Opendoor Technologies Inc (OPEN) 2022 Q3 法說會逐字稿

Good day, and thank you for standing by. Welcome to the Opendoor Third Quarter 2022 Earnings Call. (Operator Instructions) Please be advised that today's conference is being recorded.

美好的一天，感謝您的支持。歡迎來到 Opendoor 2022 年第三季度財報電話會議。 （操作員說明）請注意，今天的會議正在錄製中。

I would now like to turn the conference over to your speaker today, Elise Wang, Vice President of Investor Relations. Please go ahead.

我現在想把會議轉給你今天的演講者，投資者關係副總裁 Elise Wang。請繼續。

Thank you, and good afternoon. Details of our results and additional management commentary are available in our earnings release and shareholder letter, which can be found on the Investor Relations section of our website at investor.opendoor.com. Please note that this call will be simultaneously webcast on the Investor Relations section of the company's corporate website.

謝謝，下午好。我們的業績和其他管理層評論的詳細信息可在我們的收益發布和股東信函中找到，可在我們網站investor.opendoor.com 的投資者關係部分找到。請注意，本次電話會議將同時在公司網站的投資者關係部分進行網絡直播。

Before we start, I would like to remind you that the following discussion contains forward-looking statements within the meaning of the federal securities laws. All statements, other than statements of historical facts, are statements that could be deemed forward-looking, including, but not limited to, statements regarding Opendoor's financial condition, anticipated financial performance, business strategy and plans, market opportunity and expansion and management objectives for future operations. These statements are neither promises nor guarantees, and undue reliance should not be placed on them. Such forward-looking statements involve risks and uncertainties that may cause actual results to differ materially from those discussed here.

在開始之前，我想提醒您，以下討論包含聯邦證券法含義內的前瞻性陳述。除歷史事實陳述外，所有陳述均為前瞻性陳述，包括但不限於關於 Opendoor 的財務狀況、預期財務業績、業務戰略和計劃、市場機會以及擴張和管理目標的陳述未來的操作。這些陳述既不是承諾也不是保證，不應過分依賴它們。此類前瞻性陳述涉及可能導致實際結果與此處討論的結果大不相同的風險和不確定性。

Additional information that could cause actual results to differ from forward-looking statements can be found in the Risk Factors section of Opendoor's most recent annual report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2021, as updated by the periodic reports filed after that 10-K.

可能導致實際結果與前瞻性陳述不同的其他信息可在 Opendoor 最新的 10-K 表格年度報告（截至 2021 年 12 月 31 日）的風險因素部分中找到，該報告已在之後提交的定期報告中更新那10-K。

Any forward-looking statements made in this conference call, including responses to your questions, are based on management's reasonable current expectations and assumptions as of today, and Opendoor assumes no obligation to update or revise them, whether as a result of new developments or otherwise, except as required by law.

本次電話會議中所做的任何前瞻性陳述，包括對您的問題的回答，均基於管理層截至今天的合理當前預期和假設，Opendoor 不承擔更新或修改它們的義務，無論是由於新的發展或其他原因, 除非法律要求。

The following discussion contains references to certain non-GAAP financial measures. The company believes these non-GAAP financial measures are useful to investors as supplemental operational measurements to evaluate the company's financial performance. For a reconciliation of each of these non-GAAP financial measures to the most directly comparable GAAP metric, please see our website at investor.opendoor.com.

以下討論包含對某些非公認會計原則財務措施的參考。該公司認為，這些非公認會計準則財務指標對投資者有用，可作為補充運營指標來評估公司的財務業績。如需將這些非 GAAP 財務指標與最直接可比的 GAAP 指標進行對賬，請訪問我們的網站investor.opendoor.com。

I will now turn the call over to Eric Wu, Co-Founder, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Opendoor.

我現在將把電話轉給 Opendoor 的聯合創始人、董事長兼首席執行官 Eric Wu。

Good afternoon. On the call with me is Carrie Wheeler, our Chief Financial Officer; and Andrew Low Ah Kee, our President. Let's start by hearing from one of our customers, Courtney Dent, who bought her Dream Home through Opendoor Exclusives.

下午好。與我通話的是我們的首席財務官 Carrie Wheeler；和我們的總裁Andrew Low Ah Kee。讓我們從我們的一位客戶考特尼·登特 (Courtney Dent) 的發言開始，她通過 Opendoor Exclusives 購買了她的夢想之家。

(presentation)

（介紹）

While navigating the current market uncertainty is at the forefront of our day-to-day, Courtney's story is a reminder of the impact of our work and the opportunity ahead for us to reshape the real estate transaction. And navigating a once in a 40-year market transition has not been easy. This moment has required us to both operate with discipline to improve the health of our inventory and move with urgency against new product initiatives.

雖然駕馭當前市場的不確定性是我們日常工作的首要任務，但考特尼的故事提醒我們工作的影響以及我們重塑房地產交易的機會。在 40 年一次的市場轉型中導航並非易事。這一時刻要求我們既要遵守紀律，以改善庫存的健康狀況，又要立即採取行動應對新產品計劃。

To that end, we are aligning around 2 core product offerings that we believe will drive our growth and profitability in this next chapter. One is our first-party product that Opendoor is known for, where we purchase them directly from the seller and resell the home to a buyer. And this is the product that attracts hundreds of thousands of sellers as product market fit and powers our engine.

為此，我們圍繞 2 種核心產品進行調整，我們相信這些產品將在下一章推動我們的增長和盈利能力。一個是我們以 Opendoor 聞名的第一方產品，我們直接從賣家那裡購買它們並將房屋轉售給買家。這款產品吸引了成千上萬的賣家，因為產品適合市場並為我們的引擎提供動力。

Two is our new marketplace exclusives, which is our third-party product, where we connect a seller with one of our buyers and facilitate the transaction. And this product has the potential to enable all sellers and buyers to leverage our platform. Together, these 2 products help deliver on our vision of enabling a seamless digital transaction, replacing the inefficiencies of a traditional listing process.

二是我們的新市場獨家產品，這是我們的第三方產品，我們將賣家與我們的買家聯繫起來並促進交易。該產品有可能使所有賣家和買家都能利用我們的平台。這兩種產品共同幫助實現了我們實現無縫數字交易的願景，取代了傳統上市流程的低效率。

Starting with our first-party product, we are focused on 4 key areas to navigate this market transition and more importantly, thrive as the market recovers. First, we are focused on improving the health of our inventory by accelerating the resell of homes we made offers on during Q2. While this will come at the expense of margin losses in the short term, we expect it will enable us to put these losses behind us as expeditiously as possible and proceed with a fresh, lower risk and better performing book of inventory. As such, we have accelerated our clearance rate versus the market to more than double that of a quarter ago and are on track to have sold or be in resell contract on approximately 65% of these homes by year-end.

從我們的第一方產品開始，我們專注於 4 個關鍵領域來駕馭這一市場轉型，更重要的是，隨著市場的複蘇而蓬勃發展。首先，我們專注於通過加速我們在第二季度提供的房屋轉售來改善庫存的健康狀況。雖然這將以短期內的利潤損失為代價，但我們預計它將使我們能夠盡快將這些損失拋在腦後，並繼續進行新的、風險更低且表現更好的庫存賬簿。因此，我們已將我們與市場的清盤率提高到一季度前的兩倍多，並且有望在年底前售出或簽訂轉售合同約 65% 的這些房屋。

Second, we are focused on growing new acquisitions at spreads that we expect will enable positive contribution margin. For homes we made offers on in Q3, we expect those homes to perform within our contribution margin target of 4% to 6%. We feel confident these cohorts are meeting our expectations based on how they're performing today.

其次，我們專注於以利差增長新收購，我們預計這將帶來正的邊際貢獻。對於我們在第三季度提供的房屋，我們預計這些房屋的表現將在我們 4% 至 6% 的邊際貢獻目標範圍內。根據他們今天的表現，我們相信這些同夥正在滿足我們的期望。

Third, we are executing on operational and platform changes that we expect will increase our resale velocity and reduce inventory hold times. One example amongst dozens includes reducing the time needed to do repairs and prepare the home for listing from an average of 23 days in Q1 to 15 days in Q3.

第三，我們正在執行我們預計將提高我們的轉售速度並減少庫存持有時間的運營和平台變更。幾十個例子中的一個例子包括將房屋維修和準備上市所需的時間從第一季度的平均 23 天減少到第三季度的 15 天。

Last, we are reducing our cost structure to ensure we continue to adapt to the market environment and rightsize our overall cost structure. This includes our announced reduction of 550 employees or 18% of our workforce across all business functions. While this was an incredibly difficult decision, it was made to ensure that we forge ahead with a sustainable cost structure that will enable us to accomplish our long-term mission.

最後，我們正在降低成本結構，以確保我們繼續適應市場環境並調整我們的整體成本結構。這包括我們宣佈在所有業務職能部門裁減 550 名員工或 18% 的員工。雖然這是一個非常困難的決定，但它是為了確保我們以可持續的成本結構向前邁進，這將使我們能夠完成我們的長期使命。

Ultimately, we believe the combination of having a product customers need, the ability to increase spreads to deliver on future contribution margins and a strong balance sheet enable us to safely and successfully navigate this market transition.

最終，我們相信擁有客戶需要的產品、增加點差以實現未來邊際貢獻的能力以及強大的資產負債表使我們能夠安全、成功地駕馭這一市場轉型。

With regards to our second priority, our marketplace, it's important to remind us that since we started the company, our stated goal and vision was to build a digital-first platform to buy and sell a home. Our belief is that platforms are earned and not built. So our path to earning our platform was to make it easy to sell a home by buying it directly, leveraging the supply to build a better buying experience and then launch a marketplace to connect supply and demand, with Opendoor as a central transaction layer.

關於我們的第二個優先事項，我們的市場，重要的是要提醒我們，自從我們創辦公司以來，我們的既定目標和願景是建立一個數字優先平台來買賣房屋。我們的信念是平台是賺來的，而不是建立起來的。因此，我們獲得平台的途徑是通過直接購買來輕鬆出售房屋，利用供應來建立更好的購買體驗，然後推出一個連接供需的市場，以 Opendoor 作為中央交易層。

Years ago, we began the latest foundation to our marketplace, starting with institutional buyers who could easily adhere to our customer experience standards. In fact, this year, these institutional buyers purchased more than 10% of our homes directly, including over 1,800 homes where we secured a contract to resell before we close with our sellers.

多年前，我們開始了我們市場的最新基礎，從可以輕鬆遵守我們的客戶體驗標準的機構買家開始。事實上，今年，這些機構買家直接購買了我們超過 10% 的房屋，其中包括 1,800 多套房屋，我們在與賣家完成交易之前簽訂了轉售合同。

Next, we aim to aggregate retail buyers and enable them to buy directly from our platform. Earlier this year, we built those pathways with Exclusives Listings and e-commerce-like experience to buy an Opendoor home directly from us, premarket and completely streamlined. Today, 20% of our homes listed on our Exclusives platform are under contract within 2 weeks, demonstrating the strong momentum we're driving with our direct buyer base. This results in a unique opportunity to instantly match hundreds of thousands of our sellers with our growing retail and institutional buyer base, all leveraging our platform to seamlessly transact.

接下來，我們的目標是聚集零售買家，使他們能夠直接從我們的平台購買。今年早些時候，我們通過 Exclusives Listings 和類似電子商務的體驗建立了這些途徑，可以直接從我們這裡購買 Opendoor 房屋，售前並完全簡化。今天，我們 Exclusives 平台上列出的 20% 的房屋在 2 週內簽訂了合同，這表明我們與直接買家群一起推動的強勁勢頭。這帶來了一個獨特的機會，可以立即將數十万賣家與我們不斷增長的零售和機構買家群進行匹配，所有這些都利用我們的平台進行無縫交易。

Today, we are launching that vision under the brand umbrella Exclusives. With years of experience as one of the largest buyers and sellers of homes, our sellers can now connect directly with our buyers to transact without the hassle and complexity of a traditional listing. This benefits both buyers and sellers alike.

今天，我們將在 Exclusives 品牌下推出這一願景。憑藉作為最大的房屋買賣雙方之一的多年經驗，我們的賣家現在可以直接與我們的買家聯繫進行交易，而無需傳統上市的麻煩和復雜性。這對買賣雙方都有利。

For home buyers, they will be the first to see unique homes before they hit the market. Each one of our homes comes with a buy now price, enabling customers to bid without negotiations or bidding wars. We back this up with an appraisal match guarantee of up to $50,000, which provides peace of mind around pricing as the buyer pays the price if it's lower.

對於購房者來說，他們將是第一個在上市之前看到獨特房屋的人。我們的每一棟房屋都有一個立即購買的價格，使客戶能夠在沒有談判或競標戰的情況下競標。我們提供高達 50,000 美元的評估匹配保證來支持這一點，這讓您在定價時高枕無憂，因為如果價格較低，買方會支付價格。

For our home sellers, we are working to make the experience just as easy as selling to Opendoor. In addition to an Opendoor offer, we seek to bring homeowners additional offers without the need of repairs, extensive home prep for months of open houses or listings. Like an Opendoor offer, these offers require no commitment from the seller and come with the control and flexibility of an early closing. I believe this is a critical part of our next chapter, and we feel uniquely positioned to launch a managed marketplace that can benefit every single home seller and home buyer.

對於我們的房屋賣家，我們正在努力讓體驗就像向 Opendoor 出售一樣簡單。除了 Opendoor 優惠外，我們還尋求為房主提供額外優惠，無需維修、為數月的開放式房屋或掛牌提供大量的房屋準備。與 Opendoor 報價一樣，這些報價不需要賣方的承諾，並且具有提前關閉的控制和靈活性。我相信這是我們下一章的關鍵部分，我們覺得自己處於獨特的位置，可以推出一個可以讓每個購房者和購房者受益的託管市場。

In summary, we continue to operate our first-party business with the requisite discipline to improve our inventory health and acquire new inventory in line with our contribution margin targets. And we will alongside accelerate the trajectory of our third-party product, leveraging our audience and capabilities built over the past 8 years.

總之，我們繼續以必要的紀律經營我們的第一方業務，以改善我們的庫存健康狀況並根據我們的邊際貢獻目標獲取新庫存。我們將同時利用我們在過去 8 年中建立的受眾和能力，加快我們第三方產品的發展軌跡。

I will now turn the call over to Carrie to discuss our financial performance.

我現在將把電話轉給 Carrie 討論我們的財務業績。

Thanks, Eric. Last quarter, we outlined key actions we were taking to navigate the current market transition. Our third quarter results reflect the ongoing impact of those actions as risk management and overall inventory health priorities are driving expedient inventory sell-through, reduce acquisition pace and widening acquisition spreads. In addition to these measures, we are actively reducing our overall cost structure as we adapt to the market environment. We've made solid progress so far and are confident we'll weather this market downturn and emerge even stronger.

謝謝，埃里克。上個季度，我們概述了我們為應對當前市場轉型而採取的關鍵行動。我們的第三季度業績反映了這些行動的持續影響，因為風險管理和整體庫存健康優先事項正在推動快速庫存銷售、降低收購速度和擴大收購價差。除了這些措施，我們也在積極降低整體成本結構，以適應市場環境。到目前為止，我們已經取得了堅實的進展，並且有信心我們將度過這次市場低迷並變得更加強大。

Before I discuss our Q3 financial results and Q4 guidance, it's important to level set that, based on our outlook for Q4, we expect to generate over $530 million in contribution profit for the full year or 3.5% contribution margin, which is just shy of our annual target margin range of 4% to 6%, notwithstanding the sharp housing market reset.

在我討論我們的第三季度財務業績和第四季度指引之前，重要的是根據我們對第四季度的展望，我們預計全年將產生超過 5.3 億美元的貢獻利潤或 3.5% 的貢獻利潤率，這略低於儘管房地產市場急劇重置，但我們的年度目標利潤率範圍為 4% 至 6%。

Turning now to our Q3 financial results. We significantly exceeded the high end of our revenue guidance, reflecting our decision to accelerate our pace of resales and further derisk our balance sheet. We sold about 2,400 more homes in the midpoint of what we've guided to, ahead of the seasonally slow fourth quarter. As a reminder, we refer to those homes priced before the housing market reset or offers made between March and June of this year as the Q2 offer cohort. As of the end of Q3, we had sold through or were in resale contract on over 40% of the Q2 offer cohort. And we expect to be approximately 65% of the way through by year-end.

現在轉向我們的第三季度財務業績。我們大大超出了收入指導的高端，反映了我們加快轉售步伐並進一步降低資產負債表風險的決定。在季節性緩慢的第四季度之前，我們在指導目標的中點賣出了大約 2,400 套房屋。提醒一下，我們將在今年 3 月至 6 月期間房地產市場重置或報價之前定價的房屋稱為第二季度報價隊列。截至第三季度末，我們在第二季度報價隊列中的 40% 以上已售出或簽訂轉售合同。我們預計到年底將完成大約 65%。

Another one of our key actions have been to proactively slow down our pace of acquisitions via substantially higher spreads and lower marketing spend in light of our risk management priorities. This resulted in a 73% sequential decline in Q3 acquisition contracts and a 41% sequential decline in closed acquisitions. Those homes are currently performing well. And over time, we expect them to deliver margins in line with our targets.

我們的另一項關鍵行動是根據我們的風險管理優先事項，通過大幅提高利差和降低營銷支出來主動放慢收購步伐。這導致第三季度收購合同連續下降 73%，已完成收購連續下降 41%。這些房屋目前表現良好。隨著時間的推移，我們希望他們能夠提供符合我們目標的利潤。

As expected, our accelerated pace of resale came at the expense of unit margins, which resulted in lower-than-expected adjusted EBITDA for the quarter. Adjusted operating expenses totaled approximately [$190] million for the quarter, consistent with our guidance.

正如預期的那樣，我們加快轉售步伐是以犧牲單位利潤率為代價的，這導致本季度調整後的 EBITDA 低於預期。本季度調整後的運營費用總計約為 [1.90 億美元]，與我們的指導一致。

Turning to our balance sheet. We're fortunate to have a substantial capital position by design to weather periods of market volatility. As of the end of the third quarter, we had $11.8 billion of borrowing capacity, of which $8.6 billion or over 70% was committed. We have deliberately focused our capital structure on having committed lending capacity with staggered rolling maturities. Despite market uncertainty, we continue to extend our existing lending facilities, which we believe speaks to the resilience of this capital structure.

轉向我們的資產負債表。我們很幸運能夠通過設計擁有大量資本頭寸，以度過市場波動時期。截至第三季度末，我們擁有 118 億美元的借貸能力，其中 86 億美元或超過 70% 已承諾。我們有意將我們的資本結構集中在具有交錯滾動到期的承諾貸款能力上。儘管市場存在不確定性，我們仍繼續擴大現有的貸款便利，我們認為這說明了這種資本結構的彈性。

We also recently closed 2 new financing facilities with our existing lenders, totaling over $700 million in borrowing capacity. These facilities will be used for financing homes remaining in the Q2 offer cohort and will give us flexibility to optimize how and when we sell these homes while allowing us to maintain more consistent performance in our other financing facilities.

我們最近還與現有貸方關閉了 2 項新的融資機制，總借貸能力超過 7 億美元。這些設施將用於為第二季度報價隊列中剩餘的房屋融資，並使我們能夠靈活地優化我們出售這些房屋的方式和時間，同時使我們能夠在其他融資設施中保持更一致的表現。

In addition, we ended the third quarter with $1.5 billion in unrestricted cash and securities and $1.5 billion of equity invested in our homes. Looking ahead, we expect macro volatility to persist through year-end and into 2023 with the path of inflation and the size, frequency and duration of Fed rate hikes continue to dictate the outlook for housing. As a result, we will continue to operate our 1P product offering with a risk-off bias. We expect our Q4 revenue to be between $2.3 billion to $2.5 billion. Although similar to this quarter, we will continue to be opportunistic and accelerate our inventory sell-through based on market conditions.

此外，我們在第三季度末以 15 億美元的非限制性現金和證券以及 15 億美元的股權投資於我們的房屋。展望未來，我們預計宏觀波動將持續到年底和 2023 年，通脹路徑以及美聯儲加息的規模、頻率和持續時間將繼續決定房地產前景。因此，我們將繼續以風險規避偏見經營我們的 1P 產品。我們預計第四季度的收入將在 23 億美元至 25 億美元之間。儘管與本季度類似，但我們將繼續投機取巧，根據市場情況加快庫存銷售。

We expect our contribution margins to reflect our resale mix of longer-dated, lower-margin homes as well as typical seasonal softness in the fourth quarter, while newly acquired homes are expected to perform in line with our contribution margin targets. Our newer book of inventory will be in sufficient scale to offset the negative margin profile of the Q2 offer cohort, given our current acquisition volume pacing. We anticipate the contribution profit will bottom in Q4 as we sunset more of the Q2 cohort and expect to have a higher proportion of fresh inventory for resale in future quarters.

我們預計我們的邊際貢獻將反映我們在第四季度的長期、低利潤房屋的轉售組合以及典型的季節性疲軟，而新收購的房屋預計將符合我們的邊際貢獻目標。鑑於我們目前的收購量節奏，我們較新的庫存賬簿將有足夠的規模來抵消第二季度報價隊列的負利潤率。我們預計貢獻利潤將在第 4 季度觸底，因為我們將更多的第 2 季度隊列淘汰，並預計在未來幾個季度將有更高比例的新庫存用於轉售。

Total adjusted operating expenses are expected to be approximately $145 million for Q4. As Eric noted, we are aggressively reducing costs across our operations and marketing commensurate with our volume expectations. Inclusive of the workforce reduction we announced yesterday, we estimate that we have reduced our run rate adjusted operating expenses by approximately $110 million on an annualized basis relative to this year's peak levels. Having to say goodbye to teammates is incredibly difficult, but these actions are necessary to rightsize our cost structure and are reflective of our commitment to returning the business to operating free cash flow positive and building a profitable generational company.

第四季度調整後的總運營費用預計約為 1.45 億美元。正如 Eric 所指出的，我們正在積極降低我們的運營和營銷成本，以符合我們的銷量預期。包括我們昨天宣布的裁員，我們估計我們已經將我們的運行率調整後的運營費用相對於今年的峰值水平按年減少了約 1.1 億美元。不得不和隊友說再見是非常困難的，但這些行動對於調整我們的成本結構是必要的，也反映了我們致力於讓業務恢復正向運營自由現金流和建立一家盈利的世代公司的承諾。

(Operator Instructions)

（操作員說明）

Operator, before we take the first question, I also wanted to introduce Daniel Morillo, our Chief Investment Officer, who is also on the call with us today. In light of the current macro environment, we thought it would be helpful for Daniel to address any macro or pricing related questions that you have. Operator, on that note, we can take the first question.

接線員，在我們回答第一個問題之前，我還想介紹一下我們的首席投資官 Daniel Morillo，他今天也與我們通話。鑑於當前的宏觀環境，我們認為 Daniel 可以幫助您解決任何與宏觀或定價相關的問題。接線員，在那張紙條上，我們可以回答第一個問題。

Our first question comes from the line of Nick Jones with JMP Securities.

我們的第一個問題來自 JMP Securities 的 Nick Jones。

Two, if I could sneak in 2. First one, I guess, is more kind of macro focused. There's been some headlines kind of indicating there might be some pretty steep home price declines into 2023. So I guess when you think about the inventory you're acquiring now, that can offset some of the 2Q inventory. What gives you confidence that you're maybe not exposed to additional risk? Are there certain markets that just aren't seeing kind of the same declines or as kind of rates keep going up and spreads widening, is that still just an inherent risk that we need to be cognizant of?

第二，如果我可以偷偷進入 2。我猜，第一個更側重於宏觀。有一些頭條新聞表明，到 2023 年房價可能會出現大幅下跌。所以我想當你考慮現在購買的庫存時，這可以抵消部分第二季度的庫存。是什麼讓您確信自己可能不會面臨額外的風險？是否有某些市場沒有看到同樣的下跌，或者利率繼續上漲並且價差擴大，這仍然只是我們需要認識到的固有風險嗎？

Nick, it's Carrie. I'll start, the answer to that question, I'll probably tag Danny for the second half and talk a little bit about macro outlook. For the homes that we have been offering an acquiring, say, from July going forward, those homes are that it was high spreads relative to the environment we're operating -- for all the reasons you just said, we're operating at peak uncertainty right now with an expectation of continued home price depreciation. But as we are selling through those homes, they're performing very well, and we expect them to continue to be in line with our target margins as we sell through the full cohort. So we feel good about the new book of inventory that we're building into right now, and we're pricing appropriately for the macro environment. Dan, do you want to comment on looking forward?

尼克，是嘉莉。我將開始，這個問題的答案，我可能會在下半場給 Danny 貼上標籤，並談談宏觀前景。對於我們一直在提供收購的房屋，例如，從 7 月開始，這些房屋相對於我們正在運營的環境而言價差很高——出於您剛才所說的所有原因，我們正處於高峰期目前的不確定性，預計房價將繼續貶值。但是當我們通過這些房屋進行銷售時，它們的表現非常好，我們希望它們在我們通過整個隊列銷售時繼續符合我們的目標利潤率。因此，我們對我們現在正在構建的新庫存賬簿感覺良好，並且我們正在為宏觀環境進行適當的定價。丹，你想對期待發表評論嗎？

Yes. Yes, Carrie. I guess the additional thing that I would say is, as Eric mentioned in the intro, we continue to carry a risk-off bias. And that means that we are being conservative in our expectations of the future macro environment. And so as we think about what we're pricing for, for offers we're making for today, we are incorporating an expectation that the current trend, which, as you know, is negative, not only will continue but will potentially worsen. So essentially, what I'm saying here is that the forecast that we are having in mind as we plan for our business into the next quarter and the next year is not only incorporating the current trends, but actually being reasonably conservative into a downside of those potential outcomes, right?

是的。是的，嘉莉。我想我要說的另外一件事是，正如 Eric 在介紹中提到的，我們繼續持有風險規避偏見。這意味著我們對未來宏觀環境的預期是保守的。因此，當我們考慮我們為什麼定價時，對於我們今天提供的報價，我們正在納入一個預期，即目前的趨勢，如你所知，是負面的，不僅會繼續，而且可能會惡化。所以本質上，我在這裡要說的是，我們在計劃下一季度和明年的業務時所考慮的預測不僅結合了當前趨勢，而且實際上是相當保守的那些潛在的結果，對吧？

And so in that sense, we feel pretty comfortable that we have responded to what essentially has been continued surprises, they're just surprises on rent size and then a number of other items.

因此，從這個意義上說，我們對我們已經對持續不斷的驚喜做出了回應，我們感到很自在，它們只是租金規模的驚喜，然後是其他一些項目。

Got it. And maybe a separate question. As some of the single-family rental companies have kind of stopped buying. And I know Eric made a comment about kind of 10% of buyers being institutional over time. How is that, in fact, impacting the business? And do we kind of need to see that come back as a sign of things improving?

知道了。也許是一個單獨的問題。由於一些單戶租賃公司已經停止購買。我知道 Eric 評論說隨著時間的推移，有 10% 的買家是機構的。實際上，這對業務有何影響？我們是否需要將其視為事情改善的跡象？

Nick, it's Andrew. Institutional buyers, as Eric mentioned, range from 10% to 20% of our business. And so it's a small minority overall. Certainly, we're in a lot of conversations with those folks. And there's a lot of reasons why they're adjusting their strategies as a market maker. We're in the business of providing liquidity into the market, and we're constantly buying and selling.

尼克，我是安德魯。正如 Eric 所說，機構買家占我們業務的 10% 到 20%。因此，總體而言，它只是一小部分。當然，我們與這些人進行了很多對話。作為做市商，他們調整策略的原因有很多。我們從事為市場提供流動性的業務，我們不斷地買賣。

Our next question comes from the line of James McCanless with Wedbush.

我們的下一個問題來自 James McCanless 和 Wedbush 的觀點。

There it is. Sorry about that. So I guess, congrats on being a net seller of homes this quarter. Is the expectation that, that's going to be the case again in the fourth quarter? And then my second question, I think you answered it when you were talking about expecting conditions to get worse. But I guess, how -- if you're taking 35% of this Q2 cohort, I guess, why not go ahead and be more aggressive in moving that inventory if you do think conditions are going to get worse? Because it doesn't seem like the valuations get better on those over time if we're looking into a down market for '23.

它在那裡。對於那個很抱歉。所以我想，恭喜你成為本季度房屋的淨賣家。是否期望在第四季度再次出現這種情況？然後是我的第二個問題，我想你在談到預期情況會變得更糟時回答了這個問題。但我想，如果你在這個第二季度隊列中佔據 35% 的份額，我猜，如果你認為情況會變得更糟，為什麼不繼續更積極地轉移庫存呢？因為如果我們正在研究 23 年的低迷市場，隨著時間的推移，估值似乎不會變得更好。

It's Carrie. I'll take the first part of that question. So I mean, we are deciding right now, as I think you saw in our earlier comments, to operate with a risk-off stance. We are embedding high spreads into our offers, and that is compressing volumes. And you're right, we do continue -- we expect to continue that pace through the fourth quarter. That means we'll sell more homes than we acquire in Q4. And that's a risk management decision we think is appropriate just given the overall macro environment.

是嘉莉。我將回答這個問題的第一部分。所以我的意思是，正如我想你在我們之前的評論中看到的那樣，我們現在正在決定以規避風險的姿態運作。我們將高點差嵌入到我們的報價中，這就是壓縮交易量。你說得對，我們確實會繼續——我們希望在第四季度繼續保持這種步伐。這意味著我們將在第四季度售出比我們獲得的更多的房屋。考慮到整體宏觀環境，這是我們認為合適的風險管理決策。

Second part of your question was about why not sell faster on the Q2 cohort? And I would say, first of all, we've made really good progress selling homes. So that was our first directive coming out of Q2 is let's expeditiously and effectively as possible monetize the challenged Q2 cohort. And we should be around 2/3 of the way by the end of the year, and we expect to be through that cohort sometime by the first half of the next year. As to whether or we can accelerate, I mean that's about optimizing for a total outcome over time. But Dan, do you want to comment a little bit just on pace of resale?

您問題的第二部分是關於為什麼不在 Q2 隊列中更快地銷售？我想說，首先，我們在銷售房屋方面取得了非常好的進展。所以這是我們從第二季度出來的第一個指令，就是讓我們盡可能快速有效地利用面臨挑戰的第二季度群體獲利。到今年年底，我們應該會完成大約 2/3 的工作，我們預計會在明年上半年的某個時候完成這個隊列。至於我們是否可以加速，我的意思是隨著時間的推移優化總體結果。但是丹，你想就轉售速度發表一點評論嗎？

Yes. I guess what I would add in here is that the way we think about resell phase basically is essentially a trade-off between what we were observing in the market and obviously our expectations all of it. And essentially, the price action that you would have to take in order to accelerate that resell, right? And what you saw this last quarter that we were just reporting is that we had a much larger revenue than expected. I mean that's because we took the opportunity to do exactly that, right? And so I would expect, as Carrie said in the intro comments, that we would do that again as far as there's opportunity to see that trade-off to be beneficial.

是的。我想我在這裡要補充的是，我們對轉售階段的思考方式基本上是在我們在市場上觀察到的情況與顯然我們的預期之間進行權衡。本質上，為了加速轉售，你必須採取的價格行動，對吧？你在上個季度看到我們剛剛報告的是我們的收入比預期的要大得多。我的意思是那是因為我們藉此機會做到了這一點，對吧？因此，正如 Carrie 在介紹性評論中所說，我希望我們會再次這樣做，只要有機會看到這種權衡是有益的。

But to be clear, in general, we would, in fact, expect to operate faster than we would have, right? So the market slows down, the market slowed down a lot, we would expect to slow down less than the market, precisely because we're looking to tick up as that trade-off, right? And we're incorporating that into our expectations, right, inclusive of those additional potential negative outputs.

但需要明確的是，總的來說，我們實際上會期望運行速度比我們預期的要快，對吧？所以市場放緩了，市場放緩了很多，我們預計放緩的幅度小於市場，正是因為我們希望在這種權衡中上升，對吧？我們正在將其納入我們的預期，對，包括那些額外的潛在負面輸出。

Great. And then I guess just on these 2 facilities for the 35% cohort, what's the time frame on those facilities? And any rate information you can give us?

偉大的。然後我猜這 35% 的人群只在這 2 個設施上，這些設施的時間框架是什麼？您能給我們提供任何價格信息嗎？

Yes. I mean we put those 2 new facilities in place really to address the Q2 offer cohort we had. We knew that they would be structurally lower margins. And so this is a way for us to have more flexibility about the pace of resale and optimize for overall outcomes. At the same time, we're managing for performance in our core facilities. It came at a slightly higher rate than our core facilities. I'm sure we break that out, but appropriate just given the short duration facility.

是的。我的意思是我們將這 2 個新設施真正到位，以解決我們擁有的第二季度報價隊列。我們知道它們在結構上會降低利潤率。因此，這是一種讓我們在轉售速度方面具有更大靈活性並針對整體結果進行優化的方式。與此同時，我們正在管理我們核心設施的性能。它的速度略高於我們的核心設施。我相信我們會打破這一點，但考慮到短期設施是合適的。

Our next question comes from the line of Jason Helfstein with Oppenheimer.

我們的下一個問題來自 Jason Helfstein 和 Oppenheimer 的觀點。

Two questions. The first, on 3P, to the extent you hit your goal of 30% of transactions by the end of next year in 3P, do you think of this as additive to what you would have done with 1P or a substitute? Just obviously, we need to come up with our own modeling, and this has pretty significant kind of margin benefits. So just how are you thinking about that? And then I just have a follow-up after that.

兩個問題。首先，在 3P 上，如果您在明年年底之前實現了 30% 的 3P 交易目標，您認為這是對您使用 1P 或替代品所做的補充嗎？很明顯，我們需要提出自己的模型，這會帶來相當大的利潤收益。那麼你是怎麼想的呢？然後我只是在那之後進行了跟進。

Thanks, Jason. It's Eric here. I view it as a substitute in the short term, an extremely additive long term. And so what I can tell you is that based on early tests, sellers are very excited to opt into the program. And that is above and beyond the pool of sellers that would have accepted an Opendoor offer. And so it can be additive long term. The target that we're putting out there that we're confident in hitting is based on traction we already see with the 2 products we've had in market, which is roughly 10% to REITs on the conservative side and roughly 20% direct to consumers on the Exclusives Listing side. And so that's what gets us to a number that we feel confident we can execute against. And there is upside to that if it's additive.

謝謝，傑森。這裡是埃里克。我認為它在短期內是一種替代品，從長遠來看是一種極具附加性的產品。所以我可以告訴你的是，基於早期的測試，賣家很高興選擇加入該計劃。這超出了接受 Opendoor 報價的賣家群體。所以它可以是長期的添加劑。我們有信心實現的目標是基於我們已經在市場上擁有的 2 種產品看到的牽引力，在保守方面，大約 10% 是 REITs，大約 20% 是直接的給獨家商品列表方面的消費者。所以這就是讓我們獲得一個我們有信心可以執行的數字的原因。如果它是添加劑，那也有好處。

Okay. That's helpful. And then just as a clarification on the inventory adjustment in the quarter. So was that basically a revaluation of the entire second quarter cohort kind of based on today? And so depending on market conditions, like we could be another write-off in subsequent quarters? Or is it like connect to home sold? Just how do we think about that $400 million, $500 million number?

好的。這很有幫助。然後作為對本季度庫存調整的澄清。那麼這基本上是基於今天對整個第二季度隊列的重估嗎？因此，根據市場情況，我們可能會在隨後的幾個季度再次註銷？或者它就像連接到家庭出售？我們如何看待這個 4 億美元、5 億美元的數字？

Yes. I'll take that one. The way -- say, first of all, let's level set on what the valuation adjustment is. It's not a revaluation of our portfolio. It is taking a look per GAAP, they require us to do this, every quarter, all the assets we own and we're marking to the lower of cost or market, and we're just recognizing the losses. It is a one-way-only downward adjustment. There is no offset for any expected gains in the portfolio. And that would be like looking at your stock portfolio and marking all the losses and not having the asset and gains.

是的。我會拿那個。方式 - 比如說，首先，讓我們確定估值調整是什麼。這不是對我們投資組合的重估。它正在按照公認會計原則進行審查，他們要求我們每個季度都這樣做，我們擁有的所有資產，我們正在標記成本或市場的較低值，我們只是承認損失。這是一種單向的向下調整。投資組合中的任何預期收益都沒有抵消。這就像查看您的股票投資組合併標記所有損失而沒有資產和收益。

So it's not a revaluation portfolio. It's just a noncash charge to recognize expected losses. I guess that's point one.

所以它不是一個重估投資組合。確認預期損失只是一項非現金費用。我想這是第一點。

Point 2 is, it is a projection. We, in this moment of, again, peak uncertainty, are taking what we believe is a very conservative forward view of where we expect these homes to sell over time. We are assuming additional downside even -- per Daniel's earlier comments to what we're already observing, which is continued home price depreciation, continued depression in transaction volumes and in clearance.

第2點是，它是一個投影。在這個不確定性再次達到頂峰的時刻，我們對我們預計這些房屋隨著時間的推移會在哪裡出售，採取了我們認為非常保守的前瞻性觀點。我們甚至假設還有額外的下行空間——根據丹尼爾早些時候對我們已經觀察到的情況的評論，即房價持續貶值、交易量和清算量持續下降。

What we're doing today is taking those losses, resetting expectations, resetting our existing book of inventory and really pulling those losses forward this quarter and then looking forward.

我們今天所做的是承擔這些損失，重新設定預期，重新設定我們現有的庫存賬簿，並在本季度真正將這些損失向前推進，然後展望未來。

To the other point of your question, this is largely about the Q2 cohort in 2 parts. One is there's a series of homes that we are under contract on. We made the decisions, we talked about last quarter to close on those homes. They're under contract. We didn't own them. We didn't touch them from an inventory valuation perspective. We are having to do so this quarter, and that's about 1/3 of the adjustment. The remainder is about just the continued deterioration we've seen in the forward expectations for the housing macro. And that's what comprises the charge we're having to take this quarter. Again, we think it's conservative. Those homes are going to sell over time. We're going to realize the losses over time and unleash the adjustment, but we're going to sell them next to the new cohort we're creating, which are performing very well. And we expect those to have the offset of expected gains and profitable margins, and we'll mix that in over time. But yes, that's the genesis of the evaluation adjustment.

對於您問題的另一點，這主要是關於第二季度的兩部分。一個是我們簽訂了一系列合同。我們做出了決定，我們在上個季度談到了關閉這些房屋。他們有合同。我們不擁有它們。我們沒有從庫存估值的角度觸及它們。我們本季度必須這樣做，這大約是調整的 1/3。其餘的只是我們在對房地產宏觀的前瞻性預期中看到的持續惡化。這就是我們本季度必須承擔的費用。同樣，我們認為這是保守的。這些房子會隨著時間的推移而出售。隨著時間的推移，我們將意識到損失並釋放調整，但我們將在我們正在創建的新隊列旁邊出售它們，它們表現非常好。我們預計這些將抵消預期收益和利潤率，我們將隨著時間的推移將其混合。但是，是的，這就是評估調整的起源。

Our next question comes from the line of Ryan Tomasello with KBW.

我們的下一個問題來自 Ryan Tomasello 與 KBW 的對話。

Can you walk us through how the restricted cash balance works in relation to your facilities and specifically, the drivers of the increase from last quarter? I know you mentioned in this shareholder letter that you expect to release some of the $1.8 billion of restricted cash as you liquidate, I think, about $350 million of the unlevered homes. But I guess that it still implies a pretty sizable remaining balance. So just wondering if we should expect any more of that to be released in coming quarters.

您能否向我們介紹受限現金餘額與您的設施相關的工作方式，特別是上一季度增長的驅動因素？我知道你在這封股東信中提到，當你清算大約 3.5 億美元的無槓桿房屋時，你預計將釋放 18 億美元的限制性現金中的一部分。但我想這仍然意味著相當可觀的剩餘餘額。所以只是想知道我們是否應該期待在未來幾個季度發布更多內容。

Yes. I mean, there's 2 components, I think, to what you're talking about there. One was on the restricted cash balance, yes, it was very inflated this quarter. We had a lot of cash that was trapped in the system. It's all secured by debt, and that's temporary because we just weren't creating new acquisition volumes. We weren't financing them, too. That's a function of just not having the volumes there. That will come down in Q4. That's number one.

是的。我的意思是，我認為，對於您所說的內容，有兩個組成部分。一個是受限制的現金餘額，是的，這個季度非常膨脹。我們有很多現金被困在系統中。這一切都由債務擔保，這是暫時的，因為我們只是沒有創造新的收購量。我們也沒有為他們提供資金。這是因為那裡沒有捲的功能。這將在第四季度下降。那是第一名。

I think you also alluded to, I think, Ryan, the $350 million we talked about in terms of the unlevered homes that we have equity invested in. Is that correct?

我想你也提到了，我想，瑞安，我們談到的 3.5 億美元是我們投資的無槓桿房屋。這是正確的嗎？

Yes.

是的。

That is going to be financed. It's in that process right now. That will come back to unrestricted cash for us in this quarter.

這將得到資助。現在就在這個過程中。這將在本季度為我們提供不受限制的現金。

Okay. And then, I guess, a bigger-picture question around capital and scaling the business longer term. Obviously, the 3P product is a positive in terms of the capital-light nature and the scalability of that. But I guess as we consider the prospects for capital destruction near term, booked value was down 40% from last quarter, presumably will decline further. Is that changing how you're thinking about the capital position and the ability to scale the 1P product longer term?

好的。然後，我想，這是一個圍繞資本和長期擴展業務的更宏觀的問題。顯然，3P產品在輕資本性質和可擴展性方面是積極的。但我想，當我們考慮近期資本破壞的前景時，賬面價值比上一季度下降了 40%，可能會進一步下降。這是否會改變您對資本狀況和長期擴展 1P 產品能力的看法？

I mean, at the highest level, we have plenty of capital. We have plenty of capital to navigate this period and the go forward. That's first and foremost. We are focused on making sure that we get back to a place where we are operating free cash flow breakeven. That's what we've got to get back to. But we're sort of separating what I'll call the asset losses, which you can time box, and we're getting our way through those, through line of sight to being done with the Q2 offer cohort. And we're building into new acquisitions into a fresh book of inventory and margins that are performing well that we're going to like a lot as we sell those homes. So no, we're not -- we don't feel capital constrained. We feel actually well capitalized for this moment in time.

我的意思是，在最高級別，我們有充足的資金。我們有足夠的資金來度過這個時期並繼續前進。這是首要的。我們專注於確保我們回到我們經營自由現金流盈虧平衡的地方。這就是我們必須回到的。但是我們在某種程度上將我稱之為資產損失的東西分開了，你可以用時間框來區分，我們正在通過這些方法，通過視線完成第二季度的報價隊列。我們正在將新的收購納入一本新的庫存和利潤率賬簿，這些賬簿表現良好，我們在出售這些房屋時會非常喜歡。所以不，我們不是——我們不覺得資本受限。在這一刻，我們實際上感覺資本充足。

Our next question comes from the line of Dae Lee with JPMorgan.

我們的下一個問題來自摩根大通的 Dae Lee。

First one, so looking at your (inaudible) per our profit -- contribution profit per home sold will be worse than what you saw in 3Q? If that's true, do you expect quarter 2 be the trough of -- I'm going to (inaudible) whether your 2Q, I guess, 2Q cohort? And moving into 1Q, do you expect the mix of your homes to shift more towards your newer home by that point and profit to improve from what you saw in 3Q?

第一個，所以看看你的（聽不清）我們的利潤——每售出房屋的貢獻利潤會比你在第三季度看到的更糟糕嗎？如果這是真的，您是否預計第 2 季度會是低谷——我會（聽不清）您的 2Q，我猜，2Q 隊列？進入第一季度，您是否預計到那時您的房屋組合會更多地轉向您的新家，並且利潤會比您在第三季度看到的有所改善？

We do expect Q4 to be the trough, and 2 reasons which you just called out. One is we're selling more of the Q2 offer cohort, you said 2/3 of the way through by the end of the year. At the same time, as we're doing that, we're not offsetting that by design with much at all in the way of new acquisitions because we're risk off. We're choosing to operate with high spreads. The market is uncertain. We're gaining the amount of new volumes in the system. As we sunset the Q2 offer cohort, we would expect to start to ramp up our mix of new acquisition volumes into the coming year. I can't give you a specific number for the first quarter. But obviously, that resale mix is going to change as we just change the mix of old book versus new book to use a short hand.

我們確實預計第四季度將成為低谷，以及您剛才提到的兩個原因。一個是我們正在銷售更多的第二季度報價隊列，你說到今年年底已經完成了 2/3。同時，在我們這樣做的同時，我們並沒有通過設計來抵消這一點，因為我們在冒險。我們選擇以高點差進行操作。市場不確定。我們正在獲得系統中新卷的數量。隨著我們結束第二季度的報價隊列，我們預計將在來年開始增加我們的新收購量組合。我不能給你第一季度的具體數字。但顯然，這種轉售組合將會改變，因為我們只是改變舊書與新書的組合以使用簡寫形式。

And then as a follow-up, and this is more of a macro question. You talked about assuming conditions get worse from here. So looking ahead, what do you need to see for demand to come back? Is it more of people's perception changing to the new reality? Or do you need to see how housing prices come down further before, I guess, demand starts to recover?

然後作為後續行動，這更像是一個宏觀問題。你談到假設情況從這裡變得更糟。因此，展望未來，您需要看到什麼才能恢復需求？是否更多的是人們對新現實的看法發生了變化？或者你是否需要看看房價在我猜需求開始復甦之前如何進一步下跌？

Yes, this is Daniel. Thanks for your question. I think the thing you want to think about it is that a lot of what we're observing now is mostly driven by the declining volumes, right? So as rates unexpectedly rose quite significantly, that resulted in potentially a decline in transactions, right, because the marginal buyer and seller and most people buy to sell and vice versa, finds the reset in that rate to be too onerous. And so volumes come down, and that's what then results in slowing down the clearance, price pressure, et cetera, right? And that's about to change in the rate.

是的，這是丹尼爾。謝謝你的問題。我認為您要考慮的是，我們現在觀察到的很多情況主要是由銷量下降驅動的，對嗎？因此，由於利率出人意料地大幅上升，這可能導致交易量下降，對，因為邊際買賣雙方以及大多數人買進賣出，反之亦然，發現該利率的重置過於繁瑣。所以成交量下降，這就是導致清倉速度放緩、價格壓力等等的原因，對吧？而且這種情況即將發生變化。

And so the thing that we're looking for is stabilization in that rate outlook because we would expect that, that stabilization, even if it is at a high level, would result in stabilization of volumes and different price pressures, et cetera, right? And so what we're looking for here is not so much rates to come down or, for that matter, prices to get to any particular level, but simply for those volumes to get to sort of steady state given the high rate.

因此，我們正在尋找的是利率前景的穩定，因為我們預計，即使處於高水平，這種穩定也會導致交易量穩定和不同的價格壓力等等，對吧？因此，我們在這裡尋找的不是降低利率，或者就此而言，價格達到任何特定水平，而只是考慮到高利率，讓這些交易量達到某種穩定狀態。

And in that context, we would expect price pressures to actually stabilize and somewhat normalize. And crucially for us, for clearance to be more manageable in terms of our projections in terms of what you have to do to buy and sell that inventory, right? And so it's that stabilization, reduction and uncertainty far more than what exactly the level is of either laser prices.

在這種情況下，我們預計價格壓力實際上會穩定下來並在某種程度上正常化。對我們來說至關重要的是，就我們對購買和出售庫存的預測而言，清關更易於管理，對吧？因此，穩定、減少和不確定性遠遠超過這兩種激光器價格的確切水平。

The only other thing I might add to that is, I just don't want to lose sight of the fact that, we continue to have a product that people love, right? People show up. They still convert at very high rates, notwithstanding, which are really high spreads. So your comments were like when do the buyers come back, we're still selling homes. We're still buying -- people are still buying homes from us. And certainly, we would expect to continue to increase our volumes over time. This is more about a temporary dislocation in the market that we're managing and their decision to really gate the volumes that we're taking in. But over time, again, the product still works even in this uncertain environment of high spreads.

我唯一要補充的一點是，我只是不想忽視這樣一個事實，即我們繼續擁有人們喜愛的產品，對吧？人出現。儘管點差非常高，但它們仍然以非常高的速度轉換。所以你的評論就像買家甚麼時候回來，我們還在賣房子。我們仍在購買——人們仍在向我們購買房屋。當然，我們希望隨著時間的推移繼續增加我們的銷量。這更多是關於我們正在管理的市場的暫時錯位，以及他們決定真正控制我們正在接受的交易量。但隨著時間的推移，即使在這種高價差的不確定環境中，該產品仍然有效。

(Operator Instructions) Our next question comes from Curtis Nagle, Bank of America.

（操作員說明）我們的下一個問題來自美國銀行的 Curtis Nagle。

So I guess the first one would be in terms of conversion rates for the homes that you're now buying or offering at higher spreads, what are the conversion rates now, say, compared to when you raised, I think, late last year? I don't know. I mean, I would imagine it's a little difficult, right, when you're in a market where home is less than it was a week or a month ago and the cost of finance is 50% or 60% higher. So would just be curious to hear what the conversion rates look like on these new homes you're buying? And what -- how much people are -- yes, well, what are the conversion rates?

所以我想第一個問題是你現在以更高的價差購買或提供的房屋的轉化率，現在的轉化率是多少，比方說，與你去年年底籌集時相比？我不知道。我的意思是，我想這有點困難，對吧，當你在一個房屋比一周或一個月前少並且融資成本高出 50% 或 60% 的市場時。那麼只是想知道您購買的這些新房的轉化率如何？什麼——有多少人——是的，好吧，轉化率是多少？

Curt, it's Eric. What I'd say is that we're observing conversion rates somewhere between 10% to 15% of true sellers, which is obviously lower than the north of 30 we've seen historically. But that is at fee -- spread levels we've never actually had in market. So to restate it, we're at peak uncertainty in this moment, which results in us having to take a risk-off stance, which means that we have the highest spreads in company history. And we're still seeing somewhere between 10% and 15% of sellers saying yes and loving the experience and delivering a north of 70 NPS experience.

柯特，是埃里克。我想說的是，我們觀察到真正賣家的轉化率介於 10% 到 15% 之間，這顯然低於我們歷史上看到的 30% 以北。但這是收費的——我們在市場上從未有過的點差水平。因此，重申一下，此時我們正處於不確定性的最高點，這導致我們不得不採取避險立場，這意味著我們擁有公司歷史上最高的利差。而且我們仍然看到 10% 到 15% 的賣家表示同意並喜歡這種體驗並提供 70 NPS 以北的體驗。

The inputs to that really is as follows. One is, there are a set of customers that really value the convenience of not having open houses and visitors and some combination of to have kids or pets or the impact of COVID and the like. And so they're more price insensitive and really just the (inaudible). And as it turns out, there's also a set of customers that just really like the speed and certainty aspect of it. And what's happened is that over the course of 8 years, they've actually built up quite a bit of equity, and they're still -- and they're valuing their time or convenience versus maximizing their equity in a backdrop of massive uncertainty. And so the combination actually has surprised us on the upside that we're able to convert a meaningful amount of our customers with spread levels that we've never tested historically.

對此的輸入實際上如下。一個是，有一組客戶真正重視沒有開放房屋和訪客的便利，以及有孩子或寵物或 COVID 等的影響的某種組合。所以他們對價格更加不敏感，實際上只是（聽不清）。事實證明，還有一群客戶非常喜歡它的速度和確定性。發生的事情是，在 8 年的時間裡，他們實際上已經建立了相當多的股權，而且他們仍然——而且他們重視自己的時間或便利，而不是在巨大的不確定性背景下最大化他們的股權.因此，這種組合實際上讓我們感到驚訝，因為我們能夠以我們歷史上從未測試過的點差水平轉換大量客戶。

Got it. Okay. And just as a follow-up, I guess why not have rolled out the 3P business sooner? Just given -- look, I would imagine the margins have to be a lot better. It's less capital risk, right? Is it a matter of just you didn't have the reach of the platform? Or I guess, why now, say, versus, I don't know, a year or 2 ago?

知道了。好的。作為後續，我想為什麼不早點推出3P業務呢？剛剛給出 - 看，我想利潤率必須要好得多。它的資本風險較小，對吧？只是您沒有平台的影響力嗎？或者我想，為什麼現在，比如說，與，我不知道，一年或兩年前？

Well, I'd say 2 things. Launching a managed marketplace has been our plan since we founded the company. And so if you look at our Series-A deck, we stated our platform will be used to connect buyers and sellers, of which Opendoor would be one of many buyers. And our stated ambition -- and it remains the state inhibition is to enable every single home buyer and seller to be a participant and earn them as a customer.

好吧，我想說兩件事。自公司成立以來，我們一直計劃推出託管市場。因此，如果您查看我們的 A 系列甲板，我們表示我們的平台將用於連接買家和賣家，其中 Opendoor 將是眾多買家之一。我們既定的雄心——仍然是國家的限制是讓每一個購房者和賣家都成為參與者並贏得他們的客戶。

Transparently, I wanted to launch this in Q1 of 2020. And we knew we had a deep and large funnel of sellers. We're unique in that. But we needed to build the demand side to ensure that we can successfully launch the marketplace. Just having supply is not sufficient, obviously. And so we've made significant investments on the demand side, one, starting with our work with institutional investors, which has been a 4-plus year endeavor for us, building APIs and pathways to power those transactions against selling somewhere between 10% and 20% of those homes to institutional investors.

很明顯，我想在 2020 年第一季度推出這款產品。而且我們知道我們擁有大量的賣家漏斗。我們在這方面是獨一無二的。但我們需要建立需求方，以確保我們能夠成功啟動市場。顯然，僅僅有供應是不夠的。因此，我們在需求方面進行了大量投資，首先是我們與機構投資者的合作，這對我們來說已經花費了 4 年多的時間，構建 API 和途徑來推動這些交易以防止在 10% 和其中 20% 的房屋歸機構投資者所有。

Another example of this is that we have secured in north of 5,000 resell contracts from REITs before even closing with the seller, right? And so logically, you would say, okay, we can make it possible to have those pathways connect directly as opposed to us closing twice on the home.

另一個例子是，在與賣方完成交易之前，我們已經從 REITs 獲得了 5,000 份轉售合同，對吧？所以從邏輯上講，你會說，好吧，我們可以讓這些路徑直接連接，而不是我們在家里關閉兩次。

The second investment was made more than 12 months ago, which was the key piece for us, which is we needed to build a product that attracted demand. And so we invested in exclusive listings, again, the ability to buy from us directly with a very simple experience and features that aren't offered by the current marketplace. And we've demonstrated that we can sell 20% of our homes directly to buyers on opendoor.com.

第二筆投資是在 12 個多月前進行的，這對我們來說是關鍵，我們需要打造一款吸引需求的產品。因此，我們再次投資了獨家商品，能夠通過當前市場不提供的非常簡單的體驗和功能直接從我們這裡購買。我們已經證明，我們可以將 20% 的房屋直接出售給 opendoor.com 上的買家。

If you measure that in 14 days, if you measure vis-a-vis the market, say, MLS is representing the market, our 20% maps to -- in our cities maps to something like 36% or 40% in the market. And so we're not, actually from a velocity standpoint, that too far behind what would be full distribution. And so that gives us a ton of confidence that there's product market fit and buyers love our product. And so -- yes, the assumption is that would we have liked to launch this 2 years ago? The answer is yes. I would have loved to launch this in Q1 2020, which was the original plan, but we had to solve the consumer demand side before launching it. And over the past year, we have good evidence that will be solved.

如果您在 14 天內進行衡量，如果您針對市場進行衡量，例如，MLS 代表市場，我們的 20% 映射到 - 在我們的城市中映射到市場中的 36% 或 40%。因此，實際上從速度的角度來看，我們並沒有遠遠落後於完全分佈。這讓我們對產品市場契合度和買家喜愛我們的產品充滿信心。所以 - 是的，假設我們希望在 2 年前推出這個？答案是肯定的。我很想在 2020 年第一季度推出它，這是最初的計劃，但我們必須在推出之前解決消費者需求方面的問題。在過去的一年裡，我們有很好的證據可以解決。

Our next question comes from the line of Justin Patterson with KeyBanc.

我們的下一個問題來自於 KeyBanc 的 Justin Patterson。

Two, if I can. First, for Eric, I wanted to circle back on Jason's question. As marketplaces scale, it becomes less of a substitute, more additive to the overall business. How do you think about reinvesting back into growth or letting it drop below the margin?

二，如果可以的話。首先，對於 Eric，我想回到 Jason 的問題。隨著市場規模的擴大，它對整體業務的替代作用越來越小。您如何看待再投資於增長或讓它跌至利潤率以下？

And then Dan, I appreciate your comments on watching for signs of stabilization. I realize this is more of a philosophical question. But when you see those signs emerge, how are you thinking about the speed in which you flip from risk off to risk on?

然後丹，我很欣賞你關於觀察穩定跡象的評論。我意識到這更像是一個哲學問題。但是當你看到這些跡像出現時，你如何看待你從冒險轉向冒險的速度？

Yes. I'll take the first question, which is as we think about this as being additive, how do we think about the trade-off of growth versus margin? What I can say is that marketplaces live or die based on the liquidity of both sides. And once you reach, let's say, velocity, that gives you a lot of defensibility and lots of opportunity for margin extraction or to increase your margins. And so they tend to kind of be built over a multiyear, multistep process.

是的。我將回答第一個問題，即當我們認為這是附加的，我們如何考慮增長與利潤的權衡？我能說的是，市場的生死取決於雙方的流動性。一旦你達到了，比如說，速度，這會給你很大的防禦能力和很多提取利潤或增加利潤的機會。因此，它們往往是在多年、多步驟的過程中構建的。

And so in the short term, we would prioritize liquidity or growth of both sides without making substantial investments. And then long term, we will prioritize margin expansion. And that actually increases the expected value of the business unit and business line holistically.

因此，在短期內，我們將優先考慮雙方的流動性或增長，而不進行大量投資。然後長期來看，我們將優先考慮擴大利潤率。這實際上從整體上增加了業務部門和業務線的預期價值。

And so to put it more succinctly, right now, we're focused on growth of both sellers and buyers within local marketplaces. And the benefit of having the 1P business alongside with that is that we believe we can do this with positive unit economics without having to go negative. And we can expand those margins over time as we get denser and denser within our cities.

因此，更簡潔地說，現在，我們專注於本地市場中賣家和買家的增長。同時擁有 1P 業務的好處是，我們相信我們可以通過積極的單位經濟來做到這一點，而不必消極。隨著城市的密度越來越高，我們可以隨著時間的推移擴大這些利潤。

I'll pass it to Daniel to answer the second part of that question.

我會將它傳遞給 Daniel 以回答該問題的第二部分。

Yes. Thanks for the question. It's actually a good question. I think the thing that I would highlight there is now we're not so much looking to sort of read the tea leaves on the macro itself, right, like what did the Fed do or say and what (inaudible), et cetera. And instead, we are very focused on building a series of indicators in our platform that give us what we believe is the best sort of set of diagnostics about what's happening on the market as compared to pretty much anywhere else -- anybody else out there, right? So we have literally real-time metrics for the full, I'm going to call it, funnel of behavior on both the buyer and the seller side. So how does the rating change result in changes in mortgage ops from there to applications from there to the actual behavior on the buying and selling side, like views of properties in the market, visits, how those visits are scheduled? How many people show up at those visits? Do they make offers or not? What sort of offers do they make? And so we have a pretty good mechanism to react.

是的。謝謝你的問題。這實際上是一個很好的問題。我認為我要強調的一點是，現在我們不太希望閱讀宏觀本身的茶葉，對，就像美聯儲做了什麼或說了什麼以及什麼（聽不清）等等。相反，我們非常專注於在我們的平台上構建一系列指標，與幾乎其他任何地方相比，我們認為這些指標是關於市場上正在發生的事情的最佳診斷集——其他任何人，正確的？因此，我們確實擁有完整的實時指標，我將其稱為買賣雙方的行為漏斗。那麼，評級變化如何導致抵押貸款業務從那裡到申請再到買賣雙方的實際行為發生變化，例如對市場上的房產的看法，訪問，這些訪問是如何安排的？有多少人參加了這些訪問？他們是否提供報價？他們提供什麼樣的報價？所以我們有一個很好的反應機制。

Like I said, it's pretty much real time to how what we're observing on the macro side is really translating on the behavior side, right? And so from our point of view, what we're looking for is the sort of saddling of the stabilization in the macro, let's say that starts to happen, picking up tomorrow, we would want to observe that, that actually results in stabilization of the behavior that we observe real time in the market, right? And on the back of that, we would have pretty good confidence in taking action sort of across the spectrum of all the actions that we take, right? Everything from what our spread is to resale strategy, pricing strategy, negotiation strategy, et cetera.

就像我說的，我們在宏觀方面觀察到的東西在行為方面是如何真正轉化的，這幾乎是實時的，對吧？因此，從我們的角度來看，我們正在尋找的是宏觀穩定的那種負擔，假設它開始發生，明天開始回升，我們希望觀察到，這實際上會導致穩定我們在市場上實時觀察到的行為，對吧？在此基礎上，我們將非常有信心在我們採取的所有行動範圍內採取行動，對吧？從我們的價差到轉售策略、定價策略、談判策略等，應有盡有。

Our next question comes from the line of Justin Ages with Berenberg.

我們的下一個問題來自 Justin Ages 和 Berenberg。

Just wondering if I could get a little more color on what is driving that reduction in renovations and the time taken on renovations and whether that's going to be the new normal going forward? Or that's just from a current push?

只是想知道我是否可以進一步了解導致裝修減少的原因和裝修所花費的時間，以及這是否會成為未來的新常態？或者這只是來自當前的推動？

It's Andrew. Andrew here, Justin. The teams in the current environment are focused on turning our homes as quickly as we can. And that push, that focus and that emphasis is showing up in a number of our operating metrics. You called out the Reno day improvement from 23 down to 15. That's really driven by improvements in the productivity of the team. And credit to our teams out in the fields who are finding new ways to reorganize the way they do work to drive those days down. And that's a big push. Equally important, we talked about our buyer cancellation rate improving 20% against a backdrop where the market actually -- market deteriorated. And all of those things contribute to us turning our homes and our book more quickly, and that's a focus and a press. And thanks to the teams who are all overdoing it.

是安德魯。安德魯在這裡，賈斯汀。當前環境中的團隊專注於盡快改造我們的家園。這種推動、這種關注和強調正體現在我們的許多運營指標中。您將 Reno 日的改進從 23 降低到 15。這實際上是由團隊生產力的提高推動的。感謝我們在各個領域的團隊，他們正在尋找新的方法來重組他們的工作方式，以減少那些日子。這是一個很大的推動力。同樣重要的是，我們談到在市場實際惡化的背景下，我們的買家取消率提高了 20%。所有這些都有助於我們更快地轉動我們的家和我們的書，這是一個焦點和一個新聞。感謝所有做得過火的團隊。

Great. And next, I was wondering if we could have a little more detail on geographic diversity on where you're seeing relative home price appreciation strength versus weakness? I think you gave some color last quarter, so just following on that.

偉大的。接下來，我想知道我們是否可以更詳細地了解地理多樣性，您看到相對房價升值強弱的地方？我認為你在上個季度給出了一些顏色，所以請繼續關注。

Yes, I'm happy to do that. This is Daniel. We are observing, broadly speaking, sort of a shape of -- not just frankly HPA, but as you think about some other metrics, volume metric, payment metrics. That is sort of similar to what we had seen last time around. So broadly speaking, we would say that the markets that were more volatile and that had higher price appreciation when the market goes hot. So think of this as generally sort of some of the larger Western markets, places like Phoenix and Austin, for example, they have generally done more poorly compared to the other markets. And that's not sort of surprising in the sense there was more room for that adjustment to take place in markets that have been hotter.

是的，我很樂意這樣做。這是丹尼爾。從廣義上講，我們正在觀察某種形式 - 不僅僅是坦率地說 HPA，而是當您考慮其他一些指標、數量指標、支付指標時。這有點類似於我們上次看到的情況。所以從廣義上講，我們會說市場變熱時波動更大並且價格升值更高的市場。因此，可以將其視為一些較大的西方市場，例如鳳凰城和奧斯汀等地，與其他市場相比，它們的表現通常更差。這並不奇怪，因為在更熱的市場上進行這種調整的空間更大。

And then sort of on the other side of that, smaller and somewhat less expensive markets, at least when the market was really hot, have performed a little better. And so they tend to be more sort of Midwest and Eastern markets. So places like, say, Nashville and Orlando, for example, have tended to do better.

另一方面，較小且價格較低的市場，至少在市場非常火爆的時候，表現要好一些。因此，它們往往更像是中西部和東部市場。因此，例如，納什維爾和奧蘭多等地方往往做得更好。

And again, not surprising, one of the things that I would highlight, for example, is a lot of what you saw when the market was hot in terms of price appreciation came from negotiation gains, people making over list offers -- multiple offers over list and that drove a significant part of the appreciation as the market cools they're far less likely to happen, and it's a bit symmetric, right? Once you start getting offers less than list, that sort of tends to equalize the behavior, and that's something you see similar across the regions.

再一次，毫不奇怪，我要強調的一件事是，例如，當市場在價格升值方面很火爆時，你看到的很多東西來自談判收益，人們提出了清單報價——多次報價超過隨著市場降溫，這推動了升值的很大一部分，它們發生的可能性要小得多，而且有點對稱，對吧？一旦您開始獲得少於列表的報價，這種行為就會趨於平衡，這就是您在各個地區看到的相似之處。

I think one last thing that I was saying here that's important to note is that all of this is happening in the context of all of the markets are looking pretty negative, right? So we're talking about differences sort of in relative performance, but the reality is you're seeing the decline in volume, the decline in clearance, the decline in -- or at least increasing price pressures that's pretty common across. These are just the relative differences in that larger concept.

我認為我在這裡要說的最後一件事是，所有這一切都發生在所有市場看起來都非常負面的背景下，對吧？所以我們談論的是相對錶現的差異，但現實是你看到數量下降，清倉下降，下降——或者至少是價格壓力增加，這在整個過程中很常見。這些只是這個更大概念中的相對差異。

Our last question comes from the line of Ryan McKeveny with Zelman.

我們的最後一個問題來自 Ryan McKeveny 和 Zelman。

One more on the 3P marketplace. So the letter mentions 5% service fees. Obviously, that helps us think about the revenue side. Assumingly, without being the principle, the margins should be pretty high. But I guess if you can help us think about what you anticipate the cost structure or margin profile potentially looking at -- looking like within the 3P marketplace as that scales up?

3P市場上的另一個。所以信中提到了5%的服務費。顯然，這有助於我們考慮收入方面。假設，如果不是原則，利潤率應該是相當高的。但我想您是否可以幫助我們考慮您預期的成本結構或利潤狀況可能會看到什麼——隨著規模的擴大，在 3P 市場中看起來像什麼？

Ryan, it's Eric. We're not giving guidance on the cost structure yet. I think the assumption that this should be -- should drop to our bottom line and demonstrate really positive unit economics is correct. And what we are guiding to is, again, the goal of north of 30% in the short term by the end of 2023. And I would also say, to the question earlier, that I fundamentally believe this could be very accretive as well, which is this increases our TAM over time and that we're able to service our customers independent of buy box constraints and operational constraints. And we're able to actually service all sellers in all different home types. But from a breakdown on the unit economics, we're not disclosing at this time.

瑞恩，是埃里克。我們尚未就成本結構提供指導。我認為這應該是 - 應該下降到我們的底線並證明真正積極的單位經濟學的假設是正確的。我們的指導方針是，到 2023 年底短期內達到 30% 以上的目標。我還要說，對於之前的問題，我從根本上相信這也可能非常具有增長性，這就是隨著時間的推移增加了我們的 TAM，並且我們能夠獨立於購買框限制和運營限制為我們的客戶提供服務。而且我們實際上能夠為所有不同家庭類型的所有賣家提供服務。但從單位經濟學的細分來看，我們目前沒有披露。

Got it. That's very helpful. And Eric, maybe one more on kind of the opportunities to expand this. I guess, geographically, it's fair to assume your current footprint, effectively where you're also acting as 1P, would be kind of the road map with the 3P marketplace? Or could we envision something 10 years down the road where there's markets where you're just the 3P player? Or do you expect to always be a 1P player to some degree within the markets where this is available?

知道了。這很有幫助。還有埃里克，也許還有一種機會來擴大這一點。我想，從地理上講，假設您當前的足跡是公平的，實際上您還充當 1P，這將是 3P 市場的路線圖嗎？或者我們能否設想 10 年後的市場，你只是 3P 玩家？或者您是否希望在市場上在某種程度上始終是 1P 玩家？

What I can tell you is that in the short term, it's really important to focus on density and liquidity. And so the goal is to get a sizable portion of sellers and buyers come to Opendoor at the same time and providing a solution that works for all of them and then expanding that playbook to all of our 50-plus markets.

我可以告訴你的是，在短期內，關注密度和流動性非常重要。因此，我們的目標是讓相當一部分賣家和買家同時來到 Opendoor，並提供適用於所有人的解決方案，然後將該劇本擴展到我們所有 50 多個市場。

I would say, also in the short term, both the 1P business, the first-party business and third-party business are essential and complementary in nature. The ability to get an offer in minutes from Opendoor attracts the hundreds of thousands of series sellers. The ability to buy from us in a different way attracts the hundreds of thousands of buyers. And so the model is additive to the 3P -- the 1P model is additive to the 3P business today.

我想說的是，同樣在短期內，1P業務、第一方業務和第三方業務本質上都是必不可少的、相輔相成的。能夠在幾分鐘內從 Opendoor 獲得報價的能力吸引了成千上萬的系列賣家。以不同方式向我們購買的能力吸引了成千上萬的買家。因此，該模型是對 3P 的附加——1P 模型是對今天的 3P 業務的附加。

In 10 years, I think if we are able to build our brand in a way that people trust the platform, and we have services that enable a seamless transaction in a market where we're not actually operating a 1P business, that's within the realm of possibility, but not on the short-term road map.

在 10 年內，我認為如果我們能夠以人們信任平台的方式建立我們的品牌，並且我們的服務能夠在我們實際上不經營 1P 業務的市場中實現無縫交易，那是在該領域內有可能，但不在短期路線圖上。

Thank you. I would now like to hand the conference back over to Eric Wu for closing remarks.

謝謝你。我現在想把會議交還給 Eric Wu 做閉幕詞。

Yes, I'd like to close with -- while challenging, and I think many of the folks around this table can attest to that, we will navigate this moment with both the necessary discipline and focus that will enable us to manage short-term uncertainty, customer financial goals long term. Thank you for attending.

是的，我想結束 - 雖然具有挑戰性，我認為在座的許多人都可以證明這一點，我們將用必要的紀律和重點來駕馭這一時刻，這將使我們能夠管理短期不確定性，客戶財務目標長期。感謝您的出席。

This concludes today's conference call. Thank you for your participation. You may now disconnect.

今天的電話會議到此結束。感謝您的參與。您現在可以斷開連接。