(RDFN) 2022 Q4 法說會逐字稿

Greetings, and welcome to the Redfin Corporation Fourth Quarter 2022 Earnings Conference Call. (Operator Instructions) Please note that this conference is being recorded.

您好，歡迎來到 Redfin Corporation 2022 年第四季度收益電話會議。 （操作員說明）請注意，正在錄製此會議。

I will now turn the conference over to our host, Meg Nunnally, Head of Investor Relations. Thank you. You may begin.

我現在將會議轉交給我們的主持人，投資者關係主管 Meg Nunnally。謝謝。你可以開始了。

Good afternoon, and welcome to Redfin's Financial Results Conference Call for the Fourth Quarter and Full Year ended December 31, 2022. I'm Meg Nunnally, Redfin's Head of Investor Relations. Joining me on the call today is Glenn Kelman, our CEO; and Chris Nielsen, our CFO.

下午好，歡迎來到 Redfin 截至 2022 年 12 月 31 日的第四季度和全年財務業績電話會議。我是 Redfin 的投資者關係主管 Meg Nunnally。今天和我一起參加電話會議的是我們的首席執行官 Glenn Kelman；和我們的首席財務官 Chris Nielsen。

Before we start, note that some of our statements on today's call are forward-looking. We believe our assumptions and expectations related to these forward-looking statements are reasonable, but our actual results may turn out to be materially different. Please read and consider the risk factors in our SEC filings together with the content of today's call. Any forward-looking statements are based on our assumptions today, and we don't undertake to update these statements in light of new information or future events.

在我們開始之前，請注意我們在今天電話會議上的一些聲明是前瞻性的。我們相信我們與這些前瞻性陳述相關的假設和預期是合理的，但我們的實際結果可能會大不相同。請閱讀並考慮我們提交給美國證券交易委員會的文件中的風險因素以及今天電話會議的內容。任何前瞻性陳述均基於我們今天的假設，我們不承諾根據新信息或未來事件更新這些陳述。

On this call, we will present non-GAAP measures when discussing our financial results. We encourage you to review today's earnings release, which is available on our website at investors.redfin.com for more information related to our non-GAAP measures, including the most directly comparable GAAP financial measures and related reconciliations.

在這次電話會議上，我們將在討論我們的財務業績時提出非 GAAP 措施。我們鼓勵您查看今天的收益發布，該發布可在我們的網站 investors.redfin.com 上獲取，以獲取與我們的非 GAAP 指標相關的更多信息，包括最直接可比的 GAAP 財務指標和相關調節。

All comparisons made in the course of this call are against the same period in the prior year, unless otherwise stated. Lastly, we will be providing a copy of our prepared remarks on our website by the conclusion of today's call, and a full transcript and audio replay will also be available soon after the call.

除非另有說明，否則本次電話會議期間進行的所有比較都是與去年同期進行的。最後，我們將在今天的電話會議結束前在我們的網站上提供我們準備好的評論的副本，電話會議後不久還將提供完整的文字記錄和音頻重播。

With that, I'll turn the call over to Glenn.

有了這個，我會把電話轉給格倫。

Thanks, Meg, and hi, everyone. Redfin generated $480 million of fourth quarter revenue, exceeding our projected range of $430 million to $459 million in revenue, mostly on the strength of RedfinNow sales. Our net loss of $62 million includes a $57 million gain from repurchasing at a discount $143 million of debt due in 2025. The adjusted EBITDA loss of $63 million was near the favorable end of our $58 million to $71 million guidance.

謝謝，梅格，大家好。 Redfin 第四季度的收入為 4.8 億美元，超過了我們預計的 4.3 億美元至 4.59 億美元的收入範圍，這主要得益於 RedfinNow 的銷售強勁。我們的 6,200 萬美元淨虧損包括以折扣價回購 2025 年到期的 1.43 億美元債務而獲得的 5,700 萬美元收益。調整後的 EBITDA 虧損 6,300 萬美元接近我們 5,800 萬至 7,100 萬美元指引的有利端。

Earnings mostly exceeded expectations, but comparing the fourth quarters of '21 and 2022, Redfin lost 2 basis points of market share, in part due to layoffs and the loss of RedfinNow-driven demand. As we compete better for online real estate traffic and improved sales execution, we expect share gains to accelerate in the second half, especially when we're no longer comparing our sales to a period of aggressive spending on agent hiring and home purchases. It will be a major achievement to take share in a year where we're also improving annual profits by nearly $200 million, driven by higher gross margins, lower spending and the closure of money-losing businesses.

收益大多超出預期，但與 21 年第四季度和 2022 年第四季度相比，Redfin 的市場份額下降了 2 個基點，部分原因是裁員和 RedfinNow 驅動的需求下降。隨著我們更好地競爭在線房地產流量和提高銷售執行力，我們預計下半年份額增長將加速，尤其是當我們不再將我們的銷售額與代理人招聘和購房方面的積極支出進行比較時。在毛利率提高、支出減少和虧損業務關閉的推動下，我們的年度利潤也提高了近 2 億美元，這將是一項重大成就。

We couldn't be more excited about the year ahead. 2 months into 2023, we're still on course to earn an adjusted EBITDA profit for the full year and on schedule to sell our last RedfinNow home in the second quarter. For the properties segment that includes RedfinNow, the gross profit losses in the fourth quarter were at the favorable end of our range. The full year gross profit losses for this segment were $23 million, and the 2023 gross profit losses should be a few million dollars more -- excuse me, should be a few million dollars or less. Only 19 homes, originally purchased by RedfinNow for $12.2 million, have neither been sold nor accepted an offer to be sold.

我們對來年感到無比興奮。進入 2023 年還有兩個月，我們仍有望獲得全年調整後的 EBITDA 利潤，並按計劃在第二季度出售我們最後一個 RedfinNow 住宅。對於包括 RedfinNow 在內的房地產部門，第四季度的毛利潤損失處於我們範圍內的有利端。該部門的全年毛利潤損失為 2300 萬美元，2023 年的毛利潤損失應該多幾百萬美元——對不起，應該在幾百萬美元或更少。最初由 RedfinNow 以 1220 萬美元購買的 19 套房屋既沒有出售也沒有接受出售要約。

The closure of RedfinNow is part of a larger shift to higher margin, less-cyclical revenues. The percentage of homebuyers served by our partner agents instead of our employees will increase from 37% in 2022 to projected 42% in 2023. We decided to tilt more demand to partners after accounting for costs that aren't directly tied to a sale but that still grow with the number of agents we employ, like the cost of human resources support and training for agents. This decision will not only increase 2023 profits but also limit layoffs and losses in future downturns.

RedfinNow 的關閉是向利潤率更高、週期性更小的收入的更大轉變的一部分。由我們的合作夥伴代理而不是我們的員工服務的購房者的百分比將從 2022 年的 37% 增加到 2023 年的預計 42%。在考慮到與銷售不直接相關但與銷售無關的成本後，我們決定將更多需求傾斜給合作夥伴仍然隨著我們僱用的代理商數量而增長，例如人力資源支持和代理商培訓的成本。這一決定不僅會增加 2023 年的利潤，還會限制未來經濟低迷時期的裁員和虧損。

Real estate services will drive more digital revenues as will Rent, our online marketplace for promoting rental homes. Once a liability, Rent has accelerated its growth in each of the last 4 months and expects to earn an adjusted EBITDA profit in the fourth quarter of 2023.

房地產服務將推動更多的數字收入，Rent 也是如此，我們用於推廣出租房屋的在線市場。 Rent 曾經是一項負債，但在過去 4 個月的每個月都在加速增長，預計將在 2023 年第四季度獲得調整後的 EBITDA 利潤。

Beyond Rent, we launched 2 other digital businesses in the second quarter of 2022, our own mortgage marketplace and ads on redfin.com, both of which are now growing faster than any other Redfin business. The mortgage marketplace offers our visitors a choice of lenders beyond the lender we acquired in April 2022, Bay Equity Home Loans. Bay Equity has a retail sales force to work with homebuyers already engaged with an agent, but doesn't have the call center to handle online inquiries at all hours of the day and night. Over the next 2 years, we expect to launch additional digital businesses, with the goal of running more money from an online visit than any other operator of a major real estate site.

除了 Rent，我們還在 2022 年第二季度推出了另外 2 項數字業務，即我們自己的抵押貸款市場和 redfin.com 上的廣告，這兩項業務現在的增長速度都快於任何其他 Redfin 業務。除了我們在 2022 年 4 月收購的貸方 Bay Equity Home Loans 之外，抵押貸款市場還為我們的訪問者提供了多種貸方選擇。 Bay Equity 擁有一支零售銷售隊伍，可以與已經與代理商接洽的購房者合作，但沒有呼叫中心可以全天候處理在線查詢。在接下來的 2 年裡，我們希望推出更多的數字業務，目標是通過在線訪問賺取比任何其他大型房地產網站運營商更多的收入。

Those are the structural changes we're making to improve Redfin's margins even at a onetime cost to our growth. More of every dollar of revenue should fall to the bottom line, but now we need more dollars, too. This is why we'll spend the rest of this call on growth.

這些是我們為提高 Redfin 的利潤率而進行的結構性變革，即使我們的增長付出了一次性成本。每一美元的收入中應該有更多的投入到利潤中，但現在我們也需要更多的錢。這就是為什麼我們將把本次電話會議的其餘部分用於增長。

The primary way we've grown is by reaching more people through our sites and mobile applications. Comparing the fourth quarters of 2021 and 2022, the average monthly visitors to Redfin's website and mobile applications declined by 2%. But over that same period, searches on Google for homes for sale declined 33%. The difference between these 2 numbers indicates why we likely increased Redfin's share of online real estate traffic.

我們發展的主要方式是通過我們的網站和移動應用程序吸引更多人。比較 2021 年和 2022 年第四季度，Redfin 網站和移動應用程序的平均每月訪問者下降了 2%。但在同一時期，谷歌上的待售房屋搜索量下降了 33%。這兩個數字之間的差異表明了為什麼我們可能會增加 Redfin 在在線房地產流量中的份額。

Comscore, which lets us compare ourselves to other sites, reported a 6% fourth quarter decline for Redfin compared to 22% for realtor.com and 2% for Zillow. According to Comscore, we started keeping pace with Zillow in December, despite a second half budget for TV ads that was 1/4 the size of Zillow's. To improve our long-term competitive position, we know we have to draw visitors away from all our major rivals, not just one, and we believe that we can.

Comscore 讓我們可以將自己與其他網站進行比較，報告稱 Redfin 第四季度下降了 6%，而 realtor.com 下降了 22%，Zillow 下降了 2%。根據 Comscore 的說法，我們在 12 月開始與 Zillow 保持同步，儘管下半年的電視廣告預算是 Zillow 的 1/4。為了提高我們的長期競爭地位，我們知道我們必須吸引所有主要競爭對手的訪客，而不僅僅是一個，我們相信我們可以做到。

For Google searches on a home address in our 10 longest-established markets, Redfin is now most likely to appear as the first result. Across the U.S. for these searches, we're now likely to appear first more than realtor.com, which has nearly doubled our traffic. And we can still grow by expanding the parts of the U.S. our competitors already cover and by improving the machine learning software we use to recommend listings.

對於我們 10 個歷史最悠久的市場中家庭住址的 Google 搜索，Redfin 現在最有可能出現在第一個結果中。在美國，對於這些搜索，我們現在很可能比 realtor.com 更先出現，realtor.com 的流量幾乎翻了一番。我們仍然可以通過擴大我們的競爭對手已經覆蓋的美國部分地區以及通過改進我們用於推薦列表的機器學習軟件來實現增長。

Drawing more visitors to Redfin is the first step in our growth, but we also want a higher proportion of those visitors to hire our agents. Because we look like other real estate sites, consumers often assume we're a marketplace for promoting the agents who paid us the highest fee. In fact, the whole reason we employed our own agents has been to deliver faster service at a lower fee from top producers. Almost no one knows that in 2022, Redfin agents had the highest average sales volume of any major brokerage, beating our closest competitor by almost 20%. Our agents' experience is 1 reason why our service is better.

吸引更多訪問者訪問 Redfin 是我們發展的第一步，但我們也希望這些訪問者中有更高比例的人聘請我們的代理商。因為我們看起來像其他房地產網站，所以消費者通常認為我們是一個宣傳支付最高費用的代理商的市場。事實上，我們聘請自己的代理商的全部原因是為了以較低的費用從頂級生產商那裡提供更快的服務。幾乎沒有人知道，在 2022 年，Redfin 代理商的平均銷售額是所有主要經紀公司中最高的，比我們最接近的競爭對手高出近 20%。我們代理人的經驗是我們服務更好的原因之一。

Now the site is telling that story, a process that started yesterday when we launched a redesigned redfin.com to promote our agents to luxury customers. We now route those customers to the Redfin agents with the most luxury experience. The week before, we launched an ad campaign that explains why, for 7 years straight, we've sold homes for more money than traditional agents because of our top producers but also due to the extra exposure each listing gets on redfin.com.

現在該網站正在講述這個故事，這個過程從昨天開始，當時我們推出了重新設計的 redfin.com 以向奢侈品客戶推廣我們的代理商。我們現在將這些客戶引導至擁有最奢華體驗的 Redfin 代理商。前一周，我們發起了一項廣告活動，解釋了為什麼連續 7 年我們的房屋銷售價格高於傳統代理商，原因是我們的頂級生產商以及每個房源在 redfin.com 上獲得的額外曝光率。

In 2023, we expect to gain share, not just due to more traffic and more customers from that traffic but also by getting more sales from each customer through mortgage and title sales and, over time, repeat and referral transactions. Our goal is to develop the brokerage into a second engine of Redfin's growth above and beyond our online presence.

到 2023 年，我們預計將獲得份額，這不僅是因為更多的流量和來自該流量的更多客戶，還因為通過抵押和產權銷售以及隨著時間的推移，重複和推薦交易從每個客戶那裡獲得更多的銷售。我們的目標是將經紀業務發展成為 Redfin 在線業務之外的第二個增長引擎。

We have more room to grow as a brokerage than as a website. Nearly 20 years since online real estate portals first launched, about 95% of homebuyers search for listings online. Just based on the sales claimed by Zillow and Redfin, it seems likely that only about 5% of home sales originate with people asking the agents on major real estate sites for service. These sites can always squeeze a bit more revenue from traffic games -- from traffic gains, not games, or by claiming a higher share of the commission from each referred sale. But if Redfin gives customers a reason to choose our own agents, building a brand for better service and value, that 5% of sales that start online can 1 day become 50%.

作為一家經紀公司，我們有比網站更大的發展空間。自在線房地產門戶網站首次推出近 20 年以來，約 95% 的購房者在線搜索房源。僅根據 Zillow 和 Redfin 聲稱的銷售額，似乎只有大約 5% 的房屋銷售來自人們向主要房地產網站的代理商尋求服務。這些網站總是可以從流量遊戲中榨取更多的收入——來自流量收益，而不是遊戲，或者通過從每次推薦的銷售中獲得更高的佣金份額。但是，如果 Redfin 讓客戶有理由選擇我們自己的代理商，建立品牌以獲得更好的服務和價值，那麼在線開始的銷售額的 5% 可以在 1 天內變成 50%。

Employing our own agents could increase consumer affinity for our service but can also increase close rates. Our data indicates that the customers who asked us for service in the third quarter were less likely to go through with the purchase, whether with Redfin or with a competing broker. But of the Redfin customers we met in the third quarter of 2022 who ended up buying a home, a projected 35% will have stuck with a Redfin agent for the purchase compared to 26% in the third quarter of 2021. This tells us that even though the market is down, our sales execution is up.

僱用我們自己的代理商可以增加消費者對我們服務的親和力，但也可以提高成交率。我們的數據表明，無論是通過 Redfin 還是通過競爭經紀人，在第三季度要求我們提供服務的客戶不太可能完成購買。但是，在我們於 2022 年第三季度遇到的最終購房的 Redfin 客戶中，預計有 35% 的客戶會堅持使用 Redfin 代理商進行購買，而 2021 年第三季度這一比例為 26%。這告訴我們，即使儘管市場不景氣，但我們的銷售執行力卻在上升。

Beyond better service for customers who come to us via redfin.com, our agents are also generating their own sales. 34% of fourth quarter sales came from repeat and referral customers compared to 32% a year earlier. Even here, a Redfin agent has a massive advantage over traditional agents, having met 100 to 200 customers via redfin.com each year with each customer's contact information and online search activity tracked in our database. Whereas many traditional agents are canvassing every Tom, Dick and Sally for sale, our agents' customer network typically starts with the hundreds of buyers and sellers whom those agents met over the years through Redfin.

除了為通過 redfin.com 來找我們的客戶提供更好的服務外，我們的代理商也產生了自己的銷售額。第四季度 34% 的銷售額來自回頭客和推薦客戶，而去年同期為 32%。即使在這裡，Redfin 代理也比傳統代理有巨大優勢，每年通過 redfin.com 會見 100 到 200 名客戶，我們的數據庫中跟踪每個客戶的聯繫信息和在線搜索活動。儘管許多傳統代理商正在為出售的每一個 Tom、Dick 和 Sally 拉票，但我們代理商的客戶網絡通常始於這些代理商多年來通過 Redfin 結識的數百名買家和賣家。

More than ever, the agents Redfin employs today are capable of driving loyalty sales. One reason for our improved sales execution is an improvement in the quality of our sales force, which ended 2022 30% smaller than it was 9 months earlier. Back in March, 37% of our agents had less than 1 year of Redfin tenure and only 29% had more than 3 years. Today, only 13% have less than a year of tenure, whereas 42% have 3 or more years under their belts.

Redfin 今天僱用的代理商比以往任何時候都更有能力推動忠誠度銷售。我們提高銷售執行力的一個原因是我們銷售人員素質的提高，到 2022 年底比 9 個月前減少了 30%。早在 3 月份，我們 37% 的代理人在 Redfin 的任期不到 1 年，只有 29% 的代理人超過 3 年。如今，只有 13% 的人任期不到一年，而 42% 的人有 3 年或更長時間。

That sales team now includes not just agents but also loan officers. After all, one rationale for serving the customer ourselves is more follow-on mortgage and title sales with all of our services working together to make a customer's move easier and less expensive.

該銷售團隊現在不僅包括代理商，還包括信貸員。畢竟，我們自己為客戶服務的一個基本原理是更多的後續抵押和產權銷售，我們所有的服務共同努力，使客戶的搬遷更容易、成本更低。

As in the third quarter, 17% of our brokerages fourth quarter homebuying customers borrowed money from Bay Equity Home Loan; the pre-acquisition high was 8%. After our January company kickoff got each region's agents and lenders in the same room for the first time, that number surged to a projected 21% for this February.

與第三季度一樣，我們經紀公司第四季度有 17% 的購房客戶從 Bay Equity Home Loan 借錢；收購前的高點是 8%。在我們 1 月份的公司啟動活動首次讓每個地區的代理人和貸方聚集在同一個房間之後，這個數字在今年 2 月份飆升至預計的 21%。

From the fourth quarters of 2021 to 2022, the percentage of eligible brokerage customers who used our title service, Title Forward, also increased from 12% to 44%. Lending and title margins improved in the fourth quarter, a trend likely to continue through 2023. As the lending industry completes its adjustment to lower volume, price competition may ease.

從 2021 年第四季度到 2022 年，使用我們的產權服務 Title Forward 的合格經紀客戶比例也從 12% 增加到 44%。貸款和產權利潤率在第四季度有所改善，這一趨勢可能會持續到 2023 年。隨著貸款行業完成對較低數量的調整，價格競爭可能會緩解。

And as the housing market recovers, our brokerage lending and title businesses will be well positioned for growth. Our Rent business, by contrast, has already benefited from rising apartment vacancies in the second half of 2022 and it's growing revenue now. This is a dazzling turnaround for a business acquired out of bankruptcy in April 2021 whose new CEO didn't start until August of that year.

隨著房地產市場的複蘇，我們的經紀貸款和產權業務將為增長做好準備。相比之下，我們的租賃業務已經受益於 2022 年下半年公寓空置率的上升，現在收入也在增長。對於一家於 2021 年 4 月從破產中收購的企業來說，這是一個令人眼花繚亂的轉機，其新任首席執行官直到當年 8 月才上任。

Net bookings, a measure of the annualized revenue rent added through sales to new customers less the annualized revenue loss from departing customers nearly doubled quarter-to-quarter, from $5 million in the third quarter to $10 million in the fourth quarter. In every quarter of 2021, net bookings have been negative $4 million to $5 million, and we're barely positive in the first half of 2022.

淨預訂量是通過向新客戶銷售而增加的年化收入租金減去離開客戶的年化收入損失後的季度環比增長近一倍，從第三季度的 500 萬美元增加到第四季度的 1000 萬美元。在 2021 年的每個季度，淨預訂量都為負 400 萬至 500 萬美元，而我們在 2022 年上半年勉強為正。

Rent's fourth quarter revenue grew year-over-year for the first time since 2017 by 5%. Compared to the third quarter of 2022, fourth quarter revenue grew 6%. We expect Rent's revenue gains to accelerate on the strength of new products, a January 2022 price increase -- excuse me, a January 2023 price increase and improved sales productivity, which has more than tripled since the summer of 2021. In support of the price increase, redfin.com's integration of Rent's listings has generated more demand for Rent's property management customers. In June, redfin.com added 12% of rental visits above and beyond the visits to Rent's site. In the fourth quarter, this contribution grew to 18%.

Rent 的第四季度收入自 2017 年以來首次同比增長 5%。與 2022 年第三季度相比，第四季度收入增長 6%。我們預計 Rent 的收入增長將在新產品的推動下加速增長，2022 年 1 月的價格上漲——對不起，2023 年 1 月的價格上漲和銷售效率的提高，自 2021 年夏季以來增長了兩倍多。支持價格增加，redfin.com 整合 Rent 的房源，對 Rent 的物業管理客戶產生了更多的需求。 6 月，redfin.com 在 Rent 網站的訪問量之外增加了 12% 的租賃訪問量。在第四季度，這一貢獻增長到 18%。

Rent also launched a $3 million fourth quarter mass media campaign offsetting some of the money we saved from the departure of Rent employees. We felt careful about investing in a second brand, but the appeal of a self-explanatory 4-letter domain was so powerful that we had to give it a shot. We'll carefully evaluate the return on this advertising investment and run the business to generate adjusted EBITDA in the fourth quarter under a variety of market conditions. The success we've had so far is a tribute to the leadership of Rent's CEO, Jon Ziglar and his whole team.

Rent 還在第四季度發起了一項價值 300 萬美元的大眾媒體宣傳活動，以抵消我們因 Rent 員工離職而節省的部分資金。我們對投資第二個品牌持謹慎態度，但不言自明的 4 個字母域名的吸引力如此強大，以至於我們不得不試一試。我們將仔細評估這項廣告投資的回報，並在各種市場條件下經營業務以在第四季度產生調整後的 EBITDA。迄今為止，我們取得的成功要歸功於 Rent 首席執行官 Jon Ziglar 及其整個團隊的領導才能。

Now before turning the call over to Chris, let's discuss the housing market. On March 15, 2022, we were one of the first to state publicly that the market was cresting, and that "It was crazy for demand to be so strong in the midst of war, market volatility and inflation." By May, the market began its first sustained decline since the Great Financial Crisis.

現在，在將電話轉給克里斯之前，讓我們討論一下房地產市場。 2022 年 3 月 15 日，我們是最早公開表示市場正在見頂的公司之一，“在戰爭、市場動盪和通貨膨脹的情況下，需求如此強勁真是太瘋狂了。”到 5 月，市場開始了自大金融危機以來的首次持續下跌。

10 months later, on January 25 of this year, we said that housing in January had been stronger than anyone could have hoped and that the market while "fragile" was "recovering." We caution that the recovery could be "cut short by a rate hike." By the end of that week, the National Association of Realtors reported that a seasonally adjusted index of pending home sales had improved 2.5% in December, a result surprising to many after 6 straight months of declines.

10 個月後，即今年 1 月 25 日，我們說 1 月份的住房市場比任何人都希望的要強勁，市場雖然“脆弱”，但正在“復甦”。我們警告說，復甦可能會“因加息而中斷”。到那個週末，全國房地產經紀人協會報告稱，經季節性因素調整後的待完成房屋銷售指數在 12 月份提高了 2.5%，在連續 6 個月下降之後，這一結果令許多人感到意外。

But in February, the market got another jolt, first from last week's record-low unemployment data and then from this week's report of persistent inflation and strong retail sales. Mortgage rates had fallen from 7.3% in November to 6% in early February, then climbed above 6.7% yesterday on the news. Unsurprisingly, Redfin's February demand is still better than it was in November even after accounting for the season, but worse than it was in January.

但在 2 月，市場再次受到衝擊，首先是上週創紀錄的低失業率數據，然後是本週持續的通貨膨脹和強勁的零售銷售報告。抵押貸款利率從 11 月份的 7.3% 下降到 2 月初的 6%，然後在昨天的新聞發布後攀升至 6.7% 以上。不出所料，Redfin 的 2 月需求即使在考慮了該季節後仍好於 11 月，但比 1 月差。

We still believe that our 2023 budgeting assumption of 4.3 million existing U.S. home sales is reasonable. Rate volatility and buyers' jitteriness about rates, just make that market unusually hard to predict. We're running Redfin out of the cash register in 2023. So if existing home sales seem likely to fall below 4.3 million, we'll reduce our spending.

我們仍然認為，我們 2023 年 430 萬套美國現有房屋銷售的預算假設是合理的。利率波動和買家對利率的不安情緒，只會讓市場異常難以預測。我們將在 2023 年將 Redfin 從收銀機中剔除。因此，如果現有房屋銷售量可能低於 430 萬套，我們將減少支出。

Regardless of what happens to rates in 2023 and beyond, inventory will likely stay low. What's most remarkable about this housing downturn is that the number of homes for sale hasn't meaningfully increased from the calamitous lows of the pandemic. Sure, the number of homes on the market at the end of January 2023 was up 40% since January 2022, but it was still at roughly half the pre-pandemic level it was from 2016 to 2019 during a strong seller's market.

無論 2023 年及以後的利率如何變化，庫存都可能保持在低位。這次房地產市場低迷最引人注目的是，待售房屋的數量並沒有從大流行的災難性低谷中顯著增加。當然，自 2022 年 1 月以來，2023 年 1 月底市場上的房屋數量增加了 40%，但仍約為 2016 年至 2019 年強勁賣方市場大流行前水平的一半。

Our agents report that would-be sellers with 30-year mortgages at a rate below 3% are choosing to keep their homes instead of selling, either to live in or to rent out. This is why from May 2020 to May 2022, home prices increased 40%, but have fallen only 3% since. The millennial generation that mostly came of home-buying age just after home prices and mortgage rates shot up still faces an affordability crisis, with no real relief in sight.

我們的經紀人報告說，擁有 30 年期抵押貸款且利率低於 3% 的潛在賣家選擇保留他們的房屋而不是出售，無論是自住還是出租。這就是為什麼從 2020 年 5 月到 2022 年 5 月，房價上漲了 40%，但此後僅下跌了 3%。在房價和抵押貸款利率飆升之後，大部分進入購房年齡的千禧一代仍然面臨負擔能力危機，看不到真正的緩解。

Because of low inventory, we continue to believe that sales volume will be more volatile than home prices. Regardless of market conditions, Redfin will generate adjusted EBITDA in 2023 and net income in 2024. Once we recover from restructuring our business to be more profitable, our share gains will resume and accelerate. And if we can make money in a housing downturn, we'll be in a good position to make a lot of money when the market recovers.

由於庫存低，我們仍然認為銷量將比房價波動更大。無論市場狀況如何，Redfin 都將在 2023 年產生調整後的 EBITDA 並在 2024 年產生淨收入。一旦我們從業務重組中恢復過來以提高盈利能力，我們的股票收益將恢復並加速。如果我們能在房地產市場低迷時賺錢，那麼當市場復甦時，我們就能大賺一筆。

Now let's hear from Chris on our financial performance and guidance.

現在讓我們聽聽克里斯對我們的財務業績和指導的看法。

Thanks, Glenn. 2022 was a challenging year, but we've taken the right actions to position Redfin for long-term profitable growth. We're entering 2023 with appropriately conservative plans and the knowledge that recovery may be touch and go, but it's comforting to see the start of the year tracking in line to slightly better than our expectations.

謝謝，格倫。 2022 年是充滿挑戰的一年，但我們採取了正確的行動來使 Redfin 實現長期盈利增長。我們以適當保守的計劃進入 2023 年，並且知道復甦可能會一觸即發，但令人欣慰的是，今年年初的走勢略好於我們的預期。

Since announcing our decision to wind down RedfinNow last November, we've moved quickly to reduce inventory. We applied the influx of cash to fully pay down the credit facility that supported home purchases and extinguished more than $140 million of convertible notes. We've also taken action to reduce costs and expand margins, including the elimination of our buy-side refund in December, which should set the business up for long-term margin expansion as we move through the year.

自去年 11 月宣布我們決定關閉 RedfinNow 以來，我們迅速採取行動減少庫存。我們使用大量現金來全額償還支持購房的信貸額度，並銷毀超過 1.4 億美元的可轉換票據。我們還採取了降低成本和擴大利潤率的行動，包括在 12 月份取消了買方退款，這應該會在我們全年為長期利潤率擴張做好準備。

Fourth quarter revenue was $480 million and decreased 25% from a year ago. Real estate services revenue, which includes our brokerage and partner business, generated $146 million in revenue, down 35% year-over-year. Brokerage revenue or revenue from home sales closed by our own agents decreased 34% on a 34% decrease in brokerage transactions.

第四季度收入為 4.8 億美元，同比下降 25%。包括我們的經紀和合作夥伴業務在內的房地產服務收入產生了 1.46 億美元的收入，同比下降 35%。由於經紀交易減少了 34%，經紀收入或我們自己的代理商完成的房屋銷售收入減少了 34%。

Revenue from our partners decreased 45% on a 40% decrease in transactions and mix shift to lower value houses. Real estate services revenue per transaction increased 1% year-over-year. The properties segment, which consists primarily of homes sold through RedfinNow, generated $261 million in revenue, down 31% year-over-year. Revenue for this segment will be de minimis once the wind down is complete. The strong fourth quarter revenue for this segment is indicative of a quick action we've taken to reduce inventory.

來自我們合作夥伴的收入減少了 45%，原因是交易減少了 40%，並且混合轉移到價值較低的房屋。每筆交易的房地產服務收入同比增長 1%。主要由通過 RedfinNow 出售的房屋組成的房地產部門產生了 2.61 億美元的收入，同比下降 31%。一旦結束結束，該部門的收入將微乎其微。該部門第四季度強勁的收入表明我們已採取快速行動來減少庫存。

Our rentals business generated $41 million in revenue, up 5% from a year ago. As Glenn highlighted, this is the first quarter of year-over-year revenue growth for the business since 2017. Our mortgage segment generated $28 million in revenue compared to $4 million in revenue in the prior year. The decrease was due to the acquisition -- increase, sorry, was due to the acquisition of Bay Equity, which occurred last April. This result was slightly below our guidance range of $29 million to $32 million with lower-than-expected volume over the last few weeks of the year impacting locked loans.

我們的租賃業務產生了 4100 萬美元的收入，比一年前增長了 5%。正如 Glenn 強調的那樣，這是自 2017 年以來該業務收入同比增長的第一季度。我們的抵押貸款部門產生了 2800 萬美元的收入，而上一年的收入為 400 萬美元。減少是由於收購——抱歉，增加是由於去年 4 月發生的對 Bay Equity 的收購。這一結果略低於我們 2900 萬至 3200 萬美元的指導範圍，今年最後幾週的交易量低於預期，影響了鎖定貸款。

Finally, our other segment, which includes title and other services, contributed revenue of $6 million, an increase of 89% or $3 million year-over-year. The increase primarily was attributable to a $2 million increase from our title business and a $1 million increase from display ad revenue. As Glenn mentioned, growing high-margin digital revenue is an important priority, and we're just getting started.

最後，我們的其他部門，包括產權和其他服務，貢獻了 600 萬美元的收入，同比增長 89% 或 300 萬美元。增長主要是由於我們的標題業務增加了 200 萬美元，展示廣告收入增加了 100 萬美元。正如 Glenn 所提到的，增加高利潤數字收入是一個重要的優先事項，而我們才剛剛開始。

Total gross profit was $37 million, down 65% year-over-year with total gross margin of 7.8%. Total operating expenses were $156 million, up $23 million year-over-year. Restructuring expenses contributed $22 million and Bay Equity, which we acquired in April, contributed $9 million. Excluding these increases, operating expenses decreased by $8 million year-over-year.

總毛利潤為 3700 萬美元，同比下降 65%，總毛利率為 7.8%。總運營費用為 1.56 億美元，同比增長 2300 萬美元。重組費用貢獻了 2200 萬美元，我們在 4 月份收購的 Bay Equity 貢獻了 900 萬美元。排除這些增加，運營費用同比減少 800 萬美元。

Technology and development expenses increased by $3 million as compared with the same period in 2021. The increase was primarily attributable to a $2 million increase in online services, we're moving more of our technology infrastructure to cloud services. Marketing expenses increased by $2 million as compared with the same period in 2021. The increase was primarily attributable to a $1 million increase from Bay Equity and higher marketing expenses for our rentals business.

與 2021 年同期相比，技術和開發費用增加了 300 萬美元。增加的主要原因是在線服務增加了 200 萬美元，我們正在將更多的技術基礎架構轉移到雲服務。與 2021 年同期相比，營銷費用增加了 200 萬美元。增加的主要原因是 Bay Equity 增加了 100 萬美元，以及我們租賃業務的營銷費用增加。

General and administrative expenses decreased by $4 million as compared to the same period in 2021. Bay Equity added $8 million to these costs. Excluding Bay Equity, general and administrative expenses declined by $12 million, driven by a $7 million decrease in personnel costs.

與 2021 年同期相比，一般和行政費用減少了 400 萬美元。Bay Equity 在這些費用中增加了 800 萬美元。不包括 Bay Equity，一般和行政費用減少了 1200 萬美元，這是由於人事成本減少了 700 萬美元。

Turning to segment level profitability. Real estate services gross margin was 18.0%, down 1,550 basis points year-over-year. This was driven by a 1,170 basis point increase in personnel costs and transaction bonuses. Total net loss for real estate services was $28 million, down from a net income of $19 million in the prior year. The decrease is primarily attributable to lower revenue and gross margins as the housing market slowed, partially offset by a $3 million year-over-year decrease in operating expenses.

轉向細分市場的盈利能力。房地產服務毛利率為 18.0%，同比下降 1,550 個基點。這是由於人員成本和交易獎金增加了 1,170 個基點。房地產服務的總淨虧損為 2800 萬美元，低於去年的淨收入 1900 萬美元。減少的主要原因是隨著房地產市場放緩，收入和毛利率下降，部分被營業費用同比減少 300 萬美元所抵消。

Properties gross margin was negative 7.0%, down from a positive 1.1% in the prior year. Margin compression was driven by an 820 basis point increase in home purchase costs and related capitalized improvements as we sold through homes purchased earlier in the year. Gross profit losses were $18 million towards the better end of our $21 million to $17 million loss guidance range. Total net loss for properties was $26 million.

房地產毛利率為負 7.0%，低於去年的正 1.1%。由於我們通過今年早些時候購買的房屋出售，購房成本增加了 820 個基點，相關的資本化改進推動了利潤率壓縮。毛利潤損失為 1800 萬美元，接近我們 2100 萬至 1700 萬美元損失指導範圍的較高端。財產淨虧損總額為 2600 萬美元。

Rentals gross margin was 76.4%, down 620 basis points year-over-year. Margin compression was driven by a 460 basis point increase in marketing as well as product mix shift. Total net loss for rentals was $22 million, down from a net loss of $14 million in the prior year. The increased loss is primarily attributable to lower gross margins and higher marketing operating expense, including the mass media campaign Glenn mentioned earlier.

租金毛利率為 76.4%，同比下降 620 個基點。利潤率壓縮是由營銷和產品組合轉變增加 460 個基點推動的。租金淨虧損總額為 2200 萬美元，低於上一年的淨虧損 1400 萬美元。虧損增加主要歸因於較低的毛利率和較高的營銷運營費用，包括前面提到的大眾媒體活動 Glenn。

Mortgage gross margin was negative 8.9%, down from a positive 9.7% in the third quarter. Margin compression was driven by price and competition across the mortgage industry as lenders grappled with rising interest rates and excess capacity. Total net loss for mortgage was $12.3 million. Other segment gross margin was 7.4%, an improvement from the negative 17.7% 1 year ago. Total net loss was $1 million compared to a net loss of $2.5 million in the prior year.

抵押貸款毛利率為負 8.9%，低於第三季度的正 9.7%。抵押貸款行業的價格和競爭推動了利潤率壓縮，因為貸款人正在努力應對利率上升和產能過剩的問題。抵押貸款淨虧損總額為 1230 萬美元。其他分部毛利率為 7.4%，較一年前的負 17.7% 有所改善。淨虧損總額為 100 萬美元，而上一年為淨虧損 250 萬美元。

Net loss was $62 million compared to a loss of $27 million in the prior year. While the year-over-year decrease in operational losses was wider, the drop in net income was comparatively smaller due to a $57 million gain on extinguishment of notes as well as $4.5 million higher interest income that benefited the quarter. Diluted loss per share attributable to common stock was $0.57 compared with diluted loss per share attributable to common stock of $0.27 per share 1 year ago.

淨虧損為 6200 萬美元，而上一年為虧損 2700 萬美元。雖然運營虧損的同比降幅更大，但由於票據清償帶來的 5700 萬美元收益以及本季度受益的 450 萬美元利息收入增加，淨收入的降幅相對較小。歸屬於普通股的每股攤薄虧損為 0.57 美元，而一年前歸屬於普通股的每股攤薄虧損為 0.27 美元。

Now turning to our financial expectations for the full year and the first quarter of 2023. We're not providing formal guidance for 2023, but as Glenn and I have both discussed on prior calls and reaffirmed today, we're running the business to generate positive adjusted EBITDA for the fiscal year 2023. We've included a slide on the larger drivers behind this target in our earnings release presentation. Compared to 2022, we've already eliminated our refund to home buyers. This will add $1,000 to the revenue and gross profit of each brokerage transaction.

現在轉向我們對全年和 2023 年第一季度的財務預期。我們沒有提供 2023 年的正式指導，但正如格倫和我在之前的電話會議上討論過並在今天重申的那樣，我們正在開展業務以產生2023 財年調整後的 EBITDA 為正。我們在收益發布演示文稿中加入了一張幻燈片，說明這一目標背後的更大驅動因素。與 2022 年相比，我們已經取消了對購房者的退款。這將使每筆經紀交易的收入和毛利增加 1,000 美元。

We'll get another 500 basis points of gross margin improvement from the staffing changes that we made in 2022. Closing RedfinNow saves $20 million in gross profit losses. Even with adding Bay Equity for a full year, the actions we've already taken will lower full year operating expenses by $25 million. That work is all done, and we expect more than $40 million in adjusted EBITDA improvements from momentum in our rentals and mortgage businesses.

我們將在 2022 年進行的人員變動中將毛利率再提高 500 個基點。關閉 RedfinNow 可以節省 2000 萬美元的毛利損失。即使將 Bay Equity 增加一整年，我們已經採取的行動也將使全年運營費用減少 2500 萬美元。這項工作已經全部完成，我們預計我們的租賃和抵押貸款業務的勢頭將帶來超過 4000 萬美元的調整後 EBITDA 改善。

Turning to our expectations for the first quarter of 2023. We expect consolidated revenue between $307 million and $324 million, representing a year-over-year decline between 49% and 46%. We expect our real estate services segment to account for $122 million to $130 million of that revenue, representing a year-over-year decline between 31% and 27%. Properties revenue is expected to be between $108 million and $113 million as we sell through most of the remaining inventory. Rentals revenue is expected to be between $41 million and $42 million, representing a year-over-year increase between 9% and 12%. Mortgage revenue is expected to be between $29 million and $32 million.

轉向我們對 2023 年第一季度的預期。我們預計綜合收入在 3.07 億美元至 3.24 億美元之間，同比下降 49% 至 46%。我們預計我們的房地產服務部門將佔該收入的 1.22 億美元至 1.3 億美元，同比下降 31% 至 27%。由於我們出售了大部分剩餘存貨，物業收入預計在 1.08 億美元至 1.13 億美元之間。租金收入預計在 4100 萬美元至 4200 萬美元之間，同比增長 9% 至 12%。抵押貸款收入預計在 2900 萬美元至 3200 萬美元之間。

Turning to segment gross profit. We expect real estate services gross margins to be flat to slightly down year-over-year. Headwinds to real estate services gross margins in the first quarter included about 100 basis points from an in-person company kickoff event that we did not have in the prior year due to COVID and will not repeat in 2024. That event also added about $8 million to our first quarter G&A expenses.

轉向分部毛利。我們預計房地產服務毛利率同比持平或略有下降。第一季度房地產服務毛利率的不利因素包括約 100 個基點的公司現場啟動活動，由於 COVID，我們在前一年沒有舉行，並且不會在 2024 年重複。該活動還增加了約 800 萬美元到我們第一季度的 G&A 費用。

Turning to properties. We expect gross profit to be slightly negative to near breakeven for the first quarter. For mortgage, we expect first quarter gross margins to return to positive territory.

轉向屬性。我們預計第一季度的毛利將略微下降至接近盈虧平衡。對於抵押貸款，我們預計第一季度毛利率將恢復正值。

Total net loss is expected to be between $116 million and $105 million. This net loss assumption includes a gain on extinguishment of notes of $7 million, reflecting the repurchase of $19 million in convertible notes already completed in the first quarter. These gains are excluded from adjusted EBITDA guidance. Adjusted EBITDA loss is expected to be between $84 million and $73 million. As a reminder, the first quarter of the year is typically our lowest volume quarter, and even accounting for these losses, we still believe we are on track to generate positive adjusted EBITDA for the full year 2023.

淨虧損總額預計在 1.16 億美元至 1.05 億美元之間。這一淨虧損假設包括 700 萬美元的票據清償收益，反映了第一季度已完成的 1900 萬美元可轉換票據的回購。這些收益不包括在調整後的 EBITDA 指南中。調整後的 EBITDA 損失預計在 8400 萬美元至 7300 萬美元之間。提醒一下，今年第一季度通常是我們銷量最低的季度，即使考慮到這些損失，我們仍然相信我們有望在 2023 年全年產生正的調整後 EBITDA。

On a consolidated basis, this guidance includes approximately $45 million in total company marketing expense, $20 million in stock-based compensation, $17 million of depreciation and amortization and flat net interest expense associated with our convertible senior notes and other credit obligations. In addition, we expect to pay a quarterly dividend of 30,640 shares of common stock to our preferred stockholder.

在合併的基礎上，該指南包括約 4500 萬美元的公司營銷費用總額、2000 萬美元的股票薪酬、1700 萬美元的折舊和攤銷以及與我們的可轉換優先票據和其他信貸義務相關的固定淨利息費用。此外，我們預計將向我們的優先股股東支付 30,640 股普通股的季度股息。

This guidance assumes, among other things, that no additional business acquisitions, convertible note or stock repurchases, investments, restructurings or legal settlements are concluded and that there are no further revisions to stock-based compensation estimates. And now let's take your questions.

本指南假設，除其他事項外，沒有完成額外的業務收購、可轉換票據或股票回購、投資、重組或法律和解，並且沒有對基於股票的薪酬估計進行進一步修訂。現在讓我們回答你的問題。

(Operator Instructions) Our first question comes from Ryan McKeveny with Zelman & Associates.

（操作員說明）我們的第一個問題來自 Zelman & Associates 的 Ryan McKeveny。

Chris, I think you might have hit on this a bit within the guidance commentary. But I just wanted to touch base on it. The brokerage revenue per transaction and kind of squaring that with the gross margin. So I guess, as we think about the moving pieces to the revenue per transaction, I guess it's home prices mix. But then on the other side, you have the buy-side refund coming out, which I guess all else equal would benefit that. So can you maybe just give a little more detail on how those various factors are flowing into the revenue per transaction? And as we look forward, maybe how you would expect that to trend into 2023?

克里斯，我想你可能已經在指導評論中提到了這一點。但我只是想以此為基礎。每筆交易的經紀收入以及與毛利率的平方。所以我想，當我們考慮移動部分到每筆交易的收入時，我想這是房價的組合。但另一方面，你會收到買方退款，我想在其他條件相同的情況下，這將使它受益。那麼，您能否更詳細地說明這些不同的因素是如何流入每筆交易的收入的？當我們展望未來時，也許您會如何期待這種趨勢進入 2023 年？

Sure. So the note that we provided here is that we're expecting about $1,000 revenue per brokerage transaction increase as compared with 2022. That takes into account the factors that you just mentioned where we will be and have eliminated the homebuyer refund. It also takes into account the relative mix of homebuyer and home seller transactions, plus various other market mix things, including the geographies across the U.S. So that's a round figure, obviously, but that's the right perspective on how to think about that combination of things as it relates to revenue per brokerage transaction.

當然。因此，我們在此提供的注意事項是，與 2022 年相比，我們預計每筆經紀交易的收入將增加約 1,000 美元。這考慮了您剛才提到的我們將在哪裡取消購房者退款的因素。它還考慮了購房者和賣房者交易的相對組合，以及其他各種市場組合因素，包括美國各地。顯然，這是一個整數，但這是考慮這些因素組合的正確觀點因為它與每筆經紀交易的收入有關。

Okay. Perfect. That's very helpful. And Glenn, I guess just from a data and kind of market trends perspective, obviously, you always have really good insights. And I guess if we think about the West Coast, California, Seattle, some of the markets where market share-wise, you guys are fairly large. Any updates? I understand the general commentary you provided on January and February, but I guess specific to the West Coast, anything you would call out about what you're seeing within those markets?

好的。完美的。這很有幫助。格倫，我想從數據和某種市場趨勢的角度來看，顯然，你總是有很好的洞察力。我想如果我們考慮一下西海岸、加利福尼亞州、西雅圖以及一些市場份額方面的市場，你們就相當大了。任何更新？我理解您在 1 月和 2 月提供的一般性評論，但我想具體到西海岸，關於您在這些市場中看到的情況，您有什麼要說的嗎？

And I ask because I assume data-wise for the industry, it would certainly seem that the declines in transaction activity was much steeper, especially in the back half of '22, which, given your footprint, I think, was probably an incremental headwind that you guys faced. So yes, any thoughts you can share on kind of current thinking within the West Coast markets? And would you expect some of the industry headwind from the mix to eventually potentially become a tailwind if those markets start to improve?

我問是因為我假設該行業的數據明智，交易活動的下降肯定會更加陡峭，尤其是在 22 世紀的後半段，我認為，考慮到您的足跡，這可能是一個漸進的逆風你們所面對的。所以，是的，您有什麼想法可以分享西海岸市場當前的想法嗎？如果這些市場開始好轉，你是否預計混合中的一些行業逆風最終可能成為順風？

Well, it's a tale of 2 markets. So Seattle is actually doing significantly better. It may be related to the fact that Seattle doesn't have an income tax. So people are still migrating to Washington State. But California continues to be a place where people are leaving. And so we are facilitating their moves to other states. The same is true of Oregon. Our geographic concentration has been an issue that we've worked on, both through the 2 layoffs that we had last year and on a go-forward basis, when we do hire someone, it's going to be in states like Texas, Georgia and Florida.

好吧，這是兩個市場的故事。所以西雅圖實際上做得更好。這可能與西雅圖沒有所得稅有關。所以人們仍在遷移到華盛頓州。但加利福尼亞仍然是人們離開的地方。因此，我們正在協助他們搬到其他州。俄勒岡州也是如此。我們的地理集中度一直是我們努力解決的一個問題，無論是通過我們去年的兩次裁員，還是在未來的基礎上，當我們確實僱用某人時，它將在德克薩斯州、佐治亞州和佛羅里達州等州.

Our next question comes from Tom White with D.A. Davidson.

我們的下一個問題來自 Tom White 和 D.A.戴維森。

Glenn, your commentary about sort of leaning more into your partner network and brokerages, would you characterize that as sort of like a temporary shift as you guys kind of trying down the hatches and move towards profitability? Or is it more of a kind of permanent change in your thinking? And if it's temporary, just curious whether you guys are kind of taking any added steps to make sure that these partners are providing the service levels that you want or -- and I don't know maybe there's anything you could do to get them to offer Redfin like pricing and how you think about the trade-off between this partner experience for the customers and kind of the Redfin brand?

格倫，你關於更多地傾向於你的合作夥伴網絡和經紀業務的評論，你會把這描述為一種暫時的轉變，因為你們正在嘗試孵化並走向盈利嗎？或者它更像是一種永久性的思維改變？如果是暫時的，我很好奇你們是否採取了任何額外的步驟來確保這些合作夥伴提供您想要的服務水平，或者 - 我不知道你們是否可以做任何事情讓他們提供類似 Redfin 的定價，以及您如何看待這種合作夥伴為客戶提供的體驗與 Redfin 品牌之間的權衡？

Great question. So it is a durable but modest shift. So going through this near-death experience of trading at $3 or $4 a share made us examine every cost associated with employing agents and comparing that to the gross profits we get from partner agents. And we do think that over time, modestly shifting demand to partner agents will lead to more gross profit and overall profit.

很好的問題。因此，這是一個持久但適度的轉變。因此，通過這種以每股 3 美元或 4 美元的價格交易的瀕死體驗，我們檢查了與僱用代理人相關的每一項成本，並將其與我們從合作代理人那裡獲得的毛利潤進行比較。我們確實認為，隨著時間的推移，將需求適度轉移到合作代理將帶來更多的毛利和整體利潤。

But having said that, Ryan Sudeck is a new executive at Redfin. He's been at the company a long time previously in business development. He's running our partner network. And we are different than most of the lead generation sites. We don't sell leads to real estate agents and are indifferent financially to the outcome.

不過話說回來，Ryan Sudeck 是 Redfin 的新任高管。此前，他一直在公司從事業務開發工作。他負責管理我們的合作夥伴網絡。我們與大多數潛在客戶生成網站不同。我們不向房地產經紀人出售潛在客戶，並且在經濟上對結果漠不關心。

We depend on those agents to close sales. So calling the herd, making sure the partner agents deliver fantastic service is not only important to the mission of the company, but it's very financially important to us. One headwind on taking share in 2023 is just that partners have lower close rates than our employees, and that is so significant that it's hard sometimes for us to give a customer to a partner even though the partner will generate more gross profit. So even though we are responding to that financial reality. Really, it's a customer service challenge to make sure that the partner is delivering service that we're proud of.

我們依靠這些代理商來完成銷售。因此，召集眾人，確保合作夥伴提供出色的服務不僅對公司的使命很重要，而且對我們來說在財務上也非常重要。在 2023 年取得份額的一個不利因素就是合作夥伴的成交率低於我們的員工，這一點非常重要，以至於我們有時很難將客戶提供給合作夥伴，即使合作夥伴會產生更多的毛利潤。因此，即使我們正在應對這一財務現實。確實，確保合作夥伴提供我們引以為豪的服務是一項客戶服務挑戰。

So we're going to be extending more demand to the best partners asking the worst partners to leave our site and also building technology to make the handoff between the customer and the partner more seamless. It will never be as good as it is with our employees because the employees are augmented by a network of contractors to offer on-demand service 24/7, but it can get better with technology and through better curation of the agents.

因此，我們將向最好的合作夥伴提出更多需求，要求最差的合作夥伴離開我們的網站，並構建技術以使客戶與合作夥伴之間的切換更加無縫。它永遠不會像我們的員工那樣好，因為員工通過承包商網絡得到增強，可以提供 24/7 全天候按需服務，但是通過技術和更好的代理管理，它可以變得更好。

Great. That's helpful. A quick follow-up. Is there a way for you guys to participate in ancillary kind of the revenue streams on those partner transactions? I mean can you guys attach some sort of condition to the lead to the partner agent that they've got to promote maybe your mortgage or title product?

偉大的。這很有幫助。快速跟進。你們有沒有辦法參與這些合作夥伴交易的輔助收入流？我的意思是，你們能否將某種條件附加到合作代理人的潛在客戶上，他們必須推銷您的抵押或產權產品？

Well, we have to be careful about that because we don't want to break the law, but we can certainly encourage our partners to recommend Bay Equity because it offers the best service at an incredible rate. We can also take some of the real estate agents who have been served by Bay Equity, traditional agents at RE/MAX or Keller Williams or some other brokerage and bring them into our partner program so that their partners not only with our mortgage business, but with our website, and that will naturally drive attach rate.

嗯，我們必須小心，因為我們不想違法，但我們當然可以鼓勵我們的合作夥伴推薦 Bay Equity，因為它以令人難以置信的速度提供最好的服務。我們還可以將一些曾在 Bay Equity、RE/MAX 或 Keller Williams 或其他經紀公司服務過的房地產經紀人納入我們的合作夥伴計劃，以便他們的合作夥伴不僅與我們的抵押貸款業務相關，而且使用我們的網站，這自然會提高附加率。

We've certainly seen that other websites don't employ agents, so really trying to drive attach rate even when those agents don't work for them. And we're obviously limited by the margin we want to make on the mortgage, but we think we can do better there. Our first priority is going to be doing really well with the employees, but our second is driving it through the partners. It's a great strategic front.

我們當然已經看到其他網站不僱用代理人，因此即使這些代理人不為他們工作，也要真正嘗試提高附加率。我們顯然受到我們想在抵押貸款上賺取的利潤的限制，但我們認為我們可以在那裡做得更好。我們的首要任務是與員工相處得很好，但我們的第二個任務是通過合作夥伴來推動它。這是一個偉大的戰略戰線。

Our next question comes from Ygal Arounian with Citigroup.

我們的下一個問題來自花旗集團的 Ygal Arounian。

I want to expand on that last point for a little bit more because it feels like a pretty big shift in your view and philosophy. And Glenn, I think in the past, what you've said is that even if it's at a lower gross margin percentage to do it yourself within your brokerage, the overall gross profit dollars are better and higher. And it sounds like you're at least changing your view on that, so maybe as you kind of dug into at $3 -- when your stock is at $3, you dug in all this. What changed in your view here? And what did you uncover that made you kind of push in this direction a little bit more?

我想進一步擴展最後一點，因為這感覺像是您的觀點和理念的重大轉變。格倫，我認為在過去，你所說的是，即使在你的經紀業務中自己做的毛利率較低，整體毛利潤也會越來越高。聽起來你至少正在改變你對此的看法，所以也許當你以 3 美元的價格買入時——當你的股票價格為 3 美元時，你就買入了所有這些。您的看法在這裡發生了什麼變化？你發現了什麼讓你朝著這個方向努力了一點？

Well, first of all, I don't want to be defensive at all, Ygal, but we haven't shifted -- sorry, there's an echo on the phone, but we haven't shifted our view that we're trying to maximize gross profit dollars. If we were trying to maximize gross margin, we would be just a pure website, but we're running the business to generate as many dollars of profit as we possibly can. And what changed was just the accounting of every possible expense.

好吧，首先，我根本不想防守，Ygal，但我們沒有改變——抱歉，電話裡有迴聲，但我們沒有改變我們正在努力的觀點最大化毛利美元。如果我們試圖最大化毛利率，我們將只是一個純粹的網站，但我們經營業務是為了盡可能多地產生利潤。改變的只是每一項可能的費用的核算。

So last year, we just asked ourselves, is it more expensive to employ agents than we realize? Are there costs that even though they're not cost of revenue, are still cost of employing agents. And when we added those costs, it modestly shifted the balance between partners and employees. Sometimes we put our thumb on the scale in favor of the employees because when we build a customer relationship with someone, we get follow-on sales through repeat and referral transactions but also higher mortgage and title attach rates. And at this point, because we're running for the roses in 2023 to make sure we generate adjusted EBITDA profit, we just had to have the discipline to say the transaction that will generate the most gross profit, whether it's through the partner or the employee that will rule the day.

所以去年，我們問自己，僱傭代理人的成本是否比我們意識到的要高？是否有成本，即使它們不是收入成本，仍然是僱用代理人的成本。當我們添加這些成本時，它適度地改變了合作夥伴和員工之間的平衡。有時我們會把拇指放在有利於員工的天平上，因為當我們與某人建立客戶關係時，我們會通過重複和推薦交易獲得後續銷售，但也會獲得更高的抵押貸款和產權附加率。在這一點上，因為我們正在為 2023 年的玫瑰而奔跑，以確保我們產生調整後的 EBITDA 利潤，我們只需要有紀律地說出將產生最大毛利潤的交易，無論是通過合作夥伴還是通過將統治一天的員工。

And so it's only a 5-point shift. We still believe in this hybrid model. If we try to serve everybody through employees, we'd go crazy hiring up and laying people off. We could never keep people busy through the winter, and we could never serve customers well through the summer. And conversely, if we referred all the demand on our website to partners, we could never build a brand for service. And so the only way we could grow is really by driving more online traffic and conversion, and there's just a limit to that, too. So we believe in the combo more than ever, but we're going to adjust the balance between these 2 businesses. Every time we see close rates go up with partners or we see costs go up with employees or vice versa.

所以這只是一個 5 點的轉變。我們仍然相信這種混合模式。如果我們試圖通過員工為每個人服務，我們就會瘋狂地招聘和裁員。我們永遠無法讓人們忙碌過冬天，也永遠無法為客戶提供良好的服務度過整個夏天。相反，如果我們將我們網站上的所有需求都交給合作夥伴，我們將永遠無法建立服務品牌。因此，我們實現增長的唯一途徑就是推動更多的在線流量和轉化，而這也是有限度的。所以我們比以往任何時候都更相信這個組合，但我們將調整這兩項業務之間的平衡。每次我們看到合作夥伴的收盤價上升，或者我們看到員工的成本上升，反之亦然。

Got it. Yes. And I certainly wasn't trying to imply that you weren't trying to maximize gross profit dollars. I understood that, but it feels like some of the dynamics, yes, which you explained here. So -- and then -- so my follow-up question is on this -- the digital margin -- high-margin digital revenue feels pretty new also. And maybe you could just expand on, I don't know how much it's contributing, what the long-term opportunities are, where else you can go with it. Whatever else you could share understanding that it's early days.

知道了。是的。我當然不是在暗示你不是在試圖最大化毛利潤美元。我明白這一點，但感覺就像是一些動態，是的，你在這裡解釋過。所以 - 然後 - 所以我的後續問題是關於這個 - 數字利潤 - 高利潤數字收入也感覺很新。也許你可以擴展，我不知道它有多大貢獻，長期機會是什麼，你還能去哪裡。無論您還可以分享什麼，都知道現在還處於早期階段。

Sure. Well, I just think our website has been under monetized and the contribution may seem small when you look at the revenue, especially compared to a near 0 margin business or a negative margin business like our properties business, but the contribution to direct profits, that is high-octane fuel for our business just because it runs at such an insane margin. So display ads in the mortgage marketplace were what we launched in the second quarter, that's under great leadership at Redfin.

當然。好吧，我只是認為我們的網站貨幣化不足，當您查看收入時，貢獻似乎很小，特別是與接近 0 利潤率的業務或像我們的房地產業務這樣的負利潤率業務相比，但對直接利潤的貢獻，對我們的業務來說是高辛烷值燃料，只是因為它的利潤率如此之高。因此，在抵押貸款市場上展示廣告是我們在第二季度推出的，這是在 Redfin 的大力領導下進行的。

We also believe that there's all sorts of other constituents who want access to consumers. So for example, the builders want to create a better consumer experience on redfin.com. Right now, we show all the homes that are currently for sale, but we don't show homes that haven't been finished. We don't show floor plans and other things that the builders want to market to those consumers. So giving the builders an opportunity to reach that audience is something that will make money for us, but it will also improve the consumer experience. And there's just so much money in motion when people move and such a small fraction of people who decide to use Redfin agents that we really think it's a big opportunity. So it will take us time to build that. But in some ways, Redfin has been getting smaller and it may feel like we're diminished by that, but in some ways, we're getting bigger.

我們還相信，還有其他各種想要接觸消費者的選民。因此，例如，建設者希望在 redfin.com 上創造更好的消費者體驗。現在，我們展示所有當前待售的房屋，但不展示尚未完工的房屋。我們不會展示建築商想要向這些消費者推銷的平面圖和其他東西。因此，讓建築商有機會接觸到這些觀眾，這將為我們賺錢，但也會改善消費者體驗。當人們搬家時，會有很多錢在流動，而決定使用 Redfin 代理的人很少，我們真的認為這是一個巨大的機會。所以我們需要時間來構建它。但在某些方面，Redfin 一直在變小，我們可能會覺得自己因此而被削弱，但在某些方面，我們正在變大。

And where we're getting smaller is in really capital-intensive low-margin businesses and where we're getting bigger is in really high-margin businesses that can monetize an already very large audience. Chris, do you have anything you want to add to that?

我們變小的地方是真正的資本密集型低利潤業務，而我們變大的地方是真正高利潤的業務，這些業務可以從已經非常龐大的受眾中獲利。克里斯，你有什麼要補充的嗎？

No, just from the financial reporting standpoint, you'll see that reflected in our other segment that it primarily includes these kinds of businesses plus our title business. So we're talking about a few million dollars here for the fourth quarter, but as we both indicated, super encouraged with what we've seen so far here.

不，僅從財務報告的角度來看，您會看到它反映在我們的其他部門中，它主要包括這些類型的業務以及我們的產權業務。所以我們在這裡談論的是第四季度的幾百萬美元，但正如我們都表示的那樣，我們對到目前為止在這裡看到的情況感到非常鼓舞。

Your next question comes from John Campbell with Stephens.

你的下一個問題來自 John Campbell 和 Stephens。

On the EBITDA inflection goal for this year, I appreciate you guys providing that bridge in the investor deck. That's super helpful. It's actually a question I had kind of queued up for you guys who beat me to the punch, but it seems like a bulk of those kind of profit drivers you've outlined are basically a given -- it sounds like you've already actioned most of that, obviously. Could you maybe talk to what you're foreseeing as the variable or kind of macro influence components? I'm thinking the $40 million of business momentum and then maybe to an extent the 500 bps of real estate gross margin expansion?

關於今年的 EBITDA 拐點目標，我感謝你們在投資者平台上提供的橋樑。這非常有幫助。這實際上是一個我已經排好隊等待你們先發製人的問題，但似乎你們概述的大部分利潤驅動因素基本上都是給定的——聽起來你們已經採取了行動顯然，其中大部分。您能否談談您所預見的變量或宏觀影響因素的種類？我在想 4000 萬美元的業務勢頭，然後可能在某種程度上 500 個基點的房地產毛利率擴張？

Sure. So you're right, most of these programs, most of these changes are already underway. Just using the example, the 500 basis point improvement in real estate services gross margin. That's because we believe we've stopped the business to be consistent with the kind of demand that we'll see during the course of the year. If we see more demand than that or less demand than that, we may need to adjust our staffing levels, but we believe that we're set up to be a good match with the kinds of volumes that we're going to expect through the course of the year.

當然。所以你是對的，這些計劃中的大多數，這些變化中的大多數已經在進行中。僅舉個例子，房地產服務毛利率提高了 500 個基點。那是因為我們相信我們已經停止了業務以滿足我們將在這一年中看到的那種需求。如果我們看到需求多於或少於該需求，我們可能需要調整我們的人員配置水平，但我們相信我們的設置能夠很好地匹配我們將通過年的課程。

It's really the same thing on the additional adjusted EBITDA from the rentals business and the mortgage business. But I think just the 1 extra comment that I'd provide here is that while many of these actions have already been taken, we also will continue to pay attention to the demand side of things. If it turns out that demand is different from what we've expected, we know that we can make changes elsewhere in the business to get back to that goal.

租賃業務和抵押貸款業務的額外調整後 EBITDA 確實是一樣的。但我想我在這裡提供的 1 條額外評論是，雖然已經採取了許多這些行動，但我們也將繼續關注事物的需求方面。如果事實證明需求與我們的預期不同，我們知道我們可以在業務的其他地方進行更改以回到該目標。

Okay. That's helpful. And then on the loyalty or the repeat sales, I feel like that's a metric that often gets overlooked. The average homeowner duration, I think, has grown to 13 years. And then you guys obviously wind back the clock that far. You guys were doing a fraction of the transactions back then versus what you're doing now. So to get, I think, Glenn, you said the 38% mix of transactions being loyalty sales, I've got to think that the vast majority of past customers are using you guys again. So I mean, the [back of mathematics] tell me that's pretty big deals. Am I thinking about that right?

好的。這很有幫助。然後是忠誠度或重複銷售，我覺得這是一個經常被忽視的指標。我認為，房主的平均持續時間已經增長到 13 年。然後你們顯然把時間倒流了那麼遠。與你們現在所做的相比，你們當時所做的交易只是一小部分。所以，我想，格倫，你說 38% 的交易組合是忠誠度銷售，我必須認為絕大多數過去的客戶再次使用你們。所以我的意思是，[數學的背後]告訴我這是非常重要的事情。我想的對嗎？

Well, first of all, it's 34, not 38, but we'll aspire to 38, John. Some of this is repeat business, where we are capturing a really high percentage for a long time. We made the claim. I don't think we comfort anymore that if you look at how likely a customer is to stick with the brokerage, we were #1 and some of that is because the brokerage just stands for something. It's not just that we happen to have the same agent there with a person relationship, it's a 1% fee in on-demand service and great technology through the whole transaction.

好吧，首先，它是 34 歲，而不是 38 歲，但我們渴望 38 歲，約翰。其中一些是重複業務，我們在很長一段時間內都佔據了非常高的比例。我們提出了索賠。我認為我們不再感到安慰，如果你看看客戶堅持經紀業務的可能性有多大，我們是第一名，其中一些是因為經紀業務代表某種東西。這不僅僅是因為我們碰巧有同一個代理人，而且在整個交易過程中，按需服務和偉大的技術收取 1% 的費用。

But some of this is just referral. At some level, the goal of the website is to light the log, but not to be the log itself. We wanted to put map-based search online so that we could tell the world there's a better way to buy and sell houses. But if we only grow in line with traffic, that means the rest of the world doesn't believe that. And if you look at where Zillow, Redfin and infer where realtor is, you are at about 5% of all sales originating from portals and yet 95% of people are using those websites. So clearly, we've done well to put listings online, but technology hasn't made the rest of the experience obviously better for consumers, and that's where we want to break through. So that's why long term, we want to see half of our sales come from repeat and referral sales so that our growth is untethered from the website or compounded by the websites growth.

但其中一些只是推薦。在某種程度上，網站的目標是點亮日誌，而不是日誌本身。我們想將基於地圖的搜索放在網上，這樣我們就可以告訴全世界有更好的買賣房屋的方式。但如果我們只根據流量增長，那就意味著世界其他地方不會相信這一點。如果你查看 Zillow、Redfin 的位置並推斷出房地產經紀人的位置，你會發現大約 5% 的銷售額來自門戶網站，但 95% 的人正在使用這些網站。很明顯，我們在將列表放在網上方面做得很好，但技術並沒有明顯改善消費者的其餘體驗，而這正是我們想要突破的地方。所以這就是為什麼從長遠來看，我們希望看到我們一半的銷售額來自重複和推薦銷售，這樣我們的增長就不受網站的束縛，或者因網站的增長而復合。

By the way, has John asked questions before? I love the housing stuff, John. It's really good.

順便問一下，約翰以前問過問題嗎？我喜歡住房的東西，約翰。真的很棒。

And our next question comes from Michael Ng with Goldman Sachs.

我們的下一個問題來自高盛的 Michael Ng。

My first one is just on the trajectory of OpEx for the rest of the year. And also, if you could just give a little bit more color around your marketing plans. I was a little bit surprised to see the $45 million outlook because I thought in the year ago period, there were some timing as it relates -- related to like mass marketing campaigns that made 1Q kind of unusually high, but would just love to hear a little bit more about those plans for this year.

我的第一個只是在今年餘下時間的 OpEx 軌跡上。而且，如果你能給你的營銷計劃多一點色彩。看到 4500 萬美元的前景讓我有點驚訝，因為我認為在一年前，有一些時間相關——與大眾營銷活動有關，這些活動使第一季度異常高，但我很想听聽更多關於今年的計劃。

Sure. So on the operating expense front, maybe just let me start with marketing there. We do expect to continue to run a mass media campaign that will go mostly in the first quarter and second quarters of the year. And so there'll be extra weight on operating expenses in the first half related to that. We just found that those campaigns are much more successful as we're speaking with customers leading into the main part of the home buying and selling season than they are in the second half of the year. And so that's why we've put the weight in that direction.

當然。所以在運營費用方面，也許讓我從那裡的營銷開始。我們確實希望繼續開展大眾媒體宣傳活動，主要在今年第一季度和第二季度進行。因此，與此相關的上半年運營費用將會增加。我們剛剛發現這些活動比下半年更成功，因為我們正在與進入房屋買賣季節主要部分的客戶交談。這就是為什麼我們把重點放在那個方向上。

I also mentioned in terms of our G&A expenses. We had a little bit of extra G&A expense in the first quarter of this year, about $8 million associated with our in-person company kickoff event. But that's an example of something that will fall off as the year goes on. But it's probably those 2 dynamics that are most important in terms of the trajectory of operating expenses during the course of the year that once we get into the second half, things should be pretty much level quarter-to-quarter because we will have gotten past those big marketing expenses and some of the unusual first quarter things.

我還提到了我們的 G&A 費用。今年第一季度，我們有一些額外的 G&A 費用，大約 800 萬美元與我們的公司現場啟動活動相關。但這是隨著時間的推移會下降的一個例子。但就年內運營支出的軌跡而言，這可能是這兩個最重要的動態，一旦我們進入下半年，季度環比應該基本持平，因為我們已經過去了那些大的營銷費用和一些不尋常的第一季度事情。

Michael, can I just speak to the higher level thinking around our allocation of capital? We sucked it up and cut costs on software for our real estate agents because that work is principally done. But the goose that lays the golden egg investing in the listing search capability to drive more traffic and then in media to build our brand. That's the one place where we really suffered because we want to keep the top line moving. And so we definitely have heard that other companies are leaning in and spending more. We're trying to have the best of both worlds where we spend more in the areas that will really drive growth and we spend less everywhere else.

邁克爾，我能否就我們的資本分配談談更高層次的思考？我們接受了它並為我們的房地產經紀人削減了軟件成本，因為這項工作主要已經完成。但是下金蛋的鵝投資於列表搜索功能以吸引更多流量，然後投資於媒體以建立我們的品牌。那是我們真正受苦的地方，因為我們想保持收入的增長。因此，我們肯定聽說過其他公司正在投入更多資金。我們正努力做到兩全其美，即我們在真正推動增長的領域投入更多，而在其他地方投入更少。

(Operator Instructions) Our next question comes from Jay McCanless with Wedbush.

（操作員說明）我們的下一個問題來自 Jay McCanless 和 Wedbush。

The first one I had and what you're talking about with building out the call center for the mortgage operation, that's typically higher cost -- ongoing cost type of operation, I guess, could you talk about the development of that with the goal also of being EBITDA positive by year-end?

我擁有的第一個以及你所說的為抵押貸款業務建立呼叫中心，這通常是成本較高的——持續成本類型的業務，我想，你能談談這個目標的發展嗎年底前 EBITDA 為正？

Sure. Well, I think I misspoke because in the call in the prepared remarks, I was trying to say that we don't have a call center and instead, we're going to refer people who come straight from our website, typically looking to refinance a loan to a lender that does have a call center. So rather than building out our own call center for Bay Equity Home Loans, we're going to build a digital mortgage marketplace. In fact, we've already built that to refer those consumers to other lenders.

當然。好吧，我想我說錯了，因為在電話中，在準備好的評論中，我試圖說我們沒有呼叫中心，相反，我們將轉介直接來自我們網站的人，他們通常希望再融資向擁有呼叫中心的貸方提供的貸款。因此，與其建立我們自己的 Bay Equity Home Loans 呼叫中心，不如建立一個數字抵押貸款市場。事實上，我們已經建立了它來將這些消費者推薦給其他貸方。

I was just explaining the rationale. There are some customers who want to serve directly. Mostly those are people working with our real estate agents who are well qualified, who want a local lender employed by Bay Equity. And then there's these other folks on our website, who at 1 in the morning, say, I want to quote and it's better to send them to a lender like Rocket, but we're not going to build a call center in 2023 for lending.

我只是在解釋理由。有些客戶想直接服務。這些人大多是與我們合格的房地產經紀人一起工作的人，他們希望 Bay Equity 僱用當地的貸方。然後還有我們網站上的其他人，他們在凌晨 1 點說，我想報價，最好將它們發送給像 Rocket 這樣的貸方，但我們不會在 2023 年建立一個呼叫中心來提供貸款.

Good. The second question I had, the EBITDA loss that you guys are projecting was about double what I think consensus and we were looking for -- is that going to be more gross margin or cost of goods sold weighted this quarter because of selling through the remainder of the homes and properties or just a little heavier OpEx, what you're talking about earlier with the in-person event and the higher marketing spend? How should we balance that out?

好的。我的第二個問題是，你們預測的 EBITDA 損失大約是我認為的共識和我們正在尋找的兩倍 - 是因為通過剩餘部分銷售，本季度加權的毛利率或銷售商品成本會更高的房屋和財產，或者只是稍微重一點的運營支出，你之前談到的面對面活動和更高的營銷支出是什麼？我們應該如何平衡呢？

Yes. We do expect to have some gross profit losses associated with selling through the remaining inventory. But I think mostly what you're seeing and the information we were trying to provide was just to give you a little bit of a shape of the year in terms of operating expenses and where we expect to see gross margin improvement during the course of the year. And so I think that's the best way to think through it.

是的。我們確實預計會有一些與通過剩餘庫存銷售相關的毛利損失。但我認為，您所看到的和我們試圖提供的信息主要是為了讓您大致了解一下今年的運營支出情況，以及我們預計毛利率在哪些方面會有所改善年。所以我認為這是思考它的最佳方式。

Maybe just one other comment, which is from our standpoint, this is pretty typical in terms of the way the year plays out, which is we incur the highest expenses as we're advertising to bring customers into the market for the year and have the lowest closes in the first quarter. And then that pays off as we get into the heart of the buying and selling season.

也許只是另一個評論，從我們的角度來看，就這一年的表現而言，這是非常典型的，我們承擔了最高的費用，因為我們正在做廣告以吸引客戶進入這一年的市場並獲得第一季度最低收盤價。然後，當我們進入買賣季節的核心時，這就會得到回報。

And just one other, if I could sneak it in. Maybe any quantification of business trends. I believe you said it was down in February versus January. Any quantification or additional color you could give on what type of declines you're seeing?

還有一個，如果我能偷偷地講的話。也許是任何商業趨勢的量化。我相信你說過 2 月份與 1 月份相比有所下降。您可以對所看到的下降類型給出任何量化或附加顏色嗎？

Well, I think it's fair to say that we were down 30-plus percent year-on-year in November in terms of people asking to tour homes coming forward to write offers. And then in January, that year-over-year drop narrowed to high teens, low 20s. And in February, it's solidly in the 20s. So it's not calamitous. And actually, if you look at booked offers, where you're just focusing on how many people wrote an offer and got it accepted, that year-over-year drop has just narrowed steadily from November to now, but that's usually a byproduct of rate increases. So the people who made an offer in the last couple of weeks who locked the loan 3 or 4 weeks ago, there's no way they're not going to go through with it because they got access to a 6% loan when rates pop back up to 6.75%. I think tours is a better leading indicator.

好吧，我認為可以公平地說，我們在 11 月份要求參觀房屋並提出要約的人數同比下降了 30% 以上。然後在 1 月，同比下降幅度縮小到十幾歲，二十多歲。而在 2 月，它穩定在 20 多歲。所以這不是災難性的。實際上，如果你查看預訂的報價，你只關注有多少人寫了報價並被接受，那麼從 11 月到現在，同比降幅剛剛穩步收窄，但這通常是率增加。因此，那些在過去幾週提出要約並在 3 或 4 週前鎖定貸款的人，他們不可能不接受貸款，因為當利率回升時，他們可以獲得 6% 的貸款到 6.75%。我認為旅遊是一個更好的領先指標。

And so going from the 30s down to the high teens into the low 20s year-over-year drop is what we're seeing. And I wouldn't be worried that it's a drop just generally because those pandemic highs were unsustainable. What we're really looking to do is get better than we were in November.

因此，從 30 多歲下降到十幾歲，再到 20 多歲的低位，同比下降就是我們所看到的。而且我不會擔心這只是普遍下降，因為那些大流行病的高點是不可持續的。我們真正希望做的是比 11 月份更好。

Our next question comes from John Colantuoni with Jefferies.

我們的下一個問題來自 Jefferies 的 John Colantuoni。

This is Chris Suchecki on for John. Can you just walk us through some incremental detail on how the Bay Equity integration has kind of progressed throughout the quarter? And then another one on kind of mortgage attach rates. I'm just kind of curious what drove the acceleration between the end of the quarter and what you were seeing in February and kind of any leverage you think you have to drive that higher into '23.

我是 John 的 Chris Suchecki。您能否向我們詳細介紹一下 Bay Equity 整合在整個季度中的進展情況？然後是另一個關於抵押貸款附加利率的問題。我只是有點好奇是什麼推動了本季度末和您在 2 月份看到的情況之間的加速，以及您認為必須將其推高到 23 年的任何槓桿。

Why don't I start, and Chris, if you have anything to add, you should finish. I think part of it is that it just takes time to build relationships between loan officers and real estate agents. And one of the signal events for doing that was the sales kickoff, which added $8 million to our Q1 expense. By getting the lenders and the agents in 1 room and just making sure everybody understands that when we work together, we can deliver more value to the customer and a better customer experience was probably what drove this uptick in attach rate.

為什麼我不開始，克里斯，如果你有什麼要補充的，你應該結束。我認為部分原因是在信貸員和房地產經紀人之間建立關係需要時間。這樣做的信號事件之一是銷售啟動，這使我們第一季度的費用增加了 800 萬美元。通過讓貸款人和代理人在一個房間裡，並確保每個人都明白，當我們一起工作時，我們可以為客戶提供更多價值，而更好的客戶體驗可能是推動依戀率上升的原因。

There's also been some online marketing where when we sign someone up for a home tour off our website. The website says, do you need to figure out what you can afford? We can connect you with the lender. We've been surprised at how many people said, sure. We thought that there wouldn't be much uptake on that. Bay Equity really wanted it. And I said, fine, we'll give it to them. It's not going to do much. It has. It's only been a few days since it went nationwide but in the pilot at the end of Q4 and the first weeks of January, it was really good.

還有一些在線營銷，當我們在我們的網站上為某人報名參加家庭旅遊時。該網站說，你需要弄清楚你能負擔得起什麼嗎？我們可以將您與貸方聯繫起來。我們很驚訝有多少人說，當然。我們認為對此不會有太多的接受。 Bay Equity 真的很想要它。我說，好吧，我們會把它給他們。它不會做太多。它有。它在全國范圍內推廣才幾天，但在第 4 季度末和 1 月的前幾週進行的試點中，效果非常好。

So we've been really encouraged about it. I think also they just really are delivering great service. We've gotten our agents to use Title Forward at a point when it wasn't delivering great service, and that just comes back in your face. But in this case, it's compounding in a positive direction because an agent sends 1 customer over there, the customer has a great experience and then we do more. What we're really proud of is that 21% for February, that's not in a pilot market, that's not in one place. It's everywhere that Bay Equity operates. And so we think it's a sustainable durable result. Chris, do you have anything to add?

所以我們對此感到非常鼓舞。我也認為他們真的提供了很棒的服務。我們已經讓我們的代理人在 Title Forward 不能提供優質服務的時候使用它，而這又回到了你的臉上。但在這種情況下，它正朝著積極的方向複合，因為代理將 1 個客戶送到那裡，客戶有很好的體驗，然後我們會做更多。我們真正引以為豪的是 2 月份的 21%，這不是在試點市場，也不是在一個地方。 Bay Equity 的業務無處不在。所以我們認為這是一個可持續的持久結果。克里斯，你有什麼要補充的嗎？

I don't. You hit the main points.

我不。你擊中了要點。

And there are no further questions at this time. So I'll now turn the call back over to Meg Nunnally for closing remarks.

目前沒有其他問題。所以我現在將電話轉回給 Meg Nunnally 以作結束語。

Thanks, everyone, for joining the call today. We can go ahead and wrap up now.

謝謝大家今天加入電話會議。我們可以繼續了，現在就結束吧。

Thank you. This concludes today's conference. All parties may disconnect. Have a great day.

謝謝。今天的會議到此結束。各方可能會斷開連接。祝你有美好的一天。