Affirm Holdings Inc (AFRM) 2023 Q2 法說會逐字稿

Good afternoon. Welcome to Affirm Holdings Second Quarter 2023 Earnings Conference Call. (Operator Instructions) As a reminder, this conference call is being recorded, and a replay of the call will be available on our Investor Relations website for a reasonable period of time after the call.

下午好。歡迎來到 Affirm Holdings 2023 年第二季度收益電話會議。 （操作員說明）提醒一下，此電話會議正在錄製中，電話重播將在電話會議結束後的一段合理時間內在我們的投資者關係網站上提供。

I'd now like to turn the call over to Zane Keller, Director, Investor Relations. Thank you. You may begin.

我現在想把電話轉給投資者關係總監 Zane Keller。謝謝。你可以開始了。

Thank you, operator. Before we begin, I would like to remind everyone listening that today's call may contain forward-looking statements. These forward-looking statements are subject to numerous risks and uncertainties, including those set forth in our filings with the SEC, which are available on our Investor Relations website. Actual results may differ materially from any forward-looking statements that we make today. These forward-looking statements speak only as of today, and the company does not assume any obligation or intent to update them, except as required by law.

謝謝你，運營商。在我們開始之前，我想提醒大家，今天的電話會議可能包含前瞻性陳述。這些前瞻性陳述受眾多風險和不確定性的影響，包括我們向美國證券交易委員會提交的文件中規定的風險和不確定性，這些風險和不確定性可在我們的投資者關係網站上找到。實際結果可能與我們今天所做的任何前瞻性陳述存在重大差異。這些前瞻性陳述僅在今天發表，除法律要求外，公司不承擔任何更新它們的義務或意圖。

In addition, today's call may include non-GAAP financial measures. These measures should be considered as a supplement to and not a substitute for GAAP financial measures. For historical non-GAAP financial measures, reconciliations to the most directly comparable GAAP measures can be found in our earnings supplement slide deck, which is available on our Investor Relations website.

此外，今天的電話會議可能包括非 GAAP 財務指標。這些措施應被視為對 GAAP 財務措施的補充而非替代。對於歷史非 GAAP 財務指標，可以在我們的投資者關係網站上的收益補充幻燈片中找到與最直接可比的 GAAP 指標的調節。

Hosting today's call with me are Max Levchin, Affirm's Founder and Chief Executive Officer; and Michael Linford, Affirm's Chief Financial Officer.

與我一起主持今天的電話會議的是 Affirm 的創始人兼首席執行官 Max Levchin；和 Affirm 的首席財務官 Michael Linford。

With that, I would like to turn the call over to Max to begin.

有了這個，我想把電話轉給 Max 開始。

Thank you, Zane. We appreciate everyone taking the time to join us. I hope you've had a chance to review our letter to shareholders as it contains a great deal of detail.

謝謝你，贊恩。我們感謝大家花時間加入我們。我希望您有機會閱讀我們致股東的信，因為其中包含大量細節。

Amidst increased macroeconomic headwinds, our fiscal Q2 had mixed results. Revenue was at the low end of our expected range, and adjusted operating income came in better than expected. On the other hand, gross merchandise volume was short of expectations as was revenue less transaction costs as our mix shifted to more interest-bearing loans and we retain more loans on the balance sheet.

在宏觀經濟逆風加劇的情況下，我們的第二財季業績喜憂參半。收入處於我們預期範圍的低端，調整後的營業收入好於預期。另一方面，由於我們的組合轉向更多的計息貸款並且我們在資產負債表上保留了更多貸款，商品總銷量低於預期，收入減去交易成本也低於預期。

We once again reported excellent credit performance as delinquencies fell on a sequential basis. Our continued vigilance and attention to credit outcomes allowed us to meaningfully increase our funding capacity in January.

由於拖欠率連續下降，我們再次報告了出色的信貸表現。我們對信貸結果的持續警惕和關注使我們能夠在 1 月份顯著提高融資能力。

We also acknowledge a tactical error on our part that hurt our results. We began increasing prices for our merchants and consumers later in the year than we should have as this process has taken us longer than we anticipated. This is a lesson we will not soon forget, though it does not change our long-term outlook at all.

我們也承認我們的戰術錯誤損害了我們的結果。我們在今年晚些時候開始為我們的商家和消費者提高價格，因為這個過程花費的時間比我們預期的要長。這是一個我們不會很快忘記的教訓，儘管它根本不會改變我們的長期前景。

We have taken appropriate action from implementing pricing initiatives, which are gaining traction, to refocusing our product development effort on margin optimization and core growth to the most difficult decision of all, reducing the size of our team by 19% today.

我們採取了適當的行動，從實施越來越受歡迎的定價計劃，到將我們的產品開發工作重新集中在利潤優化和核心增長上，再到最困難的決定，今天我們的團隊規模減少了 19%。

I believe this is the right decision as we have hired a larger team that we can sustainably support in today's economic reality, but I am truly sorry to see many of our talented colleagues depart and we'll be forever grateful for their contributions to our mission.

我相信這是正確的決定，因為我們聘請了一個更大的團隊，我們可以在當今的經濟現實中為他們提供可持續的支持，但我真的很遺憾看到我們許多才華橫溢的同事離開，我們將永遠感謝他們為我們的使命做出的貢獻.

With a smaller, therefore, nimbler team, we are focused on achieving profitability on an adjusted operating income basis as we exit fiscal '23 by executing on 3 key initiatives: accelerating GMV growth while optimizing RLTC; engaging consumers to drive greater frequency and repeat usage; and growing Debit+.

有了一個更小、更靈活的團隊，我們專注於在調整後的營業收入基礎上實現盈利，因為我們通過執行 3 項關鍵舉措退出 23 財年：加速 GMV 增長，同時優化 RLTC；吸引消費者以推動更高的頻率和重複使用；以及不斷增長的 Debit+。

We continue executing on our strategy to scale our network, make disciplined high conviction bets in our most promising opportunities and capitalize on our massive secular tailwinds.

我們繼續執行我們的戰略以擴大我們的網絡，在我們最有希望的機會中進行有紀律的高信念賭注，並利用我們巨大的長期順風。

Anybody wants to ask me about the recently proposed rule on late fee, please go for it. We'll head to Q&A now. Back to you, Zane.

有人想問我最近提出的滯納金規則，請問。我們現在將前往問答環節。回到你身邊，贊恩。

Thank you, Max. With that, we will now begin our question-and-answer session. Operator, please open the line for our first question.

謝謝你，麥克斯。有了這個，我們現在將開始我們的問答環節。接線員，請為我們的第一個問題打開線路。

(Operator Instructions) Our first question is from Ramsey El-Assal with Barclays.

（操作員說明）我們的第一個問題來自巴克萊銀行的 Ramsey El-Assal。

I was wondering on the new pricing actions that rolled in a little bit late, what do you see there typically in terms of attrition or other impacts kind of downstream when you go about rolling those in? Is that a risk factor for later? Or do you have a pretty good idea in terms of what to expect as you roll those pricing actions in over the course of the next few months?

我想知道有點晚才推出的新定價行動，當你開始推出這些行動時，你通常會看到哪些下游的損耗或其他影響？這是以後的風險因素嗎？或者，在接下來的幾個月中，當您推出這些定價行動時，您對預期會發生什麼有一個很好的想法？

We have seen 0 attrition that I can think of, Michael, sure, will correct me. But it is not a matter of risk of implementation, but it is very much a matter of timing. The process is a little more complicated than, in some cases, any way than simply notifying someone because for a large percentage of our merchants, they utilize something or anything in our set of offerings as far as buying down rates is concerned.

我們已經看到我能想到的 0 損耗，邁克爾，當然，會糾正我。但這不是實施的風險問題，而是時間問題。在某些情況下，這個過程比簡單地通知某人要復雜一些，因為對於我們的大部分商家來說，就購買降價而言，他們使用我們產品集中的某些東西或任何東西。

So the conversation isn't just, hey, we need to raise prices on consumers or you need to pay us more MDR. It's inevitably a conversation about how the programs change, what buydowns will look like going forward now that there's a different construct in front of the consumer.

所以談話不僅僅是，嘿，我們需要提高消費者的價格，或者你需要向我們支付更多的 MDR。這不可避免地是關於程序如何改變的對話，既然消費者面前有不同的結構，那麼未來的買斷會是什麼樣子。

For example, you might see -- we now have a significantly more visible set of 4% and 5% APR is not a product or not a program that we featured last year at all, et cetera. So it's a matter of underestimating complexity on our part. And the other unfortunate reality is that having these conversations in calendar Q4 with merchants is just not something that happens very quickly. So we don't have much risk in those conversations, but the timing may differ.

例如，您可能會看到——我們現在有一組明顯更明顯的 4% 和 5% APR 根本不是我們去年推出的產品或程序，等等。所以這是低估我們這方面的複雜性的問題。另一個不幸的現實是，在第四季度與商家進行這些對話並不是很快就會發生的事情。所以我們在這些對話中沒有太大風險，但時間可能會有所不同。

And then I think it's also important to know that from a consumer price standpoint, we continue to believe that there is very minimal elasticity. So in thinking about the impact on the top line and the top of the funnel, we don't think there's a measurable impact there.

然後我認為從消費者價格的角度來看，我們仍然認為彈性非常小，這一點也很重要。因此，在考慮對頂線和漏斗頂部的影響時，我們認為那裡沒有可衡量的影響。

Okay. One quick follow-up for me. I also noted that more of your GMV was coming from interest-bearing loans, and as you called out, the highest ratio in the corporate history. Can you just kind of comment on how we should expect that to trend going forward? Is that a rate that should continue to increase? Or I've noticed that I've seen some, for example, some 0% loans on the Amazon website that I hadn't seen in the past. Could we expect that to kind of come in?

好的。對我來說是一個快速跟進。我還注意到你們更多的 GMV 來自有息貸款，正如你所說的，這是公司歷史上最高的比率。您能否就我們應該如何期望這種趨勢向前發展發表評論？這個比率應該繼續增加嗎？或者我注意到我在亞馬遜網站上看到了一些過去從未見過的 0% 貸款。我們可以期望它會出現嗎？

I think it's, generally speaking, reasonable to expect as the Fed rate continues to go up or at least remains high or elevated relative to last year to see more interest-bearing loans versus zeroes. That said, the subsidies to reduce the rates or eliminate them entirely come from both merchants and platforms as well as manufacturers, et cetera.

我認為，總的來說，隨著美聯儲利率繼續上升，或者至少相對於去年保持高位或高位，會有更多的有息貸款與零貸款相比，我認為這是合理的。也就是說，降低費率或取消費率的補貼完全來自商家和平台以及製造商等。

So overall, the trend should be expected to be towards more interest-bearing loans. But we're certainly still very much in the business of finding ways of offering consumers [matrical] deals that contain no interest at all, which is obviously far more valuable now that the overall borrowing cost for consumers went up a lot.

因此，總的來說，趨勢應該是傾向於更多的有息貸款。但我們肯定仍在努力尋找向消費者提供根本不包含利息的 [重大] 交易的方法，這顯然更有價值，因為消費者的整體借貸成本上升了很多。

Our next question is from Rob Wildhack with Autonomous Research.

我們的下一個問題來自 Rob Wildhack 的 Autonomous Research。

The new guidance, especially in the second half of '23, points to lower volume and revenue growth and RLTC that's actually going to be down year-over-year. I know you stuck to the profitability target, but how are you thinking about the longer-term margin and profitability of the business? And how do you get there given that the growth seems to be slowing before you really hit escape velocity?

新的指引，尤其是 23 年下半年的指引，指出銷量和收入增長以及 RLTC 實際上將同比下降。我知道您堅持盈利目標，但您如何看待企業的長期利潤率和盈利能力？鑑於在您真正達到逃逸速度之前增長似乎正在放緩，您如何到達那裡？

That's a good question. We continue to believe that the long-term range of the revenue less transaction cost as a percentage of GMV should be in the 3% to 4% range. I think with -- you have a couple of factors going on in Q2 with respect to the timing of how we earn the revenue and how we recognize the expense that distorts it. And given the -- what we think is a onetime step-up in loans that are held for investment through our warehouse financing growth, we think that obviously will weigh down the full year number but still allow us to end up in the 3% to 4%. And the reason for that is, as we talked about before, the business is really a mix of split pay, paying for volume, which has margins that are much lower, and very profitable longer-term monthly installment. And the 2 mix in a way where we can pretty reliably predict that 3% to 4%.

這是個好問題。我們仍然認為，收入減去交易成本佔 GMV 的百分比的長期範圍應該在 3% 到 4% 的範圍內。我認為 - 關於我們如何賺取收入的時間以及我們如何識彆扭曲收入的費用，您在第二季度有幾個因素正在發生。考慮到——我們認為通過我們的倉庫融資增長持有的用於投資的貸款一次性增加，我們認為這顯然會壓低全年數字，但仍然允許我們最終達到 3% 至4%。原因是，正如我們之前談到的，這項業務實際上是一種混合支付，按量付費，利潤率要低得多，而且長期每月分期付款非常有利可圖。兩者的混合方式我們可以非常可靠地預測 3% 到 4%。

Additionally, I'd point out that we feel really good about the quality of the assets that we originated this quarter. And as I say, the economic content there is really good. That hasn't been a primary driver. Most of what you're seeing is, again, how those yields flow through the P&L.

此外，我要指出的是，我們對本季度發起的資產質量感覺非常好。正如我所說，那裡的經濟內容真的很好。這並不是主要的驅動因素。您再次看到的大部分內容是這些收益率如何流經損益表。

If I could just follow up there. Similar question but more from an operating profit standpoint. The long-term target, I think, used to be a 20% or 30% operating margin when GMV growth was below 30%. You're kind of there now but still have a lot of fixed costs to scale. So from an operating profit standpoint, how do you think about the longer-term margin here?

如果我能跟進那裡就好了。類似的問題，但更多是從營業利潤的角度來看。我認為，當 GMV 增長低於 30% 時，長期目標過去是 20% 或 30% 的營業利潤率。你現在有點在那裡，但仍然有很多固定成本需要擴展。那麼從營業利潤的角度來看，您如何看待這裡的長期利潤率？

Yes. We've not given any update to the framework that we laid out last year. I think that we would probably say we're in the midst of one of the biggest kind of moments of volatility from a macro sense. So not sure that we would hold ourselves to the framework that we outlined 1.5 years ago in this very moment. But I think part of the reason we laid out our profitability commitment to the end of the year was a reflection of the fact that we were wanting to get ahead of that from a framework standpoint.

是的。我們沒有對去年制定的框架進行任何更新。我認為我們可能會說我們正處於宏觀意義上最大的動盪時刻之一。所以不確定我們是否會在 1.5 年前的此時此刻堅持我們概述的框架。但我認為，我們在年底前做出盈利承諾的部分原因是，我們希望從框架的角度超越這一事實。

Just for the record, this is not the growth rate that I personally like. We intend to grow the business faster. So the expectation of where they now is not the expectation that I have for this business. That said, we will manage credit, most importantly, as job #0. Like, we will never allow growth trump the necessity of managing losses and yields, et cetera. But there's absolutely no reason to believe that having taken over 1/4 of U.S. retail sales, we're going to attenuate and match some steady-as-she-goes growth rate.

鄭重聲明，這不是我個人喜歡的增長率。我們打算更快地發展業務。因此，對他們現在所處位置的期望並不是我對這項業務的期望。也就是說，我們將管理信用，最重要的是，作為工作#0。比如，我們永遠不會讓增長勝過管理損失和收益等的必要性。但絕對沒有理由相信，在接管了美國零售額的 1/4 之後，我們將減弱並匹配一些穩定的增長速度。

Our next question is from Dan Perlin with RBC Capital Markets.

我們的下一個問題來自 RBC Capital Markets 的 Dan Perlin。

I wanted to explore the long-term profitability question again. But from the viewpoint, I feel like I've heard you say at conferences like one of the biggest toggle points is really kind of the human capital aspect of your business. And you just -- you obviously just did a very large reduction in force here. So my question is -- that seems to be helpful today. But to the extent that you're able to sustain long-term profitability, are you going to have to lean into something that requires a lot more automation on your part? Are you doing that? Or are you just trying to match -- obviously, right now, obviously, you're kind of matching an expense versus a downdraft in the top line, but I'm thinking about this longer term from a sustainability perspective.

我想再次探討長期盈利能力問題。但從這個角度來看，我覺得我聽到你在會議上說過，最大的轉折點之一實際上是你企業的人力資本方面。你只是 - 你顯然只是在這里大大減少了力量。所以我的問題是-- 這在今天看來很有用。但就您能夠維持長期盈利能力而言，您是否將不得不依賴於需要更多自動化的東西？你在這樣做嗎？或者你只是想匹配——很明顯，現在，很明顯，你在某種程度上匹配了支出與收入的下降，但我正在從可持續發展的角度考慮這個長期問題。

A couple of different thoughts on that. The [RIF] is very unfortunate and certainly saddens me greatly and the rest of the team. It is an economic reality that we have to live within our means and match growth of head count with growth in revenue. But just for the record, what we've done is we've rolled back 6 months of engineering hiring. This is not a -- everything is going to be replaced by robots. And we're writing a lot of code, and we'll continue to do so.

對此有幾個不同的想法。 [RIF] 非常不幸，當然讓我和團隊其他人都非常難過。這是一個經濟現實，我們必須量入為出，並使員工人數的增長與收入的增長相匹配。但鄭重聲明，我們所做的是縮減了 6 個月的工程招聘。這不是——一切都將被機器人取代。我們正在編寫大量代碼，並將繼續這樣做。

We have definitely shifted our geographic hiring focus to Poland, where we've been able to attract exceptional talent at significantly lower cost than Silicon Valley, for example. We have a lot of things that we want to build, and we'll certainly expect to -- ourselves to build and deliver it. What we're doing right now is not building all those things concurrently. What we've really done is reduce the service area of engineering projects we're allowing ourselves to invest in, which 1.5 years ago or 2 years ago was exactly the right strategy, and I stand by those decisions.

我們肯定已經將我們的地域招聘重點轉移到波蘭，例如，我們能夠以比矽谷低得多的成本吸引傑出人才。我們有很多我們想要構建的東西，我們當然會期望——我們自己來構建和交付它。我們現在正在做的不是同時構建所有這些東西。我們真正做的是減少我們允許自己投資的工程項目的服務區域，這在 1.5 年前或 2 年前是完全正確的策略，我支持這些決定。

Today, it's a little bit tougher to justify having things that will create the next $1 billion business 3 years from now built today. We'll have to build it a year from now.

今天，要證明擁有將在 3 年後創造下一個價值 10 億美元的業務的東西是合理的，從現在開始建造今天有點困難。我們必須在一年後建造它。

Got it. If I can just do a quick follow-up on the pricing initiatives. The question here is really, as you increase APRs up to 36% is the cap, and then you're also, I guess, toying with the idea of increasing MDRs on the 0% APRs, which kind of puts a burden on merchants, I'm just wondering, do you kind of foresee any, I guess, diminishing returns associated with that? From a merchant perspective, I know you have to get some approvals, it sounds like, in order for you to actually take those caps up, but I'm just wondering how those discussions have gone and what that kind of feels like from a merchant perspective.

知道了。如果我可以快速跟進定價計劃。這裡的問題真的是，當你將 APR 提高到 36% 是上限時，我猜你也在玩弄在 0% APR 上增加 MDR 的想法，這會給商家帶來負擔，我只是想知道，我猜你是否預見到任何與此相關的收益遞減？從商家的角度來看，我知道你必須獲得一些批准，這聽起來像是，為了讓你真正接受這些上限，但我只是想知道這些討論是如何進行的，以及商家的那種感覺看法。

I think everyone, merchants and Affirm alike, are keen on more volume. And as I've repeated often, I'll say it again, we are fundamentally governed by yield and risk management. So we must maintain the risk frameworks that we've signed up with our capital partners. If we are able to increase the compensation we get for taking the risk, and we really do think of it in terms of MDR APR trade-off. There are many situations where the merchant is more than willing to pick up the increased cost because they want to pass the savings on to the consumer and attract them this way, obviously, works really well for folks with direct-to-consumer brands where maybe manufacturing is partially owned or fully owned. And in other situations where the brand is already paying us minimal possible and is unable to shoulder any more than the consumer that has to see increased rates.

我認為每個人，包括商家和 Affirm，都希望增加交易量。正如我經常重複的那樣，我再說一遍，我們從根本上受收益和風險管理的約束。因此，我們必須維護我們與資本合作夥伴簽署的風險框架。如果我們能夠增加我們因承擔風險而獲得的補償，我們確實會根據 MDR APR 權衡來考慮它。在很多情況下，商家非常願意承擔增加的成本，因為他們希望將節省的費用轉嫁給消費者並以這種方式吸引他們，顯然，對於那些擁有直接面向消費者品牌的人來說，這可能非常有效製造業是部分擁有或完全擁有。在其他情況下，品牌已經向我們支付了最低限度的費用，並且無法承擔比不得不看到更高價格的消費者更多的負擔。

In either of those 2 cases, if we are able to raise the rates, we will increase approvals. Like this is fundamentally not about expanding the margin. We're quite comfortable with the margin structure that Michael outlined. We continue targeting those RLTC percentages, but being able to talk to merchants about helping them sell more in a period of obvious consumer slowdown is a pretty welcome conversation.

在這兩種情況中的任何一種情況下，如果我們能夠提高利率，我們就會增加批准。像這樣從根本上不是為了擴大利潤率。我們對邁克爾概述的保證金結構非常滿意。我們繼續以這些 RLTC 百分比為目標，但能夠與商家討論如何在消費者明顯放緩的時期幫助他們銷售更多產品是一個非常受歡迎的對話。

It is not a -- not in every case anyway is it, a, hey, we're just going to go do this because, again, we run complex programs as part of why this business is so defensible, is because a vast majority of our merchants have significantly more to do with us than just showing up our logo on their checkout. If you look at their product detail's pages, you'll see that there are pre-quals and various forms of finding out the true cost to the consumer, which has to be updated for regulatory and just marketing purposes, et cetera. So it's a more complicated thing to execute than perhaps meets the eye, but it is not a difficult conversation with the merchant.

它不是 - 不是在任何情況下都是，嘿，我們只是要去做這個，因為，再一次，我們運行複雜的程序作為這個業務如此可靠的一部分，是因為絕大多數我們的商家與我們有更多的關係，而不僅僅是在結賬時顯示我們的徽標。如果您查看他們的產品詳細信息頁面，您會發現有資格預審和各種形式來找出消費者的真實成本，必須更新這些內容以用於監管和營銷目的等。因此，執行起來可能比看上去要復雜得多，但與商家的對話並不困難。

And as Michael pointed out, we've run the 36 versus 30 sensitivity tests last year and found that our consumer is actually smart enough to realize that when there are no fees, there are fixed schedules, and there's no compounding difference between 30 and 36 on a $240 loan over 12 months is $0.70 a month. So the true cost to the consumer is practically de minimis on a cash basis, and our merchants are smart enough to understand that as well.

正如邁克爾指出的那樣，我們去年進行了 36 與 30 的敏感性測試，發現我們的消費者實際上足夠聰明，可以意識到在不收費的情況下，有固定的時間表，並且 30 和 36 之間沒有復利差異12 個月的 240 美元貸款是每月 0.70 美元。因此，以現金為基礎，消費者的真正成本實際上是微不足道的，我們的商家也足夠聰明地理解這一點。

I think it's important to note that our direct-to-consumer channel where we have complete control, it's probably the best inside into where the structural economics are here, and that's our most profitable product and channel. We have a very efficient way to engage and monetize that engagement in our app.

我認為重要的是要注意我們完全控制的直接面向消費者的渠道，它可能是結構經濟學所在的最佳內部渠道，這是我們最賺錢的產品和渠道。我們有一種非常有效的方式來參與我們應用程序中的參與並從中獲利。

I think Max's opening remarks pointed out that one of the ways we're getting to our goals is by driving that engagement back to our own services where we can very profitably engage consumers, and we're in full control of that experience.

我認為 Max 的開場白指出，我們實現目標的方法之一是將這種參與帶回到我們自己的服務中，我們可以在這些服務中非常有利可圖地吸引消費者，並且我們完全控制這種體驗。

Our next question is from Jason Kupferberg with Bank of America.

我們的下一個問題來自美國銀行的 Jason Kupferberg。

I just wanted to start on GMV. I'm just looking at the new outlook there. You talked in the shareholder letter about some slowdown in discretionary consumer spending. But just wanted to take your temperature on how much of the lower outlook on the volume is that versus other factors, whether it be competition or just some tightening of the credit box. And then if you can just talk about what you see ultimately reaccelerating the GMV growth because I think the math suggests you'd be down around 13% or 14% in the next couple of quarters.

我只是想從 GMV 開始。我只是在看那裡的新前景。你在股東信中談到可自由支配的消費者支出有所放緩。但只是想了解一下與其他因素相比，無論是競爭還是信貸箱的一些收緊，對數量的較低前景有多大影響。然後，如果你能談談你所看到的最終重新加速 GMV 增長的情況，因為我認為數學表明你在接下來的幾個季度會下降 13% 或 14% 左右。

It's a great question. So the discretionary spend is down. We get a pretty good preview of what that looks like, especially around Christmas shopping and Black Friday. From our seats, electronics were down about 11%. Homewares and sports equipment, in particular, were hovering in the negative high 30s. So there's quite a lot of -- I'm not sure of the right word to use, but folks are digesting the purchases they made during the pandemic. And I think those are not transactions that will disappear forever, but I think they're probably going to remain muted for, we expect, at least a few quarters of that.

這是一個很好的問題。因此，可自由支配的支出下降了。我們可以很好地預覽它的外觀，尤其是在聖誕節購物和黑色星期五前後。從我們的座位來看，電子產品下降了約 11%。尤其是家庭用品和運動器材，徘徊在 30 多歲的負高位。所以有很多 - 我不確定使用正確的詞，但人們正在消化他們在大流行期間購買的東西。而且我認為這些交易不會永遠消失，但我認為它們可能會保持沉默，我們預計，至少有幾個季度。

On the flip side, credit is always an input. We set the loss rate that we're willing to live with and our capital partners are willing to live with. And then we manage everything towards that. That's why the delinquencies are as good as they look. We have total control, and we are willing to compromise GMV, although we don't have to compromise too much of it to maintain industry winning loss rates. And so I'm not sure I'm prepared to give you a breakdown, but those are the 2 fundamental reasons. Consumers are pulling back their spend.

另一方面，信用始終是一種輸入。我們設定我們願意接受的損失率，我們的資本合作夥伴也願意接受。然後我們為此管理一切。這就是為什麼拖欠貸款和看起來一樣好。我們擁有完全的控制權，我們願意在 GMV 上做出妥協，儘管我們不必為了維持行業贏虧率而妥協太多。所以我不確定我是否準備好給你一個細分，但這是兩個根本原因。消費者正在縮減支出。

Anytime I talk to my friends, CEOs of broadline retailers, they tell me that discretionary spend is down. There's quite a lot of movement into things like consumables. And obviously, food prices being higher does not help either.

每當我與我的朋友、大型零售商的首席執行官交談時，他們都會告訴我可自由支配的支出正在下降。消耗品之類的東西有很多動作。顯然，食品價格上漲也無濟於事。

To the reacceleration point, obviously, we've talked for a long time about Debit+. I'm sure somebody will ask me, and I'll give you a full update on what's going on there, but I remain very, very bullish on that. So we've worked really hard over the last 6 months. It's hard to overstate just how much work went into the product just over the last couple of quarters. We feel very good about its state of readiness, and we'll start finding out just how much of that food and consumable spend we're going to be able to shift to Affirm.

顯然，對於再加速點，我們已經討論了很長時間的 Debit+。我相信有人會問我，我會給你一個完整的最新情況，但我仍然非常、非常看好這一點。所以我們在過去 6 個月裡非常努力地工作。很難誇大過去幾個季度在產品上投入了多少工作。我們對它的準備狀態感覺非常好，我們將開始了解我們將能夠轉移到 Affirm 的食品和消費品支出中有多少。

Our consumers still love us. They still come back to us. You can see that the frequency per user is rising. The network activity is extremely healthy. I think probably the set of metrics that I would direct all of you to look at if you wanted the -- how does Affirm [wind] story spelled out very clearly, there's almost a 40% growth in active consumers year-over-year, almost 40% growth in transactions, 3.5 transactions per year per active user, 51% growth in transactions themselves and 86% up slightly from last one is the repeat transactions.

我們的消費者仍然愛我們。他們仍然回到我們身邊。您可以看到每個用戶的頻率正在上升。網絡活動非常健康。我想如果你們想要的話，我可能會指導你們所有人查看的一組指標——Affirm [wind] 故事如何非常清楚地闡明，活躍消費者同比增長近 40%，交易量增長近 40%，每位活躍用戶每年交易 3.5 次，交易本身增長 51%，重複交易比上次略高 86%。

And so the network itself is increasing density, and that is fundamentally the long-term play. Like if we are able to pick up more and more of your transactions, we will ultimately have a really good shot at also helping you buy groceries. And that is transactions that do not, generally speaking, diminish much in the positive and negative economic environment. So that is where the reacceleration will come from.

因此網絡本身正在增加密度，這從根本上說是長期的。就像如果我們能夠獲得越來越多的您的交易，我們最終將有很好的機會幫助您購買雜貨。一般來說，在積極和消極的經濟環境中，交易不會減少太多。這就是再加速的來源。

We're also selling to more merchants and launching new projects and new products with them. So that, too, will bear fruit. But in terms of new categories, off-line and lower AV transactions off-line in particular, is where I'm most excited about.

我們還向更多商家銷售產品，並與他們一起推出新項目和新產品。因此，這也將取得成果。但就新類別而言，尤其是線下和較低的 AV 交易，是我最興奮的地方。

And then just quickly on Amazon, I think, the exclusivity provision of the contract expired January 31. Just any updates there?

然後很快就在亞馬遜上，我認為，合同的排他性條款於 1 月 31 日到期。那裡有任何更新嗎？

I think the world where you can lock up your partners with a 10-year contract and not do much after that is -- that's left to card issuing banks. We're not one of those. The way we maintain our partnerships and, hopefully, have a rate to continue showing up is by showing up and delivering real value every day. I think we feel very good about all of our enterprise partnerships.

我認為你可以用 10 年的合同鎖定你的合作夥伴並且在那之後不做太多的世界 - 這留給發卡銀行。我們不是其中之一。我們保持合作夥伴關係並希望有一定比例繼續出現的方式是每天出現並提供真正的價值。我認為我們對我們所有的企業合作夥伴關係感覺非常好。

Yes. Just real quick. In our queue, you'll see we are breaking down the concentration that you see for Amazon. And I think we are -- we have a meaningful exposure there. We are a little over 20% of our GMV. That is still underpenetrated versus Amazon's share of e-commerce. So we still feel like we have a lot of room to grow there. And nothing happened to our business on, to Max' earlier point, on the day the contract terms turned over.

是的。真快。在我們的隊列中，您會看到我們正在打破您在亞馬遜上看到的集中度。而且我認為我們 - 我們在那裡有有意義的曝光。我們的 GMV 略高於 20%。與亞馬遜在電子商務中的份額相比，這仍然不足。所以我們仍然覺得我們在那裡有很大的發展空間。在合同條款交接的那天，我們的業務沒有發生任何變化，對 Max 早些時候的觀點而言。

Our next question is from Rayna Kumar with UBS.

我們的下一個問題來自瑞銀的 Rayna Kumar。

Just looking at your FY '23 guidance, you're calling for cut at the midpoint on revenue of 8% and transaction costs to be cut by 2% at the midpoint. Just wondering what that -- why there's that big differential. Any call-outs there?

只要看看你的 23 財年指導，你就要求在中點削減 8% 的收入和 2% 的交易成本。只是想知道那是什麼——為什麼會有這麼大的差異。那裡有外呼嗎？

Sorry. Is your question why are we able to...

對不起。你的問題是為什麼我們能夠...

Why are you cutting on revenue more than on the transaction costs?

為什麼你削減的收入多於交易成本？

Okay. Yes. I think we -- the guidance for the back half of the year, transaction cost does reflect continued -- some volatile macroeconomic conditions, including and especially the capital markets where we would continue to expect there to be a lot of pressure on the yields that we need to generate for our capital partners. I think that's reflected in the guide. That's the thing that's happening to us. The thing that we're doing about it is the pricing initiatives that Max alluded to. I think we'd feel better about the world, have that already been in the ground and reflected in the mix of GMV that we're originating. And so we do expect that continue to be a source of pressure on us in the near term.

好的。是的。我認為我們 - 今年下半年的指導，交易成本確實反映了一些持續的 - 一些不穩定的宏觀經濟狀況，包括特別是資本市場，我們將繼續預期收益率會承受很大壓力我們需要為我們的資本合作夥伴創造。我認為這反映在指南中。這就是發生在我們身上的事情。我們正在做的事情是 Max 提到的定價計劃。我認為我們會對這個世界感覺更好，如果它已經在地面上並反映在我們發起的 GMV 組合中。因此，我們確實預計這將在短期內繼續成為我們的壓力來源。

Got it. That's really helpful. And then just one follow-up. If you can just provide us an update on how the Shopify partnership is ramping and how that runway for growth looks like from here?

知道了。這真的很有幫助。然後只是一個跟進。您是否可以向我們提供有關 Shopify 合作夥伴關係如何發展以及增長跑道從這裡看起來如何的最新信息？

We're very happy with the Shopify relationship. Sort of the headline answer is these things take a long time to build out. It's just sort of -- again, I love being our -- just a little bit about the complexity of this business as a moat, but it really is that. It typically takes us 2 to 3 years to get to kind of a full deployment because it's such an interesting beast. You have to figure out how to promote the product the right way, and yet you can't overpromote it because then you're going to be pushing people into death where they shouldn't be.

我們對 Shopify 的關係非常滿意。某種程度上的標題答案是這些東西需要很長時間才能建立起來。這只是——再一次，我喜歡成為我們的——只是關於這個業務作為護城河的複雜性的一點點，但它確實是這樣。我們通常需要 2 到 3 年的時間才能完成某種程度的全面部署，因為它是如此有趣的野獸。你必須弄清楚如何以正確的方式推廣產品，但你不能過度推廣它，因為那樣你就會把人們推向他們不應該死亡的地方。

And so there's a lot of finesse to figuring out how to get to a full -- sort of a fully deployed mode. And you know you're there when you're seeing kind of a 1% to 2% improvement and not better than that. And we're still in a really happy position where we can roll out an improvement or a project with Shopify, the meaningful improvements come out in GMV or in profitability of the program, et cetera.

因此，要想弄清楚如何達到完全——一種完全部署的模式，需要很多技巧。當您看到 1% 到 2% 的改善並且不比這更好時，您就知道自己在那裡。我們仍然處於一個非常高興的位置，我們可以通過 Shopify 推出改進或項目，有意義的改進出現在 GMV 或程序的盈利能力等方面。

So we're still very much at work. We have a significant percentage of our effort dedicated to what we call PBA, Powered by Affirm, that's the component -- (inaudible) that powers both Shopify and several other platforms for us. And we're still very significantly invested in building that out. There's still quite a lot of opportunity there.

所以我們仍在努力工作。我們有很大一部分努力致力於我們所謂的 PBA，由 Affirm 提供支持，這是為我們的 Shopify 和其他幾個平台提供支持的組件——（聽不清）。而且我們仍然非常重視建設它。那裡仍然有很多機會。

So generally speaking, very excited, great relationship. Spend a lot of time talking to my counterparts there.

所以總的來說，很興奮，關係很大。花很多時間和那裡的同行交談。

Our next question is from Andrew Jeffrey with Truist Securities.

我們的下一個問題來自 Truist Securities 的 Andrew Jeffrey。

Michael, by all accounts, it would appear that capital markets are maybe healing a little bit, and equity as a percent of the total funding platform is up pretty substantially quarter-on-quarter. So I guess a couple of questions. One, how do you sort of assess the state of the capital markets from a funding standpoint? I noticed you expanded capacity. And two, do you think you're going to be able to stay below that sort of 10% pre-IPO equity funding threshold through the cycle?

邁克爾，從各方面來看，資本市場似乎正在復蘇，股權佔總融資平台的百分比環比大幅上升。所以我猜有幾個問題。第一，您如何從融資的角度評估資本市場的狀況？我注意到你擴大了容量。第二，你認為你能夠在整個週期中保持在 IPO 前 10% 的股權融資門檻以下嗎？

Yes. So the first question first. The markets are healing. I think that the new year did an awful lot for the debt capital markets broadly. And you're seeing the ABS market open up. You're seeing much more constructive conversations with forward flow partners. Max and I spent a lot of time over the past couple of weeks meeting with capital partners of all stripes. And the tone is just markedly better than where it was as the volatility appeared to be reducing, and the new year really did help. So we feel much better today, and yet we are still very much humbled around just how difficult it is to execute and how volatile and uncertainty remains.

是的。那麼第一個問題先。市場正在癒合。我認為新的一年對債務資本市場的影響很大。你會看到 ABS 市場開放。您會看到與前向合作夥伴進行更具建設性的對話。在過去的幾周里，我和馬克斯花了很多時間與各種各樣的資本合作夥伴會面。而且基調明顯好於波動似乎正在減少的情況，而新的一年確實有所幫助。因此，我們今天感覺好多了，但我們仍然對執行的難度以及仍然存在的波動和不確定性感到非常謙虛。

You saw the whipsaw this week in around the Fed meeting. And I think that kind of volatility is something we're just -- we're prepared to and comfortable at navigating, but it does reflecting us being very thoughtful and careful about how we run the business.

你在本周美聯儲會議前後看到了洗盤。而且我認為這種波動是我們正在做的事情——我們已經準備好並且樂於駕馭，但這確實反映出我們對我們如何經營業務非常周到和謹慎。

With respect to your second question, absolutely, we will stay below 10%. We think this is near the high watermark for where that number should be. We think that the seasonality of our GMV, specifically the holiday shopping season late in the quarter and then, of course, in the quarter itself, causes an increase, a pretty big step-up in total platform portfolio that we don't think will continue to grow as quickly to the back half of the year, which means that our funding mix will probably be very stable through the back half of the fiscal year.

關於你的第二個問題，我們絕對會保持在10%以下。我們認為這接近該數字應達到的高水位線。我們認為我們的 GMV 的季節性，特別是本季度末的假日購物季，當然還有本季度本身，會導致增長，我們認為整個平台組合的增長相當大繼續快速增長到今年下半年，這意味著我們的資金組合在本財年下半年可能會非常穩定。

So you wouldn't expect any meaningful increases in that equity capital required. And we would continue to feel confident in our ability to execute both securitization like we did earlier in January as well as net new capacity with forward flow partners. And so we feel good about our ability to do that right now as we sit here today, but nowhere near 10%.

因此，您不會期望所需的股權資本有任何有意義的增加。我們將繼續對我們執行證券化的能力充滿信心，就像我們在 1 月初所做的那樣，以及與遠期流動合作夥伴的淨新能力。因此，當我們今天坐在這裡時，我們對自己有能力做到這一點感到滿意，但遠不及 10%。

Okay. And as a follow-up, wondering about -- pardon me, I lost my train of thought. Oh, yes, on the loan loss reserve, I know it's -- you've admonished us not to necessarily consider that as we would in more traditional financial, but can you just discuss sort of the 5% reserve and where you think that goes in the current environment should it fall given the slowdown in growth?

好的。作為後續行動，想知道——對不起，我失去了思路。哦，是的，關於貸款損失準備金，我知道它是——你已經告誡我們不要像在更傳統的金融領域那樣考慮這一點，但你能不能討論一下 5% 的準備金以及你認為的去向在目前的環境下，鑑於增長放緩，它應該下降嗎？

I think 5% is a really good number. I think it is obviously linked to delinquencies. And again, I apologize if this comes off as a (inaudible) it's really not. It's just a chance to learn about how this business works. We have a target -- in my letter, I would really encourage everyone to look at it. It shows the delinquency trends at Affirm as compared to some of those traditional players whose measures, I think, some folks are wanting to apply to our business.

我認為 5% 是一個非常好的數字。我認為這顯然與拖欠有關。再一次，如果這是（聽不清），我很抱歉，但事實並非如此。這只是了解這項業務如何運作的機會。我們有一個目標——在我的信中，我真的鼓勵大家看看它。它顯示了與一些傳統參與者相比，Affirm 的拖欠趨勢，我認為，有些人希望將其措施應用於我們的業務。

We're the only player with the line on delinquencies pointing down, okay? And some players are not as high as others, but the directionality is very different. And that's because our asset turns over so fast that you're not building for losses for loans that you have. And it's somewhat of a cheeky statement, but we can't build allowance for loans that we don't own. And so we can't build ahead originations that haven't happened yet. And what you see here then isn't a judgment about how the back book will deteriorate in the macroeconomic environment. It is a reflection of the quality of loans that have originated recently given the velocity of the book.

我們是唯一一個拖欠率線朝下的玩家，好嗎？而有的球員身高沒有其他球員高，但指向性卻大不相同。那是因為我們的資產周轉速度如此之快，以至於您不會為您擁有的貸款造成損失。這是一個有點厚臉皮的聲明，但我們不能為我們不擁有的貸款建立津貼。因此，我們無法提前建立尚未發生的起源。你在這裡看到的並不是對宏觀經濟環境下背書將如何惡化的判斷。考慮到賬面速度，這反映了最近發放的貸款質量。

And so what you should interpret as the 5% is very much connected to that declining delinquency trend that you see. That's a reflection of extremely strong credit performance, much more so than anything else.

因此，您應該將 5% 解釋為與您看到的拖欠率下降趨勢密切相關。這反映了極其強勁的信用表現，比其他任何事情都更重要。

Lastly, I think, we included a chart in the supplement that I would encourage folks to look at, it just breaks out where the allowance bridge to from September to December and then again where the last 12 months have gone. And you'll see the allowance build is a reflection of both growth in assets, but also the actual charge-offs in the period.

最後，我認為，我們在補充中包含了一張圖表，我鼓勵人們查看，它只是打破了從 9 月到 12 月的津貼橋在哪裡，然後又是過去 12 個月的去向。你會看到津貼的增加既反映了資產的增長，也反映了這一時期的實際沖銷。

Just I don't mean for it to be admonishment either, but I will attempt to say exactly what Michael said in a probably less careful way, but I think it's really important to understand. The whole point of including this chart, it's not as though our consumers are experiencing less or more stress on average, is that we have through the really short-term nature of the product that we print and the fact that we decide every loan individually, where we think we are not able to take the risk, we don't.

只是我也不是說這是一種警告，但我會嘗試以一種可能不太謹慎的方式準確地說出 Michael 所說的話，但我認為理解這一點非常重要。包括這張圖表的全部意義在於，這並不是說我們的消費者平均承受的壓力更少或更多，而是我們通過我們打印的產品的真正短期性質以及我們單獨決定每筆貸款的事實，在我們認為我們無法承擔風險的地方，我們沒有。

And the downward slope of delinquency is a direct result of our action. We changed our credit posture sometime starting maybe 9 months ago, and we've done it again several times since, sometimes with finesse, and other times, somewhat more actively. But the point is we are in control of the credit outcomes, and we'll continue controlling them.

拖欠率的下降是我們行動的直接結果。大約從 9 個月前開始，我們改變了我們的信用狀況，此後我們又做了幾次，有時是巧妙的，有時是更積極的。但關鍵是我們控制著信貸結果，我們將繼續控制它們。

And that's really, really important to understand. We're not building allowances for the mistakes we made that we couldn't have predicted 3 years ago by giving someone a credit card. We make the decision every single time they choose to transact. How's a direct consequence of GMV might be lower, because we decided the GMV that is coming to us is higher risk than we want to take on, but we do rank risk really well.

理解這一點真的非常重要。我們不會為 3 年前我們無法通過給某人一張信用卡而預測到的錯誤建立津貼。每次他們選擇交易時，我們都會做出決定。 GMV 的直接結果可能會更低，因為我們認為即將到來的 GMV 風險高於我們想要承擔的風險，但我們確實對風險進行了很好的排名。

Reducing GMV a little bit eliminates a tremendous amount of potential loss, and we are in total control of what kind of loss we take on. But that is -- the reason we included that is to just drive the message home, we're not interested in building up giant piles of cash for losses that we'll make for loans from 3 years ago because we don't really have a whole lot of loans left from 3 years ago at all. I hope that didn't sound too admonishing.

稍微降低 GMV 可以消除大量潛在損失，我們可以完全控制我們承擔的損失類型。但那是——我們將其包括在內的原因只是為了傳達信息，我們對積累巨額現金以彌補 3 年前的貸款損失不感興趣，因為我們真的沒有3 年前留下的一大筆貸款。我希望這聽起來不是過於警告。

Our next question is from Bryan Keane with Deutsche Bank.

我們的下一個問題來自德意志銀行的 Bryan Keane。

I guess, just thinking big picture here, Michael, what surprised you versus the guidance you just laid out last quarter? Was it the pullback in consumer spend? Was it that you thought the pricing would get all pushed through? Was it the mix of loans? I'm just trying to get a handle on the reduction in the guidance going forward and kind of the surprise in that, that caught you by surprise?

我想，只是想一想這裡的大局，邁克爾，與你上個季度剛剛制定的指導相比，有什麼讓你感到驚訝的？這是消費者支出的回落嗎？您是否認為定價會全部通過？是混合貸款嗎？我只是想了解未來指導的減少，這讓你感到驚訝嗎？

Yes. I think it really is the overall consumer demand, which shows up both in the aggregate GMV, but also the mix underneath that. And I think there's some good progress that we made. So for example, we were pretty happy to get our business with Peloton to actually -- to be ahead of where we thought it was going to be. There's a lot of strength of that program as they returned to some of the programs that we had from years before. And then there was a lot of real legitimate slowdown in the broad line merchants that we are very proud to partner with in some more of the durable goods categories. These are the larger considered purchases. And so I think we were surprised about that.

是的。我認為這確實是整體消費者需求，它既體現在總體 GMV 中，也體現在其下的組合中。我認為我們取得了一些不錯的進展。因此，例如，我們很高興與 Peloton 的業務真正達到 - 領先於我們預期的水平。當他們回到我們幾年前的一些項目時，這個項目有很多優勢。然後，廣泛的商家出現了很多真正合理的放緩，我們很自豪能在更多的耐用品類別中與之合作。這些是較大的考慮購買。所以我認為我們對此感到驚訝。

And then frankly, we continue to manage credit very tightly. And we will probably and continue to be -- as Max alluded to, we're going to manage credit first. And that shows up on the positive side with really excellent credit performance, which ensures that we continue to access capital. And our capital is not a constraint in the growth in our business. And yes, it does create some short-term top line headwind.

然後坦率地說，我們繼續非常嚴格地管理信貸。正如 Max 所暗示的那樣，我們可能會並繼續是，我們將首先管理信貸。這在積極的一面顯示出非常出色的信用表現，這確保了我們繼續獲得資本。我們的資本不會限制我們業務的增長。是的，它確實造成了一些短期的頂線逆風。

Got it. No, that's helpful. And then, Max, I'll take the bait and ask about Debit+, the rollout there and the prospects of profitability. I know there was some hesitation, worried about the profitability of Debit+. So maybe you can update on that as well.

知道了。不，那很有幫助。然後，Max，我會上鉤並詢問有關 Debit+、那裡的推出和盈利前景的問題。我知道有人有些猶豫，擔心 Debit+ 的盈利能力。所以也許你也可以對此進行更新。

Could not have set me up better for that one. Thank you. All right. So sorry? All right. So the -- I'll tell you the long story, but -- so some time about 8 -- 7 or 8 months ago, we rolled out the first kind of a seriously sized batch, if you will, of cards to our existing users and began observing. So obviously, you're rolling out a completely new set of credit programs. You're taking overnights or multi-day risk on pay now transactions and a whole bunch of different things that we needed to watch.

不能讓我為那個更好。謝謝。好的。非常抱歉？好的。所以 - 我會告訴你一個很長的故事，但是 - 大約 8 - 7 或 8 個月前的某個時候，我們推出了第一種大規模批量的卡片，如果你願意的話，我們現有的卡片用戶並開始觀察。很明顯，你正在推出一套全新的信貸計劃。你在現付交易和我們需要關注的一大堆不同的事情上承擔隔夜或多天的風險。

And it's the kind of thing that you can't really model because you just don't have any real background information. And so we did that. And much to my chagrin, sometime by mid-summer, we knew that transactions we knew how to do, which is longer-term interest-bearing and short-term paying forth, we're generally performing buying, but we encountered a whole bunch of types of transactions, and I certainly won't get into the details, but there are multiple modalities of using the card that are just fundamentally unprofitable.

這是一種你無法真正建模的東西，因為你沒有任何真實的背景信息。所以我們做到了。令我懊惱的是，在仲夏的某個時候，我們知道我們知道如何進行交易，即長期生息和短期支付，我們通常在進行購買，但我們遇到了一大堆交易類型的種類繁多，我當然不會詳細介紹，但是有多種使用該卡的方式從根本上說是無利可圖的。

And as we were looking at the usage and the fact that the product is so sticky, consumers would literally shift from using Affirm in any other mode to using the card the second they get access to it, sort of debated the responsibility of rolling out a product that was inherently less profitable and, in some modalities, unprofitable to users that are very hungry for it, but we're not going to transact with the -- other products. And so we spent the last 6 months just drilling into profitability of Debit+.

當我們查看產品的使用情況和產品如此粘稠的事實時，消費者會從字面上從以任何其他模式使用 Affirm 轉變為在他們第二次使用該卡時使用該卡，有點爭論推出一個的責任本質上利潤較低的產品，並且在某些模式下，對於非常渴望它的用戶來說是無利可圖的，但我們不會與其他產品進行交易。因此，我們在過去的 6 個月裡一直在深入研究 Debit+ 的盈利能力。

And there are people who -- you knew who they are. So I'm not going to name them and embarrass them, but they spend an uncountable number of hours figuring out how to optimize it. This is primarily machine learning work where you're figuring out things like probability of insufficient funds in someone's settlement accounts. And it's a major body of work that was actually in the end faster than I expected, but the punch line is that I'm very happy to report that every class of transactions in Debit+ is profitable.

有些人——你知道他們是誰。所以我不打算點名和讓他們難堪，但他們花費了無數小時來弄清楚如何優化它。這主要是機器學習工作，您可以在其中找出諸如某人結算賬戶中資金不足的可能性之類的事情。這是一項主要的工作，實際上最終比我預期的要快，但重點是我很高興地報告 Debit+ 中的每一類交易都是有利可圖的。

And so an enormous amount of optimization, again, one of these things where you look back and say, no one else will go through the trouble. They'll just print out some revolving line and move on. But our consumers doesn't want revolving line. They want Debit+. And so very excited that this thing is profitable now.

因此，大量的優化，再次，其中一個你回頭看會說，沒有其他人會遇到麻煩。他們只會打印出一些旋轉線並繼續前進。但是我們的消費者不想要循環線。他們想要藉記卡+。非常興奮，這件事現在有利可圖。

And the other thing, a little bit less, but kind of even more in the weeds, we saw really good stickiness of the product once you comprehended the value proposition, but there's a bunch of wrinkles in onboarding, in particular, that lost too many people as we were trying to onboard them. And so we spend the remainder of the time in the last 6 months just figuring out how to make it as easy to get live with a card, like eliminating huge number of steps while not losing anything in KYC and all the other things that we have to do. So both of those projects are basically completed.

另一件事，少了一點，但在雜草中更多了，一旦你理解了價值主張，我們就會看到產品的粘性非常好，但在入職過程中有很多皺紋，特別是，失去了太多我們試圖讓他們加入的人。因此，我們在過去 6 個月的剩餘時間裡只是想弄清楚如何讓使用卡片變得容易，比如減少大量步驟，同時不丟失 KYC 中的任何東西以及我們擁有的所有其他東西去做。所以這兩個項目都基本完成了。

The way you know -- you will know that we are matching the pedal through the floor, as Michael likes to say, is you'll see Debit+ cease to be its own separate application. So up until now, it's been a standalone app that you have to download. So we purposely put in a bunch of friction so that we'll be able to control the spread.

你知道的方式 - 你會知道我們正在通過地板匹配踏板，正如邁克爾喜歡說的那樣，你會看到 Debit+ 不再是它自己的獨立應用程序。所以到目前為止，它一直是您必須下載的獨立應用程序。因此，我們有意加入一系列摩擦，以便我們能夠控制傳播。

Now that we feel very good about the economics and comprehensibility of the product, we're actually going to integrate it directly into the mainline app. I am not going to make the same mistake in the past and put a number out there. And I will do that internally, but the team knows exactly the pressure and excitement we have for the product. So extremely bullish. You will see it in your app soon. The rest of the team is looking at me angrily. So that's all I'll say.

既然我們對產品的經濟性和可理解性感到非常滿意，我們實際上將把它直接集成到主線應用程序中。我不會在過去犯同樣的錯誤並在那裡放一個數字。我會在內部這樣做，但團隊確切地知道我們對產品的壓力和興奮。非常看漲。您很快就會在您的應用程序中看到它。團隊的其他人都憤怒地看著我。所以這就是我要說的。

And remember, the Debit+ product is another one of these channels that we control entirely. So some of the profitability of the product is a function of that, and we feel really good about where that sits right now.

請記住，Debit+ 產品是我們完全控制的這些渠道中的另一個。因此，產品的一些盈利能力是其功能，我們對現在的位置感到非常滿意。

Our next question is from Moshe Orenbuch with Credit Suisse.

我們的下一個問題來自瑞士信貸的 Moshe Orenbuch。

Most of my questions have been asked and answered. Could you talk a little bit more about the -- how much of your GMV, you think, will be on the balance sheet? You sort of talked a little bit about some of that versus what you'd be able to sell and the idea of what -- in those discussions you were talking about that you're having with your capital markets partners, how much is their pricing to you changing? And how much do you need to raise pricing to keep them perhaps where they had been prior to this range of interest rate increases?

我的大部分問題都已被詢問和回答。你能多談談——你認為你的 GMV 有多少會出現在資產負債表上嗎？你有點談到了其中的一些與你能夠出售的東西以及什麼的想法 - 在你談論的那些討論中你與你的資本市場合作夥伴進行的討論，他們的定價是多少給你換？您需要提高多少定價才能使它們保持在這個利率上調範圍之前的水平？

Yes. It's 2 factors. There's interest rate increases, and there is credit. And I think we've spent a lot of time on talking about why controlling credit is so important for the yield those investors get. And that is a point of pretty big differentiation when thinking about us versus some of the other alternatives that some of these forward flow partners could be buying. And as that differentiation grows, we know we'll get rewarded for it. And yes, also, we need -- we do feel the need to increase the revenue content in the loans that we're selling in the form of higher APRs, for example.

是的。這是2個因素。有利率上升，有信貸。而且我認為我們已經花了很多時間來討論為什麼控制信貸對投資者獲得的收益如此重要。在考慮我們與其中一些前向流量合作夥伴可能購買的其他一些替代方案時，這是一個相當大的差異點。隨著這種差異化的增長，我們知道我們會因此得到回報。是的，我們也需要——例如，我們確實覺得有必要增加我們以更高的年利率形式出售的貸款的收入內容。

I think that -- we're not giving specific guidance to the balance sheet or to the funding models through the back half of the year, but we do expect the mix that we saw in our second quarter to be pretty consistent with the mix that you would end the year at. So I think a safe starting point is to assume that we're flattish, which means we still have -- our largest funding channel is still going to be the forward flow market that's where the most of the total platform portfolio will be sitting as a single channel. We did the securitization in the beginning of this quarter, which will allow us to grow that line item. And yet, that's still on the balance sheet with slightly more leveraged yet with the warehouses.

我認為 - 我們不會在今年下半年對資產負債表或融資模式提供具體指導，但我們確實希望我們在第二季度看到的組合與你會在這一年結束。所以我認為一個安全的起點是假設我們持平，這意味著我們仍然有 - 我們最大的融資渠道仍然是遠期流動市場，這是整個平台組合中的大部分將作為單通道。我們在本季度初進行了證券化，這將使我們能夠增加該項目。然而，這仍然在資產負債表上，但倉庫的槓桿率略高。

So anyway, I would assume flat within -- certainly within modeling [error] is a good assumption, which means that our forward flow partners are at the table and still dealing constructively and maintaining their level of commitment throughout the back half of the year.

所以無論如何，我會假設持平 - 當然在建模 [錯誤] 內是一個很好的假設，這意味著我們的前向流量合作夥伴在談判桌上並且仍在建設性地處理並在整個下半年保持他們的承諾水平。

Maybe just as a follow-up. When you gave the guidance for revenue less transaction cost, did you factor in kind of a better, worse or comparable level of gain on sale on the assets that will be sold?

也許只是作為後續行動。當你給出收入減去交易成本的指導時，你是否考慮了將要出售的資產的更好、更差或可比的銷售收益水平？

That's a great question. It's worse. So we've contemplated that we would continue to have yield pressure with respect to our forward flow partners. We saw that in the pricing conversations that we've had and been having. And while we're very confident about our ability to control the asset yields, as Max talked about, it is the case that the rising rate environment has put the yield threshold higher for all of these programs.

這是一個很好的問題。更糟。因此，我們已經考慮到我們將繼續對我們的前向流量合作夥伴產生屈服壓力。我們在我們已經和一直在進行的定價對話中看到了這一點。正如 Max 所說，儘管我們對控制資產收益率的能力非常有信心，但利率上升的環境確實提高了所有這些項目的收益率門檻。

Our next question is from Kevin Barker with Piper Sandler. We will move on to Chris Brendler with D.A. Davidson.

我們的下一個問題來自 Kevin Barker 和 Piper Sandler。我們將繼續與 D.A. 的 Chris Brendler。戴維森。

I want to try the volume question one more time, just to make sure I'm understanding correctly. Just relative to your expectations 3 months ago, is it fair to say that there was probably a little bit of consumer moving away from discretionary items, especially discretionary items that would be of a ticket size that would make an Affirm product? Is that -- I mean that's only part of it? What about the sort of the offset of increased consumer demand in a stressed macro environment? Is that still a factor? Or is it overall net negative what consumers are choosing to spend today? And I have a follow-up.

我想再試一次音量問題，只是為了確保我理解正確。就您 3 個月前的預期而言，可以公平地說，可能有一點消費者不再使用可自由支配的商品，尤其是可以製作 Affirm 產品的票據大小的可自由支配的商品？那是——我的意思是那隻是其中的一部分嗎？在壓力大的宏觀環境中，消費者需求增加的抵消方式又如何呢？這仍然是一個因素嗎？還是消費者今天選擇消費的總體淨負值？我有一個後續行動。

It's a great question. The pullback from discretionary spend is exactly right. I think I already rattled off a bunch of category drops that we are seeing year-on-year. And so that's certainly factual, and we do expect it to continue. Nobody knows when the trough of consumer demand has hit, but I don't feel like people are running out and buying couches all of February or all of January.

這是一個很好的問題。可自由支配支出的減少是完全正確的。我想我已經說出了我們看到的同比下降的一系列類別。所以這當然是事實，我們確實希望它繼續下去。沒有人知道消費者需求的低谷何時到來，但我不覺得人們在整個 2 月或整個 1 月都在跑出去買沙發。

But the demand for the program -- I think, I dropped a juicy stat in the opening part of my letter. We see about $1 billion of demand every week. And I think that's not the same thing as well, great, why don't you guys take it because each one of these loans -- sorry, each one of these applications has to be underwritten for -- through the lens of what's responsible for us to take a risk on and what's responsible, frankly, for this person to borrow.

但是對該計劃的需求——我認為，我在信的開頭部分放棄了一個有趣的數據。我們每週看到大約 10 億美元的需求。而且我認為這也不是一回事，太好了，你們為什麼不接受它，因為這些貸款中的每一項——抱歉，這些申請中的每一項都必須得到承保——從負責的角度來看我們承擔風險，坦率地說，這個人借錢的責任。

So increasing consumer demand is certainly there. I think if we were careless, we could probably grow GMV to astronomical numbers quite quickly, but that is most certainly not what we're going to do. We are unique in a sense that we don't charge late fees. We do not profit from delinquencies. We do not celebrate late fee increases. And I'm glad there's some pressure downwards in that particular part of the world recently. So hopefully, the playing field is getting a little bit more level. But the demand is a good thing to have.

因此，消費者需求的增加肯定是存在的。我認為如果我們粗心大意，我們可能會很快將 GMV 增長到天文數字，但這肯定不是我們要做的。從某種意義上說，我們是獨一無二的，因為我們不收取滯納金。我們不從拖欠中獲利。我們不慶祝滯納金增加。我很高興最近在世界的那個特定地區存在一些下行壓力。因此，希望競爭環境變得更加公平。但有需求是好事。

I think we are now big enough where the overall consumer sentiment makes a deference to our business a little bit more than it used to. We're still growing 3x the U.S. e-commerce rate. But as people walk away from buying more TVs, for example, it will have consequences. And so long as we are responsible lenders, we will feel a little bit of that.

我認為我們現在已經足夠大了，整體消費者情緒比以前更尊重我們的業務。我們的增長率仍然是美國電子商務增長率的 3 倍。但是，例如，當人們不再購買更多電視時，它就會產生後果。只要我們是負責任的貸方，我們就會感受到一點。

Okay. Great. And then the follow-up would be sort of a clarification on sort of putting all these factors together, and correct me if I'm wrong here. But it sounds like consumers [are] experiencing BNPL burnout. To the extent that your last question -- last answer suggests that there's still very much a lot of interest in BNPL, especially in this macro environment. It is not really consumers tiring of the product, it is more your line of [scrimmage] calls making sure you're [editing] profitable loans.

好的。偉大的。然後後續將對將所有這些因素放在一起進行某種澄清，如果我在這裡錯了，請糾正我。但聽起來消費者 [are] 正在經歷 BNPL 倦怠。在某種程度上，你的最後一個問題——最後一個答案表明，人們對 BNPL 仍然非常感興趣，尤其是在這個宏觀環境中。並不是真正的消費者厭倦了產品，更多的是你的[混戰]電話線，以確保你[編輯]有利可圖的貸款。

And because of the higher interest rate environment as well as higher sensitivity to credit costs, you pulled back maybe potentially at the bottom of the funnel, not at the top of the funnel, but more at the bottom of the funnel. And as you make pricing changes, that you could see a better conversion rate in the next fiscal year potentially. Is that fair?

而且由於更高的利率環境以及對信貸成本的更高敏感性，您可能會在漏斗底部撤回，而不是在漏斗頂部，但更多是在漏斗底部。當您進行定價更改時，您可能會在下一個財政年度看到更好的轉化率。這公平嗎？

That's exactly right. And actually, Michael, I'm stealing his line in this one, but he loves to remind everybody that our loans are ranked in profit. The correlation between profitability of our loans and the internal credit score or FICO score, if you will, more or less, are tightly correlated. In other words, the highest credit quality loans are also most profitable for us. We are not using -- pardon the crap statement, poor people to subsidize great deals for rich people who are actually attributing the cost and profitability quite directly, which means that any time we need to or we decide to improve the profitability of the book, we end up taking slightly less risk at the very bottom.

這是完全正確的。事實上，邁克爾，我在這件事上偷了他的話，但他喜歡提醒大家我們的貸款是按利潤排列的。如果您願意，我們貸款的盈利能力與內部信用評分或 FICO 評分之間的相關性或多或少是緊密相關的。換句話說，最高信用質量的貸款對我們來說也是最有利可圖的。我們沒有使用 - 請原諒廢話聲明，窮人補貼富人的大量交易，他們實際上非常直接地歸因於成本和盈利能力，這意味著任何時候我們需要或我們決定提高這本書的盈利能力，我們最終在最底層承擔的風險略小。

The overall demand for the product is still very strong. We're not seeing any -- I've had enough BNPL during the pandemic back to my -- I'm not sure which credit card will help on here. But not seeing burnout. If anything, on the margin, I feel like there's demand for more flexibility.

對該產品的整體需求仍然非常強勁。我們沒有看到任何——在大流行期間我已經有足夠的 BNPL 回到我的——我不確定哪張信用卡在這裡有幫助。但沒有看到倦怠。如果有的話，在邊際上，我覺得需要更大的靈活性。

I think the one thing that we're probably seeing -- this is a little bit more anecdotal, so take it with a little bit of grain of salt, but any experiments during Debit+, we looked at sensitivity and consumer demand for longer terms. And obviously, people always want longer terms because just a little bit less cash flow hit on a monthly basis. But as the overall economic environment softened and consumer pulled back, it seems that at least part of the full pullback is actually cash flow dependent versus kind of a general decluttering trend, which is also, by the way, happening.

我認為我們可能看到的一件事——這有點軼事，所以要多加保留，但在 Debit+ 期間的任何實驗中，我們都著眼於長期的敏感性和消費者需求。顯然，人們總是想要更長的期限，因為每月的現金流量會減少一點點。但隨著整體經濟環境的疲軟和消費者的回落，似乎至少部分全面回落實際上取決於現金流，而不是一種普遍的整理趨勢，順便說一句，這也在發生。

Yes. And again, we don't talk enough about this, but we should. We're growing at somewhere between 2 and 3x we estimate the U.S. e-commerce growth rate to be, and that's despite posting 115% growth in GMV last year. And so I think it's easy to think about -- thinking that the industry has slowed down, but you have to put into context the overall scale that we got to and how we kind of got there a little bit more quickly. We still feel like it's underpenetrated, and we'll get to the kind of numbers that we talked about.

是的。再一次，我們對此討論得不夠多，但我們應該討論。我們的增長速度是我們估計美國電子商務增長率的 2 到 3 倍，儘管去年 GMV 增長了 115%。所以我認為很容易想到——認為這個行業已經放緩，但你必須將我們所達到的總體規模以及我們如何更快地到達那裡放在一起考慮。我們仍然覺得它沒有被充分滲透，我們會得到我們談到的那種數字。

I think some of the quarter growth rate numbers are a reflection of the comps. And again, the growth rate last year was buoyed up by the launch of 3 major programs, all happening at the same time. And we're quite proud that we were able to do that, but that doesn't mean that some of the growth rates need a little bit wider aperture to get an understanding of what's really going on.

我認為一些季度增長率數字反映了補償。去年的增長率再次受到同時啟動的 3 個主要項目的提振。我們為能夠做到這一點感到非常自豪，但這並不意味著某些增長率需要更大的光圈才能了解真正發生的事情。

The fact that transaction counts are up 50% year-on-year suggests that consumers are not at all being burned out by -- they're in high demand for. We are figuring out a way to profitably serve those transactions.

交易量同比增長 50% 的事實表明，消費者根本沒有被燒毀——他們的需求量很大。我們正在想辦法為這些交易提供有利可圖的服務。

Should have just quoted the transaction growth. I think that's the single highest growing metric actually in this quarter.

應該剛剛引用交易增長。我認為這是本季度實際增長最快的單一指標。

Our next question is from James Faucette with Morgan Stanley.

我們的下一個問題來自摩根士丹利的 James Faucette。

I want to ask a couple of follow-up questions, particularly the one that was just asked. It's understandable in terms of tightening the bottom of the funnel, as you said, a little bit where appropriate to manage that. Any sense for how much that then cost you or introduces incremental friction to bring those people back, whether that'd be first-time applicants or people that have taken out multiple loans in the past, and for whatever reason, just don't meet the criteria you're looking for, for that incremental one?

我想問幾個後續問題，尤其是剛才問的那個。正如您所說，收緊漏斗底部是可以理解的，在適當的地方稍微控制一下。無論是初次申請者還是過去多次貸款的人，無論出於何種原因，無論出於何種原因，無論是第一次申請者還是過去多次貸款的人，都不知道這會花費你多少成本或引入增量摩擦來讓這些人回來您正在尋找的標準，對於那個增量標準？

That is a great question and something that is extremely top of mind for me. So I spend a lot of my time staring at reengagement stats, which is why you see it in my top 3 priority, both in my letter and certainly communications to the company. So the good news there -- so first of all, you're exactly right. If you tell someone, sorry, no loan for you, and it's the first transaction that is not agreed first impression, and we will have to work harder to get the consumer back.

這是一個很好的問題，也是我最關心的問題。所以我花了很多時間盯著重新參與的統計數據，這就是為什麼你在我的信中以及與公司的溝通中都將其列為我的前 3 個優先事項。好消息是——首先，你是完全正確的。如果你告訴別人，對不起，不給你貸款，而且是第一筆交易，第一印像不同意，我們要更加努力把消費者拉回來。

Perhaps even worse, you can imagine a -- I've been a loyal customer for a very long time, and now he can no longer serve me. So we invest tremendous amount of resources to both the communication of the clients and also trying to make sure that we can bring folks back where appropriate. And part of why we know so well that the rate sensitivity is not actually a major problem for our consumer, certainly at the bottom part of the credit funnel, is because we tested tremendous amount of those communications and just various forms of reengaging the consumer in our own services where we have total control where, of course, we are able to raise prices and ask for significantly higher down payments and optimize the overall experience instead of saying no, we can say, yes.

或許更糟糕的是，你可以想像——我長期以來一直是忠實客戶，現在他不能再為我服務了。因此，我們投入了大量資源來與客戶溝通，並努力確保我們能夠在適當的時候讓人們回來。為什麼我們如此清楚利率敏感性實際上並不是我們消費者的主要問題，當然是在信用漏斗的底部，部分原因是因為我們測試了大量這些通信以及重新吸引消費者的各種形式我們自己的服務，我們可以完全控制，當然，我們可以提高價格並要求大幅提高首付並優化整體體驗，而不是說不，我們可以說是。

The long and short of it is the results are good, probably not worth getting into without a whiteboard, but perhaps when we see each other in person, I'll show you -- we'll probably have to publish a charge for everybody to see, but we've tested what happens when we recontact the consumer that we have declined. And what do they do when we tell them, hey, you're now approved or when we tell them here's a different form of transaction that we can approve you for.

總而言之，結果很好，如果沒有白板，可能不值得進入，但也許當我們親自見面時，我會告訴你——我們可能不得不為每個人發布收費看，但是我們已經測試了當我們重新聯繫我們拒絕的消費者時會發生什麼。當我們告訴他們時，他們會做什麼，嘿，你現在已經獲得批准，或者當我們告訴他們這是我們可以批准你的另一種交易形式時。

And they're very encouraging in the sense that consumers, especially those that have used Affirm before, are not particularly hurt or offended by the decline because we think we do a pretty good job explaining what happened and are quite willing to come back and reapply. So I'm, on the margin, confident we'll be able to continue engaging those consumers, and you'll see us actually invest quite a lot in products that enable that reengagement.

從某種意義上說，他們非常鼓舞人心，因為消費者，尤其是那些以前使用過 Affirm 的消費者，並沒有因為下降而受到特別的傷害或冒犯，因為我們認為我們在解釋發生的事情方面做得很好，並且非常願意回來重新申請.因此，我相信我們能夠繼續吸引這些消費者，而且您會看到我們實際上在能夠實現這種重新參與的產品上投入了大量資金。

That's a huge push within the product road map in the next couple of quarters, really, but it is very much top of mind and not something that we think is just going to be available to us and take it for granted. So it's an area of extreme focus for me.

這確實是未來幾個季度產品路線圖中的巨大推動力，但它是我們最關心的問題，而不是我們認為我們可以得到並認為是理所當然的事情。所以這對我來說是一個極度關注的領域。

And then just as a follow-up, you mentioned a couple of times, particularly as it relates to the changes in pricing, et cetera, that some of those implementations took -- or price changes and work with the merchants took longer than expected and there was more back and forth there maybe than you had anticipated. What is that -- what are you being able to do so that in the future, like you've got more flexibility there and can move more dynamically as rates, you've got to imagine in the very long run, we're going to move around quite a bit? So I'm just wondering how you're approaching that.

然後作為後續行動，您提到了幾次，特別是與價格變化等相關，其中一些實施所花費的時間——或者價格變化和與商家的合作花費了比預期更長的時間，並且那裡的來回可能比您預期的要多。那是什麼——你能做什麼，以便在未來，就像你在那裡有更多的靈活性，並且可以隨著利率更動態地移動，你必須想像從長遠來看，我們會多走動？所以我只是想知道你是如何處理這個問題的。

Yes. This is -- if I have some egg in my face to clean off still, this is the one. I saw myself a bit of a payments expert going back 30 years, and I think I still am, but I completely forgot the part where Visa and Mastercard, whenever they change rates, or any network rule changes, they always operated in a 6-month schedule, where there's 6 months' notice and then there's a 6-month implementation window. And late summer, we decided this is what's going to have to happen. And it, in fact, takes 6 months.

是的。這是——如果我臉上還有一些雞蛋需要清理，就是這個。我看到自己有點像 30 年前的支付專家，我想我現在仍然是，但我完全忘記了 Visa 和萬事達卡的部分，每當他們改變利率或任何網絡規則改變時，他們總是以 6-月時間表，其中有 6 個月的通知，然後有 6 個月的實施窗口。夏末，我們決定這是必鬚髮生的事情。事實上，它需要 6 個月的時間。

And the way you do this right, is you structure these into the contracts. You make sure that these contracts stipulate both what happens when the rates go up and when rates go down. You make sure that you know what the transition periods look like, et cetera, et cetera. And this is, again, somewhat embarrassingly our first effort of that kind. This is a lesson that we've all now learned here.

而您正確執行此操作的方式是將這些結構化到合同中。您確保這些合同規定了利率上升和下降時會發生什麼。你要確保你知道過渡期是什麼樣的，等等，等等。令人尷尬的是，這是我們第一次進行此類嘗試。這是我們現在在這裡學到的一課。

Certainly, I am first in the line of the lesson learnings. So I think you should not expect us to have another one of these apologizing sessions where we say, yes, we're going to change prices, but we took a lot longer than we thought. So we've now figured out to -- we've learned how to price in the right amount of time.

當然，我是第一個學習課程的人。所以我認為你不應該期望我們再舉行一次這樣的道歉會議，我們會說，是的，我們將改變價格，但我們花費的時間比我們想像的要長得多。所以我們現在想通了——我們已經學會瞭如何在適當的時間內定價。

Our next question is from Eugene Simuni with MoffettNathanson.

我們的下一個問題來自 Eugene Simuni 和 MoffettNathanson。

I wanted to ask about the merchant counts actually. So see the data on the slight decrease in total merchant counts, and I understand that's driven by smaller merchants as you're showing a very helpful disclosure on what's happening with the larger merchants. So even with the larger merchants, there's a pretty noticeable slowdown in kind of the incremental merchants added to the network. Just wanted to ask about that, what's sort of driving that in your view? And what's your expectation for that trend going forward? How important it is to the overall growth of your platform for that kind of number of larger merchants, let's say, to keep growing at a decent pace?

其實我想問一下商家的數量。因此，請查看有關商家總數略有下降的數據，我知道這是由較小的商家推動的，因為您正在展示有關較大商家正在發生的事情的非常有用的披露。因此，即使有較大的商家，添加到網絡中的增量商家也有相當明顯的放緩。只是想問一下，在您看來，是什麼驅動了它？您對未來的趨勢有何期待？對於這種數量的大型商家來說，保持良好的增長速度對您平台的整體增長有多重要？

First of all, merchant count is a little bit of a vanity network at our scale. I think Michael has a few promises in the letter. We're going to publish a slightly different metrics to make sure it just shows kind of a true state of penetration. "Huge merchants" is a very countable set, and we are very well penetrated there, as I'm sure all of you know.

首先，商家數量在我們的規模上有點虛榮。我認為邁克爾在信中做出了一些承諾。我們將發布一個略有不同的指標，以確保它只是顯示一種真實的滲透狀態。 “巨商”是一個非常可數的集合，我們在裡面滲透得很好，我相信你們都知道。

Midsized merchants are important because these are kind of leaps and bounds of volume that we're picking up, and that's where a majority of our, if you will, hand-to-hand sales combat takes place these days and probably has been in the last few years. And so those are important.

中型商家很重要，因為這些是我們正在獲得的數量的飛躍和界限，這就是我們大多數的地方，如果你願意的話，近來發生了肉搏戰，並且可能一直在最近幾年。所以這些很重要。

Little merchants are a little bit different. They sometimes become inactive, especially they are really small scale, become inactive over the course of the quarter. The true count of installed merchants are activated, but not necessarily active is significantly larger than the number we published and be easy to sort of have an even more inflated vanity metric here, but we're trying to be transparent here.

小商人有點不同。他們有時會變得不活躍，尤其是規模很小，在整個季度內變得不活躍。已安裝商家的真實數量已激活，但不一定比我們發布的數量大得多，並且很容易在這裡有一個更加膨脹的虛榮指標，但我們試圖在這裡保持透明。

So the growth of merchant base is kind of a set of weights for the weighted average total GMV. Obviously, GMV growth is what we are entirely focused on.

因此，商家基數的增長是加權平均總 GMV 的一組權重。顯然，GMV 增長是我們完全關注的重點。

Yes. Got it. Okay. That's helpful. And then a quick follow-up on, I wanted to ask about the Affirm app and kind of the transactions that are initiated through your app, through your website. Think of I'm kind of looking at these numbers correctly, the proportion of that has declined a little bit sequentially. But my question is really broader, sort of what are the -- what are your initiatives around improving the engagement with the app? And again, how important it is to keep investing in it? And what are you doing to keep driving traffic through it?

是的。知道了。好的。這很有幫助。然後快速跟進，我想詢問有關 Affirm 應用程序以及通過您的應用程序、通過您的網站發起的交易類型的問題。想想我在某種程度上正確地看待這些數字，其中的比例已經連續下降了一點。但我的問題真的更廣泛，有點什麼 - 你在改善與應用程序的互動方面採取了哪些舉措？再一次，繼續投資有多重要？您正在做什麼來繼續吸引流量？

Yes. To be honest, I don't have it off the top of my head whether inclined or -- yes, I guess it's slightly down quarter-on-quarter on a percentage basis. It is super importance to us. So for the avoidance of doubt that is a thing that I care tremendously about.

是的。老實說，無論是傾斜還是——是的，我想它在百分比基礎上環比略有下降，我都沒有想到。這對我們來說非常重要。因此，為免生疑問，這是我非常關心的事情。

There's a little bit of equivalence between transactions that happen in our partner apps. For example, as we grow within Shopify, you know that -- or imagine that you can service those transactions, both inside the Shopify app and in our own app. And we always route the consumer towards the most likely place of repayment because, again, job #1, job #0 is making sure that credit metrics remain excellent.

在我們的合作夥伴應用程序中發生的交易之間有一點等價性。例如，隨著我們在 Shopify 中的發展，您知道 - 或者想像您可以在 Shopify 應用程序和我們自己的應用程序中為這些交易提供服務。我們總是將消費者引向最有可能還款的地方，因為工作#1、工作#0 再次確保信用指標保持良好。

But the overall reengagement within the network is what we care about the most in our app, in our site, in our user extension and a bunch of other things. And most importantly, to me, at least right now, the card is where we are investing a huge percentage of our engineering cycles.

但網絡內的整體重新參與是我們在我們的應用程序、我們的網站、我們的用戶擴展和許多其他事情中最關心的。最重要的是，對我來說，至少現在，卡片是我們在工程週期中投入很大一部分的地方。

The app is a required companion to the card, in fact, the functionality in the app, you're borrowing money in the app. You're not ever borrowing money in the card itself. And that is where we think a lot more of this engagement will take place. There's some really good experiments taking place there. I'm staring at a spreadsheet titled Max' Top 20, which has 35 elements in it right now. All the projects that we've put in the motion over at Christmas break with our Head of Consumer Products, and we're shipping a couple of those every week now. So I'm very happy with the velocity of the experiments we're doing there.

該應用程序是該卡的必備配套，實際上，應用程序中的功能，您在應用程序中藉錢。您永遠不會通過卡本身借錢。這就是我們認為更多這種參與將會發生的地方。那裡正在進行一些非常好的實驗。我正在盯著一個名為 Max' Top 20 的電子表格，其中現在有 35 個元素。我們在聖誕節假期與我們的消費品主管一起提出的所有項目，現在我們每週都會運送幾個。所以我對我們在那裡進行的實驗的速度感到非常滿意。

And then there's also some math that's really important when we are scaling programs like we are with the largest platforms and e-commerce players, and Amazon and Shopify as an example, all of that growth, all those transactions are obviously not starting on our platform. And so a lot of growth is coming from there, which means that like -- I'm actually very impressed we've been able to hold it as constant given the rapid rise in growth in these partners.

然後還有一些數學在我們擴展程序時非常重要，比如我們與最大的平台和電子商務玩家，以亞馬遜和 Shopify 為例，所有這些增長，所有這些交易顯然不是在我們的平台上開始的.所以很多增長來自那裡，這意味著 - 我真的很印象深刻，鑑於這些合作夥伴的增長迅速增長，我們能夠保持它不變。

And so I think to Max' earlier point, the health of the network is reflected in those engagement stats and the user stats and growth in transaction count. And the fact that we're holding serve on the level of engagement through our properties today is a really encouraging sign given the growth that's happening away. As those growth rates attenuate, you're going to see our share pick up.

因此，我認為 Max 之前的觀點是，網絡的健康狀況反映在這些參與統計數據、用戶統計數據和交易數量的增長中。考慮到正在發生的增長，我們今天通過我們的財產保持參與度這一事實是一個非常令人鼓舞的跡象。隨著這些增長率的下降，你會看到我們的份額回升。

Our next question is from Andrew Bauch with SMBC Nikko Securities.

我們的下一個問題來自 SMBC 日興證券的 Andrew Bauch。

Just wanted to hone in on one of the comments in the shareholder letter here, where you say you're redirecting R&D efforts towards margin-improving projects. I mean -- I guess, how much of that is tangible in the current guidance? And is it fair to assume that, that is a bottom line margin improvement variable rather than any kind of shift to potential long-term RLTC numbers?

只是想了解一下股東信中的其中一條評論，你說你正在將研發工作重新轉向提高利潤率的項目。我的意思是——我想，在當前的指南中有多少是有形的？假設這是一個底線利潤率改善變量，而不是任何一種向潛在長期 RLTC 數字的轉變，這是否公平？

Yes. So the short answer is when we talk about some of the speed of, for example, taking pricing, we would have a lot more of the impact in this year's guidance had we acted earlier, and especially true given the size of the balance sheet that we're sitting on right now.

是的。因此，簡短的回答是，當我們談論一些速度時，例如定價，如果我們早點採取行動，我們會對今年的指導產生更大的影響，尤其是考慮到資產負債表的規模我們現在坐等。

So we feel like there's a lot of very long, very big initiatives to improve the margin, and that is up in the revenue less transaction cost line item much more so than in an OpEx. We feel like there's a lot of very big and structural improvements that we're going to be able to make, but they don't really show up in the vertical periods in Q3 and Q4 just given the timing of so many of the flow-throughs for any loans on the balance sheet, for example.

因此，我們覺得有很多非常長、非常大的舉措來提高利潤率，而且在收入減去交易成本的項目中，比在運營支出中要多得多。我們覺得我們將能夠做出很多非常大的結構性改進，但考慮到這麼多流量的時間，它們並沒有真正出現在第三季度和第四季度的垂直時期 -例如，通過資產負債表上的任何貸款。

And so that's where the focus is. The effort is reflected in our guidance, but you're not going to see the full benefit of all of the efforts until the quarters play out in the back half of the calendar year.

這就是重點所在。這些努力反映在我們的指導中，但在日曆年下半年的季度結束之前，您不會看到所有努力的全部好處。

Makes a lot of sense. And then the sensitivity that you guys have historically provided of RLTC relative to rates, any material change in that to what was provided last quarter? I know that heading into fiscal first quarter, you had narrowed the range of impact in -- given where rates could potentially go, but just want to double check on that one.

很有道理。然後你們歷史上提供的 RLTC 相對於利率的敏感性，與上個季度提供的相比有什麼實質性變化嗎？我知道在進入第一財季時，你已經縮小了影響範圍——考慮到利率可能走向何方，但只是想仔細檢查一下。

No. No material change. I think we're thankfully staring down what looks like a more flat rate curve, which I think is allowing us to focus our efforts on making sure we create profitable units at the kind of peak rate curve environment, but further stress above that would continue to have the same reaction in our framework.

沒有。沒有實質性的變化。我認為我們正在慶幸地盯著看起來更平坦的利率曲線，我認為這使我們能夠集中精力確保我們在那種峰值利率曲線環境下創造盈利單位，但進一步的壓力將繼續存在在我們的框架中有同樣的反應。

That is all the time that we have for the Q&A today. I would like to hand the conference back over for closing comments.

這就是我們今天的問答時間。我想將會議交還給閉幕評論。

Thank you, everybody, for joining today. We look forward to speaking with you again next quarter.

謝謝大家今天的加入。我們期待下個季度再次與您交談。

Thank you. This will conclude today's conference. You may disconnect your lines at this time, and thank you for your participation.

謝謝。今天的會議到此結束。此時您可以斷開您的線路，感謝您的參與。