Match Group Inc (MTCH) 2014 Q4 法說會逐字稿

Good day, everyone, and welcome to the IAC reports Q4 2014 results call. As a reminder, today's call is being recorded. At this time, I'd like to turn the conference over to Mr. Jeff Kip, Chief Financial Officer. Please go ahead, sir.

大家好，歡迎參加IAC 2014年第四季業績電話會議。提醒各位，本次會議正在錄音。現在，我將會議交給財務長傑夫‧基普先生。請您發言。

Thanks, Operator. Good morning, everyone. Welcome to our fourth-quarter earnings call. I have here with me Greg Blatt, Chairman of the Match group, and Joey Levin, CEO of our Search and Applications segment. Just to remind you, we will not be reading any prepared remarks on this call. They are currently available on Investor Relations section of our website. Before we get to Q&A, though, I would like to remind you that during this call, we may discuss our outlook and future performance.

謝謝接線生。大家早安。歡迎參加我們的第四季財報電話會議。今天陪同我的是Match集團董事長Greg Blatt先生和搜尋與應用部門執行長Joey Levin先生。提醒各位，本次電話會議我們不宣讀任何事先準備好的發言稿。發言稿目前已發佈在我們網站的投資者關係頁面。在進入問答環節之前，我想再次提醒各位，在本次電話會議中，我們可能會討論公司展望和未來業績。

These forward-looking statements typically may be preceded by words such as we expect, we believe, we anticipate or similar statements. These forward-looking views are subject to risks and uncertainties, and our actual results could differ materially from the views expressed today. Some of these risks have been set forth in our fourth-quarter press release, and our periodic reports filed with the SEC.

這些前瞻性陳述通常會以「我們預期」、「我們相信」、「我們預期」或類似表述開頭。這些前瞻性觀點受風險和不確定性因素的影響，我們的實際結果可能與今天表達的觀點有重大差異。其中一些風險已在我們的第四季新聞稿和向美國證券交易委員會提交的定期報告中列出。

We will also today discuss certain non-GAAP measures, which, as a reminder, include adjusted EBITDA, which we will refer to today as EBITDA, for simplicity, during the call. I'll also point you to our press release, and again, to the Investor Relations section of our website, for all comparable GAAP measures and full reconciliations for all material non-GAAP measures. And with that, we will jump right into Q&A. Operator?

今天我們也將討論一些非GAAP指標，再次提醒大家，其中包括調整後EBITDA，為簡單起見，在今天的電話會議中，我們將簡稱為EBITDA。此外，請各位參閱我們的新聞稿，並再次造訪我們網站的投資者關係頁面，查看所有可比較的GAAP指標以及所有重要非GAAP指標的完整調節表。接下來，我們將直接進入問答環節。接線生？

(Operator Instructions)

（操作說明）

John Blackledge, Cowen and Company.

John Blackledge，Cowen and Company。

Great, thanks. Three questions. First, with Core Match registrations up 30% year over year in January, does that imply a year-over-year increase in net paying sub-ads in 1Q 2015? What are mobile and desktop registration to paid conversion rates?

太好了，謝謝。我有三個問題。首先，1月Core Match註冊量年增30%，這是否意味著2015年第一季淨付費子廣告數量也較去年同期成長？行動端和桌面端的註冊付費轉換率分別是多少？

And are the January results evidence that Core Match has turned the corner? Second, at Match, can you quantify the significant first-quarter EBITDA decline on a year-over-year percentage basis? And also quantify investment losses in the non-dating businesses in 1Q 2015 and 4Q 2014? And then lastly, for Tinder, just timing for global monetization? And is advertising on Tinder in the plan for 2015? Thank you.

一月份的業績是否顯示Core Match已經扭轉頹勢？其次，Match能否量化一下第一季EBITDA年比大幅下降的具體百分比？另外，能否量化一下2015年第一季和2014年第四季非約會業務的投資損失？最後，關於Tinder，全球商業化的時機如何？ Tinder是否計劃在2015年投放廣告？謝謝。

You have challenged my note-taking prowess, so let me --

你質疑我的筆記能力，那麼就讓我——

I can repeat.

我可以重複。

I think we've got it.

我想我們明白了。

Let me try and hit all of it. There were a lot of, I think, subparts in there. So let me try and hit. On the 30% red growth, think about it this way. Which is, in any given period, your paid subscribers, your new paid -- sorry. During a period, your subscribers are going to be partly the subscribers who came into the period. And then a new set of subscribers. And those new set of subscribers are going to come, really, from three different places. One is the regs that you are getting at that time, call that the 30% in January.

讓我盡量把所有內容都解釋清楚。我覺得這裡面有很多子部分。所以讓我來解釋一下。關於30%的紅色成長，你可以這樣想。在任何特定時期，你的付費用戶，也就是你新增的付費用戶——抱歉，是新增用戶——在某個時期，你的用戶一部分是在這個時期內新增的，另一部分是新增用戶。這些新增用戶其實來自三個不同的管道。一是你在那個時期獲得的常規用戶，我們姑且稱之為1月份的30%增長。

Then you get a piece from regs who didn't convert as quickly who are the prior period. And then you get a bunch from re-subs. So people who had subbed before, and come in. We're seeing big growth in that top section, which is the 30%. But it certainly doesn't translate into 30% paid sub growth in the same period. In February, we will have another good February. And then we'll also have a better reserve of old regs from January, because we will have had a great January.

然後，一部分來自上一期付費用戶，他們轉換速度較慢。還有一部分是來自續訂用戶，也就是之前訂閱過的用戶。我們看到高階用戶群成長顯著，佔比高達30%。但這並不代表同期付費用戶數也增加了30%。二月預計又是一個不錯的月份。而且，由於一月份的良好表現，我們一月份的老用戶儲備也會更加充足。

So the momentum builds over the course of the year. It is very positive sign, but it takes a while to trickle into that PMC growth. But just as an example, though, like I just looked at the flash numbers for January, and we ended January with North America subs up 6.3%, versus, I think, December ending in the 4%s. So it shows you it's not -- it doesn't translate directly, but the momentum is building, and we expect that momentum to build throughout the quarter. One of the things that's going to drive a lower Q1 EBITDA rate is, we are increasing marketing spend overall. But January to January was actually even. The big increase is coming in February and March.

因此，成長勢頭會在一年內逐漸增強。這是一個非常積極的信號，但需要一段時間才能轉化為PMC的成長。舉個例子，就像我剛才看的1月的初步數據，1月北美訂閱用戶成長了6.3%，而12月份的增幅約為4%。這表明，成長勢頭並不能直接轉化為PMC的成長，但確實在增強，我們預計這一勢頭將在整個季度持續增強。導致第一季EBITDA下降的原因之一是，我們整體行銷支出增加。但實際上，1月份與1月份基本持平。大幅成長將在2月和3月到來。

So we expect North American PMC growth to accelerate meaningfully over the course of Q1. In terms of, I think, mobile to desktop conversion, there is different conversion for mobile web, for the iOS app, the Android app. In general, it's a little behind desktop. It's been getting better. But it differs across three, so I'd say there's a small deficit on a blended basis. But clearly, with the kind of volume we are seeing, that is a net pickup. Meaning we will take the dilutive conversion for the significant increase in regs. There is no question that the positive offsets the negative there.

因此，我們預計北美PMC業務將在第一季顯著加速成長。就行動端到桌面端的轉換率而言，我認為行動網頁、iOS應用程式和安卓應用程式的轉換率各不相同。總體而言，行動端轉換率略低於桌面端，但情況正在好轉。由於三個平台的轉換率有差異，因此綜合來看，行動端轉換率略低於桌面端。不過，鑑於我們目前看到的交易量，這顯然是淨成長。這意味著，我們將接受因監管業務大幅成長而導致的轉換率稀釋。毫無疑問，正面因素足以抵消負面因素的影響。

In terms of whether it means Match has turned the corner, look, I think we are having a really good January. We expect to have a good year. I think last year was obviously not our best. We are doing a lot on product, our marketing is better. I think there was a shock to the system last year, for the overall, with Tinder's explosive growth. I think the system has digested that, meaning Tinder is still growing really well. But we are seeing accelerating growth in everything else. So we feel really good about it.

至於這是否意味著Match已經扭轉頹勢，我認為我們一月份的表現確實非常出色。我們預計今年也會有不錯的成績。去年顯然不是我們最好的一年。我們在產品方面投入了大量精力，行銷也做得更好了。去年Tinder的爆炸性成長對整個市場造成了衝擊。我認為市場已經消化了這種衝擊，這意味著Tinder目前仍保持著強勁的成長勢頭。但我們看到其他所有業務都在加速成長。所以我們對未來充滿信心。

Next, I think, was a question on Tinder monetization, but I'm not sure exactly what it was. Why don't you repeat?

接下來，我想問的是關於 Tinder 獲利模式的問題，但我不太確定具體是什麼。你能再說一次嗎？

Yes, just the timing for the global monetization? And then is advertising on Tinder in the plan for 2015? And I had one other one.

是的，只是全球商業化的具體時間安排？另外，2015年Tinder是否計劃投放廣告？我還有一個問題。

Okay. We started the test in, I think, December. The test is ongoing. We expect to be global, certainly, by the end of Q1, with a full rollout. It's a little later that we thought, but that's the life of a startup. And startups are inherently -- they are not as regimented, in terms of when everything exactly happens. That's the nature of a two-year-old, fast-growing enterprise. But we are out, we're testing in both iOS and Android right now, and we expect to be fully rolled out, certainly this month.

好的。我們大概在去年12月開始了測試，目前測試仍在進行中。我們預計到第一季末肯定會在全球範圍內全面上線。這比我們預想的要晚一些，但這就是新創公司的特色。新創公司本質上——它們不像大型公司那樣有條不紊地按部就班地進行所有操作。這就是一家成立兩年、快速發展的公司的本質。但我們已經啟動了測試，目前正在iOS和Android平台上進行測試，預計本月肯定會全面上線。

In terms of advertising, I think I said on the last call, when we've talked about Tinder numbers in the past, we've not included ad dollars, but I've also said we do expect add revenue to be a meaningful part of the mix. I think that exactly when we will bleed that in will be a combination of opportunity, resource allocation choices that we make. I would certainly expect to have some ad revenue this year. Exactly when, and to what extent, I'm not prepared to say at this point. And you said you had one other?

關於廣告方面，我想我在上次電話會議上說過，我們之前討論 Tinder 的用戶數據時，並沒有把廣告收入算進去，但我也說過，我們預計廣告收入會成為收入構成中相當重要的一部分。至於具體何時能實現，我認為取決於機會和我們所做的資源分配選擇。我肯定今年會有一些廣告收入。至於具體時間以及收入規模，我現在還不方便透露。你剛才說你還有另一個人？

Yes, just quantifying the significant 1Q EBITDA decline on a year-over-year basis?

是的，只是想量化一下第一季 EBITDA 年比大幅下降的情況？

Sure.

當然。

And the non-dating losses.

以及非約會相關的損失。

Right. The biggest thing is, we are -- if you think about it, I think there's about $15 million more of COA spend in Q1 2015 over 2014. I think there's then, call it, $4 million or $5 million incremental net investment in our non-dating businesses. And our investment, part of that is Tinder, so our historical investment businesses. As I think I said in the prepared remarks, we are expecting more than 100% of the total losses for the year in our non-dating businesses to be in Q1. And so that takes a big hit, and that's different than last year. We accelerated a lot of the spend, especially in the DailyBurn business, where we just found that the returns are just much better early in the year.

沒錯。最重要的是，如果你仔細想想，我認為2015年第一季我們在COA（客戶營運成本）的支出比2014年同期增加了大約1500萬美元。此外，我們在非約會業務方面也新增了約400萬到500萬美元的淨投資。而我們的投資，其中一部分來自Tinder，也就是我們一直以來投資的業務。正如我在事先準備好的演講稿中提到的，我們預計非約會業務全年虧損的100%以上都將發生在第一季。因此，這部分業務遭受了重創，與去年有所不同。我們加快了許多支出，尤其是在DailyBurn業務方面，因為我們發現年初的回報要好得多。

And so when you put all those things together, that really drives the Q1 down. I think if you want to think about the non-dating businesses for the year, the investment there is in the low- to mid-teens in millions, which is down meaningfully from last year. And at least right now, we would expect that to be neutral to positive in 2016. That's how we think about it. So those factors together drive down the Q1 EBITDA. As I think I said, we expect Q2 EBITDA to be positive and healthy, and for the full year to be the same.

因此，綜合所有這些因素，確實拉低了第一季的業績。我認為，如果考慮非約會類業務，今年的投資額在數百萬美元左右，比去年大幅下降。至少目前來看，我們預計2016年該項投資將維持中性或略微成長。我們是這樣看待的。所以，這些因素共同導致了第一季EBITDA的下降。正如我之前所說，我們預計第二季EBITDA將保持正成長，全年業績也將如此。

Thank you.

謝謝。

You're welcome.

不客氣。

Ross Sandler, Deutsche Bank.

羅斯‧桑德勒，德意志銀行。

Okay, guys, just one following up on Tinder, and then one on Search. On Tinder, can you give us an update of what the total number of MAUs currently on the platform are? Or maybe how fast MAUs are growing? And then what kind of total revenue contribution do you expect from Tinder in 2015?

好的，各位，關於Tinder，還有一個問題想問，關於搜尋功能。關於Tinder，能否提供一下目前平台的每月活躍用戶總數（MAU）？或者說說月活躍用戶成長的速度？另外，你們預計Tinder在2015年的總收入貢獻是多少？

And then, if Joey's on the call on Search, can you give us a little more color on the over $300 million in EBITDA guidance for 2015? You guys noted some of the hiccups from the recent changes at Google for Ask. But that's a pretty meaningful stepdown versus what was reported in 2014. So just more color on what's going on there? And then any update on the Google contract renewal? Thank you.

如果Joey也參加了關於搜尋業務的電話會議，能否請您詳細解釋一下2015年超過3億美元的EBITDA預期？你們提到了谷歌最近對Ask業務進行的一些調整帶來了一些問題。但與2014年公佈的數據相比，這確實是相當大的降幅。所以，能否請您更詳細說明一下具體情況？另外，關於谷歌合約續簽，有什麼最新進展嗎？謝謝。

Yes, I think Tinder MAUs continue to grow really well. We've not disclosed the aggregate number. I think they are up approximately -- they were up about 200% of what it was. So up 100%, I guess, over last year. And growing very strong. In terms of --

是的，我認為 Tinder 的月活躍用戶數 (MAU) 繼續保持著非常強勁的成長勢頭。我們尚未公佈具體數字。我認為成長幅度大約是——大約是之前的 200%。所以，我猜比去年同期成長了 100%。而且成長勢頭非常強勁。就——

January was the biggest month we've ever had.

一月份是我們有史以來業績最好的一個月。

Yes, January was the biggest month we ever had, which you would expect, because that's the seasonal best month for this category. But growth continues -- that's right. By far, growth continues very strong in this business, and globally and domestically. So it's continuing to roll from a user-growth perspective. In terms of monetization, I laid out last time, a general strawman that we thought was a reasonable strawman. Nothing's really changed in that. I also, in my prepared remarks, I think, talked about how it can be choppy and uneven.

是的，一月份是我們有史以來業績最好的一個月，這也在意料之中，因為一月份通常是這類產品的旺季。但成長仍在繼續——沒錯。目前為止，無論在全球或國內，這項業務的成長都非常強勁。因此，從用戶成長的角度來看，成長動能依然強勁。至於獲利模式，我上次概述了一個我們認為合理的整體框架。這方面並沒有什麼改變。此外，我認為我在準備的發言稿中也談到了獲利模式可能會出現波動和不均衡的情況。

We expect to generate meaningful revenue this year, with some modest EBITDA contribution and that slipping into significant contribution and revenue next year. But, look, this is a startup. Its an odd startup, because it's housed within a public company. But it's a two-year-old company. And we're not going to get it hung up on quarter-to-quarter projections, because it is not good for a Company like that. We are focused very much on long-term value creation here. We think it's a unique and tremendously valuable asset.

我們預計今年將產生可觀的收入，EBITDA貢獻適中，明年將實現顯著的EBITDA貢獻和收入成長。但是，請注意，這畢竟是一家新創公司。它是一家比較特殊的新創公司，因為它隸屬於上市公司。不過，它成立至今只有兩年。我們不會讓它過於專注於季度業績預測，因為這對這樣的公司來說並不好。我們非常注重長期價值創造。我們認為這是一項獨特且極具價值的資產。

We started monetizing it, I think, earlier than many others would, just because that's our philosophy. We think that it is good for businesses to be able to both grow users and generate revenue at the same time. But there is certainly no stick we're going to be walking around with beating people up for quarterly revenue. So I think we are going to let it produce at the pace that it produces. We expect to be driving monetization improvements throughout the year. But we're also going to be doing a lot of other things. And I think once it's rolled out globally, I will be in a position to speak better, and more completely, on what I think the near-term expectations are, as opposed to the long-term, which I think are tremendous.

我認為，我們比許多其他公司更早開始獲利，因為這是我們的理念。我們認為，企業能夠同時發展用戶和創造收入是件好事。但我們絕不會為了季度收入而大動幹戈。所以我們會順其自然，讓它按照自身的發展速度前進。我們預計全年都會持續改善獲利模式。但我們也會做很多其他的事情。我認為，一旦這項服務在全球範圍內推出，我將能夠更全面、更清晰地闡述我對近期預期（而非長期預期，我認為長期預期非常可觀）的看法。

In terms of the $300 million, we said over $300 million, and I feel good about over $300 million. So I think we've got some room for flexibility there. But when you're comparing that to 2014, there's a few things in 2014 that don't flow through to 2015. The biggest one is, as you point out, the Google change that's affecting Ask.com's ability to market on Google. So when you carry that forward, that is by far the biggest factor in that. And then there's just some old things.

關於3億美元的目標，我們之前說過會超過3億美元，我對超過3億美元很有信心。所以我覺得我們在這方面還有一些迴旋餘地。但是，如果把這個數字和2014年相比，2014年的一些因素並沒有延續到2015年。最大的因素，正如你所指出的，是谷歌的政策變化影響了Ask.com在谷歌上的行銷能力。所以，把這個因素考慮進去，這無疑是最大的影響因素。此外，還有一些舊因素。

Like there's the Chrome run rate, which we have talked about. The older Chrome experience that was there in the second half of 2014, and some tail on that in the second half of 2014, which doesn't run through to 2015. And just a few other smaller things. We sold UrbanSpoon. We're doing a little investment in Ask.fm. Bloomware, from a P&L perspective, a GAAP P&L perspective, has investment in it, although not from a cash perspective. And so all those things flow through to the number there, but I feel good that we will be over $300 million.

例如我們之前提到的Chrome瀏覽器運行率。還有2014年下半年推出的舊版Chrome瀏覽器，以及2014年下半年持續一段時間的舊版Chrome瀏覽器，這些都延續到了2015年。另外還有一些其他的小項目。我們出售了UrbanSpoon。我們正在對Ask.fm進行一些投資。從損益表（GAAP損益表）的角度來看，我們對Bloomware也有投資，儘管從現金流的角度來看並非如此。所有這些因素都會影響到最終的營收，但我相信我們最終的營收會超過3億美元。

And as it relates to the Google contract, we still have got over a year left on the existing agreement. And I don't think there's anything to report, other than there is an active market for people looking for this kind of business. You've seen Yahoo just won the Mozilla deal. There's a lot of activity going on right now. And everybody in the market, Google included, has suggested they are very interested in our business, after the current contract term. So we'll report on that when we have something to report.

至於與Google的合同，我們目前的協議還有一年多才到期。除了市場上有很多公司在尋找這類業務之外，我認為沒有什麼特別需要說明的。雅虎剛拿下了Mozilla的收購案。現在市場非常活躍。包括Google在內的所有潛在買家都表示，在現有合約期滿後，他們對我們的業務非常感興趣。所以，一旦有新的進展，我們會及時報告。

Great. Thanks, guys.

太好了，謝謝各位。

(Operator Instructions)

（操作說明）

Jason Helfstein, Oppenheimer

傑森·赫爾夫斯坦，奧本海默

Two questions. Greg, can you just talk a little bit more about what's driving the lower [COA]? How much of it's competitive dynamics, as far as the (inaudible) less spending by competition? How much of this is, you guys are doing better things, whether it's with social marketing, or doing a better job with mobile conversions? So just a little bit more detail around what's happening there? Because obviously, you are saying you have significant confidence to invest behind it.

兩個問題。 Greg，你能再詳細說說降低客戶獲取成本 (COA) 的原因嗎？其中有多少是競爭動態造成的，例如競爭對手的支出減少？又有多少是因為你們自身做得更好，無論是社群行銷還是行動端轉換率的提升？所以，能否更詳細地解釋一下具體情況？因為很明顯，你表示你們對這方面有很大的信心，願意投入大量資源。

And then, secondly, I guess, the question for Jeff, for more broadly. To the extent if Search keeps declining on a consolidated basis for EBITDA, is there a point at which it does not make sense to spin off Match, because there's not enough value in the core? And then, do you consider effectively separating Search from everything else? And ultimately, how do you do that? How do you think about that? Thanks.

其次，我想問傑夫一個更廣義的問題。如果搜尋業務的合併EBITDA持續下滑，是否存在一個臨界點，使得分拆Match業務變得毫無意義，因為核心業務的價值已經不足？那麼，您是否考慮過將搜尋業務與其他所有業務有效分開？最終，您會如何做到這一點？您對此有何看法？謝謝。

On COA, I think there's two things going on. We are seeing lower COA on a unit basis, and we're increasing aggregate COA, in part because of that. And I think what's drriving the better returns we are seeing, it is a combination of things. Our off-line marketing is working better, working really well, and better than it was.

關於成本成本（COA），我認為有兩個因素在起作用。一方面，我們看到單位成本成本下降了，另一方面，由於單位成本下降，我們的總成本成本卻在上升。我認為，推動我們獲得更好回報的因素是多種因素共同作用的結果。我們的離線行銷效果更好了，而且比以前好得多。

We are getting better at mobile paid acquisition, which is something we've talked about is a discipline that we need to get better at, and that we're starting to. Opening up some channels there that are working really well for us. I think those are really the two big drivers, at this point. We are starting to play in video and social, and everything else, but still relatively small. I think that was it on the Match side?

我們在行動付費用戶獲取方面做得越來越好，我們之前也討論過這是我們需要改進的領域，而我們也正在著手改進。我們開闢了一些頻道，這些頻道的效果非常好。我認為目前來說，這確實是兩大主要驅動力。我們也開始涉足影片、社群媒體和其他領域，但規模仍然相對較小。我想這就是Match方面的情況了吧？

Yes, and, look, we very often get the structural question. I don't think relative growth in any given business is a hugely material factor to these kinds of things. And, look, they've happened in the past, but we're not announcing or discussing them. And I understand your line of questioning; I just am not sure it is the right path to go down. And it's not really the way we think about it.

是的，而且，你看，我們常被問到結構性問題。我認為任何特定業務的相對成長對這類事情來說都不是至關重要的因素。而且，你看，過去也發生過類似的事情，但我們不會宣布或討論。我理解你的疑問；我只是不確定這是否是正確的方向。這也不是我們考慮的重點。

Peter Stabler, Wells Fargo Securities.

Peter Stabler，富國證券。

I've got one for Greg and one for Joey. Greg, could you give us a little more color around the pullback in marketing spend in Q4 for Match? It sounds like the marketing is more productive. Curious as to why that would lead to a pullback.

我給格雷格和喬伊各提了一個問題。格雷格，你能詳細解釋一下Match第四季行銷支出縮減的原因嗎？聽起來行銷成效似乎更好了。我很好奇為什麼這反而會導致支出減少。

And then Joey, wondering if you could offer us a little color on the website page view metrics there? What were the drivers on those declines? And if you could break out any subcomponent color there, that would be great. I lied. One more for Greg. On the 4% growth, are in-app payments having any sort of negative impact on revenue generation? And that's it. Thank you.

然後，Joey，你能不能給我們詳細解釋一下網站頁面瀏覽量指標？導致這些指標下降的原因是什麼？如果能把各個子指標的分析也列出來就更好了。我撒謊了。還有一個問題要問Greg。關於4%的成長，應用程式內支付是否對收入產生了任何負面影響？好了，就這些。謝謝。

On the fourth quarter, I think fourth quarter is always a seasonally low marketing period for us, and Q1 is always a seasonally high, in that Q4 pricing of inventory is the highest, and dating behavior is the lowest. And Q1 is the opposite, which is Q1 is the most active time for users to engage with our product, and it's when inventory is the lowest. So you have those two dynamics working on a seasonal basis. And then we just felt like what we are seeing in Q4, in terms of the marketing opportunities, what we expected to see in Q1, we thought better to spend heavy in Q1.

我認為第四季通常是我們行銷淡季，而第一季則是旺季，因為第四季庫存價格最高，而用戶活躍度卻最低。第一季則恰恰相反，用戶最活躍地使用我們的產品，但此時庫存卻最低。所以，這兩種因素會隨著季節變化而產生交互作用。鑑於我們目前在第四季度看到的行銷機會，以及我們預期在第一季看到的行銷機會，我們認為應該在第一季加大投入。

We're a business that likes to grow revenue and profit at the same time. Not necessarily every quarter, but over time. And we felt like Q4 was a good time to pull back on marketing a little bit, and take some extra profit, knowing that we were going to invest it further in Q1. So it is the -- call them the endgame decisions that we make along the way. We ended up pulling back more than we thought, more than we had originally expected. But we felt it was a good thing to do, and we're able to put cash in the bank, and have accelerated growth here in Q1.

我們是一家追求營收和利潤雙重成長的企業。並非每季都如此，而是長期來看。我們認為第四季是適當縮減行銷投入、獲取額外利潤的好時機，因為我們計劃在第一季加大投資。所以，這可以說是我們一路走來做出的最終決策。最終，我們縮減的行銷投入比預期要多，也比最初的計畫要多。但我們認為這樣做是明智之舉，既能增加現金儲備，又能在第一季加速成長。

So that was really the thinking. On the other question, I'm not sure I understood it. Can you repeat the other Match question? And then Joey can --

這就是我的想法。至於另一個問題，我不太確定我是否理解了。你能再重複一次那個匹配題嗎？然後喬伊可以——

I was wondering, with the growth of mobile, whether you guys are impacted by a sharing of revenue in-app?

我想知道，隨著行動端的快速發展，你們是否受到了應用程式內收入分成模式的影響？

I think that it's still small today. There are two ways to think about the App Store fee. One is as a pretty reasonable cost of acquisition rev share deal, and the other is as a highly unreasonable payment processing fee. And the reality is probably somewhere in between. It's a little bit of both. And the trick is, over time, as that number grows, are you able to improve the efficiency of the rest of your marketing spend? And are you able to improve the monetization of those channels? We believe the answer is yes.

我認為目前App Store的費用仍然很小。看待App Store費用有兩種角度：一種是將其視為相當合理的獲客成本分成，另一種是將其視為極其不合理的支付處理費。而實際情況可能介於兩者之間，兩者兼具。關鍵在於，隨著費用的成長，你能否提高其他行銷支出的效率？能否提升這些通路的變現能力？我們認為答案是肯定的。

In fact, I told you that our COA is down this year overall. In part, that's because we're getting a bunch of registrations and users in the App Store that we weren't getting last year. And so, so far, so good in that area. I think it is something that we need to watch. But I do think that over time, we are going to be expanding margins outside of the App Store, by reducing marketing cost on a per-unit basis. And I think that's why, over time, we still expect margins, overall, to expand meaningfully in this business.

事實上，我之前說過，我們今年的總用戶獲取成本（COA）總體下降了。部分原因是我們在App Store獲得了大量去年沒有獲得的註冊用戶和用戶。所以，到目前為止，這方面進展順利。我認為這是我們需要密切關注的。但我相信，隨著時間的推移，我們將透過降低單位行銷成本，在App Store之外擴大利潤率。我認為，這就是為什麼我們仍然預期，隨著時間的推移，我們業務的整體利潤率將顯著成長。

Thanks. And then any color on websites from Joey?

謝謝。還有，Joey 的網站上有彩色圖片嗎？

We're not thrilled to see the page views down. But it's also not a huge concern. I'd like to see that start to grow. But if you look at the mix, we're losing page views in lower RPM channels, and growing them in higher RPM channels. So we are growing revenue while the page views is declining, it's not because we're putting more ads on anything. In fact, if anything, we are decreasing the ad load where we can. It's because we're, A, getting better at selling the ads, and they are optimizing the ad funnel programmatic, premium, et cetera. But also because we are shifting to higher RPM channels.

頁面瀏覽量下降我們並不樂見，但也不是什麼大問題。我希望它能開始成長。但如果你仔細分析一下，你會發現我們在低RPM管道的頁面瀏覽量有所下降，而在高RPM管道的頁面瀏覽量則有所增長。所以，儘管頁面瀏覽量正在下降，我們的收入卻在成長，這並非因為我們增加了廣告投放量。事實上，我們盡可能地減少了廣告投放量。原因有二：一是我們廣告銷售能力的提升，他們正在優化廣告漏斗，包括程式化廣告、進階廣告等等；二是我們正在轉型為高RPM管道。

So overall, that's an okay trend, but we'd very much like to see the page views start to grow. And I think what will drive that -- there will be some noise over the year on this, especially with the sale of UrbanSpoon, and making adjustments for all that. But the page views should start to grow. And where we'd like to see it start to grow is on About.com, and through high-quality content. We're putting a lot of investment into that content. We know, empirically, that we are publishing the best quality content in the categories where we're publishing.

總的來說，這是一個不錯的趨勢，但我們非常希望看到頁面瀏覽量開始成長。我認為推動頁面瀏覽量成長的因素有很多——今年這方面可能會有一些波動，特別是考慮到 UrbanSpoon 的出售以及隨之而來的調整。但頁面瀏覽量應該會開始成長。我們希望它能在 About.com 上開始成長，並透過高品質的內容來實現。我們在內容方面投入了大量資源。我們根據經驗知道，在我們發布的類別中，我們發布的內容品質都是最好的。

So we'd like to start to start to see the traffic grow on that. And that's definitely a bet we're making. In terms of other components, the mobile is certainly growing faster. And probably the biggest decliner, in terms of page views, is, for sure, Ask.com. And that will continue to be the case over the course of 2015, especially with the change that rolled out over the last few weeks.

所以我們希望看到流量開始成長。這絕對是我們押注的方向。就其他方面而言，行動端的成長速度無疑更快。而頁面瀏覽量下降幅度最大的，無疑是 Ask.com。這種情況在 2015 年還會持續，尤其是在過去幾週推出新政策之後。

(multiple speakers) I want to correct an earlier question that I jumbled. Tinder's MAUs are up more than three times year over year, not two times. And as Jeff said, we had a fantastic January. So I just jumbled that one, sorry about it.

（多人發言）我想修正一下我之前問的一個問題，我把問題搞混了。 Tinder 的月活躍用戶數比去年同期成長了三倍多，而不是兩倍。而且正如 Jeff 所說，我們一月份的業績非常出色。所以我剛才把這個問題搞混了，很抱歉。

Brian Fitzgerald, Jefferies.

Brian Fitzgerald，傑富瑞集團。

Thanks, guys, maybe a bit of a follow-up on About. You mentioned the new platform and site design is driving engagement and monetization. Wondering how much of About advertising is done programmatically, maybe? If you could give us that? A loose break? And then how much of it would you consider native maybe versus display versus video at About? So that's the first question.

謝謝各位，關於About，我想再補充一點。你們提到新的平台和網站設計正在提升用戶參與度和獲利能力。我想知道About的廣告投放中，有多少是透過程式化購買實現的？能否透露一下具體數字？另外，在About，原生廣告、展示廣告和影片廣告的比例分別是多少？這是我的第一個問題。

The second one, just broadly on, in terms of investment at Vimeo, is that more around content or distribution or growing subs? Any color there would be great.

第二個問題，就Vimeo的投資而言，更著重於內容、發行還是增加訂閱用戶？任何看法都非常感謝。

Sure. On About, I'm not going to break out the pieces of revenue, but I'll try and give you some color. Native is, for sure, important and, for sure, growing. And I can't really give you the slice that comes from native. Because the way it really works, in terms of the sale, is native is a component of really, most premium campaigns now. So you'd buy some standard units, and some components of that would be native. And native very much drives the sale. And the new platform enables us to sell native in ways that we have never sold it before. So we are seeing great demand on that, and it is working to supplement or accelerate the premium display stuff.

當然。關於「關於」這個板塊，我不會詳細列出各項收入組成，但我會盡量概括一下。原生廣告無疑非常重要，而且成長勢頭強勁。我無法具體說明原生廣告的收入佔比，因為就銷售而言，原生廣告實際上是大多數高端廣告系列的組成部分。也就是說，您購買一些標準廣告單元，其中一部分就是原生廣告。原生廣告在很大程度上推動了銷售。新平台讓我們能夠以前所未有的方式銷售原生廣告。因此，我們看到市場對原生廣告的需求非常旺盛，它正在有效地補充或加速高端展示廣告的發展。

But I don't want to do the breakout of what's where. I'd only also say that everything is sold -- the more we sell premium, and our average deal size continues to grow there, and the momentum in the market continues to grow there, the more we sell premium, the more it lifts up the rest of the stack. So from premium, it goes to private marketplaces. And the more inventory we're eating up up there, the better it's been for the overall. And that's a good trend that has accelerated every quarter. And I think we expect that to continue throughout 2015.

但我不想詳細分析每種產品的具體情況。我只想說，所有產品都已售罄——我們高端產品的銷量越高，平均交易規模持續增長，市場勢頭也持續強勁，高端產品銷量越高，就越能帶動其他產品的整體增長。高端產品會流向私有市場。我們在私人市場吸收的庫存越多，對整體市場就越有利。這是一個很好的趨勢，而且每個季度都在加速發展。我認為我們預計這一趨勢將在2015年持續下去。

In terms of Vimeo, for the year and for the quarter, the biggest piece of the increase is really COA, in terms of increasing marketing. And there's also some increase in content acquisition for Vimeo on demand.

就 Vimeo 而言，無論是全年還是本季度，成長的最大部分實際上來自內容獲取成本 (COA)，也就是行銷投入的增加。此外，Vimeo 點播內容的取得也有所成長。

Great, thanks, guys.

太好了，謝謝各位。

Chris Merwin, Barclays.

克里斯·默溫，巴克萊銀行。

Great, thank you. You mentioned in your prepared remarks that you are expecting phenomenal growth in 2016 for Match. Is that just effectively reaffirming your long-term guidance of $500 million in EBITDA for the Match group in 2016? And if so, I was just wondering if you could help us walk through that bridge from 2015 to 2016 Match EBITDA? Greg, you obviously mentioned the non-dating investments for the full year of 2015. But what level of Tinder losses should we be expecting in 2015? And how much of that won't recur? Just really trying to bridge that gap between 2015 and 2016. And what that implies for both Tinder and the core. Because just on simple math, it looks like it's about 10 points of margin expansion, year on year.

太好了，謝謝。您在準備好的演講稿中提到，您預計Match在2016年將實現驚人的成長。這是否只是重申了您對Match集團2016年EBITDA達到5億美元的長期預期？如果是這樣，我想請您幫我們分析一下2015年到2016年Match的EBITDA資料之間的差距。 Greg，您顯然提到了2015年全年非約會類投資。那麼，我們應該預期Tinder在2015年會有多少虧損？其中有多少不會再發生？我只是想弄清楚2015年和2016年之間的差距，以及這對Tinder和核心業務意味著什麼。因為簡單計算一下，利潤率似乎會比前一年提高10個百分點左右。

Okay, the way I think about the $500 million is the way I've always thought about the $500 million, which is, I'm not saying we will necessarily hit it. I'm saying it's a good target, and representative of the kind of growth we expect to have. It's still a long ways off. I'm totally confident that this business is going to hit $500 million of EBITDA. Whether it does it in the four quarters ending December 31, 2016, or whether it misses by a quarter or two, that's just hard for me to pinpoint at this point.

好的，我對5億美元的看法一直沒變，我並不是說我們一定能達到這個目標。我的意思是，這是一個很好的目標，也代表了我們預期中的成長水準。當然，距離目標還有很長的路要走。但我完全相信，這家公司的EBITDA最終會達到5億美元。至於它是在截至2016年12月31日的四個季度內實現，還是會差一兩個季度，我現在很難準確預測。

Obviously, as I said in my prepared remarks, we just lost $10 million plus of -- just on FX movements in 2016. It makes it that much harder. FX goes back the other way, it's that much easier.

正如我在事先準備好的演講稿中所說，2016年我們僅在外匯波動中就損失了超過1000萬美元。這讓情況變得更加艱難。而外匯市場一旦走強，情況就容易得多。

So I don't want to get too hung up on the precision of the $500 million in 2016, although I'm not backing off the general statement, which is, we think we can get there. We may or we may not, but we are certainly going to get there at some point soon, and frankly beyond. If you look at the business, we're still only 20% to 25% penetrated in this business in North America, never mind the rest of the world. We think that's going to grow dramatically. So I think we are talking about dramatic growth, whether we hit the $500 million precisely or not. That said, we still see the same reasonable path to get there in 2016. And we're not backing off. And it's just the nature of these long-term things.

所以我不想過度糾結於2016年能否精確達到5億美元，但我不會收回先前的整體說法，那就是我們認為我們能夠實現這個目標。我們或許能做到，或許做不到，但我們肯定會在不久的將來達到這個目標，坦白說，甚至可能遠遠超越這個數字。看看我們目前的業務，在北美，我們的市場滲透率只有20%到25%，更不用說世界其他地區了。我們認為這個數字將會大幅增加。所以我認為，無論我們最終能否精確達到5億美元，我們都在談論的是大幅成長。即便如此，我們仍然認為2016年實現目標的路徑是合理的。我們不會放棄。這就是長期發展的必然法則。

I think the way you'd get there is really, in the non-Tinder businesses, modest expansion of revenue growth rate, back up to the low double-digits by 2016. Meaningful margin expansion in 2016. Dating margins are going to be flattish in 2015, but we expect significant expansion in 2016, due both to increased Tinder contribution, but also the payoff from the tech projects that I've been talking about.

我認為實現這一目標的途徑是，在非 Tinder 業務方面，適度提高收入成長率，並在 2016 年恢復到兩位數低點。 2016 年利潤率也將顯著提高。約會業務的利潤率在 2015 年將保持平穩，但我們預計 2016 年將大幅增長，這既得益於 Tinder 貢獻的增加，也得益於我一直提到的技術項目的回報。

A nice rebound in Meetic. Meetic lost a fair amount of PMC in 2014. That is going to -- we'll pay the price for that in 2015, as we try and build it back up, just the nature of deferred revenue. And then FriendScout, which we bought at the end of 2014, is negative in 2015. And then we complete the integration at the end of 2015, and it slips into a nice positive in 2016.

Meetic業績出現不錯的反彈。 Meetic在2014年損失了相當一部分PMC業務。這將會－我們將在2015年為此付出代價，因為我們需要努力重建這部分業務，這是遞延收入的必然結果。此外，我們在2014年底收購的FriendScout在2015年出現虧損。不過，我們在2015年底完成了整合，並在2016年實現了可觀的獲利。

So when you combine those things, plus with what should be a normalization of marketing increases in 2016, versus more meaningful ones in 2015, you get meaningful margin expansion there. And then you have Tinder, which, as I said on the last call, I laid out a strawman, which is basically doubling MAUs over a two-year period, and getting the monetization rates that are two-thirds the rate of OkCupid in North America and Western Europe, and one-tenth that everywhere else. Those things will either happen or not.

所以，綜合以上因素，再加上2016年行銷投入成長趨於正常化（相較於2015年更為顯著的成長），就能達到利潤率的顯著提升。至於Tinder，正如我在上次電話會議上提到的，我只是做了一個初步預測，即在兩年內將每月活躍用戶數翻一番，並在北美和西歐地區實現OkCupid三分之二的變現率，在其他地區則只有十分之一。這些預測要么會實現，要么不會。

On the Tinder side, I'm quite confident they'll happen. Again, whether they happen in precisely that time frame, or whether it takes a little longer, or we beat it by a little bit, I don't know. I'll be in a better position to talk about that over the next couple quarters. So I think the general point is, we think it's a reasonable target. I don't want to get too hung up on the precision, though. We're going to get there, if not precisely then, very soon thereafter.

就 Tinder 而言，我很有信心這些目標會實現。至於能否在預定的時間內實現，或者會稍晚一些，甚至提前一些，我目前還無法確定。未來幾季我會更清楚地討論這個問題。所以總的來說，我們認為這是一個合理的目標。不過，我也不想過於糾結於時間的精確性。即使無法完全按照預定時間實現，我們也一定會很快達成目標。

And if I could just add in one follow-up. As it relates to Tinder monetization, can you talk a little bit about what type of strategies you are using internationally? What has worked well, what hasn't worked well? And have you settled on how exactly you're going to be monetizing this business globally by the end of the first quarter?

我還可以再補充一個問題。關於 Tinder 的獲利模式，您能否談談您在國際市場採用的策略？哪些策略行之有效，哪些無效？在第一季末之前，你們是否已經確定了在全球範圍內實現這項業務盈利的具體方案？

Yes, I think long-term, we've talked about the fact that it's going to be a mix of three fundamental revenue streams, which is recurring revenue subscriptions, a la carte revenue payments, and advertising. We've started out primarily with the direct recurring payments. That's what we've been testing. That's going to roll out globally. And we expect the others to roll in over time. But I don't want to be too precise, in terms of that timing, because it is going to play out over the course of the year.

是的，我認為從長遠來看，我們之前討論過，最終的收入來源將由三種基本模式組成：訂閱收入、單項付費收入和廣告收入。我們目前主要測試的是直接訂閱收入，這項模式將在全球推廣。我們預計其他模式也會陸續推出。但我不想對具體時間給出太精確的估計，因為這需要一年的時間才能逐步實現。

Thank you.

謝謝。

Heath Terry, Goldman Sachs.

Heath Terry，高盛集團。

Great, thanks. Just a few questions. You guys spent $260 million or so on acquisitions last year. What would you say the level that you feel like you'll probably end up at for 2015 is, from an M&A perspective? And then, given the size of that number, can you give us some clarity on the organic growth at IAC? Or at the very least, the contribution that you are seeing from these acquisitions in the quarter and the impact that it's having on your guidance?

好的，謝謝。我還有幾個問題。你們去年在收購方面花了大約2.6億美元。從併購的角度來看，您認為2015年的併購規模大概會達到多少？另外，鑑於這個數字如此龐大，您能否詳細說明一下IAC的內生成長？或者至少，您能否說明一下這些收購在本季對業績的貢獻，以及它們對您們業績指引的影響？

And then, I guess, Joey, if you could give us a sense of exactly what changes that you saw from Google that are negatively impacting Ask? And now that you've been through nearly two years, or over two years, of these one-off events from Google, do you see a point where this is going to end? Or is this just what you're going to have to deal with? That they are going to continue to be making these kind of revisions that negatively impact the business?

那麼，Joey，你能具體說說你觀察到的谷歌哪些改動對Ask產生了負面影響嗎？現在，你們已經經歷了近兩年，或者說兩年多的谷歌此類突發事件，你覺得這種情況何時才能結束？還是說你們只能繼續忍受下去？他們會繼續進行這些對業務產生負面影響的調整嗎？

And then last question, if you could just give us a sense of what the strategy is for IAC Films? Given the success of Top Five, is this something that the Company is going to incrementally invest in?

最後一個問題，您能否簡單介紹一下IAC Films的策略？鑑於Top Five的成功，公司是否會逐步增加對IAC Films的投資？

So let me start with a little bit of the first, and let Greg and Joey comment, as well, then take the last. IAC Films is a small business. We got a couple of films out at the end of last year. I think that's a reasonable rate to expect. Although I do think you'll see IAC investing in content broadly against several businesses. Obviously, we have Vimeo; obviously, we have Electus. So it's consistent with what we're doing there.

那麼，我先簡單說說第一點，也請 Greg 和 Joey 發表一下看法，然後再說最後一點。 IAC Films 是一家小公司。去年年底我們推出了幾部電影。我認為這個產量算是比較合理的。不過，我認為你會看到 IAC 在內容方面進行廣泛的投資，與其他幾家公司競爭。顯然，我們有 Vimeo；顯然，我們還有 Electus。這與我們目前在其他領域的策略是一致的。

In terms of acquisitions, we don't have a bunch of stuff slated or anything like that. But I think over the last few years, we've pretty consistently done a few small or mid-sized acquisitions. We obviously did About, which was fairly significant, a couple of years ago. So I think, all else equal, you'd expect some activity. But it's not a number we forecast, or we give a number out. I think broadly, growth is primarily organic, because there is some offsetting things. This year, we took some deferred revenue write-downs.

就收購而言，我們目前並沒有很多計劃或類似的安排。但我認為過去幾年，我們一直在進行一些中小型的收購。幾年前，我們收購了About，這筆交易規模相當大。所以我覺得，在其他條件相同的情況下，我們會有一些收購活動。但我們不會預測具體的收購數量，也不會公佈具體的數字。我認為整體而言，成長主要來自內生成長，因為有一些因素會相互抵消。今年，我們提列了一些遞延收入減損。

You have some deferred revenue accounting at SlimWare that, as we ramp up, we actually end up with a negative EBITDA number. So I think we're largely organic, with probably, modestly, a little more contribution in Search than in Match. But not really significant contributions overall, from last year's numbers, based on the puts and takes. Joey, Greg, do you want to add anything to that?

SlimWare有一些遞延收入會計處理，隨著業務成長，我們最終的EBITDA實際上會為負值。所以我認為我們主要依靠內生成長，搜尋業務的貢獻可能略高於匹配業務。但根據去年的數據，整體而言，兩者的貢獻並不顯著。 Joey、Greg，你們還有什麼要補充的嗎？

I think that is generally right. We look at lots of things. We don't budget for anything. Each acquisition tends to be its own analysis. And when they pan out, you can get it done, you get it done. And sometimes, they come in bunches, I think. Looking at the dating category, I think that there are definitely things out there that, at the right place, we buy, because we think we can meaningfully improve the multiple. There is a smaller group of things that we think are more exciting strategically versus financially, that you could see doing at some point in the future, or you could do none of them.

我覺得這總體上是對的。我們會考慮很多因素。我們不做任何預算。每次收購都需要單獨分析。如果結果可行，我們就會完成收購。而且有時候，收購機會會成批出現。就約會領域而言，我認為肯定有一些公司，在合適的時機，我們會收購，因為我們相信可以顯著提高其估值倍數。還有一小部分公司，我們認為它們在策略層面比財務層面更有吸引力，未來某個時候可能會進行收購，也可能一個都不做。

I think education is an area where, obviously, we bought Princeton Review. I think you could see some small things there, or not. Just really depends on the opportunity, I think that -- I haven't gone back and looked at the stats. If you do, I would probably project them forward. Because over a multi-year period, I don't think we are in a particularly different place, one way or the other, than we've been, in terms of our general M&A appetite.

我認為教育領域是我們收購普林斯頓評論（Princeton Review）的重點。我覺得這方面可能會有一些小的進展，也可能不會。這真的取決於機會，我還沒去查閱過相關數據。如果你查閱了，我可能會進行預測。因為從多年來看，就我們整體的併購意願而言，我認為我們目前的情況與以往並無太大差異。

My answer is similar. We're going to continue to prioritize. In terms of M&A, we are going to continue to prioritize content businesses where we think we have an edge. And then on the application side, probably favoring non-Search- based application models. Because I think that has been an interesting vein for us. But we don't have a certain amount of capital set aside. And nothing meaningful planned. And generally, we've been making relatively smaller bets.

我的回答也類似。我們會繼續分清輕重緩急。在併購方面，我們會繼續優先考慮我們認為具有優勢的內容業務。而在應用程式方面，我們可能會更傾向於非搜尋型應用程式模式，因為我認為這對我們來說是一個很有趣的方向。但我們並沒有為此預留一定的資金，也沒有任何實質的計畫。總的來說，我們一直以來都進行規模相對較小的投資。

I think the Ask [FM], [Avalon] and SlimWare combined was roughly equivalent to what we sold UrbanSpoon for. So it's targeted measure bets where we think that most of the execution happens post-acquisition. Or most of the growth happens post-acquisition. I think probably, I'll take the next questions. So Google changed specifically on Ask. This is a change to the advertising. There's an algorithm that people talk about a lot, with respect to the organic results. There's also algorithms that drive the advertising results. And a bunch of things go into there.

我認為 Ask [FM]、[Avalon] 和 SlimWare 的總價值大致相當於我們出售 UrbanSpoon 的價格。所以，這是有針對性的投資，我們認為大部分執行工作會在收購後完成。或者說，大部分成長會在收購後實現。我想我可以回答下一個問題了。谷歌專門針對 Ask 做了一些改變。這是廣告方面的改動。人們經常談論的演算法是影響自然搜尋結果的。廣告效果也由演算法驅動。這其中涉及很多因素。

Significantly price, for sure, but it's definitely not just the highest bid that gets you into the ad placement. It's also a lot of factors, like click-through rate, [blanding] page, relevance, keyword category, and a bunch of other factors. And that's the thing that they updated. I think they updated the algorithm and the inputs to that. And that change effectively made it ineffective to market Ask.com on Google. We've been told explicitly by Google that it was not targeted at us. There was a broad change that impacted us.

價格當然很重要，但廣告位絕不只取決於出價最高者。還有很多其他因素，例如點擊率、頁面品質、相關性、關鍵字類別等等。而這正是他們更新的內容。我認為他們更新了演算法及其輸入參數。這項變更實際上導致 Ask.com 在 Google 上推廣的效果大打折扣。 Google 已經明確告知我們，這次更新並非針對我們。這是一次影響廣泛的變革。

And I think that with Ask.com, I think we were a very large advertiser on Google. So the magnitude of this, the impact to Ask is going to be bigger. And when you think about it in the broad context of multi-years, multiple impacts, and a series of things we've seen, we do exist in Google's ecosystem, and they do have a meaningful impact in media companies, digital publishers, on the web. And certainly, search-supported businesses, and, of course, our partnership. So we are meaningfully existing within their ecosystem.

我認為，就 Ask.com 而言，我們曾經是 Google 上非常大的廣告客戶。因此，此次合作對 Ask 的影響規模更大。從長遠來看，考慮到多年發展、多重影響以及我們所看到的一系列事件，我們確實身處 Google 的生態系統之中，而他們對媒體公司、數位出版商、網路以及所有依賴搜尋的企業都產生了深遠的影響，當然，還有我們與 Google 的合作關係。因此，我們在他們的生態系統中扮演著舉足輕重的角色。

But when they sneeze, given their scale, when they sneeze, it's going to shake things up in our building. We talk to them very regularly. It's not a concerted effort on their part to hurt us, or to impact us. And in the last couple quarters, I think we've delivered some very strong numbers, thanks, in part, to Google and lifts they've delivered on RPQ. So the overall thing is, movements at Google are magnified in their impact on our business. But there's not a -- and we've discussed this with them directly. There's not a concerted direct pattern to hurt or impact our business.

但鑑於他們的規模，他們哪怕打個噴嚏，都會對我們公司造成影響。我們和他們保持著非常密切的溝通。他們並沒有蓄意傷害我們或對我們造成影響。而且在過去的幾個季度裡，我認為我們取得了非常亮眼的業績，這在一定程度上要歸功於Google以及他們在RPQ（響應式定價）方面的提升。所以總的來說，谷歌的任何舉動都會放大對我們業務的影響。但是，我們並沒有——而且我們也直接和他們討論過——他們並沒有蓄意損害或影響我們的業務。

Was there another question? I can't remember now.

還有其他問題嗎？我現在想不起來了。

No, that's it. Just one clarification. I want to make sure I understand exactly what Jeff was saying with regard to organic. Jeff, when you say that there was no net impact, I'm assuming you're referring to EBITDA. Because obviously, if you spent $260 million, there had to be a revenue impact.

不，就這些了。還有一個問題需要澄清。我想確認一下我是否完全理解傑夫關於有機產品的說法。傑夫，你說沒有淨影響，我猜你指的是 EBITDA（息稅折舊攤提前利潤）。因為很顯然，如果你花了 2.6 億美元，肯定會對收入產生影響。

And we expect EBITDA going forward, but I think that the impact this year was net, about neutral, actually. And next year, modest contribution from those businesses.

我們預計未來 EBITDA 將保持成長，但我認為今年的影響總體上是中性的。明年這些業務的貢獻預計不大。

Okay. Thank you.

好的，謝謝。

Mark Mahaney, RBC Capital Markets.

Mark Mahaney，加拿大皇家銀行資本市場。

Two questions related to Tinder. Could you talk about whether the user profile, how that's changed, which demographic groups are starting to get much larger on the Tinder platform? That 200% year-over-year growth? Are you pulling in for much older or materially older demographics than you have in the past? And then, Greg, I think you mentioned there is 20% to 25% market penetration. Could you just provide a little more color around that? What do you mean there? And what's the TAM? Are you doing that in base of users or spend? Just a little explanation on that?

關於 Tinder，我有兩個問題。您能否談談使用者畫像的變化，以及哪些人群在 Tinder 平台上的使用者規模正在快速成長？ 200% 的年增長率是為什麼？你們的使用者群體是否比以往更年長？另外，Greg，我記得您提到過市場滲透率在 20% 到 25% 之間。能否詳細解釋一下？具體指的是什麼？ TAM（潛在市場規模）又是指用戶基數還是用戶消費額？能否簡單解釋一下？

Sure. On the Tinder demo, I think -- and I'd caveat by saying, I don't have the stats directly in front of me, and so I'm speaking from a my general sense of it all. It's getting a little older, although not dramatically so. And it is more about bulking out in that younger demo so far than meaningfully increasing the age bracket. And it's also a lot about global. It is a lot about growth. It is growing meaningfully in the US, too. But a big part of that growth is also coming from new markets and new areas.

當然。關於 Tinder 的用戶群體，我認為——當然，我得先說明一下，我手頭上沒有具體的統計數據，所以我只能根據我的總體感覺來談——用戶群體正在逐漸老齡化，雖然變化幅度並不大。而且，目前來看，Tinder 的用戶群主要集中在年輕用戶群中，而不是顯著擴大年齡範圍。此外，Tinder 的發展也與全球市場息息相關，它正處於高速成長期。在美國，Tinder 的用戶成長也相當顯著。但這種成長很大一部分來自於新興市場和新領域。

So I think it still continues to be a predominately under-age-35 business, with certainly some users, and a growing amount older than that. But not yet meaningfully changing the profile, I think. In terms of the 25% number, again, I confess, this is internal stats that we do through some surveys and otherwise. I think it is generally the percentage of single people not in a committed relationship in the US, who have used a dating product within X period of time, I want to say three months, I'm not sure exactly.

所以我認為，這個行業仍然主要針對35歲以下的用戶，當然也有一些用戶年齡較大，而且年齡較大的用戶數量也在增加。但我認為，使用者組成還沒有實質的變化。至於25%這個數字，我承認，這是我們透過一些調查和其他方式獲得的內部統計數據。我認為它通常指的是美國單身且沒有穩定戀愛關係的人，在特定時間段內（我想是三個月，但我不太確定）使用過約會產品的比例。

And that number has been rising. It had been rising steadily, but has accelerated over the past two years, especially in that youth demo, as I went in in some detail last time. And our general view is that, A, that youth demo will continue to get older. And within the youth demo -- and they are not going to stop. And within the youth demo, that concentration will continue to increase with the proliferation of mobile. And this is just such a great mobile use case. I've said for a while now, I think in the not-too-distant future, everyone who is single is going to use a product like this for their single life.

這個數字一直在上升。它一直在穩步增長，但在過去兩年裡增長速度加快，尤其是在年輕人群體中，正如我上次詳細分析的那樣。我們的總體觀點是，首先，年輕人群體將會繼續老化。其次，年輕人群體內部——而且這種趨勢不會停止——隨著行動裝置的普及，年輕人群體中的這一比例將會持續上升。這正是一個絕佳的行動應用案例。我之前就說過，我認為在不久的將來，所有單身人士都會使用類似的產品來規劃他們的單身生活。

They are going to use it as one of the things that they do. And so I think we've got a long way to go before, from a user perspective, the market is saturated, both in the US and globally.

他們會把它當作日常活動之一。所以我認為，從使用者角度來看，無論是在美國還是全球範圍內，市場都遠未飽和。

Thank you, Greg.

謝謝你，格雷格。

John Blackledge, Cowen.

John Blackledge，Cowen。

Great, thanks. The Tinder MAUs of 3X's, could you just clarify that that's January 2015 versus January 2014? Second is, HomeAdvisor had a huge fourth quarter. Can you talk about the 2015 growth profile and where HomeAdvisor stacks up versus competition? And then lastly, there's a higher EBITDA loss for media/e-commerce in the first quarter. What are the key drivers there? Thanks.

太好了，謝謝。關於Tinder的月活躍用戶數成長了3倍，您能否澄清一下，這是指2015年1月與2014年1月的比較？其次，HomeAdvisor第四季業績非常強勁。您能否談談2015年的成長情況，以及HomeAdvisor與競爭對手相比的優勢？最後，媒體/電商產業第一季的EBITDA虧損較高。造成這種情況的主要原因是什麼？謝謝。

Yes, the January -- sorry, year end. Month's end January over month's end January, MAU's are more than 3 times.

是的，一月底──抱歉，是年底。一月底的月活躍用戶數比一月底高出三倍以上。

In terms of media and e-commerce in the first quarter, really, substantially all of the year-over-year increase is COA, more at HomeAdvisor than Vimeo, but at both HomeAdvisor and Vimeo. So it's increased marketing spend, because we are having great success with marketing in both of those businesses, and it will pay back well during the year. In terms of HomeAdvisor, HomeAdvisor has accelerated the last couple of quarters. It's gotten to almost $300 million in total revenue. It's profitable.

就第一季的媒體和電商業務而言，幾乎所有同比成長都來自COA（客戶營運成本），HomeAdvisor的成長幅度大於Vimeo，但兩者的成長幅度相當。這主要得益於行銷支出的增加，因為我們在這兩個業務領域的行銷都取得了巨大成功，預計這些投入將在今年獲得豐厚的回報。 HomeAdvisor在過去幾季發展迅猛，總營收已接近3億美元，並且實現了盈利。

We think the business is doing very well. And we expect, probably on a consolidated basis, not to reach quite that level. But in the domestic business, we'll probably still be approaching that level of growth, in the 20% to 30% range, for the coming year. And I think we stack up well against the competition. As the remarks said, we have by far the largest service provider network. And when you look at the satisfaction data, we have best-in-class customer satisfaction in the Internet, when people get a service provider. And not as good when they don't.

我們認為公司業務發展勢頭良好。我們預計，從整體來看，可能無法達到先前的水平。但在國內業務方面，我們預計明年仍將維持20%至30%的成長速度。我認為我們在競爭中處於領先地位。如同前面所提到的，我們擁有迄今為止規模最大的服務提供者網路。從客戶滿意度資料來看，如果使用者能夠找到服務供應商，我們的客戶滿意度在網路領域首屈一指。但如果用戶沒有找到服務提供者，滿意度則略遜一籌。

And we think that that's a huge key in this business. And while there's some very good businesses out there attacking the space, it's very hard to build this kind of network and retain them, and provide the service to the consumers. So I think we're pretty excited and optimistic.

我們認為這是這個產業的關鍵所在。雖然市面上有許多優秀的企業都在開拓這個領域，但要建立並留住這樣的客戶網絡，並為消費者提供服務，卻非常困難。所以，我們對此感到非常興奮和樂觀。

Thank you.

謝謝。

Kevin Rippey, Maxim Group.

Kevin Rippey，Maxim集團。

Hi, guys. Thanks for taking the question. If you could discuss some of the trends that were impacting the paid- user ARPU in the dating websites? It would be interesting, because it looks like it trended positive, especially in North America. And some of the puts and takes there would be interesting to hear about.

大家好。感謝你們回答這個問題。能否請你們探討一下影響約會網站付費用戶平均每用戶收入（ARPU）的一些趨勢？這很有意思，因為看起來ARPU呈現上升趨勢，尤其是在北美地區。我很想聽聽大家的看法。

And I think after this question, we have time for one more.

我認為在這個問題之後，我們還有時間再問一個問題。

Yes, I think when you look at the number that you look at, you are looking at total revenue divided by quarter-end paid users. That's going to be impacted by a number of factors. One is the rate within each product line. In general, rate is going up in the various product lines. There is then mix between the product lines.

是的，我認為你看這個數字的時候，實際上是看總收入除以季度末付費用戶數。這會受到很多因素的影響。其中之一是各產品線內部的付費率。總的來說，各個產品線的付費率都在上升。此外，不同產品線之間的組成也存在差異。

That tends to be a negative trend, as OkCupid is the lowest price product, and it is growing faster than the other businesses. So that brings it down. I also think that -- I think when you net those things out, rate in North America was actually flat sequentially. But when you have a decline in paid users during the period, which we had in Q4, you're averaging the full quarter's revenue over a number that's lower than the average number throughout the period. So I think that made it look a little more favorable than it is. I think the overall trend for North America was about flat.

這往往是個負面趨勢，因為OkCupid是價格最低的產品，而且成長速度也比其他公司快。所以這拉低了整體水平。我還認為——我認為如果把這些因素都考慮進去，北美地區的成長率實際上是環比持平。但是，當付費用戶數量在第四季度出現下降時，你會用低於該季度平均水平的數字來計算整個季度的平均收入。所以我認為這讓實際數據看起來比看起來好一些。我認為北美地區的整體趨勢基本上持平。

And then in Europe, Europe being impacted there by -- or North America -- sorry. Internationally, being impacted by negative FX, which Q3 was down. Because of the FriendScout acquisition, you had all this purchase accounting issues. And in Q4, you've got rate, again, within each product is basically flat to up. But you've got some FX negatives, and you've got, still, some purchase accounting issues from the FriendScout acquisition impacting the International number. So those are really the trends. As I said before, in general, we think that we should be able to increase rate within our various product lines. And then mix will be what it will be, as the different products perform over time.

然後，歐洲市場——或者說北美市場——抱歉，是國際市場。國際市場受到匯率負面影響，第三季業績下滑。由於收購 FriendScout，出現了一系列採購會計問題。第四季度，各產品線的業績基本持平或有所成長。但匯率仍對國際業績產生負面影響，而且收購 FriendScout 帶來的採購會計問題仍存在。以上就是目前的趨勢。正如我之前所說，整體而言，我們認為各個產品線的績效應該可以提升。至於產品組合，則取決於不同產品的實際表現。

Got it, thank you.

明白了，謝謝。

Last question.

最後一個問題。

Nat Schindler, Bank of America Merrill Lynch.

納特‧辛德勒，美國銀行美林證券。

Yes. Hi, guys. Which of my questions have we not talked about? Okay. Joey, there is a belief that -- I believe this is the fifth time in two years that Google has made a change that has substantially impacted your business. Given this ability for them to directly affect you within an existing contract, is there anything you can do in the upcoming contract negotiations that will affect this risk? Or will the contract simply be setting the tack for the next three years?

是的。嗨，各位。我的哪些問題我們還沒討論過？好的。喬伊，有人認為──我相信這是谷歌兩年內第五次做出對你們業務產生重大影響的變更。鑑於他們有能力在現有合約框架內直接影響你們，在即將到來的合約談判中，你們可以採取哪些措施來降低這種風險？或者說，這份合約只是為未來三年定調？

And, Greg, can you tell me a little bit -- talk to a little bit about the Core dating cannibalization that is occurring by Tinder. Is it occurring because people are just going to Tinder first? Or are they reducing their time within Core Dating? Effectively, are you increasing your churn of paid subscribers by doing that?

格雷格，可以稍微談談Tinder對Core Dating造成的蠶食嗎？是因為人們先去Tinder了嗎？還是因為他們減少了在Core Dating的時間？實際上，這樣做是否會導致付費用戶的流失率上升？

I'll take that question -- I'll take the last question first. We're not seeing any meaningful change in churn. Frankly, the impact you've seen to churn have come from the credit card breaches, not from any other extraneous factors that we can see. As far as the cannibalization, look, I wish I could be more scientific about this. These businesses didn't have a great year last year, and Tinder did. And at some point, we started saying, okay, there is real cannibalization here. Now, they're both doing really well.

我先回答最後一個問題。我們沒有看到客戶流失率有任何顯著變化。坦白說，你們看到的客戶流失率變化主要來自信用卡資料外洩事件，而不是其他我們能觀察到的外部因素。至於市場蠶食，唉，我真希望我能用更科學的方法來解釋這個問題。這些公司去年的表現都不太好，而Tinder的表現很好。後來我們開始意識到，市場蠶食確實存在。現在，它們兩家公司都發展得很好。

So it's hard to be scientific about this stuff. There's a lot of factors at play. I think clearly, there was a -- I use the term shock to the system, when you had just the explosive growth of this new thing that had a dynamic one-time impact of people who might have either been going back to use Match a second time, or who had never used Match, who would have who tried Tinder instead. I think that's normalizing a bit. And it's taking on more of a traditional dynamic, where there are people who use Tinder who also use Match. And there are people who have used Match who have gone to Tinder, and all that. It's still incredibly early in all this dynamic.

所以很難用科學的眼光來分析這類事情。其中涉及很多因素。我認為很明顯，這帶來了一種——我用「衝擊」這個詞來形容——當這個新事物以爆炸式增長時，它對用戶產生了一次性的動態影響，這些人要么會再次使用Match，要么會轉而嘗試Tinder。我認為這種情況正在逐漸恢復正常。它正在呈現出一種更傳統的動態，即使用Tinder的人也使用Match，而使用過Match的人也轉而使用Tinder，等等。這一切還處於非常早期的階段。

What I can say is that we're seeing growth in these Core businesses on the user front that is very healthy. And the healthy growth really continues at Tinder. So cannibalization is always this what if analysis. And it is hard to say. They're both going up into the right right now, which is really what we try and focus on.

我可以肯定的是，我們看到這些核心業務在用戶方面實現了非常健康的成長。 Tinder 的成長動能也一直保持良好。所以，業務蠶食問題總是我們用來做假設分析的。很難說。目前它們都在朝著正確的方向發展，而這正是我們努力關注的重點。

In terms of the contract, we will certainly consider all information that we have, and everything that's happened over the last couple of years, and a bunch of other things, as we move into the next set of contract discussions. And some of the things, we may be able to address through a contract, and some we may not. Of course, everything that this Business is doing and experiencing is a factor, as we consider the next set of contracts. And the only thing I would say overall is, I think we do have a set of protections in there. And I think we have generally fared better than our competitors, in most of the events that have happened over the last couple of years. And I think that's a result of a good job on the last one.

關於合同，我們肯定會考慮我們掌握的所有信息，包括過去幾年發生的一切，以及其他許多因素，以便進行下一輪合約談判。有些問題或許可以透過合約解決，有些則可能無法解決。當然，公司目前的營運狀況和經驗都會影響我們考慮下一輪合約。總的來說，我認為我們已經制定了一套保障措施。而且，我認為在過去幾年發生的大多數事件中，我們的表現都優於競爭對手。我認為這得益於我們上一輪談判的出色工作。

Great, thank you.

太好了，謝謝。

And with that, I think we would just like to thank everybody for joining, and we will wrap up, and we will talk to you next quarter.

最後，我想感謝大家的參與，我們今天的會議就到這裡，下個季度再見。

Thanks, everybody.

謝謝大家。

Thank you.

謝謝。

And that does conclude today's conference. We thank everyone again for their participation.

今天的會議到此結束。再次感謝各位的參與。