Frontline PLC (FRO) 2026 Q1 法說會逐字稿

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  • Operator

    Operator

  • Good day, and thank you for standing by. Welcome to the Q1 2026 Frontline PLC earnings conference call. (Operator Instructions) Please be advised that today's conference is being recorded.

    各位好,感謝您耐心等候。歡迎參加 Frontline PLC 2026 年第一季財報電話會議。(接線員指示) 請注意,今天的會議將被錄音。

  • I would now like to hand the conference over to your speaker today, Mr. Lars Barstad, CEO. Please go ahead.

    現在我想把會議交給今天的主講人——執行長 Lars Barstad 先生。請開始。

  • Lars Barstad - Chief Executive Officer of Frontline Management AS

    Lars Barstad - Chief Executive Officer of Frontline Management AS

  • Thank you. Dear all, thank you for dialing into Frontline's quarterly earnings call. Unprecedented times springs to mind as we report in Q1 '26, well into the first half of the year. I've been in this industry for more than 20 years, and I did not imagine us in a situation for this duration where the Strait of Hormuz has been effectively closed. With the opaque and volatile political narrative these days, the Frontline team focused on the real cash-generating business to be done, not speculating too far into the future.

    謝謝。各位好,感謝撥冗參加 Frontline 的季度財報電話會議。在我們於 2026 年第一季('26)進行報告、且已進入上半年之際,「前所未有的時期」這句話浮現在腦海。我在這個產業超過 20 年,從未想過我們會在如此長的期間內面臨荷姆茲海峽實質上被封鎖的情況。在當前政治敘事不透明且波動劇烈之下,Frontline 團隊專注於真正能創造現金的業務,而不是對未來做過度的投機性推測。

  • We have put the most profitable quarter since 2004 behind us and are well into a potentially even more rewarding one. I'll get back to how we analyze the situation later in the call.

    我們剛結束自 2004 年以來最賺錢的一個季度,並且正深入進入一個可能更具回報的季度。我稍後會在電話會議中回到我們如何分析當前情勢。

  • And before I give the word to Inger, I'll run through our TCE numbers on slide 3 in the deck. In the first quarter of 2026, Frontline achieved $103,500 per day on our VLCC fleet, $72,400 per day on our Suezmax fleet and $50,700 per day on our LR2/Aframax fleet. So far in the second quarter of 2026, 82% of our VLCC days are booked at $181,700. 79% of our Suezmax days are booked at $131,300 per day and 68% of our LR2/Aframax days are booked at $125,000 per day, six digits across the board. All numbers in this table are on a load to discharge basis with implications of ballast days at the end of the quarter.

    在把時間交給 Inger 之前,我先帶各位看簡報第 3 頁的 TCE 數據。2026 年第一季,Frontline 的 VLCC 船隊達成每日 103,500 美元,Suezmax 船隊每日 72,400 美元,LR2/Aframax 船隊每日 50,700 美元。截至目前的 2026 年第二季,我們的 VLCC 營運日有 82% 已以 181,700 美元訂妥;Suezmax 營運日有 79% 已以每日 131,300 美元訂妥;LR2/Aframax 營運日有 68% 已以每日 125,000 美元訂妥,全面都是六位數。此表中所有數字皆以「裝貨至卸貨」為基礎計算,並包含季度末壓艙航行日(ballast days)的影響。

  • I'll now let you, Inger, take you through the financial highlights.

    接下來我把時間交給你,Inger,請你帶大家看財務重點。

  • Inger Klemp - Chief Financial Officer of Frontline Management AS

    Inger Klemp - Chief Financial Officer of Frontline Management AS

  • Yes. Thanks, Lars, and good morning and good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. We can then turn to slide 4 and look at the profit statement highlights. We report profit of $559 million or $2.51 per share and adjusted profit of $344.9 million or $1.55 per share in the first quarter of 2026. The adjusted profit in the first quarter increased by $114.5 million compared with the previous quarter, and that was primarily due to an increase in our time charter earnings of $112 million from $424.5 million in the previous quarter to $536.5 million in this quarter.

    好的。謝謝你,Lars,各位女士、先生,早安與午安。我們請翻到第 4 頁,看看損益表重點。我們在 2026 年第一季報告淨利 5.59 億美元(每股 2.51 美元),以及調整後淨利 3.449 億美元(每股 1.55 美元)。第一季的調整後淨利較上一季增加 1.145 億美元,主要原因是我們的定期租船(time charter)收入增加 1.12 億美元,從上一季的 4.245 億美元提升至本季的 5.365 億美元。

  • Ship operating expenses increased by $5.9 million from previous quarter, and that was mainly due to a decrease in supplier rebates of $5.4 million in the quarter. Administrative expenses, excluding the synthetic option revaluation loss of $5.8 million in the first quarter and gain of $0.5 million in the fourth quarter of '25 increased by $8.5 million from the previous quarter, and that was primarily due to synthetic option exercises in the first quarter of 2026. Then the adjusted interest expense decreased by $9.8 million from previous quarter, and that was due to lower debt and decrease in interest rates and margins. Also, depreciation decreased by $6.2 million from previous quarter due to sales of VLCCs in the period. Lastly, income tax expense decreased by $0.6 million from the previous quarter.

    船舶營運費用較上一季增加 590 萬美元,主要是因為本季供應商回饋(rebates)減少 540 萬美元。管理費用方面,若排除第一季 580 萬美元的合成選擇權重估損失,以及 2025 年第四季 50 萬美元的重估收益,則管理費用較上一季增加 850 萬美元,主要是因為 2026 年第一季進行合成選擇權行使所致。接著,調整後利息費用較上一季減少 980 萬美元,原因是負債降低,以及利率與利差下降。此外,折舊較上一季減少 620 萬美元,係因期間內出售 VLCC 所致。最後,所得稅費用較上一季減少 60 萬美元。

  • Let's then look at the balance sheet on slide 5. Frontline has a solid balance sheet and strong liquidity of $945 million in cash and cash equivalents, including undrawn amounts of revolver capacity of $473 million, marketable securities and minimum cash requirements as per the March 31, 2026. We have no meaningful debt maturities until 2030. Remaining newbuilding commitments at the end of the first quarter was $925 million, which relates to the acquisition of the nine newbuildings from affiliates of Hemen. The company has secured newbuilding financing of up to $737 million as set out in the press release.

    接著我們看第 5 頁的資產負債表。截至 2026 年 3 月 31 日,Frontline 擁有穩健的資產負債表與強勁的流動性:現金及約當現金合計 9.45 億美元,其中包含循環信貸(revolver)額度中尚未動用的 4.73 億美元,以及有價證券與最低現金要求。我們在 2030 年之前沒有任何具實質規模的到期債務。第一季末尚餘的新造船承諾為 9.25 億美元,與向 Hemen 關聯方收購 9 艘新造船有關。公司已取得最高 7.37 億美元的新造船融資,如新聞稿所述。

  • Let's then look at slide 6, fleet composition, cash breakeven [base and off]. Our fleet consists of 33 VLCCs, 21 Suezmax tankers, and 18 LR2 tankers has an average age of 7.5 years and consists of 100% eco vessels, whereof 64% are scrubber fitted. We estimate average cash breakeven rates for the next 12 months of approximately $24,300 per day for VLCCs, $24,300 per day for Suezmax tankers, and $23,600 per day for the LR2 tankers. That gives a fleet average estimate of about $24,100 per day. This number includes dry dock costs for six VLCCs, three Suezmax tankers, and eight LR2 tankers.

    接著看第 6 頁:船隊組成、現金損益兩平[base and off]。我們的船隊由 33 艘 VLCC、21 艘 Suezmax 油輪與 18 艘 LR2 油輪組成,平均船齡 7.5 年,100% 為節能船(eco vessels),其中 64% 配備洗滌器(scrubber)。我們估計未來 12 個月的平均現金損益兩平運價約為:VLCC 每日 24,300 美元、Suezmax 油輪每日 24,300 美元,以及 LR2 油輪每日 23,600 美元。因此船隊平均估計約為每日 24,100 美元。此數字包含 6 艘 VLCC、3 艘 Suezmax 油輪與 8 艘 LR2 油輪的進塢(dry dock)成本。

  • The fleet average estimate, excluding dry dock costs is about $23,000 per day or $1,100 per day less. We recorded OpEx included dry dock in the fourth -- sorry, in the first quarter of $11,300 per day for VLCCs, $9,100 per day for Suezmax tankers and $10,900 per day for LR2 tankers. This includes dry dock of four VLCCs and three LR2 tankers. And the Q1 '26 fleet average OpEx, excluding dry dock, was $8,100 per day.

    若排除進塢成本,船隊平均估計約為每日 23,000 美元,亦即少 1,100 美元/日。我們在第一季(抱歉,剛才說第四季)記錄的營運費用(OpEx,含進塢)為:VLCC 每日 11,300 美元、Suezmax 油輪每日 9,100 美元,以及 LR2 油輪每日 10,900 美元。其中包含 4 艘 VLCC 與 3 艘 LR2 油輪的進塢。而 2026 年第一季船隊平均 OpEx(不含進塢)為每日 8,100 美元。

  • Then let's look at slide 7 and cash generation. Following that we have been entering into one-year time charter agreements, and we have a fleet renewal in the first quarter and also in the second quarter, spot days for the next 12 months is about 23,700 days. Frontline has substantial cash generation potential with 27,900 earnings days annually. As you can see from this slide, the cash generation potential basis current fleet TCE rates and TCE as of May 22, 2026, is $1.5 billion or approximately $7 per share. That provides a cash flow yield of 18% basis the current share price.

    接著看第 7 頁的現金創造。由於我們已開始簽訂一年期的定期租船合約,且我們在第一季與第二季進行船隊汰舊換新,未來 12 個月的現貨(spot)營運日約為 23,700 天。Frontline 每年有 27,900 個收益日,具備可觀的現金創造潛力。如本頁所示,以目前船隊 TCE 運價以及截至 2026 年 5 月 22 日的 TCE 計算,現金創造潛力為 15 億美元,約每股 7 美元。以目前股價為基礎,這相當於 18% 的現金流殖利率。

  • If we look at a 30% increase from current spot market, that will increase the cash generation potential to about $2.1 billion or $9.51 per share. And equal 30% decrease from current spot markets will decrease the cash generation potential to about $1 billion or $4.41 per share.

    若以目前現貨市場再上升 30% 來看,現金創造潛力將提高至約 21 億美元,或每股 9.51 美元。而若目前現貨市場下跌 30%,現金創造潛力將降至約 10 億美元,或每股 4.41 美元。

  • With this, I leave the word to Lars again.

    基於此,我把發言權再交回給 Lars。

  • Lars Barstad - Chief Executive Officer of Frontline Management AS

    Lars Barstad - Chief Executive Officer of Frontline Management AS

  • Thank you, Inger. Let's move to slide 8 and look at some of the market highlights that we're going to go through in this deck. But first of all, I'd like to remind the audience that we've had tightening fundamentals in the tanker market ever since around this time last year, prior to the Middle East conflict. We reached an unprecedented situation after February 28 with the Strait of Hormuz effectively closed. The chart on the top hand right side kind of indicates this.

    謝謝你,Inger。我們來看第 8 頁,看看這份簡報中我們將要帶過的一些市場重點。但首先,我想提醒各位,自從大約去年這個時候、也就是中東衝突之前,油輪市場的基本面就一直在收緊。在 2 月 28 日之後,我們面臨前所未有的情況:荷姆茲海峽實質上被封鎖。右上方的圖表大致反映了這一點。

  • Here, you see the year-on-year weekly changes in flows, whereas the Middle East Gulf drops dramatically starting in week 12. The US Iran on/off peace talks and the tightening potentially easing of Iran-related sanctions together with uncertainty on Russia -- Russian oil assets creates a lot of volatility.

    在這裡,你看到的是每週的年對年流量變化;而中東波斯灣自第 12 週起大幅下滑。美伊時而重啟、時而中止的和平談判,以及伊朗相關制裁可能收緊或放鬆,再加上對俄羅斯——俄羅斯石油資產的不確定性,造成了很大的波動。

  • The market are starting to focus on the potential long-term implications coming from the current situation in the Middle East and more so if we can imagine the situation getting solved. We're going to see restocking of inventories, increased strategic storage, especially amongst the Asian importers. And we're also going to see higher focus on diversification of oil supply now that we've seen how vulnerable you can be being dependent on purely Middle East supply. We also see that order books continue to grow as we stretch into 2030 delivery windows now. Asset prices continue to appreciate as freight market outlook remains firm, and we see a fairly high activity on longer-term time charter market or contracts.

    市場開始關注當前中東局勢可能帶來的長期影響,尤其是如果我們設想局勢得以解決的情境。我們將看到庫存回補、戰略儲備增加,特別是在亞洲進口國之間。同時,鑑於我們已看到過度依賴純粹中東供應的脆弱性,未來也會更重視原油供應來源的多元化。我們也看到新船訂單(order book)持續成長,交付期甚至已延伸到 2030 年的交船窗口。在運價市場展望仍然穩健的情況下,資產價格持續上漲;而長期期租市場或合約的活動也相當熱絡。

  • Just want to give you a small little kind of hint on the bottom left-hand side chart. We're basically not only using the TD3C index, which is the Middle East Gulf Loading index to China. We're also using the TD15 index outside of the Middle East Gulf, West Africa to China. Although it looks quite bleak only kind of rewarding us with $100,000 per day, this is 4 times our cash breakeven levels. So it's still very good money.

    我想就左下角的圖表給大家一個小提示。我們基本上不只使用 TD3C 指數,也就是中東波斯灣裝港到中國的指數。我們也使用 TD15 指數,也就是中東波斯灣以外、西非到中國的航線。雖然看起來相當黯淡,似乎只回報我們每天 10 萬美元,但這其實是我們現金損益兩平水準的 4 倍。所以仍然是非常可觀的收入。

  • Although we wish we could have made $400,000 per day every day, this is very much a theoretical exercise as the market is right now.

    雖然我們希望每天都能賺到 40 萬美元,但以目前的市場狀況而言,這更多只是理論上的推演。

  • Further, if we move to slide 9, I'm going to take you through two fairly complicated slides, but I think needed for this session as we are in the situation we are. So we try to -- first of all, Strait of Hormuz closure is very much a VLCC event. This is a big kind of ride for the VLCCs. This is where the most volume is listed on VLCC, transporting oil both to the East and to the West. We've seen kind of prior to the closure that the daily tied up VLCCs in this market has been on average 491 vessels.

    接著,如果我們翻到第 9 頁,我會帶大家看兩張相當複雜的投影片,但在我們目前所處的情境下,我認為這對本次會議是必要的。我們先嘗試——首先,荷姆茲海峽封鎖基本上是一個 VLCC(超大型原油輪)事件。這對 VLCC 來說是一段很大的「旅程」。因為最大宗的運量是由 VLCC 承載,將原油運往東方與西方。在封鎖之前,我們看到這個市場中每日被綁住(tied up)的 VLCC 平均約為 491 艘。

  • This consists of laden, dry dock, vessels that are doing cargo ops or other stuff. We have, at any point in time, have had stopped balusters, East of Suez, and we've always had vessels waiting to load in the Red Sea.

    這包括滿載航行(laden)、進乾塢(dry dock)、正在進行裝卸作業或其他作業的船舶。在任何時間點,我們都會看到在蘇伊士以東停航並處於壓艙狀態(stopped balusters)的船舶,而且也一直有船在紅海等待裝貨。

  • Basically, when the Strait closed, we had a massive loss of 130 ships that were so-called laden, dry docking or doing cargos. This is the dark blue kind of baseline in the chart in the middle here. Then we had an increase of 21 vessels waiting loading in the Red Sea, and this is like daily tied up tonnage, so it shouldn't really be looked at as an absolute number.

    基本上,當海峽關閉時,我們所謂的滿載、進乾塢或正在執行貨運作業的船舶,出現了 130 艘的巨大損失。這就是中間這張圖表裡深藍色的基準線。接著,在紅海等待裝貨的船舶增加了 21 艘;而這是「每日被綁住的運力」概念,因此不應被視為絕對數字。

  • Then suddenly, we had 41 VLCCs laden loaded with oil waiting inside the Middle East Gulf. And then you had 55 VLCC equivalents stopped and in ballast East of Suez. This brought us back to 480 VLCCs after the Hormuz closed, basically only a reduction of 11 VLCC equivalents in this extremely severe situation for the VLCC segment in special.

    然後突然之間,有 41 艘 VLCC 滿載原油、在中東波斯灣內等待。同時,還有 55 艘以 VLCC 等值計的船舶在蘇伊士以東停航並處於壓艙狀態。在荷姆茲關閉後,這使我們回到 480 艘 VLCC——也就是在這種對 VLCC 尤其嚴峻的情況下,實際上只減少了 11 艘 VLCC 等值。

  • If we move to slide 10 and look at how the flows developed post closure, we were at 17.7 million barrels per day from various suppliers inside the Middle East Gulf. We lost 5.9 million barrels per day from Saudi, 3.2 million from Iraq, almost 2 million from UAE, and on it goes. 1.4 million from Kuwait and almost 1 million barrels from Qatar. Well, as we proceeded, UAE were able to increase the throughput in the pipeline ending up in Fujairah of almost 1 million barrels per day. Saudi Arabia started to utilize the Yanbu pipeline going from Middle East Gulf out to the Red Sea, increasing by 3.5 million barrels per day.

    如果我們翻到第 10 頁,看看封鎖後的流向如何發展,原本中東波斯灣內各供應方合計為每日 1,770 萬桶。我們失去了沙烏地阿拉伯每日 590 萬桶、伊拉克 320 萬桶、阿聯酋將近 200 萬桶,等等;科威特 140 萬桶,以及卡達將近 100 萬桶。不過隨著情勢推進,阿聯酋得以提高通往富查伊拉(Fujairah)的管線輸送量,增加接近每日 100 萬桶。沙烏地阿拉伯開始利用延布(Yanbu)管線,從中東波斯灣通往紅海,增加了每日 350 萬桶。

  • And then the rest of the world has gradually towards where we are now, increased output by 3.3 million barrels per day. This is basically meaning a net loss of only 6.2 million barrels per day.

    此外,世界其他地區也逐步提高產量,直到我們目前的水準,合計增加了每日 330 萬桶。這基本上意味著淨減少量只有每日 620 萬桶。

  • What's related when I look at, and we might jump at it straight away, if we move to slide 11, is that even with this effective closure of Hormuz, we have had so large changes in trading patterns that we're actually back to oil kind of traveling over distances, oil on water pre the Hormuz closure. The long-haul trade has kind of outgrown the loss of the relatively short-haul trade from the Middle East Gulf to Far East. We've also seen export capacity that we actually didn't know existed or at least we didn't really focus on it, adding to this volume. We've seen Asia increase their sourcing from virtually all available regions, all of them further far, fueling this ton mile and this high utilization.

    我在觀察時覺得相關、而且我們可以立刻切入的一點是:如果我們翻到第 11 頁,即使荷姆茲實質封鎖,我們的貿易型態變化之大,使得原油實際上又回到在海上運輸的距離——也就是「海上原油量」(oil on water)回到荷姆茲封鎖前的水準。長航程貿易的成長,已經超過了中東波斯灣到遠東這種相對短航程貿易的流失。我們也看到一些我們先前並不知道存在、或至少沒有特別關注的出口能力,為這個運量增添了貢獻。我們看到亞洲幾乎從所有可用地區增加採購,而這些地區距離都更遠,推升了噸海里(ton mile)與高利用率。

  • Despite the volume shortfall then, adjusted for distances, shipping demand is surprisingly robust. Crude on water is recovering fast. And this is important to note. When you look at a real-time picture, you will not record this until after the fact. It takes 30 to 45 days from a barrel is contracted to be freighted before the oil is actually loaded on a ship. This means that it's only in the last three, four weeks, we've seen this materially happen using the data or using the kind of oil on water data.

    因此,儘管運量有所缺口,但在距離調整後,航運需求仍出乎意料地強勁。海上原油量正在快速回升。這點很重要。當你看即時畫面時,你不會在事發當下就記錄到這些變化。從一桶原油簽約要運輸,到實際裝船,通常需要 30 到 45 天。這表示,只有在最近三到四週,我們才透過數據、也就是透過「海上原油量」數據,看到這些變化明顯發生。

  • I have to say though, and we might actually flip back to slide 9 because this is important. On this chart, you'll see kind of in the middle on the top right-hand side there, the number plus 55. These are vessels that are contracted or majorly contracted to players that are not necessarily having the same economical rationale then we as a shipowner would have. These are vessels who do the baseline of oil transportation from the Middle East Gulf to Asia. They're contracted to industrial players like refiners and oil majors.

    不過我必須說,而且我們可能要翻回第 9 頁,因為這很重要。在這張圖上,你會在右上方中間位置看到「+55」這個數字。這些船舶是簽約、或主要簽約給一些參與者,而他們的經濟邏輯未必與我們作為船東相同。這些船舶承擔了從中東波斯灣到亞洲的基礎原油運輸。它們是與煉油商、石油巨頭等產業參與者簽約。

  • And for these guys to not have vessels available should the Strait open can be an extremely costly affair. These ships are contracted on modest rates. You're talking 5-year deals, 6-year or 7- or 10-year deals between $35,000 and $45,000 per day, meaning that, that's the option premium they pay in order to be able to lift first oil as it comes.

    而對這些業者而言,若海峽一旦開放卻沒有可用船舶,將會是極其昂貴的代價。這些船舶是以相對溫和的租金簽約。你談的是5年、6年、7年或10年的合約,每天3.5萬到4.5萬美元,這表示那就是他們為了能在第一批原油一出來就能優先提貨所支付的選擇權溢價。

  • And for them, this is logistics. It's not necessarily profit, different from Frontline. And of course, hadn't we had this kind of idle fleet, I think the supply and demand picture would have looked a bit different on tankers, especially VLCC. But that's the case, and that's the way it is. And right now, we're reaping the benefits of the fact that a relatively large portion of the fleet is unutilized waiting for something to happen in the Middle East.

    對他們來說,這是物流安排。不一定是利潤,這點與Frontline不同。當然,如果我們沒有這種閒置船隊,我認為油輪市場的供需樣貌會有些不同,尤其是VLCC。但現況就是如此,也只能如此。而現在,我們正受益於相對大比例的船隊處於未被利用狀態、在等待中東發生某些事情這一事實。

  • Let's jump forward again and get into slide number 12. So I mentioned that the order books continue to grow. We're starting to get into kind of territory where you have kind of percentage numbers that start with the three, but still we have this aging of the fleet that is ongoing. If you look at the table on the top left-hand side, the vessels that are currently 15 years or younger, they are going to be 20 years within five years, and that amounts to 45.5% of the current fleet. If you put that in the back of your heads and you look at the order book, which for the asset classes we deploy is around 23.2%, then it doesn't look too alarming.

    我們再往前跳,進入第12頁投影片。我提到過,訂單簿仍在持續成長。我們開始進入一種區間:百分比數字的開頭變成3,但船隊老化仍在持續。如果你看左上角的表格,目前船齡15年或以下的船舶,在五年內就會變成20年船齡,這相當於現有船隊的45.5%。把這點放在心裡,再看訂單簿——就我們所部署的資產類別而言約為23.2%——那看起來就不算太令人擔憂。

  • The period that the current order book is delivering over is the next three to four years, where kind of the bulk of the vessels for especially VLCC and Suezmax are actually coming in 2028.

    目前訂單簿的交付期落在未來三到四年,其中尤其是VLCC與Suezmax的大部分新船實際上會在2028年交付。

  • So with this in mind, I'm not saying that the order book is nonexistent, but I'm saying that the order book is manageable. Also, I think it's important to note when we look at these charts that the likely outcome or the likely kind of points on the list if there is a peace solution between US and Iran is going to include sanctions on Iranian oil. This means that the current part of the fleet that is now servicing the Iranian crude is going to be obsolete. And that amounts to 15% to 17% of the overall VLCC fleet, which overnight are going to become useless.

    因此在這個前提下,我不是說訂單簿不存在,而是說訂單簿是可控的。另外,我認為在看這些圖表時也很重要的一點是:如果美國與伊朗之間出現和平解決方案,清單上很可能會包含對伊朗原油的制裁。這意味著目前正在運輸伊朗原油的那部分船隊將會變得過時。而這相當於整體VLCC船隊的15%到17%,將在一夜之間變得毫無用處。

  • We can move to slide 13 and dig a little bit further into this argument. So we have very strong spot and period markets in addition to the fundamental backdrop, which I just pointed on, and this keeps ordering activity high despite the current opaque situation in the Middle East. Tanker ordering is accelerating for 2029, and we are starting to see slots move into the 2030 window, increasing the runway. We're talking about 3 years, 3.5 years until a new hull can be added to this order book. With the absence of recycling, but the continuous aging of the fleet, the net compliant fleet growth is still manageable where we are now.

    我們可以到第13頁投影片,進一步深挖這個論點。除了我剛指出的基本面背景之外,我們也看到非常強勁的即期與期租市場,這使得即便中東局勢目前仍不明朗,下單造船活動仍維持高檔。油輪訂單正加速排到2029年,我們也開始看到船廠船台檔期延伸到2030年,拉長了可見的跑道。也就是說,從現在到新增一艘新船船體納入訂單簿,大約要3年到3.5年。在缺乏拆船回收、但船隊持續老化的情況下,目前合規船隊的淨增長仍屬可控。

  • And mind you, again, we do not see vessels over 20 years being deployed in any markets despite extremely constructive rates.

    而且請注意,即便運價極具建設性,我們仍未看到船齡超過20年的船舶在任何市場被投入營運。

  • As I mentioned, the likely end game of Middle East conflict implies reversal of Iran sanctions, adding to the demand for compliant tonnage and potentially triggering the very kind of sought-after wave of recycling. One kind of larger fundamental piece in this picture is that the number of shipyards is still materially lower than what we saw in the 2010, 2011 peak, but the consolidation and more recently, efficiency gains put the CGE capacity closer to highs. I'm almost saying this that basically to explain how even though the building capacity and the capacity to basically have new tonnage into the market to service future oil transportation demand seems limited, we are actually in a place where we are going to be able to maintain a fleet that can service the oil markets for many years to come. The top right-hand side chart shows us basically how the kind of overall net fleet development is looking right now, and it's not alarming by any means.

    如我所提,中東衝突可能的最終結局意味著伊朗制裁的逆轉,這將增加對合規運力的需求,並可能觸發市場一直期待的那波拆船回收潮。在這幅圖景中另一個更大的基本面因素是:船廠數量仍顯著低於2010、2011年高峰時期,但產業整併以及近年的效率提升,使得CGE產能更接近歷史高位。我幾乎是想用這點來解釋:即便造船能力、以及將新運力投放市場以滿足未來原油運輸需求的能力看似有限,我們其實正處於一個能在未來多年維持足以服務油品市場之船隊規模的位置。右上角的圖表基本上顯示目前整體船隊淨增長的樣貌,無論如何都不令人擔憂。

  • Then let's move into slide 14. I think I'll just start so that you can look at the bottom-hand slide -- the bottom chart, because we've used that for quite a few quarters now. And mind you, the orange thing at the end there. I mentioned that we, Frontline, has not had a quarter like this since 2004. Look at where we are now year-to-date in 2026.

    接著我們進入第14頁投影片。我想我先從下方那張圖開始,因為我們已經用了好幾個季度。請注意最末端那個橘色部分。我提到過,我們Frontline自2004年以來就沒有出現過這樣的一個季度。看看我們在2026年截至目前的年初至今表現。

  • It's quite extraordinary. Yes, there is a certain portion of this index that is colored by the fact that we have some of the trades that cannot be performed, but are being printed at extremely high levels, but still, we are in unprecedented times.

    這相當非凡。是的,這個指數中有一部分受到某些交易無法實際執行、但卻以極高水準被報價/印出所影響;但即便如此,我們仍處於前所未有的時期。

  • Fundamentally, tight market conditions, and they were present prior to the Middle East disruptions. The disruption in trade lanes has yielded inefficiencies and new trades and longer trade lanes have been developing. And we believe this can be a bit sticky basically due to the energy security part of this. We have continuous muted growth in the compliant tanker fleet, and that remains -- that is still at the core of the case of owning tanker stocks. Asset prices continue to move and both spot and period markets support investment decisions as we move forward here.

    從基本面來看,市場供給緊俏,而這在中東干擾之前就已存在。航線受干擾帶來效率損失,也催生了新的貿易與更長的航線。我們認為,基於能源安全這一部分因素,這種變化可能會具有一定黏著性。合規油輪船隊的增長持續溫和,而這仍然——仍是持有油輪類股票投資論點的核心。資產價格持續上行,即期與期租市場都支持我們接下來的投資決策。

  • The current political environment changes the game. And I repeat myself, we are focused -- we will see a higher focus on energy supply security going forward. Frontline is in center stage with our VLCC heavy efficient business model as hopefully positive outcomes nears.

    當前的政治環境改變了遊戲規則。我再重申一次,我們聚焦——未來將更重視能源供應安全。Frontline以我們VLCC占比高且效率優異的商業模式站在舞台中央,並期待正面結果逐步接近。

  • Thank you very much for the attention, and then I'll open up for questions.

    非常感謝各位的聆聽,接下來我開放提問。

  • Operator

    Operator

  • (Operator Instructions) Sherif Elmaghrabi, BTIG.

    (接線員指示) Sherif Elmaghrabi,BTIG。

  • Sherif Elmaghrabi - Analyst

    Sherif Elmaghrabi - Analyst

  • First, starting with the fixture count. When I look at VLCC fixtures, I see activity out of the US Gulf West Africa declining slightly from April to May, even though rates have remained very strong. So I'm curious if you're seeing the same thing and if you have an idea of what's going on with the fixture activity.

    首先,從成交/租船(fixture)數量談起。我看VLCC的fixtures時,看到美國墨西哥灣—西非的活動從4月到5月略有下降,儘管運價仍然非常強勁。所以我想知道你們是否也看到同樣情況,以及你是否知道這些fixture活動背後發生了什麼。

  • Lars Barstad - Chief Executive Officer of Frontline Management AS

    Lars Barstad - Chief Executive Officer of Frontline Management AS

  • Well, it's kind of this market has kind of moved into very much a stealth mode. So it's, of course, not everything that is seen. But I think kind of from a utilization perspective, if you are an oil trader, you'll always utilize your own fleet first. And this means that those are fixtures that will not be reported in the market, although the volume might remain the same.

    嗯,這個市場某種程度上已經進入非常「隱身」的模式。所以當然,不是所有事情都能被看見。但我認為從使用率的角度來看,如果你是原油交易商,你永遠會先使用自有船隊。這意味著那些成交/租船不會在市場上被回報,儘管運量可能維持不變。

  • Secondly, we've seen that kind of the fixing happening out of the US Gulf has been extremely kind of mini cyclical. It starts with kind of the short-term barrels being fixed on Aframaxes, which we've seen kind of recently. Then suddenly, it tricks into Suezmaxes bringing the oil to Europe until suddenly, you see dates being kind of confirmed for oil moving into the Far East, which brings the VLCC kind of into the game. And then suddenly, the VLCC fade, the Suezmax fade and we're back on the Aframaxes again, and then it just repeats itself.

    其次,我們看到從美國墨西哥灣出來的那種租船成交(fixing)呈現非常明顯的「小型循環」特徵。它通常從短期貨量先用Aframax成交開始,這點我們最近也看到了。接著突然就會延伸到Suezmax,把原油運到歐洲;直到你突然看到往遠東移動的日期開始被確認,VLCC就被帶進場。然後又突然VLCC淡出、Suezmax淡出,我們又回到Aframax,接著就這樣重複。

  • So it seems like the US Gulf fixtures on the VLCC side happens on a kind of a monthly cycle, and it only happens within a week, 1.5 weeks in that month. So I think it's quite difficult to read from fixtures, first of all, because it's very difficult to see all of them. And secondly, because you have this kind of a little bit untypical pattern. You don't have like kind of a continuous flow of VLCCs being fixed or a continuous flow of Suezmaxes or continuous flow of Aframaxes.

    所以看起來,美國墨西哥灣在VLCC端的租船成交是以某種「每月」的週期發生,而且在那個月裡只會集中在一週到一週半內發生。因此我認為,首先要從成交去解讀市場其實很困難,因為很難把所有成交都看得到。其次,因為你會看到這種有點不典型的模式。你不會看到VLCC持續不斷地成交,或Suezmax持續不斷地成交,或Aframax持續不斷地成交。

  • It basically depends a little bit on the prices of crude and how the arbs are kind of opening or closing. And of course, with extreme volatile narrative. Virtually every Friday, we're about to open Hormuz and every Monday, it's closed again. This makes this kind of a very difficult playground for even the traders.

    基本上這有點取決於原油價格,以及套利窗口(arbs)是打開還是關閉。當然,在極度波動的敘事之下。幾乎每個星期五我們都快要開放荷莫茲海峽,而每個星期一它又再次關閉。這讓即便是交易員,也面臨一個非常難操作的環境。

  • Sherif Elmaghrabi - Analyst

    Sherif Elmaghrabi - Analyst

  • Yeah, I definitely get whiplash from the headlines. Sticking with the idea of captive fleets, the presentation mentioned 55 VLCCs on standby outside the Arabian Gulf. Do you have a thought on why the NOCs -- I'm assuming the NOCs might do that rather than participate in alternative trades for the time being?

    是的,我確實會被新聞標題搞得暈頭轉向。延續「自有/封閉船隊(captive fleets)」的概念,簡報提到有55艘VLCC在阿拉伯灣外待命。你是否有想法,為什麼國家石油公司(NOCs)——我猜可能是NOCs這麼做——會選擇先這樣待命,而不是暫時去參與其他替代航線的交易?

  • Lars Barstad - Chief Executive Officer of Frontline Management AS

    Lars Barstad - Chief Executive Officer of Frontline Management AS

  • No, I think it's -- obviously, I don't know this, but a likely theory is that in the event of an opening, say, somebody kind of tweets and the press kind of release is coming out tomorrow saying that now it's all okay, we can travel through. The first vessel that goes through can potentially buy Iraqi oil with a $30 discount to Dubai or Brent. That's $60 million right there. So I think kind of that's the motivation, having the ability to be able to move quickly to take the first barrels as opposed to having to call Frontline and ask us for a rate that has huge value.

    不,我想——顯然我並不確定,但一個可能的理論是:假設出現開放的情況,比如有人發推文,媒體明天就發布說現在一切都沒問題、可以通行了。第一艘通過的船,可能可以用相較杜拜或布蘭特折價30美元的價格買到伊拉克原油。那就是6,000萬美元。所以我認為動機在於:保有快速行動的能力,去拿到第一批貨,而不是必須打電話給Frontline,向我們詢價一個非常高的運價——那個選擇權價值很大。

  • And the alternative is that if they went in to compete with, say, us in the Atlantic market, that vessel would be gone for 70 to 90 days. And then they really have to call us if they need freight out of the Middle East Gulf quickly kind of. So I think I would assume that's the analysis behind this. And since the cost kind of on holding these vessels is not like a current market cost. It's a time charter contract that was agreed years ago.

    另一種選擇是:如果他們進去跟我們在大西洋市場競爭,那艘船就會離開70到90天。然後如果他們需要很快從中東海灣出貨,就真的得打電話給我們。所以我想我會假設這就是背後的分析。而且,持有這些船的成本並不是像現貨市場那樣的當期市場成本。那是多年前就談定的期租合約(time charter contract)。

  • I think the cost to kind of keeping that option is manageable. But of course, what happens tomorrow is impossible to say.

    我認為,維持這個選擇權的成本是可控的。但當然,明天會發生什麼是不可能說得準的。

  • Operator

    Operator

  • Jon Chappell, Evercore ISI.

    Jon Chappell,Evercore ISI。

  • Jonathan Chappell - Analyst

    Jonathan Chappell - Analyst

  • Lars, the slides 9 through 11 are really fantastic. Ton of detail, super interesting. I haven't seen it laid out this way before. My question is, if the impact from the fleet on slide 9 is only 11 VLCCs and then 10 and 11 kind of net themselves out, like you said, like the loss of volume is obviously negative, but the ton-mile impact is almost a complete offset. It feels like the utilization then overall should be relatively balanced to before the Strait close, yet rates have obviously been incredibly strong.

    Lars,第9到第11頁的投影片真的非常棒。細節很多,非常有趣。我以前沒看過有人用這種方式把它整理出來。我的問題是:如果第9頁船隊的影響只有11艘VLCC,而第10與第11頁如你所說大致互相抵消——也就是說,貨量減少顯然是負面,但噸海里(ton-mile)的影響幾乎完全抵消。那麼整體利用率看起來應該相對於海峽關閉前是比較平衡的,但運價顯然一直強得驚人。

  • You have the theoretical ones, but then you also have the real ones as well. So what's the differentiating factor that takes what looks to be a balanced outcome versus three months ago and has put rates into the stratosphere?

    你有理論上的推估,但也有實際發生的情況。那麼,究竟是什麼差異因素,讓看起來與三個月前相對平衡的結果,卻把運價推到高得離譜的程度?

  • Lars Barstad - Chief Executive Officer of Frontline Management AS

    Lars Barstad - Chief Executive Officer of Frontline Management AS

  • I think, again, it's the big effect factor, and we didn't kind of see this coming at all. What's the amount of vessels that seemingly for kind of -- it's not like obvious economical reasons sit unutilized. So I think that's kind of -- the ton miles do amount to a lot. I think people were surprised by the amount of volume Saudi has been able to ramp up the Yanbu loads with. But I don't think you can get away from the fact that we have this kind of uneconomical -- and for different reasons, a part of the fleet that remains unutilized is the biggest kind of factor in here because even we did not believe that what's happened or transpired over since 28th of February could be bullish VLCC or unneutral to VLCC.

    我想,再次強調,是那個「大影響因子」,而且我們完全沒有預料到。也就是:有多少船看起來因為某些——並非明顯經濟因素——而處於未被利用的狀態。所以我認為那就是關鍵——噸海里確實增加很多。我想市場也對沙烏地能把延布(Yanbu)的裝載量拉升到那個程度感到驚訝。但你無法忽視的是:我們有一部分船隊出於不經濟——且原因各異——而仍未被利用;這是最大的因素,因為即便我們也不相信,自2月28日以來發生或演變的事情,會對VLCC是利多,或至少不是中性。

  • Jonathan Chappell - Analyst

    Jonathan Chappell - Analyst

  • Okay. You spoke on slide 13 about the likely end game, and I think that most people would agree with you that, that's most likely, certainly, the stock market acts that way. And Frontline has always been positioned, obviously, to maximize spot market exposure. If we were to consider the other end game, which is continued and escalated hostilities and maybe a more permanent closure of that waterway. How do you think about how you manage risk in that outcome?

    了解。你在第13頁談到可能的最終結局,我想大多數人會同意你,那應該是最可能的情境,股市的反應也像是如此。而Frontline一向的定位,顯然是要最大化現貨市場曝險。如果我們考慮另一種結局,也就是敵對行動持續並升級,甚至那條水道更永久性地關閉。在那種結果下,你會如何思考風險管理?

  • Again, I know we have to lean towards the likely outcome and what the market is telling you and the Friday afternoon tweets. But have you thought about managing the fleet or even the balance sheet in a different manner just in case that unlikely tail risk emerges from this unprecedented time?

    我知道我們必須傾向於最可能的結果,以及市場告訴你的訊息,還有週五下午的推文。但你是否想過,萬一這個前所未見時期出現那種不太可能的尾端風險(tail risk),你會用不同方式來管理船隊,甚至資產負債表?

  • Lars Barstad - Chief Executive Officer of Frontline Management AS

    Lars Barstad - Chief Executive Officer of Frontline Management AS

  • Yes, we have. And I think although kind of we've done some more kind of time charter coverage, particularly so on the VLCCs kind of during Q1 and also continuing -- and I think kind of the first iteration of that was basically we looked at unprecedented market prior to the Hormuz closing. So of course, we didn't know that was going to happen. But what's happened in the aftermath is that we've actually continued to secure short-term covers, like one-year coverage on the VLCCs to the point where -- and Inger has a table in there, we're closing on 30% of our voyage days for VLCC for the next 12 months or thereabouts or at least for the first couple of quarters being covered by time charter contracts.

    是的,我們有。我想雖然我們做了一些更多的期租覆蓋(time charter coverage),特別是在第一季針對VLCC,並且也持續進行——而且我想第一輪的做法基本上是:我們看到的是荷莫茲關閉之前一個前所未見的市場。所以當然,我們不知道那會發生。但事後發生的是:我們其實持續去鎖定短期覆蓋,例如VLCC的一年期覆蓋;到某個程度——Inger在裡面有一個表——我們接近把未來12個月左右、或至少前幾個季度,VLCC約30%的航次天數(voyage days)用期租合約覆蓋起來。

  • And we've always kind of communicated this that our proposition to you as investors, is to try and give you a spot exposure. But of course, at certain points in the curve, we'll try to cover. And that's, of course, to try and prevent ourselves from going bankrupt should we be wrong. So I think that is the answer to your question. We could kind of be all spot at this point in time, but we're actually very close to 30% of our voyage sales on VLCC, which is the most exposed segment, we believe, for a long-term closure in case nothing is sold there.

    而且我們一直對你們溝通:我們給投資人的主張,是盡量提供現貨曝險(spot exposure)。但當然,在曲線的某些位置,我們會嘗試做覆蓋。那當然是為了避免如果我們判斷錯誤而導致破產。所以我想這就是你問題的答案。我們此刻本來可以全部做現貨,但實際上我們已非常接近把VLCC——我們認為在長期關閉、若那裡沒有貨可做時最暴露的區段——約30%的航次銷售(voyage sales)做了期租覆蓋。

  • Operator

    Operator

  • (Operator Instructions) [Devin Sangoi, Tej Investments.]

    (接線員指示)[Devin Sangoi,Tej Investments。]

  • Unidentified Participant

    Unidentified Participant

  • I just want to ask you two questions. First one is that we have seen a lot of countries have used the reserves, crude reserves, what they had because of the disruptions. And if they have to go back to the previous reserves previous to this war and (inaudible), how the demand will shape up even if the war is over?

    我想請教兩個問題。第一個是,我們看到很多國家因為供應中斷而動用了儲備、原油儲備,也就是他們手上原本有的儲備。如果他們必須把儲備補回到這場戰爭之前的水準以及(聽不清),即使戰爭結束,需求會如何演變?

  • Lars Barstad - Chief Executive Officer of Frontline Management AS

    Lars Barstad - Chief Executive Officer of Frontline Management AS

  • Well, kind of -- this is a big -- and if I got your question correctly, you're asking basically how will this market look when it normalizes, right?

    嗯,算是——這是一個很大的——如果我正確理解你的問題,你基本上是在問:當市場回到正常狀態時,會是什麼樣子,對嗎?

  • Unidentified Participant

    Unidentified Participant

  • Yes, yes.

    是的,是的。

  • Lars Barstad - Chief Executive Officer of Frontline Management AS

    Lars Barstad - Chief Executive Officer of Frontline Management AS

  • Yeah. No. So in our world, and of course, we lean on analysts that actually knows this properly. I don't think we'll see kind of Middle East exports resume to levels prior to the closure anytime soon. I think that will take time.

    對。不。所以在我們的世界裡,當然,我們也依賴真正懂這些的分析師。我不認為我們會在短期內看到中東出口恢復到關閉之前的水準。我認為那需要時間。

  • You will have an initial kind of flow of oil coming out. First of all, the vessels that are already laden. Secondly, kind of barrels that sit in tanks inside the Gulf currently. And then new production is going to be coming on. For some of the exporters, this is, of course, a liquidity thing. So they want to get as much oil into the market sold and get some cash as soon as possible.

    一開始會有一波原油流出。首先,是那些已經裝載在船上的船舶。其次,是目前存放在波斯灣內陸上儲槽裡的那些桶數。接著,新產量也會逐步上來。對某些出口國而言,這當然是流動性問題。所以他們希望盡快把更多原油賣到市場上、盡快回收現金。

  • At the same time, we also have this, what we believe high probability of Iranian crude also being a compliant crude when this happens. And mind you that, that's 1.5 million to 2 million barrels there as well coming from Iran that needs compliant tonnage. But as we move forward here, I think if I was a refinery in Asia or a short kind of oil entity in Asia, I would kind of -- the minute I filled up my inventories, I would start to basically spread my risk on how I procure oil going forward.

    同時,我們也認為伊朗原油在這件事發生時,很可能也會成為合規原油。請注意,伊朗那邊也有150萬到200萬桶的供給需要合規船噸來運輸。但往前看,我認為如果我是亞洲的煉油廠,或是在亞洲偏短(short)的原油實體,我會——一旦把庫存補滿,就會開始在未來採購原油的方式上分散風險。

  • So I think that could kind of create a more long-term situation where we see kind of these longer old-school ton miles become more and more stable as we proceed. So kind of the opening scenario I think it's very difficult to paint a bleak picture for tankers. There could also be the possibility to paint a quite bullish picture for oil price basically because you need all this inventory build, you will not get production back overnight. And there will be kind of a bit of a shortness on oil as well going forward.

    所以我認為,這可能會形成一個較長期的局面:隨著我們往前走,這些較長、傳統的噸海里(ton-miles)需求會變得越來越穩定。因此,就開放後的情境而言,我覺得很難為油輪市場描繪一個悲觀的圖景。同時,也可能對油價描繪出相當偏多的圖景,因為你需要建立這些庫存,而產量不可能一夜之間恢復。未來也會出現一定程度的原油偏緊。

  • But I think the point that we cannot get away from is that this whole situation, which has now lasted for 12 weeks or whatever on counting, is also a huge kind of push for energy diversification by way of looking at other kind of energy sources like nuclear, wind, gas, what have you, maybe not gas, but at least solar. So it's -- so kind of this is actually a push towards long-term energy transition. But I think kind of that's five years out. It's not something that we need to think about right now. But I think kind of the short-term scenario is how I describe it.

    但我認為我們無法忽視的一點是:整個情勢已經持續了12週左右(還在計算中),也在很大程度上推動能源多元化,也就是轉向其他能源來源,例如核能、風能、天然氣等等——也許不是天然氣,但至少是太陽能。所以——這其實是在推動長期的能源轉型。但我認為那是五年之後的事。不是我們現在就需要思考的事情。不過我認為短期情境大致如我所描述。

  • Unidentified Participant

    Unidentified Participant

  • And Lars, the other thing is that India contracted today from Venezuela. And after this war is over, the 20%, which is a huge dependence of a lot of countries, especially India, China, which is taking it from Middle East, they would like to diversify. Does that permanently change the ton-mile demand and the ton mile travel for the ships, especially the large ones?

    另外,Lars,還有一點是:印度今天與委內瑞拉簽了合約。而在這場戰爭結束後,那20%——這對很多國家是很大的依賴,尤其是印度、中國,主要從中東取得——他們會想要多元化。這是否會永久改變噸海里需求與船舶的噸海里航程,特別是大型船舶?

  • Lars Barstad - Chief Executive Officer of Frontline Management AS

    Lars Barstad - Chief Executive Officer of Frontline Management AS

  • Yeah, I believe so. And I think this is also the root cause for some of the interest we're seeing from kind of this Asian industrial players that they actually are trying to access the time charter market, taking ships for delivery in '27, '28 and '29. So I think that's kind of the long game in this that they are there to try and commit themselves for oil supply contracts from Latin America, West Africa, and US, and then basically need to secure tonnage against those contracts.

    是的,我相信會。而我認為,這也是我們看到一些亞洲工業參與者產生興趣的根本原因:他們其實正嘗試進入定期租船(time charter)市場,承租在27、28、29年交付的船舶。所以我認為,這是一個長期布局:他們希望就來自拉丁美洲、西非與美國的原油供應合約做出承諾,然後基本上需要針對這些合約鎖定船噸。

  • Unidentified Participant

    Unidentified Participant

  • So does it mean till FY29, calendar year '29, you're going to have a very strong or a stable high rate scenario for the ship?

    所以這是否意味著直到FY29,也就是曆年2029年,你們都會看到船舶運價非常強勁或維持在高檔且穩定的情境?

  • Lars Barstad - Chief Executive Officer of Frontline Management AS

    Lars Barstad - Chief Executive Officer of Frontline Management AS

  • I think that's impossible to say, to be quite honest. We see that the freight markets and the period markets are backwardated. So kind of a year contract for a vessel delivering fairly soon is around $120,000 per day. The minute you do a two-year contract, you talk about $90,000, three-year contract, $75,000, $76,000. And then if you kind of go out and do a five-year deal for delivery 2029, you're down in the 40s.

    老實說,我認為這不可能下定論。我們看到現貨運費市場與期租市場呈現逆價差(backwardation)。所以,一年期、且交付時間相對較近的船舶合約,大約是每天12萬美元。一旦做兩年期合約,就大約是9萬美元;三年期合約是7.5萬到7.6萬美元。然後如果你往外做五年期、2029年交付的交易,價格就降到4萬多美元區間。

  • So it's -- yes.

    所以——是的。

  • Operator

    Operator

  • There are no further questions for today. I will now hand the call back to Mr. Lars Barstad for closing remarks.

    今天沒有其他問題。我現在把電話交回給Lars Barstad先生作結語。

  • Lars Barstad - Chief Executive Officer of Frontline Management AS

    Lars Barstad - Chief Executive Officer of Frontline Management AS

  • Yeah. Again, thank you very much for listening in. It's quite a hectic political landscape we're working under. But rest assured, Frontline are focused on trying to collect cash as we proceed here, and it looks pretty okay for now. Thank you.

    好的。再次非常感謝各位收聽。我們所處的政治環境相當動盪。但請放心,Frontline 會專注於在接下來的進程中盡可能回收現金,而目前看起來還不錯。謝謝。

  • Operator

    Operator

  • Thank you. This concludes today's conference call. Thank you for participating. You may now disconnect.

    謝謝。今天的電話會議到此結束。感謝各位參與。您現在可以掛線。