Frontline Plc (FRO) 2025 Q1 法說會逐字稿

Good day and thank you for standing by. Welcome to the Q1 2025 Frontline Plc earnings conference call. (Operator Instructions) Please be advised that today's conference is being recorded.

您好，感謝您的支持。歡迎參加 Frontline Plc 2025 年第一季財報電話會議。（操作員指示）請注意，今天的會議正在錄音。

I would now like to hand the conference over to your speaker today, Lars Barstad, CEO. Please go ahead.

現在，我想將會議交給今天的發言人、執行長 Lars Barstad。請繼續。

Thank you very much dear all. Thank you for dialing into Frontline's quarterly earnings call. It's encouraging to see so many joining us today. Despite all the action around us, both in respect of equity market volatility, changing policies and global trade negotiations the tanker market has moved along in an orderly manner.

非常感謝大家。感謝您撥入 Frontline 的季度財報電話會議。今天看到這麼多人加入我們，真是令人鼓舞。儘管我們周圍發生了各種事件，包括股市波動、政策變化和全球貿易談判，但油輪市場仍在有序發展。

To recap the first quarter of the year, the VLCC were volatile with three to four exciting rallies and a rising floor. Suezmax and Aframax had a strong finish to the first quarter, whilst LR2s struggled. We are in a situation where the inverse earnings relationship between asset classes seems to be gone and the VLCC is taking the lead. This may also be caused by the fact that incremental export growth is finally coming from compliant sources.

回顧今年第一季度，VLCC 價格波動較大，出現三至四次令人興奮的上漲，並且底部有所上升。蘇伊士型油輪和阿芙拉型油輪在第一季表現強勁，而 LR2 型油輪則表現掙扎。我們目前所處的境況是，資產類別之間的反向收益關係似乎已經消失，而 VLCC 正處於領先地位。這也可能是增量出口成長最終來自合規來源所致。

So before I go and give the word to Inger, I'll run through our TCE numbers on slide 3 in the deck. In the first quarter of 2025, Frontline achieved $37,200 per day on our VLCC fleet, $31,200 per day on our Suezmax fleet and $22,300 per day on our LR2/Aframax fleet.

因此，在我向 Inger 傳達訊息之前，我將先瀏覽簡報第 3 張投影片上的 TCE 數字。2025 年第一季度，Frontline 的 VLCC 船隊日均盈利 37,200 美元，蘇伊士型油輪船隊日均盈利 31,200 美元，LR2/阿芙拉型油輪船隊日均盈利 22,300 美元。

So far, in the [first] quarter, 68% of our VLCC days are booked at $56,400 per day, 69% of our Suezmax days are booked at $44,900 per day, and 66% of our LR2/Aframax days are booked at $36,100 per day. Again, all numbers in this table are on a low to discharge basis, with implications of ballast days at the end of the quarter. And I think it is worth mentioning that in particular for our LR2s in Q1, we finished the quarter with quite a few ballast days as we entered Q2.

到目前為止，在第一季度，我們 68% 的 VLCC 租船天數為 56,400 美元/天，69% 的蘇伊士型油輪租船天數為 44,900 美元/天，66% 的 LR2/阿芙拉型油輪租船天數為 36,100 美元/天天。再次強調，本表中的所有數字都是以低排放為基礎的，並暗示了本季末的壓載天數。我認為值得一提的是，特別是對於我們第一季的 LR2 型油輪，在進入第二季時，我們以相當多的壓載天數結束了本季。

Now I'll let Inger take you through the financial highlights.

現在我讓英格帶您了解財務亮點。

Thanks, Lars, and good morning and good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Let's then turn to slide 4, profit statement and look at some highlights. We report profit of $33.3 million or $0.15 per share and adjusted profit of $40.4 million or $0.18 per share in this quarter.

謝謝，拉爾斯，女士們、先生們，早安，下午好。然後讓我們翻到幻燈片 4，利潤表，看看一些亮點。我們報告本季利潤為 3330 萬美元，即每股 0.15 美元，調整後利潤為 4040 萬美元，即每股 0.18 美元。

Adjusted profit in the first quarter decreased by $4.7 million compared with the previous quarter and that was primarily due to a decrease in our time charter earnings from $249 million in the previous quarter to $241 million in the first quarter. That again is a result of lower TCE rates, that was also partially offset by fluctuations in other income and expenses.

第一季調整後利潤與上一季相比減少了 470 萬美元，這主要是由於我們的定期租船收益從上一季的 2.49 億美元減少到第一季的 2.41 億美元。這又是TCE利率較低的結果，但也被其他收入和支出的波動部分抵銷。

Let's then look at the balance sheet on slide 5. The balance sheet movements this quarter are related to ordinary items. Frontline has a solid balance sheet and strong liquidity of $805 million in cash and cash equivalents including undrawn amounts of revolver capacity, marketable securities and minimum cash requirements for bank as for March 31, 2025. We have no meaningful debt maturities until 2030 and no new building commitments.

然後我們看一下投影片 5 上的資產負債表。本季資產負債表變動與一般項目有關。Frontline 擁有穩健的資產負債表和強大的流動性，截至 2025 年 3 月 31 日，其現金和現金等價物為 8.05 億美元，包括未提取的循環信貸額度、有價證券和銀行最低現金需求。到 2030 年為止，我們沒有重大債務到期，也沒有新的建設承諾。

Let's then look at slide 6. Fleet Composition, cash breakeven and OpEx. Our fleet consists of 41 VLCCs, 22 Suezmax tankers and 18 LR2 tankers, has an average age of 6.8 years and consists of 99% ECO vessels, where 56% are scrubber fitted.

我們再來看投影片 6。船隊組成、現金損益平衡和營運支出。我們的船隊由 41 艘 VLCC、22 艘蘇伊士型油輪和 18 艘 LR2 油輪組成，平均船齡為 6.8 年，其中 99% 為 ECO 船舶，56% 安裝了洗滌器。

We estimate average cash breakeven rate for the next 12 months of approximately $29,700 per day for VLCCs, $24,300 per day for Suezmax tankers and $23,300 per day for LR2 tankers with a fleet average estimate of about $26,800 per day. This includes drydock cost for 10 VLCCs, two Suezmax tankers and five LR2 tankers.

我們估計，未來 12 個月 VLCC 的平均現金盈虧平衡率約為每天 29,700 美元，蘇伊士型油輪的平均現金盈虧平衡率約為每天 24,300 美元，LR2 油輪的平均現金盈虧平衡率約為每天 23,300 美元，而船隊平均虧平衡率約為每天 26 美元。其中包括 10 艘 VLCC、2 艘蘇伊士型油輪和 5 艘 LR2 油輪的乾船塢費用。

Fleet average estimate, excluding drydock costs is about $25,700 per day or $1,100 per day less. No vessels were drydocked in the first quarter, and we recorded OpEx expenses of $8,400 per day for VLCCs, $8,000 per day for Suezmax tankers and $8,200 per day for LR2 tankers. The Q1 fleet average was [$8,300] per day.

不包括乾船塢成本，船隊平均估計成本約為每天 25,700 美元，或每天減少 1,100 美元。第一季沒有船舶進行乾船塢作業，我們記錄的 VLCC 營運支出為每天 8,400 美元，蘇伊士型油輪營運支出為每天 8,000 美元，LR2 油輪營運支出為每天 8,200 美元。Q1 船隊平均租金為每天 [8,300 美元]。

Lastly let's look slide 7, cash generation. Frontline has a substantial cash generation potential with about 30,000 earnings days annually. As you can see from the graph on the left-hand side of this slide, the cash generation potential basis our current fleet and May 25 forward rates for TD3C for VLCCs, TD20 for Suezmax tankers and an average of TD25 and TC1 for Aframax and LR2 tankers from the Baltic Exchange as on May 23 is $332 million or $1.49 per share and a 30% increase from current spot market will increase the potential cash generation with about 100%.

最後讓我們來看投影片 7，現金產生。Frontline 每年約有 30,000 個獲利日，具有巨大的現金創造潛力。從這張幻燈片左側的圖表可以看出，基於我們目前的船隊以及 5 月 25 日波羅的海交易所 VLCC 的 TD3C 遠期價格、蘇伊士型油輪的 TD20 遠期價格以及阿芙拉型油輪和 LR2 油輪的 TD25 和 TC1 平均值，截至 5 月 23 日為每股 3.美元，如果比目前現貨市場上漲 30%，潛在現金產生量將增加約 100%。

With this, I'll leave the word to Lars again.

有了這個，我再次把話語權交給拉爾斯。

Thank you very much, Inger. Let's look at slide 8 and have a discussion on the various market themes. So I mentioned initially that it's been a lot of noise around us. We've had paralyzing US policy changes likely limited impact on the energy complex so far and for tankers in general, but this is in total quite worrying for global growth prospects.

非常感謝，英格。讓我們看第 8 張投影片並討論各種市場主題。所以我最初提到我們周圍有很多噪音。我們已經經歷了美國政策的癱瘓變化，這可能對迄今為止的能源綜合體和油輪整體的影響有限，但總體而言，這對全球成長前景而言相當令人擔憂。

And as we proceed, we will learn how big these impacts may be. We've had a very positive development on sanctions, both by way of scope widening. The various agencies are literally adding new vessels to the sanction list and new operators on a day-to-day basis.

隨著研究的深入，我們將會了解這些影響有多大。我們在製裁方面取得了非常積極的進展，包括擴大製裁範圍。各個機構實際上每天都在將新船隻和新運營商添加到製裁名單中。

But we've also seen that there is a bit more will in enforcement of the same sanctions. But I think most importantly is the behavioral changes specifically by India and China on the way they operate with or towards OFAC listed vessels. And so far, both Russia and India -- sorry, China and India, seem to be shunning vessels that are on the OFAC list.

但我們也看到，在執行同樣的製裁方面，人們的意願有所增強。但我認為最重要的是印度和中國在與 OFAC 所列船隻合作或對其採取的行動方式上的行為變化。到目前為止，俄羅斯和印度——抱歉，是中國和印度，似乎都在迴避 OFAC 名單上的船隻。

There are some excitement around Russia and the Ukraine ceasefire discussions. There is also a parallel discussion ongoing in respect of nuclear deal with Iran. Both outcomes can have pivotal changes for tanker market dynamics, and I'm going to come to that later.

俄羅斯和烏克蘭停火談判引發了一些關注。目前，有關與伊朗核協議的討論也在進行中。這兩種結果都可能對油輪市場動態產生重大變化，我稍後會談到這一點。

We're also seeing some positive movements on OPEC stances and OPEC policy. They seem at least until now, quite eager on returning oil to the market, which is positive for compliant tank utilization.

我們也看到歐佩克立場和政策的一些積極動向。至少到目前為止，他們似乎非常渴望將石油重返市場，這對合規油罐的利用率有利。

I'm also going to come into or talk into old school demand, supply and inventory movements. It's quite funny, this chart was a recurring theme in our presentations kind of early in 2020 and 2021 and so forth, but it's been out of the deck for a while. But there are some interesting moves happening.

我還將討論或談論傳統的需求、供應和庫存變動。很有趣的是，這張圖表是我們 2020 年初和 2021 年等演示中反覆出現的主題，但它已經有一段時間沒有出現了。但確實有一些有趣的舉動正在發生。

And also, again, reiterate the same after Q4 report. Active trading fleet has stopped growing and despite the deliveries we're going to see in 2025 and to some extent '26 as well. The overall trading fleet looks to continue to reduce.

並且，在第四季度報告之後再次重申這一點。活躍的貿易船隊已經停止成長，儘管我們將在 2025 年甚至某種程度上在 2026 年看到交付。整體貿易船隊規模似乎將持續減少。

I would very much like to draw your attention to the chart on the top right-hand side, and this is kind of mind boggling. If you look at vessels that are either sanctions, not sanctioned yet, but have been lifting Iranian-Russian (inaudible) barrels during the last year or are older than 20 years that population of vessels makes up 25% of the VLCC fleet. It makes up 46% of the Suezmax fleet and 52% of the Afra/LR2 fleet.

我非常想提請您注意右上角的圖表，這有點令人難以置信。如果你看看那些受到製裁或尚未受到製裁，但在過去一年中一直在裝載伊朗-俄羅斯（聽不清楚）石油的船隻，或者船齡超過 20 年的船隻，這些船隻佔 VLCC 船隊的 25%。它佔蘇伊士型油輪船隊的 46% 和 Afra/LR2 型油輪船隊的 52%。

Of course, a reversal of actions will make a material amount of particularly Suezmax and Aframax return to the market. A lot of these guys that are lifting Russian barrels are doing so in accordance with the price cap. So they are, of course, perfectly allowed to do that but any tightening on sanctions could suddenly make them move from the gray side to the more dark side.

當然，逆轉行動將使大量船舶特別是蘇伊士型油輪和阿芙拉型油輪重返市場。許多偷運俄羅斯石油的人都是按照價格上限行事的。因此，他們當然完全可以這樣做，但任何制裁的加強都可能突然讓他們從灰色地帶走向更黑暗的一面。

There is also an increase in demand for non-UA listed vessels, in particular the Russian market. And this portion of the fleet is gradually growing. But it also exemplifies how sensitive our market is to sanctions and changes in sanctions, basically due to the amount of tonnage that is up or in play.

對非 UA 上市船舶的需求也有所增加，尤其是俄羅斯市場。而這部分船隊規模還在逐漸擴大。但這也顯示我們的市場對制裁和製裁變化的敏感度，這主要是由於增加或正在發揮作用的噸位數量所致。

So let's move to slide 9 and look at the old school market logics. The chart on the left, it is a bit extreme, but it's obviously post-COVID development in oil demand and supply. So quite a steep pricing curve there in the beginning, but now, it's more normalized. If you look at the gray area, which represents EIA latest forecast, we're actually moving into an overall supply and demand around 106 million barrels by the end of 2026.

那麼讓我們轉到第 9 張投影片，看看老派的市場邏輯。左邊的圖表有點極端，但顯然是疫情後石油需求和供應的發展。因此，一開始定價曲線相當陡峭，但現在更正常了。如果你看一下代表 EIA 最新預測的灰色區域，那麼到 2026 年底，我們的整體供需水準實際上將達到 1.06 億桶左右。

What's more interesting is that supply, and this is obviously motivated by [OPEC's] increase, but also or fueled by OPEC's increase but also to some extent, by expected production growth in especially Guiana and some in Brazil where we're going to end up in an oversupplied position in the oil markets.

更有趣的是供應，這顯然是受到 [OPEC] 增產的推動，但也受到 OPEC 增產的推動，但在某種程度上，也受到預期產量增長的影響，特別是圭亞那和巴西的部分地區，最終將導致石油市場供應過剩。

Historically, and this is the chart on the right. If you look at the ebb and flows of inventory builds and grows, they correlate quite strongly to the performance of the overall tanker market. This is pretty easy to explain, and this is not due to utilization by way of floating storage.

從歷史上看，這是右邊的圖表。如果你觀察庫存的增加和成長的起伏，你會發現它們與整個油輪市場的表現有著相當密切的關聯。這很容易解釋，這並不是由於利用浮動儲存造成的。

You don't need a carrier strong enough to achieve this in the market. It's simply the incremental volume that ends up being transported that's not going directly for consummation it's going for storages, either in China, Japan, Korea or even in the US. And I don't think I need to remind the audience that we are at years low inventory around the globe.

您不需要一個足夠強大的運營商來實現市場上的這一目標。最終被運輸的增量量並沒有直接用於消費，而是儲存在中國、日本、韓國甚至美國。我認為我不需要提醒觀眾，我們全球的庫存多年來一直處於低位。

Let's move to slide 10. I'd just go through some of the headlines affecting tankers these days. So on tariffs, there was a 90-day delay on the enforcement of the Liberation Day tariff and the tariffs themselves are being eased. Also on the tariff side, energy is to a large exempt. So we don't really fear this will affect global trading patterns that much.

讓我們翻到第 10 張投影片。我只是想回顧一下最近影響油輪的一些頭條新聞。因此，在關稅方面，解放日關稅的執行被推遲了 90 天，關稅本身也在降低。另外在關稅方面，能源在很大程度上是免稅的。所以我們並不擔心這會對全球貿易模式產生太大影響。

On the USTR, the recent proposal from USTR shows a softening stand or softening wording with the key exceptions for oil and energy. The final proposal is expected by the end of May after the more recent hearing. But so far, it looks like exports from the US is extent and oil discharge into the US is not a material exposure to Frontline and also half of our fleet is non-Chinese. So we may still be able to serve that market.

關於美國貿易代表辦公室，美國貿易代表辦公室最近的提案表現出軟化的立場或軟化的措辭，但對石油和能源做出了關鍵的例外規定。預計最終提案將在最近的聽證會後於五月底公佈。但到目前為止，看起來美國的出口量和排入美國的石油對 Frontline 來說並不構成實質影響，而且我們船隊的一半都不是中國產的。所以我們可能仍然能夠服務該市場。

Overall, the US accounts for around 17% of the global oil market. So it's not an absolute disaster if this is related to relationship or communication from the USTR remains as we saw it last. We have maximum pressure on Iran 2.0 or a nuclear deal. This is back in the headlines in the middle of this trade war.

整體而言，美國佔全球石油市場的17%左右。因此，如果這與美國貿易代表辦公室的關係或溝通仍然像我們上次看到的那樣，那麼這並不是一場絕對的災難。我們對伊朗2.0或核協議施加最大壓力。在貿易戰期間，此事再次成為頭條新聞。

Negotiations are ongoing, but in the case of making a nuclear deal with Iran for them, lifting sanctions is a red line. And if the audience can imagine what will happen then. So 1.4 million to 1.6 million barrels per day of export capacity that can grow quite rapidly will then all of a sudden become a compliant barrel. And as I've said repetitively, compliant barrels need compliant ships.

談判仍在進行中，但對他們來說，與伊朗達成核協議，解除制裁是一條紅線。如果觀眾能夠想像接下來會發生什麼事。因此，每天 140 萬至 160 萬桶的出口能力會迅速增長，然後突然變成合規桶。正如我反覆說過的，合規的桶子需要合規的船。

Yes, you might see some vessels being able to return to the compliance market but in general terms, most of the vessels that are engaged in Iranian trade right now have absolutely no chance to come back into the compliant market.

是的，你可能會看到一些船隻能夠重返合規市場，但總的來說，目前從事伊朗貿易的大多數船隻根本沒有機會重返合規市場。

The actors in the compliance market have extremely strict rules and relations around the ships they want to engage. And these ships are also carrying an environmental risk cargo worth for VLCC around $120 million. So it's not something a charter is going to kind of take a light on.

合規市場的參與者對其想要參與的船舶有著極為嚴格的規則和關係。這些船隻還裝載了對超大型油輪來說價值約 1.2 億美元的環境風險貨物。所以這不是憲章能夠解決的事情。

Then we have Russian sanctions expansion, this peace or a ceasefire discussion going on between Russia and Ukraine. On the table, there will for sure be sanctions either lifting or tightening? Whether we look at it right now, it's more likely that we're going to see tightening rather than easing.

然後我們看到俄羅斯的製裁擴大，俄羅斯和烏克蘭之間正在進行和平或停火談判。談判桌上一定會有取消或加強制裁的提議嗎？無論我們現在如何看待這個問題，我們更有可能看到的是緊縮政策而不是寬鬆政策。

EU lastly, added 168 or I thought thereabouts vessels to their sanction list. UK added 100 about 1.5 weeks ago and it seems like OFAC is going to continue their pursuit to find sanctions breakers around the Russian trade. There is also a discussion coming up whether if the oil price cap is going to be reduced from $60 to $50. So a lot of excitement on that.

歐盟最終將約168艘船隻列入製裁名單。英國大約在一周半前增加了 100 個制裁對象，看來 OFAC 將繼續搜尋俄羅斯貿易周圍的製裁違規者。目前還正在進行討論，是否要將石油價格上限從 60 美元降至 50 美元。因此，我對此感到非常興奮。

Then sale exemptions removal, there was formally a situation where you could export equity barrels out of Venezuela so typically Chevron were allowed to take the oil that they actually own in Venezuela. This has to a large degree now been removed, and it's only on a case-by-case basis. We see Chevron being able to take oil out of Venezuela. This means that their exports, which actually grew to 800,000 barrels a day in the last cycle is now going dark.

然後取消銷售豁免，正式出現了一種情況，你可以將權益石油出口出委內瑞拉，因此雪佛龍通常被允許帶走他們在委內瑞拉實際擁有的石油。現在，這一問題已在很大程度上被消除，並且僅根據具體情況進行處理。我們看到雪佛龍能夠從委內瑞拉運出石油。這意味著，他們的出口量正在下降，而在上一個週期，他們的出口量實際上增長到了每天 80 萬桶。

And then we have this, as I also touched upon earlier, the Shandong Port and India OFAC compliance. This is extremely welcoming because it's actually the only way sanctions can work is that the receivers or the actors self-functioning using these vessels.

然後我們有了這一點，正如我之前提到的，山東港和印度 OFAC 合規性。這是非常受歡迎的，因為實際上製裁發揮作用的唯一方法是接收者或行為者利用這些容器自行運作。

We have the Red Sea, Israel and Hamas and I should add in the US to this. There is now a ceasefire between US and the Houthis. This has not materially changed our position on trading the Red Sea area. And it has not materially altered traffic claims yet but it's also so that it's quite a fluid situation and any kind of action that happens around this conflict could suddenly trigger an attack.

我們有紅海、以色列和哈馬斯，我還應該加上美國。目前，美國與胡塞武裝已達成停火協議。這並沒有實質地改變我們在紅海地區貿易問題上的立場。目前，這還沒有從根本上改變交通索賠，但情況也相當不穩定，圍繞這一衝突發生的任何行動都可能突然引發襲擊。

So, so far, we do not want to risk the lives of our seafarers by trading through the Red Sea. But then finally, we have OFAC (inaudible) which is almost disappearing in all these other narratives that have said that they might potentially kind of return their voluntary cuts back to the market by October.

因此，到目前為止，我們不想透過紅海進行貿易，從而危及海員的生命。但最後，我們有了 OFAC（聽不清楚），它在所有其他敘述中幾乎消失了，這些敘述表示他們可能會在 10 月之前將自願減產返還給市場。

It's going to be exciting to see what comes out of the next meeting, and there is already signals that they might add 411,000 barrels per day in July as well. What we have seen in the initial production rises have not really given us that many more molecules into the market.

下次會議的結果令人興奮，而且已經有跡象表明，7 月他們可能還會增加 411,000 桶/日的產量。我們看到的初期產量成長其實並沒有為市場帶來更多的分子。

I think this is primarily due to the fact but it's more a paper exercise to catch up to the overproduction that's already present in OPEC. But from June onwards, the volumes that might come will be real molecules coming into the market.

我認為這主要是由於事實，但這更像是一種紙上談兵，以彌補歐佩克已經存在的生產過剩。但從六月開始，可能出現的量將成為真正進入市場的分子。

I'd like to draw your attention to the right-hand side on this slide, and you've all seen the fleet development with the orange line being vessels just plainly below 20 years of age. And again, it's still so that very few shafters, if any, accept the ship that's above 20 years in our industry.

我想提請大家注意這張幻燈片的右側，大家都看到了船隊的發展情況，橙色線表示船齡不到 20 年的船隻。而且，在我們的行業中，很少有船長（如果有的話）會接受船齡超過 20 年的船舶。

But if you look at the chart now, here, we've looked at basically all tankers that take part in the market that are not OFAC listed and not on long-term storage and not coastal trading tankers. And there, you can see that the overall tanker fleet actually shrunk by 0.5% in 2024 and including all the deliveries coming into 2025. It's not really that many, but there are some looks to continue to shrink.

但如果你現在看一下圖表，我們基本上查看了參與市場的所有油輪，這些油輪未在 OFAC 上市，並且不是長期儲存的油輪，也不是沿海貿易油輪。您可以看到，包括 2025 年交付的所有油輪在內，2024 年整體油輪船隊規模實際上縮減了 0.5%。其實不算多，但有些看起來還在持續縮小。

Let's move to slide 11, and I'm quite happy to say that sanctions actually do work not by way of volume. It's more or less -- it's quite sticky, the volume that is coming into the market. But by way of the fleet that is actually carrying this oil.

讓我們翻到第 11 張投影片，我很高興地說，制裁確實有效，不是通過數量。或多或少——進入市場的數量相當大。而是透過實際運送石油的船隊。

The January expansion of particular of sanctions and also the self-sanctioning by China and India has made the market conditions for an OFAC listed tanker extremely poor. As particularly, the Russian crude has been below the price cap, it's attracted a lot of compliance tonnage to come in and service this market. But this kind of fall in utilization OFAC listed tankers is extremely promising.

今年 1 月，制裁範圍擴大，加上中國和印度的自我制裁，導致 OFAC 列出的油輪的市場狀況極為惡劣。特別是由於俄羅斯原油價格一直低於價格上限，它吸引了大量合規噸位進入並為該市場提供服務。但 OFAC 列出的油輪利用率的這種下降是非常有前景的。

On the right-hand side on the top, we've played with a scenario that sanctions are removed and this is important because tightening sanctions and removal of sanctions will actually both yield a positive effect on our market. And there's about 7 million barrels per day of global transported oil that is exposed to one sanction or another around the world.

在右上方，我們模擬了製裁被取消的情景，這很重要，因為加強制裁和取消制裁實際上都會對我們的市場產生積極影響。全球每天運輸的石油約有 700 萬桶，受到世界各地各種制裁的影響。

And just imagine if all this comes back. It's not likely, but it just gives you a picture. This 7 million barrels would equate to more than 200 VLCCs worth of transport need and looking at the fleet composition, it's not very likely that we have that kind of capacity easily.

想像一下如果這一切都再次發生。這不太可能，但它只是給你一個畫面。這 700 萬桶相當於 200 多艘 VLCC 的運輸需求，從船隊組成來看，我們不太可能輕易擁有這種運力。

I think it is, however, likely that one or maybe two of these will actually come in and become non-sanction barrels over the next years. Back to sanctions. This is due work. If you look at Iranian crude inventories, the floating storage seems to be on the rise. And this is basically due to crude struggling to find a home.

不過，我認為，未來幾年內，其中一兩桶石油可能會真正進入美國市場，並成為非制裁石油桶。回到製裁問題。這是應盡的義務。如果你看一下伊朗原油庫存，你會發現浮動庫存似乎正在增加。這基本上是由於原油難以找到歸宿。

Let's move to slide 12 and looking at the good old order book. There's nothing material that's changed since our Q4 report, but I'd like to draw the attention to the fact that for the VLCCs that are now far more OFAC-listed VLCCs than there are vessels in the order book.

讓我們翻到第 12 張投影片並查看舊的訂單簿。自從我們發布第四季度報告以來，沒有什麼重大變化，但我想提請大家注意這樣一個事實：目前，OFAC 列出的 VLCC 數量遠遠超過訂單中的船隻數量。

Suezmax more of the same, if you adjust for was on OFAC and mind you, OFAC listed vessels are extremely unlikely to return to the compliant market, the order book is almost ignorable. And the same goes for Aframax and LR2s, even though the LR2 has a very high nominal order book.

蘇伊士型油輪的情況也大致相同，如果您根據 OFAC 進行調整，請注意，OFAC 列出的船隻極不可能重返合規市場，訂單量幾乎可以忽略不計。阿芙拉型油輪和 LR2 型油輪的情況也一樣，儘管 LR2 型油輪的名義訂單量非常高。

If we look or kind of have a look back at the chart I showed on slide 8, with 52% of that fleet exposed to one sanction or another, we're actually not that worried about that fleet going forward. Also, on the age situation for LR2s in particular, they seem to lose efficiency and become less attractive as a products trading vessel at the age of 15. And this is still the case in the normal tanker market.

如果我們看一下或回顧我在第 8 張幻燈片上展示的圖表，我們會發現 52% 的船隊受到了這樣或那樣的製裁，我們實際上並不擔心這些船隊未來的發展。此外，就LR2型油輪的船齡而言，在船齡超過15年時，它們的效率似乎會下降，作為產品貿易船的吸引力也會降低。在正常的油輪市場中，情況依然如此。

So let's move to slide 13 and look at the summary. I've basically put the positive heading of pressure building question mark. That's at least what it feels like on the floor here. So oil supply and demand suggest we approach a period with the old school inventory buildings with the utilization implications that has for the tanker market in general.

讓我們翻到第 13 張投影片並查看摘要。我基本上已經對壓力增大的正向方向打上了問號。至少這裡的地面感覺是這樣。因此，石油供需表明，我們正進入一個老式庫存建築的時期，這對整個油輪市場的利用率有影響。

Demand for compliant tonnage is growing as the sanction scope and enforcement widens. And again, the fact that certain key players in this market are actually self-sanctioning, particularly against OFAC. Less active tanker fleet growth will remain muted for 2025. We actually continue to see oil demand looking to increase and considering the aging of the fleet, this gives us the tailwind we need further into '25 and into '26.

隨著制裁範圍和執法力度的擴大，對合規噸位的需求也在增加。事實是，這個市場的某些關鍵參與者實際上正在自我制裁，特別是針對 OFAC 的製裁。到 2025 年，活躍油輪船隊成長仍將保持低迷。事實上，我們看到石油需求持續增加，考慮到船隊的老化，這為我們進入2025年和2026年提供了所需的順風。

Policy changes do create more questions and answers. We will get hopefully some answers by the end of this month, but the overall wording has softened. And again, I'm going to repeat this until it changes, world oil trade continues to be serviced by the oldest fleet in more than two decades.

政策變化確實帶來了更多的問題和答案。我們希望在本月底能得到一些答案，但整體措辭已經變得溫和了。我要再說一遍，直到情況發生變化，世界石油貿易仍然由二十多年來最古老的船隊提供服務。

And obviously, if we look at the regulatory landscape we are in with the carbonization being a key goal for the industry, this is very contradicting. And lastly, Frontline continue to retain our material upside, as Inger pointed to. We have a modern spot-exposed fleet ready to service the compliant oil market.

顯然，如果我們看看我們所處的監管環境，將碳化作為該行業的關鍵目標，這是非常矛盾的。最後，正如 Inger 指出的那樣，Frontline 繼續保持我們的物質優勢。我們擁有一支現代化的現場運輸船隊，隨時準備為合規石油市場提供服務。

Thank you for that, and we can open up for questions.

謝謝您，我們可以開始提問了。

(Operator Instructions) Sherif Elmaghrabi, BTIG.

（操作員指示）Sherif Elmaghrabi，BTIG。

Hi. Thanks for taking my questions. First, at a high level, when I look at VLCC fixtures over the last few weeks, activity in the Atlantic has been a bit on the quiet side. Do you think that's a reaction to OPEC's accelerated ramp? And do you have a sense what might drive more long-haul cargoes out of the Atlantic Basin?

你好。感謝您回答我的問題。首先，從總體上看，當我查看過去幾週的 VLCC 租船情況時，發現大西洋的活動有點平靜。您認為這是對 OPEC 加速增產的反應嗎？您是否知道什麼因素可能會促使更多的長途貨物流出大西洋盆地？

Yeah. No. It's a very good question. The [ARB] and basically the economics of US exports is very much an ebb and flow business. We actually find it difficult to explain the quietness in the US Gulf area as we speak, basically. In general terms, there is quite a bit of tonnage sitting on oil majors and traders' hands.

是的。不。這是一個非常好的問題。[ARB] 以及美國出口經濟基本上都是一個起伏不定的行業。事實上，我們很難解釋美國墨西哥灣地區的平靜。整體而言，石油巨頭和貿易商手中積壓著相當多的噸位。

And these are fixtures you will not really see in the market. They will basically be concluded in-house, and the material will sail. So it could be a degree of that. But it could also be a degree of refinery runs in the US ahead of summer. That basically lessens the demand for exports or the push for exports.

這些都是您在市場上不會見到的裝置。它們基本上將在內部完成，並且材料將會順利完成。所以這可能是某種程度的。但這也可能是美國煉油廠在夏季來臨前一定程度的開工。這實際上減少了​​出口需求或出口推動力。

And lastly, there is also an element around Canada, who have increased their exports away from US, not materially because it's limited mostly to the TMX pipeline expansion, but it also adds to the picture.

最後，還有一個因素是加拿大，它增加了對美國的出口，雖然不是實質性的，因為它主要限於 TMX 管道擴建，但它也增加了影響。

But as I say on the same note, we have seen extremely active flows coming out of Brazil and also a good volume coming out of Guyana. And we've also seen an increased interest, particularly from India on lifting West African barrels.

但正如我在同一篇評論中所說的那樣，我們看到來自巴西的資金流入極其活躍，來自圭亞那的資金流也相當可觀。我們也看到，特別是印度對進口西非石油的興趣日益濃厚。

That's great color, Lars. And just one on, I guess, on the operating side. Operating costs were a bit higher sequentially and also year-over-year on a per vessel basis. So could you shed some light on what's driving that?

顏色真棒，拉爾斯。我想，在操作方面只有一個。以每艘船計算，營運成本比上一季略高，比去年同期也略高。那麼，您能否解釋一下造成這現象的原因？

Yeah. If you refer to this ship operating expenses this quarter, it was more like a going rate in a way. The number you had last quarter was affected by rebates on insurance and on the supplier rebates, about $4.9 million. So I think the $60.3 million is more like going ahead in a way.

是的。如果您參考本季的船舶營運費用，它在某種程度上更像是一種現行費率。上個季度的數字受到保險回扣和供應商回扣的影響，約 490 萬美元。所以我認為 6030 萬美元在某種程度上更像是向前邁進。

Also, if you refer to the administrative expenses, you can't really compare these two numbers, I guess, each other. You have to adjust for this re-evaluation of the synthetic option liability that we are giving information about in the press release.

此外，如果您參考管理費用，我想您實際上無法比較這兩個數字。您必須根據我們在新聞稿中提供的有關合成選擇權責任的重新評估進行調整。

In the Q4, you had a gain of $7.9 million and in Q1, you have a loss of $1.6 million. So if you do those adjustments, you will see that the cost increase in Q1 on administrative expenses is only $2 million. And then you have the interest expense, which is down from previous quarter with about $6 million. So all in all, actually, we are quite good on cost development.

在第四季度，您的收益為 790 萬美元，而在第一季度，您的損失為 160 萬美元。因此，如果您進行這些調整，您會發現第一季的管理費用成本增加僅為 200 萬美元。然後是利息支出，比上一季下降了約 600 萬美元。總而言之，實際上，我們在成本開發方面做得相當不錯。

John Chappell, Evercore ISI.

約翰‧查佩爾 (John Chappell)，Evercore ISI。

Thank you. Good afternoon, Lars. Frontline had a tried and true strategy. You're sticking with it, a lot of spot market exposure, 100% dividend payout ratio, you just refinanced the balance sheet probably arguably the strongest -- the capital structure has been this millennium.

謝謝。下午好，拉爾斯。前線有一個經過實踐檢驗的策略。你堅持下去，大量的現貨市場敞口，100％的股息支付率，你剛剛為資產負債表進行了再融資，這可能是最強勁的——資本結構一直是本世紀的。

You've laid out a very positive industry dynamic with OPEC production increases in the older fleet and all the headlines, et cetera, and it feels for the first time that business model isn't being appreciated. It feels like it's the first time with this much of a positive outlook in the industry, your balance sheet as strong as it is, still well above cash breakeven and that you're trading at a discount to NAV.

您已經展示了非常積極的行業動態，包括歐佩克增加老舊油輪的產量以及所有的頭條新聞等等，但感覺這種商業模式第一次沒有受到重視。感覺這是業界第一次出現如此樂觀的前景，您的資產負債表如此強勁，仍然遠高於現金損益平衡點，而且您的交易價格低於資產淨值。

So do you feel like there needs to be a strategic change, whether it's the way that you think about your leverage, whether it's the way you think about your fleet, the dividend versus buyback? Anything that you think needs to be altered to get Frontline back to that premium valuation at a time when the industry outlook is still favorable?

那麼，您是否覺得需要進行策略性變革，無論是您對槓桿的看法，還是您對車隊的看法，還是股利與回購的看法？在產業前景依然看好的情況下，您認為需要做出哪些改變才能讓 Frontline 恢復到溢價估值？

It's an extremely good question, John. And you've been very long in head in Frontline very well. And the fact that we're giving this kind of discount surprises as well. Relative to peers, Q4 was -- not relative to peers, but together with peers, Q4 was an absolute disaster for tanker stocks.

這是一個非常好的問題，約翰。你在前線已經待了很久了。事實上，我們提供這種折扣也令人驚訝。相對於同行，第四季——不是相對於同行，而是與同行一起，第四季度對於油輪股票來說絕對是一場災難。

I think kind of if you compare it to last year this time, it was a lot more fun to be a tanker CEO and the incoming calls from large generalists globally was literally on a weekly basis. I think they did not appreciate the fact that the second half last year failed and have lots of alternatives in their investment universe.

我認為，如果與去年同期相比，擔任油輪執行長要有趣得多，而且每週都會接到來自全球大型綜合企​​業的電話。我認為他們沒有意識到去年下半年的失敗，而且他們的投資領域還有很多其他選擇。

So it means that we basically have kind of an outflow of shareholders in our stock, which has put us on under some pressure. We also note that the short interest in Frontline is a unusual high which probably could be in connection with kind of big investment banks having global strategies going and we're a shortened Frontline suit that purpose.

所以這意味著我們股票的股東基本上出現了流出，這給我們帶來了一些壓力。我們也注意到，Frontline 的空頭利息異常高，這可能與大型投資銀行正在實施的全球策略有關，而我們縮短的 Frontline 正好符合這一目的。

So my impression is that previously, investors were willing to price expectations or a 12-month forward NAV into the share, but they have a much lower in connection of doing that now and basically want to see the proof in the pudding before they make the investment decision.

因此，我的印像是，以前投資者願意將預期或 12 個月的遠期資產淨值計入股票價格，但現在他們這樣做的意願要低得多，基本上是想在做出投資決定之前先看到事實的檢驗。

So that I think that's kind of I hope that's the kind of reason and not necessarily that front line is running the wrong strategy. We're actually trying to act quite disciplined in this market, it's tempting to engage in the same time charter contracting and take away the upside.

所以我認為這是一種我希望是的原因，而不一定是前線執行了錯誤的策略。實際上，我們正​​試圖在這個市場上採取相當自律的行動，參與同期租船合約並消除上行空間是很誘人的。

Some of our peers have done that quite extensively. We want to retain the upside because we still have a very firm belief that this market is going to kind of give us some money back over the coming years.

我們的一些同行已經相當廣泛地做了這件事。我們希望保留上行空間，因為我們仍然堅信這個市場將在未來幾年為我們帶來一些回報。

Just as a quick follow-up to that, and along the same lines of thinking, there's also been some asset sales in the industry at values that are still somewhat elevated, especially for older tonnage. And I understand that the sanction fleet or shadow fleet where you want to call it is under a bit more pressure.

順著這個思路快速跟進一下，業內也有一些資產出售，其價值仍然有些高，尤其是老噸位的資產。我理解，你所說的製裁艦隊或影子艦隊承受的壓力更大一些。

But are there opportunities for you? You still have 81 vessels, a ton of operating leverage. Are there some older vessels that you may be able to monetize now without giving up much of your operating leverage? But maybe providing a bit of an arb on asset values versus equity value?

但你還有機會嗎？您仍然擁有 81 艘船，並擁有巨大的經營槓桿。是否有一些較舊的船隻，您現在可以透過它們賺錢而不需要放棄太多的經營槓桿？但或許可以提供一些資產價值與股權價值之間的套利？

Of course, but as you probably appreciate, and I don't think it's a big secret, some of the demand for the more vintage tonnage is coming from counterparties that quite obviously want to engage in trades we don't like. So we're very cautious on addressing that market.

當然，但正如你可能意識到的，而且我認為這不是什麼大秘密，對更老式噸位的需求部分來自於那些顯然想參與我們不喜歡的交易的交易對手。因此，我們對該市場的態度非常謹慎。

However, there are also players out there and that's not necessarily a big owners now, but have a growth strategy for the compliant market and actually see the same opportunity in buying vessels that have five to seven years life in them or for storage projects or conversion projects. So you're right, there are opportunities out there. But we want to retain this magic [$30,000] earnings days per year. We have maybe one candidate out there, but it's not going to be material in our strategy to reduce the fleet here.

然而，也有一些參與者，現在不一定是大型船東，但他們有合規市場的成長策略，並且實際上看到了購買使用壽命為五到七年的船舶或用於存儲項目或改裝項目的同樣的機會。所以你說得對，機會還是有的。但我們希望保留這個神奇的每年 30,000 美元的收入天數。我們可能有一個候選人，但它不會成為我們減少艦隊策略的重要組成部分。

Omar Nokta, Jefferies.

傑富瑞的奧馬爾諾克塔 (Omar Nokta)。

Thank you. Hi, Lars. Hi, Inger. Good afternoon. Just a couple of questions from my end and maybe just first on the market. We've seen obviously VLCCs improve here into the second quarter, definitely better than what we saw second half of last year.

謝謝。你好，拉爾斯。你好，英格。午安.我只想問幾個問題，也許這只是市場上第一個問題。我們看到 VLCC 在第二季明顯有所改善，肯定比去年下半年的情況要好。

As you said, it was a real disappointment back then. But things have improved, although they don't necessarily jump off the page when we look at where rates are. I guess from your perspective, how would you say things have been progressing.

正如你所說，當時確實令人失望。但情況已經有所改善，儘管當我們查看利率水準時，這些改善並不一定會引人注目。我想從您的角度來看，您認為事情進展如何。

We've seen the sanctions take out a big portion of the fleet. We've got the OPEC volumes now coming. How do you explain the rate structure today? Is it still too early to expect a real gapping up? Have we seen the benefit yet of these sanctions fully? Or is there still more to come?

我們看到製裁使很大一部分船隊遭到破壞。我們現在已經獲得了 OPEC 的產量。您如何解釋今天的費率結構？現在期待真正的跳空上漲是否還為時過早？我們是否已經充分看到了這些制裁的好處？或者還有更多的事情發生？

I don't think we've seen it fully. Well, first of all, just on the OPEC side, as I mentioned in the presentation, we haven't really seen the impact on cargoes that they have kind of month-over-month growth materially from the Middle East OPEC producers. And the only kind of area where we've seen a significant growth is out of Kazakhstan, which might actually be the reason why OPEC decided to do this.

我認為我們還沒有完全看到這一點。首先，就 OPEC 方面而言，正如我在演講中提到的那樣，我們還沒有真正看到中東 OPEC 產油國的產量對貨物量的影響，環比增長幅度並不顯著。我們看到的唯一一個顯著增長的地區是哈薩克斯坦，這也許就是歐佩克決定這樣做的原因。

But on the general note, what we're observing and hopefully it's a trend is that ever since it started off, of course Venezuela being sanctioned around going back being fully sanctioned and we saw that volume getting kind of moving over to the dark side. Then Chem Russia, which is a big chunk coming into the dark side, basically, the incremental barrel that comes to market now and mind you, demand is still growing is actually coming from compliance sources.

但總體而言，我們觀察到並且希望這是一個趨勢，那就是自從制裁開始以來，委內瑞拉當然就一直受到製裁，然後又重新受到全面製裁，我們看到製裁的數量開始轉向黑暗面。然後是俄羅斯化學公司，這是進入黑暗面的一大塊，基本上，現在進入市場的增量桶，請注意，需求仍在增長，實際上來自合規來源。

So the market that we operate in has actually seen a gradually declining volume, particularly, Iran has been able to ramp up their exports quite materially second half last year. And but now that's finished too. And I've said before that this will be solved eventually anyway because kind of it's not very likely that Iran, Venezuela or Russia can manage to increase direct production and exports materially going forward.

因此，我們經營的市場其實已經出現了出口量逐漸下降的現象，特別是伊朗在去年下半年已經大幅增加了出口量。但現在這也結束了。我之前說過，這個問題最終都會得到解決，因為伊朗、委內瑞拉或俄羅斯不太可能在未來大幅增加直接產量和出口。

Then you need compliant oil exports to grow to satisfy demand. And that seems to be going on now and further amplified by the fact that the OPEC is returning barrels to the market. So this is kind of good news for the compliant fleet. And a lot of these barrels are VLCC barrels.

然後你需要增加合規的石油出口來滿足需求。現在這種情況似乎正在發生，而石油輸出國組織 (OPEC) 向市場重新供應石油使這種情況進一步加劇。這對合規船隊來說是個好消息。其中很多桶子都是 VLCC 桶。

And that's why we made a huge investment in VLCC, half our fleet are VLCCs. We believe that maybe it can be the dorm of a proper VLCC market over the next six months.

這就是我們對 VLCC 進行巨額投資的原因，我們的船隊中有一半都是 VLCC。我們相信，未來六個月內，它或許可以成為真正的 VLCC 市場的基地。

Thanks Lars. And I guess maybe just a quick follow-up to that point over the next six months, your last comment there. How do you think the summer seasonality shakes out this year? Does that take a back seat you think to kind of the current dynamics that you're talking about?

謝謝拉爾斯。我想也許只是在接下來的六個月裡對這一點進行快速跟進，這是您的最後一條評論。您認為今年夏季的季節性如何？您認為這與您所談論的當前動態相比是否處於次要地位？

I think the most exciting part around what's going to happen in the near term and over the summer, I think on which will sit now, the slide 11, where I mentioned that sanctions actually do work. Any action coming out of EU or US in respect of the sanctions and it's very likely to come quickly because either you have a breakdown or a success in the nuclear talks in Iran or people get tired of no ceasefire being able to be negotiated between Russia and Iran.

我認為最令人興奮的部分是關於近期和夏季將發生的事情，我想現在就在第 11 張幻燈片上，我在那裡提到製裁確實有效。歐盟或美國就制裁採取的任何行動都很可能很快到來，因為要么是伊朗核談判破裂，要么是成功，要么是人們對俄羅斯和伊朗之間無法達成停火協議感到厭倦。

So I think we're talking weeks rather than months before you're going to see increased action either way in this respect. And since this volume is pulling now so much tonnage out of the compliant market. And also these sanctions means so much to the utilization on the compliant fleet. I think we can have a very interesting summer if you just look at the political narrative around these two situations in particular.

因此我認為，我們談論的是幾週而不是幾個月的時間，你會看到這方面的行動增加。由於這一數量現在正在從合規市場中抽走大量噸位。這些制裁對於合規船隊的利用率也有很大影響。我認為，如果你特別關注這兩種情況的政治敘述，我們將會度過一個非常有趣的夏天。

Yeah. Thank you, Lars. And just a final one, maybe perhaps to you, Inger. The refinancing of the '24 VLCCs. Obviously, nice to have that termed out now until 2030. You did refinance as you mentioned, the release 3.5 years before maturity of the existing or prior facility.

是的。謝謝你，拉爾斯。最後一個問題，也許是給你的，英格。24艘VLCC的再融資。顯然，很高興現在就將這一期限延長至 2030 年。正如您所提到的，您確實進行了再融資，在現有或之前的融資到期前 3.5 年釋放了資金。

What would you say was the main driver of the refinance doing it so early was the margin benefit that important? Or was it really about extending the duration?

您認為這麼早就進行再融資的主要動力是什麼？保證金收益真的那麼重要嗎？還是真的是為了延長持續時間？

It was the margin reduction, which was the most important. And obviously, the extension was kind of a benefit on top of it the way.

最重要的是利潤率的降低。顯然，這種擴展在某種程度上來說是一種好處。

Can you get a sense of what the savings were on the spread?

您能了解利差省了多少錢嗎？

Well, we came from a level which was not, let's say, our norm. We can call it that. So I wouldn't be precise on it. But we were about 200 basis points and now we are at 170.

好吧，我們來自一個不符合我們常態的層次。我們可以這樣稱呼它。所以我不能對此做出精確的描述。但之前的利率約為 200 個基點，現在則為 170 個基點。

Geoffrey Scott, Scott Asset Management.

傑弗瑞‧史考特，史考特資產管理公司。

Good morning. Thank you for taking my question. On page 6 of the presentation, in the presentation for 4Q '24 said that the drydock for the next 12 months or for calendar '25 was going to be two Vs and one Suezmax tanker.

早安.感謝您回答我的問題。在簡報的第 6 頁中，24 年第四季的簡報中表示，未來 12 個月或 25 年的乾船塢將是兩艘 V 型油輪和一艘蘇伊士型油輪。

And then on today's presentation, we've upped it to 10 Vs, two Suez and five LRs. And all we've done is slide into the first quarter of 2026. Is that just a normal very heavy drydock for that first quarter of '26? Or is there something else happening to the maintenance of the fleet?

在今天的演示中，我們將其增加到 10 艘 V 型船、2 艘 Suez 型船和 5 艘 LR 型船。我們所做的一切就是進入 2026 年第一季。對於 26 年第一季來說，這只是一次普通的重型乾船塢嗎？還是艦隊維護方面出現了其他問題？

No. You're completely correct about what we mentioned that it was two VLCCs and one Suezmax last time we spoke. And that was for the calendar year of '25. Then what happened now is that two VLCCs were moved from '26 into in Q4 in '25.

不。您完全正確地理解了我們上次談話時提到的兩艘 VLCC 和一艘蘇伊士型油輪。這是 1925 年的情況。現在發生的情況是，兩艘 VLCC 從 26 年移至 25 年第四季。

And then in addition to that, we have added on the first quarter of '26 since this is a 12-month forward-looking cash breakeven rate. And that takes the total number to these 10 VLCCs, two Suezmax and five LR2s because it's kind of very many of these vessels which are going to be dry docked in 2026 or dry docked in the first quarter.

除此之外，我們還加入了 26 年第一季的數據，因為這是一個 12 個月的前瞻性現金損益平衡率。這樣，總數就達到了 10 艘 VLCC、2 艘 Suezmax 和 5 艘 LR2，因為這些船隻中有很多將於 2026 年或第一季進行乾船塢維修。

Okay. So it's a heavy maintenance for the first quarter of 2026?

好的。那麼這是 2026 年第一季的一次大維護嗎？

Yeah.

是的。

And just to add, this obviously follows the age and delivery of the vessel, it's not untypical that you have deliveries lumped into first quarter of any year. And this time, we have quite a few ships due in 2026.

另外，這顯然與船舶的年齡和交付情況有關，將交付集中在每年的第一季並不罕見。而這次，我們有不少船隻將於 2026 年交付。

Okay. Thank you. Quick question for you, Lars. You're suggesting it's going to be a lot harder to trade OFAC ships in the future, trade restrictions plus the age they're never coming back into the compliant market. One would think that would drive the older ships and the OFAC ships to scrapping.

好的。謝謝。拉爾斯，我問你一個快速問題。您認為，未來交易 OFAC 船舶將變得更加困難，貿易限制加上船齡，使它們永遠無法回到合規市場。人們可能會認為這會導致老舊船隻和 OFAC 船隻報廢。

And so far, that has not happened. What do you think will be necessary to drive that scrapping decision? And when do you think it's likely to happen? Thank you.

但到目前為止，這種情況還沒有發生。您認為需要什麼來推動這項廢除決定？您認為什麼時候最有可能發生？謝謝。

Yeah. No. It's a very, very good question and thank you for bringing it up because this is something that needs to come into the discussion with IMO and other regulatory offices or whatever you call it, because we actually have a big issue ahead of us.

是的。不。這是一個非常非常好的問題，感謝您提出這個問題，因為這是一個需要與國際海事組織和其他監管辦公室或不管您怎麼稱呼它進行討論的問題，因為我們實際上面臨著一個大問題。

If you look at, I think the last number I saw, if you combine all the various sanctioned entities and ships -- ships actually the relevant ones here. We were talking about 600, 700 ships being on OFAC list or EU sanction list or similar. What some of you might not know is that the recycling industry is a dollar industry.

如果你看一下，我認為我看到的最後一個數字，如果你把所有受制裁的實體和船隻結合起來——船隻實際上是與此相關的。我們談論的是 600 到 700 艘船被列入 OFAC 名單或歐盟制裁名單或類似名單。你們中的一些人可能不知道，回收業是一個美元產業。

And they need to do their KYC and they obviously can't buy a vessel for recycling from an actor that has broken sanctions. So this is kind of a clog in the recycling world. So there, I think actually the needs to be set up some sort of rules for exemptions for recycling. And this is typically where IMO as a UN organization can take a strong initiative in order to find a method how we can facilitate that because the scary picture is that these vessels will sit somewhere in Southeast Asia with keys in and just be kind of a floating environmental bumps.

他們需要進行 KYC，顯然他們不能從違反制裁的行為者那裡購買船隻進行回收。所以這對回收業來說是一個障礙。因此，我認為實際上需要製定某種回收豁免規則。而這正是國際海事組織作為聯合國組織可以​​採取強有力的舉措來尋找方法促進這一進程的地方，因為令人擔憂的是，這些船隻將停泊在東南亞的某個地方，成為漂浮的環境障礙物。

So it's a very kind of good point to make. And hopefully, this is going to come up higher on the agenda from the regulators, hopefully higher than further the decarbonization. So have that conversation first and then we can talk on the decarb later.

所以這是一個非常好的觀點。希望監管機構能將此議題列為更高層級的議程，希望其層級高於進一步脫碳。因此，我們先進行這個對話，然後稍後再討論脫羧問題。

And on timing, it's regretfully so that these processes take very, very long until they sit in front. So there was this -- we also see that was sitting outside Libya -- no, sorry, Syria, it sat there for 15 years until people were able to actually do something about it.

就時間而言，遺憾的是，這些過程需要很長時間才能完成。所以有這個——我們還看到它位於利比亞境外——不，對不起，是敘利亞，它在那裡待了 15 年，直到人們能夠真正採取行動。

Thank you. There are no further questions at this time. I would now like to down the conference back to Lars Barstad for closing remarks.

謝謝。目前沒有其他問題。現在我想請拉爾斯·巴斯塔德在會議結束時致閉幕詞。

Well, thank you very much for dialing in. Spring is ahead of us, hopefully, it will be a spring in the tanker market as well as we proceed. And obviously, every headline that comes up can be important for our markets. So with that, thank you all.

好的，非常感謝您撥入電話。春天已經來臨，希望隨著我們的前進，油輪市場也能迎來春天。顯然，出現的每一個頭條新聞對我們的市場都很重要。所以，謝謝大家。

This concludes today's conference call. Thank you for participating. You may now disconnect.

今天的電話會議到此結束。感謝您的參與。您現在可以斷開連線。