Frontline Plc (FRO) 2024 Q2 法說會逐字稿

Thank you for dialing into Frontline's quarterly earnings call for the second quarter of 2024 ended up very much in line with the first with volatility but ending up on a softer note as we entered the seasonal summer lows. Complications around war risks in the Middle East and tightening sanctions against Russia has regretfully becomes more and I will be touching on that later in the call.

感謝您撥入 Frontline 的 2024 年第二季財報電話會議，會議結果與第一次非常一致，波動性較大，但隨著我們進入夏季季節性低點，最終走勢較為疲軟。遺憾的是，中東戰爭風險和針對俄羅斯的製裁加劇了情勢的複雜程度，我將在稍後的電話會議中談到這一點。

It's important to remember, though, that we are at the seasonal lows, and we'd like to say that all shareholders have a very exciting fall ahead as from planned not have this number of potential moneymaking days going into the winter for decades.

但重要的是要記住，我們正處於季節性低谷，我們想說的是，所有股東都將迎來一個非常令人興奮的秋季，因為從計劃來看，幾十年來冬季都沒有這麼多的潛在賺錢天數。

Before I give the word to Inger, I'll run through our TCE numbers on slide 3 in the deck. In the second quarter of 2024 Frontline achieved $49,600 per day on our VLCC fleet, $45,600 per day on our Suezmax fleet and $53,100 per day from our LR2/Aframax fleet.

在向 Inger 報告之前，我將先瀏覽幻燈片第 3 頁上的 TCE 號碼。2024 年第二季度，Frontline 的 VLCC 船隊日均盈利 49,600 美元，蘇伊士型油輪船隊日均盈利 45,600 美元，LR2/阿芙拉型油輪船隊日均盈利 53,100 美元。

So far in the third quarter, 79% of our VLCC days are booked at $47,400, 85% of our Suezmax days are booked at $49,900 and 65% of our LR2/Aframax days are booked at $50,100 per day. Again, all these numbers are on a load to discharge basis, meaning they will be affected by the amount of ballast days we end up having at the end of the third quarter.

截至第三季度，我們 79% 的 VLCC 租船天數以 47,400 美元/天的價格預訂，我們 85% 的蘇伊士型油輪租船天數以 49,900 美元/天的價格預訂，我們 65% 的 LR2/阿芙拉型油型再次強調，所有這些數字都是基於裝載到卸載的，這意味著它們將受到我們在第三季末的壓載天數的影響。

Although Q3 bookings came in somewhat short of market expectations, please do keep in mind the buying rate characteristics of our market, especially as we come out of the seasonal lows.

儘管第三季的預訂量略低於市場預期，但請記住我們市場的購買率特徵，尤其是在我們走出季節性低谷的時候。

And then I'll let Inger take you through the financial highlights.

然後我將讓英格向您介紹財務亮點。

Thanks, Josh. And good morning and good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. And then turn to slide 4 and look at profit statement and highlights. We report a profit of $187.6 million or $0.84 per share this quarter, and adjusted profit of $138.2 million or $0.62 per share.

謝謝，喬希。女士們、先生們，大家早安、午安。然後翻到投影片 4，查看利潤表和重點內容。我們報告本季利潤為 1.876 億美元，即每股 0.84 美元，調整後利潤為 1.382 億美元，即每股 0.62 美元。

The adjusted profits in the second quarter was comparable to the first quarter as you could see from the slide, and the decrease in our TCE earnings with $12.4 million as a result of the disposal of three VLCCs and two Suezmax tankers was offset by a decrease in ship operating expenses, administrative expenses, depreciation and finance expense as well as an increase in interest income of $12.6 million, making up the $0.2 million increase in the quarter.

從幻燈片中可以看出，第二季度的調整後利潤與第一季相當，由於處置三艘 VLCC 和兩艘蘇伊士型油輪，我們的 TCE 收益減少了 1,240 萬美元，但這一減少被船舶運營費用、管理費用、折舊和財務費用的減少以及利息收入的增加 1,260 萬美元所抵消，彌補了本季 20 萬美元的增幅。

Let's move to slide 5 and look at the balance sheet. The balance sheet movements in this quarter are mainly related to sale of four vessels in the second quarter, of which one VLCC was held for sale in the first quarter and also to re-leverageing part of the existing fleet used to repay debt drawn to partly finance the acquisition of the 24 VLCCs from Euronav.

讓我們翻到投影片 5 並查看資產負債表。本季資產負債表的變動主要與第二季出售四艘船舶有關，其中一艘 VLCC 是在第一季度出售的，同時也與重新利用部分現有船隊有關，這些船隊用於償還為收購 Euronav 的 24 艘 VLCC 而藉入的債務。

Frontline has strong liquidity of $567 million in cash and cash equivalents, including undrawn amounts of the senior unsecured revolving credit facility, the marketable securities and minimum cash requirements to the banks as could you calculate to 2024. We have no remaining newbuilding commitments. Again, no meaningful debt maturity until '27.

Frontline 擁有 5.67 億美元的現金和現金等價物，流動性強勁，包括未提取的無擔保高級循環信貸額度、有價證券以及可計算至 2024 年的銀行最低現金需求。我們沒有剩餘的新造船承諾。再一次，直到 27 年才有有意義的債務到期。

Then you can look at slide 6. In the second and third quarters of 2024, we completed our strategy of freeing up capital by the deleveraging part of the existing fleet and also divesting older vessels, which enabled us to repay an aggregate of $395 million, which was strong on the Hemen shareholder loan and also under our revolving credit facility with an affiliate of Hemen to partly finance the acquisition of 24 VLCCs from Euronav.

然後你可以看投影片 6。在 2024 年第二季和第三季度，我們完成了透過去槓桿化現有船隊部分資產並剝離老舊船舶來釋放資本的策略，這使我們能夠償還總計 3.95 億美元的款項，這筆款項不僅來自 Hemen 股東貸款，還來自我們與 Hemen 附屬公司的循環信貸安排，用於部分融資從 Euronav VLCC 24 艘 VLCC。

From this slide, we have made a pair we can see that this has involved optimizing the capital structure through refinancing of 36 vessels and divesting eight older vessels. Total recent and ongoing refinancings in a total amount of $1.55 billion have secured long-term financing at highly attractive terms with a maturity of about eight years and have improved margins with about 30 basis points on a weighted average basis.

從這張幻燈片中，我們可以看到，這涉及透過對 36 艘船舶進行再融資和剝離 8 艘舊船舶來優化資本結構。近期及正在進行的再融資總額為 15.5 億美元，獲得了期限約為 8 年、極具吸引力的長期融資，加權平均利潤率提高了約 30 個基點。

The net expected cash proceeds from the refinancings is $548 million and $311 million from divesting older vessels.

再融資的預期淨現金收益為 5.48 億美元，而剝離舊船的預期淨現金收益為 3.11 億美元。

Let's then look at slide 7. Our fleet consists of 41 VLCCs, 23 Suezmax tankers and 18 LR2 tankers. It has an average age of six years and consistently 99% Eco vessels and whereof 56% is Scrubber fitted. We estimate average cash breakeven rates for the next 12 months of approximately $29,600 per day for VLCCs to $22,300 per day for Suezmax tankers and $21,200 per day for the LR2 tankers with a fleet average estimate of about $35,700 per day.

我們再來看投影片 7。我們的船隊由 41 艘 VLCC、23 艘蘇伊士型油輪和 18 艘 LR2 油輪組成。該船平均船齡為六年，其中 99% 為環保船舶，而 56% 則安裝了洗滌器。我們估計，未來 12 個月的平均現金損益平衡率：VLCC 約為每天 29,600 美元，蘇伊士型油輪為每天 22,300 美元，LR2 油輪為每天 21,200 美元，船隊平均盈虧平衡率估計約為每天 35,700 美元。

It is slightly down from previous quarter, mainly as a result of the financing and refinancing. The fleet average estimate includes dry-dock of two Suezmax tankers and four VLCCs in the next 12 months, whereof two VLCCs in the third quarter or '24, one versus the fourth quarter or '24, one Suezmax in the first quarter of '25 and one VLCCs and one Suezmax in second quarter or '25.

與上一季相比略有下降，主要由於融資和再融資。船隊平均規模預估包括未來 12 個月內兩艘蘇伊士型油輪和四艘巨型原油輪的干塢維修，其中 2024 年第三季為兩艘巨型原油輪，2024 年第四季為一艘，2025 年第一季為一艘蘇伊士型油輪，2025 年第二季為一艘巨型原油和一艘蘇伊士型油輪。

We recorded OpEx expenses, including drydocks in the second quarter of $8,600 per day for VLCCs, $9,300 per day for Suezmax tankers and $7,600 per day for LR2 tankers. This includes start-up of two Suezmax tankers and two VLCCs in the quarter. The Q2 '24 fleet average OpEx, including -- excluding the drydocks was $7,600 per day.

我們記錄了營運支出，包括第二季的乾船塢費用，VLCC 為每天 8,600 美元，蘇伊士型油輪為每天 9,300 美元，LR2 油輪為每天 7,600 美元。其中包括本季啟動兩艘蘇伊士型油輪和兩艘超大型油輪。24 年第二季船隊平均營運支出（包括乾船塢費用）為每天 7,600 美元。

Then let's move to slide 8. The cash generation potential. Frontline has about 30 earnings days annually. We have about [28,000] are spot days. Even in this weak spot market that we experience now, the cash generation potential of the current fleet and spot market earnings from Clarksons Research as of August 29, over $33,500 per day for VLCCs, $36,600 for Suezmax tankers and $28,700 for LR2 tankers. If $242 million or $1.09 per share.

然後我們轉到第 8 張投影片。現金產生潛力。Frontline 每年約有 30 天的收入日。我們有大約 [28,000] 個現貨日。即使在我們目前經歷的這個疲軟的現貨市場中，截至 8 月 29 日，克拉克森研究公司 (Clarksons Research) 的數據顯示，現有船隊的現金創造潛力和現貨市場收益為：VLCC 每天超過 33,500 美元，蘇伊士型油輪每天超過 36,600 美元，LR2 油輪每天超過 28,700 美元，LR28,700 美元，LR28,700 美元。如果是 2.42 億美元或每股 1.09 美元。

The sensitivity is high from these spot market levels that you see now and 30% increase from current spot market will increase the potential cash generation with about 116%. Note that the spot market earnings at the 30% increase is only $43,600 for VLCCs, $47,500 for Suezmax and $37,300 for LR2 tankers and the upside potential should be much higher going forward when the party begins.

從您現在看到的現貨市場水準來看，敏感度很高，當前現貨市場上漲 30% 將使潛在現金產生量增加約 116%。請注意，在 30% 漲幅下，現貨市場的收益對於 VLCC 來說僅為 43,600 美元，對於蘇伊士型油輪來說僅為 47,500 美元，對於 LR2 油輪來說僅為 37,300 美元，而當盛宴開始時，未來的上行潛力應該會更高。

With this, I leave the word to Lars again.

說到這裡，我再次把話語權交給了拉爾斯。

Thank you very much, Inger. And let's then go to slide 9 and start discussion on the current market narrative. You will notice that there is a new theme where we're focusing at Frontline as we've been trying to kind of explain the developments in the current market.

非常感謝，英格。然後我們轉到投影片 9，開始討論目前的市場敘述。您會注意到，我們在 Frontline 上關注了一個新主題，我們一直在嘗試解釋當前市場的發展。

We all sit on more or less the same as in the models (technical difficulty) the unknown is basically how oil trades. There is a development of a two-tier market between what we would refer to as the compliance among compliant markets. And this, the volume has grown over the last 12 to 18 months.

我們或多或少都處於與模型相同的境地（技術難度），未知的基本上就是石油如何交易。我們所說的合規市場與合規市場之間正在形成一個雙層市場。並且，在過去 12 到 18 個月中，交易量一直在增加。

Currently, this is quite surprising to some, I would assume, 23% of the global fleet is expected to be or enrolled in fashion trade. And in these numbers is not necessarily a ship that has lifted Russian crude because the molecule is still not sanction, but it's vessels that have adverse activities surrounding the trade, whether it fits with Russian crude or other sanction crudes.

目前，這對某些人來說相當令人驚訝，我認為，預計全球 23% 的船隊將從事或已參與時尚貿易。這些數字中不一定包括裝載過俄羅斯原油的船隻，因為這些原油仍未受到製裁，但包括那些在貿易方面有不良行為的船隻，無論這些原油是裝載俄羅斯原油還是其他受制裁原油。

And so, basically what these numbers tell you is that 17% of the VLCC fleet is currently under some sort of scrutiny, either (inaudible) or they have red flags attached to their activities. And likewise, if you move to the Suezmaxes, you have 21% of the fleet is under the same kind of -- in the same situation.

所以，這些數字基本上告訴你，17% 的 VLCC 船隊目前正在接受某種形式的審查，要么（聽不清楚），要么他們的活動被警告。同樣，如果你轉向蘇伊士型油輪，你會發現 21% 的船隊也處於同樣的境地。

And we have 28% of the Afra/LR2 fleets having the same characteristics. This is obviously related to the rise in sanctions scrutiny and also the volumes trading. And I'll come back later -- I come back to that later in the following slide.

我們擁有 28% 的 Afra/LR2 船隊，它們具有相同的特徵。這顯然與制裁審查加強以及交易量增加有關。我稍後會再回來——我會在下一張幻燈片中繼續討論這個問題。

Geopolitical risk linked to the Middle East is ever-increasing. It's also quite surprising to us to see the somewhat moderate oil movements of volatility considering this explosive backdrop. Chinese imports are in question after softer July. But as far as we can see it, August tracking imply an increase of 1.2 million barrels month over month to China.

與中東相關的地緣政治風險不斷增加。考慮到這種爆炸性的背景，油價波動幅度如此溫和也令我們頗感驚訝。七月份進口量疲軟後，中國進口量受到質疑。但據我們所知，8月的追蹤數據顯示，中國進口量較上季增加了120萬桶。

So although that doesn't really make this story fantastic. At least you should not base China on the July observation.

儘管這並沒有真正讓這個故事變得精彩。至少你不應該根據七月的觀察來判斷中國。

Global oil demand is on track, at least looking at the numbers we see. Oil in transit is in a rising trend. Oil inventories are at historical lows and there is a limited cushion for adverse events, which also could be related to weather. The order book expansion in our industry is slowing. The available delivery window for tankers has moved into 2028 for any substantial order that this and other classes are starting to take the center stage.

至少從我們看到的數字來看，全球石油需求正在步入正軌。過境石油呈上漲趨勢。石油庫存處於歷史低位，對不利事件的緩衝有限，這也可能與天氣有關。我們行業的訂單擴張正在放緩。對於任何大宗訂單而言，油輪的可用交付窗口已移至 2028 年，此類油輪和其他類型的油輪開始成為焦點。

Let's move to slide 10 and discuss a little bit more of the sanctions exposed trade growth. So there has been over the last months an increased scrutiny on the Russian trade, basically exposing more and more vessels to being sanctioned by either G7 or EU in their operations surrounding the Russian trade.

讓我們翻到第 10 張投影片，進一步討論制裁對貿易成長的影響。因此，過去幾個月來，對俄羅斯貿易的審查不斷加強，基本上導致越來越多的船隻在圍繞俄羅斯貿易的作業中受到七國集團或歐盟的製裁。

We've also seen a steep growth in the rain and exports, which basically have increased the need for tonnage for transportation. What we've ended up seeing is that we have a two-tier market, which is kind of developing in front of our eyes.

我們也看到降雨和出口的急劇增長，這實際上增加了對運輸噸位的需求。我們最終看到的是，我們有一個兩級市場，它正在我們眼前發展。

We have what we would refer to as the compliance market, which involves some 80% of the tanker fleets or thereabouts. And then you have the dark gray fleet which involves 20% of the tanker fleet or even up to 23% of the tanker fleet. The interesting part here is that you're not building vessels to enter dark or gray fleets.

我們擁有所謂的合規市場，涉及約 80% 的油輪船隊。然後是深灰色船隊，佔油輪船隊的 20%，甚至高達油輪船隊的 23%。這裡有趣的部分是，您建造的船隻並不是為了加入黑暗或灰色艦隊。

So basically, they get their fleet supply from the compliant fleet. So the compliant fleet is shrinking. Whilst this dark or gray fleet is growing. It supplied by the aging of the overall tanker fleet basically and over central vessels still do not trade in what we regard the conventional market.

因此基本上，他們從合規的船隊獲得船隊供應。因此合規船隊的數量正在減少。而這支黑色或灰色的艦隊正在不斷壯大。它基本上是由整體油輪船隊的老化所造成的，而且中心船隻仍然沒有在我們所認為的傳統市場上進行交易。

It creates an interesting dynamics because unless non-conventional trade continues to grow, the illicit market will soon be oversupplied as the fleet aging accelerates. So basically vessels moving from the compliant market due to age and basically because we have zero scrapping.

這創造了一種有趣的動態，因為除非非傳統貿易繼續增長，否則隨著船隊老化的加速，非法市場很快就會供過於求。因此，基本上，船舶由於年齡而退出合規市場，基本上因為我們沒有報廢船舶。

We'll at some point here start to over crowd the darker or gray fleets and one should expect scrapping to start to happen in the end. The parallel oil trade carries an increasing risk to any reversal of sanctions as well, and that needs to be kept close to mind.

在某種程度上，我們會開始讓深色或灰色的艦隊變得過於擁擠，最終我們應該預料到會出現報廢的情況。平行石油貿易對於任何制裁的逆轉都帶來越來越大的風險，這一點需要牢記。

There are some implications here and we can question where is sanctions enforcement in this picture and also where is IMO in respect of safety and reducing emissions, et cetera. I can assure you this fleet is not spending too much CapEx on reducing their carbon footprint.

這其中蘊含著一些意義，我們可以質疑制裁執行在哪裡，以及國際海事組織在安全和減少排放等方面的職責在哪裡。我可以向你保證，這支船隊不會在減少碳足跡上花費太多的資本支出。

At the bottom right-hand side of this slide, you will see how this development is. And the red arrows basically indicate this divide. So basically, the overall fleet continues to grow as basically no fleet -- no ships are being recycled, but the compliant fleet vessels under 20 years of age is gradually shrinking as a proceed. This includes the newbuildings coming into the market.

在這張投影片的右下角，你會看到這個發展。紅色箭頭基本上表明了這種分歧。因此，基本上，整體船隊繼續成長，因為基本上沒有船隊 - 沒有船舶被回收，但 20 歲以下的合規船隊船隻正在逐漸減少。其中包括進入市場的新船。

So with that harsh message, I'm going to move to slide 11 and let's look at the upside potential here in the combined market. We have tankers seasonality, and it's extremely pronounced, 90% of the global population lives in the Northern Hemisphere, basically where most of us on this call live and EIA expect the oil consumption to increase by 1.5 million barrels by December, basically due to some temperatures turning.

因此，聽到這個嚴厲的訊息後，我將轉到第 11 張投影片，讓我們看看合併後的市場的上行潛力。油輪運輸具有季節性，而且非常明顯，全球 90% 的人口生活在北半球，基本上也是我們大多數人居住的地方，而 EIA 預計到 12 月石油消費量將增加 150 萬桶，主要是由於氣溫轉變。

On average, looking back the winter market sees an increase of consumption by 1.5 million to 2 million barrels in the period from August to December. This is a long-term pattern, and we see it both in oil-in-transit and then obviously in freight earnings.

平均而言，回顧冬季市場，8月至12月的消費量增加了150萬至200萬桶。這是一種長期模式，我們在運輸石油和貨運收入中都可以看到這一點。

If you look at the bottom right-hand slide chart, that's basically just taking the last 34 years and look that this is seasonal trend. And we're basically in the weeks where this market starts to contraction, which is also quite encouraging to see oil in transit actually deeping out of the long-term trend.

如果您查看右下角的幻燈片圖表，基本上只是過去 34 年的數據，並且看起來這是季節性趨勢。我們基本上已經進入了市場開始收縮的幾週，看到運輸中的石油實際上已經脫離了長期趨勢，這也是相當令人鼓舞的。

And to top it, we have to keep in mind that the inventories within [OSCD] and we added China and India as well to this is at historical lows. And again, I would like to emphasis it offers a very limited cushion in the event of an unexpected event.

最重要的是，我們必須記住，[OSCD] 的庫存（包括中國和印度的庫存）處於歷史低點。我想再次強調，如果發生意外事件，它提供的緩衝非常有限。

OPEC is still supposed to be increased supply from October. The question is whether if they will do it where oil is currently trading, but 2.2 million barrels is set to be returned between October and the end of 2025.

OPEC 仍預計將從 10 月開始增加供應。問題是他們是否會在目前的石油交易地點這樣做，但預計在 2025 年 10 月至年底期間將歸還 220 萬桶石油。

And again, as from the previous slide, this shrinking compliant tanker fleet capacity to serve conventional oil demand growth makes this a very interesting picture. And also, I think we need to keep in mind that although the market is sluggish, currently the balance is fairly thin. Only two weeks ago, we had VLCC rates moving up 25% and it doesn't take much to move.

再次，正如上一張幻燈片所示，為了滿足常規石油需求的成長，合規油輪船隊的運力不斷縮減，這是一個非常有趣的畫面。而且，我認為我們需要記住，儘管市場低迷，但目前的平衡相當薄弱。光是兩週前，超大型油輪 (VLCC) 的運價就上漲了 25%，而且漲幅並不大。

Let's then have a look at the order books. And the overarching theme here is that the ordering we saw in the beginning, or the first half of the year has been muted over the last month, month-and-a-half. Basically, virtually zero tankers have been ordered in the last month and a half and basically, at the same time, we've seen other vessel classes move into contracts vessels and in particular, we've seen big orders being placed on the container side for 2028 delivery.

那我們來看看訂單簿。這裡的總體主題是，我們在年初或上半年看到的秩序在過去一個月或一個半月裡變得平淡無奇。基本上，在過去一個半月中幾乎沒有訂購油輪，與此同時，我們看到其他級別的船型轉向合約船，特別是我們看到貨櫃船方面有大量訂單，預計 2028 年交付。

We think that for VLCC and Suezmax, the order book looks still looks low, very low for VLCC, medium-low for Suezmax and high for a LR2. But with LR2s, as I mentioned before, we need to consider that there are virtually no Aframaxes on order. So if you take that percentage and apply it -- sorry, take that number of ships on order apply it to the overall LR2 Aframax fleet, we come in at 13%, which is still not alarming.

我們認為，對於 VLCC 和蘇伊士型油輪來說，訂單量仍然很低，VLCC 的訂單量非常低，蘇伊士型油輪的訂單量中低，而 LR2 的訂單量較高。但對於 LR2，正如我之前提到的，我們需要考慮到幾乎沒有阿芙拉型油輪訂單。因此，如果你採用這個百分比並將其應用 - 抱歉，將訂購的船舶數量應用於整個 LR2 阿芙拉型油輪船隊，我們的比例為 13%，這仍然不令人擔憂。

We also need to keep in mind that we're heading into a generation of ships that came post '28 -- sorry, 2008 for VLCC and Suezmax, post 2007 for LR2s, which are highest of all generations of vessels, which will come to age in 2027, 2028 and onwards.

我們還需要記住，我們正邁入 28 年後的船舶時代——抱歉，VLCC 和蘇伊士型油輪是 2008 年之後的，LR2 是 2007 年之後的，它們是所有船舶時代中年齡最高的，它們將在 2027 年、2028 年及以後達到老化年齡。

So to sum this up before we open up for questions, Frontline have [bestest high] earnings capacity as we move into second half. We have a strong balance sheet with sensible leverage on our modern fleet. The reassessments and a growing divide between the compliance and the sanction trade, which can create interesting volatility going forward.

因此，在我們開始提問之前，我們先總結一下，隨著我們進入下半年，Frontline 擁有 [最佳高] 獲利能力。我們擁有強勁的資產負債表，並對我們的現代化船隊進行了合理的槓桿調整。重新評估以及遵守和製裁之間的分歧越來越大，可能會在未來造成有趣的波動。

The security situation in Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and Middle East is ever increasing. As delivery slots for newbuilding moves into 2028, we have seen that container ordering has accelerated again. Short term, medium term or in demand looks on track. But China is, of course, a question. The seasonal play is on and I know a few people know this, but I'll say it again, winter is coming.

紅海、亞丁灣及中東地區安全情勢持續緊張。隨著新船交付時間進入2028年，我們看到貨櫃訂購量再次加速。短期、中期或需求看起來都在正軌上。但中國當然是個問題。季節性戲劇正在上演，我知道有些人知道這一點，但我要再說一遍，冬天來了。

So with that, we'll open the floor up for questions.

因此，我們將開始回答問題。

(Operator Instructions) Jonathan Chappell, Evercore ISI.

（操作員指示）Jonathan Chappell，Evercore ISI。

Thank you. Good afternoon. Inger, first question is for you, slide 6 as you've completed the re-leveraging and the divesting of older vessels. So I just want to be clear, there's no more big refinancings that we should expect before 2027. And the divestiture of the older vessels is mainly complete at this point.

謝謝。午安.Inger，第一個問題是問您的，幻燈片 6，您已經完成了舊船的重新利用和剝離。所以我只想明確一點，2027 年之前我們不應該再進行大規模再融資。目前，老舊船舶的剝離工作已基本完成。

Your first question was that there were no more refinancings until 2027. Was that correct?

您的第一個問題是，直到 2027 年才有再融資。那是正確的嗎？

Correct.

正確的。

Well, not any material once. We have a few smaller ones, which will come in 2025. And your next question or your second question was, sorry?

嗯，沒有任何材料。我們還有一些較小的項目，將於 2025 年推出。您的下一個問題或第二個問題是，對不起？

Was around the divesting of the older vessels. Is that process completed as well?

圍繞著老舊船隻的剝離。這個過程也完成了嗎？

Yeah, that is also competed.

是的，這也是競爭。

Okay. Good. And then just a follow-up question on this latest refinancing with the sale and leaseback. it's interesting sale and leasebacks were, I think, of the prior tanker markets where rates were weak and maybe financing wasn't available or attractive. And you've done most of your refinancing through traditional credit facilities. What was the thought process of doing another sale and leaseback at this point in the cycle to refinance that prior one?

好的。好的。然後是關於這次最新售後回租再融資的後續問題。有趣的是，我認為售後回租是以前的油輪市場，當時利率很低，而且可能無法獲得融資或沒有吸引力。而且，你們的再融資大多是透過傳統信貸手段完成的。在週期的這個階段，進行另一次售後回租來為先前的售後回租進行再融資的想法是什麼？

Well, actually, it's -- this new sale leaseback arrangement is refinancing at current sale-leaseback arrangement. So we are not they're actually doing more. I mean, that is same type 10 vessels that we have today, which we just are replacing.

嗯，實際上，這種新的售後回租安排是對當前售後回租安排的再融資。所以我們實際上並沒有做得更多。我的意思是，那與我們今天擁有的 10 型船隻相同，我們只是在更換它。

And it's not a standard sale-leaseback arrangement in a way. You can look upon it more like a kind of bank facility because its leverage is only 60% loan-to-value. And the term saw like a banking facility in a way. So that's why.

從某種程度上來說，這並不是標準的售後回租安排。你可以把它看作是一種銀行貸款，因為它的槓桿率僅為貸款價值比的 60%。從某種程度上來說，這個術語就像是一種銀行設施。這就是原因。

Okay. That's very helpful. Thank you for that, Inger. And then, Lars, just one for you. I mean, I think the seasonality slide is pretty clear and many of us who've been around understand this very well. I guess there is some concern about China. You noted in your prepared remarks, let's not extrapolate July, but is there any way to take that inventory slide that you did for slide 11 and isolate China?

好的。這非常有幫助。謝謝你，英格。然後，拉爾斯，只給你一個。我的意思是，我認為季節性下滑非常明顯，我們許多經歷過這一點的人都非常了解。我猜想人們對中國有些擔憂。您在準備好的發言中指出，我們不要推斷 7 月份的情況，但是有沒有辦法利用您在第 11 張幻燈片中所做的庫存幻燈片來孤立中國？

And is there a reason that China may be a lot more aggressive in the back half of the year? Or is it more of an OECD depleted inventory and maybe China doesn't have that type of panic going into the winter season where they need to be more aggressive on the imports?

那麼，中國在今年下半年可能採取更激進的行動的原因是什麼？還是經合組織庫存耗盡，中國可能沒有那種進入冬季而需要更積極進口的恐慌？

It's a very good point. And if we did that chat with China isolated, although its implied inventory builds because the strategic part of their inventories is not public. It would be a bit different, whereas China has been more or less stable, running a fairly high level of inventory ever since we came out of COVID.

這是一個非常好的觀點。如果我們與中國單獨進行這樣的對話，儘管其隱含庫存會增加，因為其庫存的戰略部分並不公開。情況會有所不同，而中國的情況基本上已經穩定，自從擺脫新冠疫情以來，庫存水準一直相當高。

And as you might remember, they used that period with extremely weak oil prices to replenish their inventories. But with regards to China, it's not a mystery, but it is apparent that China is not growing at the speed that we would like to see.

您可能還記得，他們利用油價極度疲軟的時期來補充庫存。但對中國來說，這並不是什麼秘密，但顯然中國的成長速度並沒有達到我們所希望的水平。

However, if you just look at our neighbors in this building being in the drydock market, there is somewhat a different story. So I think it's just very important to -- it's very difficult to kind of read China right now. We also need to keep in mind that of the imports China do, they take close to 20% of their supply is coming from either Iran or Russia.

然而，如果你只看這棟大樓裡的鄰居在幹船塢市場的情況，情況就有所不同。所以我認為這非常重要——現在要了解中國非常困難。我們還要記住，中國進口的商品中，近20%來自伊朗或俄羅斯。

So it's kind of difficult to monitor these flows accurately. But also, we know that they're taking more crude coming from Russia in the north. So I would say China as the dark horse and right now, it doesn't look too good to be fair. But there are other countries in the region that are historically higher consumers during the winter.

因此要準確監控這些流量有點困難。但我們也知道，他們正在從北部的俄羅斯進口更多原油。所以我會說中國是一匹黑馬，但目前看來，公平地說，它的表現並不太好。但該地區其他國家在冬季的能源消耗量歷來較高。

And the most notable one is, in fact, India. So -- but I actually think that I don't believe we'll have a muted China into Q4 or towards Q1, that I doubt. Whether if we want to have a year-on-year growth, that's more questionable. But I still think that, with the rest of the situation -- the rest of the countries that normally grow their demand during winter, I think we should still be.

事實上，最引人注目的是印度。所以——但實際上我認為，我不相信中國經濟在第四季或第一季會保持低迷，對此我表示懷疑。我們是否希望實現同比成長，這更值得懷疑。但我仍然認為，考慮到其他情況——其他國家在冬季通常會增加需求，我認為我們仍然應該這樣做。

Omar Nokta, Jefferies.

諾克塔（Omar Nokta），傑富瑞集團。

Hi, Lars and Inger. Good afternoon. Just got a couple of questions on the market, but also wanted to touch on the [TCE] performance you've booked thus far into the third quarter, you've got 79% of 3Q booked at just over $47,000, which obviously a little bit down from the first half.

你好，Lars 和 Inger。午安.我只是對市場有幾個問題，但也想談談你們在第三季度迄今為止預定的 [TCE] 表現，你們第三季度的預定量為 79%，略高於 47,000 美元，這顯然比上半年略有下降。

But still, I would say quite impressive when we look at what the market has averaged since the start of, say, June, whether you take into account Eco and Scrubber premiums. So just wanted to ask what's driven that perhaps outperformance in your view.

但是，當我們看看自 6 月初以來的市場平均水平時，無論是否考慮到 Eco 和 Scrubber 溢價，我都會說這相當令人印象深刻。所以只是想問一下，您認為是什麼推動了這種優異的表現。

First of all, Omar, you need to keep in mind the fact that we report on a load to discharge basis. So that has to be highlighted. It's not all our peers, and it's not always clear how our peers report. So you should not expect us to be able to book too much towards the end of the quarter, basically because we can't account for income until the vessels actually load the cargo.

首先，奧馬爾，你需要記住，我們是根據裝卸情況進行報告的。所以這一點必須強調。並非所有同行都是如此，而且我們的同行如何報告並不總是很清楚。因此，您不應期望我們能夠在本季結束時預訂太多貨物，主要是因為我們無法在船舶實際裝載貨物之前核算收入。

But what has happened in Q1 is that we received the fairly big new fleets from Euronav, almost all delivered in the Middle East. What we've done over the quarter is been able to kind of put this fleet into the trade reflecting the rest of the Frontline fleet.

但第一季的情況是，我們從 Euronav 接收了相當大的新船隊，幾乎全部在中東交付。我們在本季度所做的工作是能夠將這支艦隊投入貿易，反映出前線艦隊的其餘部分。

Whereas we tried to keep -- limit our exposure to trying to avoid having too much exposure to one particular base. And more recently it's been the Middle East that is the soft spot -- it's kind of ironic that the VLCC benchmark or S&P 500 Dow Jones Index is based on (technical difficulty)

而我們試圖限制我們的投資，以避免對某個特定基地有太多的關注。最近，中東成了軟肋——諷刺的是，VLCC 基准或標準普爾 500 道瓊斯指數是基於（技術難度）

Since the trade in the Atlantic Basin, West Africa, US Gulf, Brazil, regretfully a lot of short haul length because oil hasn't really gone far during the latter part of Q2 and into Q3. This also explains some of the weakness in this segment in particular and also how it's been cannibalizing on Suezmaxes and to some extent (technical difficulty) I have to say that there is no magic push.

自從大西洋盆地、西非、美國墨西哥灣、巴西的貿易以來，遺憾的是，由於石油在第二季後期和第三季並沒有真正走遠，所以很多短程運輸都是如此。這也解釋了該領域特別存在的一些弱點，以及它是如何蠶食蘇伊士型油輪的，而且在某種程度上（技術難度），我不得不說，沒有什麼神奇的推動力。

But also keep in mind that this performance is we're required to Okay, we are proud of it's considering also the fact that we've reduced our scrubber penetration in the fit. Having said that, you probably also noticed that the spread between high and low sulfur has been fairly narrow. So you could say that the scrubber benefit in the more recent months of us not been as pronounced.

但也請記住，我們必須達到這種表現，好吧，我們對此感到自豪，同時也考慮到我們已經減少了洗滌器的滲透率。話雖如此，您可能也注意到高硫和低硫之間的差距相當小。因此，您可以說，最近幾個月洗滌器的好處並不那麼明顯。

Okay. Thanks. I appreciate that. And just a quick follow-up just on that point or just generally on the Vs. Have you played into the whole product cargo lifting in your fleet?

好的。謝謝。我很感激。並且只是針對這一點或只是針對 Vs 進行快速跟進。您的車隊是否參與過整個產品貨物的起重？

Not on the VLCCs, but on the Suezmaxes, yes. So basically, cannibalizing our own LR2s.

是的，不是在 VLCC 上，而是在蘇伊士型油輪上。所以基本上，這就是在蠶食我們自己的 LR2。

Okay. And then just more on the market here. One, we've seen the recent pullback in Libyan exports or at least production volumes. It seems that there may be still able to export from inventory. But if this is prolonged and that volume is away from the market, how do you think that affects the different dynamics within the crude trade at this point. Obviously, Aframaxes seem more exposed to that, but how do you think the VLCCs and Suezmax react in that type of environment?

好的。然後這裡還有更多關於市場的資訊。首先，我們看到利比亞出口量或至少產量近期有所回落。看來還是可以從庫存出口。但如果這種情況持續下去，並且交易量遠離市場，您認為這會對目前原油貿易的不同動態產生什麼影響。顯然，阿芙拉型油輪似乎更容易受到這種影響，但您認為超大型油輪和蘇伊士型油輪在這種環境下會如何反應？

Already asked me before, the disruptions started in the Suez Canal or Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, I would have said that this is a material, but basically what's happened since those events started to occur. Libyan used to go is by way of either Suez or actually really all the way around, but at least three Suez.

之前已經問過我，蘇伊士運河或紅海、亞丁灣的混亂已經開始，我會說這是一種材料，但基本上自從這些事件開始發生以來就發生了什麼。利比亞過去的路線要麼取道蘇伊士運河，要麼繞行至少三個蘇伊士運河。

And with the disruptions in Suez, we've seen that oil trade local. So you're right that it affects the Aframaxes. It might have been a limited impact on Suezmaxes. But I would say virtually no impact on the VLCCs. And it's actually again, then if you take one crude out of the equation, another one comes up.

隨著蘇伊士運河的中斷，我們看到石油貿易陷入局部混亂。所以您說得對，它會影響阿芙拉型油輪。這對蘇伊士型油輪的影響可能有限。但我想說這對超大型油輪幾乎沒有影響。事實上，如果你從等式中去除一種原油，就會出現另一種原油。

And I guess in that situation, if you lose that crude from Libya and that gets made up potential from the Middle East, does that become a VLCC trade?

我想在這種情況下，如果你失去了來自利比亞的原油，而獲得了來自中東的潛在原油，這是否會成為 VLCC 交易？

Potentially, but it could also be replenished from Latin America or US Gulf for West Africa because the Libyan is now then predominantly going into Europe and not to -- basically due to disruption in Suez.

有可能，但也可能從拉丁美洲或美國海灣為西非提供補給，因為利比亞石油現在主要進入歐洲，而不是——主要原因是蘇伊士運河中斷。

Okay, got it. And then one more for you. Just on you talked about the sanctions and the dark fleet, the gray fleet. I wanted to ask in terms of what's gone on with Iran, how would -- how do you think the market would move forward in this situation where say there's more scrutiny on Iranian crude exports in those fallbacks to where there were a few years ago?

好的，明白了。然後再給你一個。剛才您談到了製裁以及黑暗艦隊和灰色艦隊。我想問一下，關於伊朗的情況，您認為在這種情況下市場會如何發展，比如說對伊朗原油出口的審查會比幾年前更加嚴格？

I guess you see that gray dark fleet perhaps maybe makes its way back to the clean quote-unquote or not clean, but the market fleet, how do you think about that versus needing to make up those barrels?

我想您會看到灰色深色船隊可能回到乾淨的“或不乾淨”的狀態，但是對於市場船隊，您如何看待這一點，而不是需要彌補這些桶子？

I think, I've asked this -- this development has been going on for far longer than at least I anticipated or we anticipated, but it's basically making it less and less likely that the vessels servicing this market is ever going to be able to return to a compliant market. So it means that you have an exchange, however, unlikely to the sanction regime against Iran. It will be even a more positive effect on the compliance markets,

我想，我已經問過這個問題——這種發展持續的時間比至少我預期或我們預期的要長得多，但它基本上使得服務於這個市場的船隻越來越不可能重返合規市場。所以這意味著你們可以進行交流，但這不太可能與針對伊朗的製裁制度相提並論。這將對合規市場產生更積極的影響，

How this happened -- this is an ongoing discussion that comes up quite often. From our side of the equation, we struggle to understand why this trade can even go on. But obviously, if you come from a crude short nation who needs to refine petrol for your habitants, then you will obviously take an opportunity for any barrels that you can get hold of.

這是如何發生的──這是一個經常被討論的問題。從我們的角度來看，我們很難理解為什麼這種交易還能繼續下去。但顯然，如果你來自一個原油短缺的國家，需要為你的居民提煉汽油，那麼你顯然會抓住機會獲得任何你能得到的汽油桶。

So regretfully, I don't think we can necessarily do much with this trade. What I am saying, though is that as the compliant fleet is aging, it's applies into this fleet and this aging is accelerating as we move forward here. So actually, unless you see Iran able to produce significant more oil or same goes for Russia, of course, In Salah, all three, which is unlikely will actually start to have an overcrowded or oversupplied sanctions market.

因此很遺憾，我認為我們無法透過這筆交易取得太大的進展。但我想說的是，隨著合規艦隊的老化，它也適用於這支艦隊，而且隨著我們前進，這種老化正在加速。因此，實際上，除非你看到伊朗能夠生產更多的石油，或者俄羅斯也能夠生產更多的石油，當然，在薩拉赫看來，這三個國家實際上不太可能開始出現過度擁擠或供應過剩的製裁市場。

So I think that's because I've lost all faith on forcing sanctions or lost faith in way to regulate one out of this. We had a set of tanker that blew up outside Singapore recently, and nobody really put too much attention to that. We have a Suezmaxes burning in the Red Sea as we speak, nobody really -- it doesn't really make that much of a headline if you're outside of shipping. So I kind of lost that faith.

所以我認為這是因為我對強制制裁失去了信心，或者對透過監管解決這個問題的方式失去了信心。最近，我們的一組油罐車在新加坡郊外爆炸，但沒有人真正關注此事。就在我們說話的時候，有一艘蘇伊士型油輪在紅海上燃燒，但實際上——如果你不是航運界人士，這並不會成為什麼頭條新聞。所以我有點失去信心了。

But what I do believe is that we will see that fleet just continue to grow because they're the source of or the alternative for ships turning 20 is still makes a lot of sense to go into that market. But once the margins in that market is still are destroyed, we'll actually start to see recycling. If that made sense? Sorry, it was a very, very long answer to your question.

但我確實相信，我們會看到船隊繼續成長，因為它們是 20 歲以上船舶的來源或替代品，進入該市場仍然很有意義。但一旦該市場的利潤率被摧毀，我們實際上就會開始看到回收。如果這有意義的話？抱歉，對於您的問題，我的回答非常非常長。

No, there are very, very interesting and I appreciate that perspective somewhat sobering. But yeah, thanks, Lars. I'll turn it over.

不，這非常非常有趣，而且我很欣賞這種有點發人深省的觀點。但是，是的，謝謝你，拉爾斯。我把它翻過來。

(Operator Instructions) [Deven Sangoi, TEJ investments].

（操作員指示）[Deven Sangoi，TEJ 投資]。

So I just wanted to ask questions that you mentioned about the oil spillage in Red Sea which happened and there were several other instances. How do you see this dark fleet insurance getting covered because that's again, the amount of crude is moving on and you don't have a global insurance companies you are willing to underwrite.

所以我只是想問您提到的有關紅海漏油事件以及其他幾起事件的問題。您如何看待這種暗艦隊保險的承保，因為原油數量不斷變化，而您又沒有一家全球保險公司願意承保。

It's an extremely good question. And when we did the -- basically, we've done an exercise prior to this (technical difficulty) to gauge how many ships and how many vessels are operating in the sanction trade or operating illicitly in the Russian trade because there are owners that are able to trade Russian barrels within either by way of getting at the station on the price cap or other means that they actually managed to trade Russian crude without raising any flags.

這是一個非常好的問題。當我們這樣做時——基本上，我們在此之前已經做過一次演習（技術難題），以衡量有多少艘船在製裁貿易中運營或在俄羅斯貿易中非法運營，因為有些船主能夠通過在價格上限內到達加油站或其他方式交易俄羅斯原油，他們實際上設法在不引起任何注意的情況下交易俄羅斯原油。

But in order to gauge how much of that oil is actually under sanction, one of the studies we did was basically to see how many of these vessels are actually not insured by any recognizable P&I Club and that is basically the foundation for saying that we assume 75% of the Russian volumes are under sanctions or sanctions exposed.

但為了衡量有多少石油實際上受到製裁，我們所做的一項研究基本上就是看看有多少船隻實際上沒有受到任何知名的保賠協會的保險，這基本上是我們假設 75% 的俄羅斯石油受到製裁或面臨制裁的基礎。

So -- and that paints a horrendous picture if something happens. So the Suezmax in question that is currently burning in Gulf of Aden that has insurance I understand from a P&I Club that's recognized, but that tanker blew up outside Singapore, I might be mistaken, but I still think they're trying to figure out you actually own the vessel. So I think this takes -- it paints a very, very bleak picture if we get more events like this.

所以——如果發生什麼事情，那將是一幅可怕的畫面。因此，據我了解，目前正在亞丁灣燃燒的那艘蘇伊士型油輪已從公認的保賠協會投保，但那艘油輪是在新加坡郊外爆炸的，我可能記錯了，但我仍然認為他們正在試圖弄清楚你是否真正擁有這艘船。所以我認為，如果我們再遇到類似事件，那將會是個極為黯淡的景象。

Okay, thanks. And the second question is on if you see the be soft landing is been question about there's always a doubt about US economic going into a recession, if not soft landing and you have a Chinese economy not recovering. So next year, do you see if both these don't recover, then there will be lower oil demand globally?

好的，謝謝。第二個問題是，您是否認為美國經濟將實現軟著陸？人們始終懷疑美國經濟是否會陷入衰退；如果不是軟著陸，中國經濟也不會復甦。那麼明年，您是否認為如果這兩者都沒有復甦，那麼全球石油需求就會下降？

I don't think we'll have a lower global oil demand globally, but the expected oil demand growth will be limited. So -- but if you couple that with the fact that the fleet, the tanker fleet is presumably shrinking, at least efficient fleet is shrinking, we're not too worried about that from a tanker demand perspective.

我認為全球石油需求不會下降，但預期的石油需求成長將有限。所以——但如果再加上船隊、油輪船隊可能正在縮減，至少是高效船隊正在縮減，從油輪需求的角度來看，我們並不太擔心這一點。

And any other factors which can affect the ton mile because we've seen a significant change in ton mile over the last 12 months. So do you see any other factor which affects ton mile positively or negatively?

以及任何其他可能影響噸英里的因素，因為我們已經看到過去 12 個月噸英里發生了顯著變化。那麼，您是否看到其他因素對噸英里產生積極或消極的影響？

No, there's nothing really that comes to mind. We are moving into a very weather exposed a period of the year, which partly explains the volatility we normally see towards winter. So that could obviously change things up. But obviously, sudden supply changes like Libya was mentioned where we are losing 660 million barrels per day or thereabouts, that is actually enough to trigger certain changes.

不，我實在想不出什麼。我們正進入一年中天氣極為不穩定的時期，這在一定程度上解釋了我們通常在冬季看到的波動性。所以這顯然會改變事情。但顯然，像利比亞這樣的突然供應變化，我們每天損失約 6.6 億桶石油，這實際上足以引發某些變化。

But there is nothing apparent I see. We see the TMX pipeline, which is a new flow out of Canada on the US West Coast, that is kind of developing, but it doesn't seem to have altered trading lanes materially. And there is again, one thing to watch is of course, a production growth in Guiana in Brazil and then in US Gulf.

但我沒有看到任何明顯的東西。我們看到 TMX 管道，這是一條從加拿大流向美國西海岸的新管道，它正在發展中，但似乎並沒有實質地改變貿易航線。當然，還有一件事需要關注，那就是巴西圭亞那和美國墨西哥灣的產量成長。

There is not so much export growth expected out two years for next year, but everybody has been wrong every year in quite a long time. And there is also an election over there. So which might affect the willingness to invest in production, which will be done on exports. I think there are numerous interesting spots to look at, but nothing material that I think will happen very soon.

預計明年兩年的出口成長不會有太大變化，但相當長一段時間內，每年的預測都是錯誤的。那邊也正在舉行選舉。這可能會影響對生產的投資意願，而投資將透過出口實現。我認為有很多有趣的地方值得一看，但我認為不會很快出現什麼實質的事情。

Okay. And as you you've seen, you've been paying out handsome dividend, but if your all on the bull market goes right, you will be flushed with so much cash. What do you do with the cash?

好的。如您所見，您一直在支付豐厚的股息，但如果牛市一切順利，您將獲得大量現金。你用現金做什麼？

We pay it to our dear investors, then they can decide what to do. That was jokingly said, but that's basically how we operate unless we see an investment opportunity that we think will yield our investors better return on equity, we will pay it all out.

我們把錢付給我們親愛的投資者，然後他們可以決定要做什麼。這只是開玩笑，但這基本上就是我們的運作方式，除非我們看到一個我們認為能為投資者帶來更好的股本回報率的投資機會，否則我們就會全額支付。

Okay. So you don't see -- see you've done a pretty -- we were the first one to take out all the ships from the yard, half completed VLCC and now you leverage your balance sheet. So you have a financial leverage, operating leverage. You still see any good asset acquiring opportunity or are we done with it?

好的。所以你看不到——看看你做得多麼出色——我們是第一個從船廠取出所有船隻的人，一半完成了 VLCC，現在你利用了你的資產負債表。所以你就有了財務槓桿和經營槓桿。您還看到任何好的資產收購機會嗎？或者我們已經完成了嗎？

I think and I hope that we are in line with the rest of the market that we need to see a confirmation in the rates in our markets before we have the conviction to do anything on the asset side. So basically right now, we're content with the fleet composition we have. But if the market is going to continue to only pay us $40,000 to $45,000 per day, there's makes no sense to either buy or order a ship at these price levels.

我認為並且希望我們與市場其他部分保持一致，即我們需要先看到市場利率的確認，然後才有信心在資產方面採取任何行動。所以基本上現在我們對現有的艦隊組成感到滿意。但如果市場繼續每天只向我們支付 40,000 至 45,000 美元，那麼以這樣的價格水平購買或訂購船舶就沒有意義了。

(Operator Instructions) As there are no further questions, I would like to hand back to Lars Barstad for any closing remarks.

（操作員指示）由於沒有其他問題，我想將演講時間交還給 Lars Barstad 做結束語。

Thank you and thank you for listening in. Thank you for very, very good questions, and we'll just keep our fingers crossed for the normal seasonal pattern to start to contemplate. Thank you.

謝謝大家，也謝謝大家的收聽。非常感謝您提出非常好的問題，我們只會祈禱正常的季節模式能夠開始考慮。謝謝。