StoneCo Ltd. (STNE) 2026 Q2 法說會逐字稿

Good evening, everyone. Thank you for standing by. Welcome to StoneCo's second-quarter 2026 earnings conference call.

各位晚安。感謝各位耐心等候。歡迎參加 StoneCo 2026 年第二季財報電話會議。

By now, everyone should have access to our earnings release. The company also posted the presentation to go along with this call. All material can be found online at investors.stone.co.

截至目前，各位應已取得我們的財報新聞稿。公司也已上傳本次電話會議搭配的簡報。所有資料皆可於 investors.stone.co 線上查閱。

Before we begin the call, I advise you to review the disclaimer included in the press release and presentation, which outlines important information about forward-looking statements and non-IFRS financial measures.

在我們開始之前，建議各位先閱讀新聞稿與簡報中的免責聲明，其中載明了關於前瞻性陳述與非 IFRS 財務衡量指標的重要資訊。

In addition, many of the risks regarding the business are disclosed in the company's Form 20-F filled with the Securities and Exchange Commission, which is also available at www.scc.gov.

此外，與本公司業務相關的多項風險已於向美國證券交易委員會（SEC）提交的 Form 20-F 中揭露，亦可於 www.scc.gov 查閱。

Before we begin, I would like to highlight that the company is restricting the number of questions to one per analyst. Joining the call today is StoneCo's CEO, Mateus Schwening; the CFO and IRO, Diego Salgado; and the Head of IR, Roberta Noronha.

在開始之前，我想提醒各位，公司將把提問數量限制為每位分析師一題。今天與會者包括 StoneCo 執行長 Mateus Schwening；財務長暨投資人關係主管 Diego Salgado；以及投資人關係主管 Roberta Noronha。

I would now like to turn the conference over to Mateus. Please proceed.

接下來我將把會議交給 Mateus。請開始。

Thank you, operator, and good evening, everyone. Let me start with some perspective on the quarter.

謝謝接線員，各位晚安。我先從本季的整體觀點談起。

This was a quarter of steady progress on the priorities we laid out earlier in the year: reaccelerating TPV growth through better retention, deepening our banking and credit franchises, and keeping a disciplined approach to costs.

本季我們在年初所提出的優先事項上持續穩健推進：透過更好的留存重新加速 TPV 成長、深化我們的銀行與信貸業務版圖，並維持嚴謹的成本紀律。

PPV growth accelerated to 4%, an early signal that the retention initiatives we launched this year are beginning to work, though there is still a lot of work to be done. Banking and credit kept advancing. With retail deposits up 22% year over year, and our credit portfolio now more than doubled its level from a year ago.

PPV 成長加速至 4%，這是我們今年啟動的留存措施開始奏效的早期訊號，但仍有大量工作要做。銀行與信貸業務也持續推進。零售存款年增 22%，而我們的信貸投組規模目前已較一年前增加逾一倍。

On costs, we kept expense growth well below revenue growth, while scaling the use of AI more broadly across the company.

在成本方面，我們將費用成長控制在遠低於營收成長的水準，同時在全公司更廣泛地擴大 AI 的使用。

Finally, we continue to return meaningful capital to shareholders throughout the quarter.

最後，我們在本季持續向股東回饋具意義的資本。

Having said that, today I want to spend a few minutes on something that goes beyond the quarterly numbers, how we are positioning StoneCo today for the long-term, and how our ecosystem is coming together for the merchants.

話雖如此，今天我想花幾分鐘談一個超越單季數字的主題：我們如何在當下為 StoneCo 的長期發展定位，以及我們的生態系如何為商戶逐步整合到位。

Let's turn to slide 3. This quarter we launched our new brand positioning, Stone, the bank for entrepreneurs. This is not a changing strategy and it does not depend on anything new. We already have the complete offering: payments, banking and credit working together in a single relationship.

請看第 3 頁。本季我們推出全新的品牌定位：「Stone，創業者的銀行」。這不是策略改變，也不依賴任何新的事物。我們已具備完整的產品組合：支付、銀行與信貸在同一段客戶關係中協同運作。

The gap is in the perception. Many clients still see Stone mainly as a payments company. This positioning is our way of closing that gap so that when an entrepreneur needs banking or credit, Stone is part of the consideration from day one. As that perception builds, it naturally opens the door to more cross-sell, deeper relationships, and growth across the ecosystem.

差距在於市場認知。許多客戶仍主要把 Stone 視為一家支付公司。這個定位是我們縮小認知落差的方式，讓創業者從第一天起在需要銀行或信貸服務時，就會把 Stone 納入考量。隨著這種認知建立，自然會為更多交叉銷售、更深的客戶關係，以及整個生態系的成長打開大門。

To bring this to life, we also launched a campaign with you. The link is on this page.

為了讓這個定位更具體落地，我們也推出了一個面向各位的行銷活動。連結就在本頁。

Now, moving to slide 4. This is what demand for entrepreneurs means in practice. Everything starts with a complete account. Money comes in through whatever channel the client sells, in person or online. It goes out to pay employees, suppliers, and taxes. In between, it stays within Stone, where clients can hold a balance, invest their money, or take credit.

接著看第 4 頁。這就是「創業者需求」在實務上的意涵。一切從一個完整的帳戶開始。資金會透過客戶的銷售渠道流入，無論是實體或線上。資金流出則用於支付員工、供應商與稅款。在此之間，資金留在 Stone 之內，客戶可以保有餘額、進行投資，或取得信貸。

On its own, this is just what a complete account should do. The difference is what we build around it, helping entrepreneurs run their day-to-day by charging customers, issuing invoices, managing orders, with AI increasingly doing part of that work, from enhancing catalog images to creating content that helps merchants sell more.

單就帳戶本身而言，這只是「完整帳戶」應具備的功能。差異在於我們在其周邊打造的能力：協助創業者處理日常營運，包括向客戶收款、開立發票、管理訂單；而 AI 也日益承擔其中一部分工作，從強化商品目錄圖片到生成內容，協助商戶提升銷售。

On slide 5, we recently reached an important milestone in that direction. Pagarmi, which historically was our digital commerce front, has been integrated into Stone. For the merchant, this means online and physical operations in one account with one view of the business. It brings our full digital commerce suite into the Stone platform.

在第 5 頁，我們近期在這個方向達成一個重要里程碑。Pagarmi（過去主要是我們的數位商務前端）已整合進 Stone。對商戶而言，這代表線上與實體營運可在同一個帳戶中管理，並以同一個視角檢視業務。這也把我們完整的數位商務套件帶入 Stone 平台。

And with sales consolidated in one place, we understand the business better. Which unlocks more credits and more cross-sell one brand, one account, one experience. For Stone, this opens a new growth avenue, capturing a larger share of digital transactions, a part of the market that is growing faster than the average.

而當銷售集中在同一處，我們就能更深入理解商戶的業務。這將解鎖更多信貸與更多交叉銷售——一個品牌、一個帳戶、一種體驗。對 Stone 而言，這開啟了新的成長途徑：在數位交易中取得更高的市占，而這一市場區塊的成長速度快於整體平均。

Now, let me connect this to our financial commitments for the year on slide 6.

接下來，讓我把這些與第 6 頁我們今年的財務承諾連結起來。

In the first half, we delivered BRL3.1 billion in adjusted gross profits and RM4.58 in adjusted basic EPS against our full-year 2026 guidance of BRL6.6 billion to BRL7 billion in adjusted gross profits and BRL10.8 to BRL11.4 in adjusted basic EPS.

上半年我們交出經調整毛利 BRL31 億，以及經調整基本每股盈餘（EPS）RM4.58；相較之下，我們 2026 全年指引為經調整毛利 BRL66 億至 BRL70 億，以及經調整基本 EPS BRL10.8 至 BRL11.4。

While our guidance remains achievable. Interest rates have stayed higher for longer than expected, making the backdrop considerably more challenging than what we anticipated at the start of the year.

雖然我們的指引仍可達成，但利率維持在高檔的時間比預期更久，使得整體環境較我們年初所預期的更具挑戰。

In that context, while the scenario today is more challenging than it was last quarter, we continue to be focused on delivering towards the lower end of these ranges.

在此背景下，儘管目前情境較上季更具挑戰，我們仍專注於朝這些區間的下緣目標交付成果。

Our year-to-date effective tax rate of 15.4% remains consistent with the meetings level we guided to, and we stay disciplined on execution, with performance weighted towards the second-half as credit revenues compound and our commercial initiatives continues to take hold.

我們年初至今的有效稅率為 15.4%，與我們所指引的水準一致；我們也持續以紀律執行，績效將更偏向下半年，因信貸收入持續累積成長，且我們的商業推進措施持續發揮效果。

With that said, I will pass it over to Diego, who will go over our financial and operating results for the partner. Diego?

接下來我把時間交給 Diego，由他說明本季的財務與營運表現。Diego？

Thank you, Mateus, and good evening, everyone.

謝謝你，Mateus，各位晚安。

Let me start on slide 7, where we present our main financial metrics for the quarter.

我先從第 7 頁開始，這裡呈現本季的主要財務指標。

Our revenue grew to BRL3.6 billion, led by credit as our portfolio continues to scale. Adjusted gross profit was broadly stable year-over-year at BRL1.6 billion as higher revenues and lower financial expenses were offset by the provision expenses that come with the credit portfolio growth.

我們的營收成長至 BRL36 億，主要由信貸帶動，因為我們的投組持續擴張。經調整毛利年對年大致持平，為 BRL16 億；較高的營收與較低的財務費用，被隨信貸投組成長而來的提列費用所抵銷。

Adjusted net income was down slightly on an annual basis, while adjusted EPS grew 9%, with continued share buybacks over the past year meaningfully reducing our share count.

經調整淨利年對年小幅下滑，但經調整 EPS 成長 9%；過去一年持續進行庫藏股回購，顯著降低了我們的流通股數。

On slide 8, our active client base reached 4.8 million merchants, and ARPAC grew mainly as credit keeps gaining penetration and weight in our client base.

在第 8 頁，我們的活躍客戶數達到 480 萬家商戶；ARPAC 的成長主要來自信貸在客戶基礎中的滲透率與占比持續提升。

Turning to slide 9. TPV growth accelerated to 4% annually, a small improvement over the pace we saw in the first quarter. We're still facing the churn challenges we detected earlier this year, and they still wait on our overall performance. However, this is the first tangible sign that our initiatives are gaining traction.

接著看第 9 頁。TPV 年增成長加速至 4%，較第一季的增速略有改善。我們仍面臨今年稍早發現的客戶流失（churn）挑戰，且這些因素仍拖累整體表現。不過，這是我們各項措施開始取得成效的第一個具體跡象。

Our work here is focused on three fronts: simplifying our offerings and bundles, aligning sales force incentives, and improving client experience to reduce operational friction. So far, the effect is more meaningful on micro-merchants, as simpler offerings and an easier contact allowed us to move quickly and bring churn down.

我們在此的工作聚焦於三個面向：簡化我們的產品與組合方案、使銷售團隊的激勵一致化，以及改善客戶體驗以降低營運摩擦。截至目前，效果在微型商戶上更為顯著，因為更簡化的產品與更容易的接觸方式，讓我們得以快速推進並降低流失率。

With larger merchants, the breadth of the offerings and needs make the operation more complex and riskier, and therefore, we calibrate it cautiously before scaling. We expect the benefits of our initiatives to become more visible as the year progresses, and therefore, accelerates TPV.

對於較大型商戶而言，產品範疇與需求的廣度使得營運更為複雜且風險更高，因此我們在擴大規模之前會謹慎校準。我們預期，隨著年度推進，我們各項舉措的效益將更為明顯，並因此加速TPV。

Looking at TPV mix, PixQR code continues to grow faster than card volumes. In banking, our deposit franchise keeps building. Retail deposits reached BRL10.8 billion, up more than 20% year over year as we further engage clients with our account offerings.

從TPV組合來看，Pix QR Code的成長仍快於卡片交易量。在銀行業務方面，我們的存款業務基礎持續擴大。零售存款達到108億巴西雷亞爾（BRL10.8 billion），年增超過20%，因我們透過帳戶產品進一步提升客戶黏著度。

On slide 10, we present the growth metrics of our credit business. Our portfolio reached BRL3.8 billion, two times larger than one year ago, driven mainly by working capital solutions.

在第10頁，我們呈現信貸業務的成長指標。我們的放款組合達到38億巴西雷亞爾（BRL3.8 billion），較一年前成長至兩倍，主要由營運資金解決方案所帶動。

During this quarter, we also began disbursing government-backed loans, which already account for roughly BRL300 million of our portfolio, while credit cards reached BRL400 million.

本季我們也開始撥付政府擔保貸款，目前已約占我們放款組合的3億巴西雷亞爾（BRL300 million），同時信用卡餘額達到4億巴西雷亞爾（BRL400 million）。

Moving to revenues, given the continued growing contribution of our credit card, we have revisited our credit revenue and yield metrics to include credit card interchange fees, as we see it as part of the overall product P&L.

談到營收，鑑於信用卡貢獻持續提升，我們已重新檢視信貸營收與收益率指標，將信用卡交換手續費（interchange fees）納入，因我們將其視為整體產品損益（P&L）的一部分。

Credit revenues grew 14% in the period with flat-ish yield. This stability reflects the entry of government-backed lines, which carry lower rates and lower risk profile.

本期信貸營收成長14%，收益率大致持平。此一穩定性反映政府擔保額度的導入，其利率較低且風險輪廓較低。

That takes me to slide 11, where I want to spend some time explaining how government-backed facilities will impact our P&L going forward, considering its growing relevance in our portfolio.

接著到第11頁，我想花一些時間說明，考量其在我們放款組合中的重要性日益提升，政府擔保融資工具將如何在未來影響我們的損益表（P&L）。

Let me first explain how we segregate clients on working capital products based on the two main solution channels we have. Our automated desk handles the smaller tickets, about 40,000 reais and typically up to 18 months standard at an average rate of 4% per month.

我先說明我們如何依據兩個主要解決方案通路，對營運資金產品的客戶進行區隔。我們的自動化團隊（automated desk）處理較小額的案件，約4萬雷亞爾，通常期限最長18個月，平均利率為每月4%。

Our dedicated desk serves larger clients with an average ticket to date closer to 700,000 reais, but with tenors going up to 30 months and lower rates of roughly 2.5% per month. Through those desks, we are currently operating two government programs, each with a different profile and focus. We began disbursing FGI PEAC in April, and it has already gained some relevance in our book. The second program we just launched, so it's still very small.

我們的專屬團隊（dedicated desk）服務較大型客戶，目前平均單筆金額更接近70萬雷亞爾，但期限可長達30個月，且利率較低，約每月2.5%。透過這些團隊，我們目前正在運作兩項政府計畫，各自具有不同的輪廓與重點。我們於4月開始撥付FGI PEAC，且其在我們的放款帳上已具一定重要性。第二項計畫我們剛推出，因此規模仍非常小。

What these programs have in common is the guarantee that reduces losses upon an event of default from a client of ours, considering the reimbursement of guarantees that we obtain from the government.

這些計畫的共同點在於提供擔保：在客戶發生違約事件時，考量我們可自政府取得擔保補償，該擔保可降低損失。

As a result, this reduction on provision expenses affects the coverage for loans on Stage 1 and 2. This kind of guarantee allows us to be more aggressive in pricing for clients where we were previously not that competitive, improving the risk-adjusted returns on what we lend.

因此，備抵提列費用的降低會影響第1階段與第2階段貸款的覆蓋率。此類擔保使我們能在過去競爭力不足的客群上採取更積極的定價，提升放款的風險調整後報酬。

In short, this is about expanding access to credit and deepening merchant relationships while keeping the risk profile of our growth under control.

簡而言之，這是為了擴大信貸可得性並深化商戶關係，同時將成長的風險輪廓控制在可管理範圍內。

On slide 12, we turn to credit quality and cost of risk. In the quarter, provision expenses reached BRL188 million. The growth on expenses is a combination of, first, the record expansion of the portfolio. The roll forward effect of the loans disbursed in late 2025 and early 2026 that are moving to later provisioning stages and finally, the continuous pressure that we've been noticing on the dedicated desks with records in bankruptcy protection filings all over the country.

在第12頁，我們轉向信用品質與風險成本。本季備抵提列費用達到1.88億巴西雷亞爾（BRL188 million）。費用成長由多項因素共同造成：第一，放款組合創紀錄的擴張。第二，2025年末與2026年初撥付的貸款隨時間推移進入較後期的提列階段所帶來的滾動影響；最後，我們也持續觀察到專屬團隊承作的案件承受壓力，因全國各地破產保護申請（bankruptcy protection filings）案件創新高。

Although the dedicated desk represents less than 25% of our total merchant portfolio and the average ticket to date is at BRL700,000, as I've mentioned, we've been facing the faults precisely on some of the largest tickets we have in our books, in some cases, north of BRL10 million.

儘管專屬團隊占我們商戶放款組合總額不到25%，且如我所述目前平均單筆金額為70萬巴西雷亞爾，但我們面臨的違約恰恰出現在帳上部分最大額的案件上，有些甚至超過1,000萬巴西雷亞爾。

On the other hand, on the automated desk, the improvements that we rolled out during the second quarter are showing significant results with first payment defaults consistently trending down and the June cohort presenting the best result during the last 12 months.

另一方面，在自動化團隊方面，我們於第二季推出的改善措施已展現顯著成效，首期還款違約（first payment defaults）持續下降，而6月批次（cohort）呈現過去12個月最佳表現。

These combined effects pushed our NPLs higher across all indicators and kept the cost of risk at 21.5%.

這些綜合效應推升了我們各項指標下的不良貸款（NPLs），並使風險成本維持在21.5%。

On coverage, the ratio came down to 204%, and I want to address that directly. Two main effects explain the move.

在覆蓋率方面，該比率降至204%，我想直接說明這點。有兩個主要因素可以解釋此一變動。

One, it's mix related, and the other is simply a mechanical effect. In the mix, we're steering new disbursements toward better rated clients and ramping our government-backed facilities, which carry a guarantee and therefore require lower provisioning. Therefore, these two effects combine structurally lower the coverage we need to hold.

第一是組合因素，第二則純粹是機械性影響。在組合方面，我們正將新增撥款導向評等較佳的客戶，並加速推進政府擔保融資工具；其具備擔保，因此所需提列較低。因此，這兩項因素結合，會在結構上降低我們需要持有的覆蓋率。

The mechanical part is simply the math of a seasoning book. This quarter, our over 90 NPLs grew faster than our provisions as the strong late 2025 and early 2026 vintages rolled into over 90 buckets while write-offs, which cleared the oldest and most heavily provisioned loans, come with a lag.

機械性部分則只是放款帳齡成熟（seasoning）的數學結果。本季，我們逾90天不良貸款（over 90 NPLs）的成長速度快於備抵，因2025年末與2026年初的強勁批次（vintages）滾入逾90天區間；而核銷（write-offs）會清除最老且提列最重的貸款，但其發生具有時間落後。

Slide 13 provides a bit more color of the NPL composition by product and channel. On the short end, sequential increase came mainly from new delinquency cases in our dedicated desk, as I've mentioned. The automated desk by contracts actually pulled this early metric down in line with the improvements of first payment default metrics we previously mentioned.

第13頁提供更多按產品與通路拆分的不良貸款（NPL）組成細節。在短期端，序列增幅主要來自我先前提到的專屬團隊新增逾期案件。而自動化團隊按合約口徑，實際上使這項早期指標下降，與我們先前提到的首期還款違約改善一致。

Later-stage delinquency tells the opposite story. Here, the automated desk was the main driver of the increase as weaker vintages are rolling forward to over 90 days stage.

較後期的逾期則呈現相反的故事。在此，自動化團隊是增幅的主要驅動因素，因較弱的批次（vintages）正滾入逾90天階段。

On slide 14, we present the evolution of our costs and expenses. Cost of services excluding provisions was broadly flat year over year as we continue seeking operational leverage using technology and start benefiting from the workforce reduction carried out in the first quarter.

在第14頁，我們呈現成本與費用的變化趨勢。扣除備抵提列後的服務成本（cost of services excluding provisions）年對年大致持平，因我們持續透過科技追求營運槓桿，並開始受益於第一季進行的人力縮減。

Net financial expenses have been flattished for quite some time now as we've been growing clients' deposits. This shows in our funding costs, which has come down to roughly 85% of CDI.

淨財務費用在相當長一段時間內大致持平，因我們持續成長客戶存款。這反映在我們的資金成本上，已降至約為CDI的85%。

Admin expenses were lower year over year on reduced personnel and third-party services expenses. Selling expenses were up modestly on higher market investments, partially offset by lower distribution channel expenses.

管理費用年對年下降，主要因人員與第三方服務費用降低。銷售費用因市場投資增加而小幅上升，但部分被較低的通路分銷費用所抵銷。

Other operating expenses were higher year over year, mainly reflecting a non-recurring gain in the prior year and higher net provisions for POS. These effects were partially offset by lower share-based compensation.

其他營運費用年對年上升，主要反映前一年一次性收益，以及POS相關的淨提列增加。上述影響部分被較低的股份基礎給付（share-based compensation）所抵銷。

Our effective tax rate was 16.4% in the quarter, slightly higher than the mid-teens implied in our guidance. We certainly have a long path towards the efficiency levels we want, but we will keep evolving in time.

本季我們的有效稅率為 16.4%，略高於我們指引所暗示的約 10% 多的水準。我們距離想要的效率水準仍有很長的路要走，但我們會隨時間持續演進。

Finally, on slide 15, we present our capital position and return on equity. Our capital ratio stood at 26%, normalizing after this extraordinary dividend paid in May from the link sale proceeds. In total, we have already returned BRL4.3 billion to shareholders during the first half of the year.

最後，在第 15 頁投影片，我們呈現了資本狀況與股東權益報酬率。我們的資本比率為 26%，在 5 月以 Link 出售所得支付這筆特別股利後，已回到較正常的水準。合計而言，我們在上半年已向股東回饋 43 億巴西雷亞爾。

To wrap it up and coming back to Mateus' opening remarks, this was a quarter of steady execution. TPV growth is reaccelerating. Our banking franchise keeps building up and credit continues to scale despite the short-term headwinds we keep facing.

總結並回到 Mateus 的開場致詞，這是一個穩健執行的季度。TPV 成長正在重新加速。我們的銀行業務版圖持續擴大，且儘管仍面臨短期逆風，信貸仍持續擴張。

Ultimately, this all comes down to the merchant. Our goal is to be the bank that Brazilian entrepreneurs rely on to run and grow their businesses. And we believe that improving our banking and credit capabilities is how we deepen that relationship over time.

歸根究柢，一切都回到商戶本身。我們的目標是成為巴西企業家在經營與擴展業務時所倚賴的銀行。我們相信，提升我們的銀行與信貸能力，是我們隨時間加深這段關係的方式。

With that, let's open it up for questions.

接下來，我們開放提問。

(Operator Instructions) Eric Ito, Bradesco BBI.

(接線員指示) Eric Ito，Bradesco BBI。

Hi, thank you. Good afternoon, everybody, Mateus, Diego, Roberta. Thanks for the call -- taking my question. I have two here on my side.

嗨，謝謝。各位下午好，Mateus、Diego、Roberta。謝謝這通電話——讓我提問。我這邊有兩個問題。

The first one, I think in the release, we saw BRL200 million non-recurring allowance for expected losses on the issuers in distress. So could you please just give us some color on the main trends there or what's the -- what happened there, just for us to have more color on that.

第一個，我想在新聞稿中我們看到針對陷入困境的發卡機構，提列了 2 億巴西雷亞爾的一次性預期損失備抵。所以能否請你們說明一下那邊的主要趨勢，或是——那邊發生了什麼，讓我們更了解一些。

And then the second one, I'd like to touch on the credit. I think you guys provided very good details on the different tasks, but my question is towards the government-backed loans already reaching BRL330 million in the quarter. So I just wanted to see if you could share more expectation going forward and how does that change your guidance for credit book forward?

第二個我想談談信貸。我認為你們對不同項目提供了很好的細節，但我的問題是關於政府擔保貸款，本季已達 3.3 億巴西雷亞爾。所以我想看看你們是否能分享更多對未來的預期，以及這會如何改變你們對未來信貸資產組合的指引？

Thank you.

謝謝。

Hey, Eric, thanks for the question. So I'll start giving some context around the provisions and then hand it over to Diego to talk about the accounting piece and the path forward as well as the credit question.

嗨，Eric，謝謝你的提問。我會先就提列備抵的部分提供一些背景，接著交給 Diego 說明會計處理與後續走向，以及信貸問題。

So in terms of the provision we did for issuers, for selected issuers this quarter, maybe it's refined to give some context on the topic. As the central bank has ordered the liquidation of a large financial group earlier this year, and one of the subsidiaries of that group was a sizable credit card issuer. It now has a little bit over 90 days since we last received the cash flow from that issuer. And then as a matter of accounting prudence, we decided to do the provision.

就我們本季針對部分發卡機構所做的備抵而言，或許先補充一些背景會更清楚。由於央行在今年稍早下令清算一家大型金融集團，而該集團旗下其中一家子公司是規模不小的信用卡發卡機構。自我們上次收到該發卡機構的現金流以來，現在已經超過 90 天。因此，基於會計上的審慎原則，我們決定提列備抵。

But in terms of how we evolve from here, we have the position that ensuring that these amounts get settled by the issuers is the role of the card networks.

但就我們接下來如何處理而言，我們的立場是：確保這些款項由發卡機構完成清算，應是卡組織（card networks）的職責。

And the reason for that is quite straightforward in our view. Just to give you some example and some color on that, whenever a merchant accepts a credit card transaction, usually the merchants don't look at who is the name of the cardholder or who is the issuer behind the transaction and in order for that to work, the merchant acquirers need to trust the networks to manage the risk of their members.

我們認為原因相當直接。舉例並補充一些說明，當商戶接受一筆信用卡交易時，通常商戶不會去看持卡人姓名或該交易背後的發卡機構是誰；要讓這套機制運作，收單機構必須信任卡組織能管理其成員的風險。

And to ensure that every transaction that is authorized gets settled to the merchant acquirer so that we can pass it through our merchants. If we merchant acquirers had to underwrite every issue one by one and then accept only those that we judge to be credit worthy, the credit card itself would lose a lot of the value that makes it such a good item to make purchases of services and goods and the system would be worse off.

並確保每一筆已授權的交易都能向收單機構完成清算，讓我們可以再把款項轉付給商戶。如果我們收單機構必須逐一對每個發卡機構進行承作審核，並且只接受我們判斷具備信用資格的發卡機構，那麼信用卡本身作為購買服務與商品的工具，將失去很大一部分價值，整個系統也會變得更差。

So in summary here, we do have an issue that has been liquidated. It has been more than 90 days since we last received. And while we do expect to settle this issue and receive the settlements that are due to us, for a matter of accounting prudence, we decided to make the provisions.

因此總結來說，我們確實遇到一個已被清算的發卡機構。自我們上次收到款項以來已超過 90 天。雖然我們預期最終能解決此事並收到應付給我們的清算款，但基於會計審慎原則，我們決定提列備抵。

I'll hand it over to Diego to give some more color on that and to address the credit question as well.

我把時間交給 Diego，請他補充更多說明，並一併回應信貸問題。

So Eric, thank you very much for the question. As Mateus has mentioned, since the asset, since the last time that we collected from that issuer was over 90 days ago, we decided to treat the asset as a distressed asset and start provisioning accordingly. So we are being prudent on the balance sheet manage and you should always expect that from us.

Eric，非常感謝你的提問。如 Mateus 所提到，由於該資產——也就是我們上次向該發卡機構收款——已超過 90 天，我們決定將該資產視為困境資產，並開始依此提列備抵。因此我們在資產負債表管理上採取審慎作法，你們也應該一向期待我們如此。

We are adjusting this effect in our results because we understand it's just temporary effect arising from our accounting standards and not our view on the recovery. We understand it is the responsibility of the network to ultimately settle these amounts as Mateus just mentioned, as it's very clear on the central bank legislation who bears the responsibility for the risk management.

我們在業績中會調整這項影響，因為我們理解這只是源自會計準則的暫時性影響，並非我們對回收的看法。正如 Mateus 剛才提到，我們理解最終清算這些款項是卡組織的責任，因為央行法規對於風險管理責任歸屬寫得非常清楚。

This is not the first time that an issuer goes bankrupt in Brazil and historically we have always collected 100% of these accounts receivables from the networks precisely because of that chain of responsibility and trust that Mateus just mentioned, which is what creates value to the overall system. So I'm cautiously optimistic about a good outcome here, but we're going to be very careful with the balance sheet management.

這不是巴西第一次有發卡機構破產；從歷史經驗來看，我們一直都能從卡組織收回 100% 的這些應收帳款，正是因為 Mateus 剛才提到的那條責任與信任鏈，這也是整個系統創造價值的原因。因此我對於能有好的結果抱持審慎樂觀，但我們在資產負債表管理上會非常小心。

To your second question on the government programs and the overall. Impact on the forecast or on the guidance and so on, it doesn't change anything when we during the last quarter mentioned that you should expect cost of risk to trend down to the mid to high teens, we already had some of that in mind.

至於你的第二個問題，關於政府方案以及整體——對預測或指引等的影響，並不會改變任何事情；我們在上一季提到你們應預期風險成本會下行至約 10% 中段到高段時，已經把其中一部分因素納入考量。

Naturally, the mix of the disbursements on a quarter over quarter basis may fluctuate. So it's not every quarter that we're going to be disbursing the same mix of products, the same kind of clients, so on and so forth. So it's natural to have some short-term fluctuation.

當然，按季來看，撥款組合的結構可能會波動。因此不會每一季都以相同的產品組合、相同類型的客戶等進行撥款。所以出現一些短期波動是很自然的。

But the guidance still stands that cost of risk will trend down to that mid to high teens. In the medium term, probably ending the end of the year already at the high teens level.

但指引仍然不變：風險成本將下行至約 10% 中段到高段。中期來看，可能在今年年底時就已落在約 10% 高段的水準。

Perfect. Just to be clear on the first point here, you mentioned, Diego, that you are optimistic with the outlook. So going forward, we shouldn't expect more provisions, just to make sure we should expect more provisions related to that. And then the recovery will depend on the process. That's correct?

很好。為了釐清第一點，你提到，Diego，你對前景感到樂觀。所以往後我們不應該預期會有更多備抵——我只是想確認，我們是否還應該預期會有更多與此相關的備抵。然後回收將取決於處理流程。這樣說對嗎？

We may need to provision more. What we have, the provision level that we have today, it's a weighted probability center for different outcomes, including a possible education, so all cards are on the table.

我們可能需要提列更多準備金。我們目前的提列水準，是針對不同結果（包括可能的和解）所做的加權機率中樞，因此所有選項都攤在檯面上。

I'm optimistic about a positive outcome because of the reasons we've mentioned, we think a possible litigation destroys value for everybody. So we think it's just a matter of time getting to that agreement, but it may occur that it won't happen during the next quarter or it won't happen at all. So we need to be ready for everything.

基於我們提到的原因，我對正面結果抱持樂觀，因為我們認為可能的訴訟對所有人都會造成價值損失。因此我們認為達成協議只是時間問題，但也可能在下一季不會發生，甚至完全不會發生。所以我們必須對所有情況做好準備。

In terms of size, which I'm pretty sure is going to be your next question about how much else. We may need to provision. Our total exposure reflects the market share that we have in payments generally. So the exposure that we have for this issuer is proportional to our market share, just as it is to any given issuer.

就規模而言，我很確定這會是你下一個問題：還需要多少。我們可能需要提列準備金。我們的總曝險反映了我們在支付領域整體的市占率。因此，我們對這個發卡機構的曝險與我們的市占率成正比，就如同對任何一個發卡機構一樣。

Very clear. Thank you so much.

非常清楚。非常感謝。

Daniel Vaz, Safra.

Daniel Vaz，Safra。

Hi, I'm Mateus. Hi, Diego, Roberta. Thank you for the opportunity of making questions.

嗨，我是Mateus。嗨，Diego、Roberta。謝謝你們提供提問的機會。

I was looking at your 2026 guidance, which you kept unchanged. You need to catch up a bit under your run rate. I know the fourth quarter usually is stronger, but to reach the low end of gross profit and looking at your revenue trajectory like quarter over quarter, it didn't look so well when we compare to the TPV, which has recovered quite a bit. So congrats on that.

我在看你們2026年的指引，你們維持不變。你們的實際運行速度（run rate）還需要追趕一些。我知道第四季通常會更強，但若要達到毛利的指引下緣，從你們營收逐季（QoQ）的軌跡來看，與已經明顯回升的TPV相比，表現看起來沒那麼好。所以也恭喜你們TPV回升。

But mostly on PICs, right? So PICs might not be bringing the same unit economics as the card when we look to your financial income. And then you have a headwind on the other financial income portion, given that you would not have the same cash position, right? So how can we deliver the low end of the guidance with these new take rate levels that look a bit more sluggish than your past?

但主要是來自PICs，對吧？因此，若看你們的金融收入，PICs的單位經濟效益可能不如卡片。另外，在其他金融收入部分，你們也會面臨逆風，因為你們不會有同樣的現金部位，對吧？那麼在新的take rate水準看起來比過去更疲弱的情況下，我們要如何達成指引下緣？

And if the costs, the COGS, which you deliver a good COGS this quarter is where you want to surprise or where you want to have your most upside to deliver the low end. So how to treat this balance between. Revenues with take rates and headwinds from the cash position? And then your COGS is there where you want to meet the guidance between with the costs and not the revenues?

另外，成本端（COGS），你們本季交出不錯的COGS表現，這是否是你們想要帶來驚喜、或是你們想要用來創造最大上行空間以達成下緣的地方？所以要如何看待這個平衡：營收端的take rate與現金部位帶來的逆風，以及你們是否打算主要靠COGS（成本）而不是營收來達成指引？

Hi, Vaz. Thank you very much for the question. So the gross profit was flattish during the first half of the year, mainly because of the reasons we've mentioned in the presentation. So credit revenues keep adding to the top line, payments revenue not necessarily because of lower prices, marginal lower prices in payments, which you've mentioned as well, but most importantly, what waits is the cost of provisions that come with the credit portfolio growth.

嗨，Vaz。非常感謝你的問題。因此，今年上半年毛利大致持平，主要是因為我們在簡報中提到的原因。信貸收入持續推升營收，但支付收入未必如此，因為支付端價格較低、邊際價格略降（你也提到了）；但更重要的是，隨著信貸組合成長而來的提列準備金成本，才是主要拖累。

As to the second half of the year, we expect growth to accelerate both on credit core TPV, but also on PICs, as we've mentioned, and we start benefiting more from the churn initiatives that we've mentioned. So these things combined with the credit portfolio growth and an improvement on the overall risk profile that we have for the portfolio should capture an additional benefit for the gross profit during the second-half of the year.

至於下半年，我們預期成長會加速，包含信貸核心TPV，以及我們提到的PICs；同時我們也會更明顯受惠於我們提到的降低流失（churn）措施。這些因素再加上信貸組合成長，以及我們整體組合風險輪廓的改善，應可在下半年為毛利帶來額外助益。

That said, when we set our guidance for the year, we assume that the CLIC would end 2026 at 12.5%. And today, that number is probably closer to 14%, maybe a quarter of a point below that, depending on what happens on the next central bank meeting. And as we have disclosed already.

話雖如此，當我們設定年度指引時，我們假設CLIC在2026年底會是12.5%。而今天這個數字可能更接近14%，也許會比14%低四分之一个百分點，取決於下一次央行會議的結果。而且如我們已經揭露的。

Every 100 basis points on (inaudible)carries a pre-tax impact of roughly BRL200 million to BRL250 million. So rates alone are headwind north of BRL300 million for 2026.

(聽不清)每變動100個基點，稅前影響約為2億至2.5億巴西雷亞爾。因此，僅利率因素就對2026年造成超過3億巴西雷亞爾的逆風。

On top of that, the crypto environment has been tougher than we all expected in line with what the broader market is seeing. None of these changes our guidance ranges, as we've mentioned before, but it does make the backdrop more demanding than it was at the start of the year, which is why we're focused on delivering toward the lower end of the guidance.

此外，加密貨幣環境比我們所有人預期的都更艱難，這也與整體市場看到的情況一致。這些都不會改變我們的指引區間（如我們先前所說），但確實使得今年年初所預期的外部環境更具挑戰，因此我們專注於朝指引下緣交付。

I don't think it's going to have to do with the total cash balance of the quarter or of the year or the benefits that we have on the second quarter in COGS.

我不認為這會與本季或全年總現金餘額，或我們在第二季COGS上的好處有關。

Thank you. And if I may follow-up, do you have any specific target for your cost or risk for the second half of the year?

謝謝。如果我可以追問一下，你們對下半年成本或風險有任何具體目標嗎？

So it's going to trend down to those high teens that we've mentioned. Naturally, as I've mentioned. Short-term fluctuations are natural because of the mix of the disbursement, but there also may occur because of specific cases on the dedicated desk.

會往我們提到的「十幾％的高檔」水準下行。如我所提到的，這是自然的。短期波動是正常的，因為放款撥付的組合會影響；此外也可能因為專案小組（dedicated desk）上的特定個案而波動。

As we've disclosed, for example, this quarter, a big impact that we had on the 15 to 90 days NPLs were cases coming from the dedicated desk, and that's hard to forecast when those cases will happen, if they do happen.

例如，如我們已揭露的，本季15到90天的不良貸款（NPL）受到很大影響，主要來自專案小組的個案；而這些個案何時會發生、是否會發生，都很難預測。

So short-term fluctuations may occur, but we are optimistic about going down to those mid to high-teen levels that we've always guided the market.

因此短期波動可能會出現，但我們對於降至我們一向向市場指引的「十幾％中段到高段」水準仍然樂觀。

Antonio Ruette, BofA.

Antonio Ruette，BofA。

Hi, thank you for your time. So my question is actually a follow-up on Vaz's question related to the cost of risk in the credit business.

嗨，謝謝你們撥冗。我的問題其實是延續Vaz的提問，與信貸業務的風險成本有關。

So my question goes on this large cases of the dedicated task. If you could provide a little bit of detail of what happened here. So why you decided to move to these clients and which kind of problem did you have and how are you addressing this going forward? And did you reduce the size of loans that you are originating, the size of clients going forward? That's pretty much it.

我的問題是關於專案小組那些大型個案。如果你們可以提供一些細節，說明這裡發生了什麼。也就是說，為什麼你們決定轉向這些客戶、遇到了什麼類型的問題、以及未來你們將如何處理？另外，你們是否降低了未來承作的貸款規模、或客戶規模？大概就是這些。

Thank you.

謝謝。

Antonio, thanks for the question. So I'll give a little bit of color and then talk about the changes that we've made.

Antonio，謝謝你的問題。我會先補充一些背景，然後談談我們做了哪些調整。

But first of all, you're right. We have seen some delinquency cases in the dedicated desk. And I think Diego mentioned this in the call, the beginning of the call as well, that the delinquency we saw was particularly among the larger ticket exposures that we have on the desk.

不過首先，你說得沒錯。我們確實在專案小組看到一些逾期案例。我想Diego在電話會議中、在一開始也提到過，我們看到的逾期特別集中在該小組中單筆金額較大的曝險。

If you remember the overall profile of the desk. We have an average ticket of around 700,000 reais, which is precisely the core clients that we serve. It's part of the core offering. But whenever we try to disburse to hire clients, I think we were a little bit exposed to the record judicial recuperations that we're having in the country as well. And that's part of the problem.

如果你還記得這個團隊（desk）的整體輪廓。我們的平均單筆金額大約是70萬雷亞爾，這正是我們所服務的核心客戶。這是核心產品組合的一部分。但每當我們嘗試對新承作的客戶放款時，我認為我們也有點暴露在國內正在出現的創紀錄司法重整案件之下。而這也是問題的一部分。

In terms of how we are addressing that, I would say we're doing two main things. The first one is that we're shifting originations. Towards the government-backed credit lines, particularly for clients where we do not have a longstanding relationship or sufficient historical data prior to the disbursement.

至於我們如何應對，我會說我們主要在做兩件事。第一，我們正在調整承作來源。轉向政府背書的信貸額度，特別是針對那些我們沒有長期往來關係、或在放款前缺乏足夠歷史數據的客戶。

And the second thing, we are minimizing the amount of maximum tickets on the dedicated desk so that we don't have exposure to any single client that can hurt the portfolio or create volatility going forward.

第二，我們正在降低專屬團隊的單筆最高額度，這樣我們就不會對任何單一客戶有過度曝險，避免其傷害投資組合或在未來造成波動。

So overall, the things I would say is that the dedicated desk itself is part of the core offering. It's something that we have some success whenever we stay around our core clients. I think the issue here has been related to specific cases, especially when we had higher tickets.

總體來說，我想說的是，這個專屬團隊本身是核心產品的一部分。當我們維持在核心客戶範圍內時，我們在這方面是有一些成功經驗的。我認為這裡的問題與特定個案有關，尤其是在我們做了較大單筆金額的時候。

And Antonio, just to add a little bit more color on what Mateusz was saying, there are different cases naturally, but just to give you an example, one of the cases that we had on the second quarter was a node client of ours, both in payments and software, which had a long standing relationship, a large client.

Antonio，為了補充 Mateusz 剛才所說、提供更多背景，個案當然各有不同，但舉個例子，我們在第二季遇到的一個案例，是我們的一個節點型（node）客戶，在支付與軟體兩方面都是我們的客戶，合作關係很久，是個大客戶。

We had a ticket of BRL11 million, if I'm not mistaken, BRL11 million or BRL12 million, large list of banks, so on and so forth. And we were supporting that client because of the overall business that we were getting from them. We started discussing them banking opportunities and then we were all taken by surprise.

我們的單筆金額是1,100萬巴西雷亞爾，如果我沒記錯的話，1,100萬或1,200萬雷亞爾，還有一長串銀行名單等等。我們之所以支持這個客戶，是因為我們從他們那裡獲得的整體業務量。我們開始和他們討論銀行業務機會，然後大家都措手不及。

With this account, with this client filing for bankruptcy protection. Once that happens, we move that client immediately from stage one to stage three. And that has an impact on the overall metrics.

因為這個帳戶、這個客戶申請了破產保護。一旦發生這種情況，我們會立刻把該客戶從第一階段移到第三階段。而這會影響整體指標。

It is a -- this is great. if I may follow-up on this. When you look at most of your large corporate cases, are these usual clients that were distressed by poor macro and high rates or you consider that most of them are some kind of fraud or is more macro related?

這個——很好。如果我可以就此追問一下。當你看你們大多數大型企業個案時，這些通常是因為宏觀環境不佳與高利率而陷入困境的客戶，還是你認為其中大多數是某種詐欺，或是更偏向宏觀因素？

No, this is mostly macro.

不，這主要是宏觀因素。

Related in this case, Antonio, was a large retailer.

在這個案例中，Antonio，是一家大型零售商。

Neha Agarwala, HSBC.

Neha Agarwala，匯豐。

Hi, thank you for taking my question.

你好，謝謝讓我提問。

You mentioned in your press release that you've seen good results from your efforts in the TON clients, but you're still working on the SMB clients. Could you explain why it has been a bit more difficult to gain back the SMB clients?

你們在新聞稿中提到，你們在 TON 客戶上的努力已看到不錯的成果，但在 SMB 客戶上仍在推進中。你能否解釋一下，為什麼要把 SMB 客戶爭取回來會比較困難？

And are you already seeing improvements starting third quarter so we can see the results in 3Q, or would it take a bit more time for the SMB turn to reduce?

另外，你們是否已經在第三季開始看到改善，讓我們能在3Q看到成果，還是 SMB 的流失率下降還需要更多時間？

Thank you.

謝謝。

Neha, thanks for the question. I can give some color and then maybe Diego can add.

Neha，謝謝你的問題。我可以先補充一些背景，然後也許 Diego 可以再補充。

So it is true that we've seen more success faster in the micro merchants. And the reason for that is quite simple, which is the offer for micro merchants is usually a lot simpler and the distribution channel is also a lot simpler. Whenever we talk about SMBs, usually the base spans different offerings, different channels and different needs.

確實，我們在微型商戶（micro merchants）上更快看到了更多成功。原因很簡單：微型商戶的方案通常更簡單，分銷渠道也更簡單。但當我們談到 SMB 時，客群通常涵蓋不同的產品、不同的渠道與不同的需求。

And because of that, there is no single fix. So we have to adjust offers in many different segments and intensify the retention work, which is by definition spread out. This changes when we talk about SMB. There are no silver bullets and they require by design a lot of testing and careful calibration before we roll out. So I wouldn't say that we were unsuccessful in these initiatives.

因此，沒有單一的解法。我們必須在許多不同細分領域調整方案，並加強留存工作，而留存本質上就是分散的。談到 SMB 時情況就是如此。沒有「銀彈」，而且按其設計，在推出之前需要大量測試與謹慎校準。所以我不會說我們在這些舉措上不成功。

I think by nature of the SMB business, we need to test more and the rollout takes a lot more time. But when we see the results that we're having, the reality is that both trends are improving in both the micro-inversion segments and within SMBs. I think it's just the definition that it's not a silver bullet. It's gradual, and therefore, when you talk about TPV acceleration, it's going to be gradual as well. I don't think it's going to be the flip of a switch.

我認為就 SMB 業務的特性而言，我們需要做更多測試，而推廣落地也需要更長時間。但從我們看到的結果來看，現實是微型商戶細分與 SMB 兩邊的趨勢都在改善。我想只是因為它本來就不是「銀彈」。它是漸進的，因此當你談到 TPV 加速時，也會是漸進的。我不認為會是一鍵切換、立刻翻轉。

Yeah. Just to add on, Mateus, Neha, most of the capital that we deploy in terms of selling goes towards SMBs. Most of our TPV comes from SMBs. So it's a very large engine and you got to be careful when changing it significantly. So these things take time. We're evolving. We're optimistic about it, but it's going to take a little bit longer than we would like.

是的。再補充一下，Mateus、Neha，我們在銷售方面投入的大部分資本都投向 SMB。我們的大部分 TPV 也來自 SMB。所以這是一個非常大的引擎，你在大幅改動它時必須非常謹慎。因此這些事情需要時間。我們正在演進。我們對此感到樂觀，但確實會比我們希望的花更久一點。

Perfect. If I can ask one more question. We've seen very strong growth and a mix shift towards the PIX volumes. And I believe you've been giving some offers where you are giving PIX volumes are being processed for free or at very low rates.

很好。如果我可以再問一個問題。我們看到 PIX 交易量成長非常強勁，且組合也朝 PIX 轉移。我相信你們提供了一些方案，讓 PIX 交易量可以免費或以非常低的費率處理。

Should we expect continued pressure on take rate coming from that? And also, as you try to reduce churn, you probably are giving more benefits to the merchants. So should we see pressure on take rate coming more from your initiatives and change in mix?

我們是否應該預期這會持續對 take rate 造成壓力？另外，當你們試圖降低流失率時，可能也會給商戶更多優惠。那麼 take rate 是否也會因你們的舉措與組合變化而承壓？

Thank you.

謝謝。

Hi, Neha. So again, yes, on the margin take rates in payments are falling mostly as a result of mix because of what you just described, right? PIX is getting, it's growing proportionally on total TPV and in some segments there are other price moves as well.

你好，Neha。所以再說一次，是的，支付業務的邊際 take rate 下降，主要是你剛描述的組合因素所致，對吧？PIX 在總 TPV 中的占比正在提高，而且在某些細分領域也有其他價格調整。

That said, we've been saying for quite some time now that looking at take rates by product tells less of the story as we price the client's relationship and not the product on a standalone basis. It's not uncommon already to have clients with very small take rates in payments, which we would typically reprice in other times of the company, but that today we bundle with credit and payments, bringing economics to very healthy levels.

不過，我們已經講了一段時間：按產品看 take rate 其實無法完整反映情況，因為我們定價的是客戶關係，而不是把產品當作獨立項目來定價。現在已經很常見有些客戶在支付上的 take rate 很低；在公司以往的階段我們通常會重新定價，但如今我們把信貸與支付打包，讓整體經濟性維持在非常健康的水準。

So once the client is on the base, we manage the relationship holistically and not looking at payments on a standalone basis or credit on a standalone basis.

因此，一旦客戶進入我們的客群基礎，我們會以整體方式管理客戶關係，而不是把支付當作獨立項目、或把信貸當作獨立項目來看。

And just to add on that, Diego, when you look at our offerings in place, I don't think we have offers in place where we provide PICs for free unconditionally. It's usually tied to a certain commitment of volume or any other commercial agreement as well, which connects to what Diego has just said, which is we really look at the unit economics on a broad base.

另外再補充一下，Diego，當你看我們現有的產品方案時，我不認為我們有任何在未附帶條件下免費提供 PIC 的方案。通常都會與一定的交易量承諾或其他商業協議綁定，這也呼應 Diego 剛才所說的：我們會以更廣泛的基礎來看單位經濟效益。

And I think it's not a good proxy of unit economics to look at those offerings on a piece by piece.

而且我認為，用逐項拆開來看這些方案，並不是衡量單位經濟效益的好替代指標。

Arnon Shirazi, Citi.

Arnon Shirazi，花旗。

Hi, all. Thank you for taking my question. Nice to be here again.

各位好。謝謝讓我提問。很高興再次參與。

My question is mainly related to the communication with the client base. From the past conversations we had, it was clear that have some problems communicating with them, mostly with core SME clients, while for some clients, it seems that the communication got better as was just addressed in the past question from Neha.

我的問題主要與和客戶群的溝通有關。從我們過去的對話來看，很明顯你們在與他們溝通上有一些問題，主要是在核心 SME 客戶；而對於部分客戶而言，溝通似乎有所改善，正如剛才 Neha 的問題中提到的。

But how is the communication with these larger SME clients and how they offer is improving? I see that the integration with Pagar.me is part of this math, but it would be great to have more information on that.

但對於這些較大型的 SME 客戶，你們的溝通情況如何？以及你們的方案提供方式如何在改善？我看到與 Pagar.me 的整合是其中一部分，但希望能有更多相關資訊。

Thank you.

謝謝。

Hi, Arnon. We keep evolving on that front. It's still easier to reach out to a micro merchant than to an SMB, especially when it becomes a larger client, which is not necessarily looking at the app every single day. You're looking at our communications every single day. So it takes those are two different processes.

嗨，Arnon。我們在這方面持續演進。相較於 SMB，接觸微型商戶仍然更容易，尤其當客戶規模變大時，他們不一定每天都在看 App。你要他們每天看我們的溝通訊息。所以這是兩種不同的流程。

So we keep evolving on that front and communicating better, both new offerings, both the current profiles or plans in which the clients are currently assigned, but it's a longer journey than simply fixing it from one quarter to the other.

因此我們持續在這方面改進並加強溝通：包含新產品方案、也包含客戶目前所屬的現有分群或方案，但這是一段較長的旅程，不是從一個季度到下一個季度就能簡單修好。

Okay, I got it. But there's any expectation on that like should we see that advancing by the end of this year or something for a story for 2027?

好的，我明白了。但對此有任何時間上的預期嗎？例如我們應該在今年底看到進展，還是要等到 2027 的故事？

It's going to be a gradual process that will certainly come with lower churn. So you will see that gradually and the best way to see it, it's not going to be on any other metric other than churn.

這會是一個循序漸進的過程，而且肯定會伴隨較低的流失率（churn）。所以你會逐步看到改善，而觀察它的最佳方式，不會是其他指標，而是流失率。

Renato Meloni, Autonomous Research.

Renato Meloni，Autonomous Research。

Everyone, good evening. Thanks for taking the question. Can you expand your comments a bit on your net revenue from transaction activities declining 11% sequentially here on the opposite way from TPV? If you can maybe comment on like how that's pricing mix affecting that or potentially some reallocations affecting the numbers?

各位晚上好。謝謝讓我提問。你們能否再多談一些：你們來自交易活動的淨營收本季環比下降 11%，但 TPV 卻是相反方向上升？是否可以評論一下，例如定價組合如何影響，或是否有一些重新分配（reallocations）影響了數字？

Thank you.

謝謝。

Hi, Meloni.

嗨，Meloni。

Basically, we had lower revenues from incentives that we get from the card networks related to our activities as credit card issuer. So every now and then, we collect certain incentives from the networks. Some of those incentives occurred in the first quarter and didn't occur on the second quarter, so short-term fluctuations.

基本上，我們從卡組織取得的激勵收入較低，這些激勵與我們作為信用卡發卡機構的活動相關。因此我們會不時從卡組織收取某些激勵。其中一些激勵發生在第一季，但第二季沒有發生，所以屬於短期波動。

Perfect. So we shouldn't expect to see anything like that over the coming quarters?

了解。所以我們不應該預期未來幾季還會看到類似情況？

Nope.

不會。

Okay, thanks very much.

好的，非常感謝。

Guilherme Grespan, JPMorgan.

Guilherme Grespan，摩根大通。

Guilherme, we're not hearing the question.

Guilherme，我們聽不到你的問題。

But Guilherme Grespo is having some technical problems. We are handing on to the next one.

但 Guilherme Grespo 似乎遇到一些技術問題。我們先轉到下一位。

Our next question comes from Mr. Pedro Leduc from Itau BBA. Please, Pedro, you may now proceed.

下一個問題來自 Itau BBA 的 Pedro Leduc 先生。Pedro，請開始。

Good evening. Thank you so much. Question on financial results, both income, but more expenses not side down a bit sequentially.

晚上好。非常感謝。我想問財務結果，包含收入，但更聚焦在費用端，本季環比略有下降。

Year over year, it seems very controlled as well. Can you remind us a little bit your strategy here, how you are in terms of home and third-party and maybe what we should also think for the next quarter, see if there are any levers that we should think about or is it just the lower effect from this leak maybe?

同比看起來也控制得很好。能否請你們再提醒一下你們在這裡的策略：自有資金（home）與第三方資金的配置目前如何？以及對下一季我們應該怎麼看，是否有任何可以思考的槓桿？還是只是這個「leak」帶來的較低影響？

Thank you.

謝謝。

Hi, Pedro. Thank you for the question.

嗨，Pedro。謝謝你的問題。

There were two combined effects here. So first, yes, Celix is slightly lower on average. This quarter than it was last quarter or at the same period of last year. But most importantly, we had more deposits from clients on average deployed on the operation.

這裡有兩個疊加的影響。第一，是的，Celix 的平均水準略低。本季相較於上季或去年同期略低。但更重要的是，我們平均而言有更多客戶存款投入在營運中。

The mix of home capital and third-party capital has been pretty much the same as the amount of capital that we've been generating every quarter has been pretty similar to the amount of capital that we have returned to shareholders every quarter through buybacks. So I'm excluding here the extraordinary effect of links dividends.

自有資金與第三方資金的組合基本上維持不變，因為我們每季產生的資本量，與我們每季透過庫藏股回購返還給股東的資本量相當接近。因此我在此排除「links dividends」的非常態影響。

As to levers for the following quarters, if any, I would be more cautious on it, basically because we expect assets to grow faster than deposits. Until the end of the year, let's see how that dynamic will evolve. Hopefully, assets will keep growing faster. And therefore, there may be pressure on financial expenses.

至於接下來幾季是否有任何槓桿，我會更謹慎看待，主要因為我們預期資產成長會快於存款成長。到今年底之前，我們再看看這個動態如何演變。希望資產能持續更快成長。因此，財務費用可能會有壓力。

Guilherme Grespan, JPMorgan.

Guilherme Grespan，摩根大通。

So my question is specifically on the credit and the government programs. And sorry about the I couldn't ask before, but on the government programs, of course, it seems to be a very important point of growth to the business nowadays.

我的問題是關於信貸與政府方案。也抱歉我剛才沒能提問；但就政府方案而言，顯然目前看起來是業務成長非常重要的一個點。

So I have two full questions here. Number one. If you can explain a little bit in more details what is the risk waterfall of the programs, how much the government guarantees in terms of NPLs, especially, I think PEAC is the one that is most relevant to you. Correct if I'm wrong, but I think it is.

我有兩個完整問題。第一。你們能否更詳細說明這些方案的風險瀑布（risk waterfall）是什麼？政府對不良貸款（NPL）的擔保比例是多少？尤其我認為 PEAC 對你們最相關。如果我說錯請糾正，但我認為是這個。

And the second one is just how you're going to treat provisions. Diego mentioned that part of the lower corporate would be natural to be driven by the government programs. How do you handle provisions in this case like if you have the guarantee of the government do you provision at all or no how it works the this this time mismatch between when you have the default and when you receive the honor of the government?

第二個問題是你們將如何處理提存（provisions）。Diego 提到企業端較低的部分自然會由政府方案所驅動。在這種情況下你們如何處理提存？如果有政府擔保，你們還會提存嗎？或是不提？實務上如何運作？以及在發生違約與收到政府履約（honor）之間的時間落差要怎麼處理？

Awesome question, Guilherme, and that's precisely why we added page 11 on the materials.

很棒的問題，Guilherme，這也正是我們在資料中加入第 11 頁的原因。

So the waterfall of the programs are similar in the objectives, but each one of them has its own nitty-gritty detail depending on what's the public, to whom you're lending, what's the size of the company, so on and so forth. But on average, especially on PEAC, the government guarantees roughly 75% of the defaulted amount.

這些方案的瀑布機制在目標上相似，但每一個方案都有其細節，取決於目標客群、你放款的對象、公司的規模等等。但平均而言，尤其在 PEAC 上，政府大約擔保違約金額的 75%。

So the loss given default for a credit under PAC, on average, it's about 25%, which is materially lower than what we have in our overall portfolio. That's the reason why we have to provision less upfront when underwriting that credit. Other programs not only.

因此，在 PAC 項下的一筆信貸，其違約損失率（LGD）平均約為 25%，明顯低於我們整體投資組合的水準。這就是為什麼在承作該筆信貸時，我們需要在一開始提列較少的準備金。其他方案也不僅如此。

The CBRI facility that we have here on the material that we didn't talk very much, but others that we've been working on will have different risk profiles, but the rationale is similar. So because of that guarantee upon a loss, we provision less upfront. So whenever one of those credits roll into default, the coverage, especially on Stage 2, will drop.

我們這裡的 CBRI 額度（facility），關於這個主題我們談得不多，但我們正在推進的其他方案會有不同的風險輪廓，不過其邏輯相似。因此，由於在發生損失時有該項擔保，我們在一開始提列較少的準備金。所以每當其中一筆信貸轉為違約時，覆蓋率（coverage），尤其是在第二階段（Stage 2），將會下降。

And the coverage for the loans between 15 and 90 days will drop because we have the right to collect the guarantee from the government on the 91st day after the default. So it doesn't affect that much the coverage for stage three or for over 90 day credits, but it does affect significantly the coverage for stage two and for short-term NPLs.

而 15 到 90 天之間的貸款覆蓋率也會下降，因為在違約後第 91 天，我們有權向政府收取該項擔保。因此，這對第三階段（Stage 3）或逾 90 天的信貸覆蓋率影響不大，但確實會顯著影響第二階段以及短期不良貸款（NPLs）的覆蓋率。

Kaio Prato, UBS.

Kaio Prato，瑞銀（UBS）。

Hello, everyone. Good evening. Thanks for the opportunity. I have two on my side, please. The first one is a follow-up on the credit portfolio.

各位好。晚安。感謝提供這個機會。我這邊有兩個問題，麻煩。第一個是關於信貸投資組合的追問。

You talked about the -- I think you comment about, could you comment about your current appetite on both the dedicated and the automated desk given the current credit landscape that you're talking about now? Today we already noted some contraction month over month on your portfolio under the FIDIX as of July.

你們談到——我想你們提到過，能否評論一下在目前你們所描述的信貸環境下，對於專屬團隊（dedicated desk）以及自動化團隊（automated desk）的當前承作意願（appetite）如何？我們注意到截至 7 月，你們在 FIDIX 項下的投資組合已出現月對月的收縮。

So just wondering if this scenario implies a reduction in the pace of growth at this point, specifically on these two fronts, please?

所以想請教，這樣的情境是否意味著此刻成長步伐會放緩，特別是在這兩個面向上？

And the second one is in terms of your DNA. We noted a reduction on your DNA this quarter allocated both in costs and expenses. If you can share a little bit more color on the drivers behind that and what can we expect in terms of DNA going forward as well.

第二個是關於你們的 DNA。我們注意到本季你們的 DNA 有所下降，且在成本與費用兩端都有分配。如果可以的話，請多分享一些背後的驅動因素，以及未來 DNA 的走勢預期。

Thank you.

謝謝。

Hey, Kaio, thanks for the question. I'll take the first one around credit growth appetite. And then hand it over to Diego for the second one.

嗨，Kaio，謝謝你的提問。我先回答第一個關於信貸成長承作意願的問題。然後把第二個問題交給 Diego。

So in terms of appetite for growth, we are very mindful that the macro environment has been very tough for Brazil, especially for Brazilian MSMBs, with rates being very high for so long, probably now over three years of high rates. And this, of course, weighs a lot on our clients.

就成長意願而言，我們非常留意到宏觀環境對巴西一直相當嚴峻，尤其對巴西的中小微企業（MSMBs）而言，利率長期維持在很高的水準，可能已經超過三年處於高利率。而這當然會對我們的客戶造成很大壓力。

That said, we continue to see a lot of room for profitable growth. Because when we look at our share of wallet within our own client base, it is still really small. We estimate that our share of wallet within our own client base at credit is still at around mid-single-digits. So the opportunity remains large and we feel that we are in a strong position of lending to clients whose daily sales flow through our platform as well.

即便如此，我們仍然看到很大的獲利性成長空間。因為當我們觀察在自有客群中的錢包占比（share of wallet）時，仍然非常小。我們估計，在自有客群的信貸錢包占比仍大約在中個位數百分比。因此機會依然很大，而且我們也認為自己處於有利位置，因為我們放款的客戶其日常銷售流水也會透過我們的平台。

In terms of how we navigate this environment that is tough while having a share of wallet that is still low. If you remember a couple of quarters ago, we started by proactively raising prices towards the second-half of last year in anticipation of this tougher macro environment.

至於在錢包占比仍低、但環境又艱難的情況下我們如何應對。如果你還記得，幾個季度前，我們在預期宏觀環境將更具挑戰之下，於去年下半年開始主動調升價格。

And now what we are increasingly doing is shifting the portfolio mix towards lower risk exposure, focusing on government-backed programs that like Diego mentioned in the previous question, have a risk sharing profile built into itself. And in terms of the dedicated desk, I think I approached this in a previous question as well, but we're taking a more conservative approach, especially in regards to ticket size.

而現在我們越來越多地在做的是，將投資組合結構轉向較低風險曝險，聚焦於政府支持的方案；正如 Diego 在上一個問題中提到的，這些方案本身就內建風險分攤（risk sharing）的特性。至於專屬團隊（dedicated desk），我想我在前一個問題也提過，我們採取更保守的做法，特別是在單筆金額（ticket size）方面。

So overall, I think the message is that we still have appetite to grow the book.

所以整體而言，我認為訊息是：我們仍然有意願擴大放款規模。

And the second thing that I would mention, you mentioned the FIDIC date as well. I wouldn't read too much into the FIDIC data, especially now that we have not only many other products, but also the facilities from the government. Not necessarily every disbursement will go through a FIDIC itself. So I think the FIDIC data becomes a read or a proxy that is not as good going forward.

第二點我想補充的是，你也提到了 FIDIC 的數據。我不會對 FIDIC 數據做過多解讀，尤其是現在我們不僅有許多其他產品，還有政府提供的額度。並不是每一筆撥款都一定會透過 FIDIC 進行。因此，我認為未來 FIDIC 數據作為觀察指標或代理（proxy）的效果會變得沒那麼好。

So in summary, I think we remain comfortable growing the portfolio. We are taking a cautious approach because we think the environment is tough. But again, I think there's a lot of room going forward.

總結來說，我認為我們仍然對投資組合的成長感到安心。我們採取審慎的做法，因為我們認為環境確實艱難。但同樣地，我認為未來仍有很大的空間。

Kaio, on the DNA, it's fairly simple. We can take it offline if you want, but basically, this is just an improvement in our accounting practice that has no effect on the P&L.

Kaio，關於 DNA，這其實相當簡單。如果你願意我們也可以會後再談，但基本上，這只是我們會計處理方式的改善，對損益表（P&L）沒有影響。

Basically, we had a provisioning mechanism for POS of inactive clients that was fully provisioned, but existed with a positive value in one line of the balance sheet and the same negative value in another line. So what we're doing now is merging these two effects on the P&L. So it's really just a mix effect between lines.

基本上，我們過去對不活躍客戶的 POS 有一套提列準備的機制，已經全額提列，但在資產負債表的一個科目上以正值呈現，同時在另一個科目上以相同的負值呈現。所以我們現在做的是把這兩個效果在損益表（P&L）上合併呈現。因此這真的只是科目之間的組合（mix）效果。

The questions and answers section is over.

問答環節到此結束。

We will like hand the floor back to CEO, Mateus Schwening, for the company's final remarks.

我們想把時間交回給執行長 Mateus Schwening，請他做公司最後的致詞。

Thank you all for the support, and we'll see you in the next year in Stone.

感謝各位的支持，我們明年在 Stone 再見。

StoneCo's conference call is now closed. We thank you for your participation and wish you a very nice day.

StoneCo 的電話會議現在結束。感謝各位的參與，並祝各位有美好的一天。