Palantir Technologies Inc (PLTR) 2021 Q4 法說會逐字稿

Good morning. Welcome to Palantir's Fourth Quarter 2021 Earnings Video Conference. We'll be discussing the results announced in our press release and related materials issued prior to the market open and posted on our Investor Relations website.

早安.歡迎參加 Palantir 2021 年第四季財報視訊會議。我們將討論在市場開盤前發布並發佈在投資者關係網站上的新聞稿和相關資料中宣布的結果。

This morning, we will make statements regarding our business that may be considered forward-looking within applicable securities laws, including statements regarding our first quarter and fiscal 2022 results, management's expectations for our future financial and operational performance and other statements regarding our plans, prospects and expectations.

今天上午，我們將就我們的業務做出可能在適用證券法中被視為前瞻性的聲明，包括有關我們的第一季和 2022 財年業績的聲明、管理層對我們未來財務和營運業績的預期以及有關我們的計劃、前景和期望的其他聲明。

These statements are not promises or guarantees and are subject to risks and uncertainties, which could cause them to differ materially from actual results. Information concerning those risks is available in our earnings press release distributed prior to market open today and in our SEC filings. We undertake no obligation to update forward-looking statements, except as required by law.

這些聲明並非承諾或保證，並且受風險和不確定性的影響，可能導致其與實際結果有重大差異。有關這些風險的資訊可在我們今天開市前發布的收益新聞稿和我們提交給美國證券交易委員會的文件中查閱。除非法律要求，我們不承擔更新前瞻性聲明的義務。

Further, during the course of today's earnings video conference, we will refer to certain adjusted financial measures. These non-GAAP financial measures should be considered in addition to, not as a substitute for or in isolation from, GAAP measures. Additional information about these non-GAAP measures, including reconciliation of non-GAAP to comparable GAAP measures is included in our press release and investor presentation provided today. Our press release, investor presentation and SEC filings are available on our Investor Relations website at investors.palantir.com.

此外，在今天的收益視訊會議中，我們將參考某些調整後的財務指標。這些非 GAAP 財務指標應作為 GAAP 指標的補充而不是替代或孤立地看待。我們今天提供的新聞稿和投資者介紹中包含了有關這些非公認會計準則指標的更多信息，包括非公認會計準則與可比公認會計準則指標的調節。我們的新聞稿、投資者介紹和 SEC 文件可在投資者關係網站 investors.palantir.com 上查閱。

Welcome to our earnings call from Denver. It's my maiden voyage. And obviously, just a couple of opening remarks, and then we'll jump into questions from the audience as it were. The -- just a 5-minute, 2-minute -- when Palantir began, people believed that data was worthless, that software was a luxury item, and that we would fail. And one of the very interesting things that's happened to Palantir is we've been able to see how the world has changed dramatically in its perception of software and, of course, of us from a world where software was something that you might want, might be in your car, but de facto would not determine your business to a world where really the laws of finance are going to be rewritten to deal with a world where the only real moat is software.

歡迎參加我們在丹佛的財報電話會議。這是我的處女航。顯然，我們只需發表幾句開場白，然後我們就會開始回答觀眾的問題。僅僅 5 分鐘、2 分鐘——當 Palantir 剛起步時，人們認為數據毫無價值，軟體是奢侈品，而且我們會失敗。 Palantir 發生的一件非常有趣的事情是，我們能夠看到世界對軟體的看法發生了巨大的變化，當然，我們從一個軟體只是你想要的東西的世界，可能在你的車上，但事實上不會決定你的業務，而到一個金融法則將被重寫的世界，以應對一個唯一真正的護城河是軟體的世界。

How do you measure it? What does it look like? How does it -- how do you understand when it's creating value? How do you understand when it's declining in value? How do you understand when it's compounding? To what extent is it compounding? What devices do we use to measure that? Are the devices we use to measure it the ones that we used in the past? Clearly, this industry is in its infancy. What's also very special about this industry is it really is, by and large, geographically located in a small section of America, which is odd, and there's lots of interesting reasons for that. But enterprise software is something that America is by far the best at.

如何測量？它看起來像什麼？它是如何－你如何理解它何時創造價值？您如何了解其價值何時下降？您如何理解何時是複利？它的複合程度如何？我們用什麼設備來測量它？我們用來測量的設備還是我們過去用過的設備嗎？顯然，這個產業還處於起步階段。這個行業的另一個非常特殊之處在於，它總體上在地理位置上位於美國的一小部分，這很奇怪，但其中有很多有趣的原因。但企業軟體是美國迄今最擅長的。

What we see currently at Palantir, it's not just the best at building it, it seems to also be the best at understanding what software developments are relevant for the world today and adapting even when it's being offered by a company that in every way looks nonstandard, run by people that are very different, look different, feel different, talk differently and with a CEO that many of you is bat(expletive) crazy.

目前我們看到，Palantir 不僅在開發軟體方面做到了最好，而且似乎在理解哪些軟體開發與當今世界相關方面也做到了最好，並且能夠適應，即使它是由一家在各方面看起來都不標準的公司提供的，由非常不同的人運營，看起來不同，感覺不同，說話方式不同，而且首席執行官讓你們中的許多人都瘋狂。

And so, just as an interesting preview, I don't want to take a ton of time with remarks because I think when I'm watching these things, if someone talks too long or there's like a lot of canned remarks, I wonder why, and it honestly gets a little boring. And of course, our legal department and IR department, which are wonderful departments are -- have a cane ready to pull me out if I'm not like a caged animal in a 1950 zoo. As I've mentioned to them, if you want caged animals in a 1950 zoo, you can watch any other earnings update.

因此，作為一個有趣的預覽，我不想花太多時間發表評論，因為我認為當我在觀看這些內容時，如果有人講得太長或有很多預先準備好的評論，我就會想知道為什麼，老實說，這會變得有點無聊。當然，我們的法律部門和 IR 部門都是非常棒的部門，如果我不像 1950 年動物園裡被關在籠子裡的動物的話，他們就會準備好一根手杖來把我拉出來。正如我向他們提到的，如果您想看 1950 年動物園裡的籠養動物，您可以觀看任何其他收益更新。

So here, you see an interesting chart. We sent this out. Some of you have probably looked at it. Some have maybe even studied it. Some of you haven't seen it. What's interesting here, what I thought would be very interesting for people who are investors, potential investors, also Palantirians, both current and ex, is our journey and what I actually believe this is a metaphor for the journey of all software companies. We had -- we were very early into whatever you want to call it, data exploration, building things that would now be understand as useful software for building analytic tools. Some of them were -- and are very, very important for national security and other areas. But then we're not -- obviously, because they were built and conceived in 2004, delivered in 2008, we're not actually able to migrate across the chain into what people need tomorrow, where people are already seeing that they need today, which is essentially not having software as a raw material exploration.

在這裡，您會看到一個有趣的圖表。我們已將其發出。你們中的一些人可能已經看過它了。有些人甚至可能研究過它。你們當中有些人還沒有看到它。這裡有趣的是，我認為對於投資者、潛在投資者以及 Palantirians（包括現任和前任）來說非常有趣的是我們的旅程，我實際上相信這是所有軟體公司旅程的隱喻。無論你怎麼稱呼它，我們都很早就進入了資料探索領域，建構了一些現在被理解為用於建立分析工具的有用軟體。其中一些對於國家安全和其他領域來說過去和現在都十分重要。但是，顯然，由於它們是在 2004 年建造和構思，並在 2008 年交付，我們實際上無法跨鏈遷移到人們明天所需要的東西，而人們已經看到了他們今天所需要的東西，這本質上是沒有將軟體作為原材料的探索。

You take the data like it's oil, you pump it out, you churn it and then you, say you've churned the data and you move on, but actually operationally determinative for your business. What you see here is cohort analysis. This is the -- and what you see is from inception of Foundry, the decline of older software products and just the massive exponential growth. Obviously, you use rough math, it's 100% growth year-on-year. And then starting last year, not off of a small integral, which is obviously very important because small numbers can go quickly even if the software is not strong.

你把數據當成石油一樣開採，你把它抽出來，攪拌它，然後你說你已經攪拌了數據，你可以繼續前進，但實際上這對你的業務具有運營決定性作用。您在此處看到的是群組分析。這就是——從 Foundry 誕生之初，您就看到舊軟體產品的衰落和大規模的指數增長。顯然，粗略計算，這是同比增長 100％。從去年開始，我們就不再依靠小的積分，這顯然非常重要，因為即使軟體不夠強大，小數字也可以很快實現。

Big numbers don't go quickly if the software doesn't exist, especially given that our sales force is super nascent. We're building it quickly, but we only have 25 fully accredited software. Fully accredited, meaning they've been here for 9 months or more. And what you see here, obviously, the CAGR here is just unbelievable and in like the 150-plus range, which is a super interesting and I wanted to drop the F-bomb here, but I was told that was probably inappropriate, but you could definitely -- we've agreed that this is something like the Phoenix rises. You don't get this.

如果沒有軟體，大數字就無法快速實現，特別是考慮到我們的銷售團隊還處於萌芽階段。我們正在快速建立它，但我們只有 25 個完全認可的軟體。已獲得完全認可，這意味著他們已經在這裡工作了 9 個月或更長時間。而您在這裡看到的，顯然，這裡的複合年增長率令人難以置信，在 150 以上，這非常有趣，我想在這裡爆粗口，但有人告訴我這可能不合適，但你絕對可以 - 我們已經同意，這就像鳳凰涅槃一樣。你不明白這一點。

And the other thing that's kind of antigravitational about this, that it's easy to forget. This is a company, this is like we've been at this for over 15 years. There are certain laws of nature in business that we are defined, which is that a software company, software usually decays for lots of reasons, decays radically. And so when you see a decline or a software product, it's also basically not part of the law of nature for a software company to build new software. Really, as far as I know, we are the only software company in the world building transformational software this far in. And that's particularly important because most software companies have distribution or they have a product, but they don't have distribution product and the ability to build new products, which is not a critique. These are great companies. They acquire companies. There are not that many companies to acquire, which is why even relatively weak companies get acquired at a very high price.

另一個與此有關的反引力現像很容易被遺忘。這是一家公司，我們已經經營這家公司超過 15 年了。我們定義的商業有一些自然法則，那就是軟體公司、軟體通常會因為各種原因而衰退，而且是完全衰退。因此，當你看到軟體產品的衰退時，軟體公司開發新軟體基本上也不是自然法則。真的，據我所知，我們是世界上唯一一家到目前為止仍在開發轉型軟體的軟體公司。這些都是很棒的公司。他們收購公司。可供收購的公司並不多，這就是為什麼即使是相對較弱的公司也會以非常高的價格被收購。

Let's just look at the next chart, which is USG. USG, you have a very similar phenomenon where you see the inception of Foundry into the USG. This is -- there's a lot here. There's a lot of qualitative stuff here that we can explain, but one of the qualitative things that you kind of can get a sense of is Palantir, the newer Foundry version not only grows dramatically with like -- this is like 65% growth just without looking at it more precisely, but it's over -- it's like over 200% CAGR here, which is also like Phoenix rises kind of thing. But what's qualitatively, particularly important and very protective is these graphs pretty neatly on to what are the programs that are going to grow tomorrow. Where is the future of USG? What do we need in a world where people are recognizing it's very dangerous? And what would the products be that you would need to power that? And so any case with that, I think we should head into questions.

讓我們來看看下一張圖表，即 USG。 USG，你會看到非常相似的現象，Foundry 開始進入 USG。這是——這裡有很多東西。這裡有很多定性的東西我們可以解釋，但您可以了解的一個定性的東西是 Palantir，較新的 Foundry 版本不僅增長迅速——如果不進行更精確的觀察，增長率就達到 65%，而且超過了——這裡的複合年增長率超過了 200%，這也就像鳳凰涅槃一樣。但從品質上來說，特別重要且非常具有保護性的是，這些圖表非常清楚地顯示了明天將會成長的項目。 USG的未來在哪裡？當人們認識到世界非常危險時，我們需要什麼？那麼您需要什麼產品來實現這個目的呢？不管怎樣，我認為我們都應該深入探討這個問題。

Great. Thanks, Alex. Our first question is from Brent Thill with Jefferies. (Operator Instructions)

偉大的。謝謝，亞歷克斯。我們的第一個問題來自 Jefferies 的 Brent Thill。 （操作員指令）

When you go back to the sales expansion opportunity...

當您回顧銷售擴展機會…

By the way, we can't see you.

順便說一句，我們看不見你。

Talk through your overall view on what you need to do on the sales force to get that building in the right direction. And what your plans for capacity are at in 2022?

請談談您對需要對銷售團隊採取哪些措施才能使這項工作朝著正確的方向發展的整體看法。你們 2022 年的產能計畫是什麼？

By the way, it would have been wonderful to see you. But yes, I think the question was what can we do to build on our -- building the sales force next year or this year and the next year? The -- if -- so there are really 2 parts to the question. One part, I think, is just to look at what's happening. And so like what is growing Palantir now and how can we accelerate it? So if you just -- what I want to do in this call and in future encounters is to -- both is to kind of -- what I think is happening and just to frame it, what I think is happening at Palantir as you have what you saw in Silicon Valley 1.0 when Silicon Valley actually produced goods and services that people wanted which was they built dual product, dual-use products and government, and there was a handoff to commercial.

順便說一句，見到你一定很高興。但是的，我認為問題是我們可以做些什麼來加強我們的銷售團隊——明年或今年和明年？如果——那麼——這個問題其實分為兩個部分。我認為，一方面只是看看正在發生的事情。那麼 Palantir 現在的發展如何？所以如果你只是——我想在這次電話會議中以及在未來的會面中做的是——兩者都是——我認為正在發生的事情，只是為了框架它，我認為 Palantir 正在發生的事情，就像你在矽谷 1.0 中看到的那樣，當時矽谷實際上生產了人們想要的商品和服務，他們製造了雙重產品、雙重用途

And so that's going very well. So you see -- even if you adjust for SPAC organic growth in commercial last year, U.S. was 80% or just under 80%, it's like 76%, 77%. But to your point, so -- and you see dollar -- net dollar retention numbers that you financial people like, how much is it growing? What I would call actually organically, I guess you guys call it net dollar retention. Very, very strong like in the 150% range. We have Glazer here, he'll pipe in with the -- but it's roughly in that range.

一切進展順利。所以你看——即使你調整去年商業 SPAC 的有機成長，美國也是 80% 或略低於 80%，而是 76%、77%。但是就您的觀點而言，那麼——您看到美元——財務人員喜歡的淨美元留存數字增長了多少？我實際上稱之為有機的，我想你們稱之為淨美元保留。非常非常強，大約在 150% 的範圍內。我們有格雷澤在這裡，他會介入——但大致就是在這個範圍內。

But what we do not have -- you could look at it as a negative, it's like we basically are doing this with a very, very nascent, honestly, if I were not on TV, I would say, bunker small sales force. And so like that means two things. What does it mean on the positive side? It means that net dollar retention number is awesome because my understanding of how this happens at other companies, there's like 8 people running around, begging the person to expand their deployment. That's not happening at Palantir. The salesperson there is the Foundry product, by and large. So obviously, that means we think we can get lift from hiring salespeople. We're doing that aggressively. I think we have about 150 salespeople now. We're in the market to hire aggressively across Palantir, honestly, mostly not salespeople because we believe we live and die based on our ability to build products of tomorrow delivered today.

但我們所沒有的——你可以把它看作是一件壞事，就像我們基本上是在用一個非常非常新生的，老實說，如果我不在電視上，我會說，小型銷售隊伍。所以這意味著兩件事。從正面的一面來看這意味著什麼？這意味著淨美元保留數字非常棒，因為據我了解，其他公司的情況是這樣的，大約有 8 個人四處奔波，乞求對方擴大他們的部署。 Palantir 不會發生這樣的事。那裡的銷售人員大致上都是 Foundry 產品。顯然，這意味著我們認為我們可以透過僱用銷售人員來獲得提升。我們正在積極地做這件事。我認為我們現在大約有 150 名銷售人員。我們正在 Palantir 市場上積極招聘，老實說，主要不是招聘銷售人員，因為我們相信，我們的生存取決於我們是否能在今天交付未來產品的能力。

But we're hiring -- going to hire in the range of 200 people. Hiring and getting value out of them are two different things. And so I think one of the things that we will see going forward is how do we play these salespeople so that we can get as much lift from them as we're getting from the product itself. And we're at the beginning of that. And so it is the part to people we've fully indoctrinated, or as normal people might say, trained, are effective but we've never done this before. There will be -- that's a process. We're also looking at ways to learn from other companies, but that's going to happen over the next couple of years.

但我們正在招聘——計劃招聘 200 人左右。僱用他們和從他們身上獲取價值是兩碼事。因此，我認為我們未來將要看到的事情之一是，我們如何發揮這些銷售人員的作用，以便我們從他們身上獲得與從產品本身獲得的一樣多的提升。我們才剛開始這一過程。因此，對於我們已經完全灌輸思想的人，或者像普通人所說的那樣，經過培訓的人，這是有效的，但我們以前從未這樣做過。會有——這是一個過程。我們也在尋找向其他公司學習的方法，但這將在未來幾年內實現。

I think the primary driver of revenue in U.S. commercial this year will still just be the way in which America, the IT organizations are actually beginning to request without knowing Foundry sometimes, what Foundry offers. The CEOs assume that this is available. There is no other product on the market that can actually move from data warehouse, which is like there's like 5 companies, they all offer the same thing. Foundry interacts with all of them. When you want to move up to the chain to actually solving a real problem because it's defined your business, Foundry is highly differentiated.

我認為今年美國商業收入的主要驅動力仍然是美國的 IT 組織實際上有時在不了解 Foundry 的情況下開始提出請求以及 Foundry 提供什麼。執行長們認為這是可行的。市場上沒有其他產品可以真正從資料倉儲轉移，就像有 5 家公司一樣，他們都提供相同的東西。 Foundry 與它們全部互動。當您想要向上推進以實際解決實際問題（因為它定義了您的業務）時，Foundry 具有高度的差異化。

So we will layer that. I think it's way too early to know exactly the impact. Obviously, to the extent we get this to work, you could expect even higher growth than what we have, although I'm very happy with. It was like we've doubled USG U.S. commercial now from 50 to 100, 100 to 200. I believe we will double it again this year. So any case, these are -- some of this is unknown, but we are working very aggressively. The other thing I would say outside of the U.S., again, a slightly longer answer, but one of the ways people look at Palantir is if you're going to -- I think a financial analyst likes to -- what we would have called science normalize the data, what you and finance would probably call strip out the inorganic inputs.

因此我們將對其進行分層。我認為現在了解其具體影響還為時過早。顯然，只要我們能夠發揮作用，你就可以期待比現在更高的成長，儘管我對此感到非常高興。這就像我們將 USG 美國商業業務從 50 增加了一倍，從 100 增加了一倍，再從 100 增加了 200。無論如何，其中一些是未知的，但我們正在積極努力。我想說的另一件事是，在美國之外，這個問題的答案又要稍微長一些，但人們看待 Palantir 的方式之一是，如果你要——我認為金融分析師喜歡——我們稱之為科學的數據標準化，你和財務人員可能會稱之為去除無機輸入。

But if I think if you're stripping out the inorganic inputs, you also have to look at the -- what I would essentially view as an inorganic input of COVID in Europe. If you strip -- and so Europe has been slow for us last year, which is one of the reasons why we are only at 41% last year and growth would be even higher. Europe grew if you include SPACs at 9%, so slightly above what's probably inflation. But there, we're taking the opportunity, believing there'll be a handoff from USG to U.S. comm to Europe to rebuild with some very, very strong salespeople who've come from the best companies, believing that that's an environment where we can really do that.

但如果我認為如果你剝離無機投入，你還必須看看——我本質上認為歐洲 COVID 的無機投入是什麼。如果剝離的話——那麼去年我們在歐洲的發展一直很緩慢，這也是為什麼我們去年的成長率只有 41% 並且成長率甚至會更高的原因之一。如果將 SPAC 計算在內，歐洲的成長率為 9%，略高於通貨膨脹率。但是，我們抓住了機會，相信 USG 和美國通訊社將進行交接，並與一些來自最優秀公司的非常非常強大的銷售人員一起重建，我們相信這是一個我們真正可以做到這一點的環境。

So like there's two ways to look at this just on that angle. You could say, well, what could you do to gas-charge America? We're working on that and very, very aggressively and most of our sales hires today are focused on that. But there's another more long-term thing. If we're right that the world wants Silicon Valley the way it was, meaning a handoff from government to commercial to the rest -- commercial U.S. to the rest of the world. And with each one with a lag, America to Europe, 18 months, the rest of this company only has to grow, everything besides Europe, commercial, 38% to get 30% growth in aggregate. So getting Europe to track better, both from a handoff of what happens in America to Europe and with more conventional sales approach is kind of what we're looking at getting done this year and see the fruits of it next year.

因此，從這個角度來看，有兩種方式可以看待這個問題。您可能會說，那麼，您能做些什麼來為美國加油呢？我們正在非常積極地致力於此，今天我們招募的大多數銷售人員都專注於此。但還有另外一件更長期的事。如果我們是對的，那麼世界希望矽穀保持原來的樣子，這意味著從政府到商業的移交，再到世界其他國家——從美國到商業的移交。而每個業務都有滯後，從美國到歐洲，滯後 18 個月，該公司除歐洲以外的其他業務（商業業務）必須成長 38%，才能實現整體 30% 的成長。因此，讓歐洲更好地跟上步伐，既要將美國的情況傳遞給歐洲，又要採用更傳統的銷售方式，這就是我們今年要做的事情，並在明年看到成果。

And just a quick follow up on the government. I know you had a tough comp. It did decelerate pretty materially in Q1 in terms of the growth. Can you give us your perspective on what's happening on the government side?

並快速跟進政府的情況。我知道你的比賽很艱難。從成長角度來看，第一季的成長確實大幅放緩。您能否從政府角度談談當前的情況？

Well, there's a couple of things that are happening there. So if you were looking at this more like from a scientific perspective, you had a time series that's 15 years, first thing you would do is say, "Okay, what's happening in that time series over the 15 years?" What you see in U.S. gov is a compounded growth of 30%, but like this which is the positive of U.S. gov is it's reliable. The sums are big. The quality of the revenue is very high. The -- one of their -- essentially, there are a number of problems, but the biggest problem is barrier to entry, which we've clearly solved and then [re-barriers] to entry, which we've solved or solving, but that's going very well.

嗯，那裡發生了幾件事。因此，如果你從科學的角度來看待這個問題，你有一個 15 年的時間序列，你要做的第一件事就是說，“好吧，這 15 年來這個時間序列中發生了什麼？”你看到的美國政府的複合成長率是30%，但美國政府的積極面就是它的可靠性。數額很大。收入品質非常高。其中之一就是，本質上存在許多問題，但最大的問題是進入壁壘，我們已經明確解決了這個問題，然後是進入壁壘，我們已經解決或正在解決這個問題，但進展非常順利。

And then the second one is lumpiness. Now you -- that lumpiness still exists. And actually, in some ways, it's worse because to get the integral to grow, you need these massive deals. We also have small deals, but the fact that we are on the biggest, most important parts of the U.S. government our software is. So there's really a twofold answer to your question. One, what will happen this year? Are there -- is a deceleration in actual one over a long time series? The answer is clearly no. But then the question is, if the baseline is 30%, how does it get to where we want it, which was like the beginning of last year?

第二個是塊狀。現在你——那個腫塊仍然存在。事實上，從某些方面來說，情況甚至更糟，因為要獲得積分成長，就需要這些大規模的交易。我們也有一些小交易，但事實上我們是美國政府最大、最重要的部門，我們的軟體就是其中的一部分。因此，對於您的問題實際上有兩個答案。一、今年會發生什麼事？長期來看，實際速度是否出現減速？答案顯然是否定的。但問題是，如果基線是 30%，那麼怎麼樣才能達到我們想要的水平，就像去年年初一樣？

And now at the end of last year, and the way that happens is the deals we're already positioned to win actually closed. And so then you get into the granularity of what will happen in the U.S. government, who gets the deals if there's no new budget? There's a lot of granularity there, which we should probably do a better job of sharing. But the short answer is, it's like huge chair gets pulled first. The people are trying to enter the market first -- last, so the new start-ups totally screwed, because the people who are not sitting on crucial programs partially screwed. The people that have software that is -- or products that are useful in the past, but have the right connections probably, what -- another version of this is if you just look at that chart I showed you with the CAGR on Foundry, these are the most important programs for a dangerous world.

現在已經是去年年底了，我們已經準備好贏得的交易實際上已經完成了。那你就會了解美國政府將會做什麼，如果沒有新的預算，誰會獲得這些交易？這裡有很多粒度的信息，我們應該更好地進行共享。但簡短的回答是，這就像先拉動巨大的椅子一樣。人們總是試圖先進入市場，最後才進入市場，因此，新創公司完全陷入困境，因為沒有參與關鍵專案的人部分陷入困境。擁有過去有用的軟體或產品的人，但可能有正確的聯繫，另一個版本是，如果您只看我向您展示的 Foundry 的複合年增長率圖表，這些是危險世界中最重要的程序。

Now I can't go into all the details, but we used to debate with people, especially my academic friends if the world was dangerous. The danger of the world being clear and present to the U.S. government is very protective. It doesn't guarantee that when this integral, actually how it behaves, but it makes it much more likely that it will happen in here and positively affect our revenue, which is another reason why I suspect that we will do well.

現在我無法講到所有的細節，但我們過去常常與人們，特別是我的學術界朋友爭論世界是否危險。世界的危險對美國政府來說是清晰而現實的，具有很強的保護性。它不能保證當這個積分時它實際上會如何表現，但它使得它更有可能在這裡發生並對我們的收入產生積極影響，這也是我認為我們會做得好的另一個原因。

Great. Thanks, Brent. Our next question comes from Palantir shareholder, Chase P.

偉大的。謝謝，布倫特。我們的下一個問題來自 Palantir 股東 Chase P.

Yes. First and foremost, congratulations on all the hard work. It seems like you guys have a great team and are executing really well. From a retail investor perspective, the most negative sentiment I hear regarding Palantir is in regards to the dilution of shares outstanding over the past 12 to 18 months, and primarily in relation to stock-based compensation that's occurred. Other than the remaining shares to be vested that have already been announced, can we expect further dilution in share offerings going forward? Or is it kind of reasonable to assume that the majority of this was from the IPO process and sort of a onetime event for the company? Once again, thanks, and congratulations on all the hard work and business developments.

是的。首先，祝賀您所有的辛勤工作。看起來你們擁有一支很棒的團隊，而且執行得非常好。從散戶投資者的角度來看，我聽到的有關 Palantir 的最負面情緒與過去 12 至 18 個月內流通股的稀釋有關，並且主要與發生的股票薪酬有關。除了已經宣布的剩餘歸屬股份外，我們是否可以預期未來的股票發行會進一步稀釋？或者我們可以合理地假設，其中大部分來自於 IPO 流程，並且對公司來說是一次性事件？再次感謝並祝賀您所有的辛勤工作和業務發展。

Thank you. And I really appreciate you, investors. Thanks for investing and the faith you have in us. Okay. So there's like the simple version, which I think it's like -- so there's really -- there's stock-based comp and there's dilution. Dilution thing, that's a red herring. We're not issuing a lot of new shares, I think it's like in the $9 million range. And so it would be a little coy for me to say that's like no issue, move on.

謝謝。我真的很感謝你們，投資者。感謝您的投資和對我們的信任。好的。所以有一個簡單的版本，我認為它就像 - 所以真的有 - 有基於股票的補償和稀釋。稀釋的事情，只是一種轉移注意力的招數而已。我們不會發行很多新股，我認為發行額在 900 萬美元左右。所以，如果我說“沒問題，繼續前進”，那就有點不好意思了。

The thing to understand about Palantir and then I want to just hit this is like it's actually not the result of the DPO, it's the result of the fact that we were completely focused on building product. We had no earthly idea we were going to DPO to like right before we did it. And so most companies are, I mean, quite frankly built so that the -- when analysts look at it, the primary customer of most software companies is not the client, it's the software analyst.

然後我想強調的是，要了解 Palantir，這實際上不是 DPO 的結果，而是我們完全專注於打造產品的結果。在做這件事之前，我們根本不知道我們會去 DPO。所以，坦白說，大多數公司都是這樣的——當分析師看來，大多數軟體公司的主要客戶不是客戶，而是軟體分析師。

So it's like we, obviously, our primary clients are our clients, which doesn't mean -- and then now we're thinking about how do we expose the data in a way that people on the outside like you and professional analysts and others can look at the data and get a better sense of what's tracking, what's not tracking. But the primary source of a lot of these like questions really comes down to look, we built the company to support the U.S. warfighter primarily and then do -- dual use it for the glory of humanity, particular humanity in the West. That was our idea. And because our primary client was not what someone with a hedge fund would think, we didn't actually think of these things from inception. And so now there's a process of normalization.

所以就像我們，顯然，我們的主要客戶是我們的客戶，這並不意味著 - 然後我們現在正在考慮如何以一種方式公開數據，以便像你這樣的外部人員和專業分析師和其他人可以查看數據並更好地了解什麼是跟踪，什麼不是跟踪。但這些問題的根源其實在於，我們建立這家公司主要是為了支援美國作戰部隊，然後為了人類的榮耀，特別是西方人類的榮耀。這是我們的想法。而且由於我們的主要客戶並不是對沖基金人士所想的那樣，所以我們從一開始就沒有真正考慮到這些事情。現在正處於一個正常化的過程之中。

You're just going to see that in -- going forward on these calls, so it's like how do you normalize, how do you provide data that people are going to look at, how do you provide data that people can understand, that they're used to seeing while simultaneously staying true to what our mission is? It's like our primary clients are the people we're serving. We're in full line with them. And that's why we survive even with the nascent sales force. You can get things to double which is in sync.

你會看到──在這些通話中，你如何規範化，如何提供人們將要查看的數據，如何提供人們可以理解、他們習慣看到的數據，同時又忠於我們的使命？就好像我們的主要客戶就是我們所服務的人。我們完全同意他們的觀點。這就是為什麼我們的銷售團隊還未成熟，我們仍能存活下來。您可以使事物同步加倍。

So then you get to stock-based comp, which is like, okay, so -- and there's two parts of it. Of course, IRI people kind of don't want me to do any kind of forward-looking math, but if you're smart enough to invest in talent, you're smart enough to figure out. There's essentially -- there's the -- what is -- what are -- how are we comping people, and there, there will be a normalization that will get us into a range where you would see in a software company within the next 18 months, latest 2 years. But there's essentially -- and that's going to take a little time. It is going to happen, because it's also very much linked to another question, which is how do you actually run the company so it's profitable someday on a GAAP basis, not stripping out comp? And that is also within eyesight.

然後你就會得到基於股票的薪酬，就像，好的，所以 - 它有兩個部分。當然，IRI 的人並不希望我做任何前瞻性的數學計算，但如果你夠聰明，願意投資人才，那麼你就夠聰明，能夠弄清楚。本質上，這就是我們如何對員工進行補償，並且會有一個正常化，使我們進入一個你可以在未來 18 個月、最多 2 年內在軟體公司看到的範圍。但本質上——這需要一點時間。這是會發生的，因為這也與另一個問題密切相關，那就是你如何實際經營公司，以便有一天公司能夠在 GAAP 基礎上實現盈利，而不是剝離利潤？這也就在視線之內。

And those are our goals for Palantir because same reason we have no debt, same reason we have $2.3 billion on our balance sheet. This is a company built for bad times. Bad times means strong finances internally. And that means at some point, you have to be GAAP profitable. You can't be GAAP profitable if you're diluting people or what -- correctly, your stock-based comp is totally -- is not in conformity with other companies.

這些就是我們對 Palantir 的目標，因為同樣的原因，我們沒有債務，同樣的原因，我們的資產負債表上有 23 億美元。這是一家為艱難時期而生的公司。困難時期意味著內部財務狀況強勁。這意味著在某個時候你必須實現 GAAP 盈利。如果你稀釋了員工的權益，或者你的股票薪酬與其他公司完全不一致，那麼你就無法實現 GAAP 獲利。

So you're seeing a normalization. This will change. It will change in the relatively near future. It will be linked to other things that we believe are important for Palantir like having a company that thrives in bad times. And we are -- bad times are very good for Palantir because we build products that are robust, that are built for danger. And then the finances internally are actually built for bad times. And bad times means you have free cash flow, the free cash flow turns into GAAP profit. That means the stock-based comp has to be one that's aligned with our investors also because that's basically -- it's part of a little bit longer philosophical narrative.

因此，您看到的是正常化。這一情況將會改變。不久的將來它將會改變。它將與我們認為對 Palantir 來說很重要的其他事物聯繫起來，例如擁有一家在困難時期能夠蓬勃發展的公司。而且對 Palantir 來說，困難時期也是一件好事，因為我們製造的產品堅固耐用，能夠抵禦危險。那麼內部的財務其實是為困難時期建立的。而經濟不景氣意味著你有自由現金流，自由現金流轉化為 GAAP 利潤。這意味著基於股票的薪酬也必須與我們的投資者保持一致，因為這基本上是——它是一個更長的哲學敘事的一部分。

But like if software is the only moat, then value and gross shares have to be reevaluated in terms of their value. Value only exists if you can actually get a tech moat, call it, maybe something besides, and growth only exist if you build a company that is where the technology is strong enough. The business fundamentals are strong enough that the free cash flow actually turns into GAAP profitability, and that's linked to stock-based comp. So this is a priority, both because you care but also, quite frankly, because it is the health of our company, which we care a lot about.

但如果軟體是唯一的護城河，那麼價值和總份額就必須重新評估。只有當你真正獲得技術護城河，或者說其他東西時，價值才存在；只有當你建立一家技術足夠強大的公司時，成長才存在。業務基本面足夠強勁，自由現金流實際上可以轉化為 GAAP 獲利能力，並且與股票薪酬掛鉤。因此，這是一個優先事項，不僅因為你們關心，而且坦白說，因為這是我們非常關心的公司的健康。

Great. Thank you, Chase. Our next question is from Keith Weiss with Morgan Stanley. (Operator Instructions)

偉大的。謝謝你，蔡斯。我們的下一個問題來自摩根士丹利的 Keith Weiss。 （操作員指令）

So two questions. One on the product side of the equation. And the other on sort of investments into 2022. On the product side of the equation, Alex, maybe -- hoping you could help us sort of better understand the product road map on a go-forward basis, how you guys are thinking about it from a high level. From our perspective, you guys did a really nice job of better modularizing the platform and made it more adoptable by commercial enterprises. And I think it looks like we've seen that traction in terms of customer adoption. What's kind of the -- on a go-forward basis, is there more activity of that ilk, if you will? Do you create more like prebuilt solutions, if you will, more directly target some of these sort of opportunities that you've been used for, but productize it, if you will? Is that a potential product direction?

所以有兩個問題。等式的乘積邊上有一個。另一個是關於 2022 年的投資。從我們的角度來看，你們在更好地模組化平台並使其更適合商業企業方面做得非常出色。我認為從客戶採用的角度來看我們已經看到了這種趨勢。從未來來看，是否還會有更多這類活動？如果可以的話，您是否會創建更多類似預先構建的解決方案，更直接地瞄準一些您已經習慣的機會，但是如果可以的話，將其產品化？這是一個潛在的產品方向嗎？

And then on the other side of the equation, in terms of investments, investing for growth into 2022. I was hoping you could give us a little bit of visibility into the nature of those investments. Is it just sales headcount? Is it the forward deployed engineers? How should we think about where those dollars are being deployed?

另一方面，就投資而言，投資 2022 年的成長。僅僅是銷售人員數量嗎？是前沿部署的工程師嗎？我們應該如何考慮將這些資金部署到何處？

Thank you for your question. And so actually, from my perspective, they're very much linked. Our primary investment in growth is product -- is investment in product, and we're doing a number of things in product. The things we've talked about at a general level is kind of making our product more modular. There's a slightly more macro riff here, which is that we were adversarial with IT structurally until recently. We are adversarial because from our perspective, there's a learning process where they had to build these things.

感謝您的提問。因此實際上，從我的角度來看，它們是緊密相關的。我們對成長的主要投資是產品投資，我們在產品方面做了很多事情。我們在整體層面上討論的事情是讓我們的產品更加模組化。這裡有一個稍微宏觀的問題，那就是直到最近我們在結構上還與 IT 處於對抗狀態。我們之所以是對手，是因為從我們的角度來看，他們在建構這些東西的過程中需要一個學習的過程。

Now there's a myriad of companies. They're all honestly, technically hard -- indistinguishable doing data lakes and all sorts of things that help IT people build something that is working for them to do certain things. And we were adversarial because they were like, "Okay, this Foundry thing, yes, great. But we've already built these things. You would replace this, it may honestly could also make us look bad. No one wants it also." The average sale price for Palantir Foundry across our business, I think last year, it was like $6.5 million. Most IT people prefer a small bite in consumption. You can argue whether that's the right model, but instead of fighting them, it's probably better to figure out a way to get our product more in their hands.

現在有無數的公司。說實話，從技術上來說，它們都很難——難以區分資料湖和各種幫助 IT 人員建立可以為他們做某些事情的東西。我們之所以會反對，是因為他們說：“好吧，Foundry 這個東西很棒。但是我們已經建好了這些東西。你要替換它，說實話，這也可能讓我們看起來很糟糕。而且也沒人想要它。”我認為去年 Palantir Foundry 在我們整個業務中的平均售價約為 650 萬美元。大多數IT人員都喜歡少量消費。你可以爭論這是否是正確的模式，但與其與他們爭論，不如想辦法讓他們更接受我們的產品。

So that's kind of the known part. What we've been working on recently, which is less known is what we're really working on is we believe that people are paying a lot now for consumption and compute. No critique. But in reality, that's very much like paying for gas and oil exploration. But what people are really going to want is the ability to use the fully digested product. It's like when you drive your car, that's minerals and oil products and all sorts of chemicals built into your car, finished product. So -- and we're going to build both modules that are reflective of Foundry but also new ones in areas that we understand and, quite frankly, we know will be built in the near future. So the things we know are working, things that we suspect to work in the future so that the nodes not only work separately but can work together. So de facto, we believe the compute of tomorrow won't be just compute, it will be productized compute. And that's what we're actually working on in rebuilding Foundry.

這就是已知的部分。我們最近一直在研究不太為人所知的事情，我們真正致力於的是我們相信人們現在為消費和計算付出了很多代價。沒有批評。但實際上，這很像支付天然氣和石油勘探的費用。但人們真正想要的是能夠使用完全消化的產品。就像您駕駛汽車時，礦物質、石油產品和各種化學物質都會進入您的汽車，成為成品。所以 — — 我們不僅要建立反映 Foundry 的模組，還要建立我們了解的領域的新模組，坦白說，我們知道這些模組將在不久的將來建構。因此，我們知道的事情正在發揮作用，我們猜測未來也會發揮作用，這樣節點不僅可以單獨工作，而且可以協同工作。因此事實上，我們相信未來的計算不僅僅是計算，而將是產品化的計算。這正是我們重建 Foundry 所要做的。

So there's still -- that doesn't mean like the foundry as an aggregate, we can do the whole thing tomorrow thing, massively valuable, and we're working on very, very large deals where companies are like, "Look, we want to transform what we're doing or take what we're doing and export it to every company in our industry tomorrow." De facto, that's a Foundry use case, and I don't think there's anything else that does that. Because you can take -- for example, there's a very large company in the health care space and it's like they have a very interesting way of doing health care. They can't sell it to other people without that essentially being a software offering. Building that would be 3 years or it could be 2 weeks.

因此，這並不意味著像代工廠那樣作為一個集合體，我們可以在明天做整件事，這是非常有價值的，我們正在進行非常非常大的交易，公司會說，“看，我們想要改變我們正在做的事情，或者把我們正在做的事情輸出到明天我們行業中的每一家公司。”事實上，這是一個 Foundry 用例，我認為沒有其他東西可以做到這一點。因為你可以舉個例子，醫療保健領域有一家非常大的公司，他們有一種非常有趣的醫療保健方式。除非它本質上是一種軟體產品，否則他們不能將其出售給其他人。建造該建築可能需要 3 年或 2 週的時間。

So that we're very much committed to continuing doing because there's like we're an n of 1 there. But where we want to be as an n of 1 on not just making it small, we like that because then we see the IT departments now saying, "Okay, well, we have all these things, and now we want to migrate here," and then selling them something that they can actually bite into. So it's -- because the primary resistance to Palantir has never been lack of sales force, lack of it's been resistance on inside of the IT structure.

所以我們非常致力於繼續做下去，因為我們就像是 1 中的 n。但是，我們希望成為 1 之 n，而不僅僅是將其做小，我們喜歡這樣，因為我們看到 IT 部門現在說，“好的，我們擁有了所有這些東西，現在我們想要遷移到這裡”，然後向他們出售一些他們真正可以接受的東西。所以，Palantir 面臨的主要阻力從來都不是缺乏銷售人員，而是 IT 結構內部的阻力。

And so now we're going to give them something they want and then also build an ecosystem around it. So it's what I think people will want going forward. And so people can stop just buying pure compute, they can buy valuable compute. So that's actually a big project. I would say on that end and on these other ends, what's particularly interesting, I mean, it's obvious, but it's not just the dollars, it's like who's spending them, just like the charisma of what we're doing. We're getting -- we're a company that's like 15 years old and like from revenue, 18 years old from concept for the -- is a company like ours should be getting declining talent. The talent we're getting now is the best in the world, it's the best we've ever gotten, and we're getting people who used to be at Palantir. Everyone knows how good our people who are coming back.

所以現在我們要給他們一些他們想要的東西，然後圍繞它建立一個生態系統。所以我認為這就是人們未來想要的。因此人們不再只是購買純計算，而是購買有價值的計算。所以這實際上是一個大項目。我想說，在這方面以及其他方面，特別有趣的是，我的意思是，這是顯而易見的，但這不僅僅是美元，而是誰在花它們，就像我們所做的事情的魅力一樣。我們的公司從成立之初已經有 15 年了，從盈利來看，從概念上講已經有 18 年了，像我們這樣的公司應該正在流失人才。我們現在招募的人才是世界上最優秀的，也是我們有史以來招募到的最優秀的人才，而且我們招募的都是曾經在 Palantir 工作過的人才。每個人都知道我們回來的人有多優秀。

Just like no company of our pedigree gets people coming back. The reason they're coming back is because this is just (expletive) cool. It's like you do this, you change the world. Now there's a lot of other things we're working on the side to actually make sure. One of the things we failed at, honestly, is capturing the value of what we've done. Most of the products you would see on a map in the industry, any company, they're delivering things we built 7 years ago. We failed in capturing the value of that. We're not going to fail again. We failed in capturing the value of that because we were selling to IT and selling to people in an adversarial way. And we -- sure, we were 7 years, 8 years ahead, but 8 years ahead but they can actually interact with you.

就像我們這樣的公司都無法吸引顧客回頭一樣。他們回來的原因是因為這太酷了。就像你這樣做了，你就改變了世界。現在我們正在同時進行許多其他工作以確保萬無一失。坦白說，我們失敗的一件事就是未能掌握我們所做之事的價值。您在產業地圖上看到的大多數產品、任何公司提供的都是我們 7 年前製造的產品。我們未能領悟其價值。我們不會再失敗。我們未能抓住這一價值，因為我們以對抗的方式向 IT 和一般大眾銷售產品。當然，我們領先了 7 年、8 年，但領先 8 年後他們實際上可以與您互動。

That's not the right way to do it, and we're not going to do it that way. In Americas, we're building specialized [sales routes], which means it will take longer to get it to work because we're working. And in Europe, we have a differentiated on the idea that -- so if you just look at the raw numbers, if you look at like where we are investing in, it's like sales hires, very high-end salespeople in Europe and then the rest is just like the best tech engineers in the world because we know we get them, we retain them and it's just very differentiated.

這不是正確的做法，我們不會這麼做。在美洲，我們正在建立專門的銷售管道，這意味著由於我們正在努力，所以需要更長的時間才能讓它發揮作用。在歐洲，我們有一個差異化的想法——所以如果你只看原始數字，看看我們投資的地方，就像銷售人員招聘，歐洲的高端銷售人員，然後剩下的就像世界上最好的技術工程師，因為我們知道我們得到了他們，我們留住了他們，這是非常差異化的。

Great. Thanks, Keith. Our next question comes from Palantir shareholder, [Brian L].

偉大的。謝謝，基斯。我們的下一個問題來自 Palantir 股東 [Brian L]。

Dr. Karp, thank you for furthering the ideals of Western democracy around the globe. Of the 1,000-plus roles that you intend to hire this year, how many of those will be focused on sales?

卡普博士，感謝您在全球推廣西方民主理想。今年您打算招募 1,000 多個職位，其中有多少專注於銷售？

So we're looking to hire 200 salespeople basically, and everyone else is like just like in the past. So the way I think about it is like x salespeople, it's like still 75% technical. We're going to try and hire 200 salespeople. And then as I mentioned, we just hired some very high-end sales acumen in Europe. Yes. Thank you for your question, and thank you for being an investor.

因此，我們基本上想招募 200 名銷售人員，其他人都和過去一樣。所以我的想法是，對於 x 名銷售人員來說，仍然有 75% 是技術性的。我們計劃招募 200 名銷售人員。正如我所提到的，我們剛剛在歐洲聘請了一些非常高端的銷售人才。是的。感謝您的提問，也感謝您成為投資人。

Great. Thanks, [Brian]. Our next question comes from Mark Cash with Morningstar. (Operator Instructions)

偉大的。謝謝，[布萊恩]。我們的下一個問題來自晨星的馬克‧卡什 (Mark Cash)。 （操作員指令）

Kind of going up what you were just talking about. There's been commentary in the past around becoming the operating system for commercial industries. You talked about airline industry. Maybe just talk about health care for a little bit there. But are there other examples, industry examples you could talk about how that's pulling customers to standardize operations around Palantir?

有點像你剛才談論的。過去曾有評論稱其將成為商業行業的操作系統。您談到了航空業。也許只是稍微談論一下醫療保健。但是，還有其他例子嗎？

Thank you. Well, there are a lot of -- like a lot of the new deals we're working -- so it's like if you look at the time line of Palantir, 2 years ago, it was all kind of -- 3 years ago, it was like analytics and operations. And what you see now is kind of people building off of what -- wanting a standardized, productized version of what we did at Airbus, what we've done internally at BP, what we did with William. And so what I can tell you is like of the very big deals we're working on now, they're almost all this. It's like we used to have to educate people. They didn't believe us.

謝謝。嗯，我們正在進行很多新交易，所以如果你看看 Palantir 的時間線，2 年前，它就是各種類型的——3 年前，它就是分析和運營。而現在你看到的是，人們希望建立一個標準化、產品化的版本，就像我們在空中巴士所做的事情、我們在英國石油公司內部所做的事情以及我們與威廉所做的事情一樣。所以我可以告訴你的是，我們現在正在處理的非常大的交易幾乎都是這樣的。這就像我們過去必須教育人們一樣。他們不相信我們。

And what's interesting, I do think it's like, obviously, there was also just the COVID distribution thing. I mean COVID distribution in England. England is not one health care system. It's 600 hospitals at our countries. It's like 600 countries, and this is true. And so just seeing this happen or the networks of people hearing this happen is the reason why you have 80% organic growth in the U.S. ex SPAC and with almost no salespeople. It's because people are now like -- okay -- now the caveat here is this is not for everybody. So there's like not everybody wants -- where this is particularly valuable as you have a business that is not protected by a moat, that has -- but has real insights on how to do something and wants to take over their industry.

有趣的是，我確實認為這顯然也與 COVID 分佈有關。我指的是英格蘭的 COVID 分佈。英格蘭並沒有單一的醫療保健體系。我們國家有 600 所醫院。大概有 600 個國家，這是真的。因此，看到這種情況發生或人們的網絡聽到這種情況發生，這就是為什麼你在美國（除 SPAC 外）幾乎沒有銷售人員的情況下實現了 80% 的有機增長的原因。這是因為人們現在喜歡——好吧——現在的警告是，這並不適合所有人。所以並不是每個人都想要——這一點尤其有價值，因為你的企業沒有護城河的保護，但是——但對如何做某事有真正的見解，並想接管他們的行業。

So it's like you're sitting there, you have a product that is maybe the best in the world, maybe the second best in the world, but it's not protected. But you do have insights there for software, you could take over your market. And that's where we're seeing it. The thing that's really changed is for once, it's not me fighting my way into the person's office and then throwing me out. It's them calling and saying "No, we know this can work. The pilot phase is now or like days, and then we're on. And so like -- and we're working on 2 or 3 of these now."

就像你坐在那裡，你有一個可能是世界上最好的產品，也許是世界上第二好的產品，但它卻沒有受到保護。但是你對軟體確實有見解，你可以佔領你的市場。這正是我們所看到的。真正改變的是，這次不是我強行闖入那個人的辦公室，然後把我趕出去。他們打電話說：“不，我們知道這可行。現在或幾天內是試點階段，然後我們就開始。所以——我們現在正在研究其中的 2 或 3 個。”

It's like -- it's just -- it's very, very exciting. The one thing I would say as a caveat though is it's a little bit -- we are both working on this and working on modularization with equal force, because -- and they're just not the same thing. Somebody who wants this is not buying modular Palantir, they want the whole Foundry thing. And what they want is -- what they want to help with is like, well, how would we identify people to hire the right to your platform? That's actually a big new question, like where can we find people -- they don't have to be Palantir quality software engineers, those are just too rare. But -- and what we're doing with our platform is making it so that just smart people can actually write to it. And so that increases our TAM a lot because smart and smart enough or specialized smart to write code at the level you write it here, those are just completely different TAMs.

這就像——這只是——這非常非常令人興奮。不過，我要說的一點是，我們都在以同樣的力量致力於這一點和模組化，因為——它們不是一回事。想要這個的人並不是要買模組化的 Palantir，他們想要的是整個 Foundry。他們想要的是──他們想要的幫助是，那麼，我們要如何找到適合你們平台僱用的人呢？這實際上是一個很大的新問題，例如我們在哪裡可以找到人才——他們不必是 Palantir 品質的軟體工程師，因為他們太稀有了。但是——我們在平台上所做的是讓只有聰明的人才能在上面寫作。這樣就大大增加了我們的 TAM，因為智慧和足夠聰明或專業智慧可以在您在此處編寫的層級編寫程式碼，這些都是完全不同的 TAM。

Thanks, Mark. Our next question is from Palantir shareholder, Juan V.

謝謝，馬克。我們的下一個問題來自 Palantir 股東 Juan V.

My question to you is, in a recent interview, Shyam said that what AWS was for developers last decade, Foundry really will be for developers this decade. Can you expand on what plans Palantir has to make Foundry available to a broader developer community? Again, thank you for allowing a retail investor like myself to have a seat at the table. I think it's much appreciated. Doesn't go unnoticed.

我的問題是，在最近的一次採訪中，Shyam 說，就像 AWS 在過去十年為開發人員所做的那樣，Foundry 在未來十年也將真正為開發人員所做的那樣。您能否詳細說明 Palantir 有哪些計劃讓 Foundry 可供更廣泛的開發者社群使用？再次感謝您允許像我這樣的散戶參與討論。我認為我們非常感激。不會被忽視。

I see myself as a retail investor, and I have all my assets in Palantir. So I'm very happy to meet another retail investor, hope in any case. So we've done these like Foundry for Builders programs in America and in France, and like it's not charity. It's because we want people in the tech community broadly to learn how to write to Foundry. We also want to learn from them. So that's one very important program, not revenue based, but it's essentially very valuable for our tech development and very valuable to get technically literate people on Palantir so they can see what they can do and tell us what they can't do.

我認為自己是一名散戶投資者，我的所有資產都投入了Palantir。所以我很高興能遇到另一位散戶投資者，無論如何都希望如此。因此，我們在美國和法國開展了類似「建造者鑄造廠」的項目，這並不是慈善事業。這是因為我們希望廣大科技界人士能夠學習如何寫入 Foundry。我們也想向他們學習。所以這是一個非常重要的項目，雖然不是基於收入的，但本質上對我們的技術開發非常有價值，而且讓技術素養高的人了解 Palantir 也非常有價值，這樣他們就能知道他們能做什麼，並告訴我們他們不能做什麼。

Then there's the broader commercial. A lot of the companies we've supplied and government agencies side of Palantir, it's like they require an ability to write to Foundry or to one of our products as like a core competence. And like -- so one of the things we know -- so we're obviously figuring out ways how we can train people, how we can make that experience easier, how can we widen the aperture. And by the way, obviously, not just because -- it's like it's not just for the altruistic reasons that are obvious.

然後還有更廣泛的商業。我們服務過的許多公司和 Palantir 的政府機構都要求具備向 Foundry 或我們的某個產品寫入資料的能力，並將其作為核心競爭力。而且 — — 我們知道的事情之一 — — 所以我們顯然正在想辦法訓練人們，如何讓這種體驗更容易，如何擴大視野。順便說一句，顯然這不僅僅是因為——這不僅僅是出於顯而易見的利他原因。

It's like if you want people who are valuable now to be valuable tomorrow, they must be able to interact with the software platform. So that's like one of the reasons we've had a lot of adoption because if you take a company like Chrysler Fiat, which has very talented people and it's -- they need to be able to write to the platform. And so that's -- and then work with the platform. So we're working on that partly for political reasons and partly because, obviously, it's very good for you as an investor in Palantir and we're proud of that.

就像如果你希望現在有價值的人明天仍然有價值，他們必須能夠與軟體平台互動。這就是我們被廣泛採用的原因之一，因為以克萊斯勒菲亞特這樣的公司為例，它擁有非常有才華的人才，他們需要能夠寫入平台。這就是——然後與平台合作。因此，我們致力於此，部分是出於政治原因，部分是因為，顯然，這對您作為 Palantir 的投資者來說非常有利，我們對此感到自豪。

Great. Thanks, Juan. Our next question is from Phil Winslow with Credit Suisse. (Operator Instructions)

偉大的。謝謝，胡安。下一個問題來自瑞士信貸的菲爾溫斯洛。 （操作員指令）

I do appreciate the cohort data that you disclosed today. That was very helpful. Just to dig in on that a little bit. Alex, you talked about seeing -- starting to see an inflection where Palantir is getting pulled into some of these commercial deals sort of asking for Palantir without even knowing necessarily that's what they needed. You see that in the cohort number on the commercial side in terms of the new for 2021. I'm curious if we can just dig into that a little bit. Are you seeing specific industries really start to have that a-ha moment get it? Are there certain use cases that they're leaning into? And then I just have one follow-up to that.

我非常感謝您今天披露的隊列數據。這非常有幫助。只是想深入探討一下這一點。亞歷克斯，你談到看到——開始看到一個轉折點，Palantir 被捲入一些商業交易中，這些交易者在不知道自己需要什麼的情況下就要求獲得 Palantir。就 2021 年的新情況而言，您可以從商業方面的隊列數量中看到這一點。您是否看到特定行業真正開始擁有這種頓悟時刻？他們是否傾向於某些特定的用例？然後我只想跟進一下這一點。

What makes Palantir Foundry valuable is that it's not really industry dependent, and this is crucial for us because we -- our sales force is so nascent. So we're very dependent on where -- either there's a crisis or where, again, that crisis or where somebody actually wants to enter a market they're not in and wants to expand. So I would say, in the past, we were very, very dependent on manufacturing. So like our high-level engineering companies like BP and others because we de facto needed the engineering talent because no one else believed us the product was differentiated.

Palantir Foundry 的價值在於它並不真正依賴產業，這對我們來說至關重要，因為我們的銷售團隊才剛起步。因此，我們非常依賴哪裡——要么是出現了危機，要么是哪裡出現了危機，要么是有人實際上想進入他們尚未進入的市場並想擴張。所以我想說，過去我們非常非常依賴製造業。因此，像我們的高級工程公司（如 BP 等）一樣，因為我們實際上需要工程人才，因為沒有人相信我們的產品是差異化的。

Now it is much more standard businesses of all kinds. And so just like really the who's who of American business, from like people building tractors to building cars to oil and gas to distribution, and there's no one kind of company. Where we do not do well is like, yes, we're not going to sell to a marketing company. It's like that we're not -- we don't [bother talking to them]. They don't call us. We're not good at marketing like they apparently are. They're so good at marketing. They don't have to quantify their results. We don't -- yes.

如今，各類企業都變得更加標準化。因此，就像美國商界名人錄一樣，從製造拖拉機的人到製造汽車的人，到石油和天然氣的人到分銷的人，並沒有哪一種公司是單一類型的。我們做得不好的地方是，是的，我們不會把產品賣給行銷公司。就好像我們不是──我們不想和他們說話。他們沒有打電話給我們。顯然，我們並不像他們一樣擅長行銷。他們非常擅長行銷。他們不必量化他們的結果。我們不知道——是的。

So by the way, one of the places, Europe -- one of the interesting ways to look at our business, by the way, since you're in Europe and since I have an affinity to your region, [Liechtenstein Schweiz], is it's that Europe in general has like grew slower and that's -- if you assume that comes back online, it's just going to be bombastic. One of the places that we're actually very strong in Europe is Switzerland. And there, you have like a lot of the pharmaceuticals, insurance companies, banks, that can't be mentioned using our products. And I think they use it, honestly, because it's like there's a Swiss quality to pound here. It's like a very high-quality product. We deliver it. It will work. You're not going to get the charming slap on the back or the steak dinner and your software is going to (expletive) work. So...

順便說一下，其中一個地方，歐洲——順便說一下，既然你在歐洲，而且我對你所在的地區 [列支敦士登-瑞士] 很感興趣，那麼看待我們業務的一個有趣方式就是，歐洲總體上增長較慢，而且 — — 如果你假設它能重新上線，那將是令人震驚的。我們在歐洲實際上非常強大的地方之一是瑞士。而且，很多藥廠、保險公司、銀行等都沒有提到使用我們的產品。而且我認為他們之所以使用它，是因為它看起來像是瑞士品質的代表。這就像一個非常高品質的產品。我們送貨。它會起作用的。你不會得到迷人的拍背或牛排晚餐，但你的軟體將會（髒話）工作。所以...

Got it. And then just to follow up on that specifically because obviously, the net retention numbers you have in U.S. government, government in general is huge, U.S. commercial is huge. That's the one thing I noticed with the disclosure of the net retention is non-U.S. commercial is significantly lower. What drives that? And how do you sort of inflect that higher?

知道了。然後具體跟進這一點，因為顯然，美國政府、政府總體的淨留存數字是巨大的，美國商業的淨留存數字也是巨大的。這是我在揭露淨留存率時注意到的一件事，非美國商業的淨留存率明顯較低。是什麼推動了這現象？那麼您怎樣才能將其提升到更高的水平呢？

Well, first of all, I do think there's a handoff function, and I think these things are actually repeating what happened in the earlier days in America when it's like where you have a handoff. Built in government because you have more time to actually get it right, hand off to commercial, go to Europe. I do think, in general, certain Swiss institutions, certain German institutions, certain French institutions are not included, where it is slower. Like if you are building something very, very new, it will be adopted a little later.

嗯，首先，我確實認為存在交接功能，而且我認為這些事情實際上是在重複早期美國發生的事情，就像你有交接一樣。建立政府是因為你有更多時間真正做好事，交給商業，然後去歐洲。我確實認為，總體而言，某些瑞士機構、某些德國機構、某些法國機構不包括在內，因為這些機構的進展較慢。例如，如果你正在建造某個非常非常新的東西，它稍後就會被採用。

But then there's also just the COVID. The reaction to COVID in Continental -- in Europe was different than in America. While it slowed things down in America, it didn't really stop them. And so I kind of -- what I suspect is going to happen is that Europe because of COVID reopening and because of basically people copying what's happening in highly adaptive America and sometimes in Switzerland, you will see the European cohort grow.

但還有新冠肺炎疫情。歐洲大陸對 COVID 的反應與美國不同。雖然它減緩了美國的發展速度，但並沒有真正阻止它。因此，我懷疑將會發生的是，歐洲由於新冠疫情的重新開放，以及人們基本上效仿高度適應性的美國以及有時在瑞士所發生的事情，你會看到歐洲群體的成長。

But again, to just make it a little more quantitative, we have, I think, 150% net dollar retention in U.S. commercial. Again, a number which we're getting with basically no one holding it up. So I don't know how it works with other companies, but I think if I were a scientist, I'd want to normalize that number. But even not normalized, this is a very strong number. What we're going to show is net dollar retention in the U.S., and over time, we're going to show how this expands outside the U.S. And that I think what you'll begin to see is that the strength in the U.S. will go outside the U.S. and we'll make our business very, very robust.

但是，再說一遍，為了使其更加量化，我認為，美國商業的淨美元保留率為 150%。再次，我們得到這個數字基本上沒有人支持它。所以我不知道其他公司是如何運作的，但我想如果我是科學家，我會希望讓這個數字標準化。但即使沒有標準化，這也是一個非常強勁的數字。我們將展示美國的淨美元保留率，隨著時間的推移，我們將展示這一數字如何擴展到美國以外。

Thanks, Phil. So Alex, we've taken -- we've received over 1,000 questions from shareholders. Obviously, you can't take them all. Any parting wisdom or parting thoughts that you want to offer about the business to our shareholders?

謝謝，菲爾。所以亞歷克斯，我們已經收到來自股東的 1,000 多個問題。顯然，你不可能把它們全部拿走。您有什麼關於公司業務的臨別贈言或想法想向我們的股東分享嗎？

It's really tough times out there, really tough for a lot of businesses. It's -- a lot of things are going wrong in the world, in our world. It -- the obvious danger, the lack of legitimacy of a lot of our institutions. And I can tell you while -- at Palantir, we are very, very focused on our business and bad times are very super motivational for us. And when we get to good times, we'll be even stronger. And we're a little bit of a like wacky group of guerilla warfighters, but we're very much in fighting mode. And not just for us and the West, but also for our shareholders. And yes, I hope to talk to you soon. Thank you.

現在確實是艱難時期，對很多企業來說，情況都很艱難。在我們的這個世界裡，很多事情都出了問題。顯而易見的危險是，我們的許多機構缺乏合法性。我可以告訴你——在 Palantir，我們非常非常專注於我們的業務，困難時期對我們來說是非常大的激勵。當我們迎來好時光時，我們會變得更加強大。我們有點像一群古怪的遊擊戰士，但我們處於戰鬥模式。這不僅對我們和西方如此，對我們的股東也是如此。是的，我希望很快能與您交談。謝謝。