Vertiv Holdings Co (VRT) 2021 Q4 法說會逐字稿

Good morning. My name is Matt, and I will be your conference operator today. At this time, I would like to welcome everyone to Vertiv's Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2021 Earnings Conference Call. (Operator Instructions) Please note that this call is being recorded.

早安.我是 Matt，今天將擔任本次電話會議的接線生。現在，我謹代表 Vertiv 歡迎各位參加 2021 財年第四季及全年財報電話會議。 （接線生提示）請注意，本次電話會議正在錄音。

I would now like to turn the program over to your host for today's conference call, Lynne Maxeiner, Vice President of Investor Relations.

現在，我將把節目交給今天的電話會議主持人，投資者關係副總裁琳恩·馬克西納。

Great. Thank you, Matt, and good morning, and welcome to Vertiv's Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2021 Earnings Conference Call. Joining me today are Vertiv's Executive Chairman, David Cote; Chief Executive Officer, Rob Johnson; Chief Financial Officer, David Fallon; and Chief Strategy and Development Officer, Gary Niederpruem.

好的。謝謝馬特，早安，歡迎參加Vertiv 2021財年第四季及全年財報電話會議。今天與我一同出席的有Vertiv執行董事長David Cote、執行長Rob Johnson、財務長David Fallon以及首席策略與發展長Gary Niederpruem。

Before we begin, I'd point out that during the course of this call, we will make forward-looking statements regarding future events, including the future financial and operating performance of Vertiv. These forward-looking statements are subject to material risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially from those in the forward-looking statements. We refer you to the cautionary language included in today's earnings release, and you can learn more about these risks in our registration statement, our proxy statement and other filings with the SEC.

在正式開始之前，我想指出，在本次電話會議中，我們將就未來事件做出前瞻性陳述，包括Vertiv未來的財務和營運績效。這些前瞻性陳述受重大風險和不確定性因素的影響，可能導致實際結果與前瞻性陳述中的結果有重大差異。請參閱今天發布的獲利報告中的相關警示性聲明，您也可以在我們的註冊聲明、委託書以及提交給美國證券交易委員會（SEC）的其他文件中了解更多關於這些風險的資訊。

Any forward-looking statements that we make today are based on assumptions that we believe to be reasonable as of this date. We undertake no obligation to update these statements as a result of new information or future events.

我們今天所作的任何前瞻性陳述均基於我們認為截至目前為止合理的假設。我們不承擔因新資訊或未來事件而更新這些陳述的義務。

During this call, we will also present both GAAP and non-GAAP financial measures. Our GAAP results and GAAP to non-GAAP reconciliations can be found in our earnings press release and in the investor slide deck found on our website at investors.vertiv.com.

在本次電話會議中，我們將同時介紹GAAP和非GAAP財務指標。您可以在我們的獲利新聞稿和投資者關係簡報（可在investors.vertiv.com網站查看）中找到我們的GAAP業績以及GAAP與非GAAP的調節表。

So with that, I'll turn the call over to Executive Chairman, Dave Cote.

那麼，接下來我將把電話交給執行主席戴夫·科特。

I and the Vertiv team are disappointed and embarrassed by our second half '21 and projected first half '22 financial performance. We got behind on the inflation recovery curve with insufficient price and stayed there all year.

我和Vertiv團隊對2021年下半年的財務表現以及對2022年上半年的預期業績感到失望和尷尬。由於定價不足，我們未能跟上通膨復甦的步伐，而這種情況持續了一整年。

In the past 2 months, Rob and his team have implemented price increases that we expect will generate $360 million year-over-year price versus $260 million incremental inflation, generating $100 million of favorable price cost for the full year '22. Because much of that price is in the backlog, it takes several months before the increases show in the financials, hence, the vast difference between our expected first half and second half '22 performances.

在過去的兩個月裡，羅布和他的團隊實施了提價措施，我們預計這將帶來 3.6 億美元的同比價格增長，而通貨膨脹增量為 2.6 億美元，從而在 2022 年全年產生 1 億美元的有利價格成本。由於其中大部分價格都包含在積壓訂單中，因此需要幾個月的時間才能在財務報表中反映出來，這也是我們預期 2022 年上半年和下半年業績之間存在巨大差異的原因。

Our unimpressive financial performance was exacerbated by continued supply chain issues, which don't show much sign of abating at this point. Like everyone else out there, we're hopeful will be [issued lessons] in the second half, but we aren't counting on much less of it. On the plus side, our orders were through the roof in 4Q with total company orders up 51% in the Americas, up 114%. And the first quarter is off to a good start even with the price increases.

我們原本就不盡人意的財務業績，因持續不斷的供應鏈問題而雪上加霜，而且目前看來這些問題似乎沒有緩解的跡象。就像所有企業一樣，我們希望下半年能從中學到教訓，但我們不期待情況會好轉多少。好的一方面是，第四季我們的訂單量大幅成長，公司總訂單量增加了51%，美洲地區的訂單量更是增加了114%。即使價格上漲，第一季也開局良好。

Our short-term performance, including anticipated first half '22 results, is unimpressive. Our expected long-term performance, starting in the second half of 2022, will be quite impressive. We get ahead finally on price inflation recovery. Our auditors are off the charts and market-leading. Supply chain should loosen. We have favorably resolved the tax receivable agreement in 2 lawsuits and the product ramp-up is just beginning.

我們的短期業績，包括預計2022年上半年的業績，並不理想。但我們預計，從2022年下半年開始的長期業績將會非常出色。我們終於在物價通膨復甦方面取得了領先優勢。我們的審計師水平卓越，處於市場領先地位。供應鏈有望放鬆。我們已在兩起訴訟中成功解決了應收稅款協議，產品產能提升工作也才剛開始。

Some of you may be wondering why I don't get more involved. The answer is, I have. And that's why you see much more aggressive inflation forecasting, price implementation and other fixes that Rob will talk about. The management has readily accepted and implemented these, let's say, suggestions and will deliver as presented.

你們當中有些人可能想知道為什麼我沒有更積極參與其中。答案是，我已經參與了。正因如此，你們才會看到更積極的通膨預測、價格調整以及羅布將要談到的其他措施。管理層已經欣然接受並實施了這些建議，並將按計劃執行。

I apologize for putting all our investors through this. That being said, it's a short-term issue that should turn around in the second half. The long-term thesis is very intact, especially as performance begins in the second half. If you take the second half run rate into 2023, you can see how intact that thesis is. We know we have to prove it to you, and we will.

對於給所有投資者帶來的困擾，我深感抱歉。不過，這只是短期問題，下半年應該會有所改善。長期來看，我們的投資邏輯依然穩固，尤其是在下半年業績開始回升之後。如果將下半年的業績成長延續到2023年，您就能看出這個邏輯有多可靠。我們知道必須用實際行動來證明這一點，而且我們一定會做到。

So with that, I'll turn the call over to Rob.

那麼，接下來我將把電話交給羅布。

Thank you, Dave. The management team and I share your sentiment about our Q4 results and the outlook for the first half of 2022. But before diving into the key messages on the first slide, let me comment on 2 topics. First, while Dave has been a good mentor to me over the last 2 years, our relationship has certainly evolved over the past 60 to 90 days as his opening comments suggest he has become much more actively involved in the day-to-day aspects of the business, both on the cost and price side. He is helping me almost daily basis to conduct reviews with our teams and host other business topics. And it is my full expectation that this level of involvement will continue through 2022.

謝謝你，戴夫。我和管理團隊都和你一樣，對第四季的業績以及2022年上半年的展望感到滿意。但在深入探討第一張投影片上的關鍵訊息之前，我想先談談兩點。首先，戴夫在過去兩年裡一直是我的良師益友，但過去60到90天裡，我們的關係無疑地發生了變化。正如他開場白所表明的那樣，他更加積極地參與到公司的日常運營中，包括成本和價格方面。他幾乎每天都在幫助我與團隊進行回顧，並主持其他業務討論。我完全相信，這種程度的參與將持續到2022年。

Secondly, let me address our guidance miss in the fourth quarter, for which I take full responsibility for. In short, we screwed up, and some of you undoubtedly are wondering how we could get so surprised. We significantly underestimated the magnitude of the material and freight inflation in the fourth quarter forecast, mostly in Americas by approximately $36 million. This underestimation of costs also contributed to our underpricing in the market in 2021. So it was a huge deal only for costs but also price.

其次，我想談談我們第四季業績預期未達預期的問題，對此我負全部責任。簡而言之，我們犯了錯，你們中的一些人無疑會好奇我們怎麼會如此措手不及。我們在第四季預測中嚴重低估了原物料和運費通膨的幅度，尤其是在美洲地區，低估幅度約為3,600萬美元。這種成本低估也導致了我們在2021年市場定價過低。因此，這不僅對成本造成了巨大影響，也對價格造成了巨大影響。

Half of the inflation miss was related to unforeseen supplier decommits on critical components and our need to execute spot buys and premium freight to meet customer commitments. The other half is related to forecasting issue within Americas region, heavily influenced by our ERP implementation, but also due to forecasting process issues within the region.

通膨預期偏差的一半是由於供應商意外取消關鍵零件的供貨，導致我們不得不進行現貨採購並支付額外運費以履行對客戶的承諾。另一半偏差則與美洲地區的預測問題有關，這很大程度上受到我們ERP系統實施的影響，但也與該地區預測流程本身的問題有關。

These regional cost forecasting issues have been fixed, and we feel very confident with our cost projections for 2022 as evidenced by our January cost being lower than what we were planning, and that is why we are comfortable with what we have -- that we have it all throughout.

這些區域成本預測問題已經解決，我們對 2022 年的成本預測非常有信心，1 月份的成本低於我們的計劃，這證明了這一點，因此我們對目前的情況感到滿意——我們擁有了所有所需的資源。

In addition, based upon better understanding of our underlying costs, we have been extremely aggressive with pricing in the last 90 days or so, as you will see in today's presentation to more than offset the higher cost. With this, better understanding of cost and higher pricing, which we are seeing in our year-to-date orders, we are confident that we will deliver a strong financial result in the second half of 2022 and beyond.

此外，基於對成本的更深入了解，正如您將在今天的演示中看到的那樣，我們在過去90天左右的時間裡採取了極具競爭力的定價策略，以彌補成本上漲帶來的收益。憑藉對成本的更清晰認知和更高的定價策略（這已從我們今年迄今為止的訂單中體現），我們有信心在2022年下半年及以後取得強勁的財務業績。

Now turning to the key messages. On demand, Vertiv products and services is very strong. Our organic sales were up 4% from Q4 of 2020. The strength of our position in the market can be validated by our order rate, which was up over 50% of -- in Q4 over last year and has pushed the total Vertiv backlog to over $3.2 billion.

現在來看幾個關鍵資訊。 Vertiv 的隨選產品和服務表現非常強勁。我們的有機銷售額較 2020 年第四季成長了 4%。我們的訂單率也印證了我們在市場上的穩固地位，第四季訂單率較去年同期成長超過 50%，使 Vertiv 的總積壓訂單金額超過 32 億美元。

Two, profitability challenge primarily driven because of inflationary headwinds. Not because of a flawed strategy or decrease in demand for our products and services, but due specifically to inflation that companies everywhere are battling.

第二，獲利能力面臨的挑戰主要源自於通膨逆風。這並非由於戰略缺陷或產品和服務需求下降，而是由於全球企業都在努力應對的通膨問題。

Our fourth quarter adjusted operating profit was $94 million, which unfortunately was $58 million lower than last year's fourth quarter. We felt inflationary pressures most severely in Americas, but also across our other regions.

我們在第四季調整後營業利潤為9,400萬美元，遺憾的是，比去年同期減少了5,800萬美元。我們感受到的通膨壓力在美洲最為嚴重，但其他地區也同樣受到影響。

Our pricing actions increased as the year went on, but they were exceeded by inflationary costs and created a $135 million net headwind. We continue to raise price at aggressive rates even as recently as last month, and we will continue to do so to make sure we get ahead of inflation. As you know, and fortunately, we are carrying a large backlog, and it takes quarters for that pricing to be fully realized.

隨著時間的推移，我們的定價措施力度不斷加大，但通膨成本卻超過了這些措施的力度，造成了1.35億美元的淨不利影響。即使在上個月，我們仍然保持著積極的漲價步伐，並且我們將繼續這樣做，以確保我們的成本收益能夠超過通膨水平。如您所知，幸運的是，我們目前積壓了大量訂單，而這些利潤需要幾個季度的時間才能完全轉化為實際收益。

Fourth, we don't -- we won't see the full impact of our pricing actions in the first half of 2022, but those actions will kick in during the second half, and we expect the second half adjusted operating profit to be approximately $455 million, $230 million over the second half of 2021.

第四，我們不會——我們不會在本年度上半年看到定價措施的全部影響，但這些措施將在下半年生效，我們預計下半年調整後的營業利潤約為 4.55 億美元，比 2021 年下半年增加 2.3 億美元。

Supply chain issues are real and challenging, delaying product completion. The Vertiv team is bailing parts on a daily basis. Our biggest challenge is with electromechanical parts and fans, critical components of many of our Vertiv products. Internally, we have launched countermeasures to address these shortages. However, we expect and have been prepared for supply chain pressures to continue for the majority of 2022.

供應鏈問題真實且極具挑戰性，導致產品交付延遲。 Vertiv 團隊每天都在緊急搶購零件。我們面臨的最大挑戰是機電部件和風扇的短缺，這些都是我們許多 Vertiv 產品的關鍵組件。公司內部已啟動應對措施來應對這些短缺。然而，我們預計並已做好準備，供應鏈壓力將在 2022 年的大部分時間持續存在。

Finally, and most important key message. Although 2021 did not produce the results we expected for reasons I just shared, Vertiv is now well positioned for strong performance in the second half of 2022 and into 2023 due to our aggressive pricing actions in Q4 and early 2022.

最後，也是最重要的訊息。儘管由於我剛才提到的原因，2021年的業績並未達到預期，但由於我們在2022年第四季和年初採取了積極的定價策略，Vertiv目前已做好充分準備，將在2022年下半年和2023年取得強勁的業績。

Turning to Slide 4. Recapping our 2021 performance, and then I'll provide some additional detail on what's playing out for 2022. With regard to 2021, we continue to have strong demand for our products. Some of this demand is because we are in a strong growing market. Some is because we are winning with our go-to-market strategies, and some is a result of our Vertiv product development efforts. These 3 reasons are giving us an order rate that's almost up 30% year-over-year and over 50%, as I mentioned earlier, in fourth quarter.

接下來請看第四張投影片。我將回顧2021年的業績，然後再詳細介紹2022年的展望。 2021年，我們的產品需求依然強勁。部分原因是市場成長迅速，部分原因是我們的市場推廣策略成功，部分原因是Vertiv在產品研發方面所做的努力。正如我之前提到的，這三方面因素共同作用，使得我們的訂單量年增近30%，第四季更是成長超過50%。

Admittedly, we believe the significant order growth rate in quarter 4 is an indicator that we could have priced even more aggressively and adding further confidence that our pricing actions over the next several months are appropriate and will be received in the market.

誠然，我們認為第四季度顯著的訂單增長率表明，我們本可以採取更激進的定價策略，這也進一步增強了我們對未來幾個月定價措施的信心，相信這些措施是恰當的，並將受到市場的歡迎。

Well, a good portion of our $3.2 billion backlog will ship in 2022, right now, we are getting visibility into customer plans for 2023 and beyond. This visibility is being provided in the form of forecast purchase orders, providing us greater visibility to our revenue profile, not only over the next several quarters, but into the future.

目前，我們32億美元的積壓訂單中很大一部分將在2022年交付。同時，我們正在逐步了解客戶2023年及以後的計畫。這種了解是透過預測採購訂單的形式來實現的，這讓我們能夠更清晰地了解未來的收入狀況，不僅包括未來幾個季度，也包括更長遠的未來。

On the 2021 supply side, we fully expect to be challenged for most of the year. Critical parts availability is spotty and despite all the efforts to qualify second and third sources and redesign products where possible, we know part shortages are something our industry will grapple with throughout the year. In addition, 2021 inflation got ahead of our pricing.

2021年供應方面，我們預計全年大部分時間都將面臨挑戰。關鍵零件的供應不穩定，儘管我們盡一切努力尋找第二和第三供應商，並在可能的情況下重新設計產品，但我們知道零件短缺將是整個行業全年都將面臨的難題。此外，2021年的通貨膨脹率已經超過了我們的定價。

Just when we thought we had budgeted enough price, inflation got worse. This happened several times. We have corrected it now and are being very conservative in our expectations that inflation will not go away in 2022.

正當我們以為已經做好價格預算時，通貨膨脹卻加劇了。這種情況發生了好幾次。我們現在已經進行了調整，並且對2022年通貨膨脹不會消失的預期非常保守。

The acquisition of E&I closed in November. Integration efforts are in full swing. We remain more confident than ever in our purchase decision. Vertiv will reap the benefits from this complementary nature of E&I's process and products and its ability to be accretive platform for Vertiv long into the future.

對E&I的收購已於11月完成。整合工作正在如火如荼地進行中。我們對此次收購決定比以往任何時候都更加充滿信心。 E&I的工藝和產品與Vertiv的互補性，以及其作為Vertiv長期增值平台的能力，將使Vertiv受益匪淺。

In 2021, we invested significantly in ER&D, just as we planned. We launched several new and innovative products. And evidenced by their order rates, these products have exceeded expectations of our acceptance from the market, allowing us to take share in certain categories. In 2021, we invested in ER&D, a fundamental part of our long-term growth strategy.

2021年，我們按計畫對研發投入了大量資金。我們推出了多款創新產品。從訂單量來看，這些產品獲得了市場認可，超出了我們的預期，使我們在某些​​品類中佔據了一定的市場份額。 2021年，我們對研發的投入是我們長期成長策略的重要組成部分。

Now as we turn to 2022 outlook. Our demand environment remains strong, but deliveries remain constrained by part shortages, especially in the semiconductors and the electromechanical parts that I discussed earlier. We are planning to see meaningful -- we aren't planning to see meaningful improvement in the supply chain this year.

現在我們展望2022年。我們的需求環境仍然強勁，但由於零件短缺，尤其是我之前提到的半導體和機電零件，交付仍然受到限制。我們預計今年供應鏈不會有顯著改善。

We have new production capacity coming online in Americas to support our growing thermal business. We are anticipating material and freight costs will continue to increase, but our incremental pricing actions are expected to materially offset 2021 and 2022 inflation by the end of 2022.

為了支持我們不斷成長的熱能業務，我們在美洲新增了產能。我們預期原物料和運輸成本將持續上漲，但我們採取的增量定價措施可望在2022年底前基本抵銷2021年和2022年的通貨膨脹影響。

Pricing realization accelerates throughout 2022 and provides a net price cost tailwind by Q3. We expect profit in the first half of 2022 will remain challenged but will markedly be improved in the second half of the year as price/cost turns positive. Due to the pricing actions already initiated, we expect to exit 2022 in a good position.

2022年全年價格逐步實現，並在第三季帶來淨價格成本利多。我們預計2022年上半年利潤仍將面臨挑戰，但隨著價格成本轉正，下半年利潤將顯著改善。鑑於已啟動的價格策略，我們預計2022年底將處於良好發展狀態。

Turning to Slide 5. This is a chart we use to illustrate what we are seeing in the market in each of our regions and each of our end markets. In the cloud and hyperscale markets, they remain strong, represented by green buttons in America and EMEA. In APAC, however, we see some slowdown as China is pushing cloud and hyperscale companies to maximize their existing facilities. We expect this to be a short-term phenomenon.

請看第五張投影片。這張圖表展示了我們各個區域和終端市場的市場狀況。雲端運算和超大規模資料中心市場依然強勁，美洲和歐洲、中東及非洲地區的綠色按鈕即代表了這一點。然而，亞太地區的市場成長速度有所放緩，因為中國正在推動雲端運算和超大規模資料中心企業最大限度地利用現有設施。我們預計這只是短期現象。

When looking at our colocation customers, we are not only seeing strength across the regions, but increasing strength in Americas and EMEA. Tier 1, Tier 2 and Tier 3 colos are building out data centers to serve their customers, and we are participating in a very healthy way with these building out efforts.

從我們的託管客戶來看，不僅各個地區的業務都在成長，而且美洲和歐洲、中東及非洲地區的業務也在不斷增強。一級、二級和三級託管服務商都在擴大資料中心以服務其客戶，我們也積極參與其中，為這些建設工作做出了貢獻。

Our enterprise, small and medium business markets remained constant for Q4 to Q1. We are experiencing good performance in each region. The pipeline is growing, and Americas is leading the way. The communication network market remains consistently strong with an uptick in Americas as 5G deployments continue to accelerate.

從第四季到第一季度，我們的企業、中小企業市場保持穩定。各地區業績均表現良好。業務成長勢頭強勁，其中美洲地區表現尤為突出。隨著5G部署的持續加速，通訊網路市場持續保持強勁成長，美洲地區更呈現上升趨勢。

In the commercial and industrial market, things remain consistent in EMEA and APAC. And we did see an uptick in Americas, allowing us to upgrade Americas from yellow to green. While the commercial and industrial market is a smaller slice of our business, the variety of products and services we sell in this market continues to grow.

在商業和工業市場，歐洲、中東和非洲地區以及亞太地區的情況保持穩定。美洲市場則出現成長，因此我們將美洲市場的評級從黃色提升至綠色。雖然商業和工業市場在我們業務中所佔比例較小，但我們在該市場銷售的產品和服務種類卻持續成長。

Moving to Slide 6. We closed the E&I acquisition on November 1, and the integration team has been hard at work ever since. E&I has also faced and is facing supply constraints and inflation, which has temporarily affected the top and bottom line. E&I has a very healthy backlog.

進入第六張幻燈片。我們於11月1日完成了對E&I的收購，整合團隊從此努力工作。 E&I也面臨供應限制和通貨膨脹的問題，暫時影響了其營收和利潤。 E&I的訂單儲備非常充足。

We believe the pricing actions that we have taken in Q4 and will continue to be taken as needed, will be realized in the back half of '22, in '22 with E&I as well. We anticipate 2022 revenue from E&I alone to come in around $470 million with an adjusted operating profit of $80 million.

我們相信，我們在第四季度採取的定價措施，以及未來將根據需要繼續採取的定價措施，將在2022年下半年，包括E&I業務在內，逐步顯現成效。我們預計，光是E&I業務在2022年的收入就將達到約4.7億美元，調整後營業利潤為8,000萬美元。

Customer reactions to the deal have been nothing short of fantastic, and this acquisition has increased our relevancy with our customers. We expect, as 2022 progresses, the synergistic leverage we will get from E&I will enhance our performance in 2023 and beyond. So I might summarize E&I in 2022 as a tough year but still a great deal.

客戶對這筆交易的反應可謂極佳，此次收購也提升了我們在客戶心中的地位。我們預計，隨著2022年的推進，E&I帶來的綜效將提升我們在2023年及以後的表現。因此，我或許可以這樣總結E&I在2022年的表現：雖然充滿挑戰，但仍然是一筆非常划算的交易。

Now I'll turn it over to David to walk through the financials. David?

現在我把麥克風交給大衛，讓他來分析一下財務狀況。大衛？

Thanks, Rob. First, turning to Slide 7. This slide summarizes our fourth quarter financial results, which certainly fell short of our external guidance across most of these financial metrics. Versus last year, sales were up $105 million or 8%, 4% organic when adjusted for the $67 million of sales from E&I and we also had a $13 million foreign exchange headwind.

謝謝羅伯。首先，請看第7張投影片。這張投影片總結了我們第四季的財務業績，在大多數財務指標上，我們的業績都低於預期。與去年同期相比，銷售額成長了1.05億美元，增幅為8%；扣除E&I業務貢獻的6,700萬美元銷售額後，有機成長率為4%；此外，我們還面臨1,300萬美元的外匯不利影響。

Our fourth quarter top line, as Rob mentioned, continued to be negatively affected by challenges with procuring parts as the underlying market demand certainly was much stronger than implied in this year-over-year sales growth with orders up over 50% compared to last year's fourth quarter, and it's definitely seen with our record high backlog at year-end.

正如羅布所提到的那樣，由於零件採購方面的挑戰，我們第四季度的營收繼續受到負面影響，因為潛在的市場需求肯定比同比銷售成長所暗示的要強勁得多，訂單量比去年第四季度增長了 50% 以上，這一點從我們年底創紀錄的積壓訂單中就可以看出。

Without the supply chain constraints, and this is a little bit hypothetical conceptual, our sales growth percentage would have easily been in the double digits for the fourth quarter.

如果沒有供應鏈的限制（這只是一個假設性的概念），我們第四季的銷售成長率很容易就能達到兩位數。

Adjusted operating profit of $94 million fell significantly short of our external guide, and it was primarily driven, if not entirely, by contribution margin, which we'll summarize in a separate slide in a short bit.

調整後的營業利潤為 9,400 萬美元，遠低於我們的外部預期，這主要是（如果不是完全）由邊際貢獻率造成的，我們稍後將在另一張幻燈片中對此進行總結。

On this slide, we captured the drivers of the $58 million reduction in adjusted operating profit from last year's fourth quarter, including $80 million lower contribution margin, which was primarily driven by a $60 million headwind from price cost, approximately $90 million of material and freight inflation, only partially offset by $30 million of incremental pricing. And of note that our pricing was actually relatively consistent with our external guide.

在這張投影片中，我們列出了導致調整後營業利潤較去年同期減少5,800萬美元的根本原因，其中包括貢獻毛利下降8,000萬美元。這主要是由於價格成本上漲導致6000萬美元的負面影響，以及約9000萬美元的材料和運費通膨，而3000萬美元的增量定價僅部分抵消了這些影響。值得注意的是，我們的定價實際上與外部指導價基本一致。

As we will discuss with 2022 guidance, we have addressed this $60 million fourth quarter and $135 million full year 2021 price cost imbalance with aggressive price actions taken in the fourth quarter and early 2022.

正如我們將在 2022 年業績指引中討論的那樣，我們已經透過在 2021 年第四季和 2022 年初採取積極的價格措施，解決了 2021 年第四季 6000 萬美元和全年 1.35 億美元的價格成本失衡問題。

Returning to fourth quarter adjusted operating margin and adjusted EPS dropped consistent with the adjusted operating profit decline with adjusted operating margin about 500 basis points lower and adjusted EPS about $0.25 lower than last year's fourth quarter.

第四季調整後營業利潤率和調整後每股收益均出現下滑，與調整後營業利潤的下滑趨勢一致，其中調整後營業利潤率比去年第四季下降約 500 個基點，調整後每股收益比去年第四季下降約 0.25 美元。

And finally, on this page, fourth quarter free cash flow was significantly lower than prior year, primarily driven by the lower adjusted operating profit, but also timing of working capital and about $30 million of cash M&A expenses.

最後，本頁顯示，第四季自由現金流明顯低於去年同期，主要原因是調整後的營業利潤下降，但也與營運資金到位時間以及約 3,000 萬美元的現金併購支出有關。

Turning to Page 8. This slide summarizes our fourth quarter segment results. The Americas region continues to be more impacted by supply chain challenges than the other 2 regions. The supply chain challenges negatively affected both America's top and bottom line, with organic net sales up just $7 million or around 1% against a very strong regional market demand backdrop where orders were more than 2x last year's fourth quarter.

請翻至第8頁。本頁總結了我們第四季各業務板塊的業績。美洲地區受供應鏈挑戰的影響比其他兩個地區更為嚴重。供應鏈挑戰對美洲地區的營收和利潤均造成了負面影響，儘管區域市場需求強勁（訂單量是去年同期的兩倍多），但有機淨銷售額僅增長了700萬美元，增幅約為1%。

The left-hand chart at the bottom of the page shows the $69 million year-over-year decline in adjusted operating profit in the Americas, of course, heavily influenced by price cost. Approximately 70% to 75% of the overall Vertiv price cost headwind for 2021 and in the fourth quarter is in the Americas despite the Americas representing less than 45% of total sales.

頁面底部的左側圖表顯示，美洲地區調整後營業利潤年減6,900萬美元，當然很大程度受到價格成本的影響。儘管美洲地區的銷售額僅佔總銷售額的不到45%，但Vertiv 2021年及第四季整體價格成本壓力中約70%至75%都來自美洲地區。

Freight inflation was particularly acute in the fourth quarter and accelerated significantly in the U.S. as we progress through the end of the year. Of course, in response to disproportionate net inflation in the Americas, our fourth quarter and 2022 pricing responses have also been much stronger in that region.

第四季貨運通膨尤為嚴重，隨著年底臨近，美國的貨運通膨顯著加速。當然，由於美洲地區的淨通膨率遠高於其他地區，我們在第四季和2022年的價格調整幅度也更大。

All things considered, APAC posted relatively good results in the fourth quarter with organic sales up almost 3% and adjusted operating profit and margin relatively flat with last year. Although not completely immune from the current supply chain challenges, relatively, little of our 2021 net price/cost headwind came from APAC.

整體而言，亞太地區第四季業績表現相對良好，有機銷售額成長近3%，調整後營業利潤和利潤率與去年同期基本持平。儘管並非完全不受當前供應鏈挑戰的影響，但相對而言，2021年淨價格/成本方面的不利因素很少來自亞太地區。

And finally, on this slide, moving to the right, EMEA showed strong fourth quarter top line growth with organic sales up 11%. However, margins were down about 130 basis points from last year as leverage -- the leverage benefit from these higher sales was more than offset by a price cost headwind.

最後，在這張投影片中，向右看，歐洲、中東和非洲地區（EMEA）第四季營收成長強勁，有機銷售額成長11%。然而，由於槓桿效應——銷售成長帶來的槓桿收益被價格成本的不利因素抵消——利潤率較去年同期下降了約130個基點。

Next, turning to Slide 9. This chart bridges fourth quarter adjusted operating profit from our $176 million guidance to the $94 million actual, an $82 million negative variance. $46 million of this variance was due to higher-than-expected material, freight and labor inflation, primarily in the Americas and especially concentrated on freight, including premium freight for both inbound and outbound shipments to protect customer deliveries, but also due to an increase in standard over the [road] rates, which were up over 30% from last year's fourth quarter. As we will discuss shortly, our 2022 guidance assumes that these fourth quarter inflationary headwinds continue and trend even higher in 2022.

接下來，請看投影片9。這張圖表比較了第四季調整後營業利潤，從我們先前預期的1.76億美元到實際的9,400萬美元，有8,200萬美元的負偏差。其中4,600萬美元的偏差是由於原材料、運費和勞動力成本高於預期造成的，主要集中在美洲地區，尤其是運費，包括為保障客戶交貨而對進出貨物收取的額外運費，以及標準公路運輸費率的上漲，較去年第四季上漲超過30%。正如我們稍後將要討論的，我們對2022年的業績預期是基於這些第四季度通膨不利因素將持續存在，並在2022年進一步加劇的假設。

Moving to the right, we incurred approximately $10 million more than in expected sales commission expense in the fourth quarter, primarily due to strong fourth quarter. Orders up over 50% from last year's fourth quarter. E&I, as Rob mentioned, came in short of expectations in the fourth quarter. And volume for overall Vertiv -- base Vertiv was lower than expected due to the parts availability that we discussed. And finally, on this page, pricing was materially in line with our fourth quarter expectations off about $2 million, but the approximately $53 million of pricing we realized in 2021 has been sticking. And as we will review in a few moments, it is expected to accelerate significantly as we progress through 2022.

往右看，由於第四季強勁的銷售業績，我們實際支付的銷售佣金比預期高出約1,000萬美元。訂單量較去年同期成長超過50%。正如羅布所提到的，電氣與儀表業務在第四季度未能達到預期。此外，由於我們之前討論過的零件供應問題，Vertiv整體銷售量（基礎Vertiv）低於預期。最後，就定價而言，第四季基本上符合預期，略有下降約200萬美元，但我們在2021年實現的約5,300萬美元的定價策略一直保持有效。正如我們稍後將要討論的，預計隨著2022年的推進，這項策略將顯著加速。

Next, turning to Slide 10. This page summarizes our full year 2021 results versus prior year. We won't spend a lot of time on this slide, as I'm sure everyone is anxious to understand what we see going forward in 2022. But to summarize 2021, despite the supply chain constraints, we grew our top line organically by about 11%, which likely would have been over 15% without the supply challenges.

接下來，請看第10頁投影片。本頁總結了我們2021年全年業績與前一年的比較。我們不會在本頁投影片上花太多時間，因為我相信大家都很想了解我們對2022年的展望。但總而言之，儘管面臨供應鏈限制，我們的營收仍實現了約11%的有機成長，如果沒有這些供應鏈挑戰，增幅可能超過15%。

Our adjusted operating profit and margin were significantly affected by negative net price cost with almost $190 million of material and freight inflation, only partially offset by $53 million of pricing.

由於材料和運費通膨導致淨價格成本增加近 1.9 億美元，我們的調整後營業利潤和利潤率受到負淨價格成本的顯著影響，而 5,300 萬美元的定價成本僅部分抵銷了這一影響。

Although more aggressive pricing actions were taken at the end of 2021 than implied with the $53 million full year number, realization in our income statement was certainly influenced by our significant backlog, which drives a timing lag between inflation and offsetting price hitting our P&L. We certainly expect pricing to catch up with cost in 2022.

儘管2021年底採取的定價措施比全年5300萬美元的業績所反映的更為激進，但我們損益表中的實際業績無疑受到了大量積壓訂單的影響，這導致通貨膨脹與價格上漲對損益表的影響之間存在時間滯後。我們預計2022年價格將與成本保持同步。

And finally, on this page, full year 2021 free cash flow was about $27 million lower than last year with a $92 million cash interest benefit from debt restructuring, more offset by an inventory build, cash M&A expenses and higher CapEx and cash taxes.

最後，在本頁中，2021 年全年自由現金流比上年減少了約 2,700 萬美元，債務重組帶來了 9,200 萬美元的現金利息收益，但這些收益更多地被庫存增加、現金併購支出以及更高的資本支出和現金稅所抵消。

Now flipping a couple of slides. We transitioned from 2021 actuals to 2022 guidance beginning with Slide 12. But before we dive in, you will see that we supply a lot of detail within our 2022 guidance, including first half, second half and quarterly breakouts for expected sales, adjusted operating profit and also pricing and inflation.

現在翻幾頁幻燈片。從第12頁開始，我們從2021年的實際數據過渡到2022年的業績展望。但在深入探討之前，您會看到我們在2022年的業績展望中提供了大量細節，包括上半年、下半年和季度預期銷售額、調整後營業利潤以及定價和通膨情況。

We are providing this detail because we realize -- absolutely realized we have likely damaged some of our credibility in 2021, notably with the quality of our external guidance, and we want to be fully transparent with you with how we see the year unfolding. And it is impossible to understand the dynamics within 2022 with looking at only full year figures.

我們提供這些細節是因為我們意識到——絕對意識到——我們可能在2021年損害了自身的部分信譽，尤其是在外部績效指引的品質方面。我們希望與您完全透明地溝通我們對2021年發展趨勢的預測。而且，僅憑全年數據無法了解2022年的整體動態。

And as you will see, our anticipated second half of 2022 is much different and much improved from the first half. And each quarter improved sequentially from the previous quarter. This expected improvement, both in the second half and with each successive quarter, is driven by accelerating price cost benefit versus 2021. Of course, we understand that providing this level of detail likely creates the expectation for us to supply the same level of detail as we progress through the year. And we are absolutely prepared to do that, and we will update our assumptions and projections for all inputs as appropriate. And we know that you'll track with us every step of the way.

如您所見，我們對2022年下半年的預期與上半年截然不同，且有了顯著改善。每季的業績都比上一季有所提升。這種預期中的改善，無論是在下半年或接下來的每個季度，都得益於與2021年相比，價格成本效益的加速提升。當然，我們也明白，提供如此詳盡的資訊可能會讓您期望我們在接下來的時間裡繼續提供同樣詳盡的資訊。我們完全做好了準備，並將根據實際情況更新所有相關因素的假設和預測。我們相信您會全程關注我們的進展。

So with that said, finally getting to the content on Slide 12. This page summarizes our broad expectations for 2022 by splitting our guidance between first and second halves. We expect first half to continue to be challenged by parts availability with underlying organic volume, when you remove price, to be down 5% year-over-year despite the record year-end backlog as we do not see significant supply chain constraints lessening at all in the first half of '22 versus what we saw at the end of 2021.

綜上所述，現在終於來到第12頁的內容。本頁總結了我們對2022年的整體預期，並將預測分為上半年和下半年。我們預計上半年零件供應仍將面臨挑戰，儘管年底積壓訂單創歷史新高，但剔除價格因素後，實際銷售量仍將年減5%。這是因為我們預計2022年上半年供應鏈的限制不會像2021年底那樣顯著緩解。

In addition, although price/cost recovers as we exit the second quarter, it is still projected to be upside down by approximately $70 million for the full first half. The second half is a much different story as we expect financial performance to improve significantly from the first half. We assume 6% higher organic volume, once again, excluding price, and part of that is based on a greater visibility to allocation of parts in the second half. And this [6%] higher organic volume could be conservative based upon our backlog and the end market demand. But once again, the underlying driver of improved sales performance in the second half is pricing.

此外，儘管價格/成本在第二季末有所回升，但預計上半年仍將虧損約7,000萬美元。下半年情況則截然不同，我們預期財務表現將較上半年顯著改善。我們假設有機銷售量將成長6%（同樣不考慮價格因素），部分原因是下半年零件分配的可見度更高。根據我們的積壓訂單和終端市場需求，這一6%的有機銷售成長可能較為保守。但再次強調，下半年銷售業績改善的根本驅動因素仍是價格。

Based upon pricing actions that we have already taken, we expect $250 million of incremental year-over-year pricing in the second half alone. And as a result, price cost is expected to be a positive $170 million in the second half, significantly improving adjusted operating profit with adjusted operating margin increasing to 14%.

基於我們已採取的定價措施，預計僅下半年就能實現2.5億美元的年成長。因此，下半年的價格成本預計將為1.7億美元，從而顯著提高調整後的營業利潤，調整後的營業利潤率也將提升至14%。

Our expectations for a strong second half portends a strong 2023 as we capture additional year-over-year pricing from actions already taken as virtually all sales in 2023 will be at the higher pricing while we have significant sales in 2022, as we mentioned, from our existing backlog at lower historical pricing levels. And we'll further explain this dynamic in a couple of slides.

我們預計下半年業績強勁，這預示著2023年也將取得良好表現。先前我們已採取措施，將進一步提升2023年的銷售額，因為幾乎所有2023年的銷售都將以更高的價格進行。而正如我們先前所提到的，2022年我們還有相當數量的銷售額來自現有積壓訂單，這些訂單的價格將處於歷史較低水準。我們將在接下來的幾張投影片中進一步闡述這項動態。

But let's move on to Slide 13. This is another slice of our guidance going from a first half, second half perspective to a quarterly perspective. Net sales, adjusted operating profit and adjusted operating margin are all projected to sequentially increase as we progress through the year. And as we mentioned on the prior slide, the primary driver of this sequentially improving financial performance is the timing of price realization.

接下來我們來看第13張投影片。這是我們對業績指引的另一部分，從上半年、下半年的視角轉向季度視角。預計隨著年內推進，淨銷售額、調整後營業利潤和調整後營業利潤率都將較上季成長。正如我們在上一張投影片中提到的，推動財務績效較上月改善的主要因素是價格實現的時機。

The chart at the bottom left illustrates the quarterly profitability trend for both 2021 and 2022. Our price/cost issues began in the third quarter of 2021, and we anticipate them to be addressed after the second quarter of this year. So we're almost 3 quarters our way through what we see is a fourth quarter issue as price/cost turns positive for each of the last 2 quarters of 2022.

左下角的圖表顯示了2021年和2022年的季度獲利趨勢。我們的價格/成本問題始於2021年第三季度，我們預計這些問題將在今年第二季後解決。因此，我們已經度過了近三個季度，我們認為這是第四季度的問題，因為價格/成本將在2022年最後兩個季度轉正。

Finally, on this page, the chart at the upper right shows the relatively conservative volume assumptions inherent in the plan, with full year organic volume, once again, excluding pricing, assumed to increase just 1% as we do not assume significantly improving parts availability as we progress through the year. And we will continuously reassess that assumption as we go forward.

最後，本頁右上角的圖表顯示了該計劃中相對保守的銷量假設。全年有機銷售量（再次強調，不考慮價格因素）預計僅成長1%，因為我們預期零件供應不會隨著時間的推移而顯著改善。我們將根據實際情況不斷重新評估這個假設。

Next, turning to Slide 14. This page details our year-over-year quarterly price cost or net inflation assumptions for 2022. For the full year, we expect to generate $100 million favorable year-over-year price cost, including the assumption of $360 million of price, offset by $260 million of incremental inflation.

接下來，請看第 14 頁投影片。本頁詳細介紹了我們對 2022 年季度同比價格成本或淨通膨的假設。我們預計全年將產生 1 億美元的年比有利價格成本，其中包括 3.6 億美元的價格假設，將被 2.6 億美元的增量通膨所抵銷。

As discussed in the prior slides, our quarterly pricing increases sequentially as the proportion of sales from existing backlog declines as you can see in the chart at the bottom of the page. Also very important, we should have significant carryover price benefit into 2023 as we expect 95% of next year's sales to be at the higher pricing levels while in 2022, only 50% were. And this drives an expectation for about $200 million of carryover pricing impact for 2023.

如前幾張投影片所述，隨著現有積壓訂單銷售額佔比的下降（如頁面底部圖表所示），我們的季度定價將逐季上調。此外，非常重要的一點是，我們預計2023年將有顯著的價格結轉收益，因為我們預計明年95%的銷售額將以較高價格水準結算，而2022年這一比例僅為50%。因此，我們預計2023年的價格結轉收益將達到約2億美元。

Now from an inflation perspective, we assume that what we experienced exiting 2021 will continue through full year 2022. That's an approximate $160 million year-over-year carryover negative impact. But in addition, we have assumed $100 million of new inflation in 2022. 20 -- as Rob mentioned, 2021 actual inflation outpaced our expectations each step of the way. And we believe it is prudent to assume that inflation will continue to worsen in 2022, which drives the $100 million incremental assumption. And we definitely will reevaluate this new inflation assumption as we progress through 2022. Now based on the foregoing assumptions, we expect price cost to be neutral in the second quarter, and as mentioned, significantly favorable for the second half, beginning in the third quarter.

從通膨角度來看，我們假設2021年底的通膨狀況將持續到2022年全年。這將造成約1.6億美元的年比負面影響。此外，我們也假設2022年新增通膨1億美元。正如羅布所提到的，2021年的實際通膨率一直超出我們的預期。我們認為，謹慎起見，假設2022年通膨將繼續惡化是合理的，這也是我們增加1億美元通膨預期的原因。隨著2022年的推進，我們肯定會重新評估這項新的通膨預期。基於上述假設，我們預計第二季價格成本將保持中性，並且如前所述，從第三季開始，下半年價格成本將顯著下降。

Next, turning to Slide 15. This page supplies some color on our confidence that the $360 million pricing number for 2022 is achievable and will stick. The first -- as we saw on the previous page, the first $125 million of the $360 million is actually included in our year-end backlog. So we risk assess that from highly probable to certain. Now the second $235 million is based on pricing projections in new 2022 orders that will book and ship within the year.

接下來，請看第15頁投影片。本頁詳細說明了我們對2022年3.6億美元定價目標的信心，並說明該目標能否實現。首先，正如我們在上一頁看到的，3.6億美元中的前1.25億美元實際上已包含在我們年底的積壓訂單中。因此，我們對這部分訂單的風險評估從「極有可能」到「確定」。其次，剩餘的2.35億美元是基於2022年新訂單的定價預測，這些訂單將在年內完成預訂和出貨。

Based upon the market acceptance of our fourth quarter price increase, evidenced by the 51% increase in orders, we certainly saw the opportunity to be much more aggressive with 2022 pricing. In late 2021 and early 2022, we initiated multiple ways of list price increases, and this is across all product lines in all regions, although, we certainly were a bit more aggressive in both the Americas and EMEA where inflation has been more pronounced.

鑑於市場對我們第四季漲價的接受度（訂單量成長51%），我們看到了在2022年採取更積極定價策略的良機。 2021年末和2022年初，我們啟動了多種提價措施，涵蓋所有地區的所有產品線。不過，在通貨膨脹較顯著的美洲和歐洲、中東及非洲地區，我們的漲價力道更大一些。

Based upon our order rates so far in January and February, which are in line or even a little bit higher than last year's order rates for that same period, it appears that our higher pricing is sticking in this high demand, short supply market environment. Of course, we will continue to reevaluate this assumption and reassess our pricing as we progress through the year.

根據我們一月和二月的訂單量來看，與去年同期相比持平甚至略高，這表明在當前高需求、低供應的市場環境下，我們較高的定價策略似乎能夠奏效。當然，我們會持續評估這個假設，並隨著時間的推移不斷調整定價策略。

As we have mentioned many times, we believe we operate in a great position in a good industry. Data center demand for our equipment and more importantly, our technology is not abating anytime soon, and it should continue to accelerate going forward. With the backdrop of rising global cost and this long-term market demand, we believe our price increases are justifiable, reasonable and achievable. But in fact, one lesson learned as we manage price increases over the last 9 months or so is that we have historically underestimated our ability to get price. And based upon the success of our recent price actions, we have absolute confidence that we will be able to drive consistent price increases going forward.

正如我們多次提到的，我們相信自身在良好的產業中佔有有利地位。資料中心對我們設備，尤其是對我們技術的需求，短期內不會減弱，未來還會繼續加速成長。在全球成本上升和長期市場需求的背景下，我們認為此次漲價是合理且可行的。事實上，在過去九個月左右的價格調整過程中，我們學到的一個教訓是，我們過去低估了自身的定價能力。基於近期價格調整的成功，我們完全有信心在未來能持續漲價。

Next, turning to Slide 16. This page summarizes our full year 2022 financial guidance. We provide added detail in the appendix to aide analysts and investors with modeling. Overall, we expect 13% top line growth, 8% organic. Components of this organic growth are 7% price and 1% volume as our assumption is that the supply chain constraints do not significantly ease in 2022 and only in the fourth quarter, if at all. We will continue to reassess this possibly conservative assumption as we go through the year.

接下來，請看第16頁投影片。本頁總結了我們對2022年全年財務表現的預測。附錄中提供了更多細節，以幫助分析師和投資者進行建模。整體而言，我們預計營收成長13%，其中有機成長8%。這部分有機成長由7%的價格成長和1%的銷售成長所構成，因為我們假設供應鏈限制在2022年不會顯著緩解，即使緩解，也只能在第四季。我們將全年持續評估這個可能較為保守的假設。

Full year adjusted operating profit is expected to increase $54 million or 11% with base Vertiv relatively flat and most of the increase coming from net acquisitions and divestitures. There is an $85 million year-over-year increase in fixed costs, and we provide some additional color on that increase in the appendix.

預計全年調整後營業利潤將成長 5,400 萬美元，增幅達 11%，其中 Vertiv 基本面基本持平，大部分成長來自淨收購和剝離。固定成本年增 8,500 萬美元，附錄中將對此成長進行詳細說明。

As we showed in prior slides, quarterly adjusted operating profit and margin increased sequentially with higher pricing with fourth quarter operating profit projected to be $255 million, fourth quarter adjusted operating margin expected to be $0.15 and fourth quarter adjusted EPS to exceed $0.40 a share. So even though full year financial metrics are not overly impressive, we should be exiting 2022 in a very good position. Finally, on this page, we summarize both adjusted EPS and free cash flow for 2022 and once again, we supply underlying assumptions for each in the appendix.

正如我們在先前的幻燈片中所展示的那樣，隨著定價的提高，季度調整後的營業利潤和利潤率環比增長，預計第四季度營業利潤為2.55億美元，第四季度調整後的營業利潤率為0.15美元，第四季度調整後的每股收益將超過0.40美元。因此，儘管全年財務指標並不十分亮眼，但我們預計2022年底的財務狀況將非常良好。最後，在本頁中，我們總結了2022年的調整後每股盈餘和自由現金流，並再次在附錄中提供了各項資料的基本假設。

Now turning to Slide 17. This page summarizes our first quarter financial guidance. As we previewed in prior slides, our performance in the first quarter will continue to be challenged by negative price cost by about $70 million in the quarter, and supply chain constraints will unfavorably affect year-over-year organic volume, we estimate by about $45 million.

現在來看第17頁投影片。本頁總結了我們第一季的財務預期。正如我們在先前的幻燈片中提到的，第一季我們的業績將繼續受到約7000萬美元的負價格成本的挑戰，同時供應鏈限制也將對同比有機銷量產生不利影響，我們預計損失約4500萬美元。

Now the net impact is not great as shown by the expected $20 million adjusted operating loss. But these first quarter results should be (inaudible) year for our quarterly financial performance as we project consistent quarterly improvement as we go through 2022 based on actions we have already initiated, including by delivering $360 million of higher pricing for full year 2022, but also pricing actions should deliver additional carryover impact of $200 million into 2023.

目前來看，淨影響並不大，預計調整後營業虧損為2,000萬美元。但鑑於我們已採取的措施，包括2022年全年提高3.6億美元的定價，預計2022年全年業績將持續改善，因此第一季的業績應該會（聽不清楚）對我們季度財務業績產生積極影響。此外，定價措施也應在2023年帶來2億美元的額外收益。

Now with that said, I turn it back over to Rob.

現在，我把麥克風交還給羅布。

Thanks, David. Now let's turn to Slide 18. I know this quarter's earnings report is not what you expected from us and is not what we expected from ourselves. We got caught up in supply chain challenges that have perplexed most of the world and we did not appropriately anticipate inflationary pressures we would experience as we try to obtain parts we needed to manufacture our products.

謝謝，大衛。現在我們來看第18張投影片。我知道本季的獲利報告並非您預期，也並非我們自己的預期。我們陷入了困擾全球大部分地區的供應鏈挑戰，我們未能充分預估在採購產品所需零件的過程中將面臨的通膨壓力。

We have a great position in a good industry. We have world-class products and service offerings. We have a talented team. We are relevant to our customers. We are cultivating our relationships. And we are investing in our future. And we have a clear line of sight to our margin expansion goals.

我們在前景廣闊的行業中佔據著有利地位。我們擁有世界一流的產品和服務。我們擁有一支才華洋溢的團隊。我們與客戶息息相關。我們致力於維繫與客戶的關係。我們投資未來。我們對利潤成長目標有著清楚的規劃。

While I'm extremely disappointed in our performance in Q4, I am confident in our ability to deliver on our 2022 commitments and how the new actions we have taken have set us up to deliver a very impressive 2023. In the end, our success for 2022 and beyond is highly dependent on our ability to deliver pricing commitments that we have communicated today. And I have the confidence that we'll be able to deliver that. I take personal responsibility for this.

儘管我對第四季的業績極為失望，但我對我們履行2022年承諾的能力充滿信心，並且我們採取的新舉措已為我們實現2023年的輝煌成就奠定了基礎。最終，我們2022年及以後的成功在很大程度上取決於我們能否兌現今天公佈的價格承諾。我有信心我們能夠做到這一點。我對此負有個人責任。

To Vertiv employees around the world, thank you for the work you've done and continue to do and the support you provide to me to each other and to our customers. With that said, I want to thank all of you for listening today.

致Vertiv全球所有員工：感謝你們過去和現在所做的工作，感謝你們對我、對彼此、對客戶的支持。最後，感謝各位今天聆聽我的演講。

And I'll now turn the call over to the operator, who will open up the line for questions.

現在我將把電話轉交給接線員，由他/她接聽電話並回答問題。

(Operator Instructions) Our first question will come from Scott Davis with Melius Research.

（操作說明）我們的第一個問題來自 Melius Research 的 Scott Davis。

Rough day for everyone. But look, I want to get a sense of the -- whether you need to change your sales commission structure? Or it kind of looks like your sales force is getting paid to book unprofitable contracts? How -- do you need to change that? Or am I misreading it? I'm just trying to get a sense of the incentive system internally and how it may need to change in '22?

今天對每個人來說都不太順利。不過，我想了解一下──你們的銷售佣金結構是否需要調整？或者看起來你們的銷售人員好像在拿一些不營利的合約？你們需要如何改進？還是我理解錯了？我只是想了解你們內在的激勵機制，以及它在2022年可能需要哪些改變？

Yes, Scott. No, that -- so to be clear, they're not paid to book unprofitable business. We actually have and have really instituted over the last 60, 90 days, even tighter control. So they don't have the ability just a discount to grow the backlog and grow the business. We have a very tight rigorous process that goes all the way up to certain levels and including myself, depending on what discounts we're trying to do. So we hold that type from that perspective, so that they don't have the freedom to just discount to build backlog or to go book orders. And in different parts of the world, we have profitability as part of the overall sales compensation. So again, the answer would be no, they're not paid to book unprofitable business.

是的，斯科特。不，這一點——為了明確起見，他們拿的薪水不是為了拿那些不盈利的訂單。事實上，在過去的60到90天裡，我們已經實施了更嚴格的管制。所以他們不能僅僅透過折扣來增加訂單積壓或拓展業務。我們有一套非常嚴格的流程，層層把關，甚至包括我自己，這取決於我們想要提供的折扣。我們從這個角度把控這類流程，確保他們沒有自由地透過折扣來增加訂單積壓或取得訂單。在世界各地，獲利能力是我們整體銷售薪酬的一部分。所以，答案還是否定的，他們拿的薪水不是為了拿那些不獲利的訂單。

Rob, from a cultural perspective, it seems like Vertiv is a place where maybe bad news doesn't travel up as fast as it should. I mean, you guys reported on October 27, you already had 1 of the 3 months of the quarter in your back pocket, how did you guys miss it from a rate of change perspective, at least where was the breakdown? Is it financial controls? Is it -- is there cultural challenges? Are there learnings from this that -- because we cover a lot of companies, and you guys are an outlier at the extreme end of really getting hit here?

羅布，從文化角度來看，Vertiv 似乎是一個壞消息傳遞速度不夠快的地方。我的意思是，你們在 10 月 27 日就發布了報告，當時你們已經掌握了季度三個月中一個月的業績，為什麼你們會漏掉變化率方面的數據？至少問題出在哪裡？是財務控制方面的問題嗎？還是文化方面的挑戰？我們報道過很多公司，而你們的情況非常特殊，遭受瞭如此嚴重的打擊，你們能從中吸取哪些教訓？

Yes. So a couple of things I'd have to say here I kind of said in my opening comments. We did have some issues upfront with our ERP in Americas. To be clear, we didn't see the rate of inflation that we are actually experiencing until later in the quarter, in the later months. We did, however, see an increase in spot buys and expedited freight in order to counter supplier decommits.

是的。有幾點我想補充一下，其實我在開場白裡也提到了。我們在美洲的ERP系統初期確實遇到了一些問題。需要說明的是，我們直到本季後期，也就是最後幾個月，才真正感受到目前的通膨水準。不過，為了因應供應商違約的情況，我們確實看到了現貨採購和加急貨運量的增加。

So when we came out in our last earnings call, supply for us with certain suppliers with our products actually got worse and decommits happened and accelerated throughout the quarter. So it really wasn't necessarily, I would say, a cultural issue as more of a system issue and our ability to see that as we change over ERPs. And secondly, we consciously made decisions to pay expedited freight and drive spot buys in order to counter the decommits from our suppliers.

所以，在上次財報電話會議上，我們坦言，某些供應商的產品供應情況實際上惡化了，取消訂單的情況出現，並且在整個季度加速惡化。因此，我認為這並非文化問題，更多的是系統問題，以及我們在ERP系統切換過程中未能及時發現問題。其次，為了因應供應商取消訂單的情況，我們有意識地決定支付加急運費並進行現貨採購。

You don't mind, Scott, this is Dave Cote, and I'll probably ask Dave Fallon to interject also. 75% of our issue approximately is the Americas. And I think we're obviously being a little too kind. In the Americas, there was a cultural issue between the sales guys and operations guys truly understanding what was going on when the October results were actually okay. November looked a little bit worse but not distressingly so. And we got the report that December was going to recover. When we got the December results, that's where all of a sudden, everything seem to crash. And we didn't really know all the details of it until we got to the latter part of January and spent a good part of February trying to figure out what the heck was going on and what we had to do.

史考特，你別介意，我是戴夫·科特，我可能還會請戴夫·法倫插話。我們大約75%的問題都出在美洲。而且我覺得我們顯然還算客氣了。在美洲，銷售人員和營運人員之間存在文化差異，他們當時並不真正了解10月業績改善的原因。 11月份的情況略有惡化，但還不至於令人擔憂。我們當時收到報告說12月會有所改善。結果12月的業績出來後，一切都突然崩盤了。直到1月下旬，我們才真正了解了所有細節，然後花了2月份的大部分時間才弄清楚到底發生了什麼，以及我們必須採取什麼措施。

And Rob and I got significantly more involved with what do we have to do to resolve the cultural issues that did exist in the Americas, and that's been addressed. When it came to inflation, it was clear we had been under-forecasting what was going to happen with inflation. And I would argue some of that was a cultural issue also, which we have addressed. And that's why we've been so aggressive on the pricing side.

羅布和我更深入地參與到解決美洲地區存在的文化問題的討論中，這些問題都已解決。在通貨膨脹方面，我們顯然低估了通貨膨脹的程度。我認為其中一部分原因也是文化因素造成的，而我們也已經著手解決。正因如此，我們在價格方面才採取如此積極的措施。

And if you take a look at our Americas orders, they were up [115%] in the fourth quarter, which, as Dave pointed out, it was an indication that we could have been pricing a lot better than we did and we have adjusted that, and that's why we're pleased to see that as we go into January, at least from what we can see in February so far, orders in the Americas are continuing to grow even over what was a good first quarter of '21. But we've had to get much more heavily involved in resolving these issues. I'm confident they have been resolved, and they will continue to work with the new process. And it's why I'm encouraged by what I see for the second half, which I think gives us a very good lead into the future and gets us back where we should have been all along.

如果你看我們在美洲的訂單，你會發現第四季成長了115%。正如戴夫指出的那樣，這表明我們的定價本可以更加合理，而我們已經進行了調整。因此，我們很高興地看到，進入1月份，至少從2月份目前的數據來看，美洲的訂單仍在持續增長，甚至超過了2021年第一季的良好表現。但是，我們不得不更加積極地參與解決這些問題。我相信這些問題已經解決，並且會繼續在新流程下順利進行。正因如此，我對下半年的前景感到鼓舞，我認為這將為我們未來的發展奠定良好的基礎，並使我們重回正軌。

And I think Dave is right. The -- one of our learnings from all this is how we've underestimated our ability to get price historically, not just currently, but historically. And that's another dynamic that's going to change. So yes, there's been a significant amount of change that's occurred over the last 60 days. And I think Rob, Dave, I don't know if there's anything else you want to add there?

我認為戴夫說得對。我們從這一切中學到的一點是，我們一直以來都低估了自己獲取價格資訊的能力，不僅是現在，而是從歷史數據來看都是如此。而這又是另一個即將改變的動態。所以，是的，過去60天確實發生了許多重大變化。羅布，戴夫，你們還有什麼要補充的嗎？

No, I think those are fair comments, Dave. I think they're fair comments.

不，我覺得這些評論很中肯，戴夫。我覺得這些評論很中肯。

Our next question will come from Nicole DeBlase with Deutsche Bank.

下一個問題將來自德意志銀行的妮可·德布萊斯。

So I guess maybe if you could just elaborate on everything you guys just said. Where I'm struggling a little bit is understanding how you'd make such big cultural changes in the scope of 2 months. So maybe you could give some examples as to kind of help us? And what has changed about the planning process in 2022 to give your investors confidence that this isn't going to happen again?

所以我想，你們能不能詳細解釋一下剛才你們說的內容呢？我有點不明白的是，你們如何在短短兩個月內做出如此巨大的文化變革。能不能舉些例子來幫助我們理解？另外，2022年的規劃流程有哪些變化，才能讓投資人相信這種情況不會再發生？

So I'll address some of the culture issues upfront and Dave can talk a little bit about -- and I'll talk a little bit about the planning process and Dave can come in over the top. As it relates to cultural issues, again, the organization probably -- not probably -- organization didn't and wasn't set up to drive a lot of price. Previous years, we've shown $20 million, $25 million in price. And what we really had to do really top down, Dave, myself and others and the management team is really drive all the way down to the salespeople what it means to get price, how to get price and not to be afraid to lose orders as we go through that. So that something culturally losing orders was something that we had to overcome and say it's okay from the perspective of we've got to go drive price. And it's proven out that, that works and that we were able to get price.

所以，我先談談一些文化方面的問題，戴夫可以再補充一些——我也會簡單介紹一下規劃流程，戴夫可以補充更多。說到文化方面的問題，再次強調，我們公司可能——不是可能——以前並沒有做好充分的定價準備。前幾年，我們的銷售額達到了2000萬到2500萬美元。我們真正需要做的，是自上而下地，戴夫、我、其他同事以及管理團隊，要讓銷售人員明白定價的意義，如何定價，以及在這個過程中不要害怕丟單。所以，我們必須克服文化上對丟單的抵觸情緒，從定價的角度來看，丟單是可以接受的。事實證明，這種做法是有效的，我們最終成功拿到了理想的價格。

As Dave mentioned, probably should have and could have gotten more price in Q4 in Americas with the order backlog that we saw. The other cultural issue that Dave talked about is really the SIOP process for Americas and really having that tighter pull together so that the demand and the supply and those constraints, we're working closely together coupled by an exacerbation of that of a new ERP system that came in that we had lack of visibility for a period of time, which is now since then fixed from that perspective. So that's kind of on the culture side.

正如戴夫所提到的，鑑於我們在美洲地區看到的訂單積壓情況，我們或許也應該能夠爭取到更高的價格。戴夫提到的另一個文化問題是美洲地區的銷售、庫存和營運計劃（SIOP）流程，我們需要更緊密地協調供需關係，並克服這些限制。由於新引入的ERP系統導致我們在一段時間內缺乏對資料的可見性，這個問題變得更加複雜，不過現在這個問題已經解決。所以，這主要涉及企業文化方面的問題。

And then on the process side, we are well in and beyond the implementation of our ERP as it relates to. And by evidence of January's results, we have visibility into what our PPV is and our price purchase variances and have a good handle on what inflation is looking like. So we were behind throughout the quarter, as Dave mentioned, got into December, recognize what was going on and have implemented both process changes, as I talked earlier on pricing, pricing levels of approval as well as process levels with the integration of Americans operations and supply and sales. Any other comments, David Fallon or David Cote?

在流程方面，我們的ERP系統實施工作已經進展順利，甚至已經超前完成。從一月份的業績來看，我們已經能夠清楚地了解採購價格差異（PPV）和價格採購差異，並且對通膨情況也有了較好的把握。正如Dave所提到的，我們整個季度都處於落後狀態，直到12月份才意識到問題所在，並實施了流程改進。正如我之前提到的，這些改進包括定價、定價審批流程以及整合美國業務、供應和銷售流程等方面的改進。 David Fallon和David Cote還有其他補充嗎？

I would say 100% agree with your comments, Rob. And Nicole, oftentimes when it comes to forecasting, it's a lot of blocking and tackling. And I would say we have instituted a lot of rigor in the last 60 days, specifically around the Americas forecasting process to the extent that last Thursday, both Rob and I were effectively in and out of a meeting that lasted from 9:00 a.m. in the morning to 10:00 p.m. at night. And so we are putting a lot of diligence into this, and we understand our credibility was harmed as it related to forecasting, and we will not let that happen again. And we're confident with the steps and processes we put together for that specific issue.

我完全同意你的觀點，羅布。妮可，很多時候，預測工作就像打仗一樣，需要大量的繁瑣準備。過去60天裡，我們採取了許多嚴格的措施，尤其是在美洲地區的預測流程方面。上週四，我和羅布幾乎從早上9點開到晚上10點，幾乎沒怎麼進出會議室。所以我們對這項工作非常重視，我們也意識到我們在預測方面的信譽受到了損害，我們絕不會讓這種情況再次發生。我們對針對這個問題所製定的步驟和流程充滿信心。

And just to add a little more color, Nicole. The Americas cultural issue was always there. It's just -- it wasn't visible in a stable cost and supply chain environment. It became extraordinarily visible as we started to run into those 2 problems. And to Dave Fallon's point, Rob pulled together a come to [Jesus] meeting with the Americas operations and sales folks to say, this is not happening anymore. I'm not going to be the arbiter of your issues. You're going to sort it out just like we're able to in EMEA and APAC on your own. And we want to figure out where exactly are we now? And how do we have a better process going forward?

妮可，我再補充一點。美洲的文化問題一直存在，只是在成本和供應鏈穩定的情況下並不明顯。但隨著我們開始遇到這兩個問題，這個問題變得異常突出。正如戴夫法倫所說，羅布召集了美洲營運和銷售人員開了一個嚴肅的會議，明確表示這種情況不能再繼續下去了。 「我不會再插手你們的問題了。你們要像我們在歐洲、中東和非洲以及亞太地區那樣，自己解決問題。我們想弄清楚我們現在究竟處於什麼階段？以及未來如何才能改進流程？”

And to Dave's point, that went on all day and then Rob and Dave came in at the conclusion. And we adjusted what we thought was going to happen for '22 as a result of that negatively, but it allowed us to be able to figure out where the bottom was a lot better than we had in the past. And they have changed the process that they're going to use going forward, both culturally and mechanically.

正如戴夫所說，這種情況持續了一整天，最後羅布和戴夫才加入討論。由於這次討論，我們對2022年的預期做出了一些不利調整，但這也讓我們比以往更準確地找到了市場底部。他們已經從文化和技術層面改變了未來將要採用的流程。

And Rob and Dave are going to be very involved going forward in understanding that reconciliation every month to make sure that we truly understand what the hell is going on. So yes, I'm confident that we've addressed it at this point. But this is going to take more than just a onetime meeting. It's going to require Rob and Dave's constant attention to make sure that it sticks and they're doing that.

羅布和戴夫今後會非常積極地參與每個月的和解工作中，確保我們真正了解到底發生了什麼。所以，是的，我相信我們目前已經解決了這個問題。但這不僅僅是一次會議就能解決的。羅布和戴夫需要持續的關注，才能確保和解真正有效，而他們也正在這樣做。

Okay. That's really helpful color. I appreciate all of that. And I'll just ask a quick one to follow up to give someone else a chance. So the order activity was obviously really strong this quarter. What did it look like excluding E&I? And maybe you could comment on organic backlog as well, like what are the E&I contribution from underlying Vertiv?

好的。這個顏色標註真的很有幫助。非常感謝。我再問一個後續問題，也給其他人一個機會。顯然，本季的訂單活動非常強勁。如果排除工程和工業（E&I）業務，情況如何？您能否也談談自然成長的訂單積壓情況，例如工程和工業業務對Vertiv底層業務的貢獻是多少？

Yes, Nicole. So the order rate percentages are all without E&I because we haven't tried to proxy what orders were or would have been in the fourth quarter of 2020. So that order rate is all excluding E&I. But if you look at the backlog, the $3.2 billion of backlog, that does include E&I. And I think E&I is just a little bit short of $300 million at year-end. So the base Vertiv backlog is somewhere between $2.9 billion and $3 billion.

是的，妮可。所有訂單率百分比都不包括工程和創新（E&I），因為我們沒有嘗試估算2020年第四季的訂單量。所以，所有訂單率都排除了工程和創新。但如果你看一下積壓訂單，32億美元的積壓訂單包含了工程和創新。我認為到年底工程和創新的訂單略低於3億美元。因此，Vertiv的基本積壓訂單應該在29億美元到30億美元之間。

Our next question will come from Jeff Sprague with Vertical Research.

下一個問題將來自 Vertical Research 的 Jeff Sprague。

Not to beat a dead horse on that last thread, but I just wanted to come back to, a, the ERP system. And if, in fact, all of the kings are worked out? And, b, I was a little concerned to hear kind of the comment that the teams are left to figure it out and we'll monitor them. It sounds like it requires much more direct marching orders, perhaps that has happened, and it wasn't conveyed in that answer. But I think we're all still looking for some level of assurance, if you will, that we've provided the ship, and everybody is kind of rowing in the same direction here?

我不想再贅述上次討論的內容，但我只想回到ERP系統上來。首先，所有關鍵問題都解決了嗎？其次，我有點擔心聽到「團隊需要自行摸索，我們會進行監督」這種說法。這聽起來需要更直接的指令，也許已經下達了，只是在先前的回答中沒有體現出來。但我認為我們仍然需要某種程度的保證，例如我們已經提供了方向，並且每個人都在朝著同一個方向努力？

Jeff, this is Rob. A couple of things comments, and others can chime in. Let's -- because the teams aren't left to just go figure it out on their own. The combination of myself, Dave Cote being involved, and Dave Fallon have given strict marching orders on what needs to happen. They need to make it happen. So it's not, hey, go figure it out and come and report out to us. We've given specific instructions as to what they need to do, what needs to happen. Guess what Dave is saying is they need to drive that, make that happen, we will monitor that. But we -- no doubt that from top down, we're driving that message to the team, the 3 of us.

傑夫，我是羅布。有幾點需要說明，其他人也可以補充。我們先來說說——因為團隊不能自己摸索。我和戴夫·科特以及戴夫·法倫一起，已經明確下達了明確的行動指示。他們必須把事情做好。所以不是那種「嘿，你們自己想辦法，然後來向我們報告」的情況。我們已經給了具體的指示，告訴他們需要做什麼，需要達成什麼目標。戴夫的意思是，他們需要主動推進，把事情做好，我們會監督。毫無疑問，從上到下，我們三個人都在向團隊傳達這個訊息。

Secondly, on the ERP system, as you know, all ERP are difficult in their own ways. And in this particular one, while things went cut over, we were able to continue to ship and do the basic business functions that you'd expect to do that some people get caught up, we didn't have that problem. It was more of an understanding of the price variance and things that we didn't get to later on. We've since then fixed that as any ERP system, you do have things you fix after the launch, and that's where we got caught up and kind of got behind on the visibility and then begin to better understand that as we got into December and really towards the end of January, and it took us a little bit longer to assess where we were at and making sure that we now understand our PPV. I don't know. Any other comments from Dave Cote or Dave Fallon?

其次，關於ERP系統，如您所知，所有ERP系統都有各自的困難點。就我們這個系統而言，雖然系統切換很頻繁，但我們能夠繼續交付產品並完成一些基本的業務功能，而有些人可能會遇到這類問題，但我們並沒有。我們遇到的問題更多在於對價格差異和其他一些我們後來沒能處理清楚的事情的理解。之後我們已經解決了這些問題，就像任何ERP系統一樣，上線後總是會有一些需要修復的地方。我們當時遇到的問題就是價格差異，導致我們在視覺性上有所滯後，直到12月和1月底才開始更能理解這些問題。我們花了一些時間來評估我們當時的狀況，並確保我們現在了解我們的PPV（每次購買價格差異）。我不知道。 Dave Cote或Dave Fallon還有其他補充嗎？

Yes, Jeff, the monitor, I guess, is not a strong enough word. And I'll leave it to Dave and Rob to use whatever strong word is required, but they're going to be much more involved in understanding did the reconciliation work the way it was supposed to. As to having the team figure it out and the approach that we took, this is a tool that I generally use, and I've talked about in the past because you can't have the CEO always having to tell people just work together. They have to do it. They have to recognize the problem. And they have to fix the processes themselves and have to come up with, here's how we're going to do it going forward.

是的，傑夫，我覺得「監督員」這個詞力道不夠。至於戴夫和羅布需要用什麼更強烈的詞，我會讓他們自己決定。他們會更深入地參與核對工作中，確保一切能如預期進行。至於讓團隊自己找出問題所在以及我們採取的方法，這是我常用的一個工具，我以前也提到過，因為你不能總是讓CEO來告訴大家「大家一起努力」。他們必須自己行動。他們必須認識到問題所在。他們必須自己改進流程，並提出「我們接下來該怎麼做」。

And it starts with they got to recognize they have a problem, which they have done. And the fixes that they've developed didn't just fix what we had is the current forecast. But it's going to get fixed going forward. And like with any new process, you don't just set it up and walk away, you still have to monitor or use a stronger word, be involved to understand that it's happening. And I can assure you, both Rob and Dave are committed to making sure that, that happens that way.

首先，他們必須意識到自身有問題，而他們也確實做到了。他們提出的解決方案不僅解決了我們目前面臨的預測問題，而且還能夠確保未來問題的解決。就像任何新流程一樣，你不能只是搭建好就置之不理，你仍然需要監控，或者更確切地說，需要參與其中，才能確保流程順利進行。我可以向你們保證，羅布和戴夫都致力於確保這一點。

Can you address cash -- could you just address free cash flow for us? And obviously, you're taking a big hit here working capital and other things. You are trying to get us to think about '23 in your exit rate. It's probably going to take some points on the board before people want to fully underwrite that. But I'd love your thoughts or commentary on kind of what the normalized free cash flow of this company should be maybe presented as -- or in kind of in the framework of maybe a free cash flow margin, free cash flow to sales, for example?

能談談現金流嗎？特別是自由現金流？顯然，您在這裡對營運資本和其他方面都造成了很大的影響。您試著讓我們把2023年的退出率考慮進去。在董事會完全認可之前，可能需要一些時間來證明這一點。但我很想聽聽您對公司正常化自由現金流的看法或評論，例如應該如何呈現——或者用自由現金流利潤率、自由現金流與銷售額的比率等方式來表示？

Yes. Thanks, Jeff. This is David. So I would say our guide for 2022 is certainly uninspiring, I think, $150 million. There are some elements of that guide that might be one-off. So for example, our CapEx for 2022 is projected to be about $130 million. That's probably a little bit elated, number one, some of the '21 CapEx split into '22, but we do have some capacity expansion dollars in there as well. I would say a more normalized CapEx number on an annual basis is probably around $100 million or so. So that's one element. The #1 driver of the free cash flow in the long term is going to be the EBITDA.

是的，謝謝傑夫。我是大衛。所以我覺得我們2022年的業績指引確實不太樂觀，只有1.5億美元。這個指引裡有些項目可能是一次性的。例如，我們預計2022年的資本支出約為1.3億美元。這可能有點樂觀，一方面是因為2021年的部分資本支出被分攤到了2022年，另一方面也包括一些產能擴張的資金。我認為更正常的年度資本支出應該在1億美元左右。這是其中一個因素。長期來看，自由現金流的首要驅動因素將是EBITDA（息稅折舊攤提前利潤）。

And the full year EBITDA is certainly not what it should be for 2022. But if you look at what we're going to do in the second half, notably in Q4, you annualize that, that is going to be a direct contributor to much higher free cash flow. And I think our guidance at the beginning of '21 was $285 million. I would say, based on where we are, especially after the pricing increases go through, our run rate should be much higher than that. It's a little bit of a hypothetical, but our overall goal is to get 100% of free cash flow and conversion on net income.

2022 年全年 EBITDA 肯定達不到預期。但如果你看看我們下半年的計劃，尤其是第四季度，將其年化後，你會發現這將直接促進自由現金流的大幅成長。我記得我們在 2021 年初給出的預期是 2.85 億美元。我認為，根據我們目前的狀況，尤其是在漲價之後，我們的實際成長率應該遠高於這個數字。這只是一個假設，但我們的總體目標是實現 100% 的自由現金流和淨利潤轉換率。

The other thing I would add, Jeff or Mr. Sprague is that if you -- AOP is a good indicator, I think, of operating cash flow. And if you take a look at our fourth quarter run rate and then the $200 million of price carryover in '23 that Dave referenced earlier, that puts us in a very good AOP position, and that is the biggest driver of what free cash flow will be.

傑夫或斯普拉格先生，我還要補充一點：我認為，年度營運計畫（AOP）是衡量經營現金流的一個很好的指標。如果您看一下我們第四季的營運速度，以及戴夫之前提到的2023年2億美元的價格結轉，就會發現我們的年度營運計畫狀況非常良好，而這正是自由現金流的最大驅動因素。

Our next question will come from Mark Delaney with Goldman Sachs.

下一個問題將來自高盛的馬克·德萊尼。

First is about the assumption of $100 million of incremental inflationary cost off of the December run rate. Maybe you could elaborate on how you're coming up with that number? And how much of that based on what suppliers are saying they may institute in terms of pricing and what you're having a good line of sight into? And how much is potentially trying to be more conservative on the inflationary metric, even if it's not cost issues you've already been seeing?

首先是關於假設1億美元的額外通膨成本（基於12月份的運行率）。您能否詳細說明一下這個數字是如何得出的？其中有多少是基於供應商表示可能實施的價格調整以及您目前掌握的可靠資訊？又有多少是為了在通膨指標上保持更保守的估計，即使您目前尚未看到成本問題？

Yes. Thanks, Mark. This is David. And I think it really is a combination of all the things you mentioned. Is there -- I would not be completely honest if I said that there is an element of conservatism included in that. And that's based on our lessons from last year. Every time we put a spike in the ground as it related to inflation, it got worse. And we saw that especially in the Americas as we progressed through the year and most notably in EMEA as we exited the year.

是的，謝謝你，馬克。我是大衛。我認為這確實是你提到的所有因素的綜合體現。如果我說其中包含保守主義的成分，那我就不完全誠實了。這是基於我們去年的教訓。每次我們採取與通膨相關的措施，情況都會變得更糟。尤其是在美洲，隨著年末的推進，我們看到了這一點，而歐洲、中東和非洲地區的情況則更為顯著。

So there is a provision for conservatism, but certainly, a part of that $100 million is based on what we are seeing currently. And so it would be hard for me to handicap a specific dollar for what we're seeing and how much it is conservatism. But that's something that we will better be able to reassess as we go through the year, and we can provide an update on that at the end of the first quarter.

因此，我們預留了一部分資金用於保守投資，但可以肯定的是，這1億美元中的一部分是基於我們目前觀察到的情況而定的。所以，我很難準確評估每一美元的具體用途以及其中有多少是出於保守考慮。但我們會在今年稍後更好地重新評估這個問題，並在第一季末提供最新進展。

And have any of the input costs stabilized that give you confidence of $100 million? Is it a conservative number? Or why wouldn't it potentially just keep going up at the same rate that it did last year?

投入成本中是否有任何一項趨於穩定，讓您對1億美元的目標充滿信心？這個數字是否保守？或者，為什麼它不會像去年那樣繼續以同樣的速度成長？

Yes. We've actually -- there is some good news out there, right, notably with some of the commodity prices and in particular with steel in the U.S. Our pricing for steel, which is our most prevalent commodity that is indexed based on an average price of the quarter before. And steel prices have come down fairly nicely since the mid-fourth quarter. We've seen some of that benefit in our Q1 pricing. But if the lower steel prices hold through the end of Q1, we should definitely see a benefit in Q2. We have not built into any of our forecasts, any specific component or commodity improving this year. So that would be an excellent example of a specific piece of conservatism built into our forecast.

是的。實際上，有一些好消息傳來，尤其是一些大宗商品價格，特別是美國鋼鐵價格。我們最主要的商品－鋼鐵的定價是基於上一季的平均價格進行調整的。自第四季中期以來，鋼鐵價格已經大幅下降。我們在第一季的定價中已經看到了一些利多因素。如果較低的鋼鐵價格能夠持續到第一季末，我們肯定會在第二季看到利好。我們所有的預測中都沒有將任何特定組件或商品價格在今年上漲的預期納入考量。這正是我們預測中所體現的保守策略的典型例子。

Okay. My other one was just on the procurement strategy for 2022. To what extent is Vertiv locking in contracts at prices that's giving a visibility into what your expenses will be? But also hoping you could touch a little bit on your ability to get that supply? You mentioned decommits were occurring. Have you taken steps to change your procurement strategy to have better certainty in how you're able to deliver both to the financial community, but also your customers?

好的。我另一個問題是關於2022年的採購策略。 Vertiv在多大程度上鎖定了能夠讓你們清楚了解支出水準的合約價格？另外，也希望你們能談談你們的供貨能力。您曾提到出現了取消訂單的情況。你們是否已採取措施調整採購策略，以更好地確保能夠滿足金融界和客戶的需求？

This is Rob. A couple of things there. As it relates to getting price and getting that in the contract, there's a couple of things we've changed to is getting that price but also putting escalators in there if commodities change outside a certain boundary. So that's something we've done and put into the contract. So it wasn't in all of our contracts prior. So we're looking at, hey, we can never predict where it's going to go, and we believe what David just said, but I would say, as a backstop, the ability to get additional price, if necessary, if things continue beyond a threshold from that perspective.

我是羅布。有幾點要說明。關於定價以及將其寫入合同，我們做了一些調整，不僅確定了價格，還加入了價格上漲機制，以防商品價格超出某個特定範圍。這是我們新加入合約的內容。之前的合約並非都包含這項條款。我們考慮到，價格走勢無法預測，我們也認同大衛剛才的觀點，但我想說，作為一種保障措施，如果價格持續超出某個閾值，我們有權在必要時獲得額外加價。

As it relates to supply, I mentioned earlier in my discussion was we've done a few things. We're not just sitting here saying, "Oh, we can't get it." We've either qualified additional suppliers. We've modified or reengineered certain parts and allowed for additional supply base to help us out. So as it relates to -- we continue to talk about fans being a problem. We've qualified additional vendors there and also have changed some of the design there that uncouples it from maybe some of the constraints that we have.

關於供應方面，我之前提到過，我們已經採取了一些措施。我們不會坐等「哦，我們搞不到貨」。我們已經篩選了更多合格的供應商，改進或重新設計了某些零件，並擴大了供應範圍來幫助我們。至於風扇——我們一直在討論這個問題。我們已經篩選了更多合格的供應商，並且修改了一些設計，使其不再受限於某些限制因素。

So we look at that, whether it's displays, whether it's qualifying additional IGBT vendors, which is a big part of our power conversion products and the DC power. One of the things you'll see from us is that from an IGBT perspective, which is the power conversion, we have a DC power business that most of our competitors don't. And so we buy a significant amount of those. And so getting additional supply base -- additional suppliers. And a lot of this got started even pre all of this inflationary and supply constraint. It was really as COVID hit, and it taught us a lesson to kind of qualify and drive additional suppliers, and we'll continue to do that even as hopefully, at some point in time, who knows when inflation goes in the -- we have a deflation in the other direction. Our strategy is still to make sure that we have multiple suppliers all the way down to our design process so that we don't single source.

所以我們會關注這一點，無論是顯示器，還是尋找更多合格的IGBT供應商——IGBT是我們電源轉換產品和直流電源的重要組成部分。你會發現，從IGBT（即電源轉換）的角度來看，我們擁有大多數競爭對手所不具備的直流電源業務。因此，我們採購大量的直流電源。我們也不斷拓展供應基礎—尋找更多供應商。很多工作甚至在通貨膨脹和供應緊張之前就已經開始了。新冠疫情爆發後，我們吸取了教訓，需要尋找並擴展更多供應商。即使未來某個時候，通貨膨脹出現逆轉（例如通貨緊縮），我們還是會繼續這樣做。我們的策略仍然是確保從設計流程到最終交付環節都有多家供應商，避免單一來源採購。

And those suppliers aren't just in one particular region that they have multiple regions because we've learned that while I may have multiple suppliers and they might be fan vendors out of Germany, that could cause a problem. So I need to have supply base in different parts of the regions.

而這些供應商並非只集中在一個地區，而是分佈在多個地區。我們了解到，即使我擁有多個供應商，其中可能包括來自德國的風扇供應商，這也會帶來問題。因此，我需要在不同地區建立供應基地。

Our next question will come from Lance Vitanza with Cowen.

下一個問題將來自考恩公司的蘭斯·維坦扎。

On Slide 13, I'm looking at the adjusted operating profit guide for 2022 and I see the $200 million in Q3 and the $255 million in Q4. My question is, is there any seasonality baked into that trajectory? I mean I'm trying to figure out when I think about the run rate, the starting point for 2023, do I want to think about annualizing the back half? Or no, do you think we really should be thinking about annualizing Q4 as a run rate to start from -- in January '23?

在第13張投影片上，我看到了2022年調整後的營業利潤預期，第三季為2億美元，第四季為2.55億美元。我的問題是，這個成長趨勢是否考慮了季節性因素？我的意思是，在考慮2023年的運行率時，我是否應該將下半年的業績年化？或者，您認為我們是否應該將第四季的業績年化作為2023年1月的運行率起點？

There's likely some seasonality in Q4 projections for 2022, but not nearly what we normally would have. So I would say Q4 is certainly a better run rate projection for 2023. With that said, Q1 2023 is probably going to be lower than Q4 2022. But it's a lot easier to annualize that Q4 2022 number, then it would be to do that in any other year. And that's because we are assuming continual -- our continued supply constraints in that number. And, of course, we're hopeful that some of that actually gets rectified as we enter the second half.

2022年第四季的預測可能存在一些季節性因素，但遠不及往年那麼嚴重。因此，我認為2023年第四季的預測數據更能反映實際的年化程度。話雖如此，2023年第一季的預測數據可能會低於2022年第四季。不過，將2022年第四季的資料進行年化比將其他年份的資料進行年化要容易得多。這是因為我們假設了持續的供應限制。當然，我們也希望隨著下半年的到來，部分供應限制能夠得到緩解。

Okay. And with the stock $11, $12 a share, can we expect the C-suite management to be buying shares in the coming days? And how about Vertiv, the company, buying back some stock? Is there any opportunity to do that based on your liquidity profile covenants and so forth?

好的。如果股價在每股 11 到 12 美元之間，我們是否可以預期高階主管團隊會在未來幾天內買進股票？ Vertiv 公司本身是否會回購一些股票？根據你們的流動性協議等條件，是否有可能進行回購？

Yes, I certainly can address from a Vertiv perspective. We look at alternative uses for our cash on a continuous basis, certainly based on the stock reaction today. A stock buyback would definitely be more attractive than it was yesterday. So not making any commitments whatsoever, but it is something that we would strategically evaluate.

是的，我當然可以從Vertiv的角度來談談這個問題。我們會持續關注現金的其他用途，當然也會根據今天的股價反應來調整。股票回購肯定比昨天更有吸引力。所以，我們目前不會做出任何承諾，但這確實是我們會進行策略評估的選項。

And the last question for me is on the balance sheet. Could you talk about your plans to delever, pay down debt? And really from a liquidity standpoint, I see the free cash flow target for the year, but could you talk about when you expect your cash plus available borrowings, when does that bottom out and at what level? And are there any maintenance covenants perhaps in your revolver that could further crimp liquidity or maybe even trigger a potential default as we progress through the year?

最後一個問題是關於資產負債表的。您能否談談您的去槓桿化計劃，也就是償還債務的計劃？從流動性角度來看，我看到了您設定的年度自由現金流目標，但您能否談談您預計現金加上可用借款何時會觸底，觸底點在哪裡？此外，您的循環信貸額度中是否存在任何維持性條款，這些條款可能會進一步限制流動性，甚至可能在年內引發潛在的違約？

Yes. On the last one, no issues on any covenants. I think there's one covenant within the ABL. It's a fixed charge coverage ratio, and we have ample room for that. That will not be an issue this year. As it relates to use of cash, as is -- and maybe 2021 was the exception, but we generally have our lowest free cash flow in Q1. We had positive free cash flow last year. This year, we will definitely use cash. So similar to the financial projections, the free cash flow should progressively improve as we go through the year as well. I would say sometime probably early third quarter would be the bottom point.

是的。關於最後一點，沒有任何契約方面的問題。我認為資產抵押貸款（ABL）中只有一項契約，即固定費用覆蓋率，而我們有足夠的空間來達到這個目標。今年這不會是個問題。至於現金使用方面，通常情況下——也許2021年是個例外——我們第一季的自由現金流最低。去年我們的自由現金流為正。今年，我們肯定會使用現金。因此，與財務預測類似，自由現金流應該會隨著時間的推移而逐步改善。我認為第三季初可能會是最低點。

As it relates to liquidity, we do have -- as we mentioned, we resolved the tax receivable agreement. There's a $50 million payment at the end of June, end of September. I think soon after that $50 million payment at the end of June would be the bottom part -- would be the -- I'm sorry, the bottom of our liquidity and then it should improve thereafter.

關於流動性方面，正如我們之前提到的，我們已經解決了應收稅款協議。 6月底或9月底會有一筆5000萬美元的款項支付。我認為，這筆6月底的5,000萬美元款項支付之後，流動性狀況將達到最低點，之後情況應該會有所改善。

Our next question will come from Nigel Coe with Wolfe Research.

下一個問題將來自 Wolfe Research 的 Nigel Coe。

I apologize for the background noise. I'm shopping, but I just want to go back to pricing. Maybe just if you could maybe address have you changed incentive structures around price specifically to make sure that, that behavior change is sort of getting hardwired and comped? And then maybe just address the order strength in Americas in 4Q? I mean, how confident are you that, that wasn't related to upcoming price increases, and therefore, pre-buying ahead of that? And perhaps also, if you could just -- I know it's a [small] question, but if you could address maybe the pricing on current order entrant backlog relative to 7% you got pressed into your guide?

抱歉背景噪音有點大。我正在購物，但我想回到定價方面。您能否解釋一下，您是否專門針對價格調整了激勵機制，以確保這種行為改變能夠真正落實到位並得到認可？另外，能否談談第四季美洲地區的訂單量？您有多大把握認為這與即將到來的價格上漲無關，導致客戶提前購買？還有，如果您能——我知道這只是個小問題——能否解釋一下，目前訂單積壓的定價與您在指導方針中提到的7%的比例有何關係？

Okay. Nigel, thanks for the question. This is Rob. I'll answer the first 2, and then David Fallon can come over on the third one. As I mentioned earlier, some of the behavioral changes that we've put in place across the world is really authority and approval. One of the quickest ways to get there is stop discounting. We've raised list prices appropriately, but you can lose price through discounting. So we've changed those thresholds across the globe. We changed the level in which those decisions can be made all the way up to and David as CFO, so that we don't give away the pricing that we were getting through discounting. So that is a, I'd call it, a cultural thing and a change that we implemented over the last 60, 90 days. And we believe that's very effective. Although painful for the organization, it's the right thing to do to guarantee that we get this price.

好的。 Nigel，謝謝你的提問。我是Rob。我先回答前兩個問題，然後David Fallon可以過來回答第三個。正如我之前提到的，我們在全球範圍內實施的一些行為改變實際上涉及授權和審批。實現這一目標最快的方法之一就是停止打折。我們已經適當地提高了標價，但折扣會導致價格損失。因此，我們調整了全球範圍內的折扣門檻。我們提高了決策權限，一直到財務長David，這樣我們就不會拱手讓出之前透過打折獲得的利潤。所以，我稱之為文化變革，也是我們在過去60到90天內實施的改變。我們相信這非常有效。雖然這對公司來說很痛苦，但為了確保我們獲得這個價格，這是正確的做法。

If you take a look at specifically Americas, what the dynamic that's going on there in our market overall is it's supply constraint in general. Lead times have gone out for whether it's generators, whether it's breakers, whatever it might be. And I think what we saw is and what we'll continue to see is people are putting orders in to get their slots to make sure they get supply, where that used to be maybe they order 6 months and ahead, 3 months ahead. In some cases, they're ordering and looking at 12, maybe 18 months as we go forward.

如果具體觀察美洲市場，就會發現整個市場普遍面臨供應緊張的局面。無論是發電機、斷路器或其他任何產品，交貨週期都已延長。我認為，我們已經看到並將繼續看到的情況是，人們都在提前下訂單以確保供貨，而過去他們可能提前6個月或3個月訂購。現在，在某些情況下，他們甚至需要提前12個月或18個月訂購。

So the demand is extremely strong on a global basis. And that's why you're seeing that uptick overall. It wasn't a rush to get it before price because a lot of that had pricing actions that were taken in November, back in October, September and then more recently in December. The strength for us really comes from a lot around the colo cloud but also even in the channel. We've seen growth as we continue to increase price here. We continue to see growth around the Vertiv product offering. David, on the third one or Gary?

所以全球需求非常強勁。這就是整體成長的原因。並沒有急於在價格上漲前搶購，因為許多價格調整措施早在去年11月、10月、9月以及最近的12月就已經出台。我們的強勁成長主要來自託管雲端業務，也來自通路通路。隨著價格的持續上漲，我們看到了成長。 Vertiv產品組合的成長也持續強勁。 David，第三個問題還是Gary？

Yes. Thanks, Rob. Nigel, it's Gary. I think your last question was specifically around pricing in the backlog. And so the pricing in the backlog as we entered January 1, was right around $125 million, give or take a little bit. So probably just north of 4%, 4.5%, somewhere in that range. And if you look at the momentum of the pricing that we had in 2021, every quarter got stronger with Q4 being the high point. So we feel good to what everyone's comments have been up to this point in time that it really is we had to believe it ourselves almost in order to be able to take that next step function. So we saw that step function in Q4 between that data point, between the data point of $125-ish million of pricing in the backlog going into this year is, number two.

是的。謝謝，羅伯。奈傑爾，我是加里。我想你上一個問題是關於積壓訂單的定價。截至1月1日，積壓訂單的定價約為1.25億美元左右，上下略有浮動。所以大概略高於4%，4.5%，在這個範圍內。如果你看看2021年的定價勢頭，每個季度都在增強，第四季達到頂峰。所以，我們對大家目前的評論感到滿意，我們幾乎必須自己相信這一點，才能踏出下一步。因此，我們看到了第四季的階躍式成長，從年初積壓訂單定價1.25億美元左右的數據點，到第二點。

And then number three, even with what we've seen in January so far in early February. The price increases that we put out at the end of Q4 and even in Q1 doesn't seem to have materially changed the order input rate at this point in time. So all of that gives us confidence of how we're going to continue to build our pricing as the year goes on.

第三，即便考慮到一月到二月初的情況，我們在第四季末甚至第一季推出的價格上漲似乎並未對目前的訂單量產生實質影響。因此，所有這些都讓我們對今年接下來的定價策略充滿信心。

Our next question will come from Steve Tusa with JPMorgan.

下一個問題將來自摩根大通的史蒂夫·圖薩。

So just on this whole pricing discussion. How will this change like next year and the year after that, when we kind of go back to what this industry has really been historically, which is generally negative price on the equipment and then a little bit of price on services? I mean, the fact that kind of you're changing these discounts in the fourth quarter of 2021 when like it was pretty readily apparent to everybody early last year that there were going to be issues here.

所以，關於定價的討論，明年以及後年，當我們回歸到這個行業歷史上的真正模式——設備價格通常為負值，服務價格略高——時，情況會如何變化？我的意思是，你們在2021年第四季改變這些折扣，而早在去年年初，每個人都清楚地意識到這裡會出現問題。

I don't know what your competitors are doing because they're kind of buried in larger organizations. But I mean, do you see the same kind of behavior from them as well? Or is this something kind of unique and specific to you guys? I guess my question is just how are you so confident that you can kind of maintain a spread like that in an industry that has typically had very challenged pricing to begin with?

我不知道你們的競爭對手在做什麼，因為他們大多隸屬於規模更大的公司。我的意思是，你們是否也觀察到他們採取了類似的策略？還是說這是你們公司獨有的做法？我想問的是，你們是如何如此自信地在一個定價競爭異常激烈的行業中維持如此大的價差的？

Steve, this is Rob. Thanks for the question. And traditionally, I think culturally, you may have heard earlier, we didn't think. David said we didn't think as a company, we could go out and be strong with our price. But what I really see is happening where we're getting prices where we're differentiated, where we're developing, call them, unique or innovative products and solutions. And the organization, you're absolutely right. And kind of the industry culturally hasn't gone there because a lot of areas haven't been providing innovation.

史蒂夫，我是羅伯。謝謝你的提問。傳統上，我認為從文化角度來說，你可能之前也聽過，我們以前並不這麼認為。大衛也說過，作為一家公司，我們以前並不認為我們可以憑藉價格優勢脫穎而出。但我現在看到的是，我們正在透過差異化定價，透過開發獨特或創新的產品和解決方案來實現這一點。你說得完全正確，整個產業在文化上還沒有做到這一點，因為很多領域都沒有進行創新。

So where we have innovated in certain areas like thermal management and so forth, those are areas that we found and learned through this, and we can actually get price and continue to get price for innovation. And that's the basis of our thesis and the reason we've been driving our R&D up is fundamentally, we believe with innovation providing stronger products to the customers, we can get that price. We can get a higher price than those that aren't innovating in those sections. And as you may know, we don't compete. I know a lot of people think it's just the big guys that are part of big conglomerates. We compete with a lot of locals that you wouldn't know that don't report out. And those also are experiencing these commodity or specific price cost issues as well.

因此，我們在熱管理等領域進行創新，這些都是我們透過實踐發現和學習的，而且我們能夠憑藉創新獲得並持續獲得價格優勢。這正是我們理念的基礎，也是我們不斷加大研發投入的原因。從根本上講，我們相信，透過創新為客戶提供更強大的產品，我們就能獲得更高的價格。我們可以比那些在這些領域沒有創新的企業獲得更高的價格。您可能知道，我們並沒有直接與大型企業競爭。我知道很多人認為只有那些隸屬於大型集團的大公司才會參與競爭。實際上，我們與許多您可能不認識、也不對外披露資訊的本地企業競爭。而這些企業也同樣面臨商品價格或特定成本的挑戰。

So we've seen people follow and we look at the different parts of the market. And as we've gone to it, what we found is where Vertiv products are preferred, where we have that innovation, pricing sticks and people will pay us more. So we've learned something through this process. and we'll continue to apply that throughout the years. Any other thoughts on...

所以我們看到人們紛紛效仿，我們也關注著市場的各個細分領域。隨著研究的深入，我們發現，在那些Vertiv產品更受歡迎、我們擁有創新優勢、定價策略更穩健且人們願意支付更高價格的領域，我們的產品更受青睞。因此，我們從這個過程中學到了一些東西，並且會在未來幾年繼續運用這些經驗。還有其他想法嗎？

Yes, you mentioned like thermal, I guess, so that's on kind of like the HVAC side?

是的，你提到了熱力方面，我想，那應該算是暖通空調方面的吧？

Yes. The thermal management products, areas of certain power distribution, E&I, other PDUs where we have strength. And again, you're absolutely right in the past, it hasn't been. But as we've driven innovation, and as we've gone through this process, the team has really kind of reset its mind in understanding that, hey, we can get paid for the things we do where we differentiate. And that's where we'll continue to focus on that differentiation to drive that price and hold that price for the future.

是的。我們在散熱管理產品、某些配電領域、電氣和儀表以及其他配電單元（PDU）方面都具有優勢。您說的完全正確，過去確實並非如此。但隨著我們不斷推動創新，並經歷了這個過程，團隊已經真正轉變了思路，認識到我們可以憑藉差異化優勢獲得回報。我們將繼續專注於這種差異化，從而提升價格並維持未來的價格優勢。

Got it. And I just wanted to clarify the cash side...

明白了。我只是想確認一下現金方面的狀況…

Steve?

史蒂夫？

Yes.

是的。

Steve, if I could just interject something building on Rob's cultural point is I'd say, historically, we also underestimated the value of that differentiation that already existed. And we had a predisposition or a deference to not lose the order. And if you approach it that way, you will generally underprice. And this process has shown us that not only is our new innovation worth more than we thought. The innovation that already exists in our products has been historically underpriced. And this has been, I think, a really good learning for all of us in the business that we've got a lot more capacity for price than we ever realized.

史蒂夫，如果我能補充羅布的文化觀點，我想說，從歷史上看，我們也低估了現有差異化的價值。我們有一種先入為主的觀念，或者說一種顧慮，那就是不想失去訂單。如果你抱著這種心態，通常就會定價過低。而這個過程讓我們意識到，我們的新創新不僅比我們想像的更有價值，而且我們產品中已有的創新也一直被低估了。我認為這對我們公司所有人來說都是一個非常寶貴的經驗，讓我們意識到我們在價格方面擁有比以往想像中更大的空間。

Right. Right. And just on those orders, you mentioned that there are some people who are ordering 12 to 18 months out. I mean, how much of your orders do you think are kind of unusually timed, if you will? I know some companies have said like 10% to 15%. How much are unusually timed that you think will kind of not be there in their normal cadence as we move through the year if things normalize?

對，對。關於訂單，您剛才提到有些人提早12到18個月就下單了。我的意思是，你覺得你們的訂單有多少屬於時間上比較特殊的情況？我知道有些公司說大概有10%到15%。如果情況恢復正常，您認為有多少時間上比較特殊的訂單會在一年中的正常週期內消失？

What we're seeing right now and from the pipelines and the discussions I'm having with most of our large customers, we continue to see a robust environment of orders. It -- I think this goes well beyond '22 into '23 and into '24. I think there is just an enormous appetite for data center space on a global basis, Steve. We have not seen this kind of level. Normally, it's EMEA is growing fast or it's Asia or it's Americas. This phenomenon that we're seeing now and experiencing is global expansion of data centers in all parts of the world.

從我們目前所看到的，以及我與大多數​​大客戶的討論來看，訂單環境依然強勁。我認為這一趨勢將持續到2022年、2023年甚至2024年。史蒂夫，我認為全球對資料中心空間的需求非常巨大。我們從未見過如此高的水平。通常情況下，成長最快的地區是歐洲、中東和非洲地區（EMEA）、亞洲或美洲。而我們現在看到的，是全球各地資料中心的擴張。

And so there's a lot more companies involved in the Tier 2, Tier 3 colos, a lot more building going -- being done for the hyperscalers. So what I'd say is it wasn't just an unusual time or one-off, I continue to see the market to be capacity constrained because of the volume of data centers that are needed to be built. And as we look at our pipeline 18, 24 months ahead, it's more robust than we've ever seen.

因此，更多公司參與到二級、三級資料中心建設中，為超大規模資料中心營運商建造的資料中心數量也大幅增加。所以我認為這並非只是暫時的或一次性的現象，由於需要建造的資料中心數量龐大，市場容量仍然受到限制。展望未來18到24個月的專案儲備，其規模比以往任何時候都更加強勁。

Our next question will come from Amit Daryanani with Evercore ISI.

我們的下一個問題將來自 Evercore ISI 的 Amit Daryanani。

I have 2 questions, I guess, and, thank you for all the details around calendar '22. You spent a fair amount of time talking about all the issues and challenges, how you intend to fix them, which has been helpful. Maybe you could spend a few minutes talking about how does incentive compensation get aligned to fix these challenges? And maybe you could talk about on the sales side where you seem to have some issues and also on the management level. I'd love to understand the incentive comp change at all to rectify some of the challenges we've had.

我想問兩個問題，非常感謝您詳細介紹2022年的計畫。您花了不少時間討論各種問題和挑戰，以及您打算如何解決這些問題，這對我很有幫助。您能否花幾分鐘時間談談如何調整激勵薪酬以應對這些挑戰？另外，您能否談談銷售方面以及管理階層上似乎存在的問題？我很想了解激勵薪酬的調整方案，以便解決我們遇到的一些挑戰。

Sure. Amit, this is Rob. I'll start off there. As it relates to management, I mean, we are completely aligned with the shareowners and what we want to deliver. And that's really earnings and profitability as we go forward. And as we look at goals and being set for 2022, pricing is absolutely in there from a management, not just my team, but my team's teams below. And pricing is one of those what we call OKRs or objectives for the year that we need to hit.

當然。阿米特，我是羅布。我先從這裡開始。關於管理方面，我的意思是，我們與股東的目標完全一致，那就是實現獲利和獲利成長。展望2022年的目標，定價絕對是管理階層關注的重點，不僅是我的團隊，也包括我團隊下屬的各個團隊。定價是我們所謂的OKR（目標與關鍵成果）之一，也是我們需要達成的年度目標。

As mentioned earlier, the incentive from the sales side and again, depending on the part of the world, is primarily right now driven by their ability to discount or not discount, right? Sales -- they need to get sales with price. They get more quota at the higher price, I guess, in general, the higher price they get, the more quota attainment they retire.

正如之前提到的，銷售方面的激勵機制，而且根據世界各地情況的不同，目前主要取決於他們是否能夠打折，對吧？銷售人員需要透過價格來促成交易。一般來說，價格越高，他們完成的銷售指標就越多，因此，價格越高，他們完成的銷售指標就越多。

And it's true for -- if I take a look at the selling regime that we have in Americas today, the salespeople are incented to get a higher price because they get a higher multiplier and a higher commission when it comes to that. And so I would say that we feel like the areas we needed to really shore up was where that price leakage could happen on big deals and other areas and really push back on that and put higher levels of approval so that we're not giving price away kind of further down in the organization.

確實如此——如果我審視我們目前在美洲的銷售體系，就會發現銷售人員為了獲得更高的佣金和更高的乘數，會不擇手段地爭取更高的價格。因此，我認為我們需要重點加強的領域是防止大宗交易和其他環節出現價格洩露，並切實遏制這種行為，同時提高審批層級，以防止價格在組織內部進一步流失。

So I feel confident that both sales and management throughout the globe understands and gets the price and understands what it's going to mean to them ultimately in their wallet.

因此，我相信全球各地的銷售和管理層都理解並接受了這個價格，也明白這最終會如何影響他們的錢包。

The other thing -- yes, I'm sorry the other thing I would add -- yes, the other thing I would add is, as you might expect, what Rob is recommending to the Board is significantly lower than what a normal payout would be. And Rob is also recommending that he and his team take a 0 bonus this year. I don't know how much more of an incentive you need than that to make things to work. But also their comp is largely focused on equity. And a big part of this is driving making sure the stock price goes up. So they're heavily incented to make sure that all these things get fixed.

還有一點——是的，抱歉，我還要補充一點——正如您可能預料到的，羅布向董事會提出的建議遠低於正常的薪酬水平。而羅布也建議他和他的團隊今年放棄獎金。我想不出還有什麼比這更有激勵作用才能讓事情順利進行。此外，他們的薪酬主要以股權為基礎。而股權激勵的關鍵在於確保股價上漲。因此，他們有很強的動力去確保所有這些問題都得到解決。

Perfect. That is really helpful. I expect to just follow up. A lot of the expectations for '22 are predicated on how good the order book is, how good the backlog is north of $3 billion, I think, is what you mentioned. Can you just talk about your conviction that there's not a lot of double ordering or the quality of the backlog is good? Is there any way to think about what's the duration of this backlog today versus what it would normally be potentially?

太好了，這真的很有幫助。我打算之後再跟進。很多對2022年的預期都取決於訂單情況，尤其是積壓訂單的質量，我記得您提到超過30億美元的訂單。您能否談談您為什麼認為重複下單的情況不多，或者積壓訂單的品質很好？有沒有辦法比較一下目前的積壓訂單的持續時間與正常情況下可能的情況相比如何？

Yes. So as we think about it -- we look at each order when it comes in, and it's not just a blanket order for this many units. Our orders are specific sites, specific jobs, specific locations where they need to go. So that gives us confidence. And this question has been asked over the last couple of years as the backlog increases or is the order rate increases, are people double and triple are ordering? We don't believe that's the case whatsoever that people were just putting in blanket orders just to cover themselves, these are specific projects as we go forward.

是的。我們仔細考慮過每一份訂單，它們並非是數量龐大的統一訂單。我們的訂單都針對特定的地點、具體的項目和具體的交貨位置。這讓我們更有信心。過去幾年，隨著積壓訂單的增加，或者說訂單量的增加，人們一直在問：是不是有人下了雙倍甚至三倍的訂單？我們完全不認為有人只是為了規避風險而下了統一訂單，這些都是針對具體項目的訂單。

If you take a look at the duration of the backlog, we used to say maybe it's 9 to 12 months or 9 to 15, maybe it's a little bit longer than that or 6 to 9 months, now it's 9 to 15, something like that. But it's not -- things don't get into backlog if they're 2 years out, that type of thing. We -- while people are looking to drive orders to us for that what you'll see is the duration hasn't moved that much, maybe by, let's say, a quarter or 3 months type of thing based on what we've seen. I don't know, Gary, are you seeing anything different than that?

如果你看一下積壓訂單的週期，我們以前會說大概是9到12個月，或是9到15個月，也可能稍微長一點，例如6到9個月，現在是9到15個月，差不多是這樣。但實際上並非如此——如果訂單的交貨期超過兩年，就不會進入積壓訂單。雖然大家都在努力向我們下單，但你會發現訂單週期並沒有太大變化，根據我們觀察到的情況，可能也就縮短了一個季度或三個月左右。我不知道，Gary，你那邊的情況有什麼不同嗎？

I think that's exactly right, Rob. There's no indication of double order and anywhere, Amit. And you're right, we would always say the backlog -- everything we have in the backlog turned in about a 12-month period of time, maybe that's slightly elongated to 15, 18 months just because even our customers are having a hard time getting trades people and site ready, all that type of stuff. But if you look at our backlog today, there's probably only 5% to 10% of it that is scheduled out in 2023. And really, customers are telling us that they would take the product as soon as they can get it. So there's nothing in 2024 or 2025, by any means.

羅布，我覺得你說得完全正確。阿米特，沒有任何跡象表明存在重複訂單的情況。你說得對，我們一直都說積壓訂單——我們積壓的訂單大約會在12個月內完成，也許會稍微延長到15到18個月，因為即使是我們的客戶也很難找到施工人員，也很難做好場地準備等等。但如果你看看我們今天的積壓訂單，大概只有5%到10%的訂單安排在2023年。而且客戶告訴我們，他們希望能盡快拿到產品。所以2024年或2025年肯定不會有任何訂單。

Our next question will come from Andrew Obin with Bank of America.

下一個問題將來自美國銀行的安德魯·奧賓。

Just sort of taking a longer picture, the medium-term goal for adjusted operating margin was 15% plus. So how do you think about the bridge from the '22 midpoint of 9.3% up to 15% sort of -- you highlighted more aggressive pricing. But also, how much do you think what's happening is structural in nature, right, more inflation environment going forward, more labor shortages, et cetera, et cetera. Are you guys just sort of putting out the fires? Or have you sort of considered how to restore this long-term bridge?

從長遠來看，中期調整後營業利益率的目標是15%以上。那麼，您如何看待從2022年9.3%的中點到15%的過渡——您強調了更積極的定價策略。但同時，您認為目前的情況在多大程度上是結構性的，對吧？例如未來通膨環境加劇、勞動力短缺加劇等等。你們只是在疲於應對這些危機嗎？還是已經考慮過如何重建這個長期的過渡橋樑？

Yes, Andrew. Like a lot of things, very much dependent upon pricing, which we feel very good. That is sticking. And I think the focus instead of looking at '21 or 2022 midpoint is to look at the adjusted operating margin in the fourth quarter, which is 15%. And as we discussed with Lance, it's not fair to just annualize that from an operating margin perspective into 2023, but it's a great start.

是的，安德魯。就像很多事情一樣，這很大程度上取決於定價，而我們對目前的定價非常滿意。這個價格會保持穩定。我認為，與其關注2021年或2022年的中點，不如關注第四季的調整後營業利潤率，目前是15%。正如我們和蘭斯討論的那樣，從營業利潤率的角度來看，直接將這個數字年化到2023年並不公平，但這確實是一個很好的開始。

And we would say we would be right back on track where our plans were, let's say, 6 months ago with our -- with the timing of getting the near-term adjusted operating margin up to 16%. So I would say, as we exit 2022, I would say things are back to normal. And even to a certain extent, maybe a little bit more accelerated than where we thought, especially with E&I's adjusted operating margin also returning to the levels that we expected.

我們可以說，我們已經重回正軌，回到了六個月前的計劃，即近期調整後營業利潤率達到16%的目標。因此，我認為，隨著2022年的結束，一切都恢復正常。甚至在某種程度上，恢復速度可能比我們預期的還要快，特別是E&I的調整後營業利潤率也已恢復到我們預期的水平。

Got you. And just to clarification -- just a clarification. Slide 13. Just understanding 110% of pricing in the first half versus 120%, 130% in Q3, Q4. It's just -- I'm just -- I don't quite understand how year-over-year comps work as well, right, because it's sort of a weak comp of an easy comp and then we have a strong comp of strong comps in the second half. Maybe I missed something on the call, I apologize for that. But just to understand why it's only 110% in the first half, given that the comps are low and given that we got 130% and 120% in Q3 and Q4, respectively?

明白了。我再澄清一下──關於第13頁投影片。我只是想弄清楚，為什麼上半年定價是110%，而第三季和第四季分別是120%和130%。我只是——我只是——我不太明白同比數據是如何計算的，對吧？因為上半年的年比數據較低，而下半年的年比數據又比較高。也許我在電話會議上漏掉了什麼，對此我深感抱歉。但我只是想弄清楚，為什麼上半年的年比數據只有110%，而第三季和第四季的年比數據分別是130%和120%？

Yes. Great question, Andrew. The biggest dynamic there is addressed on Slide 14 at the bottom. So the pricing is driven by what we're able to sell at a backlog and based on what we're able to sell on a book and ship basis. And the pricing that we get for book and ship deliveries is certainly higher than what's in the backlog. So the dynamic that it's $110 million in the first half and much higher in the second half is directly driven by the amount of sales that come out of backlog in the first half and the amount of sales that come from book and ship in the second half.

是的，安德魯，問得好。最重要的動態因素在第14張投影片底部有說明。定價取決於我們能夠售出的積壓訂單數量以及我們能夠售出的即訂即發訂單數量。而即訂即發訂單的定價肯定高於積壓訂單的定價。因此，上半年銷售額為1.1億美元，下半年大幅成長的趨勢，直接取決於上半年積壓訂單的銷售額和下半年即訂即發訂單的銷售額。

And so that implies that there was a lot more book and ship in Q3 and Q4, and now we're just shipping out of backlog. Is that just this impact [finance]? I'm sorry?

所以這是否意味著第三季和第四季的訂單量和出貨量都大幅增加，而現在我們只是在處理積壓訂單。這僅僅是財務方面的影響嗎？抱歉？

Yes. When we progress through 2022, specifically for Q3, 70% of the sales that we anticipate in Q3 will be based on new orders placed in 2022, which will be at a price point much higher than those coming from backlog. And there's still about 30% of our sales in Q3 which will be based out of the 12/31/'21 backlog, but you can see that sequentially improves as we go through the year. And as important, I think Q4, we still have 25% of our sales that are based on orders that were in the backlog at the end of '21.

是的。展望2022年，特別是第三季度，我們預期第三季銷售額的70%將來自2022年新下的訂單，這些訂單的價格將遠高於積壓訂單的價格。第三季仍有約30%的銷售額來自2021年12月31日的積壓訂單，但您可以看到，隨著時間的推移，這一比例會逐步改善。同樣重要的是，我認為第四季仍有25%的銷售額來自2021年底的積壓訂單。

If you progress to 2023, almost 95% of our sales in 2023 are going to be based on this higher pricing that we get not only in 2022, but also in 2023.

如果時間推移到 2023 年，我們 2023 年近 95% 的銷售額將基於我們在 2022 年以及 2023 年獲得的更高價格。

This concludes our question-and-answer session. I would like to turn the conference back over to Rob Johnson for any closing remarks.

問答環節到此結束。現在我把會議交還給羅伯·約翰遜，請他作總結發言。

Sure. Again, I want to apologize to all of you for our Q4 performance. As you know, we're not happy, you're not happy with it. We have a handle on the issues. I hope you saw that through our presentation today and need to prove it to you throughout this year. We will earn your trust back. I want to thank you, and have a good day.

當然。再次就我們第四季的業績向大家致歉。正如你們所知，我們對此並不滿意，你們也不滿意。我們已經著手解決這些問題。希望你們從今天的報告中看到了這一點，並且需要在今年用實際行動證明這一點。我們會重新贏得你們的信任。謝謝大家，祝你們今天愉快。

The conference has now concluded. Thank you for attending today's presentation. You may now disconnect.

會議已結束。感謝您參加今天的報告。您可以斷開連線了。