StoneCo Ltd. (STNE) 2026 Q1 法說會逐字稿

Good evening, everyone. Thank you for standing by. Welcome to StoneCo’s first-quarter 2026 earnings conference call. (Operator Instructions)

各位晚安。感謝各位耐心等候。歡迎參加 StoneCo 2026 年第一季財報電話會議。（接線員指示）

All material can be found online at investors.stone.co. Before we begin the call, I advise you to review the disclaimer included in the press release and presentation, which outlines important information about forward-looking statements and non-IFRS financial measures. Many of the risks regarding the business are disclosed in the company’s Form 20-F, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, which is available at www.sec.gov.

所有資料皆可於 investors.stone.co 線上取得。在我們開始之前，我建議各位查閱新聞稿與簡報中所載之免責聲明，其中概述了有關前瞻性陳述與非 IFRS 財務衡量指標的重要資訊。公司在提交給美國證券交易委員會（SEC）的 Form 20-F 中揭露了與業務相關的多項風險，該文件可於 www.sec.gov 取得。

(Operator Instructions)

（接線員指示）

Joining the call today is StoneCo’s CEO, Mateus Scherer; the CFO and IRO, Diego Salgado; and the Head of IR, Roberta Noronha.

今天參與會議的有 StoneCo 執行長 Mateus Scherer；財務長兼投資人關係主管（IRO）Diego Salgado；以及投資人關係主管 Roberta Noronha。

I would now like to turn the conference over to Mateus. Please proceed.

現在我想把會議交給 Mateus。請開始。

Thank you, operator, and good evening, everyone. Let me begin with a broad review of our first quarter. The quarter was broadly consistent with the softer first half dynamics we had anticipated. Three dynamics shaped the quarter. First, a macro environment that continues to weigh on smaller merchants. Second, typical first-quarter seasonality. Third, a credit portfolio that continues to grow profitably even though NPLs came in above our expectations. All of this while we work to bring churn to healthier levels and re-accelerate TPV growth.

謝謝接線員，各位晚安。讓我先對第一季做一個整體回顧。本季整體表現與我們先前預期的上半年偏弱態勢大致一致。有三項動態形塑了本季：第一，總體環境持續對小型商戶造成壓力；第二，第一季典型的季節性因素；第三，信貸投資組合持續以獲利方式成長，儘管不良貸款（NPL）高於我們的預期。同時，我們也在努力將流失率（churn）拉回更健康的水準，並重新加速 TPV 成長。

Against that backdrop, we grew revenue, held our adjusted gross profit broadly stable, and continued to return significant capital to shareholders. More importantly, this quarter marks the beginning of a transition phase between the extraordinary capital distribution linked to the Linx divestiture and the operational momentum we expect to build through the second half.

在此背景下，我們實現營收成長、調整後毛利大致維持穩定，並持續向股東回饋可觀資本。更重要的是，本季標誌著一個轉換階段的開始：從與 Linx 出售案相關的超額資本分配，轉向我們預期在下半年建立的營運動能。

The work underway give us confidence in the trajectory ahead, and we remain fully focused on execution. Now, I want to spend a few minutes on what matters most heading into the rest of 2026: our capital allocation discipline, our operating priorities, and our commitment to shareholder value.

目前進行中的工作讓我們對未來走勢更具信心，我們仍將全力聚焦於執行。接下來，我想用幾分鐘談談 2026 年剩餘時間最重要的事項：我們的資本配置紀律、營運優先事項，以及對股東價值的承諾。

Let’s turn to slide 3, where we show our capital distribution to shareholders across the last couple of years with emphasis on what we have delivered so far in 2026. Year to date, we have distributed BRL3.6 billion, representing a 27% distribution yield. This includes the extraordinary dividend paid on May 4 with proceeds from the Linx divestiture and approximately BRL0.6 billion in ordinary share buybacks.

請看第 3 頁投影片，我們展示了過去幾年向股東進行的資本分配，並特別強調 2026 年迄今的成果。今年截至目前，我們已分配 36 億巴西雷亞爾（BRL），相當於 27% 的分配殖利率。其中包括 5 月 4 日以 Linx 出售案所得支付的特別股利，以及約 6 億巴西雷亞爾的普通股回購。

In addition, we still have at least another BRL1.4 billion to be repurchased throughout this year. As we have consistently said, whenever value accretive opportunities are not immediately available, excess capital gets returned to shareholders, and the 27% yield year to date is a direct reflection of that commitment.

此外，今年我們仍至少還有 14 億巴西雷亞爾可在全年期間進行回購。正如我們一貫所說，當短期內沒有具增值效益的投資機會時，超額資本就會回饋給股東；而今年迄今 27% 的殖利率正是這項承諾的直接體現。

Moving on, slide 4 outlines our key priorities for the rest of 2026. On payments, our priority is to re-accelerate profitable TPV growth. To do that, we’re focused on improving retention, managing churn more actively, and simplifying the way we bring our broader set of solutions to clients. As we deepened our understanding of the drivers behind the elevated churn observed towards the end of 2025, one important point became clear, the churn pressure is not broad based. Our legacy customer base continues to perform in line with historical churn levels, reinforcing the strength of our core value proposition.

接著，第 4 頁投影片概述了我們在 2026 年剩餘時間的關鍵優先事項。在支付業務方面，我們的優先目標是重新加速具獲利性的 TPV 成長。為此，我們聚焦於提升留存、更加積極地管理流失，並簡化我們向客戶提供更廣泛解決方案的方式。隨著我們加深對 2025 年底觀察到的較高流失之驅動因素的理解，有一點變得很清楚：流失壓力並非全面性。我們的既有客戶群仍維持在歷史流失水準，這也再次印證我們核心價值主張的強韌性。

Instead, the pressure has been more concentrated among clients onboarded during 2025, a period in which the company began offering a broader set of products. As we expanded our offering into additional products, such as instant settlement, investments, and credit cards, our bundles and pricing architecture became more complex than they should have been. That created friction for some clients, and we are addressing it directly.

相反地，壓力更集中在 2025 年導入的客戶上；那段期間公司開始提供更廣泛的產品組合。當我們將產品擴展至即時結算、投資與信用卡等更多品項時，我們的方案組合與定價架構變得比應有的更複雜。這對部分客戶造成摩擦，而我們正直接加以處理。

We are now conducting a full review of our offerings, simplifying bundles, and moving towards a cleaner and more transparent pricing structure. The objective is not to chase volume at any cost. The objective is profitable TPV growth, supported by better retention and deeper relationship with clients who use more of our ecosystem. It is still too early to call a definitive trend, but the initial data is encouraging.

我們目前正在對產品供給進行全面檢視，簡化方案組合，並朝向更清晰、更透明的定價結構邁進。我們的目標不是不計代價追求量的成長；目標是具獲利性的 TPV 成長，並以更佳的留存與更深的客戶關係作為支撐，特別是那些使用我們生態系更多服務的客戶。現在要下定論仍為時過早，但初步數據令人鼓舞。

TPV growth is improving in April. We are watching leading volume indicators closely. They suggest that the actions we are taking are moving us in the right direction.

4 月的 TPV 成長正在改善。我們正密切觀察領先的交易量指標；這些指標顯示，我們採取的行動正把我們帶往正確方向。

On credit, we are also being proactive and disciplined. Towards the end of last year, we saw our models beginning to perform below our expectations, with first payment default rates increasing in newer cohorts. We responded quickly by adjusting pricing to preserve cohort profitability and by tightening our risk selection. Since then, we have implemented a set of model and policy changes. And the early results are promising as first payment default rates are converging back to historical levels.

在信貸方面，我們同樣採取主動且有紀律的作法。去年底，我們看到模型表現開始低於預期，新批次客群的首期付款違約率上升。我們迅速回應，透過調整定價以維持批次獲利能力，並收緊風險篩選。自那之後，我們已實施一系列模型與政策調整；早期結果相當正面，首期付款違約率正收斂回到歷史水準。

Looking ahead, our priority is not simply to grow credit, but to grow it with the right risk-adjusted returns. We will continue refining our underwriting models, pricing risk appropriately, and diversifying the portfolio across products such as credit cards, overdrafts, and secured working capital offerings.

展望未來，我們的優先事項不只是擴大信貸規模，而是以正確的風險調整後報酬來成長。我們將持續精進授信模型、適當地為風險定價，並在信用卡、透支額度與擔保型營運資金等產品之間分散投資組合。

We have recently begun disbursing secured credit products, and we believe these offerings can help us expand access to credits, deepen our relationship with merchants, and reduce the risk intensity of portfolio growth.

我們近期已開始撥付擔保型信貸產品，並相信這些產品能協助我們擴大信貸可得性、加深與商戶的關係，並降低投資組合成長的風險強度。

We’re also committed to improving efficiency throughout the year. First-quarter results were affected by higher provisions and certain one-off expenses, including severance costs in addition to the quarter’s typical seasonal softness. As these factors normalize, we expect operating leverage to resume, supporting continued improvements in our cost structure through disciplined prioritization and AI-driven efficiencies as we progress through 2026 and beyond.

我們也致力於在全年提升效率。第一季結果受到較高的提存以及部分一次性費用影響，其中包括資遣成本，此外也有本季典型的季節性偏弱。隨著這些因素回歸常態，我們預期營運槓桿將重新展現，並透過有紀律的優先排序與 AI 驅動的效率提升，在 2026 年及其後持續改善成本結構。

Finally, we’re also focused on expanding the share of our clients using our full suite of solutions through our unified app, which we’re progressively upgrading to address our merchants’ needs across every financial workflow. Linked to that, we’re making continuous investments in positioning our brand to reflect our evolution into a full-service financial partner.

最後，我們也聚焦於透過我們的整合式 App 擴大使用全套解決方案的客戶占比；我們正逐步升級該 App，以滿足商戶在各項金融工作流程中的需求。與此同時，我們也持續投資於品牌定位，使其反映我們演進為全方位金融夥伴的定位。

Turning to slide 5, our adjusted gross profit was BRL1.5 billion in the quarter, and adjusted basic EPS was BRL2.19 per share. Although interest rates may continue higher for longer, our full-year 2026 guidance remains unchanged. We are on a trajectory that we believe is consistent with delivering within that range, with performance weighted towards the second half as credit revenues continue to compound and the commercial initiatives we are executing begin to normalize retention rates.

請看第 5 頁投影片，本季調整後毛利為 15 億巴西雷亞爾，調整後基本每股盈餘（EPS）為每股 2.19 巴西雷亞爾。儘管利率可能在更長時間內維持較高水準，我們 2026 全年財測指引維持不變。我們正沿著一條我們認為可在該區間內交付的軌跡前進，且表現將更偏向下半年，因為信貸收入持續複利成長，而我們正在推進的商業舉措也將開始使留存率回歸常態。

Finally, beyond the quarterly numbers, I want to flag that what drives us every day is straightforward: building a financial platform that Brazilian entrepreneurs can rely on for their core financial needs. We’re moving fast towards that goal, executing against it with focus and discipline.

最後，除了季度數字之外，我也想強調，我們每天的驅動力很簡單：打造一個巴西創業者可依賴、用以滿足其核心金融需求的金融平台。我們正快速朝此目標前進，並以專注與紀律加以執行。

With that said, I will pass it over to Diego, who will go over our financial and operating results for the quarter.

接下來，我將把時間交給 Diego，由他說明本季的財務與營運結果。

Thank you, Mateus, and good evening, everyone. Let me start on slide 6, where we present our main financial metrics for the quarter. Total revenue and income reached BRL3.6 billion, up 6% year over year. This growth was primarily driven by the continued expansion of our credit revenues and healthy profitability in payments. These tailwinds more than offset the expected headwind from lower floating revenues from deposits, which we started using as funding source in early 2025 and reduced our revenue recognition with the benefit showing up as lower financial expenses.

謝謝你，Mateus，各位晚安。讓我從第 6 頁投影片開始，我們在此呈現本季主要財務指標。總營收與收入達 36 億巴西雷亞爾，年增 6%。此成長主要由信貸收入持續擴張以及支付業務的健康獲利所帶動。這些利多因素，足以抵消我們預期的逆風：存款浮動收益下降。我們自 2025 年初開始將存款作為資金來源，因而降低了收入認列；其效益則反映為較低的財務費用。

Adjusted gross profit came in at BRL1.5 billion, broadly stable year over year as revenue growth was offset mostly by higher provisions for credit losses and increased operating costs. Gross profit margin contracted from 44.4% in the first quarter 2025 to 41.6% this quarter, primarily reflecting the step-up in credit provisions, which we will further explore in this presentation.

調整後毛利為 15 億巴西雷亞爾，年比大致持平，因為營收成長多數被較高的信用損失提存與增加的營運成本所抵消。毛利率由 2025 年第一季的 44.4% 收縮至本季的 41.6%，主要反映信貸提存的提升；我們將在本簡報中進一步探討。

Adjusted net income increased at 3% year over year and reached BRL549 million in the quarter. Adjusted basic EPS grew over 4 times faster, increasing 15% year over year, reaching BRL2.19 per share. The EPS outperformance relative to net income was driven by the continued and consistent share buybacks execution, reflecting our ongoing commitment to returning excess capital to our shareholders.

調整後淨利年增 3%，本季達到 5.49 億巴西雷亞爾（BRL）。調整後基本每股盈餘（EPS）成長速度快於淨利逾 4 倍，年增 15%，達到每股 BRL2.19。EPS 相對於淨利的超額表現，主要由於我們持續且一致地執行庫藏股回購，反映我們持續致力於將多餘資本回饋股東。

On slide 7, I want to briefly explain a reporting change that we’re introducing this quarter. As we advance in our strategy to become the primary financial partner for Brazilian merchants, we are consolidating our active client base definition into a single unified metric. Merchants that have generated revenue during the past 30 days across any of our payments, banking, or credit solutions.

在第 7 頁投影片，我想簡要說明我們本季導入的一項報導變更。隨著我們推進成為巴西商戶主要金融合作夥伴的策略，我們將活躍客戶基礎的定義整合為單一、統一的指標：在過去 30 天內，於我們任何支付、銀行或信貸解決方案中產生收入的商戶。

While payments are still usually our first contact point with merchants, we have a growing number of clients with whom our relationship starts with other business fronts and then evolves into a broader relationship. As a result, we are discontinuing the separate disclosure of the micro, small, and medium-sized payments active client base and banking active client base that we previously reported. Going forward, you will see one unified number.

雖然支付通常仍是我們與商戶的第一個接觸點，但我們與越來越多客戶的關係是從其他業務面向開始，之後再演進為更廣泛的合作關係。因此，我們將停止分別揭露先前所報告的微型、小型與中型支付活躍客戶基礎，以及銀行活躍客戶基礎。未來您將只會看到一個統一的數字。

Under this new definition, our total active client base was 4.7 million clients in the first quarter 2026, up 13% year over year and 5% down sequentially. The sequential decline is largely a result of conscious actions to focus our efforts on a more engaged and revenue-generating clients. We’re also introducing average revenue per active client as a new key metric to track how effectively we are monetizing our client relationships.

在此新定義下，我們於 2026 年第一季的活躍客戶總數為 470 萬戶，年增 13%，季減 5%。季減主要是因為我們有意識地採取行動，將資源聚焦於更投入且能帶來收入的客戶。我們也導入「每位活躍客戶平均收入」作為新的關鍵指標，用以追蹤我們將客戶關係變現的效率。

RPAC was BRL247 per month per client the first quarter 2026, down 3% sequentially and 11% year over year. The sequential decline largely reflects first quarter seasonality, while year-over-year decrease reflects client mix effects.

2026 年第一季 RPAC 為每位客戶每月 BRL247，季減 3%，年減 11%。季減主要反映第一季的季節性因素，而年減則反映客戶組合效應。

Now, let’s turn to slide 8. On TPV, starting this quarter, we’re simplifying our disclosure to focus on total TPV only. TPV was BRL137 billion in the period, growing 3% year over year, with big QR code volumes continuing to outperform our TPV. This growth reflects the impacts of a more challenging microeconomic environment for smaller merchants, the relative outperformance of digital sales where we have less exposure, and finally, the elevated churn levels identified last quarter and that are still affecting our performance while being slowly addressed.

接著看第 8 頁投影片。關於 TPV，自本季起我們將簡化揭露方式，僅聚焦於總 TPV。期間 TPV 為 BRL1,370 億，年增 3%，其中大型 QR code 交易量持續優於我們的 TPV 表現。此成長反映：小型商戶面臨更具挑戰的總體經濟環境、我們曝險較低的數位銷售相對表現較佳，以及上季辨識出的較高流失率仍在影響我們的表現，且正逐步被改善。

Retail deposits reached BRL10.1 billion at the quarter end, growing 22% year over year and declining 9% sequentially, reflecting typical first quarter seasonality. A better read of the underlying trend is the average daily retail deposits, which grew 7% sequentially and 26% year over year, reinforcing the ongoing development of our banking franchise when normalized for end of quarter timing effects.

零售存款於季末達到 BRL101 億，年增 22%，季減 9%，反映典型的第一季季節性。更能反映基本趨勢的是「零售存款日均餘額」，其季增 7%、年增 26%，在排除季末時點效應後，強化了我們銀行業務持續發展的趨勢。

On slide 9, we present our credit portfolio evolution alongside its revenue and NII trajectory. Our total credit portfolio reached BRL3.2 billion, growing 14% sequentially. Merchant solutions, composed mostly by our working capital offerings, reached BRL2.9 billion, growing 13% quarter over quarter. While our credit card portfolio reached BRL400 million, growing 23% sequentially.

在第 9 頁投影片，我們呈現信貸投資組合的演進，以及其收入與淨利息收入（NII）走勢。我們的信貸投資組合總額達到 BRL32 億，季增 14%。其中商戶解決方案（主要由營運資金產品構成）達到 BRL29 億，季增 13%。而信用卡投資組合達到 BRL4 億，季增 23%。

Credit revenues kept their strong growth trajectory both on a nominal and yield basis, reaching BRL297 million in the quarter, up 25% sequentially, and the portfolio yield reaching 3.3%, up from 3.1% in the fourth quarter and 2.6% one year ago. The growth in revenues reflects the expansion of the portfolio, but also the better risk-adjusted products and mix.

信貸收入無論在名目金額或收益率基礎上皆維持強勁成長，本季達到 BRL2.97 億，季增 25%；投資組合收益率達到 3.3%，高於第四季的 3.1% 與一年前的 2.6%。收入成長反映投資組合擴張，同時也反映風險調整後更佳的產品與組合。

Now on slide 10, we focus on credit quality and provision expenses. During the first quarter, our models for micro, small, and medium-sized merchants on the automated desk lost efficiency, and we saw newer cohorts performing worse than historical average, leading to higher than expected delinquencies, a trend that seems to have affected the entire banking industry but is more pronounced in our portfolio given the concentration that we have on the segment.

接著在第 10 頁投影片，我們聚焦於信用品質與提存費用。第一季期間，我們針對微型、小型與中型商戶的自動化審核（automated desk）模型效率下降，且較新的放款批次（cohorts）表現劣於歷史平均，導致逾期率高於預期。此趨勢似乎影響整個銀行業，但由於我們在該客群的集中度較高，因此在我們的投資組合中更為明顯。

Our NPLs 15 to 90 days increased almost 60 basis points, driven mostly from the worst performance in the automated desk. The dedicated desk, while no longer the main driver of sequential movement, continued to contribute to an elevated baseline. NPLs over 90 days reached 7%, up from 5.2% in the prior quarter, but mostly as a carryover effect of select cases within the dedicated desk progressing into higher delinquency bands, along with the expected seasoning trajectory of our portfolio.

15 至 90 天不良貸款（NPL）上升近 60 個基點，主要由自動化審核表現較差所驅動。專責審核（dedicated desk）雖不再是季對季變動的主要驅動因素，但仍持續造成較高的基準水準。90 天以上 NPL 達到 7%，高於前一季的 5.2%，但主要是因專責審核中的部分個案延續性地進入更高逾期區間的遞延效應，加上我們投資組合隨時間成熟（seasoning）的預期軌跡。

In response, we maintained a conservative provisioning approach with our coverage ratio standing at 229%. We have provisioned BRL166 million in the first quarter for credit losses, driving our cost of risk to 21.9%. Moving forward, we expect that the combination of tighter underwriting policies on the dedicated desk and the deployment of new models to the automated desk push down cost of risk to lower level at a slow but steady pace.

作為回應，我們維持保守的提存策略，覆蓋率為 229%。第一季我們為信貸損失提列 BRL1.66 億，使風險成本達到 21.9%。展望未來，我們預期專責審核更嚴格的承作政策與自動化審核部署新模型的組合，將以緩慢但穩定的步伐把風險成本推降至較低水準。

The early signs that we have arising from first payment defaults indicate the path. Looking at the March cohort, we see a clear improvement compared to January and February, returning to levels closer to our baseline. While this represents one data point, we see it as a positive early sign.

我們從首期付款違約（first payment defaults）所觀察到的早期跡象，指引了這條路徑。以 3 月批次來看，相較於 1 月與 2 月有明顯改善，回到更接近我們基準的水準。雖然這僅是一個資料點，但我們視其為正向的早期訊號。

On slide 11, our cost of services increased 420 basis points as a percentage of revenues year-over-year, driven primarily by higher provision for credit losses, as I just described. Excluding provisions, cost of services increased a more modest 60 basis points, reflecting severance costs related to the workforce reduction we executed at the end of the first quarter and higher D&A as several technology projects were completed and moved into production.

在第 11 頁投影片，我們的服務成本占收入比重年增 420 個基點，主要由較高的信貸損失提存所驅動，如我剛才所述。若排除提存，服務成本僅小幅增加 60 個基點，反映我們在第一季末執行人力縮減所產生的資遣成本，以及多項科技專案完成並上線投產後帶來較高的折舊與攤銷（D&A）。

Financial expenses improved 150 basis points as percentage of revenues year over year, reflecting the benefit of client deposits as a lower cost of funding source, which more than offset the impact of higher average CDI rate. As we keep developing our deposit franchise, deposits will increase its importance as a funding source.

財務費用占收入比重年減 150 個基點，反映客戶存款作為較低成本資金來源的效益，且其效益足以抵銷平均 CDI 利率較高的影響。隨著我們持續發展存款業務，存款作為資金來源的重要性將進一步提升。

As a result, we have been able to reduce our total cost of funding from 100% of CDI in early 2025 to approximately 87% more recently, a meaningful improvement that flows directly into our financial expenses. Admin expenses decreased 30 basis points, reflecting continued operating leverage in our support functions. Selling expenses decreased 50 basis points, driven by lower marketing and distribution channel spending as a percentage of revenues.

因此，我們已能將總資金成本從 2025 年初相當於 CDI 的 100%，降低至近期約 87%；這是一項顯著改善，並直接反映在財務費用上。管理費用占比下降 30 個基點，反映支援職能持續的營運槓桿。銷售費用占比下降 50 個基點，主要由於行銷與通路支出占收入比重降低。

Other expenses decreased at 50 basis points, primarily due to lower share-based compensation, which was partially offset by certain tangible write-offs. Effective tax rate was 14.3% in the quarter, a reduction of 4.5 percentage points on a year-over-year basis. This reduction is mostly a reflection of the aggregated benefits from deferred tax assets.

其他費用占比下降 50 個基點，主要因股權基礎薪酬降低，但部分被某些有形資產報廢沖銷所抵銷。本季有效稅率為 14.3%，較去年同期下降 4.5 個百分點。此下降主要反映遞延所得稅資產所帶來的整體效益。

Moving to slide 12, we present our managerial capital position and return on equity. We’re introducing this metric to provide greater transparency about our capital position on a quarterly basis. As a reminder, our capital ratio metric is based on the Central Bank of Brazil methodology for authorized entities, but we apply it to all StoneCo legal entities.

來到第 12 頁投影片，我們呈現管理口徑的資本部位與股東權益報酬率（ROE）。我們導入此指標，以在季度基礎上更透明地揭露我們的資本狀況。提醒一下，我們的資本比率指標係依巴西中央銀行對受許可機構的計算方法，但我們將其套用於 StoneCo 的所有法人實體。

Our capital ratio stood at 44% at the end of the first quarter, elevated by Linx divestiture concluded in February. Excluding Linx proceeds, which were returned to shareholders on May 4, our capital ratio would have been approximately 29%. It’s still comfortably above our 17% internal hurdle. It is also worth noting that we still expect to buy back BRL1.4 billion worth of shares until the end of the year, as announced in our last earnings call.

第一季末我們的資本比率為 44%，主要受 2 月完成的 Linx 出售案所推升。若排除 Linx 的出售所得（已於 5 月 4 日回饋股東），我們的資本比率約為 29%。該水準仍明顯高於我們 17% 的內部門檻。另值得注意的是，正如我們在上次財報電話會議中所宣布，我們仍預期在年底前回購價值 BRL14 億的股份。

Finally, our adjusted return on equity was 19% in the first quarter, up 40 basis points year-over-year, but down sequentially from 25% in the fourth quarter of 2025. The sequential decline reflects the recognition of BRL1.2 billion in deferred tax assets related to the Linx goodwill amortization, which expanded our gap equity base and compressed the ratio by approximately 100 basis points.

最後，我們第一季的調整後股東權益報酬率（ROE）為 19%，年增 40 個基點，但較 2025 年第四季的 25% 依序下滑。這一下滑反映了我們認列了與 Linx 商譽攤銷相關的 12 億巴西雷亞爾（BRL1.2 billion）遞延所得稅資產，擴大了我們的缺口（GAAP）權益基礎，並使該比率約壓縮 100 個基點。

Additionally, it is important to remember that the extraordinary dividend Linx payment will reduce our equity base starting on the second quarter and will have a positive impact in our ROE going forward. Therefore, to wrap it up and going back to Mateus’ initial comments, we had a first quarter in which TPV was soft but in line with what we expected.

此外，重要的是要記得，Linx 的一次性特別股利支付將自第二季起降低我們的權益基礎，並將在未來對我們的 ROE 產生正面影響。因此，總結一下並回到 Mateus 一開始的評論，我們第一季的 TPV 表現偏弱，但符合我們的預期。

Although it will be a longer journey, we believe we have the tools to further engage and retain our clients. In addition, we had a challenging backdrop on credit, but this is part of our learning journey as we build the business for the long term, and we remain highly confident that both credit and banking will be the main growth levers to our business in the coming years.

雖然這將是一段更長的旅程，但我們相信我們具備進一步提升客戶參與度並留存客戶的工具。此外，我們在信貸方面面臨具挑戰性的環境，但這是我們在打造長期業務過程中的學習旅程之一；我們仍高度有信心，未來幾年信貸與銀行業務將成為我們業務的主要成長槓桿。

With that, let’s open it up for questions.

接下來，我們開放提問。

(Operator Instructions) Daniel Vaz, Safra.

（接線員指示）Daniel Vaz，Safra。

Mateus, Diego. I was looking at, again, at your 2026 priorities on the payments. You said you’re shifting focus from new sales to active base, right? You’re looking into your active base rather than new sales. I wanted to understand how are you looking to improve the ARPACs, right? When we see the ARPACs right now it’s down 11% year over year, and the client base decontract, right? Can you help us frame what’s the trajectory you wanna go from here? Like, when you go from a negative trajectory on ARPACs to a positive, any quarter that you expect that to happen or any moment that you wanna share with us?

Mateus、Diego。我再次看了你們在支付業務上的 2026 年優先事項。你們說正把重心從新銷售轉向活躍客群，對吧？也就是更關注活躍基礎而非新銷售。我想了解你們打算如何提升 ARPAC。因為我們看到目前 ARPAC 年減 11%，而且客戶基礎在縮減。你們能否幫我們梳理一下接下來想走的軌跡？例如，從 ARPAC 的負向趨勢轉為正向，你們預期會在某個季度發生，或有任何時間點可以與我們分享嗎？

The second, related to that, what’s the optimal number of clients that you wanna work with since you’re looking at your base? Does that mean that you’re going to still have a net loss on your clients for the next quarters? Thank you.

第二個問題也相關：既然你們在看既有客群，你們希望合作的最適客戶數量是多少？這是否意味著未來幾個季度你們的客戶數仍會呈現淨流失？謝謝。

Hey, Daniel. Mateus here. Thanks for the question. I think the question is generally around ARPAC. When we look around ARPAC, it has been decreasing mainly because of mix, not because of a deterioration in the monetization for our core client base. Just to give you a little bit more color, what we’re seeing now is basically two opposing trends.

嗨，Daniel。我是 Mateus。謝謝你的問題。我認為問題主要是在 ARPAC。當我們看 ARPAC 時，它下降主要是因為組合（mix）因素，而不是我們核心客群的變現能力惡化。為了提供更多背景，我們目前基本上看到兩個相反的趨勢。

On one hand, we’re now expanding our ecosystem more and more towards new products. When we do that, we also have more clients using lower RPAC solutions. Just to give you an example, what if you were to look at the banking-only clients that we have, those clients are really valuable because they expand our relationship base and increase engagement with the ecosystem. Of course, their initial RPAC is naturally lower than that of a client using payments or credits.

一方面，我們正在把生態系愈來愈多地擴展到新產品。當我們這麼做時，也會有更多客戶使用較低 RPAC 的解決方案。舉例來說，如果你看我們僅使用銀行服務的客戶，這些客戶非常有價值，因為他們擴大了我們的關係基礎並提升對生態系的參與度。當然，他們的初始 RPAC 自然會低於使用支付或信貸的客戶。

That’s one trend that we have. As we open new products, we have new avenues to onboard clients as well, and they tend to use these newer solutions which have lower RPAC. On the other hand, when we look at clients that use multiple products, for example, payments, banking and credits, their RPAC is significantly higher than the company average.

這是我們的一個趨勢。隨著我們推出新產品，我們也有新的管道可以導入客戶，而他們往往會使用這些較新的、RPAC 較低的解決方案。另一方面，當我們看使用多項產品的客戶，例如支付、銀行與信貸，他們的 RPAC 明顯高於公司平均。

Short-term, you have this negative pressure as you open up more avenues, but longer term, this is a big opportunity for the company. Those are the trends. As for the second question around the optimal amount of clients, I think it aligns with the first piece of the answer, which is as we open these new layers and new products over time, they also become a new source of opportunity for us to onboard new clients that were previously not in our team.

短期來看，當你開啟更多管道時會有這種負向壓力，但長期而言，這對公司是很大的機會。這些就是趨勢。至於第二個關於最適客戶數量的問題，我認為它與第一部分的回答一致：也就是隨著我們隨時間開啟這些新層次與新產品，它們也會成為我們導入先前不在我們團隊中的新客戶的全新機會來源。

In the end of the day, that expands the amount of clients that we can target longer term. We’re not seeing the roof on active client base as of now.

歸根結底，這會在長期擴大我們可鎖定的客戶數量。目前我們尚未看到活躍客戶基礎的天花板。

Daniel, adding to Mateus’s comments, naturally, this is the first time that investors see this metric. It’s the first time that we’re reporting it. What we should be able to disclose in time, it’s a vintage analysis for the RPAC in which investors will be able to see this evolvement, this increasing evolvement from clients with us in time. The reason why we’re disclosing this is to unify how we look at clients.

Daniel，補充 Mateus 的評論，這自然也是投資人第一次看到這個指標——也是我們第一次揭露它。隨著時間推進，我們應該能披露 RPAC 的分期（vintage）分析，投資人將能看到客戶隨時間推移的演進、以及這種逐步提升的演進。我們之所以揭露這個，是為了統一我們看待客戶的方式。

As you know, previously, we reported different numbers for active clients in banking, active clients in payments, so on and so forth. The idea here is really to present to the market how we are looking at the client base and how we are really positioning ourselves and looking at the business more as a broader financial platform than a pure payment business.

如你所知，過去我們會分別報告銀行的活躍客戶數、支付的活躍客戶數等等。這裡的想法是向市場呈現我們如何看待客戶基礎，以及我們如何定位自己——把業務視為更廣泛的金融平台，而不只是純支付業務。

That’s really helpful and looking forward to see these vintages. Thank you.

這非常有幫助，也期待看到這些分期（vintage）資料。謝謝。

Caio da Prata, UBS.

Caio da Prata，UBS。

Hi, guys. Good evening. Thanks for the opportunity to ask question here. I have a question on the credit business, please. First, we saw some pickup on your cost of risk this quarter and still some consumption of your coverage ratio. If you can please comment a little bit more on that. I would like to clarify if this is only on the dedicated desk or also on your automated working capital solution as well. You showed the first payment default improving in March after tightening the underwriting.

嗨，各位。晚安。謝謝讓我在這裡提問。我想請教信貸業務的問題。首先，我們看到你們本季的風險成本（cost of risk）有所上升，覆蓋率（coverage ratio）也仍有一些消耗。能否請你們多評論一下？我想釐清這是否只發生在專屬團隊（dedicated desk），還是也包括你們的自動化營運資金解決方案。你們在收緊授信審核（underwriting）後，展示了 3 月首期付款違約（first payment default）有所改善。

By the way, thanks for the data. How should we read that? Would that mean a deceleration in the pace of growth of the book going forward and on the cost of risk also some improvement going forward, or this is the new level that we should work with, please? Thank you.

順帶一提，謝謝提供數據。我們應該如何解讀？這是否意味著未來放款餘額（book）的成長速度會放緩，且風險成本也會有所改善？還是說這就是我們應該採用的新水準？謝謝。

Thanks for the question, Caio. I’ll give some overview around credit in general and then pass it over to Diego to comment on the coverage and the cost of risk going forward.

謝謝你的問題，Caio。我先就整體信貸做一些概述，然後交給 Diego 評論未來的覆蓋率與風險成本。

First of all, on credit, I think there were three main drivers behind the increase in NPLs and therefore in provisions as well that we had in the quarter. The first thing that’s important to keep in mind is that the broader market deteriorated within the quarter. If you look at Central Bank data, it clearly shows that delinquency increased across the market in the first quarter as a whole. Part of what we’re seeing reflects a tougher macro and credit environment in general.

首先談信貸，我認為本季不良貸款（NPL）上升、因此提存（provisions）也增加，背後主要有三個驅動因素。第一個需要記住的是，整體市場在本季內轉差。如果你看央行數據，清楚顯示第一季整體市場的逾期率上升。我們看到的一部分反映了更嚴峻的總體與信貸環境。

The second point, which we flagged in the presentation is that starting towards the end of the fourth quarter, we saw our modules beginning to underperform, meaning that the actual delinquency that we saw was coming above our expectations. The third point is that we did continue to see some isolated delinquency cases in the dedicated desk, but they are not the majority of what explains the sequential improvement.

第二點，我們在簡報中也提到，從第四季末開始，我們看到模型模組（modules）開始表現不如預期，也就是實際逾期情況高於我們的預估。第三點是，我們確實在專屬團隊（dedicated desk）看到一些零星的逾期個案，但它們並非解釋依序改善的主要原因。

Given the larger ticket size in that portfolio, these individual cases, they can have some impact on the overall numbers. Now, in terms of how we addressed the problems, we are addressing this on several fronts. The first thing that we did proactively is to increase pricing throughout the second half of last year, to preserve cohort profitability, and I think we also showed that in the presentation.

由於該投資組合的單筆金額（ticket size）較大，這些個別案例可能會對整體數字造成一定影響。至於我們如何處理這些問題，我們正從多個面向著手。第一個我們主動採取的措施，是在去年下半年全面提高定價，以維持各批次（cohort）的獲利能力，我想我們也在簡報中展示了這點。

The second thing was basically implementing a new set of models and credit policies, which are now in production. This is what explains the early data from March with the first payment defaults conversion back to the norm. April data suggests we’re moving in the right direction as well. The third thing, which is related to the dedicated desk, we did reduce the maximum ticket size in the dedicated desk to limit the impact of these outliers.

第二個措施是導入一套新的模型與信貸政策，目前已上線運行。這也解釋了 3 月的早期數據：首期付款違約（first payment defaults）轉換率回到常態。4 月數據也顯示我們正朝正確方向前進。第三個措施與專屬團隊（dedicated desk）相關：我們降低了專屬團隊的最高單筆額度，以限制這些離群值（outliers）的影響。

I think going forward, what we are beginning to do now is to move more and more towards disbursing secured working capital products as well, which should gradually increase the share of secured lending in the portfolio and improve the overall risk profile.

我認為展望未來，我們現在開始做的是，逐步更多地轉向發放有擔保的營運資金產品，這應會逐步提高投資組合中有擔保放款的占比，並改善整體風險概況。

While the first quarter was clearly impacted, we believe we took the right actions. Let me pass it over to Diego.

雖然第一季明顯受到影響，但我們相信我們採取了正確的行動。我把時間交給 Diego。

Caio, let me start first with your question on the coverage. When you have the chance to look at the numbers, you’re going to see that the coverage for both Stage 1 and Stage 2 remain flattish. Actually, coverage for Stage 2 increased a bit, and coverage for Stage 3 decreased a bit.

Caio，讓我先回答你關於覆蓋率的問題。當你有機會看數字時，你會看到第 1 階段與第 2 階段的覆蓋率都大致持平。實際上，第 2 階段的覆蓋率略有上升，而第 3 階段的覆蓋率略有下降。

The coverage for Stage 3 decreased a bit basically as a result of different collateral levels and different collateral enhancements that we have for certain places that went through Stage 3. Basically, when you have a strong collateral for a client that is on Stage 3, the LGD, the loss given default may fluctuate, and that what leads to this fluctuation in coverage. As to cost of risk, what’s the level, how it should trend in time.

第 3 階段的覆蓋率略有下降，基本上是因為我們對某些進入第 3 階段的部位，所對應的擔保品水位與擔保增信不同。基本上，當第 3 階段的客戶擁有強而有力的擔保品時，LGD（違約損失率，loss given default）可能會波動，而這正是導致覆蓋率波動的原因。至於風險成本，目前的水準以及隨時間應如何走勢。

As we’ve mentioned on the call, we expect cost of risk to decrease, going back to mid to high teens in time. It will take some time. First, because some of these delinquencies, these early delinquencies that we’ve seen on the first quarter, they still have to flow through the P&L during the following months, so there is going to be a lag on those expenses during the following months.

正如我們在電話會議中提到的，我們預期風險成本會下降，並在一段時間後回到中到高十幾%的水準。這需要一些時間。首先，因為我們在第一季看到的一些逾期、這些早期逾期，仍需要在接下來幾個月流入損益表（P&L），因此接下來幾個月這些費用會有滯後。

Most importantly, what we expect is that this combination that Mateus mentioned of both new underwriting standards, a reduction on the concentration of the dedicated desk and the new secured facilities that we’ve been deploying now for clients, using some credit facilities from the Brazilian National Development Bank, tend to have a positive impact in time.

更重要的是，我們預期 Mateus 提到的這個組合——新的承作（underwriting）標準、降低專責團隊（dedicated desk）的集中度，以及我們目前為客戶推出的新有擔保融資方案（使用巴西國家開發銀行的一些授信額度）——將會隨時間帶來正面影響。

Especially these new programs from the Brazilian National Development Bank that I’ve mentioned, they have multiple benefits. First, they require, on one hand, that we limit the yield that we charge from clients. On the other hand, they enable a material reduction in risk given its nature. That enable us both to increase the client base to whom we can extend credit. It makes us more competitive, and it’s an inherent demand that we see in our client base.

尤其是我提到的這些巴西國家開發銀行的新方案，具有多重效益。第一，一方面它們要求我們限制向客戶收取的收益率；另一方面，基於其性質，它們能實質降低風險。這使我們既能擴大可提供授信的客戶基礎，也讓我們更具競爭力，而且這是我們在客戶群中看到的內生需求。

Okay, this is a pretty comprehensive answer. Thanks a lot. Just a quick follow-up, the last part in terms of the pace of growth of the portfolio going forward, if this should be more at these levels or a little bit different because of this measure that you are taking or not?

好的，這個回答相當全面。非常感謝。再快速追問一下，關於未來投資組合成長的節奏，是否會維持在目前這些水準，或因為你們正在採取的措施而有所不同？

No, it’s, it didn’t change, Caio. As we’ve mentioned, the growth on the portfolio will not be linear. As we deploy new products, new models, expand to new publics, there may be short-term fluctuations, but we don’t expect the overall decision to tighten the screws a bit on the underwriting process, given the recent macro backdrop to affect long-term trends.

不，Caio，沒有改變。正如我們提到的，投資組合的成長不會是線性的。當我們推出新產品、新模型、擴展到新的客群時，短期可能會有波動，但我們不預期在近期總體環境背景下，稍微收緊承作流程的整體決策會影響長期趨勢。

[Antonio Ruez], Bank of America.

[Antonio Ruez]，美國銀行（Bank of America）。

Hey guys. Thank you for your time. Before my question, I just have a quick follow-up on Caio’s previous question on credit. I understand and how you decided to address that, but I would like to focus on why it happened. What do you think had happened here?

各位好，謝謝你們撥冗。在我提問之前，我想先就 Caio 先前關於信用的問題快速追問。我理解你們如何以及為何決定這樣處理，但我想聚焦在為什麼會發生。你們認為這裡發生了什麼？

It was a concentration on sectors, on segments, that maybe they were riskier than you initially thought. Maybe it was a level of underwriting issues here or prices. Rather than how you decided to address this, and particularly about the underlying deterioration of the SME problem, just trying to dig deeper here on why it happened. My actual question here is on the guidance that you provided earlier.

是因為產業、細分領域的集中度，而它們可能比你們一開始想的更高風險？或者是承作上的問題或定價？我想探討的不是你們如何處理，而是為什麼會發生，特別是關於中小企業（SME）問題的底層惡化，想更深入挖掘原因。我真正的問題是關於你們先前提供的指引（guidance）。

Since you provided it, what came different from you, what you expected in this first, four or five months of the year, mainly credit or even TPV prices? Thank you very much.

既然你們提供了指引，那麼在今年前四、五個月中，哪些地方與你們原先預期不同？主要是信用面，或甚至是 TPV 的價格？非常感謝。

Hey, Antonio. Thank you very much for the question. What happened? As we’ve mentioned on the call, this seems to have a trend that has affected the entire banking industry, based on what we’ve seen so far in other banks’ results.

嗨，Antonio，謝謝你的提問。發生了什麼？正如我們在電話會議中提到的，根據我們目前在其他銀行業績中看到的情況，這似乎是一個影響整個銀行業的趨勢。

Naturally, we have a larger concentration on that segment. We don’t have other portfolios. We don’t have other segments of the economy. This effect is more pronounced in our client base. That seems to be the effect. The overall macro environment in Brazil, delinquency, from consumers and consumption in general, suffering pressure affecting our clients. It takes a while to see some of that data, as you have seen on the graph in which we’ve shown the first payment default, and the other KPIs that we follow up on a daily basis.

自然地，我們在該細分領域的集中度更高。我們沒有其他投資組合，也沒有覆蓋經濟中的其他細分領域，因此這個影響在我們的客戶群中更為明顯。看起來就是這個效果。巴西整體宏觀環境下，消費者與整體消費的逾期在壓力下上升，進而影響我們的客戶。要看到其中一些數據需要時間，正如你在圖表中看到的，我們展示了首期付款違約（first payment default）以及其他我們每日追蹤的 KPI。

Although we’ve seen it takes a while to fix the challenge. It’s a learning process to start with. There’s a second effect, which is there is a seasonality for our clients on top line. You all know that. We know that for a fact. Although it was a little bit, the impact was a little bit bigger than we expected, we should get used in seeing that dynamic going forward as part of the overall business.

雖然我們已經看到這個情況，但要解決這個挑戰需要時間。首先這是一個學習過程。第二個影響是，我們客戶的營收（top line）具有季節性，你們都知道，我們也非常確定。雖然影響比我們預期稍大一些，但未來我們應該會習慣把這種動態視為整體業務的一部分。

Let me go to your question on the guidance. Naturally the uptick that we had in expenses provisions during the first quarter wasn’t really there on the guidance. It was a surprise, but I think it is something that we can accommodate within that guidance.

我來回答你關於指引的問題。自然地，我們在第一季看到的提存費用（provision）上升，並沒有反映在指引中。這是個意外，但我認為我們可以在該指引範圍內消化。

We expect provision expenses to normalize throughout the year. As I’ve explained, there are a lot of moving parts that will lead to that normalization. In terms of TPV on the first quarter was soft, but in line with what we expected, so no surprises there. We expect TPV to grow faster on the second half of the year and therefore, contributing to gross profit and to net income.

我們預期提存費用將在全年逐步正常化。正如我解釋的，會有許多變動因素推動其正常化。就第一季的 TPV 而言表現偏軟，但符合我們的預期，因此沒有意外。我們預期 TPV 在下半年會更快成長，從而對毛利與淨利作出貢獻。

Therefore, the big challenge or the big question mark becomes interest rates, right? When we provide the guidance for 2026, we’ve mentioned that we were expecting interest rates to end the year at 12.5%. That number today is probably closer to 14%.

因此，最大的挑戰或最大的問號就變成利率，對吧？當我們提供 2026 年指引時，我們提到預期年底利率為 12.5%。而今天這個數字可能更接近 14%。

As you all know, every 100 basis points at Selic levels has an impact of roughly BRL200 million to BRL250 million in pre-tax earnings. That effect today is probably the most challenging point in our, in our forecast or in our projections. I think today we’re probably closer to the bottom of the guidance that we provided, but there is still a long way to go. We have other levers to pull. It’s going to be an interesting year.

如各位所知，Selic 水準每變動 100 個基點，對稅前盈餘的影響約為 2 億至 2.5 億巴西雷亞爾（BRL）。就目前而言，這個效果可能是我們預測或推估中最具挑戰的一點。我認為今天我們可能更接近先前提供指引的下緣，但仍有很長的路要走。我們還有其他槓桿可以拉動。這將會是有意思的一年。

Renato Meloni, Autonomous Research.

Renato Meloni，Autonomous Research。

I would like to stick with the guidance, right. Especially because we’re seeing this general deterioration in asset quality, as you mentioned, right. Despite of the problems that you might have had, we saw this in other banks, and I think the perspectives are also deteriorating.

我想繼續聚焦在指引上。特別是因為我們看到你們提到的資產品質普遍惡化。儘管你們可能有自身的問題，但我們也在其他銀行看到這點，而且我認為前景也在惡化。

Last call you mentioned that like one of the levers here was to grow credit. Do you think you still have space to continue growing credit into a credit cycle? What in the previous question you mentioned about these levers, what are the levers you can pull here to achieve at least the bottom of the guidance and what gives you conviction you might get there? Thank you.

上次電話會議你們提到，其中一個槓桿是擴張信貸。你認為在信貸週期中，你們仍有空間持續擴張信貸嗎？你在前一個問題中提到的這些槓桿，具體是哪些槓桿可以用來至少達到指引下緣？又是什麼讓你有信心能做到？謝謝。

Hey, Renato, thanks for the question. I’ll start around credit and then Diego can complement on the guidance as a whole.

嗨，Renato，謝謝你的提問。我先從信貸談起，然後 Diego 可以補充整體指引的部分。

On credit, I think we’ve actually touched upon this on the presentation as well. If on one hand we have a more challenging scenario, macroeconomically speaking than what we anticipated in the beginning of the year, I think it’s also important to keep in mind that, first of all, our penetration within credit is still really small. While those macro challenges tend to affect us, we still have a very large base, and if we do a good job in terms of picking and choosing the right mix of clients, there is for sure space to grow.

關於信貸，我認為我們其實在簡報中也提到過。一方面，從總體經濟角度來看，情境比我們年初預期更具挑戰；但同時也要記得，首先，我們在信貸領域的滲透率仍然非常小。雖然這些宏觀挑戰確實會影響我們，但我們仍有非常大的基礎盤；只要我們在挑選並配置合適的客戶組合上做得好，肯定仍有成長空間。

The second thing I think Diego also mentioned on his previous answer is the secured lending piece that was not really there when we initially planned for the year. What we’re seeing now is that we have more levers at our disposal to grow credit.

第二點，我想 Diego 在前一個回答也提到，就是擔保放款（secured lending）這一塊，在我們最初做年度規劃時其實還不存在。現在我們看到的是，我們手上有更多槓桿可以用來推動信貸成長。

Not only the secured lending, which is for sure, a big one, but also if you look at the product portfolio as a whole, we have more and more new offerings to offer to our clients, like overdrafts, like the credit card product as well. When we bundle that all together, if on one hand we have a tough scenario from a macro standpoint, on the other hand, I think we have more options than we did in the past to build good value proposition to our clients. That’s where the confidence lies.

不僅是擔保放款，這當然是一個很大的因素；而且如果你看整體產品組合，我們也持續推出更多新產品提供給客戶，例如透支額度（overdraft）、以及信用卡產品等。把這些綁在一起看，一方面宏觀環境確實艱難；但另一方面，我認為我們比過去擁有更多選項，能為客戶建立更好的價值主張。信心就在這裡。

As for the second part, I’ll pass it over to Diego.

至於第二部分，我把問題交給 Diego。

Let me just add to Mateus’ point. The good thing about a challenging credit backdrop is the fact that we’re seeing better clients now that didn’t demand credit before, actually considering the possibility, that creates a new growth possibility without necessarily increasing risk in any relevant form. There are still a lot of opportunities on the table.

我補充一下 Mateus 的觀點。信貸環境具挑戰的一個好處是：我們現在看到一些以前不需要信貸、也不會去申請信貸的更優質客戶，開始在考慮信貸的可能性；這在不必以任何顯著方式增加風險的情況下，創造了新的成長機會。桌面上仍然有很多機會。

Going back to gross profit, as I’ve mentioned, interest rates are still the main driver in addition to credit to make us get there or not. We have some levers still to pull on pricing depending on how quick we decide to pass over the recent interest rates cuts to the base or not. It’s going to be a super volatile year.

回到毛利（gross profit），如我提到的，利率仍然是主要驅動因素，並且與信貸一起決定我們能否達成目標。我們在定價上仍有一些槓桿可用，取決於我們決定以多快的速度把近期的降息傳導到存量客群。這將會是非常波動的一年。

I think everybody’s been following what’s going on with the economic environment and also with rates. We are going to operate that environment in a very disciplined fashion on a daily basis.

我想大家都在關注經濟環境以及利率的變化。我們會以非常嚴謹、自律的方式，在每日層面去應對這個環境。

Neha Agarwala, HSBC.

Neha Agarwala，匯豐（HSBC）。

Hi, thank you for taking my question. On the credit product, I understand that you say that you have more credit product options now than you had previously, which will allow you to grow more, but doing more of secured working capital, that should be a lower, less profitable product than unsecured working capital in terms of how you price. Do you see that impacting the kind of profitability that you expected from the credit business for this year as well as for the coming two, three years, in your own budgeting? If you can just shed some light on that.

嗨，謝謝讓我提問。關於信貸產品，我理解你們說現在比以前有更多信貸產品選項，因此能夠帶來更多成長；但如果更多做的是有擔保的營運資金（secured working capital），在定價上相較於無擔保營運資金（unsecured working capital）應該是利率更低、獲利性更差的產品。你們是否認為這會影響你們對今年以及未來兩、三年信貸業務獲利性的預期（在你們自己的預算中）？如果可以的話，請多分享一些看法。

My second question is, you mentioned volume acceleration in the second half. What are the key drivers that make you expect that we will see an acceleration? Is it more, you expect a better macro or is it because of your initiatives to reduce the churn should enable you to grow a bit more on volumes? Thank you.

第二個問題是，你們提到下半年交易量（volume）會加速。你們預期加速的關鍵驅動因素是什麼？是你們預期宏觀環境會更好，還是因為你們降低流失率（churn）的措施，能讓交易量成長更快一些？謝謝。

Hey, Neha. Thank you for the question. Let me start on credit. When we move into some of these government-backed programs, they demand lower rates. Some of them have actually capped rates, but the NII or the NIM is not necessarily lower because of the risk that it’s embedded in the profile of the product, considering the guarantees that we have from the BNDES or because of the profile of the client.

嗨，Neha，謝謝你的問題。我先從信貸說起。當我們進入一些政府支持的方案時，這些方案要求較低的利率；其中一些甚至有利率上限。但由於產品本身風險結構所隱含的特性——考量我們從 BNDES 取得的擔保，或是客戶的風險輪廓——其利息淨收入（NII）或淨利差（NIM）未必更低。

On top of that, we’re talking about better rated clients, the clients in which banks tend to be more competitive. Once we’re able to deploy credit to those clients, we tend to be more competitive in not only gaining share in credit from banks, but also in gaining other services, including deposits and payments. That’s the first answer.

此外，我們談的是評等更好的客戶，也就是銀行通常競爭更激烈的客群。一旦我們能把信貸投放到這些客戶，我們往往不僅能在信貸上從銀行手中取得市占，也能帶動其他服務的取得，包括存款與支付。這是第一部分的回答。

The second on TPV, the growth that we expect on the second half of the year has to do with the fact of lower churn above, other variations. Naturally, we still expect to work better on the capital that we are deploying for new sales, for new clients, and so on. That’s an ongoing process. Just by adjusting the churn levels on the client base, if we maintain the same investments on the distribution channels, then TPV tends to accelerate significantly.

第二個關於 TPV（總支付交易額）。我們預期下半年成長加速，主要是因為流失率下降，勝過其他變動因素。當然，我們也仍預期能更有效地運用我們用於新銷售、新客戶等的資本配置，這是一個持續進行的流程。只要把客戶基礎的流失率調整下來，若我們在通路上的投資維持不變，TPV 往往會顯著加速。

Just to add on the churn piece. I think we’re really focused on doing three things here. The first thing is that we are reviewing our product offerings and bundles end to end. The clear focus here is on simplification, transparency, and doing that across all of the distribution channels that we have.

再補充一下流失率（churn）這一塊。我認為我們主要聚焦三件事。第一，我們正在端到端檢視我們的產品供給與組合（bundles）。這裡的明確重點是簡化與透明化，並且在我們所有的分銷通路上同步推進。

Some of the offerings that are simpler, they have already been deployed. Others naturally require more work, especially when you have more products, and therefore, they should begin to contribute more meaningfully in the second half of the year.

其中一些更簡單的方案已經上線。其他方案自然需要更多工作，尤其當產品更多時更是如此；因此它們應該會在下半年開始更有意義地貢獻。

The second thing that we did, and this connects to the focus on the client base instead of solely on new sales, is adjusting the sales force incentives to better align origination with client retention and long-term value creation.

第二件事，我們做了（這也呼應我們把重心放在既有客戶基礎，而不只是新銷售），就是調整銷售團隊的激勵機制，使放款承作（origination）能更好地與客戶留存以及長期價值創造對齊。

The third thing that we’re focused is on really making targeted product and experience improvements, all of them aimed in reducing friction and improving the overall client journey. All of those actions, when we add them all up, they should start to yield more results in the second half of the year, and therefore accelerate TPV growth. Just to emphasize what Diego said, I don’t think we’re betting the macro environment becoming better in the second half. I think it’s more a matter of execution.

第三件事，我們聚焦在做更有針對性的產品與體驗改善，目標都是降低摩擦、提升整體客戶旅程。把這些行動加總起來，它們應該會在下半年開始產生更多成果，進而加速 TPV 成長。再強調 Diego 說的，我不認為我們是在押注下半年宏觀環境會變好；我認為更多是執行力的問題。

Marcelo Mizrahi, Bradesco.

Marcelo Mizrahi，布拉德斯科（Bradesco）。

Hello, guys. Thank you for the opportunity. My question is regarding the credit again. Two questions. First one is how is the proportion or the participation of the centralized desk comparing to the total credit, if we just want to compare to in the outstanding credit? How much it depends out of centralized desk just to think looking forward the impact on the origination. It’s not clear for me why we will not see any impacts, if it’s just, or after you guys are doing too many adjustments in terms of risk-appetite, okay?

各位好，謝謝給我這個機會。我還是想問信貸相關的問題，有兩個。第一個是：集中式專責團隊（centralized desk）在總信貸中的占比或參與度如何？如果我們用未償信貸（outstanding credit）來比較，集中式團隊占了多少？往前看，放款承作（origination）有多少依賴集中式團隊？我不太清楚為什麼我們不會看到任何影響——如果只是因為你們正在做很多風險偏好（risk appetite）的調整，對吧？

You are reducing the ticket, you are reducing the risk in the clients and you are increasing prices, you are adjusting a little bit the risk appetite to maintain the profitability. Definitely my view. It’s not clear for me why we’re not seeing impact on the sending credit.

你們在降低單筆額度（ticket）、降低客戶風險、提高價格，等於是在調整風險偏好以維持獲利性——這絕對是我的看法。但我不清楚為什麼我們沒有看到對信貸投放（sending credit）的影響。

The second one is regarding the automatized portfolio, the automatized credit. How is the how if you can understand a little bit more how the delinquency ratio of this credit were in term or, how can we compare the delinquency of both credits on this quarter? If we are seeing the same pace of deterioration on delinquency as we are seeing in the centralized desk. Thank you.

第二個問題是關於自動化投組（automatized portfolio）、自動化信貸（automatized credit）。如果可以的話，能否更清楚說明這類信貸的逾期率（delinquency ratio）表現如何？本季我們要如何比較兩種信貸的逾期情況？自動化信貸的逾期惡化速度，是否與集中式團隊看到的一樣？謝謝。

Hi, Mizrahi. Thank you for the question. The dedicated desk today accounts for roughly 20% to 25% of our current portfolio. The decision that we have made on that front was basically to reduce the maximum ticket that we were willing to extend to the clients on that front, basically reducing our overall risk appetite in terms of size. We have naturally also made the decision to reduce the risk appetite to lower-rated clients.

嗨，Mizrahi，謝謝你的問題。目前專責團隊（dedicated desk）大約占我們現有投組的 20% 到 25%。我們在這方面做的決策，基本上是降低我們願意提供給該渠道客戶的最高單筆額度（maximum ticket），也就是在規模上降低整體風險偏好。我們也自然做了決定，降低對較低評等客戶的風險偏好。

On the other hand, with these new secure lendings that we’ve just mentioned, we are actually able to be more competitive in large clients that we typically were not willing to take the risk. Despite those clients had better ratings, the risk-adjusted returns, were not necessarily the best, that we had in the portfolio. Now considering, the new BNDES facilities that we’re being able to transfer or to offer to those clients, that P&L dynamic changes.

另一方面，透過我們剛提到的這些新擔保放款（secure lendings），我們其實能在大型客戶上更具競爭力——這些客戶過去我們通常不願意承擔其風險。儘管這些客戶評等較好，但其風險調整後報酬（risk-adjusted returns）未必是我們投組中最好的。現在考量到我們能夠轉移或提供給這些客戶的新 BNDES 額度（facilities），損益（P&L）的動態就改變了。

If I may add, Diego, I think there is a third point here, which is actually model improvements as well. I think we’ve mentioned this on the presentation, but we just deployed a new generation of models, and that, of course, over time, whenever we have those upgrades, they allow us to discriminate more the clients and somewhat increase the pool without increasing necessarily the risk.

如果我可以補充一下，Diego，我認為這裡還有第三點，其實也與模型改進有關。我想我們在簡報中提到過，我們剛部署了新一代模型，當然，隨著時間推移，每當我們進行這些升級時，都能讓我們更有效地區分客戶，並在不一定增加風險的情況下，某種程度上擴大可服務的客群。

I think a good example of that, if you look at the March cohort, which is the 1 that we flagged that had a performed actual lower first payment default rate. If you look at the FIDC data, March was 1 of the months within the quarter with the highest disbursement as well.

我認為一個很好的例子是，如果你看 3 月的批次（cohort），也就是我們標示出實際表現為較低首期付款違約率的那一批。如果你看 FIDC 的數據，3 月也是該季度中放款金額最高的月份之一。

I think that shows that you don’t necessarily have a one-to-one correlation between tightening the risk appetite profiles versus the disbursement levels because like Diego said, we have more products, we have better models, and so on and so forth. The second piece, Diego.

我認為這顯示，收緊風險偏好設定與放款水準之間不一定存在一對一的關係，因為如 Diego 所說，我們有更多產品、更好的模型等等。第二點，Diego。

Then I miss, can you repeat the second part of your question again, Mizrahi, please?

那我漏掉了，你可以再重複一次你問題的第二部分嗎，Mizrahi，麻煩你？

Okay. It’s how we compare the deterioration of, on the delinquency ratios on the central dedicated desk.

好的。是我們如何比較中央專屬團隊（central dedicated desk）的逾期比率惡化情況。

From the dedicated desk.

來自專屬團隊（dedicated desk）。

Yeah

對。

The automated desk.

自動化團隊（automated desk）。

Yeah.

對。

That’s very hard to compare because of the size of the ticket, of the different size of the tickets, right? Remember that on the dedicated desk, we have tickets that go up to BRL500,000, and on the automated desk, up to BRL500,000, and on the dedicated desk above BRL500,000, in some cases reaching a few million BRL. Whenever you have any specific delinquency case on the dedicated desk, like we had, for example, in March, one client for BRL2 million or BRL3 million if I’m not mistaken, that files for judicial recovery, that creates a big asymmetry on the ratios of the two portfolios.

這非常難比較，因為票面金額（ticket size）不同、票面金額的規模不同，對吧？請記得，在專屬團隊這邊，我們有最高到 50 萬巴西雷亞爾（BRL500,000）的案件，而在自動化團隊也是到 BRL500,000；而在專屬團隊中，超過 BRL500,000 的案件，在某些情況下會達到數百萬巴西雷亞爾。當你在專屬團隊出現任何特定的逾期案例時，例如我們在 3 月遇到的情況，一位客戶金額約 BRL200 萬或 BRL300 萬（如果我沒記錯）申請司法重整（judicial recovery），就會在兩個投資組合的比率上造成很大的不對稱。

Tiago Binsfeld, Goldman Sachs.

Tiago Binsfeld，高盛。

Hi, everyone. Thank you for taking our question. We wanted to understand a little bit your strategy on deposits. There was a decline sequentially quarter on quarter with the penetration over TPV also staying stable. Is this mostly a function of seasonality or is it also affected by the churn dynamics you were discussing? Can you discuss a little bit more how you expect both penetration and overall deposit growth to perform for the rest of the year? Thank you.

各位好。謝謝讓我們提問。我們想更了解你們在存款方面的策略。存款在季度環比出現下滑，而相對於 TPV 的滲透率也維持穩定。這主要是季節性因素所致，還是也受到你們先前討論的客戶流失（churn）動態影響？能否再多談談你們預期今年剩餘時間滲透率與整體存款成長會如何表現？謝謝。

Hey, Thiago. Thank you very much for the question. Making a long story short, seasonality, that’s what explains the fluctuation quarter over quarter. How do we move forward from here? We’ve been mentioning that we’ve been investing a lot in getting other transactional flows from our clients.

嗨，Thiago。非常感謝你的問題。長話短說：是季節性，這就是季度環比波動的原因。接下來我們怎麼做？我們一直提到，我們正在大量投資，以從客戶那裡取得其他交易性資金流。

How do we get other forms of money in than that doesn’t include only TPV or core TPV whatsoever, and that has to do with how we enable clients to sell more, use more our platform, and then engage on the platform once that cash is in-house, right? Whenever we build a workflow tool that enables a client to sell more using the app and delivering to a client a payment link, that’s one form of increasing money in and increasing deposits.

我們如何取得不僅僅包含 TPV 或核心 TPV 的其他入金形式，這與我們如何讓客戶賣得更多、更多使用我們的平台，並在資金進到我們體系內後在平台上更深度互動有關，對吧？當我們打造一個工作流程工具，讓客戶能用 App 賣得更多，並向其客戶提供付款連結（payment link）完成收款，這就是一種增加入金、提升存款的方式。

Once that money is in-house, how we help the client to better manage that money, it’s how we make that money stays longer with us, increase the duration of the deposits, and then grow at a healthy pace.

當這些資金進到我們體系內後，我們如何幫助客戶更好地管理這筆錢，這就是我們如何讓資金在我們這裡停留更久、提高存款久期（duration），並以健康的速度成長。

Arnon Shirazi, Citi.

Arnon Shirazi，花旗。

My question is related to transaction activities in general. We see a strong decrease on a yearly basis. While it’s very clear to us that it’s going to financial income, mostly through prepayment product. What should we expect in the future, the future of transaction activities revenue line in general? Should we see further pressure on it or sometime we’re gonna see a bottom? What’s behind the decision? Thank you.

我的問題與整體交易活動有關。我們看到交易活動在年比基礎上大幅下降。雖然我們很清楚這部分正在轉向金融收入，主要透過預付款（prepayment）產品。那麼未來我們應該如何看待整體交易活動收入這條線？是否會面臨進一步壓力，還是某個時點會見底？背後的決策考量是什麼？謝謝。

Arnon, thank you very much for the question. Nothing different than what happened during the previous quarters. We’ve always mentioned that we look at the client overall relationship and the way we allocate the pricing to the client, whether through financial revenues or through MDRs or through the sale of the POS or through the fee on the account, that really doesn’t matter to us. It’s how we better price it to clients. Fluctuations within those lines tend to occur. Nothing really special. It’s really about the best way of interacting and selling to the client the services that we provide.

Arnon，非常感謝你的問題。這與前幾個季度發生的情況沒有不同。我們一直提到，我們看的是客戶整體關係，以及我們如何把定價分配到客戶身上——不論是透過金融收入、MDR（商戶折扣率）、POS 的銷售，或是帳戶費用，對我們而言其實都不是重點。重點是我們如何以最佳方式對客戶定價。這些科目之間出現波動是常見的，沒有什麼特別。核心在於以最佳方式與客戶互動，並向客戶銷售我們提供的服務。

Ricardo Buchpiguel, BTG.

Ricardo Buchpiguel，BTG。

Hi, everyone. Thank you for the opportunity here. I have a just a follow-up on the deposit question. Can you provide more details on what we should expect in terms of deposit growth and also cost of funding on deposits for the remaining of the year? Also, to what extent that could be an important lever to offset the high interest rate scenario that could be unfolding, both by reducing the sensitivity to interest rates and also by adding more ARPA to the following quarters? Thank you.

各位好。謝謝提供這個機會。我想就存款問題追問一下。你們能否提供更多細節，說明今年剩餘時間存款成長以及存款資金成本（cost of funding on deposits）的展望？另外，在可能出現的高利率情境下，這在多大程度上能成為重要槓桿來抵消影響——一方面降低對利率的敏感度，另一方面在接下來幾季增加 ARPA？謝謝。

Ricardo, thank you very much for the question. Yes, increasing deposits, it’s the best way to naturally hedge interest rates fluctuations. As you know, today, we have a very strong exposure in interest rates because we have materially more assets at a fixed rate than the liabilities that we have, hence, the exposure.

Ricardo，非常感謝你的問題。是的，提高存款是自然對沖利率波動的最佳方式。如你所知，目前我們對利率有很強的曝險，因為我們以固定利率計價的資產明顯多於我們的負債，因此產生曝險。

Whenever we go to the market on the wholesale market and have to fund, we always fund new facilities at CDI plus a given spread. When we get new deposits from clients, new demand deposits from clients, we usually pay very close to 0% on those deposits. That’s an important lever, not only to reduce the overall cost of funding, but also to reduce our exposure to interest rates fluctuations.

當我們到批發市場融資、需要資金時，我們的新融資額度通常都是以 CDI 加上一定利差來定價。當我們從客戶取得新的存款、也就是新的活期存款（demand deposits）時，我們通常支付的利率非常接近 0%。這是一個重要槓桿，不僅能降低整體資金成本，也能降低我們對利率波動的曝險。

That said, the profile of the clients that we have are slightly different than the overall economy. Not necessarily all of our clients have large cash available on their accounts, but that’s an evolution. As I was answering to Tiago before, it’s something that we’ve been investing a lot in enhancing those levers, improving the engagement and getting that money for a longer period in our accounts.

話雖如此，我們的客戶結構與整體經濟略有不同。不一定所有客戶帳戶上都有大量可用現金，但這是一個演進的過程。正如我先前回答 Tiago 時所說，這是我們投入很多資源在強化的槓桿：提升互動度，並讓資金在我們帳戶中停留更長時間。

We are showing no further questions. I would now like to hand the floor back to Stone’s team for closing remarks.

我們顯示目前沒有更多問題。現在我想把時間交還給 Stone 團隊做結語。

Thank you all for coming. We remain focused on our execution, we’ll see you on the next call.

感謝各位出席。我們將持續專注於執行，下一次電話會議再見。

This concludes today’s presentation. You may now disconnect and have a nice evening.

今天的簡報到此結束。您現在可以斷線，祝您晚安。