我們正在消化一個相當大的阻力。當然，有一些宏觀條件可能使這一目標和目標無法實現，但我們今天坐在這裡感到非常有信心。

Act of God are not included in our guidance.

上帝的作為不包括在我們的指導中。

And our next question comes from the line of Bryan Keane with Deutsche Bank.

我們的下一個問題來自德意志銀行的 Bryan Keane。

Just want to ask on 2 popular questions we get. Just on approval rates, it sounds like they stayed high, but maybe they were down a little bit in the quarter. Maybe you can just clarify that and then the outlook on approval rates, what do you expect?

只想問我們得到的 2 個熱門問題。僅就批准率而言，聽起來他們仍然很高，但也許他們在本季度有所下降。也許你可以澄清一下，然後是批准率的前景，你有什麼期望？

The approval rate has actually stayed relatively flat throughout the quarter. In fact, they basically stayed flat for the last 9 months, if memory serves, with a slight uptick in the interim -- in the 3 months in between. The first 3 and the last 3, we actually increased the approval rate a little bit. And so maybe this month -- this quarter, it went down a tiny bit. But this is sort of back to the products that we offer consumers. So we have an enormous amount of control over the actual shape of the risk we're going to take on.

整個季度的批准率實際上保持相對平穩。事實上，如果沒有記錯的話，他們在過去的 9 個月里基本持平，在此期間略有上升——在中間的 3 個月內。前3個和後3個，我們其實提高了一點點的支持率。所以也許這個月 - 這個季度，它下降了一點。但這有點回到我們為消費者提供的產品上。所以我們對我們將要承擔的風險的實際形式有很大的控制權。

We, generally speaking, have a way of finding a way to say yes to a consumer. If somebody comes in and says, "Hey, I want to borrow x $100 over y months or weeks," in some situations, the answer is, no, that's not going to happen because we just don't think you can carry this much cash flow burden on a monthly basis. However, we're very happy to help you with a lower monthly number if you're willing to prepay the delta basically. And that have a dozen other levers that allow us to shape the risk we take and make sure we meet the consumers where they are without adding unnecessary burden to our provision.

一般來說，我們有辦法找到對消費者說“是”的方法。如果有人進來說：“嘿，我想在 y 個月或幾週內借 x 100 美元”，在某些情況下，答案是，不，這不會發生，因為我們只是認為你不能攜帶這麼多每月的現金流負擔。但是，如果您基本上願意預付 delta，我們很樂意為您提供較低的月數。還有十幾個其他的槓桿，使我們能夠塑造我們所承擔的風險，並確保我們在不給我們的供應增加不必要的負擔的情況下滿足他們所在的消費者。

So we have been certainly very active in using those levers. We do this at the merchant by merchant level, sometimes SKU by SKU level because we can infer which products are getting prioritized how and repayments and things like that. But to date, we have not needed to slam the brakes on approvals. And again, and I said it before, credit is job number one. We will always prioritize matching to numbers that we feel we must hit to ensure capital partners see us as the best yield, most predictable yield generator for them.

因此，我們肯定非常積極地使用這些槓桿。我們在商戶層面逐個商戶執行此操作，有時是逐個 SKU 層級，因為我們可以推斷出哪些產品被優先考慮如何以及還款之類的事情。但迄今為止，我們還不需要急剎車。再說一次，我之前說過，信用是第一要務。我們將始終優先匹配我們認為必須達到的數字，以確保資本合作夥伴將我們視為最佳收益、最可預測的收益創造者。

But that does not mean for us that we have to turn people away at the door. It does mean that some people will have a slightly larger down payment request. In some cases, we will ask for more information. In some cases, this means that we need to see their cash flow data, which is somewhat burdensome, but it's better than being told no.

但這並不意味著我們必須在門口把人拒之門外。這確實意味著有些人會有稍大的首付要求。在某些情況下，我們會要求提供更多信息。在某些情況下，這意味著我們需要查看他們的現金流數據，這有點繁瑣，但總比被拒絕要好。

And so we have a lot of confidence in our ability to maintain rates. And while we don't generally speak and contractually agree to guaranteed approvals with our merchants, the reason they keep us hired, if you will, and the reason they like to hire us over our competitors, because we always deliver on approval rates, first and foremost. And that helps them drive their top line and sales that wouldn't have happened without Affirm.

因此，我們對維持利率的能力充滿信心。雖然我們通常不會與我們的商家交談並在合同上同意保證批准，但他們讓我們聘用的原因（如果您願意的話），以及他們喜歡僱用我們而不是競爭對手的原因，因為我們總是首先提供批准率最重要的是。這有助於他們提高收入和銷售額，如果沒有 Affirm 就不會發生。

Got it. No, that's helpful. And then maybe just an update, Max, on the Debit+ product and the rollout there.

知道了。不，這很有幫助。然後可能只是對 Debit+ 產品的更新，Max，並在那裡推出。

Thank you for asking. I was wondering if somebody might remember. So actually trying not to be glib. So one of the things that I could do a year ago as the Product in Chief and don't feel like I can now is roll out a product with economics that I don't feel are fundamentally accretive to the business. So sometimes I think in the beginning of last quarter or right around that time, we've basically taken the week list that we generated and given a pretty meaningful number of people sort of tens of thousands of active cards type level cards to observe the usage.

謝謝你的慰問。我想知道是否有人會記得。所以實際上盡量不要油嘴滑舌。因此，一年前我作為產品負責人可以做的一件事，但現在我覺得我不能做的事情是推出一種我認為不會從根本上為業務增值的經濟產品。所以有時我認為在上個季度初或大約那個時候，我們基本上採用了我們生成的周列表，並給了相當數量的人提供了數以萬計的活動卡類型級別卡來觀察使用情況.

As with every new credit product, you end up with economics you don't particularly like. And we spent the last 3 months just really chiseling away at all the various fraud vectors and loss possibilities and a whole bunch of new kind of losses that happen in debit loss. There's obviously pre-transaction, which is very similar to -- for many of the product that we have inside the SuperApp. There's the post one, which is where you swipe and then you choose to split, how these are a 24-hour limbo with the transaction might turn into pay now or could become pay later.

與每一個新的信貸產品一樣，你最終會得到你不特別喜歡的經濟學。在過去的 3 個月裡，我們只是徹底消除了所有各種欺詐媒介和損失可能性，以及在藉方損失中發生的一大堆新損失。顯然有預交易，這與我們在 SuperApp 中擁有的許多產品非常相似。有一個帖子，這是你刷卡然後你選擇拆分的地方，這些是一個 24 小時的交易狀態，現在可能變成付款，或者以後可能變成付款。

And then there's also inhibition funds, which is the pay now can become a default and bio. So there's a bunch of new vectors, both intentional, unintentional losses, spent the last 3 months just really making sure that we feel good about the unit economics of this product. We're almost there. I feel very good about it. And probably January 1 is kind of a realistic time line when we're going to start pushing this forward. Again, a product that is brand new. We're not going to -- given today's reality of the question about our term profitability, nothing will be more frustrating than saying everything is awesome, we're hitting every number, except debit loss turn out to be lost here than I thought. So sorry about that profitability is postponed. That will not happen.

然後還有抑制基金，即現在的工資可以成為違約和生物。因此，在過去的 3 個月裡，有很多新的載體，無論是有意的還是無意的損失，都只是為了確保我們對這個產品的單位經濟性感覺良好。我們快到了。我對此感覺很好。 1 月 1 日可能是我們開始推動這一進程的現實時間線。再次，一個全新的產品。我們不會——考慮到今天關於我們術語盈利能力的問題的現實，沒有什麼比說一切都很棒，我們正在達到每一個數字更令人沮喪的了，除了借方損失在這裡比我想像的要丟失。很抱歉，盈利能力被推遲了。那不會發生。

That said, I feel quite good about where the profitability of that product is today. I'll feel a lot better in January when a whole bunch more planned. And that's when we expect to start actually delivering these cards. And you will know this pretty easily right now to get to Debit+, you have to either be in the selected group or we promote it or you kind of have to know your way. I mean you can go on if you want it, but it's a little bit of work.

也就是說，我對該產品今天的盈利能力感到非常滿意。一月份我會感覺好多了，因為有更多的計劃。那就是我們期望開始實際交付這些卡的時候。而且您現在很容易知道這一點才能進入 Debit+，您必須在選定的組中，或者我們對其進行推廣，或者您必須知道自己的方式。我的意思是，如果你願意，你可以繼續，但這需要一點工作。

The day you see your Affirm app feature a tile saying, hey, get yourself a Debit+, you'll know that we're starting to promote the product quite aggressively. And again, we're not including anything in our guide about what Debit+ will do for us in the volume or revenue on RLTC basis just because it's a little bit too hard to model that right now. But we probably will talk about it quite more -- quite a lot more in terms of the actual expectations starting next calendar year.

當您看到您的 Affirm 應用程序有一個磁貼說，嘿，給自己一個 Debit+ 時，您就會知道我們開始非常積極地推廣該產品。再說一次，我們的指南中沒有包含任何關於借記卡+將在 RLTC 基礎上的數量或收入方面為我們做什麼的任何內容，只是因為現在建模有點太難了。但我們可能會更多地談論它——就從明年開始的實際預期而言，會更多地談論它。

Hopefully, at least the point about we will not risk our unit economics just to launch a product sooner than we're ready, those people give a view to how we think about the economy today.

希望至少我們不會為了在我們準備好之前推出產品而冒著我們的單位經濟風險，這些人給出了我們對當今經濟的看法。

Our next question comes from the line of Mihir Bhatia with Bank of America.

我們的下一個問題來自美國銀行的 Mihir Bhatia。

I'm on for Jason Kupferberg. I just want to ask just a couple of questions. First was in your Q1 results in the first quarter, I think you mentioned higher interest rates impacting gain on sale with pricing with certain forward flow buyers. Can you talk about that a little more? Obviously, I mean, I understand interest rates are up, but just trying to understand how often does that pricing get adjusted? And is the lower pricing like going to stay until -- I think these agreements tend to be 2, 3 years? So just trying to understand, does the lower gain on sale -- now you're kind of locked into those lower gain on sales for the next couple of years? Or how does that exactly work?

我支持傑森庫普弗伯格。我只想問幾個問題。首先是在第一季度的第一季度業績中，我認為您提到較高的利率會影響銷售收益，並與某些遠期買家進行定價。你能多談一點嗎？顯然，我的意思是，我了解利率上升，但只是想了解該定價多久調整一次？較低的價格是否會一直持續到——我認為這些協議往往是 2 年或 3 年？所以只是想了解一下，較低的銷售收益 - 現在您在接下來的幾年中被鎖定在較低的銷售收益中嗎？或者這究竟是如何工作的？

That's a good question, yes. And the commentary is really about the year-on-year comparison. The agreement is varying. Some agreements are locked in for the duration of the contract. Some have regular repricing triggers and it varies with 6 months to even floating arrangement. So we kind of have lots of different flavors. But I wouldn't -- we're not -- I'm not worried about being locked in at the worst rate. I think a decline in rates would be good for us.

這是一個很好的問題，是的。評論實際上是關於同比比較。協議各不相同。一些協議在合同期限內被鎖定。有些有定期重新定價觸發器，它會隨著 6 個月甚至浮動安排而變化。所以我們有很多不同的口味。但我不會——我們不會——我不擔心以最差的速度被鎖定。我認為利率下降對我們有利。

Okay. And then I just wanted to ask about adjusted operating margin. The first quarter came in better than your guidance, but you -- I mean, obviously, the top line guidance is coming in a little bit. But you've also -- you're also slowing down hiring. Just trying to understand, was there something unusual about the first quarter, like some expenses got pushed to the second quarter or something? Just what's happening there, anything to call out?

好的。然後我只想問一下調整後的營業利潤率。第一季度的業績好於你的指導，但你——我的意思是，很明顯，一線指導即將到來。但你也 - 你也在放慢招聘速度。只是想了解一下，第一季度是否有什麼不尋常的地方，比如一些費用被推到了第二季度之類的？那裡正在發生什麼，有什麼要說的嗎？

No. We did have a little bit of a benefit associated with some items that aren't repeatable throughout the course of the year, but the strength in the revenue less transaction cost is combined with slightly below hiring plan, were the biggest drivers for us. In the first quarter, the reduction hiring plan is as much about managing the fiscal '24 number as it is about managing '23. Just think about the timing of the hiring that we have in the plan. Obviously, an employee will be hired in the last day of the fiscal year doesn't really affect the profitability in the year, but it's extra costs that we take into next year.

不。我們確實有一些與全年不可重複的項目相關的一點好處，但收入減少交易成本的優勢加上略低於招聘計劃，是我們最大的驅動力.在第一季度，減少招聘計劃與管理 '24 財年數字一樣重要。想想我們計劃中的招聘時間。顯然，員工將在財政年度的最後一天被雇用並不會真正影響當年的盈利能力，但這是我們明年要承擔的額外成本。

And I think the focus for us is to get our units as healthy as possible and to get the operating expense as rightsized as we can going into next fiscal year when we feel like we want to be as fit and lean and strong as possible.

而且我認為我們的重點是讓我們的單位盡可能健康，並在我們覺得我們想要盡可能健康、精簡和強壯的下一個財政年度盡可能地調整運營費用。

Our next question comes from the line of Eugene Simuni with MoffettNathanson.

我們的下一個問題來自 Eugene Simuni 和 MoffettNathanson 的觀點。

Just got one question on the consumer engagement with the platform. So your transactions per active user keeps going up, which is great. It's a great sign of better engagement. But if we do the math on sort of dollars spent per active consumer, that keeps going down. And I understand that there might be some mix factors in here, perhaps Peloton is influencing that. But can you talk about that trend a little bit? And do you see a path to getting consumers to spend more dollars with your platform over time? And how -- what are the leverage you might be able to use to encourage them to do that?

剛收到一個關於消費者與平台互動的問題。因此，每個活躍用戶的交易量不斷增加，這很棒。這是更好參與的一個很好的跡象。但是，如果我們對每位活躍消費者花費的美元進行數學計算，那將繼續下降。我知道這裡可能有一些混合因素，也許 Peloton 正在影響這一點。但是你能談談這個趨勢嗎？隨著時間的推移，您是否看到了讓消費者在您的平台上花費更多錢的途徑？以及如何 - 您可以用來鼓勵他們這樣做的槓桿是什麼？

So I think the -- there are kind of 2 competing vectors here. And to be completely honest, I track slightly different metrics. I care about average ticket size for every transaction and number of transactions per active user. Those are kind of my contours of our consumers engaging. And it is, in fact, the case that if you ask someone to spend more money through you with you -- sorry, if you're trying to convince consumers to use you more often, more transactions, you are absolutely signing up for smaller tickets, right?

所以我認為 - 這裡有 2 個相互競爭的向量。老實說，我跟踪的指標略有不同。我關心每筆交易的平均票證大小和每個活躍用戶的交易數量。這些是我對我們的消費者參與度的概括。事實上，如果你要求某人通過你和你一起花更多的錢——對不起，如果你試圖說服消費者更頻繁地使用你，更多的交易，你絕對是在註冊更小的門票，對吧？

People aren't going to buy an exercise bike every quarter, and they're going to buy maybe a couch once a year or so, but then you're really trying to get high frequency, which is certainly what we're chasing here. You're looking at things like apparel, maybe tickets, travel. And so we're very active in all those industries, general merchandise, umbrella name for everything you buy, that kind of happens all the time.

人們不會每季度都購買健身車，他們可能會每年購買一次沙發，但是你真的想獲得高頻率，這當然是我們在這裡追求的.您正在查看諸如服裝，可能是門票，旅行之類的東西。所以我們在所有這些行業中都非常活躍，日用百貨，你購買的所有東西的總稱，這種情況一直在發生。

So AOV is just expected to continue coming down. It's an important measure of our success, frankly. I think the growth of transaction frequency per user is an indication of increasing spend in the pay in 4 category, which is uniquely suitable for these shorter-term lower AOV transactions. And so that's where a lot of that is coming from. As you might expect, we've dominated high longer periods for a very long time in the U.S. markets. We're still very rapidly expanding into the short-term lower AOV transactions.

因此，預計 AOV 將繼續下降。坦率地說，這是衡量我們成功的重要標準。我認為每用戶交易頻率的增長表明 4 類支付的支出增加，這特別適合這些短期較低 AOV 交易。這就是其中很多的來源。正如您所料，我們在美國市場上長期佔據主導地位已經很長時間了。我們仍在非常迅速地擴展到短期較低 AOV 交易。

So I think in the long term, I care about trying to get to all transactions possible. And I think that will naturally result in the most possible number of dollars spent with Affirm by any one active consumer, but for now, we're very focused on making sure that we're there for the consumer in pay in 4, in monthly payments. If the average ticket size goes down, that trend goes on success.

所以我認為從長遠來看，我關心的是嘗試進行所有可能的交易。我認為這自然會導致任何一位活躍消費者在 Affirm 上花費最多的美元，但就目前而言，我們非常專注於確保我們在 4 天內為消費者提供每月付款付款。如果平均門票規模下降，那麼這種趨勢就會成功。

Just on the math. I think the average is maybe -- I'm not quite sure what math you're doing and how you're looking at it, but the averages can really lie here. One $2,300 purchase can look like a lot longer share of wallet even if it's not repeatable as opposed to those consumers who maybe would never entertain a $2,300 purchase. I think for the consumers that are engaging on our platform today, we definitely believe we have a higher share of their spend.

只是在數學上。我認為平均值可能是 - 我不太確定你在做什麼數學以及你如何看待它，但平均值可能真的在這裡。與那些可能永遠不會接受 2,300 美元購買的消費者相比，即使不可重複購買，一次 2,300 美元的購買看起來也像是錢包中更長的份額。我認為對於今天參與我們平台的消費者來說，我們絕對相信我們在他們的支出中佔有更高的份額。

Thank you. And our final question comes from the line of Andrew Bauch with SMBC Nikko Securities.

謝謝你。我們的最後一個問題來自 SMBC Nikko Securities 的 Andrew Bauch。

Just looking at the Affirm share of U.S. e-commerce spend, and this kind of dovetails with the prior question, is growing above the 2% in fiscal '23 and beyond and the trajectory of that, is that more of a function of you making progress on the consumer side? Or is it more around the continued expansion of wallet within merchants? I know they likely go hand in hand, but any other color you could provide would be great.

看看美國電子商務支出的肯定份額，這種與前面的問題相吻合，在 23 財年及以後增長到 2% 以上，而其軌跡，更多的是你做的消費者方面的進展？還是更多地圍繞著商家內部錢包的持續擴張？我知道它們可能齊頭並進，但你能提供的任何其他顏色都會很棒。

We are building a network. And one begets the other and back. I guess the -- assuming pretty good earlier today about 2% of e-commerce. And now I feel I've got to shop with more soon. The good news is that we are currently integrated at about 60% of all U.S. e-commerce. So we can increase that 2% penetration by getting more share of wallet with the merchants. Our merchants are really dependent on us in these inflationary times because consumers need to stretch their dollar and we're there for them.

我們正在建立一個網絡。一個生出另一個然後回來。我猜 - 假設今天早些時候相當不錯，大約 2% 的電子商務。現在我覺得我必須盡快購買更多。好消息是，我們目前在美國所有電子商務中的佔比約為 60%。因此，我們可以通過在商家那裡獲得更多的錢包份額來提高 2% 的滲透率。在這些通貨膨脹時期，我們的商家真的很依賴我們，因為消費者需要花大價錢，而我們會為他們服務。

And we have a really healthy business that is generated from our own services in our app that some of it is merchant-integrated, but a lot of it is not. Still very excited about what it will do for us. It extends us into things like daily purchase where we don't play today. And importantly, it gets us to offline, which is not included in the 60% number, and for us is a nicely growing, but still very, very trivial amount of volume. So we have lots of ways of getting above that, too. When we get there, we'll -- I'll spike this football again at that point.

我們有一個非常健康的業務，它是由我們自己的應用程序中的服務產生的，其中一些是商家集成的，但很多不是。仍然對它將為我們做什麼感到非常興奮。它將我們擴展到我們今天不玩的日常購買之類的東西。重要的是，它讓我們離線，這不包括在 60% 的數字中，對我們來說，這是一個很好的增長，但仍然非常非常微不足道。因此，我們也有很多方法可以超越這一點。當我們到達那裡時，我們會 - 我會在那個時候再次釘住這個足球。

Just looking at the industry mix, I mean one that kind of sticks out to us is a pretty sizable opportunity that could grow over time would be the travel and ticketing segment, thinking about getting further into airline purchases or hotels. Maybe you could just speak about that, the vertical inside that opportunity and what obstacles or potential like roads to taking that 12% up over the next couple of years to be.

只看行業組合，我的意思是，對我們來說，一個相當大的機會可能會隨著時間的推移而增長，這將是旅行和票務領域，考慮進一步涉足航空公司購買或酒店。也許你可以談談這個機會，以及在未來幾年內實現 12% 增長的障礙或潛力之類的道路。

It's a great opportunity. I think it's a wonderful place to apply what we have to offer. We have a handful of really good partnerships in the travel industry today, both in airlines -- and hotels are probably least penetrated from our point of view. We have a bunch of online travel agency integrations that we've had for years and years and have done extraordinarily good work with them. Direct integrations with airlines is a little bit newer, and there's more to do there as well.

這是一個很好的機會。我認為這是一個應用我們所提供的東西的好地方。今天，我們在旅遊行業有一些非常好的合作夥伴關係，無論是在航空公司——從我們的角度來看，酒店可能是最少滲透的。我們有很多在線旅行社整合，我們已經有很多年了，並且與他們進行了非常好的合作。與航空公司的直接整合有點新，而且還有更多工作要做。

The cool thing about travel, in general, it's kind of a sweet spot for what we know how to do. It's sort of a thing that other's team really do very well. All these things, including -- I'll start far but I'll get here in a second. But if you look at the work we've done with some of the largest big-box retailers and with the platforms, and now we're looking to do with hotels and expanding our work with OTAs, it is inevitably a thing you do not as much in credit and underwriting and understanding the consumer use case as you do in product.

旅行最酷的地方，一般來說，它是我們知道如何做的最佳地點。這是其他團隊真正做得很好的事情。所有這些，包括-- 我將開始很遠，但我會在一秒鐘內到達這裡。但如果你看看我們與一些最大的大型零售商和平台所做的工作，現在我們正在尋求與酒店合作並擴大我們與 OTA 的合作，這不可避免地是你不會做的事情與您在產品中所做的一樣，在信貸和承保方面以及對消費者用例的理解方面。

I can give you a very -- example. Hotels you sort of think back to the last time you checked out, you pay and checkout. Except a lot of times, you don't check out, you leave the key in the room and you walk. And so the actual exact mechanics of this transaction is now real. We know the total amount. And now we're going to turn into a loan and you'll pay it over time. Just very, very different between hotels and buying a couch. And so inevitably, to do this right, to do it well, to convert a lot of consumers, to really deliver the value that our merchants expect us to, you have to build a product that is fine-tuned to that particular industry. And all of our long-term growth opportunities are built around our ability to create products that are unique and are very hard for others to replicate.

我可以給你一個非常——的例子。您有點回想起上次結賬時的酒店，您付款並結賬。除了很多時候，你不退房，你把鑰匙留在房間裡然後走路。因此，該交易的實際確切機制現在是真實的。我們知道總量。現在我們要變成貸款，你會隨著時間的推移償還。酒店和購買沙發之間非常非常不同。所以不可避免地，要做到這一點，做得好，轉化很多消費者，真正提供我們的商家期望我們提供的價值，你必須打造一款針對特定行業進行微調的產品。我們所有的長期增長機會都建立在我們創造獨特且其他人難以復制的產品的能力之上。

So I feel very strongly about it. Obviously, for a long time, I used to say Affirm is a machine, engineers in RLTC out being very careful with hiring. So maybe some of these opportunities to get even bigger and faster will probably be the right amount of discipline to it, but definitely very -- in travel. And there's probably 500 industries that I can rattle off immediately where just the right product and we'll break through and become bigger than average.

所以我對此感覺非常強烈。很明顯，很長一段時間以來，我一直說 Affirm 是一台機器，RLTC 的工程師在招聘時非常謹慎。因此，也許其中一些變得更大更快的機會可能是適當的紀律，但絕對非常 - 在旅行中。大概有 500 個行業，我可以立即說出只要有合適的產品，我們就會突破並變得比平均水平更大。

Thank you. Ladies and gentlemen, this concludes our question-and-answer session. I would now like to turn the call back to Zane Keller.

謝謝你。女士們，先生們，我們的問答環節到此結束。我現在想把電話轉回 Zane Keller。

Well, thank you, everybody, for joining the call today. We look forward to speaking with you again next quarter.

好吧，謝謝大家今天加入電話會議。我們期待下個季度再次與您交談。

This concludes today's conference. Thank you for your participation. You may now disconnect.

今天的會議到此結束。感謝您的參與。您現在可以斷開連接。