Frontline Plc (FRO) 2024 Q3 法說會逐字稿

Thank you very much dear all and thank you for dialling into Frontline's quarterly earnings call. Thank you markets and stocks don't move in a straight line I believe the last months have told us that. We have previously argued we are in a period comparable to the 2002 to 2008 Bull run, although supply of tonnage driven rather than fuelled by strong oil demand growth.

非常感謝大家，也感謝您撥打 Frontline 的季度財報電話會議。謝謝，市場和股票不會直線移動，我相信過去幾個月已經告訴我們這一點。我們之前曾說過，我們正處於與 2002 年至 2008 年牛市相當的時期，儘管噸位供應是由強勁的石油需求增長驅動的，而不是由強勁的石油需求增長推動的。

That comparison still holds, I'd argue and as an example in November 2004 the market was said to be doomed and we corrected more than 30%. The Bull rally resumed a few weeks thereafter and we were off for the skies again. For the same reasons, it's difficult to predict the bearish sentiment, the Bull runs are equally hard to call to.

我認為，這種比較仍然成立，並以 2004 年 11 月為例，據說市場注定要失敗，而我們的修正幅度超過 30%。幾週後，牛市反彈重新開始，我們再次飛向天空。同樣的原因，很難預測看跌情緒，多頭市場同樣難以預測。

So before I give the word to Inger, I'll run through RTC numbers on slide 3 in the deck. In the third quarter of 2024, Frontline achieved $39,600 per day on our VLCC fleet, $39,900 per day on our Suezmaxes and $36,000 per day on our LR2/Aframax suite.

因此，在向 Inger 傳達訊息之前，我將瀏覽幻燈片 3 上的 RTC 數字。2024 年第三季度，Frontline 的 VLCC 船隊每天收入 39,600 美元，蘇伊士型油輪每天收入 39,900 美元，LR2/Aframax 套件每天收入 36,000 美元。

So far in the third quarter, we've booked 77% of our VLCC days at $44,300 per day, 70% of our Suezmax days at $39,600 per day and 60% of our LR2/Aframax days at $34,800 per day. And again, all numbers in this table are on a low to discharge basis, with the implications of balance days at the end of the quarter. The market has not offered us the numbers we hope for, but we are operating a decent margin still.

到目前為止，第三季度，我們以每天44,300 美元的價格預訂了77% 的VLCC 船期，以每天39,600 美元的價格預訂了70% 的蘇伊士型船船期，以每天34,800 美元的價格預訂了60 % 的LR2/阿芙拉型船船期。再次強調，該表中的所有數字均以低排放量為基礎，並考慮到季度末的平衡天數。市場並未向我們提供我們希望的數字，但我們的利潤率仍然不錯。

With that, I'll let Inger take you through the financial highlights.

接下來，我將讓英格帶您了解財務亮點。

Thanks, Lars and good morning and good afternoon, ladies, and gentlemen. Let's then turn to slide 4, the profit statement. We report profit of $60.5 million this quarter or $0.27 per share and adjusted profit of $75.4 million or $0.34 per share. The adjusted profit in this quarter decreased by $62.8 million compared to the previous quarter and that was primarily due to a decrease in our TCE earnings, coming down from $357.7 million in the previous quarter to $292.2 million end of this quarter. That results from lower TCE rates in the third quarter, compared to the second quarter.

謝謝，拉爾斯，女士們先生們，早安，下午好。然後我們來看第四張投影片，即利潤表。我們報告本季利潤為 6050 萬美元，即每股 0.27 美元，調整後利潤為 7540 萬美元，即每股 0.34 美元。本季調整後利潤比上一季減少了 6,280 萬美元，這主要是由於我們的 TCE 收入下降，從上一季的 3.577 億美元降至本季末的 2.922 億美元。這是因為與第二季相比，第三季的 TCE 率較低。

Let's then look at the balance sheet at slide 5. The balance sheet movements this quarter are related to refinancing to reduce debt in addition to ordinary items. Frontline has a solid balance sheet, a strong liquidity of $526 million in cash and cash equivalents, which includes an undrawn amount of the senior unsecured revolving Fed facility, marketable securities, and minimum cash requirements as per the September 30, 2024. We do not have any remaining new building commitments and we do not have any meaningful debt securities until 2027.

然後讓我們來看看投影片 5 中的資產負債表。本季的資產負債表變動與除普通項目外減少債務的再融資有關。Frontline 擁有穩健的資產負債表、5.26 億美元的現金和現金等價物的強大流動性，其中包括未提取的高級無擔保循環美聯儲貸款、有價證券以及截至 2024 年 9 月 30 日的最低現金要求。我們沒有任何剩餘的新建築承諾，在 2027 年之前我們沒有任何有意義的債務證券。

If we then turn to slide 6, our fleet consist of 41 VLCCs, 22 Suezmax tankers and 18 LR2 tankers. The fleet has an average age of six years and consist of 99% eco vessels, where 56% is scrubber fitted. We estimate average cash breakeven rates for the next 12 months of approximately $29,600 per day for VLCCs and $23,400 per day for Suezmax tankers and $22,000 per day for LR2 tankers. This gave the fleet average estimate of about $26,300 per day.

如果我們轉向幻燈片 6，我們的船隊由 41 艘 VLCC、22 艘 Suezmax 油輪和 18 艘 LR2 油輪組成。船隊的平均船齡為六年，其中 99% 是生態船舶，其中 56% 裝有洗滌器。我們估計，未來 12 個月 VLCC 的平均現金損益平衡率約為每天 29,600 美元，Suezmax 油輪為每天 23,400 美元，LR2 油輪為每天 22,000 美元。這使得車隊平均每天的費用約為 26,300 美元。

This fleet average estimate includes drydock of five VLCCs and two Suezmax tankers in the next 12 months, where two VLCCs are drydock in the fourth quarter of 2024, one Suezmax in the first quarter of 2025, one VLCC and one Suezmax in second quarter of 2025 and two VLCCs in third quarter of 2025.

該船隊平均估計包括未來12 個月內停泊的5 艘VLCC 和兩艘Suezmax 油輪，其中2 艘VLCC 將於2024 年第四季度停泊，一艘Suezmax 將於2025 年第一季度停泊，一艘VLCC和一艘Suezmax 將於2025 年第二季停泊以及 2025 年第三季建造兩艘 VLCC。

This quarter we recorded OpEx expenses including drydock of $8,700 per day for VLCCs, $7,900 per day for Suezmax tankers and $7,800 per day for LR2 tankers. This includes then drydock of two VLCCs. The Q3 2024 fleet average OpEx excluding drydock was $7,900 per day.

本季我們記錄的營運支出包括 VLCC 每天 8,700 美元的乾塢費用、Suezmax 油輪每天 7,900 美元以及 LR2 油輪每天 7,800 美元。這包括兩艘 VLCC 的乾船塢。2024 年第三季度，不包括乾船塢的船隊平均營運支出為每天 7,900 美元。

Then let's move to slide 7. Despite current challenged spot market, Frontline generates a decent positive cash flow and with 30,000 earnings days annually, Frontline has a substantial upside potential. As you can see from the graph on the right hand side of this slide, the cash generation potential at current fleet and spot market earnings from Clarkson Research as of November 26 is $304 million or $1.36 per share and with a 30% increase from current spot market, it will increase the potential cash generation with about 100%.

然後我們轉到投影片 7。儘管目前現貨市場面臨挑戰，但 Frontline 仍能產生可觀的正現金流，並且每年有 30,000 個盈利日，因此具有巨大的上升潛力。正如您從這張投影片右側的圖表中看到的那樣，截至11 月26 日克拉克森研究公司當前機隊和現貨市場收益的現金產生潛力為3.04 億美元，即每股1.36 美元，比當前現貨成長30%市場上，它將增加約 100% 的潛在現金產生。

With this, I leave the word to Lars again.

說到這裡，我再次向拉斯轉告。

Thank you very much, Inger. So the current market narrative is somewhat mixed. Global oil supply is increasing, but demand growth is very much muted, I'm on slide 8 now. The geopolitical risk linked to Middle east continues and it's very important to see how the new kind of US policy is going to be going forward.

非常感謝你，英格。因此，目前的市場敘述有些複雜。全球石油供應正在增加，但需求成長非常緩慢，我現在在幻燈片 8 上。與中東相關的地緣政治風險仍在持續，了解美國新政策將如何推進非常重要。

17% of the shipped oil is in the market is sanctioned and 6% of global consumption includes sanctioned barrels. The very recent tariffs on Canada and Mexico may increase in efficiencies in oil flows, but more importantly the order books have stopped growing for tankers, as containers are starting to take the stage again.

市場上 17% 的運輸石油受到製裁，全球消費量的 6% 包括受制裁的石油。最近對加拿大和墨西哥徵收的關稅可能會提高石油流動的效率，但更重要的是，隨著貨櫃開始再次登上舞台，油輪的訂單已經停止增長。

If you look at the chart on the right hand side, this is basically compare the balance between supply and demand according to EIA, which is the orange line versus the tanking markets and how they performed over the years. What we see and this is notable is that although demand is quite disappointing somewhat expected to continue to grow. And when we move into 2025, we are looking to be in an oversupplied market again on tankers with kind of with affects you then have on utilization on tankers.

如果你看一下右邊的圖表，這基本上是根據 EIA 來比較供需平衡的，即橙色線與油罐市場以及它們多年來的表現。我們看到，值得注意的是，儘管需求相當令人失望，但預計將繼續增長。當我們進入 2025 年時，我們預期油輪市場將再次出現供應過剩，這將對油輪的利用率產生一定的影響。

At the bottom three slides of the bottom three charts of this slide, you can see kind of how these markets are actually range bound, although at a very, very low level, apart from an exemption of the clean market, the LR2 exposure which has corrected sharply during the period.

在這張投影片底部三張圖表的底部三張幻燈片中，您可以看到這些市場實際上是如何受到區間限制的，儘管處於非常非常低的水平，除了乾淨市場的豁免之外，LR2 敞口期間大幅修正。

Let's move to slide 9 and look at the key oil flows. So as I mentioned previously, overall global demand growth is neutral year-to-date and this is across all regions. We do see oil supply continuing to rise and this is predominantly happening around the Atlantic Basin. Countries like North America, Brazil, Guyana and to some extent West Africa are increasing supply to the market. But the challenge we have is that this increase or increments of barrels tend to stay local. By local I mean to remain in the Northern hemisphere, of course going into Europe to replace the lack of Russian barrels, but also trading into regionally.

讓我們轉到投影片 9，看看關鍵的石油流動。正如我之前提到的，今年迄今為止，全球整體需求成長呈中性，而且遍及所有地區。我們確實看到石油供應持續增加，這主要發生在大西洋盆地周圍。北美、巴西、圭亞那以及西非等國家正在增加市場供應。但我們面臨的挑戰是，這種增加或增加的桶數往往停留在本地。我所說的本地是指留在北半球，當然是進入歐洲以取代俄羅斯桶的缺乏，但也進行區域性貿易。

Having said that, it's a pretty stable flow of oil leaving the Atlantic Basin going to Asia, but there's no growth to be seen in those barrels. This basically means that although we've had for years a positive effect on ton miles as oil has travelled in general further, what we've seen over the last period is that the ton miles have actually not depreciated more than the volume coming out and actually to some extent reduced. If you incorporate what's the compliant fleet and what's not.

話雖如此，從大西洋盆地流向亞洲的石油流量相當穩定，但這些桶子中沒有看到成長。這基本上意味著，儘管多年來隨著石油運輸量的進一步增長，我們對噸英里產生了積極影響，但我們在過去一段時間內看到的是，噸英里的貶值實際上並沒有超過排放量，而且實際上在一定程度上減少了。如果您將哪些是合規車隊和哪些不合規車隊合併在一起。

We see the sanction exposed oil market as a share of Asian demand has reached a whopping 25% in Q3 2024 and this we would argue that tells us that the tanking market is increasingly exposed to any changes in sanctions and policies going forward.

我們認為，受制裁影響的石油市場在 2024 年第三季佔亞洲需求的比例已達到高達 25%，我們認為這告訴我們，油輪市場越來越容易受到未來制裁和政策變化的影響。

Let's move on to slide 9 and have a look at the order books. The order books have increased materially during the year and specifically so for Suezmaxes and for LR2/Aframaxes, but also to a great degree on VLCC.

讓我們繼續看投影片 9，看看訂單簿。今年的訂單量大幅增加，尤其是蘇伊士型油輪和 LR2/阿芙拉型油輪，而且 VLCC 的訂單量也大幅增加。

But at the same time, we are seeing that the fleet continuing to age as virtually zero ships have been sold for recycling. If you look at the current VLCC fleet, the order book is equating to 76% of the existing fleet, while 14.8% of the fleet is above 20 years and not trading the market that we recognize ourselves with.

但同時，我們看到船隊繼續老化，出售用於回收的船舶幾乎為零。如果你看一下目前的 VLCC 船隊，訂單量相當於現有船隊的 76%，而 14.8% 的船隊船齡超過 20 年，並且不屬於我們認可的市場。

On the same metrics for Suezmaxes, the order book is now equal to the population of ships that are above 20 years. Sorry, on the LR2 slope, we see that there is a whopping amount of ships on order. But if you take the LR2s and from combined as there are very few unquoted Aframaxes being on order, the picture becomes more balanced where you get (technical difficulty) the Suezmaxes where there is an equal amount of vessels above 20 years that is on order. And with that we basically don't look at the order books as a big threat, particularly so for the VLCC going forward.

按照蘇伊士型油輪的相同指標，訂單量現在等於船齡超過 20 年的船舶數量。抱歉，在 LR2 斜坡上，我們看到訂購的船隻數量龐大。但如果你把LR2 和LR2 結合起來，因為很少有未報價的阿芙拉型油輪被訂購，那麼當你得到（技術難度）蘇伊士型油輪時，情況會變得更加平衡，其中有相同數量的20 年以上的船隻在訂購。因此，我們基本上不會將訂單視為一個巨大的威脅，特別是對於未來的 VLCC 而言。

There's five vessels scheduled to be delivered next year and there are 131 VLCC trade in the market which formally wouldn't be qualified to trade. Similar numbers is Suezmax. There are 108 about 20 years as we call the year come to an end. And if you look at the Afra/LR2 market combined, you've got more than close to 200 vessels trade in the market. Basically ships that are not necessarily accessible for the mainstream players.

計劃明年交付的船舶有 5 艘，市場上有 131 艘 VLCC 交易，正式不具備交易資格。類似的數字還有蘇伊士型油輪。有108個大約20年，我們稱之為年終。如果您綜合考慮 Afra/LR2 市場，您會發現市場上有超過 200 艘船舶在交易。基本上主流玩家不一定能接觸到的船艦。

So moving from page 10 and going to 11. So in summary, we like to call it roller-coaster Bull market sales. Frontline has a modern fleet, strong balance sheet and we have -- we continue to retain the upside here.

所以從第 10 頁轉到第 11 頁。所以綜上所述，我們喜歡稱之為過山車牛市銷售。Frontline 擁有現代化的機隊和強大的資產負債表，而且我們將繼續保持這裡的優勢。

Oil supply is expected to outpace demand in 2025 with the implications that may occur,. The current trade flow developments are challenging as sanctions bite and I put bite in exclamations mark because basically the sanctions is forcing the long ton miles onto ships that we don't identify ourselves with. Policy changes on Middle East and with the maximum pressure which Trump has been calling for going forward, this will be very interesting space to watch.

預計 2025 年石油供應將超過需求，可能會產生影響。目前的貿易流動發展充滿挑戰，因為制裁的影響很大，我把影響加了感嘆號，因為基本上製裁迫使我們不認同自己的船隻行駛長噸英里。中東政策的變化以及川普一直呼籲的最大壓力，這將是一個非常值得關注的領域。

The order book growth has stopped and modern asset values remain firm. On a small note on that, with the order book now kind of moving into 2028, no shipyards are in any urgency of discounting tankers as they are or they continue to be busy contracting or getting interest or contracts on container ships and other asset classes.

訂單成長已經停止，現代資產價值依然堅挺。需要注意的是，隨著訂單簿現在進入 2028 年，沒有一家造船廠像現在那樣迫切地打折油輪，或者他們繼續忙於簽訂貨櫃船和其他資產類別的利息或合約。

And also some fun fact at the end of the presentation. World oil trade is now serviced by the oldest fleet in more than two decades. You need to go back to 2002 to have an average tanker fleet of this age, which is somewhat surprising considering the efforts in trying to reduce emissions and the tightening kind of scrutiny around the world we're observing.

演示結束時還有一些有趣的事實。現在，世界石油貿易由二十多年來最古老的船隊提供服務。你需要回到 2002 年才能擁有這個年齡的平均油輪船隊，考慮到我們觀察到的世界各地為減少排放所做的努力和嚴格的審查，這有點令人驚訝。

So with that, I'll open up for questions.

因此，我將開放提問。

(Operator Instructions) Jonathan Chappell, Evercore.

（操作員說明）Jonathan Chappell，Evercore。

Thank you. Good afternoon. Inger, I want to start with you. I know you've done a lot with the capital structure this year, refinancing, paying down debt, etc. As the market becomes bit more volatile and maybe lower lows that people are concerned about, maybe just the leverage by appearances looks still a little high.

謝謝。午安.英格，我想從你開始。我知道今年你們在資本結構方面做了很多工作，再融資、償還債務等。

So has there been any thought about taking the strong market that we've had for the last couple of years, some of the strong asset values, some of the fleet, older fleet that you sold and even though you don't have any near-term big debt maturities, to be a little bit more proactive in deleveraging the balance sheet in this part of the cycle?

那麼，有沒有想過要抓住過去幾年我們所擁有的強勁市場，一些強大的資產價值，一些機隊，你出售的舊機隊，即使你沒有任何接近的- 長期大額債務到期，在周期的這一部分更積極主動地去槓桿化資產負債表？

My thinking is that the long term value that we have currently is just below 50% and we don't really see any (technical difficulty) modern fleet will decrease in value. So we don't really see that this is the high leverage that you probably are running out to, we are comfortable with that debt level.

我的想法是，我們目前擁有的長期價值略低於 50%，而且我們實際上並沒有看到任何（技術難度）現代機隊的價值會下降。因此，我們並沒有真正看到您可能會使用的高槓桿率，我們對這種債務水平感到滿意。

Okay. Lars, you touched on a couple times narrative geopolitics watching what's going to happen from here. Maybe we could just tease that out a little bit because sometimes the narrative kind of dominates the view of the market. I think there's probably two, well, one thing that people are really focused on and one thing maybe a little bit less so, so maybe short answers to both, but if there were to be a resolution in Ukraine, but the sanctions and the pressure were to be ratcheted up on Iran, what would be the puts and takes of those two things happening somewhat simultaneously?

好的。拉爾斯，你多次談到了地緣政治敘事，觀察這裡會發生什麼。也許我們可以稍微梳理一下這一點，因為有時敘事主導了市場的觀點。我認為可能有兩件事，嗯，人們真正關注的一件事，而另一件事可能不那麼重要，所以也許對這兩件事都有簡短的回答，但如果要在烏克蘭問題上達成一項決議，那麼制裁和壓力如果對伊朗的製裁力度加大，那麼這兩件事同時發生的後果會是什麼呢？

Well, if, kind of let's do the Russia-Ukraine first. The sanctions that are imposed on Russia are I would argue somewhat flaky. So Europe is buying record amounts of gas from Russia, whilst they're having this price cap on oil and products. We're also just as a coincidence buying a record number of fertilizer from Russia as well. So this kind of leads me to the thinking that any kind of long-term solution to the conflict or the relation from Russia on Ukraine, I think these sanctions may be reversed fairly quickly.

好吧，如果，我們先討論俄羅斯-烏克蘭問題。我認為對俄羅斯實施的製裁有些不穩定。因此，歐洲正在從俄羅斯購買創紀錄數量的天然氣，同時他們為石油和產品設定了價格上限。巧合的是，我們也從俄羅斯購買了創紀錄數量的化肥。因此，這讓我想到，任何解決衝突或俄羅斯與烏克蘭關係的長期解決方案，我認為這些制裁可能很快就會被撤銷。

The political cost of holding these sanctions in place, particularly now coming into or what's expected to be a cold winter in Europe, could actually motivate politicians to actually walk back on these sanctions fairly quickly. This would almost immediately put a lot of oil, which locally belongs to Europe back into Europe and that would push a lot of the Atlantic Basin barrels to find another home and that's more likely to be priced into Asia, incurring longer term miles.

維持這些制裁的政治成本，特別是現在歐洲即將進入寒冬，實際上可能會促使政客們相當快地取消這些制裁。這幾乎會立即將大量在當地屬於歐洲的石油帶回歐洲，這將推動大西洋盆地的大量石油尋找另一個家園，而這些石油更有可能被定價到亞洲，從而產生更長期的里程。

If you on top of that do something about Russia, sorry about Iran and I mentioned it numerous times that Iran are having very, very great success in exporting huge amounts of oil despite production. And if one is able to limit that, that oil also needs to be replaced. And there the likely replacement is from OPEC. It's quite surprising to me that OPEC are happy kind of cutting them up about they are, watching Iran growing their exports. And so if something happens there as well, this means that the Iranian flow needs to go on compliant tonnage and that will kind of give an exponential effect on our market.

如果你除此之外對俄羅斯做點什麼，那麼對伊朗感到抱歉，我多次提到伊朗在生產大量石油時在出口大量石油方面取得了非常非常巨大的成功。如果能夠限制這一點，那麼油也需要更換。可能的替代者來自歐佩克。讓我感到非常驚訝的是，歐佩克很高興地削減他們的現狀，看著伊朗增加出口。因此，如果那裡也發生了一些事情，這意味著伊朗的流量需要繼續保持合規噸位，這將對我們的市場產生指數級影響。

With regards to the Russian fleet, basically what's happened over the last couple of years is that Russia is now more than or closely self-sufficient on how much they're required to 300 vessels, split, kind of major or to the most part it's Aframax and Suezmax, meaning that they can cater for their own volume.

就俄羅斯艦隊而言，基本上過去幾年發生的情況是，俄羅斯現在在需要 300 艘艦艇的數量方面已經超過或接近自給自足，部分是主要的，或者是大部分是阿芙拉型油輪和蘇伊士型油輪，這意味著它們可以滿足自己的需求。

So you're not going to have this massive shift, of course some of these ships are coming back to the compliant market once sanctions are lifted. But we have to consider that the average age of this fleet, more than half of these vessels are north of 20 years old and those we don't believe kind of compliance charters are going to change their age restrictions just yet.

因此，你不會發生這種巨大的轉變，當然，一旦制裁解除，其中一些船舶就會回到合規市場。但我們必須考慮到這支船隊的平均船齡，其中超過一半的船齡超過 20 年，而我們認為合規租船合約不會改變其船齡限制。

Okay, that's very helpful. Thank you, Lars. Thanks, Inger.

好的，這非常有幫助。謝謝你，拉爾斯。謝謝，英格。

Thank you, Jon.

謝謝你，喬恩。

Omar Nokta, Jefferies.

奧馬爾諾克塔，傑弗里斯。

Thank you, Lars and Inger, good afternoon. Just a bit more kind of discussion from my end on the market itself and wanted to ask just in terms of how the VLCC market specifically how that's been developing. You know, it seems and I think Lars you touched on this early in the presentation. You know, rates tend to be drifting at unexciting levels, then a run-up in charging activity takes rates higher, but then that activity kind of slows again and you're back to where we were and it just seems that rates are in this narrow range of call it for modern ships, maybe 25,000 to 50,000 and that's been the case seemingly since August. Do you think that there's a case that we can't see rates break out this winter or is there just simply not enough cargo in the market to move?

謝謝拉斯和英格，下午好。我對市場本身進行了更多的討論，並想問 VLCC 市場具體是如何發展的。你知道，我認為拉爾斯你在演講的早期就提到了這一點。你知道，費率往往會在令人興奮的水平上漂移，然後充電活動的增加會使費率更高，但隨後該活動又會放緩，你又回到了原來的水平，而且費率似乎在這個範圍內。您是否認為今年冬天我們看不到價格突破，或者市場上根本沒有足夠的貨物可供運輸？

As you know, Omar, that's a very difficult question to answer. I think kind of the fact that we are actually in fact ranging is a sign that the market balance is not that completely awful. It's basically we're just missing kind of those incremental barrels that we need to push the scale further. I would say though that the market has changed characteristics a little bit. We have the Middle East or the Ag market as we call it, which you know, is kind of there are Asian interests in more than 80% of those cargoes and Asians again are friendly with each other. Meaning that you don't really get pressure out of those negotiating.

正如你所知，奧馬爾，這是一個很難回答的問題。我認為，我們實際上在進行範圍調整這一事實表明市場平衡並沒有那麼糟糕。基本上我們只是缺少一些我們需要進一步擴大規模的增量桶。我想說的是，市場的特徵已經發生了一些變化。我們有中東或我們所說的農業市場，你知道，其中 80% 以上的貨物都有亞洲人的利益，而且亞洲人彼此之間也很友善。這意味著你不會真正從這些談判中感受到壓力。

So basically it's the Atlantic Basin that needs to price the markets. This TD3C which is the benchmark index for Middle East to China, have kind of -- it's like the Dow Jones freight, but it has the least kind of open interest to use the term from the oil market.

所以基本上是大西洋盆地需要為市場定價。TD3C 是從中東到中國的基準指數，有點像道瓊貨運指數，但它的未平倉合約最少，可以使用石油市場這個術語。

So, you basically need that anti-basin to price because the mechanism then is that the vessels will just shun it, go straight to US. Gulf, Brazil, or West Africa because that offer better return. And for that we basically lacked the expansion in ton miles from those Atlantic Basin east. I mentioned that in my presentation that, that volume has been more or less flat. So we need some dynamics to change here in order for that to occur basically to force Atlantic Basin barrels to not force them, but attract them to Asia to a greater degree than what we've had.

所以，你基本上需要反盆地來定價，因為當時的機制是船隻會避開它，直接前往美國。海灣、巴西或西非，因為這些可以提供更好的回報。為此，我們基本上缺乏從大西洋盆地東部以噸英里為單位的擴張。我在演講中提到，這個數字或多或少持平。因此，我們需要在這裡改變一些動力，以便基本上實現這一點，迫使大西洋盆地的桶子不再強迫它們，而是比我們現有的更大程度地吸引它們到亞洲。

So, I would say, if you ask me right now it seems like we are in this range bound kind of motion, but again, the balances are still tight. You know, we're actually making black numbers on the fixtures we make here. So it's not an absolute disaster, but it's very difficult to put beyond this 50,000 per day as you described.

所以，我想說，如果你現在問我，我們似乎處於這種範圍內的運動中，但同樣，平衡仍然很緊。你知道，我們實際上是在我們在這裡製造的燈具上製作黑色數字。所以這並不是一場絕對的災難，但是像你所描述的那樣，每天的投入量很難超過 50,000。

Yes, thanks, Lars, appreciate that and the difficult, definitely difficult question to answer and maybe I'll throw another one at you, that's probably, perhaps just as difficult or we'll see. But I guess maybe just in terms of, you know, 2025 and as talked before and with Jon, there's so much going on between the Middle East conflict, Russia-Ukraine, the Red Sea, Iran, OPEC changes, there's just a lot of different variables.

是的，謝謝，拉爾斯，感謝這一點，以及這個很難、絕對很難回答的問題，也許我會向你拋出另一個問題，這可能同樣困難，或者我們拭目以待。但我想也許就 2025 年而言，正如之前和喬恩談到的那樣，中東衝突、俄羅斯-烏克蘭、紅海、伊朗、歐佩克變化之間發生了很多事情，有很多不同的變數。

How in general would you see from your vantage point heading into 2025. What do you think is the base case next year for VLCCs in terms of earnings potential? I know it's obviously very difficult to define, but maybe just in relation to how 2024 is averaged, how would you say from your perspective what 2025 will look like relative to this year?

從您的角度來看，您對 2025 年的整體看法如何？您認為明年 VLCC 獲利潛力的基本情況是什麼？我知道這顯然很難定義，但也許只是與 2024 年的平均情況有關，從您的角度來看，2025 年相對於今年會是什麼樣子？

I was actually hoping that 2024 would be what we now probably have to wait until 2025 to see if kind of we've completely underestimated to which extent this current state of the market can extend. I think it's on (technical difficulty) fees will be above that, 6%, 7% of the oil fees from the sanctions and so forth and everybody would be happily trading.

我實際上希望 2024 年會是我們現在可能必須等到 2025 年才能看到的情況，看看我們是否完全低估了當前市場狀況可以延續到什麼程度。我認為（技術難度）費用將高於此，制裁產生的石油費用的 6%、7% 等等，每個人都會愉快地進行交易。

I would say that's impossible, but apparently it's not. I think the exciting part is that the incoming kind of government in the US are arguing for very hard stance on (technical difficulty) I think it's obvious to most what kind of these exports is financing. I think it should be also even at some point here obvious to IMO that they shouldn't maybe focus on what's going on in the unregulated shipping market rather than talking about decarbonization every turn. So I'm very hopeful. I'm also, I think kind of we are extending ourselves here not by way of Frontline, we're very happy, but the market itself is extending itself here.

我想說這是不可能的，但顯然事實並非如此。我認為令人興奮的部分是，即將上任的美國政府在（技術難度）方面主張採取非常強硬的立場，我認為對大多數人來說，這些出口融資的類型是顯而易見的。我認為，即使在某些時候，對國際海事組織來說，他們也不應該關注不受監管的航運市場正在發生的事情，而不是每次都談論脫碳。所以我非常有希望。我也認為，我們不是透過 Frontline 在這裡擴展自己，我們非常高興，但市場本身正在這裡擴展。

So, kind of any adverse event in this market, say (technical difficulty) we discussed, if something happens with Russia-Ukraine that shifts the balances if something happens to Iran and they miss their ability to export. We're extremely sensitive to these changes which obviously would put the tanking market in a all of a sudden and in a very, very strong position.

因此，這個市場中的任何不利事件，比如說我們討論過的（技術困難），如果俄羅斯和烏克蘭發生什麼事，如果伊朗發生什麼事並且他們失去了出口能力，就會改變平衡。我們對這些變化非常敏感，這顯然會讓油輪市場突然處於非常非常強勢的地位。

Yes, understood. Well, largely appreciate it. I'll turn it over.

是的，明白了。嗯，很大程度上很欣賞。我會把它翻過來。

Thank you.

謝謝。

Sherif Elmaghrabi, BTIG.

謝里夫·埃爾馬格拉比，BTIG。

Hi, thanks for taking my questions. I was hoping you could give a little bit more color on the sale and purchase markets. It seems like asset values have softened slightly in the last month or two and I'm wondering is that due to more sellers coming to the market? Maybe less appetite for vessels from the dark fleet? Any color would be helpful?

您好，感謝您回答我的問題。我希望你能為銷售和購買市場提供更多的資訊。過去一兩個月資產價值似乎略有疲軟，我想知道這是由於更多賣家進入市場嗎？也許對黑暗艦隊的船隻興趣減弱？任何顏色都會有幫助嗎？

I think it's a combination of less appetite from the sanctioned trade. I mentioned previously that Russia are themselves more or less saturated in respect of the fleet they need in order to trade their markets. The margins, as I believe we mentioned little bit in our Q2 presentation, the margins in this market is under pressure. We're even seeing that discounts on Iranian crude are getting smaller and smaller, meaning that there's less cost for freight.

我認為這是受制裁貿易的胃口減少的綜合影響。我之前提到過，俄羅斯本身在市場貿易所需的艦隊方面或多或少已經飽和。利潤率，正如我相信我們在第二季的演示中提到的那樣，這個市場的利潤率面臨壓力。我們甚至看到伊朗原油的折扣越來越小，這意味著貨運成本越來越低。

So there is hope that these markets are getting saturated with the effect that the latter or the older part of the tanker fleet will lose that kind of bid and you'll have an adjustment in values. This is exactly why Frontline has been so focused on selling (technical difficulty) basically because we've seen that gap you could say or over performance on asset values on the more older (technical difficulty) to be extremely risky.

因此，這些市場有望變得飽和，因為油輪船隊的後者或較舊的部分將失去這種出價，並且您將進行價值調整。這正是為什麼 Frontline 如此專注於銷售（技術難度）的原因，基本上是因為我們已經看到了您可以說的差距或較舊的（技術難度）資產價值的過度表現是極其危險的。

So, but I think kind of from what we're seeing, it's not many weeks ago that we saw fairly good prices on modern second-hand vessels. Right now the market is a little bit paralyzed. There's nobody really exchanging kind of numbers nor trading ships firm. But we're quite comfortable that for the modern part of this fleet it hasn't actually grown at all for the last couple of years and that the downside is very limited. But for the older part of the fleet and the tail end of the curve, I think we'll need to kind of recycling parity fairly soon.

所以，但我認為從我們所看到的情況來看，就在幾週前，我們看到現代二手船的價格相當不錯。現在市場有點癱瘓。沒有人真正交換數字，也沒有人進行船舶貿易。但我們感到非常滿意的是，對於這支機隊的現代部分來說，過去幾年實際上根本沒有成長，而且下行空間非常有限。但對於機隊的較舊部分和曲線的尾部，我認為我們需要很快實現回收平價。

Thanks. And then regarding this phenomenon of larger tankers that are trading products, hearing some industry reports that they're coming back into the dirty trade, my question is, what keeps them in the dirty trade once they switch back, especially kind of you highlighted what's going on with the rate momentum heading into December?

謝謝。然後，關於大型油輪交易產品的現象，聽到一些行業報告稱它們將重新回到骯髒的貿易中，我的問題是，一旦它們回來，是什麼讓它們繼續從事骯髒的貿易，特別是你強調了什麼進入12月，利率動能會持續下去嗎？

Well, it's, this is just pure mathematics or economics to put it that way. If you have the ability, when the crude market is subdued and you have a vessel and a cargo history that gives you the opportunity to within a reasonable cost clean-up, you will do that. But, none of these ships on the crude tanker side are really designed to carry product.

嗯，這只是純粹的數學或經濟學。如果你有能力，當原油市場低迷時，並且你擁有一艘船舶和一段貨物歷史，使你有機會在合理的成本內進行清理，你就會這樣做。但是，這些原油油輪方面的船隻都不是真正設計用於運輸產品的。

So it means that they can't do it for an extended period of time. But I think kind of the key motivation here is the economics. And obviously now the clean market is not offering the economics to compete with crude and basically that you rather than switch back.

所以這意味著他們不能在很長一段時間內這樣做。但我認為這裡的關鍵動機是經濟。顯然，現在清潔市場並沒有提供與原油競爭的經濟性，基本上你不會再轉回來。

But I think what this has showed us that we saw kind of in May, June this year is that the efficiency between asset classes has increased. We were ourselves surprised to see how quickly kind of these e-comms put crude tankers into the clean trade. But that was obviously also due to the fact that the crude market was challenged at the time. So this will kind of in a scenario, say if the clean market suddenly rallies now, you would get crude vessels to clean up. But in a case where both rallies, you won't have that kind of interconnectivity between the Afra classes.

但我認為這向我們表明，我們在今年五月、六月看到的是，資產類別之間的效率有所提高。我們自己也驚訝地發現這些電子商務如此快速地將原油油輪納入清潔貿易。但這顯然也是由於當時原油市場受到挑戰所致。因此，這將在某種情況下發生，比如說，如果清潔市場現在突然反彈，您將需要原油船舶進行清理。但在兩者都上漲的情況下，阿夫拉類別之間就不會有這種互連性。

Yes, that's very helpful. Thanks for taking my questions.

是的，這非常有幫助。感謝您回答我的問題。

Thank you.

謝謝。

(Operator Instructions) Devin Sanjoy, (technical difficulty) Investment.

（操作員指令）Devin Sanjoy，（技術難度）投資。

Hi, Lars, I have a couple of questions. One on the China demand because I asked you last time. So there's been a massive shift and significant downgrade in the consumption pattern due to shift to LNG and to more cleaner EV. How do you see the demand going back into 2025 and how much difference does it make to overall tanker demand?

嗨，拉爾斯，我有幾個問題。一個是關於中國的需求，因為我上次問過你。因此，由於轉向液化天然氣和更清潔的電動車，消費模式發生了巨大轉變並顯著下降。您如何看待 2025 年的需求？

No, you're absolutely right. There is particularly on the heavy duty trucks, there's heavy subsidizing going on in China in order to kind of get that fleet with checked up to 16 million vehicles or something to get them to go into for east, let's call it gas propulsion, it's LNG and LPG where with staggering sales numbers where 50% of new sales are actually on alternative fuels that is being reported to have reduced diesel demand in China by somewhere between 500,000 and 700,000 barrels per day. This is out of 3.5 million barrels per day with the current population of alternative fuel kind of heavy duty trucks.

不，你說得完全正確。特別是重型卡車，中國正在進行大量補貼，以便讓車隊擁有多達 1600 萬輛汽車，或者讓它們進入東部，讓我們稱之為氣體推進，它是液化天然氣液化石油氣的銷量驚人，其中50%的新銷量實際上來自替代燃料，據報道，這使得中國的柴油需求每天減少50 萬至70 萬桶。目前替代燃料重型卡車的產量為每天 350 萬桶。

Having said that, we're actually at a very good position to having observed these kind of developments ourselves, particularly from Norway, because Norway has had the highest penetration -- the highest new sales of EVs in the world for a long period of time. There were more Teslas sold in Norway than in the US due to heavy subsidizing. And basically surprisingly we've seen that fuel demand has not fallen as expected, which basically leads us more onto the point that it's more activity and consumer driven than actually the penetration.

話雖如此，我們實際上處於非常有利的位置，可以親自觀察此類發展，特別是來自挪威，因為挪威的普及率最高，並且在很長一段時間內是世界上電動汽車新銷量最高的國家。由於高額補貼，挪威的特斯拉銷量比美國還要多。令人驚訝的是，我們發現燃料需求並未如預期下降，這基本上使我們更加認識到，它更多是由活動和消費者驅動的，而不是實際的滲透率。

Even though you have two or three million alternative fuel trucks or maybe more, 6 million I guess you could get to fairly soon in China, you still have that existing fleet that is also driving and on increased economic activity these tend to drive longer at least or further. This is at least what we've experienced here. On the EV side, there's a huge population of cars in China. I think we are still some years away from that market getting to tipping point where actually petrol demand starts to decrease materially.

即使你有兩三百萬輛替代燃料卡車，甚至更多，我想你在中國很快就會達到六百萬輛，但你仍然擁有現有的車隊也在行駛，而且隨著經濟活動的增加，這些卡車至少會行駛更長時間或更進一步。這至少是我們在這裡經歷過的。在電動車方面，中國擁有大量汽車。我認為我們距離市場達到臨界點還有幾年的時間，實際上汽油需求開始大幅下降。

But I think kind of we have to expect that in most markets around the world except US, we are actually getting to stages where at least for personal cars demand is not expected to grow materially. And it's actually -- we reached peak gasoline demand in many countries already. But kind of on that note, what we haven't seen peak demand of is on petrochemicals. So if you look at the various agencies and how they report on petrochemicals, there is the tremendous growth.

但我認為，我們必須預期，在美國以外的全球大多數市場中，我們實際上正處於至少個人汽車需求預計不會大幅成長的階段。事實上，我們已經在許多國家達到了汽油需求的高峰。但在某種程度上，我們還沒有看到石化產品的需求高峰。因此，如果你看看各個機構以及他們如何報告石化產品，你會發現巨大的成長。

So this means that although transportation is a huge part of the demand picture, we're also seeing quite sustainable growth on demand coming from the pet chem markets. So I think kind of it's a little bit too early to call the doom to oil demand basically due to high numbers of sold EVs in Asia or in China.

因此，這意味著儘管運輸在需求圖中佔據很大一部分，但我們也看到來自寵物化學品市場的需求相當可持續的成長。因此，我認為現在就斷定石油需求的末日還為時過早，這主要是因為亞洲或中國的電動車銷量很高。

Second question is on the OPEC. OPEC has kept on pushing back the production increase. What's your view going back, going to the 2025 year, how do you see the production? Will they focus on market share or will they focus on price stability?

第二個問題是關於歐佩克的。OPEC持續延後增產。回顧過去，到 2025 年，您如何看待製作？他們會關注市佔率還是價格穩定？

That's the 10 or (technical difficulty) isn't it? You know, we read the same narrative as you do, one month, you know, it said that OPEC will look or particularly so Saudi will focus on market share rather than the absolute price. And you know, kind of a month after it's that the narrative is completely the opposite. What surprises me is, is that we are actually in this territory for such a long period of time and it's quite impressive to see OPEC so disciplined as they see non (technical difficulty) production numbers increase and taking market share to this extent.

這就是 10 或（技術難度）不是嗎？你知道，我們讀到的敘述和你一樣，一個月，你知道，它說歐佩克將看起來或特別是沙烏地阿拉伯將關注市場份額而不是絕對價格。你知道，大約一個月後，故事就完全相反了。令我驚訝的是，我們實際上在這個領域已經呆了很長一段時間了，看到歐佩克如此自律，因為他們看到非（技術難度）產量增加並佔據市場份額到了這種程度，這令人印象深刻。

So it's logically for me, I can't really understand why they're so disciplined. But that's only, kind of how I see it. But I think kind of it's a very, it's very difficult to understand what's happening in the whole west of Vienna, well, actually online now on Sunday, but when they discuss these matters.

所以這對我來說是合乎邏輯的，我真的無法理解為什麼他們會如此自律。但這只是我的看法。但我認為，很難理解整個維也納西部正在發生的事情，嗯，實際上週日在網上，但是當他們討論這些問題時。

And how do you see the current season, current quarter, which is typically very strong, we haven't seen that. But as we go in December and January, how do you see the season going forward?

您如何看待當前季節、當前季度，通常情況下非常強勁，我們還沒有看到這一點。但隨著 12 月和 1 月的到來，您對本賽季的未來有何看法？

Sorry, I missed that, what, seeing what?

抱歉，我錯過了，什麼，看到什麼？

How do you see that, typically this quarter is the strongest quarter for the rates, but we haven't seen that. So how you see the rates going forward in December and January peak winter?

您如何看待這一點，通常本季是利率最強勁的季度，但我們還沒有看到這一點。那麼您如何看待 12 月和 1 月冬季高峰期的費率走勢？

Well, it's actually been noted by a couple of kind of market analysts that maybe Q1 will be the new Q4. We've seen that on a couple of occasions that on the event of Q4 failing, Q1 has come back with a vengeance. It's impossible to call. There are many factors that affect this. But I think kind of at what's the point in our presentation here, I think this kind of maximum pressure to owe on Iran is far more interesting coming into next year than the potential kind of seasonal slip where we're actually we see incremental demand coming in as we start to move into the new year.

事實上，一些市場分析師已經指出，第一季可能會成為新的第四季。我們有幾次看到，在第四季失敗的情況下，第一季會捲土重來。打電話是不可能的。影響這一點的因素很多。但我認為我們在這裡的演講有什麼意義，我認為明年對伊朗的這種最大壓力比潛在的季節性下滑更有趣，我們實際上看到增量需求即將到來當我們開始進入新的一年時。

So I think kind of, I'm more excited about political events coming into the New Year or in the near term than whether if the seasons have shifted. But it is a fact we have actually seen seasonal demand increased into Q1. There is kind of increased degree of refinery turnarounds, basically putting more oil available for trade.

所以我認為，我對新年或近期的政治事件比季節是否變化更感興趣。但事實是，我們實際上看到第一季的季節性需求增加。煉油廠的周轉程度有所提高，基本上可以提供更多的石油用於貿易。

Lars, what makes you so confident about the Iran? Is it the change in the political scene in US with the Trump administration coming in, that Iran sanction will become much more tougher or it's something else?

拉斯，是什麼讓你對伊朗如此有信心？是川普政府上台後美國政局發生變化，對伊朗的製裁將變得更加嚴厲，還是另有原因？

No. So we're completely a political. But it is a fact that Iranian barrels are sanctioned by most of the countries in the Western world. The way they're able to evade these sanctions is by engaging in ships that are not kind of regulated by or adhering to any of the IMO kind of principles. So -- and I don't think or I hope that's not a long-term situation. So something has to give her at some point. Actually, the most bullish scenario you can paint is that all sanctions are listed on Iran. That would be a fantastic scenario.

不。所以我們完全是一個政治家。但伊朗桶受到西方世界大多數國家的製裁卻是事實。他們逃避這些制裁的方法是參與不受國際海事組織任何原則監管或遵守任何原則的船舶。所以——我不認為或希望這不是一個長期的情況。所以在某個時候必須給她一些東西。事實上，你能描繪的最樂觀的情景是所有製裁都針對伊朗。那將會是一個美妙的場景。

Thanks, Lars. All the best.

謝謝，拉爾斯。一切順利。

Thank you.

謝謝。

We have no further questions at this time. I'll hand back to you for closing remarks.

目前我們沒有進一步的問題。我將把結束語交給您。

Well, thank you very much for listening in and please don't forget (technical difficulty) 2004 we also thought it was the doom and gloom and then only months after we were really rallying for the skies. So hopefully we'll -- this market will develop a bit more excitingly than we expected for this quarter and have a good Christmas presentations. Thank you.

好吧，非常感謝您的收聽，請不要忘記（技術難度）2004 年，我們也認為那是厄運和陰鬱，但就在我們真正為天空而戰的幾個月後。因此，希望這個市場的發展比我們本季的預期更加令人興奮，並有一個很好的聖誕節展示。謝謝。