Frontline PLC (FRO) 2026 Q2 法說會逐字稿

Good day, and thank you for standing by. Welcome to the Q2 2026 Frontline PLC earnings conference call. (Operator Instructions) Please be advised that today's conference is being recorded.

各位好，感謝您耐心等候。歡迎參加 Frontline PLC 2026 年第二季財報電話會議。(接線員指示) 請注意，今天的會議將被錄音。

I would now like to hand the conference over to your speaker today, Mr. Lars Barstad, CEO. Please go ahead.

現在我想把會議交給今天的講者——執行長 Lars Barstad 先生。請開始。

Thank you very much. Dear all, thank you for dialing into Frontline's quarterly earnings call. Frontline is reporting its best quarter ever. Our long-term strategy of growing voyage base and VLCC exposure during the slim years post-COVID has come to fruition, and our shareholders are now reaping the benefits. There are lots of moving parts in this market and no playbook.

非常感謝。各位好，感謝撥冗參加 Frontline 的季度財報電話會議。Frontline 正在公布公司史上最佳的一個季度。我們在 COVID 後景氣低迷的幾年中，長期策略是擴大航次基礎（voyage base）並提高 VLCC 曝險，如今已開花結果，股東也正享受其成果。這個市場變動因素很多，沒有既定劇本可循。

The key takeaway, though, is that the prevailing situation will have long-term implications. The current environment puts our lean organization to the test, and we are extremely thankful for the hard work the Frontline global team is putting in, in keeping the propellers turning in this ocean of profits. Before I give the word to Inger, I'll run through our TCE numbers on slide 3 in the deck. In the second quarter of 2026, Frontline achieved $152,700 per day on our VLCC fleet, $111,400 per day on our Suezmax fleet and $92,400 per day on our LR2/Aframax fleet.

不過，關鍵重點在於，當前局勢將帶來長期影響。目前的環境考驗著我們精實的組織，我們非常感謝 Frontline 全球團隊的辛勤付出，讓螺旋槳在這片利潤之海中持續轉動。在把時間交給 Inger 之前，我先帶大家看簡報第 3 頁的 TCE 數據。2026 年第二季，Frontline 的 VLCC 船隊達成每日 152,700 美元，Suezmax 船隊每日 111,400 美元，LR2/Aframax 船隊每日 92,400 美元。

So far in the second quarter of 2026, 86% of our VLCC days are booked at $156,900 per day, 79% of our Suezmax days are booked at $117,400 per day and the LR2s are catching up, having booked 70% of the days at $81,000 per day. Again, all numbers in this table are on a load-to-discharge basis with the implications of ballast days at the end of the quarter this has.

截至目前在 2026 年第二季，我們的 VLCC 航行日有 86% 已以每日 156,900 美元訂妥，Suezmax 航行日有 79% 已以每日 117,400 美元訂妥，而 LR2 也正在追趕進度，已以每日 81,000 美元訂妥 70% 的航行日。再次說明，本表所有數字皆以裝貨至卸貨（load-to-discharge）為基礎計算，並包含季度末壓艙航行日（ballast days）所帶來的影響。

I'll now let Inger take you through the financial highlights.

接下來我把時間交給 Inger，請她帶大家看財務重點。

Thanks, Lars, and good morning and good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. We report profit of $659.2 million or $2.96 per share and adjusted profit of $580.2 million or $2.61 per share in the second quarter of 2026. As Lars mentioned, this is the best quarterly profit and adjusted profit ever recorded by the company. The adjusted profit in the second quarter increased by $235.3 million compared with the previous quarter, primarily due to an increase in our TCE earnings. Ship operating expenses decreased by $4.3 million from previous quarter, and that was mainly due to sales of eight VLCCs in the first quarter and two Suezmax tankers in the second quarter and an increase in supplier rebates, which is partially offset by an increase in general running costs.

謝謝你，Lars。各位女士、先生，早安與午安。我們在 2026 年第二季錄得淨利 6.592 億美元（每股 2.96 美元），以及調整後淨利 5.802 億美元（每股 2.61 美元）。如 Lars 所提，這是公司有史以來最高的單季淨利與調整後淨利。第二季調整後淨利較上一季增加 2.353 億美元，主要來自我們 TCE 收益的提升。船舶營運費用較上一季減少 430 萬美元，主要因第一季出售 8 艘 VLCC、第二季出售 2 艘 Suezmax 油輪，以及供應商回饋增加；但部分被一般營運成本上升所抵銷。

Administrative expenses decreased by $2.4 million from previous quarter. This excludes the synthetic option revaluation gain of $5.3 million in the second quarter and then synthetic option revaluation loss of $5.8 million in the first quarter. Adjusted interest expense decreased by $4.8 million from previous quarter due to lower debt and decrease in interest rates. Lastly, depreciation decreased by $4.7 million from previous quarter due to sales of vessels.

管理費用較上一季減少 240 萬美元。此數字不包含第二季合成選擇權（synthetic option）重估收益 530 萬美元，以及第一季合成選擇權重估損失 580 萬美元。調整後利息費用較上一季減少 480 萬美元，原因是負債降低以及利率下滑。最後，折舊較上一季減少 470 萬美元，係因出售船舶所致。

Let's then look at the balance sheet on slide 5. Frontline has a solid balance sheet and a very strong liquidity of $1.2 billion in cash and cash equivalents, including undrawn amounts of revolver capacity of $901 million, marketable securities and minimum cash requirements bank as per June 30. We have no meaningful debt maturities until 2030. Remaining newbuilding commitments as per end June was $601.1 million and relate to the acquisition of the nine newbuildings from affiliates of Hemen. The company has secured new building financing of up to $737 million as set out in the press release.

接著看簡報第 5 頁的資產負債表。Frontline 擁有穩健的資產負債表與非常充裕的流動性：截至 6 月 30 日，現金及約當現金合計 12 億美元，其中包含 9.01 億美元未動用的循環信貸額度（revolver capacity）、有價證券，以及銀行要求的最低現金餘額。我們在 2030 年之前沒有任何具實質意義的到期債務。截至 6 月底，剩餘新造船承諾為 6.011 億美元，與向 Hemen 關聯方收購 9 艘新造船有關。公司已取得最高 7.37 億美元的新造船融資，如新聞稿所述。

Then let's turn to slide 6. In the second and third quarter of 2026, we reduced our financing costs through a combination of margin reductions on existing facilities for the remaining tenors and a full refinancing of selected facilities, reducing the weighted average interest rate margin by approximately 52 basis points from 178 basis points at the end of the first quarter of 2026 to 126 basis points upon completion of the process in the third quarter of 2026. The reduction was driven by amendments with 24 basis points, refinancings with 21 basis points and new building financing and asset sales with 7 basis points. We have no debt maturities until 2028, and no meaningful maturities until 2030, supported by increased tenor across the portfolio as shown in the maturity chart.

接著看簡報第 6 頁。在 2026 年第二季與第三季，我們透過兩項措施降低融資成本：一是針對既有融資在剩餘期限內下調利差，二是對部分融資進行全面再融資；使加權平均利率利差約下降 52 個基點，從 2026 年第一季末的 178 個基點，降至 2026 年第三季流程完成時的 126 個基點。此降幅主要來自：修訂條款貢獻 24 個基點、再融資貢獻 21 個基點，以及新造船融資與資產出售貢獻 7 個基點。我們在 2028 年之前沒有到期債務，且在 2030 年之前也沒有任何具實質意義的到期項目；如到期結構圖所示，這得益於整體融資組合期限的延長。

Then we can look at slide 7, fleet composition and cash breakeven rates and OpEx. Upon delivery of the remaining VLCC newbuildings and sale of two VLCCs, our fleet consists of 40 VLCCs, 19 Suezmax tankers and 18 Aframax/LR2 tankers at an average age of 6.6 years and consists of 100% ECO vessels where 59% are scrubber fitted.

接著看第 7 頁：船隊組成、現金損益兩平運價（cash breakeven rates）以及營運費用（OpEx）。在交付剩餘 VLCC 新造船並出售 2 艘 VLCC 後，我們的船隊由 40 艘 VLCC、19 艘 Suezmax 油輪與 18 艘 Aframax/LR2 油輪組成，平均船齡 6.6 年，且 100% 為 ECO 船舶，其中 59% 配備洗滌器（scrubber）。

We estimate that average cash breakeven rates for the next 12 months of approximately $23,800 per day for the VLCCs, $25,700 per day for the Suezmax tankers and $22,200 per day for LR2 tankers, with a fleet average estimate of about $23,900 per day. This includes dry dock costs for seven VLCCs, seven Suezmax tankers, and eight LR2 tankers. The fleet average estimate excluding dry dock cost is about $22,300 per day or $1,600 per day less. We recorded OpEx, including dry dock in the second quarter of $9,200 per day for VLCCs, $9,000 per day for Suezmax tankers and $13,300 per day for LR2 tankers. This includes dry dock of 1 VLCC and 3 LR2 tankers.

我們估計未來 12 個月的平均現金損益兩平運價約為：VLCC 每日 23,800 美元、Suezmax 油輪每日 25,700 美元、LR2 油輪每日 22,200 美元；船隊平均約每日 23,900 美元。此估計包含 7 艘 VLCC、7 艘 Suezmax 油輪與 8 艘 LR2 油輪的進塢（dry dock）成本。若排除進塢成本，船隊平均估計約每日 22,300 美元，亦即少約每日 1,600 美元。我們在第二季記錄的 OpEx（含進塢）為：VLCC 每日 9,200 美元、Suezmax 油輪每日 9,000 美元、LR2 油輪每日 13,300 美元。其中包含 1 艘 VLCC 與 3 艘 LR2 油輪的進塢。

And the Q2 '26 fleet average OpEx excluding dry dock was $8,700 per day. Then lastly, let us look at slide 8 and the cash generation. Frontline has a substantial cash generation potential with about 27,800 earning days annually. And as you can see from this slide, the cash generation potential basis current fleet, TC rates and average spot market rates as of August 28 is $2.3 billion or approximately $10.35 per share, providing a cash flow yield of 24% basis current share price. A 30% increase of these rates will increase the cash generation potential to $3.1 billion or $13.91 per share and at 30% decrease of these rates, we decreased the cash generation potential to $1.5 billion or $6.80 per share.

而 2026 年第二季船隊平均 OpEx（不含進塢）為每日 8,700 美元。最後，讓我們看第 8 頁的現金創造。Frontline 具備可觀的現金創造潛力，每年約有 27,800 個營收日（earning days）。如本頁所示，以目前船隊、期租（TC）費率以及截至 8 月 28 日的平均現貨市場運價為基礎，現金創造潛力為 23 億美元，約合每股 10.35 美元；以目前股價計算，現金流殖利率為 24%。若上述運價上升 30%，現金創造潛力將提高至 31 億美元或每股 13.91 美元；若運價下降 30%，現金創造潛力則降至 15 億美元或每股 6.80 美元。

With this, I'll leave the word to Lars again.

接下來我把發言權再交回給 Lars。

(technical difficulty) Frontline center stage. We see increasing risk in and around the Gulf area, both in the Gulf of Oman, in the Red Sea. We also see increased risk in the Black Sea and the Houthis have become active again. Tanker rates remain high, inefficiencies carry the weight of the shipping market. And we also see high risk premiums on certain trades, in particular, inner AG, which is somewhat illiquid.

(技術問題) Frontline 站在風口浪尖。我們看到波斯灣周邊地區的風險正在上升，包括阿曼灣與紅海。我們也看到黑海的風險增加，而胡塞武裝也再次活躍。油輪運價仍維持高位，低效率因素支撐著航運市場。我們也看到某些航線的風險溢價很高，特別是內阿拉伯灣（inner AG），其流動性相對不足。

But at least showing on the bottom left-hand chart, you can see how the now somewhat theoretical TD3C index is printing levels nearing $600,000 per day. We tend to look at the TD15 and it's being dwarfed in this connection. But if you look closely on the left-hand scale, it's actually showing very close to $200,000 per day. Oil balances are kept in check by aggressive inventory draws. We are extremely surprised that the oil price manages to keep in this band between, say, $78 and somewhat north of $90.

但至少從左下角的圖表可以看到，如今有些偏理論性的 TD3C 指數正印出接近每日 60 萬美元的水準。我們通常會看 TD15，而在這個情境下它顯得相形見絀。但如果仔細看左側刻度，其實顯示也非常接近每日 20 萬美元。原油供需平衡因積極去庫存而受到控制。我們非常驚訝油價竟能維持在大約 78 美元到略高於 90 美元的區間內。

US, China and the rest of the OECD are kind of the key sources of this inventory growth. The question is, of course, for how long can we grow. The tanker order book paused over the summer. Lead times from ordering to delivery is now moving into 3.5 years. So we are talking about 2030 deliveries. And we see this has kind of created a bit of a vacuum in the ordering market after a quite frantic activity in the first half of the year.

美國、中國以及其他 OECD 國家算是這波庫存成長的主要來源。問題當然是，我們還能成長多久。油輪新船訂單簿在夏季暫停。從下單到交付的交期如今正拉長到 3.5 年。所以我們談的是 2030 年的交付。而我們看到，在上半年相當熱絡的活動之後，這在訂造市場上某種程度造成了一段真空期。

The long-term implications as fleets continue to age will be around the inventory refill story, energy security policies and in the case of some sort of relief or some sort of solution between US and Iran, sanctions relief could also play a part. We are in the midst of the storm, I would say, but the long-term implications are at least easier to read. If we move to slide 10 and try and kind of analyze a little bit what's behind this.

長期影響方面，隨著船隊持續老化，將圍繞補庫故事、能源安全政策；若美伊之間出現某種緩解或解決方案，制裁鬆綁也可能扮演角色。我會說我們正身處風暴之中，但長期影響至少更容易判讀。如果我們移到第 10 張投影片，試著分析一下背後的原因。

It's actually easier to analyze the market after the fact. We've had an 82% reduction in crude oil exports from inside the Strait of Hormuz. I know this is kind of a big question mark as certain agencies report higher exports than what's recorded out of the Middle East. Others are lower in respect of kind of transits by ocean through the Strait of Hormuz, Frontline are amongst the school of thought that believe we're somewhere between 4.5 million to 5.5 million barrels per day. China crude imports have created a cushion to the oil price, we believe, and it's actually reduced by 35% in the same period.

其實事後分析市場更容易。我們看到從荷姆茲海峽內側的原油出口減少了 82%。我知道這裡存在很大的問號，因為某些機構報告的出口量高於中東端的記錄。另一些則較低；就經由海運穿越荷姆茲海峽的航次而言，Frontline 屬於認為大約介於每日 450 萬到 550 萬桶的那派。我們認為，中國的原油進口為油價提供了緩衝，而在同一期間其實也下降了 35%。

What's happened is that we've seen huge growth in inefficiencies in the market to the tune of 23% increase in idling days per VLCC. But I do note that this is not a waiting time or time that where owners like ourselves are fiddling around trying to figure out what to do. This is basically due to the trade itself, where inefficiencies are creeping into every aspect of the voyage and under contract and being paid, you are actually waiting. We've also seen a great increase in the trade between particularly Latin America to the east of Suez. This basically results in the effective fleet supply tightening despite a decline in volumes.

發生的情況是，我們看到市場低效率大幅成長，表現在每艘 VLCC 的閒置天數增加了 23%。但我要指出，這不是等待時間，或像我們這樣的船東在那裡猶豫不決、想著該怎麼做的時間。這基本上是由於貿易本身所致：低效率正滲入航程的各個環節；在合約之下且有收費的情況下，你其實就是在等待。我們也看到貿易量大幅增加，特別是拉丁美洲到蘇伊士以東的航線。這使得即便運量下降，有效船隊供給仍趨於緊縮。

The increased STS transfers of Fujairah and around Singapore and Malaysia also add to this. If you can imagine the cargo flow that formerly used to be from inner Middle East Gulf to, say, Japan is now like a 3 times trip. You go firstly from inner MEG to Fujairah in some sort of shuttling traffic. Then you by way of STS, put the oil into another ship that takes it to Malaysia, where you can do an STS operation before Japanese controlled ships take it into Japan. So basically moving the same barrels in an increasingly inefficient manner.

富查伊拉以及新加坡、馬來西亞周邊增加的 STS（船對船）轉運也加劇了這點。你可以想像，以前從中東灣區內部到例如日本的貨物流，如今變成大約 3 倍的航程。你先從 MEG 內部到富查伊拉，以某種接駁式運輸來回穿梭。接著透過 STS，把油轉到另一艘船運到馬來西亞，在那裡再做一次 STS，之後由日本控制的船舶把油運進日本。所以基本上是在以愈來愈低效率的方式搬運同樣的桶數。

We do see, though, that there are large gaps in the tracking data, and this also confuses us and most market analysts as a lot of vessels are sailing dark, leaving a big blind spot. The headline figures may no longer be representative of the market, but what is representative of the market is the rates that we are actually collecting. If you move to the next slide, the flows from Atlantic Basin have grown, both outright by way of volume, but more importantly, by the way of distances it's actually sailing. In a normal market, you will have kind of almost equal volume going from, say, US Gulf into Europe as into Asia.

不過我們確實看到追蹤資料存在很大的缺口，這也讓我們以及多數市場分析師感到困惑，因為許多船舶在「關閉訊號」航行，造成很大的盲區。頭條數據可能已不再能代表市場，但能代表市場的是我們實際收取到的運價。如果移到下一張投影片，大西洋盆地的流向已經成長，不僅是運量的絕對增加，更重要的是航行距離也拉長了。在正常市場中，從例如美國墨西哥灣到歐洲與到亞洲的運量大致會接近均衡。

Now a larger part of the volume being exported out of the Atlantic Basin is actually taking the long route. With the Houthi action, we're also seeing some very specific inefficiencies for the Yanbu exports that formerly used to sail through the Red Sea, where it's now, to a greater degree, going northbound, basically by way of you fill up a VLCC 3 quarters full, take it through the Suez Canal and then load up the remaining barrels in Sidi Kerir, which is the end of the Sumed pipeline. The supply shortage from the Middle East is further compensated by inventory draws in virtually any or every corner of the world with US and China being the largest contributors. Asia ex China has increased the sourcing, again, adding or creating the same ton-miles.

現在，從大西洋盆地出口的較大部分運量其實走的是長航線。隨著胡塞行動，我們也看到針對延布（Yanbu）出口出現一些非常特定的低效率：過去會穿越紅海航行，如今在更大程度上改為向北，基本做法是先把一艘 VLCC 裝到四分之三滿，通過蘇伊士運河，然後在西迪克里爾（Sidi Kerir）再裝上剩餘桶數；那裡是 SUMED 管線的終點。中東供給短缺進一步由全球幾乎各個角落的去庫存所補償，其中美國與中國貢獻最大。除中國以外的亞洲增加了採購來源，再次增加或創造相同的噸海里需求。

Despite the volume shortfall, as previously mentioned, the inefficiency and the growing distances yields the high tanker demand we're currently experiencing. The big question, though, and this is the question as we near winter is how long can and will we draw on inventories as we approach the colder season in the Northern Hemisphere. If you look at the top right chart, this is OECD onshore crude inventories. We have drawn materially. The total, including kind of other inventories as well is actually nearing 0.5 billion barrels.

儘管運量不足，如前所述，低效率與航程距離的增加帶來了我們目前所經歷的高油輪需求。但最大的問題——尤其當我們接近冬季——是：在北半球進入更冷的季節之際，我們還能、也會在多長時間內持續動用庫存。如果看右上角圖表，這是 OECD 的陸上原油庫存。我們已經出現顯著下降。總量（也包含其他類型庫存）其實正接近 5 億桶。

There is still a lot of barrels to draw, but there is certainly a limit to how far down the various nations are willing to go in this very insecure situation we're in. If we move to slide 12 and look at the order books. These order books continue to grow or continued, I would like to say, going into Q3. Currently, looking at kind of the headline number of VLCCs, the order book is around 33.5% of the existing fleet. I do, however, think that one should look at the efficient fleet.

仍然還有不少桶數可以繼續動用，但在我們所處的這種高度不安全情勢下，各國願意把庫存降到多低，確實存在上限。如果我們移到第 12 張投影片看訂單簿。這些訂單簿在進入第三季時仍在成長——或我應該說，持續成長。目前以 VLCC 的頭條數字來看，訂單簿約為現有船隊的 33.5%。不過，我確實認為應該看的是「有效船隊」。

And as we note here, around 166 to 167 vessels are not a part of kind of the commercially traded fleet, meaning that the VLCC order book currently is, in fact, very close to 40%. If you do the same kind of analysis across the asset classes that Frontline is exposed to, you'll get to that the current kind of order book to fleet ratio is in the mid-30s percent. We're actually closing in on what we saw in 2008, 2009. And this is, of course, a concern looking forward. However, if you look at the aging of the fleet, which we actually didn't have to this extent back in the late 2010, the situation looks far more balanced.

正如我們在這裡指出的，大約有166到167艘船並不屬於商業交易的船隊的一部分，這意味著VLCC的新船訂單簿目前事實上非常接近40%。如果你對Frontline所涉足的各資產類別做同樣的分析，你會得到目前的訂單簿對船隊比率在30%中段。我們其實正逐步接近2008、2009年所見的水準。而這當然是對未來的一項擔憂。然而，如果你看船隊的老化情況——在2010年代末期我們其實沒有到這種程度——情勢看起來要平衡得多。

So if you move to slide 13, you can see that the total order book of the asset classes we're involved in currently stands around 707 ships. As they deliver over the next five years, we'll see 578 vessels moving towards the 20-year threshold, which means that we'll have a total population of 1,293 vessels coming to age, assuming no scrapping. This is, of course, dwarfing the current order book. If we have a look at the summary then from this presentation, the current market dwarfs the previous cycles.

所以如果你翻到第13頁投影片，你可以看到我們所涉及的資產類別的總訂單簿目前約為707艘。在未來五年交付的同時，我們將看到578艘船逐步邁向20年船齡門檻，這表示在假設沒有拆船的情況下，將有總計1,293艘船達到老化年限。這當然遠遠超過目前的訂單簿。如果我們再看一下本次簡報的摘要，目前市場規模遠勝以往週期。

I'd like to draw your attention to the orange column on the right-hand side. Looking at what we thought was the strongest market we've ever seen in 2004, we're now twice that almost. The index is lying a little bit because a certain part of it is, of course, being weighed by both TC1 and TD3, which are inner AG loadings, but still including that, we're way beyond what we've seen in previous years. And as I mentioned earlier in the presentation, constricted global oil supply yields inefficiencies, and we see new trades and much longer trade lanes. Growing concern is starting to come forward for the supply cushion provided by primarily US and China.

我想請各位注意右側的橘色欄位。回顧我們認為在2004年所見過的最強市場，如今我們幾乎是其兩倍。該指數有點失真，因為其中一部分當然受到TC1與TD3的權重影響——這些是阿拉伯灣（AG）內部裝載——但即便把這些也納入，我們仍遠超過過去幾年的水準。如我先前在簡報中提到的，全球原油供應受限會帶來效率損失，我們看到新的貿易流向以及更長的航線。市場對主要由美國與中國提供的供應緩衝的擔憂正開始浮現。

We have the Russia-Ukraine situation adding fuel to the fire with increased risk in the Black Sea. We also see reduced Russian product exports going forward. Although this is, in many cases, sanctioned barrels, it still adds to the product pool and in particular affects the diesel supply going forward. The growth in the tanker order book is slowing as the lead times are extending. We also see that yard expansions are stretched.

俄烏局勢也在黑海風險升高的情況下火上加油。我們也看到未來俄羅斯成品油出口將減少。雖然在許多情況下這些是受制裁的桶數，但它仍會影響成品油供給池，並特別影響未來柴油供應。由於交付期拉長，油輪訂單簿的成長正在放緩。我們也看到船廠擴產的能力已被拉到極限。

There's been a little bit of a period now since we've heard of new berths being launched, particularly in China. Energy security and inventory situation is likely to dominate the narrative if the current situation persists into the winter. Again, Frontline is center stage with our VLCC heavy, efficient business model. And we do see that the long-term period market is actually starting to price in these disruptions to last for much longer.

我們已經有一段時間沒有聽到新增船台（berths）啟用的消息了，特別是在中國。如果目前情勢延續到冬季，能源安全與庫存狀況很可能會主導市場敘事。同樣地，Frontline以我們以VLCC為主、效率導向的商業模式站在舞台中央。而我們確實看到長期期租市場開始把這些擾動定價為會持續更久。

With that, I would like to open for questions and answers.

接下來，我想開放問答。

(Operator Instructions) John Chappell, Evercore ISI.

(接線員指示) John Chappell，Evercore ISI。

Lars, last quarter, you spoke to, I think it was 5% of the fleet that you were estimated was sitting outside of the strait, and that was part of the inefficiencies. Didn't mention that today. Obviously, you had a lot of other data, but do you have an update on that? And as it relates to that, is that just right outside of the strait? Or is there a much greater geographical area that we're talking to where a lot of ships are idling and basically adding to the inefficiencies?

Lars，上個季度你提到，我記得大約有5%的船隊估計停在海峽外，這是效率損失的一部分。你今天沒有提到這點。顯然你有很多其他數據，但你能更新一下嗎？另外，這是只在海峽外面嗎？還是我們談的是更大的地理範圍，有很多船在閒置，基本上加劇了效率損失？

Surprisingly, we are actually observing that, that's kind of number of ships that are idling outside of Oman, you could say, or the Gulf of Oman, stretching basically all down the Indian Coast has actually increased. But this has increased with the growing kind of volume coming out of the Middle East by way of STS. So firstly, you have the pipeline coming into Fujairah and the kind of the Omani coast outside. But secondly, now you have kind of an increased or have had at least an increased traffic in vessels coming out for STS business. The timing of this is somewhat difficult to nail down.

令人意外的是，我們其實觀察到，某種程度上可以說停在阿曼外海、或阿曼灣外海的閒置船舶數量——基本上一路延伸到印度海岸——實際上增加了。但這種增加是伴隨著透過STS方式從中東流出的貨量成長而來的。所以首先，你有通往富查伊拉（Fujairah）的管線，以及阿曼外海那一帶。但其次，現在你也看到（或至少曾看到）從事STS業務的船舶流量增加。這件事的時間點其實有點難以精準掌握。

So it means that if you are a charterer and you book the ship, you're not exactly going to know the date that STS ship is going to be ready for you. So this is creating a lot of delays. So this is why we see actually the population sitting in that region in particular, is actually growing, completely illogical to be quite honest in the current market situation.

這表示如果你是承租人、你訂了船，你並不會很清楚那艘STS作業的船什麼時候會準備好給你。因此這造成了很多延誤。這也是為什麼我們看到特別是在那個區域停留的船舶數量其實在增加；老實說，在目前的市場情況下這完全不合邏輯。

Okay. Second one, more strategic. Obviously, a generational market right now, as you laid out in the last slide. And I think Frontline's track record and business model has been clear for the last 30 years. But you're doing some things you haven't really done before with the time charters and like the two of the three-year time charter, special dividend.

好的。第二個問題，比較偏策略面。顯然，如你在最後一張投影片所說，現在是世代級的市場。我想Frontline過去30年的紀錄與商業模式也很清楚。但你們正在做一些以前不太做的事，例如期租，以及像兩到三年的期租、特別股利。

Could this be an opportunity to really change the capital structure? I know Inger has done a lot with taking the cost of debt down and pushing all the maturities out. But could you use some of this generational upside to take the leverage down? Or is that just something that's not part of the DNA?

這會不會是一個真正改變資本結構的機會？我知道Inger在降低負債成本、並把到期日往後延方面做了很多工作。但你們能否利用這波世代級上行來降低槓桿？還是說那根本不在你們的DNA裡？

No, I would say it's not really a part of our DNA. As I think I've said many times, we have kind of an informal strategy of trying to cover kind of one-third of our revenues as well as covering one-third of our key costs being fuel or interest rates. Currently, the market conditions have kind of prompted us to secure some of the revenues on VLCCs. And we're actually a little bit above 30% right now as we wait for the last newbuildings to deliver. But I don't think it's really changed kind of the way we look at the capital allocation.

不，我會說這確實不太算是我們的DNA。如我多次提到的，我們有一個非正式策略：嘗試鎖定大約三分之一的營收，同時也對沖三分之一的主要成本，也就是燃油或利率。目前的市場狀況促使我們在VLCC上鎖定部分營收。在等待最後幾艘新造船交付之際，我們現在其實略高於30%。但我不認為這真的改變了我們看待資本配置的方式。

Kind of our proposition to investors continues to be that we pay everything out and then we leave to the investor to decide whether if he wants to reinvest. That will only kind of -- and it's never really going to disturb our dividends. But I think the special dividends, which you pointed to, which came from selling two ships, why we decided to just pay it out was basically due to the fact that we didn't really see much of kind of upside in reinvesting it in the market in the current kind of price environment we're in. So I think kind of Frontline will just continue as we've always done. We pay the money to our shareholders.

我們對投資人的主張仍然是：我們把所有現金都配發出去，然後讓投資人自行決定是否要再投資。這只會——而且它從來不會真正干擾我們的股利政策。但我想你提到的特別股利，是來自出售兩艘船；我們之所以決定直接配發，基本上是因為在目前的價格環境下，我們並不覺得把這筆錢再投入市場會有太多上行空間。所以我認為Frontline會一如既往地繼續下去。我們把錢發給股東。

The leverage that we have now is comfortable considering the current market and where we are on asset values and so forth. So I think one should kind of keep that in mind going forward.

以目前的市場狀況、以及我們在資產價值等方面所處的位置來看，我們現在的槓桿水準是令人安心的。所以我認為往後大家應該把這點放在心上。

Greg Lewis, BTIG.

Greg Lewis，BTIG。

I did want to just -- if you could follow up, Lars, more on thoughts to John's question around the decision to do the longer-term time charters. Really, I'm kind of curious, these were obviously opportunistic. Historically, we've seen a lot of one-year -- it seems like, hey, the price is pricey at the time, but one year, the time charters in the B market are available. I'm kind of curious how -- and you alluded to it, how is the actual depth of the two, three and potentially longer time charter market for VLCCs as we kind of sit here looking at the back half of the year.

我確實想再追問一下——Lars，如果可以的話，針對 John 那個關於決定簽較長期定期租約的問題，請再多談一些想法。老實說，我有點好奇，這些顯然是把握機會的操作。從歷史來看，我們常看到很多一年期——感覺像是，當時價格很貴，但一年期的定期租約在 B 市場是有的。我想了解的是——你們也提到了一點——就我們現在坐在這裡看今年下半年，VLCC 的兩年、三年、甚至更長期的定期租約市場，實際的深度到底如何？

Is there really customer demand for these that we could actually see maybe not Frontline, but a real increase of these types -- of these term deals going forward? Or was this kind of more of like a one-off?

這類合約真的有客戶需求，讓我們未來可能看到——也許不是 Frontline，但整體市場會實質增加這類——這種期限交易嗎？還是這比較像一次性的個案？

No, it's a very good question. At the time when kind of these two time charters, the two-year and the three-year were concluded, I would say the depth was somewhat limited. But as we kind of got over the summer, currently, is quite deep. And this is what we alluded to in our presentation a little bit as well. It seems like kind of what is deemed intelligent money is now increasingly interested in getting kind of longer-term contracts on.

不，這是個非常好的問題。在當時那兩筆定期租約——兩年期與三年期——敲定的時候，我會說市場深度是有些有限的。但隨著我們度過夏季，目前的深度相當可觀。這也是我們在簡報中稍微提到的。看起來所謂的「聰明資金」現在愈來愈有興趣去鎖定較長期的合約。

So we're talking about oil majors and big kind of operators. So we could easily today do three, four, three-year time charters now kind of if we were willing to accept the current levels, which is -- well, it's still south of $80,000 per day, but closing in. And it could actually be north of $80,000 depending on the position you can deliver the ship in. So I would say this is -- we don't have a crystal ball in this market, right? So this is why, of course, you tend to end up fixing a little bit too early in retrospect.

我們談的是石油巨頭與大型營運商。所以以今天來說，只要我們願意接受目前的水準，我們很容易就能再做三、四筆三年期的定期租約——目前水準雖然仍低於每日 80,000 美元，但已經在逼近。而且依你能在哪個位置交船，實際上也可能高於每日 80,000 美元。所以我會說——我們在這個市場沒有水晶球，對吧？因此你當然常常會在事後回頭看，覺得自己鎖定得有點太早。

But I must say that the liquidity wasn't really there either. So you basically just had to make a decision. But now I think the game has changed a little bit. And we see -- I think a good indicator is looking at the FFA market. Right now, exclusive of the Middle East, so exclusive of TD3C, the TD22, which is US Gulf to Asia kind of marker, that paper is trading kind of close to $100,000 per day for 2028 when there is 115 VLCCs being delivered.

但我必須說，當時市場的流動性其實也不在。所以你基本上只能做出決定。但現在我認為遊戲規則有些改變了。而我們看到——我認為一個很好的指標是看 FFA 市場。目前，撇除中東、也就是撇除 TD3C，TD22（美國墨西哥灣到亞洲的指標航線）那個紙貨合約，在 2028 年的交易價格接近每日 100,000 美元，而那一年將有 115 艘 VLCC 交付。

So I think the market is starting to potentially price in some of the tailwinds that we've been discussing that in the event -- well, first of all, the expectation is the situation will prevail for a while, which is just going to add further draws to the inventory, which is further going to strengthen the tailwinds coming out of this ordeal at some point. So I'm actually happy to say that right now, that market is pretty deep. I'd like to add one comment, though, which I probably should have mentioned.

所以我認為市場可能開始把我們一直在討論的一些順風因素納入定價；在某種情境下——嗯，首先，市場預期目前的局勢會持續一段時間，這只會進一步消耗庫存，而這又會在某個時間點，讓這場事件結束後的順風更為強勁。所以我很高興地說，就目前而言，那個市場的深度相當不錯。不過我想再補充一點評論，這點我可能本來就應該提到。

We did the two-time charters, but we also sold two ships. This is actually our way of being able to capture the inner AG profits because the actor that was willing to pay that kind of money for almost 10-year-old ship was -- he had a reason for that, basically because it would enable him to get full control of the logistical chain of transporting oil through the Strait of Hormuz because owners are actually starting -- even the more kind of adventurous owners are starting to be a little bit reluctant to sail through the Strait of Hormuz, meaning that if you are an inner Middle East or inner AG exporter, you're much better off basically just paying $135 million for a 10-year-old ship and controlling the entire logistical chain.

我們做了兩筆定期租約，但我們也賣了兩艘船。這其實是我們用來捕捉「內 AG」利潤的一種方式，因為願意為一艘將近 10 年船齡的船付出那種價錢的買家——他之所以這麼做是有原因的：基本上，這能讓他完全掌控穿越荷姆茲海峽運輸原油的整條物流鏈，因為船東其實開始——就連比較敢冒險的船東也開始對航行穿越荷姆茲海峽有點卻步；也就是說，如果你是中東內部或 AG 內部的出口商，最好的做法基本上就是花 1.35 億美元買一艘 10 年船齡的船，並掌控整個物流鏈。

But for us, since we don't trade into the AG, at least not currently, that was a way for us to capture that premium. And hence, why we also just paid the proceeds out to shareholders.

但對我們而言，因為我們不在 AG 內交易——至少目前不是——那就是我們捕捉那個溢價的一種方式。因此，我們也就把出售所得直接配發給股東。

Okay. Okay. Super helpful. And then I did have a question on -- I just was looking for some clarity on slide 12, where you kind of laid out your view of the VLCC fleet, the 900 ships. Just as we think about those -- and I think you mentioned that there's maybe 170 ships that aren't really part of the active fleet, maybe they're doing infrastructure or other types of issues.

好的。好的。非常有幫助。另外我還有一個問題——我想釐清一下第 12 頁投影片，你們在那裡概述了你們對 VLCC 船隊（900 艘）的看法。當我們思考那些船時——而且我想你提到可能有大約 170 艘其實不算是活躍船隊的一部分，可能在做基礎設施用途或其他類型的事情。

Is that the sanctioned fleet? Or is that outside -- is that other vessels because the sanctioned fleet I would think is trading? Like how do we think about where the -- and then I'm also curious, as we think about that sanctioned fleet, is a good way to think about it of those 170-ish sanctioned ships, those are all 15-plus year old vessels? Or is it kind of more broad across the, I guess, the fleet age profile?

那是受制裁船隊嗎？還是那是其他——其他船舶？因為我以為受制裁船隊應該仍在交易。我們該如何理解那個——另外我也好奇，當我們談到受制裁船隊時，把那大約 170 艘受制裁船理解為全部都是 15 年以上船齡的船，這樣想對嗎？還是說它在整體船齡結構上分布更廣？

No, I think -- no, it's more -- so that every vessel over 20 years is almost -- almost all of them are sanctioned. Because in the commercial kind of markets where we operate, very few actors accept vessels that are north of -- or older than 20 years. There are some trading, but they're trading them kind of internally for big oil majors or refiners where they kind of control the technical management and the vetting of the ship themselves. So that would almost put like an equal sign between 20-plus and sanctioned. So speaking of the sanctioned fleet, we're not really seeing kind of utilization increase on that fleet.

不，我想——不是，那更像是——幾乎所有 20 年以上的船——幾乎全部都屬於受制裁。因為在我們所營運的商業市場裡，很少有參與者會接受船齡超過——或大於 20 年的船。確實有一些仍在交易，但它們多半是在大型石油公司或煉油商的內部體系中運作，因為他們自己掌控技術管理與對船舶的審核（vetting）。所以幾乎可以在「20 年以上」與「受制裁」之間畫上等號。因此談到受制裁船隊，我們並沒有真的看到那個船隊的使用率在提升。

But what we are seeing is that although extremely slowly, more and more are getting kind of sold for recycling. So it's a very, very kind of slow trend because you do face kind of the sanctions as you -- the recyclers face it when they need to or want to purchase the steel. But there are kind of starting to -- we're starting to see movements there where actually some of these ships are getting removed.

但我們看到的是，雖然非常非常慢，愈來愈多的船正被出售去拆解回收。所以這是一個非常、非常緩慢的趨勢，因為當回收商需要或想要購買鋼材時，也會面臨制裁的問題。但那邊開始出現一些動向——我們開始看到其中一些船實際上正被移出市場。

(Operator Instructions) (inaudible).

(接線員指示)（聽不清）。

Congratulations Lars, on a good set of numbers. I had a few questions. One on, when do you see the China -- as the winters will approach, China will come back in the market? And in that situation, how do you see the market? And second one is on the Suez.

恭喜你，Lars，這次數字表現很好。我有幾個問題。第一個是，你怎麼看中國——隨著冬季將近，中國會回到市場嗎？在那種情況下，你怎麼看市場？第二個問題是關於蘇伊士運河。

You have a drought and obviously, the limited amount of ships are going to go through Suez now. How does it impact the flows for the smaller ships?

你提到乾旱，而且顯然現在能通過蘇伊士的船舶數量會受限。這會如何影響小型船舶的運輸流向？

Yes. No, first of all, on China, I think kind of the question you're raising there is basically the big question -- the biggest question of them all in shipping because China has effectively reduced their imports at certain periods, they basically halved it. And from what we understand from industry sources is that Chinese kind of domestic demand is not materially reduced. And since imports are down to the tune of 3.5 million to 5 million barrels per day, for sure, they need to be drawing on inventories. They have a huge pile of oil.

是。不，首先談中國，我想你提出的其實就是航運業最大的問題——也是最重要的問題。因為中國在某些時期實際上已經降低了進口，基本上減半。而根據我們從產業消息來源的了解，中國國內需求並沒有實質性下降。既然進口下降到每天約350萬到500萬桶的幅度，他們肯定需要動用庫存。他們有非常龐大的石油存量。

They've actually been building inventories in the last years, leading up to the situation in 2026. So they have a huge cushion. But at a certain point, when somebody in Beijing will start to think that maybe we should kind of be a bit careful on continuing here. I don't know whether if we're there yet. I don't know if we will be there in a year's time.

事實上，他們在過去幾年一直在建立庫存，一路累積到2026年的這個情況。所以他們有很大的緩衝。但在某個時間點，北京方面會開始覺得，也許我們應該對繼續這樣做稍微謹慎一點。我不知道我們現在是否已經到那個點。我也不知道一年後是否會到那個點。

It's very difficult to say. But this is one of the kind of the big important questions. But I think it's more important in respect of oil price rather than shipping at this point. Of course, it could propel shipping even further if they start to aggressively chase barrels. But I think kind of this is more an oil price kind of thing than the shipping thing.

這非常難說。但這確實是其中一個非常重要的大問題。不過我認為，就目前而言，它對油價的影響比對航運的影響更重要。當然，如果他們開始積極追逐原油，可能會進一步推升航運。但我認為這更像是油價的議題，而不是航運的議題。

When it comes to Suez, I think respectfully, you might be confusing Suez for the Panama Canal. The Panama Canal is where the drought is being experienced, and that's where kind of we're seeing reduced volumes, but not really we -- because the Panama Canal, it's prioritized for containers and natural gas and LPG vessels and kind of the rates and the way that kind of transits are organized, very few tankers are using Panama Canal as it is. For the Suez, this has not yet been an issue that's been addressed.

至於蘇伊士，我想恕我直言，你可能把蘇伊士和巴拿馬運河搞混了。乾旱發生在巴拿馬運河，那裡我們確實看到通行量下降；但其實我們——因為巴拿馬運河會優先給貨櫃、天然氣與LPG船舶，而且費率與通行安排的方式使得本來就很少油輪使用巴拿馬運河。至於蘇伊士，目前還沒有出現需要處理的這類問題。

And one more question on the scrapping, what are your views? We have seen no scrapping because the market has been very good. But what's your view going forward in next, say, 12 to 24 months?

再問一個關於拆船，你們怎麼看？我們看到幾乎沒有拆船，因為市場一直很好。但你對未來例如接下來12到24個月的看法是什麼？

No. As I mentioned a little bit previously, we are seeing some small positive developments on recycling or scrapping as you say. The challenge has been that the recycling industry is a dollar-denominated industry, too. So it means that they have difficulty in actually paying cash for a vessel that is sanctioned.

不。如我先前稍微提到的，我們確實看到回收或拆船（如你所說）出現一些小幅的正面進展。挑戰在於，回收產業也是以美元計價的產業。這表示他們在實際以現金支付購買一艘被制裁的船舶時會有困難。

What we have seen is that the US authorities have been willing to give exemptions for vessels that are not owned by owners that are sanctioned themselves. So it means that certain kind of quite well-renowned recyclers have been able to go to US authorities. This is the vessel. This is the history of the vessel.

我們看到的是，美國主管機關願意對那些船東本身未被制裁的船舶給予豁免。這表示某些相當知名的回收商能夠去找美國主管機關。這是這艘船。這是這艘船的歷史。

These are the owners. Can we kind of buy this and get an exemption or a license to buy this vessel for recycling, and they've gotten yes. So the number of vessels here, we're talking kind of in the teens. So it's not material looking at the vast fleet of sanctioned vessels currently. But at least it's a start. So how that will evolve going forward, it's very difficult to say, but it's a positive movement at least.

這些是船東。我們是否可以購買並取得豁免或許可（license），把這艘船買來做回收？而他們得到的答覆是可以。所以這裡的船舶數量大概是十幾艘。相較於目前龐大的受制裁船隊，這並不具重大影響。但至少是一個開始。未來會如何演變很難說，但至少是個正向的動向。

(inaudible), China Securities.

（聽不清），中國證券。

This is [Audrey Zhong] from China Securities. Lars, my first question is on the recent VLCC sale. We know that you sold two VLCCs for about $270 million. I think this is (technical difficulty) your decision to sell the VLCC because given the current strong rate environment, how did you compare the sale price with the present value of the future cash flows from continuing to operate the two tankers? This is my first question.

我是來自中國證券的[Audrey Zhong]。Lars，我第一個問題是關於近期VLCC的出售。我們知道你們以約2.7億美元賣出兩艘VLCC。我想這是（技術問題）你們決定出售VLCC的原因是什麼？因為在目前運價環境強勁的情況下，你們如何比較出售價格與繼續營運這兩艘油輪所能帶來的未來現金流之現值？這是我的第一個問題。

Yes. No, it's -- again, excellent question. There were two kind of key analysis that we applied to the considerations. One was kind of what is the implied value of the assets that Frontline own. And as we're priced by the market at a multiple of almost -- well, at the time, it was north of 1.3 times NAV.

是。不，這——再次，這是個很好的問題。我們在考量時主要做了兩個關鍵分析。第一個是Frontline所擁有資產的隱含價值是多少。而市場給我們的定價倍數幾乎——嗯，當時是高於1.3倍的NAV（淨資產價值）。

The implied value of the vessel was actually higher than what we achieved. But the second one is -- and this is where it gets a little bit kind of not mathematical to put it that way. It goes a little bit on experience in this market. We are operating in one of the most volatile markets in the world, if not the most. That volatility tells you that nobody actually knows what's going to happen around the next turn.

船舶的隱含價值其實高於我們實際成交的價格。但第二個是——這裡就有點不是純數學可以表達的。它更偏向於在這個市場的經驗。我們所處的是全球最波動的市場之一，甚至可能是最波動的。這種波動性告訴你，沒有人真的知道下一個轉折點會發生什麼。

We looked at the assets. And for us to decline selling at that level, we had to believe that we were going to make almost $70,000 per day every day until that vessel was 20 years old or those vessels were 20 years old. If you look at kind of how our market has been moving historically, we thought that, that was a bold ask. So of course, it was the highest price achieved for that generation of ships at the time. And that was basically the analysis.

我們看了這些資產。對我們而言，如果要拒絕在那個水準出售，我們就必須相信，直到那艘船滿20年船齡、或那兩艘船滿20年船齡之前，我們每天幾乎都能賺到接近7萬美元/日。如果你看我們市場歷史上的走勢，我們認為那是相當大膽的假設。所以當然，那在當時是該世代船舶所達成的最高價格。基本上分析就是如此。

So basically, what we do is we look at what do we need to get a 15% return on equity, which is where Frontline wants it to be kind of in order to make an investment case. And that resulted in this kind of rate requirement. And how likely was it that, that rate requirement was going to be real. And we thought potentially not. Maybe for the next couple of years, but not for 9.5 years or -- sorry, 11.5 years or 11 years, whatever it was at the time.

所以基本上，我們做的是看要達到15%的股東權益報酬率（ROE）需要什麼條件；這是Frontline希望達到的水準，才能形成投資論點。而這導出了這樣的運價要求。接著我們評估，這個運價要求成真的可能性有多高。我們認為可能性不高。也許未來幾年可以，但不太可能維持9.5年——或抱歉，11.5年或11年，當時大概是那樣的期間。

So that was basically the analysis. But you have a very good point. It was not an easy decision to make when you're standing in the middle of a market which at the time was earning for a VLCC around $100,000 per day. It's, of course, something that needs deep consideration.

所以那基本上就是分析。但你提出了一個非常好的觀點。當你站在一個市場的正中央、而當時VLCC每天大約可賺取10萬美元時，這並不是一個容易做出的決定。當然，這是需要深入考量的事情。

Great. That's very clear and very helpful. And my second question is on cash breakeven rates. I noticed that despite the reduction in financing margins, I think you did a very great job in decreasing your financing cost. But actually, the Suezmax cash breakeven point increased to [25%], exceeding the VLCC breakeven for the first time since 2021 based on our quarterly tracking.

很好。這非常清楚，也非常有幫助。我的第二個問題是關於現金損益兩平運價。我注意到，儘管融資利差下降，我認為你們在降低融資成本方面做得非常出色。但實際上，根據我們的季度追蹤，Suezmax的現金損益兩平點上升至[25%]，自2021年以來首次超過VLCC的損益兩平。

So does the $25,700 already reflect the benefit of the lower financing margins? If so, what other factors that drove the increase? And how should we expect the Suezmax cash breakeven to trend in the second half of 2026?

那麼，25,700美元是否已經反映了較低融資利差帶來的效益？如果是，還有哪些其他因素推動了上升？以及我們應該如何預期2026年下半年Suezmax現金損益兩平將如何走勢？

Sorry, I wasn't hearing everything you asked about, but I think you were referring to the Suezmax breakeven rate. Is that correct?

抱歉，我沒有聽清你問的所有內容，但我想你是在指Suezmax的損益兩平運價。是這樣嗎？

Yes. Please allow me to repeat my question. Actually is why is the Suezmax cash breakeven higher than even VLCC cash breakeven rate in Q2?

是的。請允許我重複我的問題。其實是為什麼在第二季Suezmax的現金損益兩平甚至高於VLCC的現金損益兩平運價？

Yes. The reason for that is that the dry dock component in the cash breakeven rate. For Q2, the cash breakeven rates are much higher than it was for the Q1 cash breakeven rates. And then in addition to that, in Q1, we had undrawn debt or an RCF, which was undrawn on one of the vessels, which is assumed to be drawn in the Q2 breakeven rate.

是的。原因在於現金損益兩平運價中的進塢（乾塢）成本組成。在第二季，現金損益兩平運價比第一季的現金損益兩平運價高得多。此外，在第一季，我們有未動用的債務或循環信貸額度（RCF），其中一艘船的額度當時未動用，但在第二季的損益兩平運價計算中假設已動用。

Okay. Great. So can we expect that the Suezmax cash breakeven in Q3 and Q4 also have the trend like in Q2 because I think it's increasing the Suezmax cash breakeven.

好的。很好。那麼我們是否可以預期第三季和第四季Suezmax的現金損益兩平也會像第二季那樣的趨勢？因為我認為這正在推高Suezmax的現金損益兩平。

I'm not sure I understood what you said now. What was the question again?

我不確定我理解你剛才說的內容。可以再問一次問題嗎？

Yes. Actually, in Q3 and Q4, what the Suezmax cash breakeven would be like since, I think, the Suezmax cash breakeven is increasing.

是的。其實是想問第三季和第四季Suezmax的現金損益兩平大概會是什麼樣子，因為我覺得Suezmax的現金損益兩平正在上升。

Sorry, these cash breakeven rates are for 12 months forward. So it is for 12 months forward from the end of June 2026. You add those four quarters to the end of June 2027. So this cash breakeven rate of $25,700 for Suezmax vessels are for the 12 months period going forward, including then the Q3, Q4, Q1 and Q2 of 2027. It's an average.

抱歉，這些現金損益兩平運價是以未來12個月為基礎。也就是從2026年6月底起往後12個月。你把那四個季度加總到2027年6月底。因此，Suezmax船舶25,700美元的現金損益兩平運價是針對未來12個月期間，包含2027年的第三季、第四季、第一季與第二季。這是一個平均值。

So yes, and it is explained by what I just said that you have a dry dock of seven vessels in that period, which we did not have in the previous cash breakeven rate, which we showed you for the end of the first quarter.

所以是的，這也可由我剛才所說的解釋：在那段期間有七艘船要進乾塢，而在先前我們在第一季末向你們展示的現金損益兩平運價中並沒有這部分。

That was the last question for today. I will now hand the call back to Lars for closing remarks.

這是今天最後一個問題。我現在把電話交回給Lars做結語。

Thank you very much. And all of you, thank you for listening in. It's truly an exceptional market we are experiencing and also well into Q3. So looking forward to our call next quarter. Thank you very much.

非常感謝。也謝謝各位收聽。我們正經歷一個真正非同尋常的市場，而且這種情況也延續到第三季。期待我們下個季度的電話會議。非常感謝。

Thank you. This concludes today's conference call. Thank you for participating. You may now disconnect.

謝謝。今天的電話會議到此結束。感謝各位參與。您現在可以掛線。