Palantir Technologies Inc (PLTR) 2021 Q4 法說會逐字稿

Good morning. Welcome to Palantir's Fourth Quarter 2021 Earnings Video Conference. We'll be discussing the results announced in our press release and related materials issued prior to the market open and posted on our Investor Relations website.

早上好。歡迎來到 Palantir 的 2021 年第四季度收益視頻會議。我們將討論在我們的新聞稿中公佈的結果以及在市場開盤前發布並發佈在我們的投資者關係網站上的相關材料。

This morning, we will make statements regarding our business that may be considered forward-looking within applicable securities laws, including statements regarding our first quarter and fiscal 2022 results, management's expectations for our future financial and operational performance and other statements regarding our plans, prospects and expectations.

今天上午，我們將就我們的業務發表在適用證券法中可能被視為前瞻性的聲明，包括關於我們第一季度和 2022 財年業績的聲明、管理層對我們未來財務和運營業績的預期以及關於我們的計劃、前景的其他聲明和期望。

These statements are not promises or guarantees and are subject to risks and uncertainties, which could cause them to differ materially from actual results. Information concerning those risks is available in our earnings press release distributed prior to market open today and in our SEC filings. We undertake no obligation to update forward-looking statements, except as required by law.

這些陳述不是承諾或保證，存在風險和不確定性，可能導致它們與實際結果存在重大差異。有關這些風險的信息可在我們今天開市前發布的收益新聞稿和我們提交給美國證券交易委員會的文件中找到。除法律要求外，我們不承擔更新前瞻性陳述的義務。

Further, during the course of today's earnings video conference, we will refer to certain adjusted financial measures. These non-GAAP financial measures should be considered in addition to, not as a substitute for or in isolation from, GAAP measures. Additional information about these non-GAAP measures, including reconciliation of non-GAAP to comparable GAAP measures is included in our press release and investor presentation provided today. Our press release, investor presentation and SEC filings are available on our Investor Relations website at investors.palantir.com.

此外，在今天的財報視頻會議期間，我們將參考某些調整後的財務指標。這些非公認會計原則財務措施應作為公認會計原則措施的補充而不是替代或孤立考慮。有關這些非公認會計原則措施的其他信息，包括非公認會計原則與可比公認會計原則措施的對賬，包含在我們今天提供的新聞稿和投資者介紹中。我們的新聞稿、投資者介紹和 SEC 文件可在我們的投資者關係網站 Investors.palantir.com 上查閱。

Welcome to our earnings call from Denver. It's my maiden voyage. And obviously, just a couple of opening remarks, and then we'll jump into questions from the audience as it were. The -- just a 5-minute, 2-minute -- when Palantir began, people believed that data was worthless, that software was a luxury item, and that we would fail. And one of the very interesting things that's happened to Palantir is we've been able to see how the world has changed dramatically in its perception of software and, of course, of us from a world where software was something that you might want, might be in your car, but de facto would not determine your business to a world where really the laws of finance are going to be rewritten to deal with a world where the only real moat is software.

歡迎參加我們來自丹佛的財報電話會議。這是我的處女航。顯然，只是幾句開場白，然後我們會直接回答觀眾的問題。在 Palantir 開始時——僅僅 5 分鐘、2 分鐘——人們認為數據毫無價值，軟件是奢侈品，我們會失敗。 Palantir 發生的一件非常有趣的事情是，我們已經能夠看到世界在對軟件的看法方面發生了怎樣的巨大變化，當然，我們從一個軟件是你可能想要的東西的世界，可能坐在你的車裡，但事實上並不會決定你的業務是否會被改寫為一個真正的金融法則將被重寫以應對一個唯一真正的護城河是軟件的世界。

How do you measure it? What does it look like? How does it -- how do you understand when it's creating value? How do you understand when it's declining in value? How do you understand when it's compounding? To what extent is it compounding? What devices do we use to measure that? Are the devices we use to measure it the ones that we used in the past? Clearly, this industry is in its infancy. What's also very special about this industry is it really is, by and large, geographically located in a small section of America, which is odd, and there's lots of interesting reasons for that. But enterprise software is something that America is by far the best at.

你如何測量它？它是什麼樣子的？它是如何——你如何理解它何時創造價值？你如何理解它何時貶值？你怎麼理解它什麼時候複合？複合到什麼程度？我們用什麼設備來測量它？我們用來測量它的設備是我們過去使用的設備嗎？顯然，這個行業還處於起步階段。這個行業還有一個非常特別的地方是，總的來說，它在地理位置上確實位於美國的一小部分，這很奇怪，而且有很多有趣的原因。但企業軟件是美國迄今為止最擅長的。

What we see currently at Palantir, it's not just the best at building it, it seems to also be the best at understanding what software developments are relevant for the world today and adapting even when it's being offered by a company that in every way looks nonstandard, run by people that are very different, look different, feel different, talk differently and with a CEO that many of you is bat(expletive) crazy.

我們目前在 Palantir 所看到的，它不僅在構建它方面做得最好，而且似乎在理解哪些軟件開發與當今世界相關並進行調整方面也是最好的，即使它是由一家在各方面看起來都不標準的公司提供的，由非常不同的人經營，看起來不同，感覺不同，說話不同，與你們中的許多人瘋狂的首席執行官一起經營。

And so, just as an interesting preview, I don't want to take a ton of time with remarks because I think when I'm watching these things, if someone talks too long or there's like a lot of canned remarks, I wonder why, and it honestly gets a little boring. And of course, our legal department and IR department, which are wonderful departments are -- have a cane ready to pull me out if I'm not like a caged animal in a 1950 zoo. As I've mentioned to them, if you want caged animals in a 1950 zoo, you can watch any other earnings update.

所以，作為一個有趣的預覽，我不想花太多時間發表評論，因為我想當我看這些東西時，如果有人說得太久或者有很多罐頭評論，我想知道為什麼，而且老實說有點無聊。當然，我們的法律部門和 IR 部門，這些部門很棒——如果我不像 1950 年動物園裡的籠子裡的動物，準備好一根手杖把我拉出來。正如我向他們提到的，如果你想在 1950 年的動物園里關上籠子裡的動物，你可以觀看任何其他收入更新。

So here, you see an interesting chart. We sent this out. Some of you have probably looked at it. Some have maybe even studied it. Some of you haven't seen it. What's interesting here, what I thought would be very interesting for people who are investors, potential investors, also Palantirians, both current and ex, is our journey and what I actually believe this is a metaphor for the journey of all software companies. We had -- we were very early into whatever you want to call it, data exploration, building things that would now be understand as useful software for building analytic tools. Some of them were -- and are very, very important for national security and other areas. But then we're not -- obviously, because they were built and conceived in 2004, delivered in 2008, we're not actually able to migrate across the chain into what people need tomorrow, where people are already seeing that they need today, which is essentially not having software as a raw material exploration.

所以在這裡，你會看到一個有趣的圖表。我們發出了這個。你們中的一些人可能已經看過它。有些人甚至可能研究過它。你們中的一些人還沒有看到它。這裡有趣的是，我認為對於投資者、潛在投資者以及 Palantirians，無論是現任還是前任，都會非常有趣的是我們的旅程，我實際上認為這是對所有軟件公司旅程的隱喻。我們有 - 我們很早就進入了你想稱之為的任何東西，數據探索，構建現在被理解為構建分析工具的有用軟件的東西。其中一些曾經——而且對國家安全和其他領域非常非常重要。但是我們不能——很明顯，因為它們是在 2004 年建造和構思，於 2008 年交付的，我們實際上無法跨鏈遷移到人們明天需要的東西，人們已經看到他們今天需要的東西，這本質上沒有將軟件作為原材料探索。

You take the data like it's oil, you pump it out, you churn it and then you, say you've churned the data and you move on, but actually operationally determinative for your business. What you see here is cohort analysis. This is the -- and what you see is from inception of Foundry, the decline of older software products and just the massive exponential growth. Obviously, you use rough math, it's 100% growth year-on-year. And then starting last year, not off of a small integral, which is obviously very important because small numbers can go quickly even if the software is not strong.

你把數據當作石油，你把它抽出來，你攪動它，然後你說你已經攪動了數據，然後你繼續前進，但實際上對你的業務具有決定性的操作性。你在這裡看到的是同期群分析。這就是——你所看到的是從 Foundry 開始，舊軟件產品的衰落以及巨大的指數增長。顯然，你用粗略的數學計算，它是 100% 的同比增長。然後從去年開始，不掉一個小積分，這顯然很重要，因為即使軟件不強大，小數字也能很快過去。

Big numbers don't go quickly if the software doesn't exist, especially given that our sales force is super nascent. We're building it quickly, but we only have 25 fully accredited software. Fully accredited, meaning they've been here for 9 months or more. And what you see here, obviously, the CAGR here is just unbelievable and in like the 150-plus range, which is a super interesting and I wanted to drop the F-bomb here, but I was told that was probably inappropriate, but you could definitely -- we've agreed that this is something like the Phoenix rises. You don't get this.

如果軟件不存在，大數字不會很快消失，特別是考慮到我們的銷售隊伍非常新生。我們正在快速構建它，但我們只有 25 個完全認可的軟件。完全認可，這意味著他們已經在這里工作了 9 個月或更長時間。很明顯，你在這裡看到的 CAGR 簡直令人難以置信，而且在 150 多倍的範圍內，這非常有趣，我想把 F 炸彈放在這裡，但有人告訴我這可能不合適，但是你可以肯定——我們已經同意這就像鳳凰升起。你不明白這個。

And the other thing that's kind of antigravitational about this, that it's easy to forget. This is a company, this is like we've been at this for over 15 years. There are certain laws of nature in business that we are defined, which is that a software company, software usually decays for lots of reasons, decays radically. And so when you see a decline or a software product, it's also basically not part of the law of nature for a software company to build new software. Really, as far as I know, we are the only software company in the world building transformational software this far in. And that's particularly important because most software companies have distribution or they have a product, but they don't have distribution product and the ability to build new products, which is not a critique. These are great companies. They acquire companies. There are not that many companies to acquire, which is why even relatively weak companies get acquired at a very high price.

另一件事有點反引力，很容易忘記。這是一家公司，就像我們已經在這家公司工作了超過 15 年一樣。我們定義了商業中的某些自然規律，那就是軟件公司，軟件通常會因為很多原因而衰敗，徹底衰敗。所以當你看到一個軟件產品衰落的時候，軟件公司開發新軟件也基本上不符合自然規律。真的，據我所知，我們是世界上唯一一家構建轉型軟件的軟件公司。這一點尤其重要，因為大多數軟件公司都有分銷或產品，但他們沒有分銷產品，而且建立新產品的能力，這不是批評。這些都是偉大的公司。他們收購公司。可以收購的公司並不多，這就是為什麼即使是相對較弱的公司也會以非常高的價格被收購。

Let's just look at the next chart, which is USG. USG, you have a very similar phenomenon where you see the inception of Foundry into the USG. This is -- there's a lot here. There's a lot of qualitative stuff here that we can explain, but one of the qualitative things that you kind of can get a sense of is Palantir, the newer Foundry version not only grows dramatically with like -- this is like 65% growth just without looking at it more precisely, but it's over -- it's like over 200% CAGR here, which is also like Phoenix rises kind of thing. But what's qualitatively, particularly important and very protective is these graphs pretty neatly on to what are the programs that are going to grow tomorrow. Where is the future of USG? What do we need in a world where people are recognizing it's very dangerous? And what would the products be that you would need to power that? And so any case with that, I think we should head into questions.

讓我們看看下一張圖表，它是 USG。 USG，您有一個非常相似的現象，您看到 Foundry 開始進入 USG。這是 - 這裡有很多。這裡有很多定性的東西我們可以解釋，但是你可以感覺到的定性的東西之一是 Palantir，較新的 Foundry 版本不僅隨著喜歡而顯著增長——這就像 65% 的增長，只是沒有更準確地看它，但它已經結束了——這裡的複合年增長率超過 200%，這也像是鳳凰城崛起之類的事情。但在質量上，特別重要和非常具有保護性的是這些圖表非常清楚地表明了明天將要發展的程序。 USG的未來在哪裡？在一個人們認識到它非常危險的世界裡，我們需要什麼？你需要什麼產品來驅動它？所以無論如何，我認為我們應該提出問題。

Great. Thanks, Alex. Our first question is from Brent Thill with Jefferies. (Operator Instructions)

偉大的。謝謝，亞歷克斯。我們的第一個問題來自 Jefferies 的 Brent Thill。 （操作員說明）

When you go back to the sales expansion opportunity...

當您回到銷售擴展機會時...

By the way, we can't see you.

順便說一句，我們看不到你。

Talk through your overall view on what you need to do on the sales force to get that building in the right direction. And what your plans for capacity are at in 2022?

談談您對銷售人員需要做什麼以使建築物朝著正確方向發展的總體看法。您在 2022 年的產能計劃是什麼？

By the way, it would have been wonderful to see you. But yes, I think the question was what can we do to build on our -- building the sales force next year or this year and the next year? The -- if -- so there are really 2 parts to the question. One part, I think, is just to look at what's happening. And so like what is growing Palantir now and how can we accelerate it? So if you just -- what I want to do in this call and in future encounters is to -- both is to kind of -- what I think is happening and just to frame it, what I think is happening at Palantir as you have what you saw in Silicon Valley 1.0 when Silicon Valley actually produced goods and services that people wanted which was they built dual product, dual-use products and government, and there was a handoff to commercial.

順便說一句，很高興見到你。但是，是的，我認為問題是我們可以做些什麼來建立我們的 - 明年或今年和明年建立銷售隊伍？ - 如果 - 所以這個問題實際上有 2 個部分。我認為，其中一部分只是看看正在發生的事情。就像現在正在成長的 Palantir 一樣，我們如何加速它？所以，如果你只是——我想在這次電話會議和未來的遭遇中——兩者都是——我認為正在發生的事情，並且只是為了框架它，我認為在 Palantir 發生的事情就像你所擁有的那樣你在矽谷 1.0 中所看到的，當矽谷實際上生產人們想要的商品和服務時，他們建立了雙重產品、雙重用途的產品和政府，並且向商業過渡。

And so that's going very well. So you see -- even if you adjust for SPAC organic growth in commercial last year, U.S. was 80% or just under 80%, it's like 76%, 77%. But to your point, so -- and you see dollar -- net dollar retention numbers that you financial people like, how much is it growing? What I would call actually organically, I guess you guys call it net dollar retention. Very, very strong like in the 150% range. We have Glazer here, he'll pipe in with the -- but it's roughly in that range.

所以進展非常順利。所以你看 - 即使你調整去年商業的 SPAC 有機增長，美國是 80% 或略低於 80%，它就像 76%、77%。但就你的觀點而言，所以——你會看到美元——你金融人士喜歡的美元淨保留數字，它增長了多少？我實際上有機地稱之為，我猜你們稱之為淨美元保留。非常非常強，例如在 150% 範圍內。我們這裡有 Glazer，他會加入 - 但它大致在那個範圍內。

But what we do not have -- you could look at it as a negative, it's like we basically are doing this with a very, very nascent, honestly, if I were not on TV, I would say, bunker small sales force. And so like that means two things. What does it mean on the positive side? It means that net dollar retention number is awesome because my understanding of how this happens at other companies, there's like 8 people running around, begging the person to expand their deployment. That's not happening at Palantir. The salesperson there is the Foundry product, by and large. So obviously, that means we think we can get lift from hiring salespeople. We're doing that aggressively. I think we have about 150 salespeople now. We're in the market to hire aggressively across Palantir, honestly, mostly not salespeople because we believe we live and die based on our ability to build products of tomorrow delivered today.

但是我們沒有 - 你可以把它看作是負面的，就像我們基本上是在一個非常非常新生的情況下這樣做的，老實說，如果我不在電視上，我會說，掩體小銷售隊伍。因此，這意味著兩件事。積極的一面是什麼意思？這意味著淨美元保留數字非常棒，因為我了解其他公司是如何發生這種情況的，大約有 8 個人跑來跑去，乞求這個人擴大他們的部署。 Palantir 不會發生這種情況。總的來說，那裡的銷售人員是 Foundry 產品。很明顯，這意味著我們認為我們可以從僱傭銷售人員中獲得提升。我們正在積極地這樣做。我想我們現在有大約 150 名銷售人員。老實說，我們在市場上積極招聘 Palantir 的員工，主要不是銷售人員，因為我們相信我們的生死存亡取決於我們構建明天交付的產品的能力。

But we're hiring -- going to hire in the range of 200 people. Hiring and getting value out of them are two different things. And so I think one of the things that we will see going forward is how do we play these salespeople so that we can get as much lift from them as we're getting from the product itself. And we're at the beginning of that. And so it is the part to people we've fully indoctrinated, or as normal people might say, trained, are effective but we've never done this before. There will be -- that's a process. We're also looking at ways to learn from other companies, but that's going to happen over the next couple of years.

但我們正在招聘——將招聘 200 人。招聘和從中獲得價值是兩件不同的事情。所以我認為我們將看到的一件事是我們如何扮演這些銷售人員，以便我們從他們那裡獲得與我們從產品本身獲得的一樣多的提升。我們正處於起步階段。所以它是我們完全灌輸給人們的部分，或者正如正常人可能會說的那樣，受過訓練的人是有效的，但我們以前從未這樣做過。會有——這是一個過程。我們也在尋找向其他公司學習的方法，但這將在未來幾年內發生。

I think the primary driver of revenue in U.S. commercial this year will still just be the way in which America, the IT organizations are actually beginning to request without knowing Foundry sometimes, what Foundry offers. The CEOs assume that this is available. There is no other product on the market that can actually move from data warehouse, which is like there's like 5 companies, they all offer the same thing. Foundry interacts with all of them. When you want to move up to the chain to actually solving a real problem because it's defined your business, Foundry is highly differentiated.

我認為今年美國商業收入的主要驅動力仍然只是美國的方式，IT 組織有時實際上開始要求不知道 Foundry 的方式，Foundry 提供什麼。 CEO 們認為這是可行的。市場上沒有其他產品可以真正從數據倉庫轉移，就像有 5 家公司一樣，它們都提供相同的東西。 Foundry 與他們進行交互。當您因為定義了您的業務而想要上鍊以實際解決實際問題時，Foundry 具有高度差異化。

So we will layer that. I think it's way too early to know exactly the impact. Obviously, to the extent we get this to work, you could expect even higher growth than what we have, although I'm very happy with. It was like we've doubled USG U.S. commercial now from 50 to 100, 100 to 200. I believe we will double it again this year. So any case, these are -- some of this is unknown, but we are working very aggressively. The other thing I would say outside of the U.S., again, a slightly longer answer, but one of the ways people look at Palantir is if you're going to -- I think a financial analyst likes to -- what we would have called science normalize the data, what you and finance would probably call strip out the inorganic inputs.

所以我們將它分層。我認為現在確切知道影響還為時過早。顯然，就我們實現這一點而言，您可以期待比我們擁有的更高的增長，儘管我對此感到非常滿意。就像我們現在將 USG 美國商業廣告從 50 倍增至 100 倍、100 倍至 200 倍。我相信今年我們會再次翻倍。所以無論如何，這些都是 - 其中一些是未知的，但我們正在非常積極地工作。我要在美國以外說的另一件事，再一次，稍微長一點的答案，但人們看待 Palantir 的方式之一是，如果你要——我認為金融分析師喜歡——我們會稱之為科學將數據標準化，你和財務部門可能會稱之為剔除無機輸入。

But if I think if you're stripping out the inorganic inputs, you also have to look at the -- what I would essentially view as an inorganic input of COVID in Europe. If you strip -- and so Europe has been slow for us last year, which is one of the reasons why we are only at 41% last year and growth would be even higher. Europe grew if you include SPACs at 9%, so slightly above what's probably inflation. But there, we're taking the opportunity, believing there'll be a handoff from USG to U.S. comm to Europe to rebuild with some very, very strong salespeople who've come from the best companies, believing that that's an environment where we can really do that.

但是，如果我認為如果您要去除無機輸入，您還必須查看 - 我基本上認為是歐洲 COVID 的無機輸入。如果你剝離 - 所以去年歐洲對我們來說一直很慢，這就是為什麼我們去年只有 41% 並且增長會更高的原因之一。如果將 SPAC 計入 9%，歐洲就會增長，因此略高於可能的通脹水平。但是在那裡，我們抓住了這個機會，相信將會有從 USG 到美國通信到歐洲的交接，與來自最好的公司的一些非常非常強大的銷售人員進行重建，相信這是一個我們可以真的這樣做。

So like there's two ways to look at this just on that angle. You could say, well, what could you do to gas-charge America? We're working on that and very, very aggressively and most of our sales hires today are focused on that. But there's another more long-term thing. If we're right that the world wants Silicon Valley the way it was, meaning a handoff from government to commercial to the rest -- commercial U.S. to the rest of the world. And with each one with a lag, America to Europe, 18 months, the rest of this company only has to grow, everything besides Europe, commercial, 38% to get 30% growth in aggregate. So getting Europe to track better, both from a handoff of what happens in America to Europe and with more conventional sales approach is kind of what we're looking at getting done this year and see the fruits of it next year.

所以就像有兩種方法可以從這個角度看待這個問題。你可以說，好吧，你能做些什麼來給美國加油？我們正在努力實現這一目標，並且非常非常積極，我們今天的大多數銷售人員都專注於這一點。但還有另一件更長期的事情。如果我們是對的，世界希望矽穀保持原來的樣子，這意味著從政府到商業再到其他地方——商業美國到世界其他地方的移交。每一個滯後，從美國到歐洲，18 個月，這家公司的其餘部分只需要增長，除了歐洲，商業，38% 才能獲得 30% 的總增長。因此，讓歐洲更好地追踪，無論是從美國發生的事情轉移到歐洲，還是採用更傳統的銷售方式，這都是我們今年希望完成的事情，並在明年看到它的成果。

And just a quick follow up on the government. I know you had a tough comp. It did decelerate pretty materially in Q1 in terms of the growth. Can you give us your perspective on what's happening on the government side?

只是對政府的快速跟進。我知道你有一個艱難的比賽。就增長而言，它在第一季度確實大幅減速。你能告訴我們你對政府方面正在發生的事情的看法嗎？

Well, there's a couple of things that are happening there. So if you were looking at this more like from a scientific perspective, you had a time series that's 15 years, first thing you would do is say, "Okay, what's happening in that time series over the 15 years?" What you see in U.S. gov is a compounded growth of 30%, but like this which is the positive of U.S. gov is it's reliable. The sums are big. The quality of the revenue is very high. The -- one of their -- essentially, there are a number of problems, but the biggest problem is barrier to entry, which we've clearly solved and then [re-barriers] to entry, which we've solved or solving, but that's going very well.

嗯，那裡正在發生一些事情。所以如果你更像是從科學的角度來看這個，你有一個 15 年的時間序列，你會做的第一件事就是說，“好吧，在 15 年的時間序列中發生了什麼？”你在美國政府看到的是30%的複合增長，但是像這樣美國政府的積極因素是它是可靠的。金額很大。收入的質量非常高。他們中的一個——本質上存在許多問題，但最大的問題是進入壁壘，我們已經明確解決了，然後[重新壁壘]進入，我們已經解決或解決了，但這進展順利。

And then the second one is lumpiness. Now you -- that lumpiness still exists. And actually, in some ways, it's worse because to get the integral to grow, you need these massive deals. We also have small deals, but the fact that we are on the biggest, most important parts of the U.S. government our software is. So there's really a twofold answer to your question. One, what will happen this year? Are there -- is a deceleration in actual one over a long time series? The answer is clearly no. But then the question is, if the baseline is 30%, how does it get to where we want it, which was like the beginning of last year?

然後第二個是塊狀。現在你——那個腫塊仍然存在。實際上，在某些方面，情況更糟，因為要讓整體增長，你需要這些大筆交易。我們也有小額交易，但事實上我們是美國政府最大、最重要的部分，我們的軟件是。因此，您的問題確實有雙重答案。一、今年會發生什麼？是否存在 - 在很長一段時間內實際減速？答案顯然是否定的。但接下來的問題是，如果基線是 30%，它如何到達我們想要的地方，就像去年年初一樣？

And now at the end of last year, and the way that happens is the deals we're already positioned to win actually closed. And so then you get into the granularity of what will happen in the U.S. government, who gets the deals if there's no new budget? There's a lot of granularity there, which we should probably do a better job of sharing. But the short answer is, it's like huge chair gets pulled first. The people are trying to enter the market first -- last, so the new start-ups totally screwed, because the people who are not sitting on crucial programs partially screwed. The people that have software that is -- or products that are useful in the past, but have the right connections probably, what -- another version of this is if you just look at that chart I showed you with the CAGR on Foundry, these are the most important programs for a dangerous world.

現在在去年年底，發生的方式是我們已經準備好贏得的交易實際上已經完成。然後你會詳細了解美國政府會發生什麼，如果沒有新的預算，誰會得到交易？那裡有很多粒度，我們應該在共享方面做得更好。但簡短的回答是，這就像先拉大椅子一樣。人們試圖首先進入市場 - 最後，所以新的初創公司完全搞砸了，因為沒有坐在關鍵項目上的人部分搞砸了。那些擁有過去有用的軟件或產品的人，但可能有正確的聯繫，另一個版本是，如果你只看一下我向你展示的關於 Foundry 的 CAGR 圖表，這些是危險世界中最重要的程序。

Now I can't go into all the details, but we used to debate with people, especially my academic friends if the world was dangerous. The danger of the world being clear and present to the U.S. government is very protective. It doesn't guarantee that when this integral, actually how it behaves, but it makes it much more likely that it will happen in here and positively affect our revenue, which is another reason why I suspect that we will do well.

現在我無法詳述所有細節，但我們過去常常與人辯論，尤其是我的學術朋友，如果這個世界是危險的。世界變得清晰並呈現在美國政府面前的危險是非常具有保護性的。它不能保證當這個積分時，它的實際表現如何，但它更有可能在這裡發生並對我們的收入產生積極影響，這也是我懷疑我們會做得好的另一個原因。

Great. Thanks, Brent. Our next question comes from Palantir shareholder, Chase P.

偉大的。謝謝，布倫特。我們的下一個問題來自 Palantir 股東 Chase P。

Yes. First and foremost, congratulations on all the hard work. It seems like you guys have a great team and are executing really well. From a retail investor perspective, the most negative sentiment I hear regarding Palantir is in regards to the dilution of shares outstanding over the past 12 to 18 months, and primarily in relation to stock-based compensation that's occurred. Other than the remaining shares to be vested that have already been announced, can we expect further dilution in share offerings going forward? Or is it kind of reasonable to assume that the majority of this was from the IPO process and sort of a onetime event for the company? Once again, thanks, and congratulations on all the hard work and business developments.

是的。首先，祝賀所有的辛勤工作。看起來你們有一個很棒的團隊，並且執行得非常好。從散戶投資者的角度來看，我聽到的關於 Palantir 的最負面情緒是關於過去 12 到 18 個月流通股的稀釋，主要是與發生的基於股票的補償有關。除了已經宣布的剩餘股份之外，我們是否可以預期未來的股票發行會進一步稀釋？或者假設其中大部分來自首次公開募股過程並且是公司的一次性事件，這是否合理？再次感謝並祝賀所有辛勤工作和業務發展。

Thank you. And I really appreciate you, investors. Thanks for investing and the faith you have in us. Okay. So there's like the simple version, which I think it's like -- so there's really -- there's stock-based comp and there's dilution. Dilution thing, that's a red herring. We're not issuing a lot of new shares, I think it's like in the $9 million range. And so it would be a little coy for me to say that's like no issue, move on.

謝謝你。我真的很感謝你，投資者。感謝您的投資和您對我們的信任。好的。所以就像簡單的版本，我認為它就像 - 所以真的 - 有基於股票的補償並且有稀釋。稀釋的東西，這是一個紅鯡魚。我們不會發行很多新股，我認為它在 900 萬美元左右。所以我有點害羞地說這就像沒有問題一樣，繼續前進。

The thing to understand about Palantir and then I want to just hit this is like it's actually not the result of the DPO, it's the result of the fact that we were completely focused on building product. We had no earthly idea we were going to DPO to like right before we did it. And so most companies are, I mean, quite frankly built so that the -- when analysts look at it, the primary customer of most software companies is not the client, it's the software analyst.

關於 Palantir 的理解，然後我只想說它實際上不是 DPO 的結果，而是我們完全專注於構建產品這一事實的結果。在我們這樣做之前，我們根本沒有想到我們會喜歡 DPO。因此，我的意思是，坦率地說，大多數公司都是這樣建立的——當分析師看到它時，大多數軟件公司的主要客戶不是客戶，而是軟件分析師。

So it's like we, obviously, our primary clients are our clients, which doesn't mean -- and then now we're thinking about how do we expose the data in a way that people on the outside like you and professional analysts and others can look at the data and get a better sense of what's tracking, what's not tracking. But the primary source of a lot of these like questions really comes down to look, we built the company to support the U.S. warfighter primarily and then do -- dual use it for the glory of humanity, particular humanity in the West. That was our idea. And because our primary client was not what someone with a hedge fund would think, we didn't actually think of these things from inception. And so now there's a process of normalization.

所以就像我們一樣，顯然，我們的主要客戶就是我們的客戶，這並不意味著 - 然後現在我們正在考慮如何以一種像你和專業分析師和其他人這樣的外部人員的方式公開數據可以查看數據並更好地了解跟踪的內容，未跟踪的內容。但是，很多類似問題的主要來源實際上歸結為，我們建立公司主要是為了支持美國戰士，然後為了人類的榮耀，特別是西方的人類，雙重使用它。那是我們的想法。而且因為我們的主要客戶不是擁有對沖基金的人所想的那樣，我們實際上並沒有從一開始就考慮這些事情。所以現在有一個正常化的過程。

You're just going to see that in -- going forward on these calls, so it's like how do you normalize, how do you provide data that people are going to look at, how do you provide data that people can understand, that they're used to seeing while simultaneously staying true to what our mission is? It's like our primary clients are the people we're serving. We're in full line with them. And that's why we survive even with the nascent sales force. You can get things to double which is in sync.

您將在這些電話中看到這一點，就像您如何規範化，如何提供人們將要查看的數據，您如何提供人們可以理解的數據，他們'習慣於看到，同時忠於我們的使命是什麼？就像我們的主要客戶就是我們所服務的人一樣。我們與他們完全一致。這就是為什麼我們即使面對新生的銷售隊伍也能生存下來的原因。你可以讓事情加倍同步。

So then you get to stock-based comp, which is like, okay, so -- and there's two parts of it. Of course, IRI people kind of don't want me to do any kind of forward-looking math, but if you're smart enough to invest in talent, you're smart enough to figure out. There's essentially -- there's the -- what is -- what are -- how are we comping people, and there, there will be a normalization that will get us into a range where you would see in a software company within the next 18 months, latest 2 years. But there's essentially -- and that's going to take a little time. It is going to happen, because it's also very much linked to another question, which is how do you actually run the company so it's profitable someday on a GAAP basis, not stripping out comp? And that is also within eyesight.

然後你會得到基於股票的補償，這就像，好的，所以 - 它有兩個部分。當然，IRI 的人有點不希望我做任何前瞻性的數學運算，但如果你足夠聰明地投資於人才，那麼你就足夠聰明地弄清楚。本質上 - 有 - 什麼 - 什麼 - 我們如何與人競爭，並且將有一個正常化，這將使我們進入未來 18 個月內您將在軟件公司中看到的範圍, 最近 2 年。但本質上是——這需要一點時間。這將會發生，因為它也與另一個問題密切相關，即您如何實際運營公司，以便有一天它在 GAAP 基礎上盈利，而不是剝離薪酬？而這也在眼界。

And those are our goals for Palantir because same reason we have no debt, same reason we have $2.3 billion on our balance sheet. This is a company built for bad times. Bad times means strong finances internally. And that means at some point, you have to be GAAP profitable. You can't be GAAP profitable if you're diluting people or what -- correctly, your stock-based comp is totally -- is not in conformity with other companies.

這些是我們對 Palantir 的目標，因為同樣的原因我們沒有債務，同樣的原因我們的資產負債表上有 23 億美元。這是一家為糟糕時期而建的公司。糟糕的時期意味著內部財務狀況良好。這意味著在某些時候，你必須是 GAAP 盈利的。如果你在稀釋人，或者什麼——正確地，你的基於股票的公司完全——不符合其他公司，你就不可能在 GAAP 中盈利。

So you're seeing a normalization. This will change. It will change in the relatively near future. It will be linked to other things that we believe are important for Palantir like having a company that thrives in bad times. And we are -- bad times are very good for Palantir because we build products that are robust, that are built for danger. And then the finances internally are actually built for bad times. And bad times means you have free cash flow, the free cash flow turns into GAAP profit. That means the stock-based comp has to be one that's aligned with our investors also because that's basically -- it's part of a little bit longer philosophical narrative.

所以你看到了正常化。這將改變。它將在相對不久的將來發生變化。它將與我們認為對 Palantir 很重要的其他事情相關聯，例如擁有一家在糟糕時期蓬勃發展的公司。而且我們 - 糟糕的時期對 Palantir 來說非常好，因為我們製造的產品堅固耐用，專為危險而生。然後內部的財務實際上是為糟糕的時期而建立的。糟糕的時期意味著你有自由現金流，自由現金流變成了 GAAP 利潤。這意味著基於股票的組合必須與我們的投資者保持一致，因為這基本上是 - 它是更長一點的哲學敘述的一部分。

But like if software is the only moat, then value and gross shares have to be reevaluated in terms of their value. Value only exists if you can actually get a tech moat, call it, maybe something besides, and growth only exist if you build a company that is where the technology is strong enough. The business fundamentals are strong enough that the free cash flow actually turns into GAAP profitability, and that's linked to stock-based comp. So this is a priority, both because you care but also, quite frankly, because it is the health of our company, which we care a lot about.

但就像軟件是唯一的護城河一樣，價值和總份額必鬚根據其價值重新評估。只有當你真的能獲得技術護城河，稱之為技術護城河，也許還有其他東西，價值才存在，只有當你建立一家技術足夠強大的公司時，增長才會存在。業務基本面足夠強大，自由現金流實際上轉化為 GAAP 盈利能力，這與基於股票的薪酬掛鉤。所以這是一個優先事項，既因為你關心，而且坦率地說，因為這是我們公司的健康，我們非常關心。

Great. Thank you, Chase. Our next question is from Keith Weiss with Morgan Stanley. (Operator Instructions)

偉大的。謝謝你，蔡斯。我們的下一個問題來自摩根士丹利的 Keith Weiss。 （操作員說明）

So two questions. One on the product side of the equation. And the other on sort of investments into 2022. On the product side of the equation, Alex, maybe -- hoping you could help us sort of better understand the product road map on a go-forward basis, how you guys are thinking about it from a high level. From our perspective, you guys did a really nice job of better modularizing the platform and made it more adoptable by commercial enterprises. And I think it looks like we've seen that traction in terms of customer adoption. What's kind of the -- on a go-forward basis, is there more activity of that ilk, if you will? Do you create more like prebuilt solutions, if you will, more directly target some of these sort of opportunities that you've been used for, but productize it, if you will? Is that a potential product direction?

所以兩個問題。一個在等式的產品方面。另一個是關於 2022 年的投資。在等式的產品方面，Alex，也許——希望你能幫助我們更好地理解產品路線圖，了解你們是如何考慮的從高水平。從我們的角度來看，你們在更好地模塊化平台並使其更容易被商業企業採用方面做得非常好。而且我認為我們在客戶採用方面已經看到了這種牽引力。什麼樣的 - 在前進的基礎上，如果你願意的話，是否有更多類似的活動？如果您願意，您是否會創建更像預先構建的解決方案，更直接地針對您已經使用過的一些此類機會，但如果您願意，將其產品化？這是一個潛在的產品方向嗎？

And then on the other side of the equation, in terms of investments, investing for growth into 2022. I was hoping you could give us a little bit of visibility into the nature of those investments. Is it just sales headcount? Is it the forward deployed engineers? How should we think about where those dollars are being deployed?

然後在等式的另一邊，在投資方面，為 2022 年的增長而投資。我希望你能讓我們對這些投資的性質有一點了解。僅僅是銷售人數嗎？是前沿部署的工程師嗎？我們應該如何考慮這些資金被部署在哪裡？

Thank you for your question. And so actually, from my perspective, they're very much linked. Our primary investment in growth is product -- is investment in product, and we're doing a number of things in product. The things we've talked about at a general level is kind of making our product more modular. There's a slightly more macro riff here, which is that we were adversarial with IT structurally until recently. We are adversarial because from our perspective, there's a learning process where they had to build these things.

謝謝你的問題。所以實際上，從我的角度來看，它們之間的聯繫非常緊密。我們對增長的主要投資是產品——是對產品的投資，我們在產品方面做了很多事情。我們在一般層面上談論的事情是使我們的產品更加模塊化。這裡有一個稍微宏觀一點的即興表演，即直到最近我們在結構上與 IT 對抗。我們是對抗性的，因為從我們的角度來看，他們必須在一個學習過程中構建這些東西。

Now there's a myriad of companies. They're all honestly, technically hard -- indistinguishable doing data lakes and all sorts of things that help IT people build something that is working for them to do certain things. And we were adversarial because they were like, "Okay, this Foundry thing, yes, great. But we've already built these things. You would replace this, it may honestly could also make us look bad. No one wants it also." The average sale price for Palantir Foundry across our business, I think last year, it was like $6.5 million. Most IT people prefer a small bite in consumption. You can argue whether that's the right model, but instead of fighting them, it's probably better to figure out a way to get our product more in their hands.

現在有無數的公司。老實說，他們在技術上都很難——在做數據湖和各種幫助 IT 人員構建一些東西來幫助他們做某些事情的事情上難以區分。我們是敵對的，因為他們就像，“好吧，這個 Foundry 的東西，是的，很棒。但我們已經建造了這些東西。你可以替換它，老實說它也可能讓我們看起來很糟糕。沒有人想要它。 "我認為去年 Palantir Foundry 整個業務的平均售價約為 650 萬美元。大多數 IT 人員更喜歡少量消費。你可以爭論這是否是正確的模式，但與其與他們抗爭，不如想辦法讓我們的產品更多地掌握在他們手中。

So that's kind of the known part. What we've been working on recently, which is less known is what we're really working on is we believe that people are paying a lot now for consumption and compute. No critique. But in reality, that's very much like paying for gas and oil exploration. But what people are really going to want is the ability to use the fully digested product. It's like when you drive your car, that's minerals and oil products and all sorts of chemicals built into your car, finished product. So -- and we're going to build both modules that are reflective of Foundry but also new ones in areas that we understand and, quite frankly, we know will be built in the near future. So the things we know are working, things that we suspect to work in the future so that the nodes not only work separately but can work together. So de facto, we believe the compute of tomorrow won't be just compute, it will be productized compute. And that's what we're actually working on in rebuilding Foundry.

這就是眾所周知的部分。我們最近一直在做的事情，鮮為人知的是我們真正在做的事情是我們相信人們現在為消費和計算付出了很多。沒有批評。但實際上，這很像支付天然氣和石油勘探費用。但人們真正想要的是能夠使用完全消化的產品。就像當你開車時，你的車裡有礦物和石油產品以及各種化學物質，成品。所以——我們將構建既反映 Foundry 的模塊，又構建我們理解的領域的新模塊，坦率地說，我們知道將在不久的將來構建。所以我們知道的東西正在工作，我們懷疑將來會工作的東西，這樣節點不僅可以單獨工作，而且可以一起工作。所以事實上，我們相信明天的計算將不僅僅是計算，它將是產品化的計算。這就是我們在重建 Foundry 時實際所做的工作。

So there's still -- that doesn't mean like the foundry as an aggregate, we can do the whole thing tomorrow thing, massively valuable, and we're working on very, very large deals where companies are like, "Look, we want to transform what we're doing or take what we're doing and export it to every company in our industry tomorrow." De facto, that's a Foundry use case, and I don't think there's anything else that does that. Because you can take -- for example, there's a very large company in the health care space and it's like they have a very interesting way of doing health care. They can't sell it to other people without that essentially being a software offering. Building that would be 3 years or it could be 2 weeks.

所以還有——這並不意味著像鑄造廠作為一個整體，我們可以在明天做整件事，非常有價值，我們正在處理非常非常大的交易，公司就像，“看，我們想要改變我們正在做的事情，或者將我們正在做的事情輸出到明天我們行業中的每一家公司。”事實上，這是一個 Foundry 用例，我認為沒有其他東西可以做到這一點。因為你可以舉個例子，在醫療保健領域有一家非常大的公司，就好像他們有一種非常有趣的醫療保健方式。如果本質上不是軟件產品，他們就無法將其出售給其他人。建造這將是 3 年或可能是 2 週。

So that we're very much committed to continuing doing because there's like we're an n of 1 there. But where we want to be as an n of 1 on not just making it small, we like that because then we see the IT departments now saying, "Okay, well, we have all these things, and now we want to migrate here," and then selling them something that they can actually bite into. So it's -- because the primary resistance to Palantir has never been lack of sales force, lack of it's been resistance on inside of the IT structure.

所以我們非常致力於繼續做，因為我們在那裡是一個 n of 1。但是我們希望成為 n of 1 的地方不僅僅是讓它變小，我們喜歡這樣，因為那時我們看到 IT 部門現在說，“好吧，好吧，我們擁有所有這些東西，現在我們想遷移到這裡， “然後賣給他們一些他們可以真正咬進去的東西。所以它是 - 因為對 Palantir 的主要阻力從來都不是缺乏銷售力量，缺乏它的是 IT 結構內部的阻力。

And so now we're going to give them something they want and then also build an ecosystem around it. So it's what I think people will want going forward. And so people can stop just buying pure compute, they can buy valuable compute. So that's actually a big project. I would say on that end and on these other ends, what's particularly interesting, I mean, it's obvious, but it's not just the dollars, it's like who's spending them, just like the charisma of what we're doing. We're getting -- we're a company that's like 15 years old and like from revenue, 18 years old from concept for the -- is a company like ours should be getting declining talent. The talent we're getting now is the best in the world, it's the best we've ever gotten, and we're getting people who used to be at Palantir. Everyone knows how good our people who are coming back.

所以現在我們要給他們他們想要的東西，然後圍繞它建立一個生態系統。所以這就是我認為人們想要前進的東西。因此人們可以停止購買純計算，他們可以購買有價值的計算。所以這實際上是一個大項目。我想說的是，在這方面和其他方面，特別有趣的是，我的意思是，這很明顯，但不僅僅是美元，這就像誰在花錢，就像我們正在做的事情的魅力一樣。我們得到 - 我們是一家 15 年曆史的公司，從收入來看，18 年從概念上來說 - 是一家像我們這樣的公司，應該會減少人才。我們現在獲得的人才是世界上最好的，這是我們曾經獲得過的最好的人才，而且我們正在招募曾經在 Palantir 工作的人。每個人都知道我們回來的人有多好。

Just like no company of our pedigree gets people coming back. The reason they're coming back is because this is just (expletive) cool. It's like you do this, you change the world. Now there's a lot of other things we're working on the side to actually make sure. One of the things we failed at, honestly, is capturing the value of what we've done. Most of the products you would see on a map in the industry, any company, they're delivering things we built 7 years ago. We failed in capturing the value of that. We're not going to fail again. We failed in capturing the value of that because we were selling to IT and selling to people in an adversarial way. And we -- sure, we were 7 years, 8 years ahead, but 8 years ahead but they can actually interact with you.

就像我們的血統書沒有一家公司能讓人們回來一樣。他們回來的原因是因為這只是（咒罵）很酷。就像你這樣做，你改變了世界。現在還有很多其他的事情我們正在努力真正確保。老實說，我們失敗的一件事就是抓住我們所做工作的價值。您會在行業地圖上看到的大多數產品，任何公司，它們都在交付我們 7 年前製造的東西。我們未能捕捉到它的價值。我們不會再失敗了。我們未能捕捉到其中的價值，因為我們向 IT 銷售產品並以對抗的方式向人們銷售產品。我們——當然，我們提前了 7 年、8 年，但提前了 8 年，但他們實際上可以與你互動。

That's not the right way to do it, and we're not going to do it that way. In Americas, we're building specialized [sales routes], which means it will take longer to get it to work because we're working. And in Europe, we have a differentiated on the idea that -- so if you just look at the raw numbers, if you look at like where we are investing in, it's like sales hires, very high-end salespeople in Europe and then the rest is just like the best tech engineers in the world because we know we get them, we retain them and it's just very differentiated.

這不是正確的做法，我們也不會那樣做。在美洲，我們正在建立專門的[銷售路線]，這意味著它需要更長的時間才能讓它發揮作用，因為我們正在努力。在歐洲，我們有一個與眾不同的想法——所以如果你只看原始數據，如果你看一下我們在哪裡投資，它就像歐洲的銷售招聘、非常高端的銷售人員，然後是rest 就像世界上最好的技術工程師一樣，因為我們知道我們得到了他們，我們留住了他們，而且它非常與眾不同。

Great. Thanks, Keith. Our next question comes from Palantir shareholder, [Brian L].

偉大的。謝謝，基思。我們的下一個問題來自 Palantir 股東 [Brian L]。

Dr. Karp, thank you for furthering the ideals of Western democracy around the globe. Of the 1,000-plus roles that you intend to hire this year, how many of those will be focused on sales?

卡普博士，感謝您在全球推動西方民主的理想。在您今年打算招聘的 1,000 多個職位中，其中有多少將專注於銷售？

So we're looking to hire 200 salespeople basically, and everyone else is like just like in the past. So the way I think about it is like x salespeople, it's like still 75% technical. We're going to try and hire 200 salespeople. And then as I mentioned, we just hired some very high-end sales acumen in Europe. Yes. Thank you for your question, and thank you for being an investor.

所以我們基本上打算僱傭 200 名銷售人員，其他人都和過去一樣。所以我認為它就像x銷售人員，它仍然是75％的技術。我們將嘗試僱傭 200 名銷售人員。然後正如我提到的，我們剛剛在歐洲聘請了一些非常高端的銷售頭腦。是的。感謝您的提問，感謝您成為投資者。

Great. Thanks, [Brian]. Our next question comes from Mark Cash with Morningstar. (Operator Instructions)

偉大的。謝謝，[布賴恩]。我們的下一個問題來自 Mark Cash 和 Morningstar。 （操作員說明）

Kind of going up what you were just talking about. There's been commentary in the past around becoming the operating system for commercial industries. You talked about airline industry. Maybe just talk about health care for a little bit there. But are there other examples, industry examples you could talk about how that's pulling customers to standardize operations around Palantir?

有點上升你剛才在說什麼。過去有關於成為商業行業操作系統的評論。你談到了航空業。也許只是在那裡談談醫療保健。但是還有其他的例子，你可以談論的行業例子是如何吸引客戶圍繞 Palantir 進行標準化操作的？

Thank you. Well, there are a lot of -- like a lot of the new deals we're working -- so it's like if you look at the time line of Palantir, 2 years ago, it was all kind of -- 3 years ago, it was like analytics and operations. And what you see now is kind of people building off of what -- wanting a standardized, productized version of what we did at Airbus, what we've done internally at BP, what we did with William. And so what I can tell you is like of the very big deals we're working on now, they're almost all this. It's like we used to have to educate people. They didn't believe us.

謝謝你。嗯，有很多 - 就像我們正在處理的很多新交易 - 所以如果你看一下 Palantir 的時間線，2 年前，它就像 - 3 年前，這就像分析和運營。你現在看到的是一些人建立在什麼基礎上——想要一個標準化的、產品化的版本，我們在空中客車公司所做的事情，我們在 BP 內部所做的事情，我們對威廉所做的事情。所以我可以告訴你的是，我們現在正在進行的非常大的交易，幾乎都是這樣。就像我們過去必須教育人們一樣。他們不相信我們。

And what's interesting, I do think it's like, obviously, there was also just the COVID distribution thing. I mean COVID distribution in England. England is not one health care system. It's 600 hospitals at our countries. It's like 600 countries, and this is true. And so just seeing this happen or the networks of people hearing this happen is the reason why you have 80% organic growth in the U.S. ex SPAC and with almost no salespeople. It's because people are now like -- okay -- now the caveat here is this is not for everybody. So there's like not everybody wants -- where this is particularly valuable as you have a business that is not protected by a moat, that has -- but has real insights on how to do something and wants to take over their industry.

有趣的是，我確實認為這就像，顯然，也只是 COVID 分發的事情。我的意思是英格蘭的 COVID 分佈。英格蘭不是一個醫療保健系統。我們國家有 600 家醫院。這就像600個國家，這是真的。因此，僅僅看到這種情況發生或聽到這種情況發生的人的網絡就是為什麼你在美國有 80% 的有機增長（除 SPAC）並且幾乎沒有銷售人員的原因。這是因為人們現在就像——好吧——現在需要注意的是，這並不適合所有人。因此，就像不是每個人都想要——這是特別有價值的，因為你有一個不受護城河保護的企業——但對如何做某事有真正的洞察力，並希望接管他們的行業。

So it's like you're sitting there, you have a product that is maybe the best in the world, maybe the second best in the world, but it's not protected. But you do have insights there for software, you could take over your market. And that's where we're seeing it. The thing that's really changed is for once, it's not me fighting my way into the person's office and then throwing me out. It's them calling and saying "No, we know this can work. The pilot phase is now or like days, and then we're on. And so like -- and we're working on 2 or 3 of these now."

所以就像你坐在那裡，你的產品也許是世界上最好的，也許是世界上第二好的，但它沒有受到保護。但是你確實對軟件有洞察力，你可以接管你的市場。這就是我們看到的地方。真正改變的是這一次，不是我拼命闖進那個人的辦公室然後把我扔出去。是他們打電話說：“不，我們知道這是可行的。試點階段現在或差不多幾天，然後我們就開始了。就像 - 我們現在正在研究其中的 2 或 3 個。”

It's like -- it's just -- it's very, very exciting. The one thing I would say as a caveat though is it's a little bit -- we are both working on this and working on modularization with equal force, because -- and they're just not the same thing. Somebody who wants this is not buying modular Palantir, they want the whole Foundry thing. And what they want is -- what they want to help with is like, well, how would we identify people to hire the right to your platform? That's actually a big new question, like where can we find people -- they don't have to be Palantir quality software engineers, those are just too rare. But -- and what we're doing with our platform is making it so that just smart people can actually write to it. And so that increases our TAM a lot because smart and smart enough or specialized smart to write code at the level you write it here, those are just completely different TAMs.

這就像 - 它只是 - 它非常非常令人興奮。不過，我要說的一件事是有點——我們都在努力解決這個問題，並以同等的力量致力於模塊化，因為——它們只是不一樣的東西。想要這個的人不是購買模塊化的 Palantir，他們想要整個 Foundry 的東西。他們想要的是——他們想要幫助的是，嗯，我們如何確定人們僱傭你平台的權利？這實際上是一個很大的新問題，比如我們在哪裡可以找到人——他們不必是 Palantir 質量軟件工程師，那些太罕見了。但是——我們正在用我們的平台做的就是讓它只有聰明的人才能真正寫到它。所以這大大增加了我們的 TAM，因為足夠聰明和足夠聰明，或者專門聰明，可以在你在這裡編寫的級別編寫代碼，這些只是完全不同的 TAM。

Thanks, Mark. Our next question is from Palantir shareholder, Juan V.

謝謝，馬克。我們的下一個問題來自 Palantir 股東 Juan V.

My question to you is, in a recent interview, Shyam said that what AWS was for developers last decade, Foundry really will be for developers this decade. Can you expand on what plans Palantir has to make Foundry available to a broader developer community? Again, thank you for allowing a retail investor like myself to have a seat at the table. I think it's much appreciated. Doesn't go unnoticed.

我的問題是，在最近的一次採訪中，Shyam 說 AWS 在過去十年對開發人員來說是什麼，而 Foundry 在這十年對開發人員來說真的是。您能否詳細說明 Palantir 為更廣泛的開發者社區提供 Foundry 的計劃？再次感謝您允許像我這樣的散戶投資者在談判桌前坐下。我認為這是非常值得讚賞的。不會被忽視。

I see myself as a retail investor, and I have all my assets in Palantir. So I'm very happy to meet another retail investor, hope in any case. So we've done these like Foundry for Builders programs in America and in France, and like it's not charity. It's because we want people in the tech community broadly to learn how to write to Foundry. We also want to learn from them. So that's one very important program, not revenue based, but it's essentially very valuable for our tech development and very valuable to get technically literate people on Palantir so they can see what they can do and tell us what they can't do.

我將自己視為散戶投資者，我在 Palantir 擁有所有資產。所以我很高興見到另一位散戶投資者，無論如何希望。因此，我們已經在美國和法國開展了類似 Foundry for Builders 計劃，並且認為這不是慈善活動。這是因為我們希望科技界的人們廣泛學習如何給 Foundry 寫信。我們也想向他們學習。所以這是一個非常重要的計劃，不是基於收入的，但它本質上對我們的技術開發非常有價值，並且非常有價值讓有技術知識的人加入 Palantir，這樣他們就可以看到他們能做什麼並告訴我們他們不能做什麼。

Then there's the broader commercial. A lot of the companies we've supplied and government agencies side of Palantir, it's like they require an ability to write to Foundry or to one of our products as like a core competence. And like -- so one of the things we know -- so we're obviously figuring out ways how we can train people, how we can make that experience easier, how can we widen the aperture. And by the way, obviously, not just because -- it's like it's not just for the altruistic reasons that are obvious.

然後是更廣泛的商業廣告。我們提供的很多公司和 Palantir 的政府機構，就像他們需要向 Foundry 或我們的產品之一寫入數據的能力，就像核心競爭力一樣。就像 - 我們知道的一件事 - 所以我們顯然正在想辦法如何培訓人們，我們如何讓這種體驗更容易，我們如何擴大視野。順便說一句，顯然，不僅僅是因為 - 這不僅僅是因為顯而易見的利他主義原因。

It's like if you want people who are valuable now to be valuable tomorrow, they must be able to interact with the software platform. So that's like one of the reasons we've had a lot of adoption because if you take a company like Chrysler Fiat, which has very talented people and it's -- they need to be able to write to the platform. And so that's -- and then work with the platform. So we're working on that partly for political reasons and partly because, obviously, it's very good for you as an investor in Palantir and we're proud of that.

這就像如果你想讓現在有價值的人明天也有價值，他們必須能夠與軟件平台進行交互。這就是我們被大量採用的原因之一，因為如果你選擇像克萊斯勒菲亞特這樣的公司，它擁有非常有才華的人，而且——他們需要能夠寫到平台上。這就是 - 然後與平台合作。因此，我們正在為此努力，部分原因是出於政治原因，部分原因顯然是，作為 Palantir 的投資者，這對你非常有利，我們為此感到自豪。

Great. Thanks, Juan. Our next question is from Phil Winslow with Credit Suisse. (Operator Instructions)

偉大的。謝謝，胡安。我們的下一個問題來自瑞士信貸的菲爾溫斯洛。 （操作員說明）

I do appreciate the cohort data that you disclosed today. That was very helpful. Just to dig in on that a little bit. Alex, you talked about seeing -- starting to see an inflection where Palantir is getting pulled into some of these commercial deals sort of asking for Palantir without even knowing necessarily that's what they needed. You see that in the cohort number on the commercial side in terms of the new for 2021. I'm curious if we can just dig into that a little bit. Are you seeing specific industries really start to have that a-ha moment get it? Are there certain use cases that they're leaning into? And then I just have one follow-up to that.

我很欣賞您今天披露的同類群組數據。這很有幫助。只是為了稍微深入一點。亞歷克斯，你談到了看到 - 開始看到 Palantir 被拉入其中一些商業交易的轉折點，有點像要求 Palantir 甚至不知道這就是他們需要的東西。您可以在 2021 年新的商業方面看到這一點。我很好奇我們是否可以深入研究一下。您是否看到特定行業真的開始有那個瞬間得到它？他們是否傾向於某些用例？然後我只有一個後續行動。

What makes Palantir Foundry valuable is that it's not really industry dependent, and this is crucial for us because we -- our sales force is so nascent. So we're very dependent on where -- either there's a crisis or where, again, that crisis or where somebody actually wants to enter a market they're not in and wants to expand. So I would say, in the past, we were very, very dependent on manufacturing. So like our high-level engineering companies like BP and others because we de facto needed the engineering talent because no one else believed us the product was differentiated.

Palantir Foundry 之所以有價值，是因為它並不真正依賴於行業，這對我們來說至關重要，因為我們——我們的銷售團隊還處於萌芽狀態。因此，我們非常依賴於哪裡——要么存在危機，要么再次發生危機，或者有人真正想要進入一個他們沒有進入並想要擴張的市場。所以我想說，在過去，我們非常非常依賴製造業。因此，就像我們的高級工程公司，如 BP 和其他公司，因為我們事實上需要工程人才，因為沒有人相信我們的產品是與眾不同的。

Now it is much more standard businesses of all kinds. And so just like really the who's who of American business, from like people building tractors to building cars to oil and gas to distribution, and there's no one kind of company. Where we do not do well is like, yes, we're not going to sell to a marketing company. It's like that we're not -- we don't [bother talking to them]. They don't call us. We're not good at marketing like they apparently are. They're so good at marketing. They don't have to quantify their results. We don't -- yes.

現在它是各種標準的業務。所以就像美國企業的名人錄一樣，從製造拖拉機到製造汽車到石油和天然氣再到分銷，沒有一種公司。我們做得不好的地方就是，是的，我們不會賣給營銷公司。就像我們不是 - 我們不[打擾與他們交談]。他們不給我們打電話。我們不像他們那樣擅長營銷。他們非常擅長營銷。他們不必量化他們的結果。我們不——是的。

So by the way, one of the places, Europe -- one of the interesting ways to look at our business, by the way, since you're in Europe and since I have an affinity to your region, [Liechtenstein Schweiz], is it's that Europe in general has like grew slower and that's -- if you assume that comes back online, it's just going to be bombastic. One of the places that we're actually very strong in Europe is Switzerland. And there, you have like a lot of the pharmaceuticals, insurance companies, banks, that can't be mentioned using our products. And I think they use it, honestly, because it's like there's a Swiss quality to pound here. It's like a very high-quality product. We deliver it. It will work. You're not going to get the charming slap on the back or the steak dinner and your software is going to (expletive) work. So...

順便說一下，歐洲是其中一個地方——順便說一下，看待我們業務的有趣方式之一，因為你在歐洲，而且我對你所在的地區有親和力，[列支敦士登瑞士]總體而言，歐洲的增長速度變慢了，那就是-如果您假設它重新上線，那將是誇大其詞。我們在歐洲實際上非常強大的地方之一是瑞士。在那裡，你有很多製藥公司、保險公司、銀行，使用我們的產品是無法提及的。老實說，我認為他們使用它，因為這就像這裡有一種瑞士品質。這就像一個非常高質量的產品。我們交付它。它會起作用的。你不會得到迷人的耳光或牛排晚餐，你的軟件會（咒罵）工作。所以...

Got it. And then just to follow up on that specifically because obviously, the net retention numbers you have in U.S. government, government in general is huge, U.S. commercial is huge. That's the one thing I noticed with the disclosure of the net retention is non-U.S. commercial is significantly lower. What drives that? And how do you sort of inflect that higher?

知道了。然後只是專門跟進這一點，因為很明顯，你在美國政府中的淨保留人數，一般政府是巨大的，美國商業是巨大的。這是我在披露淨留存率時注意到的一件事，即非美國商業廣告的比例要低得多。是什麼驅動了它？你是怎麼把它變高的？

Well, first of all, I do think there's a handoff function, and I think these things are actually repeating what happened in the earlier days in America when it's like where you have a handoff. Built in government because you have more time to actually get it right, hand off to commercial, go to Europe. I do think, in general, certain Swiss institutions, certain German institutions, certain French institutions are not included, where it is slower. Like if you are building something very, very new, it will be adopted a little later.

嗯，首先，我確實認為有一個切換功能，我認為這些事情實際上是在重複美國早期發生的事情，就像你有一個切換的地方一樣。建立政府，因為你有更多的時間真正做到正確，交給商業，去歐洲。我確實認為，總的來說，某些瑞士機構、某些德國機構、某些法國機構不包括在內，它們的速度較慢。就像如果你正在構建一些非常非常新的東西，它會在稍後被採用。

But then there's also just the COVID. The reaction to COVID in Continental -- in Europe was different than in America. While it slowed things down in America, it didn't really stop them. And so I kind of -- what I suspect is going to happen is that Europe because of COVID reopening and because of basically people copying what's happening in highly adaptive America and sometimes in Switzerland, you will see the European cohort grow.

但也只有COVID。歐洲大陸對 COVID 的反應與美國不同。雖然它在美國放慢了速度，但並沒有真正阻止它們。所以我有點——我懷疑歐洲會因為 COVID 重新開放而發生，因為基本上人們複製了高度適應的美國和有時在瑞士發生的事情，你會看到歐洲群體的增長。

But again, to just make it a little more quantitative, we have, I think, 150% net dollar retention in U.S. commercial. Again, a number which we're getting with basically no one holding it up. So I don't know how it works with other companies, but I think if I were a scientist, I'd want to normalize that number. But even not normalized, this is a very strong number. What we're going to show is net dollar retention in the U.S., and over time, we're going to show how this expands outside the U.S. And that I think what you'll begin to see is that the strength in the U.S. will go outside the U.S. and we'll make our business very, very robust.

但同樣，為了讓它更量化一點，我認為，我們在美國商業廣告中擁有 150% 的淨美元保留率。同樣，我們得到的數字基本上沒有人支持。所以我不知道它如何與其他公司合作，但我認為如果我是一名科學家，我想將這個數字標準化。但即使沒有標準化，這是一個非常強大的數字。我們要展示的是美國的淨美元保留，隨著時間的推移，我們將展示它如何在美國以外的地方擴張，我想你會開始看到的是，美國的實力將會走出美國，我們將使我們的業務非常非常強大。

Thanks, Phil. So Alex, we've taken -- we've received over 1,000 questions from shareholders. Obviously, you can't take them all. Any parting wisdom or parting thoughts that you want to offer about the business to our shareholders?

謝謝，菲爾。所以亞歷克斯，我們已經接受了 - 我們已經收到了來自股東的 1,000 多個問題。顯然，你不能把它們都拿走。您想向我們的股東提供有關業務的任何離別智慧或離別想法？

It's really tough times out there, really tough for a lot of businesses. It's -- a lot of things are going wrong in the world, in our world. It -- the obvious danger, the lack of legitimacy of a lot of our institutions. And I can tell you while -- at Palantir, we are very, very focused on our business and bad times are very super motivational for us. And when we get to good times, we'll be even stronger. And we're a little bit of a like wacky group of guerilla warfighters, but we're very much in fighting mode. And not just for us and the West, but also for our shareholders. And yes, I hope to talk to you soon. Thank you.

那裡真的很艱難，對很多企業來說真的很艱難。這是——在我們的世界裡，世界上很多事情都出了問題。它 - 明顯的危險，我們的許多機構缺乏合法性。我可以告訴你，在 Palantir，我們非常非常專注於我們的業務，而糟糕的時期對我們來說非常有動力。當我們度過美好時光時，我們會變得更加強大。我們有點像一群古怪的游擊戰士，但我們非常處於戰鬥模式。不僅為我們和西方，也為我們的股東。是的，我希望很快能和你談談。謝謝你。