Match Group Inc (MTCH) 2015 Q2 法說會逐字稿

Good day, and welcome to the IAC reports Q2 2015 results conference call. Today's conference is being recorded. At this time, I would like to turn the conference over to Jeff Kip, Executive Vice President. Please go ahead.

各位好，歡迎參加IAC 2015年第二季業績電話會議。本次會議正在錄音。現在，我將會議交給執行副總裁傑夫‧基普先生。請開始。

Thanks very much, operator. Good morning, everybody. Welcome to our second-quarter earnings call. With me today is Joey Levin, CEO of IAC; and Greg Blatt, Chairman of the Match Group. As a reminder, we will not be reading our prepared remarks on this call. They are currently available on the investor relations section of our website.

非常感謝接線生。大家早安。歡迎參加我們第二季財報電話會議。今天與我一同出席的有IAC執行長Joey Levin和Match Group董事長Greg Blatt。再次提醒大家，這次電話會議我們不宣讀事先準備好的演講稿。發言稿目前已發佈在我們網站的投資者關係頁面。

Before we get to Q&A however, I would like to remind you that during this call we may discuss our outlook and future performance. These forward-looking statements typically may be preceded by words such as we expect, we believe, we anticipate, or similar statements. These forward-looking views are subject to risks and uncertainties, and our actual results could differ materially from the views expressed today. Some of these risks have been set forth in the second-quarter press release and our periodic reports filed with the SEC.

不過，在進入問答環節之前，我想提醒各位，這次電話會議中我們可能會討論公司前景和未來業績。這些前瞻性陳述通常會以「我們預期」、「我們相信」、「我們預期」或類似表述開頭。這些前瞻性觀點受風險和不確定性因素的影響，我們的實際業績可能與今天表達的觀點有重大差異。部分風險已在第二季新聞稿和我們向美國證券交易委員會提交的定期報告中列出。

We will also discuss certain non-GAAP measures, which as a reminder include adjusted EBITDA, which we will refer to today as EBITDA for simplicity during the call. I will also refer you to our press release, and again to the investor relations section of our website for all comparable GAAP measures and full reconciliations for all material non-GAAP measures.

我們還將討論一些非GAAP指標，其中包括調整後EBITDA，為簡單起見，在今天的電話會議中，我們將統稱為EBITDA。此外，請各位參閱我們的新聞稿，並造訪我們網站的投資者關係頁面，查看所有可比較的GAAP指標以及所有重要非GAAP指標的完整調節表。

With that, we will go right to Q&A. Operator?

接下來，我們將直接進入問答環節。接線生？

(Operator instructions)

（操作說明）

John Blackledge, Cowen and Company.

John Blackledge，Cowen and Company。

Great, thanks. Two questions on Match, one on HomeAdvisor. So, Match, North America Match total page sales growth was 12%. Just wondering what the core North America Match, or ex-Tinder user growth was roughly? And then similarly, what was the international page sub growth ex-Tinder?

太好了，謝謝。關於Match有兩個問題，關於HomeAdvisor有一個問題。 Match北美地區的頁面總銷售額成長了12%。我想知道Match北美地區的核心用戶（也就是從Tinder流失的用戶）的成長率大概是多少？同樣地，從Tinder流失的用戶中，國際用戶的頁面訂閱用戶增長率是多少？

And then in the 2015 guide you mentioned ramping marketing spend at Match. But then in your prepared remarks you mentioned that marketing spend was actually lower. So just wondering what drove the lower marketing spend. And Jeff, maybe on HomeAdvisor, top-line growth was really strong again, $5 billion in EBITDA was better than we had. That implied I think mid-single-digit EBITDA margins. Just can you talk about how we should think about the ramp in HomeAdvisor's EBITDA through the rest of the year and then over the next couple of years? Thank you.

在2015年的指南中，您提到Match平台增加了行銷支出。但在您事先準備好的發言稿中，您又提到行銷支出實際上有所下降。所以我想知道是什麼原因導致了行銷支出的下降。另外，Jeff，關於HomeAdvisor，其營收成長再次強勁，50億美元的EBITDA比我們之前預期的要好。這意味著EBITDA利潤率達到了中等個位數。您能否談談我們應該如何看待HomeAdvisor在今年剩餘時間和未來幾年的EBITDA成長？謝謝。

All right, John. On the sub growth reach, Tinder was a major contributor to both. I think I said last quarter that in general we don't break apart our businesses. And I told you last quarter that our Tinder breakout was a one-time only deal, given its launch. I can tell you that Tinder is a significant part of the growth in both North America and international.

好的，約翰。關於用戶成長，Tinder 在兩個方面都做出了重大貢獻。我想我上個季度說過，我們通常不會拆分業務。而且我也告訴過你，鑑於 Tinder 的推出，我們將其拆分為獨立業務只是一次性的。我可以告訴你，Tinder 在北美和國際市場的成長中都扮演著重要的角色。

In North America for some perspective, Tinder had more paying subscribers outside of North America than inside of North America. At the same time, ex-Tinder our North American subscriber base is much bigger than our international. So those two things combined to have Tinder's growth be much more impactful on overall sub growth rate in international than North America, Growing great in both.

以北美為例，Tinder 在北美以外地區的付費用戶數量超過了北美地區。同時，Tinder 北美地區的用戶基數遠大於國際用戶基數。因此，這兩個因素共同導致 Tinder 的成長對國際用戶成長率的影響遠大於北美，儘管在兩個地區都取得了顯著成長。

On the North America side ex-Tinder, as I said we pulled back on marketing a bit. In international we spiked marketing a bit, and so that is a driver as well. When you talk about the marketing, I don't recall specifically that we were planning on ramping marketing in Q2 over Q1. If I did say that, we didn't do that. Really what we did is we followed a much more historical pattern, which is, and maybe it makes sense to go back and talk about marketing a little bit in depth because I know it is a matter of interest on this particular call.

正如我之前所說，在北美地區（不包括 Tinder），我們稍微縮減了行銷投入。而在國際市場，我們則加強了行銷力度，這也是一個驅動因素。說到行銷，我記不清我們是否曾計劃在第二季加大行銷投入，即便我說過，我們也沒有這麼做。實際上，我們遵循的是更傳統的行銷模式。或許有必要回顧行銷，因為我知道這是本次電話會議大家比較關注的議題。

In general, first half our marketing spend is up about 10% year over year for the first half, all FX adjusted. It's up 13% in Q1. It was up 5% in Q2. Sequential decline of about 25% in marketing spend this year between Q1 and Q2 versus a 19% sequential decline last year. So in general there is always a sequential decline in our marketing spend between Q2 and Q1. It's just the marketing environment. Rates are cheapest in Q1. And for our category, receptivity happens to be the greatest.

整體而言，經匯率調整後，我們上半年的行銷支出年增約10%。第一季成長13%，第二季成長5%。今年第一季到第二季度，行銷支出較上季下降約25%，去年同期較上季下降19%。因此，通常情況下，我們的行銷支出在第二季到第一季之間都會較上季下降。這主要是市場環境所致。第一季的利率最低，而且就我們所在的品類而言，消費者的接受度也最高。

In North America this year we spiked hard in Q1, up 18%, and are flat in Q2. International again sort of the opposite. We were up 7% in Q1 and up 20% in Q2. All that is a way of saying that we are increasing marketing throughout the portfolio in a way consistent with historical trends, even higher, frankly.

今年第一季度，我們在北美市場表現強勁，成長了18%，第二季度則保持穩定。國際市場的情況則恰恰相反，第一季成長了7%，第二季成長了20%。總而言之，我們正在加大對整個產品組合的行銷投入，這與歷史趨勢相符，坦白說，甚至更高。

But we take a very disciplined approach to marketing overall. We build the plan on a product-by-product basis at the beginning of the year, trying to optimize for both sub growth and profit growth. Then as we go through, we stack rank throughout the year and we spend where the spending is most profitable. And those collection of things led to a big spike in Q1, opened up some good mobile channels, wanted to make sure we got the spend in. And then we pulled back because we got good user growth, wanted to take some profits.

但我們整體上採取非常嚴謹的行銷策略。年初時，我們會逐一產品製定計劃，力求在用戶成長和利潤成長兩方面都達到最佳平衡。然後，隨著時間的推移，我們會根據產品排名調整策略，並將資金投入利潤最高的領域。正是這些因素促成了第一季的大幅成長，我們開闢了一些不錯的行動管道，確保投入目標金額。之後，由於用戶成長良好，我們調整了策略，希望獲得一定的利潤。

So I think the lesson here is don't read too much into quarter-to-quarter marketing trends in this business, ever. We have said that before, and we will say it again. I think overall marketing spend is increasing. It is driving growth. And I could go into a lot more detail here on our marketing dynamics, if anyone is interested. But just in answer to that question, I wouldn't want you to get too bogged down in the fact that North America marketing in Q2 was flat. That's just the output of a complicated algorithm, if you will, that determines how much we spend, where and when.

所以我認為這裡要學到的教訓是，永遠不要過度解讀這個產業的季度行銷趨勢。我們之前說過，以後還會再說。我認為整體行銷支出正在成長，並且正在推動成長。如果有人有興趣，我可以更詳細地介紹我們的行銷動態。但就這個問題而言，我不想讓大家過於糾結於第二季北美行銷支出持平這一事實。這只是一個複雜的演算法的輸出結果，這個演算法決定了我們的支出金額、支出地點和時間。

On HomeAdvisor -- this is Joey, and I will let Jeff chime in here as I get it wrong. But (technical difficulties) HomeAdvisor performance. It's been growing nicely. We expect it to continue to grow. We expect EBITDA to continue to grow. We're not going to optimize for near-term profits on this business, but we're -- because we see huge opportunity for investment, both in sales and in marketing. And that is starting to yield results. So where you see the EBITDA coming, that is the leverage in the model starting to come to fruition.

關於HomeAdvisor－我是Joey，如果我說錯了，請Jeff補充。但是（技術故障）HomeAdvisor的業績一直保持良好成長動能。我們預計它將繼續增長。我們預計EBITDA也會持續成長。我們不會在這個業務上追求短期利潤最大化，但我們確實看到了巨大的投資機會，無論是在銷售還是行銷方面。而這些投資已經開始產生效果。所以，您看到的EBITDA成長，正是我們商業模式中槓桿效應開始顯現的體現。

We have got more service professionals in the network, better service professionals in the network. And that leads to more efficiency on our marketing. So that all starts to drop down to the bottom line. Now, we will continue to spend into that by growing sales and marketing. But I do expect for the rest of the year we will grow profits a little and into next year. You want to add to that?

我們的網路中服務專業人員數量較多，服務品質也較高。這提高了我們的行銷效率，最終都會轉化為利潤成長。我們將持續加大投入，拓展銷售和行銷。但我預計，今年剩餘時間和明年，我們的利潤將略有成長。您對此有何補充？

Yes. I just think that the only thing I would add is you have to realize that this year we tripled our TV spend and we have grown our SP base 30% at the same time that we have grown the quality of the service provider. Which means they cost more to acquire, but their profit tail is larger and longer. So with the big ramp in marketing and the big ramp in quality SP, you have a bigger profit tail and you get natural leverage coming after a year of significant ramp.

是的。我唯一想補充的是，您需要意識到，今年我們的電視廣告支出翻了三倍，服務提供者 (SP) 的用戶基數也增長了 30%，與此同時，服務提供商的品質也得到了提升。這意味著獲客成本更高，但他們的利潤成長週期更長、利潤空間更大。因此，隨著行銷投入和優質服務提供者數量的大幅增長，利潤增長週期也更長，經過一年的顯著增長，自然而然地獲得了槓桿效應。

That's great, thank you. Thanks.

太好了，謝謝。謝謝。

Jason Helfstein, Oppenheimer & Co.

Jason Helfstein，奧本海默公司

Thanks, a few questions. Just to dig a little bit more deeper. In the press release when you said North American PMC growth was a step behind fourth-quarter's growth rate. Can you go a little more deeper? Did it grow ex-Tinder in the US? Can you maybe give us that? We can tell you what we were guessing it grew in the first quarter. Just a little more color behind just that.

謝謝，我有幾個問題，想更深入地了解一下。在新聞稿中，您提到北美私人行銷公司 (PMC) 的成長速度比第四季略慢。能再詳細解釋一下嗎？美國市場剔除 Tinder 後是否實現了成長？能否提供一些相關資訊？我們猜測第一季的成長情況，但希望您能提供更多細節。

Secondly, have you seen any changes in the competitive environment around dating? And then thirdly, as you guys are thinking about what this Company looks like post the IPO of Match, can you talk about the desire to perhaps reorganize or gives additional disclosure, perhaps making HomeAdvisor or Vimeo separate segments? Thank you.

其次，您是否觀察到約會領域的競爭環境發生了任何變化？第三，鑑於你們正在考慮Match上市後公司的發展方向，能否談談是否考慮進行重組或增加資訊揭露，例如將HomeAdvisor或Vimeo拆分為獨立業務部門？謝謝。

All right. I didn't get the first part of your question about Q4 versus Q2.

好的。關於第四季和第二季的問題，我沒聽懂前半部。

Just the comment in the release you said that the quote was, second-quarter North American PMC growth was a step behind first quarter's growth rate. Can you just go (multiple speakers).

新聞稿中你提到的那句話是，北美PMC第二季的成長速度比第一季慢了一點。你能直接說（多位發言人）嗎？

Oh, first quarter, sorry.

哦，是第一季度，抱歉。

Was it positive, was it --

結果是正面的嗎？ ——

Yes, yes, yes. Sorry. I thought you said fourth quarter. First quarter. Yes, we had positive sub growth in North America ex-Tinder. There were a number of things. One, we pulled back marketing spend. We bought HowAboutWe in Q2 last year, and that was basically a run-off. So we had a negative impact there where we bought some subs, basically at a very low price, and basically ran them off, which [tamped] things down. Definitely ex-Tinder, it was lower than it was last year but it was positive and mostly reflective of a pullback in marketing once you normalized for the noise.

是的，是的，是的。抱歉，我以為你說的是第四季。是第一季。是的，我們在北美地區（不包括 Tinder）的訂閱用戶數量實現了正增長。這其中有很多原因。首先，我們減少了行銷支出。去年第二季我們收購了 HowAboutWe，這基本上算是一筆後續支出。所以我們之前以很低的價格收購了一些訂閱用戶，然後又迅速用完，這在一定程度上抑制了成長。當然，不包括 Tinder 的訂閱用戶數量確實比去年有所下降，但總體而言是正增長，這主要反映了我們在減少行銷支出後，剔除其他因素的影響。

Lower than it was in the first quarter.

低於第一季的水平。

Sorry. Lower than it was in the first quarter, yes, once you normalized for those things. In terms of competitive environment, I mean, competitive environment is remarkably stable. I mean, if you look at the top five dating products in the US, four of them are well over 10 years old, and the fifth is Tinder. The gap between usage in the fifth biggest and the sixth biggest is dramatic.

抱歉。確實比第一季低，當然，前提是你已經把那些因素都考慮進去了。至於競爭環境，我的意思是，競爭環境非常穩定。你看，美國排名前五的約會軟體，其中四個都超過十年了，第五名是 Tinder。第五名和第六名用戶量之間的差距非常顯著。

There have always been small numbers of small players. Over time some of those have gotten big. I mean, OkCupid once was a small player that got big. It happened over 10 years. Same with PlentyOfFish. eHarmony and Match have spent a lot of money to get there. There's no one else out there really spending to grow the way Match and eHarmony were before.

一直以來，市場上都存在著一些規模較小的公司。隨著時間的推移，其中一些發展壯大。例如，OkCupid 曾經也是一家小公司，後來發展壯大，這花了十年。 PlentyOfFish 也是如此。 eHarmony 和 Match 也投入大量資金才走到今天。目前市場上還沒有其他公司像 Match 和 eHarmony 以前那樣投入巨資進行擴張。

So I think you have this incredible outlier in Tinder that racked this code that grew in two years into the biggest dating product in the world. Nothing before or after has been able to replicate that DNA at all. So, to me it is very stable. Could one of the small things that exists today someday be big? Absolutely.

所以我認為Tinder是一個不可思議的特例，它憑藉著一套獨特的程式碼，在短短兩年內發展成為全球最大的約會產品。之前或之後，沒有其他產品能夠複製這種模式。因此，在我看來，它非常穩定。如今看似不起眼的小事物，未來是否有可能發展成大事件？當然有可能。

But given that nothing came up like a rocketship like Tinder, you wouldn't expect some dramatic acceleration. So I think it is an incredibly stable competitive environment. And frankly, no different than it has been in the seven or eight years I have been involved in this category.

但考慮到沒有什麼像 Tinder 那樣迅速躥紅的軟體出現，你也不會指望它會出現劇烈的加速成長。所以我認為這是一個非常穩定的競爭環境。坦白說，這和我過去七、八年從事這個行業以來的情況並無二致。

On segments, I am taking a look at that now and we will make a change if it makes sense. There's certainly some arguments for a different look at the segments. And we are considering all of those now.

關於細分市場，我現在正在研究這個問題，如果合適我們會做出調整。確實有一些理由需要重新審視細分市場，我們正在考慮所有這些理由。

Thank you.

謝謝。

Ross Sandler, Deutsche Bank.

羅斯‧桑德勒，德意志銀行。

Hey, guys. I got two for Greg and one for Joey. Greg, the prepared remarks mentioned that you want to expand Tinder's use case beyond that of a typical dating product. Elaborate a little bit what you meant there.

嘿，各位。我為格雷格準備了兩題，給喬伊一道。格雷格，你準備的演講稿裡提到你想拓展 Tinder 的應用場景，使其超越傳統約會產品的範疇。請你詳細解釋一下你的意思。

And then second is the PlentyOfFish acquisition looks like a great deal for you guys. But what, I guess, core competencies or capabilities do they bring to the family that maybe you didn't have already? And then are you guys going to disclose specific metrics around Tinder? I know you're not giving forward guidance, but metrics around Tinder in the upcoming filing?

其次，收購 PlentyOfFish 對你們來說似乎是一筆非常划算的交易。但我想問的是，他們能為你們帶來哪些你們之前不具備的核心競爭力或能力？另外，你們會揭露關於 Tinder 的具體指標嗎？我知道你們目前沒有提供業績指引，但會在即將提交的文件中揭露 Tinder 的相關指標嗎？

And then Joey, on search it looks you guided to sequential increases from here. Any update on the Google renewal? And we noticed that the Java deal went away from you guys. So any materiality in that agreement, or any color there would be helpful. Thanks

Joey，搜尋結果顯示你們似乎一直在逐步提高薪資。谷歌續約有什麼進展嗎？我們注意到你們和Java的合作似乎已經結束了。所以，如果能透露協議的具體內容或相關訊息，那就太好了。謝謝。

Thanks, Ross. On the [Tin] use case, I guess the point I was making is, there are always -- when you think about product development, there's sort of always have -- I think about product development in four different buckets, at least in our kinds of products. There is the kind of development you do that is sort of invisible to the world but very important, which is making sure you can scale, making sure that -- we just fixed a bug where literally swipes per user went up double digits just by fixing a bug. So there are a lot of opportunities in that bucket.

謝謝，羅斯。關於[Tin]的使用案例，我想表達的觀點是，在產品開發過程中，總是會有──至少在我們這類產品中，我認為產品開發可以分為四個不同的類別。其中一種開發工作對外界來說可能不太明顯，但卻非常重要，那就是確保產品能夠擴展，確保——我們剛剛修復了一個bug，僅僅修復這個bug，每個用戶的滑動次數就增加了兩位數。所以，這方面有很多機會。

Then you have the bucket that are visible but not game-changing. It is changing algorithms, improving filters, matching and all of that. We have tons of opportunity there. There is monetization, where we have done one thing so far, which is the Tinder-plus features that we launched in February. It's had amazing growth there. There is no question that we can monetize this product really well.

然後還有一些顯而易見但卻並非顛覆性的改進。例如演算法的改變、篩選功能的最佳化、匹配機制的改進等等。我們在這方面擁有巨大的潛力。獲利方面，我們目前只做了一件事，那就是二月推出的 Tinder Plus 功能。這項功能取得了驚人的成長。毫無疑問，我們完全有能力將這款產品實現良好的盈利。

And then there's the fourth bucket, which is, I call, things that users see and they say; wow, that is really different and cool, and drives user growth, excitement, et cetera. We have things in that bucket as well that we are working on.

還有第四類，我稱之為用戶看到後會說「哇，這真特別，真酷」的東西，它能推動用戶成長，激發用戶熱情等等。我們也有這類東西正在努力開發中。

Typical dating products really do three things. They provided a community, they provide filters by which you can search that community, and they provide the ability to message with other members of that community. That's what they all do. We think Tinder has the potential within dating to do more than that. And we think it is one of the only products that has that potential, and we have resources dedicated to that. We are very excited about it. No timetable. It's just -- it's these are the things that we are allocating our resources to. And we think it's got big potential. I could say more, but I would have to kill everybody on the call. So I will leave it at that.

典型的約會產品其實只有三件事：提供一個社群、提供篩選功能方便使用者搜尋社群成員，以及提供與其他社群成員溝通的功能。這就是它們的全部功能。我們認為 Tinder 在約會領域擁有更大的潛力。而我們認為它是目前為數不多的擁有這種潛力的產品之一，我們也為此投入了資源。我們對此感到非常興奮。目前還沒有具體的時間表。我們只是把資源投入這些方面。我們認為它潛力巨大。我本來還可以說更多，但那樣我就得把電話會議裡的人都吵醒了。所以就說到這裡吧。

Sorry, there were other things as well. PlentyOfFish, great acquisition. We're paying a low double-digit multiple on trailing EBITDA. Can't get into the future on it, but -- sorry, about a 13 multiple on trailing EBITDA. We will be disclosing the historical financials for PlentyOfFish, I guess, within the next 90 days, or whatever the timetable is.

抱歉，還有其他事情。 PlentyOfFish 的收購非常成功。我們以較低的兩位數倍 EBITDA 倍數收購了它。目前還無法預測未來，但——抱歉，大概是 13 倍左右。我們計劃在未來 90 天內（或根據具體時間表）披露 PlentyOfFish 的歷史財務數據。

It's growing well. It's a business that has solid user growth, but even better on that monetization ramp that we watched OkCupid go through for several years. So that's really exciting. We think we will get good growth out of it.

它發展勢頭良好。用戶成長穩健，獲利能力也像OkCupid那樣突飛猛進，我們見證了它數年的發展歷程。這真的令人振奮。我們相信它會帶來良好的成長。

In terms of competencies, in general I think we bring certain competencies to the table which I just think we're good at running these things. We've got a system of analytics. We can deploy wins and losses -- wins across the portfolio quickly and prevent mistakes from being duplicated. So operationally we think we've got abilities there.

就能力而言，我認為我們總體上具備某些優勢，而且我們很擅長處理這類事情。我們擁有一套分析系統。我們可以快速地將成功和失敗的經驗應用到整個投資組合中，並防止錯誤重演。因此，我們認為我們在營運方面具備相應的能力。

And then I think when you think about our portfolio and the way we go about building it, you buy or launch products that have special resonance with particular groups. What that does is effectively brings down -- or brings up the net lifetime value of a user, meaning it is the relationship between the ability to monetize a user and the cost to acquire that user. When that is the greatest, you have the most profitability. And it varies dramatically from population to population and from site to site.

然後，我認為，當你思考我們的產品組合以及我們建立產品組合的方式時，你會發現，我們收購或推出的產品往往能引起特定群體的共鳴。這樣做其實會降低或提高使用者的淨生命週期價值，也就是使用者變現能力與獲客成本之間的比值。當這個比值最高時，獲利能力也就最強。而這個比值會因使用者群體和網站的不同而產生顯著差異。

So PlentyOfFish is a big product. It has a lot of overlap with a lot of our products, but it also has a real hold on what I would call a less metropolitan geographic base in the US and an older base in the US then do, say, certainly OkCupid and Tinder. It from an age demography it sort of matches Match more, but from a sensibility perspective in terms of the intent levels and how heavily it is monetized, it mimics Tinder and OkCupid more. And that really creates this big patchwork where you have the older population, and again, PlentyOfFish has plenty of younger people too, but it has an older group also which OkCupid and Tinder don't. We think it is highly protectable. It's a lucrative group. And if I were looking at it from a stray sort of, what part of the landscape does this fill in that you don't already have? That would be it.

所以 PlentyOfFish 是一款規模龐大的產品。它與我們許多產品都有重疊之處，但它在美國也佔據著一個我稱之為「非都市化」的地理使用者群體，而且使用者年齡層也比 OkCupid 和 Tinder 更為老化。從年齡結構來看，它更接近 Match，但從用戶意圖和獲利模式的角度來看，它更像 Tinder 和 OkCupid。這就形成了一個很大的用戶群拼圖：一方面，PlentyOfFish 擁有大量年輕用戶；另一方面，它還擁有 OkCupid 和 Tinder 所不具備的老年用戶群。我們認為這個群體非常值得保護，因為它利潤豐厚。如果我從一個旁觀者的角度來看，它填補了我們目前市場中哪些空白？答案就是這一點。

In terms of Tinder metrics disclosure, look, we're going through that process, evaluating metrics to disclose now. I would reiterate what I have said before, which is we are in this weird position where Tinder is still a very early start-up company. We are trying to protect it from the burdens of being a public company as much as we can while recognizing the fact that it is part of a public company. I go there. I am the mean corporate overlord who wants this number and that number and they look at me like I am from Mars because they are focused on growing the business. And I try and balance those two things out. So I know that there's lots of metrics you'd like to get. We're looking at disclosing as much as we can without impacting the growth of the business and its rhythms. And that will come out in the wash when we file.

關於Tinder的數據揭露，我們正在進行評估，確定哪些指標需要揭露。我想重申我之前說過的話，那就是我們現在處境很特殊，Tinder仍然是一家非常早期的新創公司。我們努力避免它承擔上市公司的種種負擔，同時也意識到它本身就是一家上市公司。我去那裡，就像一個嚴厲的“企業老闆”，想要這個數據那個數據，而他們卻像看外星人一樣看著我，因為他們專注於業務增長。我努力在這兩者之間找到平衡。我知道你們有很多指標想要了解。我們正在考慮在不影響業務成長和節奏的前提下，盡可能揭露數據。最終結果會在我們提交文件時揭曉。

On Google, nothing to report right now. We're, as I have said before, we are in active discussions right now, as you would imagine. There's multiple people interested in the business. When we have something to report, we will certainly, obviously report something. But nothing to say right now on that.

關於谷歌，目前沒有什麼可透露的。正如我之前所說，我們正在積極洽談，正如您所料。有多方對這項業務感興趣。一旦有任何進展，我們當然會在第一時間公佈。但目前就此事，我們無可奉告。

On Java, it was a -- the nature of these details, especially with a partner like Java, which is a relatively stagnant user base, large but stagnant user base, is they do turn over every few years. So if you look at the history, they were with Google for a few years, then they were with Microsoft for a few years, then they were with us for a few years, and now they've transitioned that to Yahoo. What happens with a relatively stagnant user base is that the offer becomes somewhat saturated. It's just less attractive for both the partner and the incumbent in there. So I wouldn't read too much into that in terms of competitive implications.

關於Java，這些細節的性質，尤其對於像Java這樣用戶基數相對穩定的合作夥伴而言，雖然用戶基數龐大，但增長緩慢，因為他們每隔幾年就會更換一次合作夥伴。回顧歷史，他們先與谷歌合作了幾年，然後與微軟合作了幾年，之後又與我們合作了幾年，現在又轉到了雅虎。用戶基數相對穩定會導致市場飽和，對合作夥伴和現有供應商的吸引力都會降低。因此，我不認為這會對競爭格局產生太大影響。

In terms of scale for us, that business for a lot of the same reasons I just said, it probably peaked in year three of the relationship. We had, I think, four one-year deals with them. I think it peaked in year three of the relationship. It's not -- we are not happy to ever lose a commercial deal, but it certainly, it's survivable, the loss, and the B2B business is still profitable, notwithstanding the loss of that particular partner.

就我們的規模而言，由於我剛才提到的許多原因，這項業務可能在合作的第三年達到了頂峰。我們與他們簽訂了四份為期一年的合約。我認為，業務的巔峰時期是在合作的第三年。當然，我們並不樂意失去任何商業合作，但即便失去了這位合作夥伴，我們的B2B業務仍然盈利，這是可以承受的損失。

Great. Thanks, guys.

太好了，謝謝各位。

Brian Fitzgerald, Jefferies.

Brian Fitzgerald，傑富瑞集團。

Thanks, guys. Maybe related to the Ross' question on the job in search. Overall gross margins surprised on the upside. How would you guys rank the leverage driving that? And then on the PlentyOfFish acquisition, I think you mentioned raising debt. Have you mentioned how much you are looking to raise or the timing around that? Thanks.

謝謝各位。這可能和羅斯在求職論壇上​​提出的問題有關。整體毛利率超出預期。你們認為推動這成長的槓桿因素是什麼？另外，關於收購 PlentyOfFish，我記得您曾提到要舉債。您有沒有說過計劃舉債多少，或是大概的時間安排？謝謝。

I will take the second one first. I think, look, PlentyOfFish got $575 million. We are going to raise that. I think it is probably likely that -- Match is a business, given its characteristics, that I think ought to be a net debt company. It has high margins, lots of cash flow, positive working capital and is growing nicely. So I think that we'll borrow for PlentyOfFish probably and then some. And the amounts that we borrow will be very manageable and supportable by the business. Joey?

我先說第二個。你看，PlentyOfFish 已經融資了 5.75 億美元。我們也要籌到這麼多。我覺得 Match 這家公司，就其自身特質而言，應該是一家淨負債公司。它利潤率高，現金流充裕，營運資本為正，成長動能良好。所以我認為我們可能會為 PlentyOfFish 借款，甚至可能會借更多。而我們藉的金額完全在公司可控範圍內。 Joey 覺得呢？

I didn't understand the question. Can you say it again?

我沒聽懂這個問題，你能再說一次嗎？

Yes. So it was around search and the job [deal] going away. Can you walk through how that impacts the gross margins? It felt like gross margins surprised nicely. So kind of thinking about was search a major driver there, how would you rank the levers for the upside in gross margin this quarter?

是的。所以問題出在搜尋和招募交易的取消。能詳細說說這會對毛利率產生什麼影響嗎？感覺毛利率表現不錯，有點出乎意料。所以我在想，搜尋是不是主要驅動因素？你覺得本季毛利率上升的關鍵因素有哪些？

I am not thinking about -- I would have to look at the gross margin actually and focused on the difference in the gross margin. I don't know, Jeff, if you've got that.

我沒考慮這些——我得實際看看毛利率，重點放在毛利率的差異。傑夫，我不知道你有沒有這方面的數據。

On the EBITDA margin, I can speak to that more familiarly. Some of the revenue that we lost sequentially quarter on quarter was lower-margin revenue. So the loss there is less impactful. But the -- we would have to get back to you on the gross margin. I hadn't focused on that.

關於 EBITDA 利潤率，我比較熟悉，可以跟您詳細說說。我們環比下降的部分收入是低利潤率收入，所以這部分損失的影響相對較小。但是——關於毛利率，我得稍後再回覆您，我之前沒有重點關注這方面。

Thanks, guys.

謝謝各位。

Peter Stabler, Wells Fargo Securities.

Peter Stabler，富國證券。

Good morning, Thanks. Two for me. Jeff, you talked about it being an investor year for HomeAdvisor. I think your prepared remarks, or Joey your prepared remarks note that you expect margin improvement. Wonder if you guys could frame kind of a three-year margin expectation for us? Can you put a bracket around it? Is this a 15%, 20%, north of 20%, or what kind of expectations do you have there?

早安，謝謝。我有兩個問題。傑夫，你之前提到今年是HomeAdvisor的投資人之年。我記得你（或喬伊，你準備好的發言稿）提到你們預計利潤率會提高。想請問你們能否給我們一個關於未來三年利潤率的預期？能否給出一個範圍？是15%、20%、超過20%，還是你們的預期具體是多少？

And then secondly for Greg, any color on Tinder monetization comparing US revenue per user to international, realizing you are not going to give us exact numbers. But any directional color would be appreciated.

其次，對於 Greg，能否提供一些關於 Tinder 獲利模式的信息，例如美國用戶人均收入與國際用戶人均收入的比較？我知道你不會提供確切的數字，但任何方向性的分析都將不勝感激。

Final one for Jeff. Balance sheet question on the debt side. With the IPO of Match, would you expect Match to be classified as an unrestricted subsidiary as defined in your bond indentures? And if so, would that require debt repayment? Thanks.

最後一個問題，問傑夫。關於資產負債表債務方面的問題。在Match公司上市後，您認為Match會被歸類為債券契約中定義的非限制性子公司嗎？如果是，是否需要償還債務？謝謝。

On Tinder monetization, first I will say that it is going great. The way these things work is that when you launch a monetization feature, you get your biggest bump at the beginning because your feature is exposed to the entire population for the first time. After some period of time, it starts to be -- additional monetization tends to be generated predominantly by new users coming in who haven't seen it yet. So you have a bump and then you have a steady build until you launch the next monetization feature, which then has the same impact again on users to whom that appeals.

關於 Tinder 的獲利模式，首先我想說，目前進展非常順利。通常情況下，當你推出一項獲利功能時，初期會迎來最大的成長高峰，因為這項功能首次向所有用戶開放。一段時間後，成長速度會放緩——新增的獲利主要來自那些尚未體驗過該功能的新用戶。因此，你會經歷一個成長高峰，然後用戶數量穩定成長，直到你推出下一個獲利功能，而下一個功能又會對那些有興趣的用戶產生同樣的影響。

So we had a nice bump at the beginning. And what we've been pleased about since last we spoke is that the build has continued to be quite solid. So we feel very good about Tinder's ability to monetize, as I said. Renewal rates, all that going great. Penetration rates are at or ahead of schedule. So we feel good about that. In terms of monetization or rate, basically US and Europe, Western Europe, are pretty comparable. And than the rest of the world is a fraction of that. I don't want to give out an exact number, but certainly the blended international rate versus the blended -- versus the North American rate is, I would -- I'm going to hazard a guess, it's in the 50% range. And what has been great is that the penetration, or the subscribers, is actually much more balanced than I would've expected between North America, Western Europe and rest of the world.

所以，我們一開始就取得了不錯的成長。自從上次交流以來，我們一直很欣慰的是，用戶成長一直非常穩健。正如我之前所說，我們對 Tinder 的獲利能力非常有信心。續訂率等等一切都很順利。用戶滲透率也達到了甚至超過了預期。所以我們對此感到很滿意。就獲利能力而言，美國和歐洲（尤其是西歐）的水平相當。而世界其他地區的水平則低得多。我不想給出確切的數字，但可以肯定的是，國際市場的平均盈利能力與北美市場的平均盈利能力相比，我估計在 50% 左右。更令人欣喜的是，北美、西歐和世界其他地區的用戶滲透率（或者說用戶數量）實際上比我預期的要均衡得多。

The ability, as I said on an earlier question, prior to Tinder so much of our base was -- two-thirds of our paid user base was North America. Tinder has effectively inverted that. So over time, we think that bring things into balance. And we are really excited about the -- we knew it would do great in the US and Western Europe. And we're very pleased with how it's done rest of world.

正如我在先前的問題中提到的，在 Tinder 出現之前，我們的用戶群很大一部分——三分之二的付費用戶來自北美。 Tinder 有效地扭轉了這一局面。所以隨著時間的推移，我們認為這最終會達到平衡。我們對此感到非常興奮——我們知道它在美國和西歐會取得巨大成功。我們對它在世界其他地區的表現也非常滿意。

In terms of HomeAdvisor long-term margins, it's a tough question to answer. I don't want to frame it specifically as 15% to 20% or north of that in the cards? I think yes, absolutely. In terms of what time frame? I don't know. I don't want to frame it specifically.

就HomeAdvisor的長期利潤率而言，這很難回答。我不想具體說它會達到15%到20%，甚至更高。我認為是的，絕對有可能。但具體時間跨度是多久？我不知道。我不想給出具體的答案。

I think if you look at a consumer marketplace business like this, margins like that, north of that are certainly potentially achievable. But the things that'll drive that are the metrics that we are seeing and the metrics that are moving that in the right direction. So you look at consumer repeat rate, that is moving up. You look at a service provider retention that's moving up. That's moving up very nicely. Those things can deliver real leverage in the model, and can start to drop margin down to the bottom line.

我認為，像這樣的消費市場業務，利潤率達到甚至超過這個水準當然是有可能實現的。但真正推動利潤率提升的是我們目前看到的那些指標，以及那些正在朝著正確方向發展的指標。例如，消費者復購率正在上升，服務提供者的留存率也在上升，而且上升勢頭非常強勁。這些指標能夠真正提升業務模式，並最終降低利潤率，從而提高淨利潤。

I don't want to put a time frame on it. I don't want to put a specific number on it. But I do think that healthy margins is something that we could see over time in this business, for sure. You want to add to that?

我不想設定時間期限，也不想給具體的數字。但我確實認為，隨著時間的推移，我們肯定能在這個行業看到健康的利潤率。你還有什麼要補充的嗎？

I just think the other two factors I would add to this is we think that online -- the leading online players are probably high single-digit penetrated in the overall home services advertising market. So there is a lot of room to run and grow here and to invest against. And our goal is to the leading player, not to grow to margin X within three years. And then I think that secondly, this is a business that has a lot of pricing power, but we would use that very carefully because our goal is to be the leader. So that's a factor in there, too.

我認為還有兩點要考慮。首先，我們認為目前領先的線上平台在整個家事服務廣告市場的滲透率可能只有個位數。因此，這個領域還有很大的發展空間，值得投資。我們的目標是成為行業領導者，而不是在三年內實現利潤率達到X。其次，我認為這個行業擁有很強的定價權，但我們會非常謹慎地使用這種權力，因為我們的目標是成為行業領導者。這也是需要考慮的因素。

And then finally Jeff, do you expect to be forced to repay debt?

最後，傑夫，你預計會被迫償還債務嗎？

Look. The comment I would make there is that there is a debt raise we could do that would require some repurchasing of some debt. However, we haven't made any final decisions around what we are doing. When we know what the scenarios are, we will have a clear communication on that.

我的看法是，我們可以增加債務，但這需要回購部分債務。不過，我們還沒有就具體方案做出最終決定。一旦確定了各種方案，我們會及時與大家溝通。

Thanks.

謝謝。

Brian Nowak, Morgan Stanley,

Brian Nowak，摩根士丹利

Thanks for taking my questions. I have two. The first one is on Tinder monetization. In the press release, you talk about how strong the monetization is. Renewal, the conversions, the re-subscription rates, and there's no discernible negative correlation between monetization and growth. It sounds like it is coming along well. With that as the backdrop, why make the decision (technical difficulties) back the Tinder revenue curve a bit, and what are you changing that is going to push back the Tinder revenue curve versus what you previously anticipated?

感謝您回答我的問題。我有兩個問題。第一個問題是關於 Tinder 的獲利模式。在新聞稿中，您提到 Tinder 的獲利模式非常強勁，續約率、轉換率、續約率都很高，而且獲利模式與用戶成長之間沒有明顯的負相關關係。聽起來一切進展順利。在此背景下，為什麼您決定（由於技術問題）稍微推遲 Tinder 的收入成長計劃？您做出的哪些改變會導致 Tinder 的營收成長計畫比您之前的預期有所延遲？

And then the second one on the Match Group, it sounds like some of the technological and organizational projects are a little bit behind. Can you give us an update on the $500 million of Match EBITDA in 2016? Thanks.

關於Match集團的第二個問題，聽起來他們的一些技術和組織專案進展稍有延遲。您能否提供Match集團2016年5億美元EBITDA的最新狀況？謝謝。

Sure. On the Tinder monetization, it goes back to an answer I gave to an earlier question, which is we've got a bunch of different products -- a bunch of different buckets that we look at product development in. And we have extremely limited although growing resources in which to tackle all of those buckets. I think if you look back, really over the last, however many quarters we've been talking about it, I've said that monetization is going to end up being much more uneven than whatever modeling anyone would do on it. And that 2015 will be choppy because of it.

當然。關於 Tinder 的獲利模式，這要追溯到我之前對一個問題的回答，那就是我們有很多不同的產品——我們把產品開發分成很多不同的類別。雖然我們的資源不斷增長，但極其有限，難以兼顧所有這些類別。我認為，如果你回顧過去幾季我們一直在討論這個問題，我說過，獲利模式最終會比任何人的預測模型都更加不均衡。因此，2015 年將會充滿波動。

I've made that point repeatedly. And I think that -- and we brought new management in, as we looked at all the opportunity, we are going to roll out some monetization features, additional monetization features, but there are so many other things that we feel we need to do, or should do because the opportunity is so great, that it's just not -- it's just we don't have the resources to do all these things at the same time. And it's a start-up and you're constantly looking at opportunity and gaining new information and insights. Again, I mentioned something we did two or three weeks ago where we devoted some resources and we increased swipes per user by 10%, or double digits. That's a huge lift to the business.

我已經反覆強調過這一點。而且我認為——我們引入了新的管理團隊，在審視了所有機會之後，我們將推出一些盈利功能，一些額外的盈利功能，但還有很多其他我們覺得需要做或應該做的事情，因為機會實在太大了，我們根本沒有足夠的資源同時完成所有這些事情。畢竟我們是一家新創公司，你必須不斷尋找機會，獲得新的資訊和見解。我之前也提到過，兩三週前我們投入了一些資源，將每位用戶的滑動次數提高了10%，也就是兩位數的成長。這對業務來說是一個巨大的提升。

I'm not saying that -- I'm not making a prediction about what revenue will or will not be because a whole lot of things factor into it. I'm just saying that when we talked about -- a few quarters ago we laid out that OkCupid analogy and made the point that they had 14 significant product initiatives and countless other smaller ones to drive their monetization. They were at a later stage of development and had focused a lot on their product before then, and so could more heavily concentrate their monetization.

我並不是說——我不會預測收入會是多少，因為影響因素很多。我只是想說，幾個季度前我們討論OkCupid的例子時，指出他們有14項重要的產品計劃和無數其他小型計劃來推動盈利。當時他們已經處於發展後期，並且在此之前已經將大量精力投入到產品研發中，因此可以更集中精力進行盈利。

As we get into this and we dig deep, there are so many opportunities here, that we need to spread our resources across these various things. We've nailed monetization. We're confident that the product monetizes, and really it's just a question of resources and where they are hitting, when.

隨著我們深入研究，會發現這裡蘊藏著許多機會，我們需要將資源分散到各個層面。我們已經找到了獲利模式。我們對產品獲利充滿信心，現在的問題只是資源的分配以及投放時機。

In terms of the $500 million, I really can't -- I think that we said -- I said in the prepared remarks, I've got a barricade full of lawyers who are saying that given that we have an offering announced, I really can't give any kind of forward-looking information than that. We've sort of laid out a lot of things here. But I can't comment on that specifically. Sorry about that.

關於那5億美元，我真的不能——我想我們在事先準備好的發言稿裡說過，我的律師團隊已經站在那裡，他們說鑑於我們已經宣布了發行計劃，我真的不能透露任何前瞻性信息。我們已經在這裡闡述了很多內容，但我不能就此發表具體評論。對此我深感抱歉。

I just want to come back to the question raised by Jefferies earlier on gross margin. I think you are looking at the overall IAC GAAP P&L, not a search gross margin number. And to your point, you have B2B business being a little lighter and the B2B rev share shows up above gross margin, whereas the costs in the consumer business are below gross margin. And so that's where the expansion is coming. So I think that is where you are going with that, if you want to get back on the line and correct me. But I think you're looking at the overall IAC P&L rather than some specific search thing, which is where we were trying to figure out what you were asking. We can go to the next question.

我想回到傑富瑞之前提出的關於毛利率的問題。我認為您關注的是整體的IAC GAAP損益表，而不是某個搜尋業務的毛利率。正如您所說，B2B業務的佔比略低，其收入佔比高於毛利率，而消費者業務的成本則低於毛利率。因此，成長主要來自消費者業務。我想這就是您的思路，如果您需要糾正我，請隨時與我聯繫。但我認為您關注的是整體的IAC損益表，而不是某個特定的搜尋業務，而這正是我們之前試圖理解您的問題所在。我們可以進入下一個問題了。

Dan Kurnos, Benchmark Company.

Dan Kurnos，基準公司。

Greg, just to maybe get into some more specifics on Ross' earlier question on the PlentyOfFish acquisition. Can you talk about some of the mobile learnings or successful opportunities or functionality that might translate directly to Tinder? And conversely, it seems like PlentyOfFish has a decent amount of room for, I guess call it, technical improvement. So from a high-level perspective, how aggressively do you think you will need to spend to modernize the overall platform?

格雷格，我想就羅斯之前​​關於收購 PlentyOfFish 的問題，再具體談談。你能說說 PlentyOfFish 在行動裝置方面有哪些經驗、成功案例或功能可以直接應用在 Tinder 上嗎？反過來，PlentyOfFish 似乎還有很大的進步空間，我姑且稱之為技術改進吧。那麼，從宏觀角度來看，你認為需要投入多少資金才能達到平台的現代化？

And then Joey, could you comment or update us on the general trends in the B2B market? Are they still continuing to get less worse generically, understanding that you've lapped most of the historical issues? And this is of course outside of the ridiculous Yahoo/Java deal which they overpaid for. Or are you guys getting the sense that Google is trying to enter into an elongated exit of the affiliate search market? And since it looks like you've mostly stopped buying from Google with Ask, can you talk about any organic content-driven traction you're seeing there, understanding that we are still really early in the reset? Thanks.

Joey，您能否就B2B市場的整體趨勢發表一下看法或更新一下資訊？考慮到你們已經克服了大部分歷史遺留問題，市場整體趨勢是否仍在改善？當然，這不包括雅虎收購Java那筆價格虛高的荒唐交易。或者，你們是否感覺到谷歌正試圖逐步退出聯盟搜尋市場？鑑於你們似乎已經基本停止透過Ask從Google購買廣告，能否談談你們在Ask上看到的自然流量成長？畢竟，我們目前仍處於市場重塑的早期階段。謝謝。

Okay. First, I think that PlentyOfFish is a great business. It's a great product. It's, I think, the number two in terms of usage. And it's doing a great job on mobile. It is one of those things where you add it to the portfolio, it brings things to the portfolio, we bring things to it. They've probably nailed the Android better than we have. And that's a big learning opportunity coming back the other way. We've nailed a couple of other things a lot better than they have, and that's learning going that way. So I think it goes both ways. I don't think of it as being especially relevant to Tinder or vice-a-versa.

好的。首先，我認為 PlentyOfFish 是一家很棒的公司，它的產品也很棒。就用戶量而言，我認為它排名第二。而且它在行動端做得非常出色。它就像是那種你把它加入產品組合，它就能為我們的產品組合帶來一些東西，反之亦然。他們在安卓平台上的表現可能比我們更好。這對我們來說是一個很好的學習機會。我們在其他一些方面也做得比他們好得多，這也是一個學習的機會。所以我認為這是一個雙向的過程。我不認為它和 Tinder 有什麼特別的關聯，反之亦然。

It comes into this blender, and OkCupid has done a bunch of things that we are doing on Tinder. They've done some things that wouldn't make sense on Tinder. And there some things that would make sense on Tinder that wouldn't make sense on the others. Our job is to pull all these things and deploy them effectively. But I certainly think that there will be learnings back and forth.

這一切都融合在一起，OkCupid 做過很多我們在 Tinder 上也在做的事情。他們做的一些事情在 Tinder 上行不通，而有些事情在 Tinder 上行得通，在其他平台上卻行不通。我們的工作就是把所有這些整合起來，有效地運用它們。但我相信，我們之間一定會有相互學習和借鏡的機會。

In terms of modernizing, I think there's some work we have to do behind the scenes on shoring up some scalabality issues and some data center issues, but it is small money. I don't expect there to be some major modernization or technological rebuild at PlentyOfFish. They are actually quite sound and works quite well. The product as they have it has great appeal to the group, to their user base. And I think that is one of the things that you always have to remember. The reason we have multiple products is because different things appeal to different people. And we try and -- our strategy is generally to keep the individuality of the products while deploying common features that should simply enhance but not reduce to commonality across product.

就現代化而言，我認為我們需要在幕後做一些工作，解決一些可擴展性和資料中心方面的問題，但這筆費用不高。我不認為 PlentyOfFish 會進行大規模的現代化改造或技術重建。他們目前的系統運作良好，非常穩健。他們的產品對使用者群體極具吸引力。我認為這一點必須牢記。我們之所以推出多款產品，是因為不同的產品吸引不同的使用者。我們的策略通常是在保持產品獨特性的同時，部署一些通用功能，這些功能應該只是增強產品的功能，而不是降低產品之間的通用性。

I will try to get these in order. So on the B2B business, it is -- I am not going to call the bottom right now, because I've just been -- well, frankly I have been wrong on that before. There's volatility in that market. I think very recently we have seen some small signs of strength there. But I am not prepared to call the bottom on that B2B market. I think there's a lot of things shifting in that marketplace and continuing to shift.

我會盡量把這些整理好。關於B2B業務，我現在不會斷言它已經觸底，因為坦白說，我以前在這方面判斷失誤過。這個市場波動很大。我認為最近我們看到了一些小幅回暖的跡象。但我還不準備斷言B2B市場已經觸底。我認為這個市場有很多因素正在發生變化，而且還在持續變化中。

As far as Google's view on the network and network partners, they are absolutely still interested in that business. They are absolutely pursuing partnerships in that business. And I think some of the changes that have happened in the marketplace all have unique components to them. I am not going to speculate on others, what mattered to others in other details but the AOL deal with Microsoft had a component of display, which I know is important to both of those players. The Mozilla going to Yahoo went to the one player in the market that didn't have their own browser. So there are other factors that are in there, but I don't think you can read into that that Google is not interested in the market, because they are still interested in it.

就谷歌對網路和網路合作夥伴的看法而言，他們仍然對這項業務非常感興趣，並且正在積極尋求合作。我認為市場上發生的一些變化都有其獨特之處。我不會對其他因素以及其他細節妄加揣測，但AOL與微軟的交易涉及展示廣告，我知道這對雙方都至關重要。 Mozilla被雅虎收購，是因為雅虎是市場上唯一沒有自有瀏覽器的公司。所以，其中還有其他因素，但我認為不能由此推斷谷歌對這個市場不感興趣，因為他們仍然對它很感興趣。

And I think the last question was content at Ask and organic growth. We usually are sequentially the last quarter starting to see some growth in the organic content. It's still small, but we are investing in the content. We're investing in the quality of the content, the production. And we are optimistic about what can happen there. But it's still early and small.

我認為最後一個問題是關於Ask的內容和自然增長。通常情況下，我們會在最後一個季度開始看到自然內容成長。雖然目前成長幅度仍然很小，但我們一直在增加對內容的投入，包括內容品質和製作水準。我們對未來的發展前景持樂觀態度。但目前仍處於起步階段，規模也比較小。

Great. Thanks, guys.

太好了，謝謝各位。

Heath Terry, Goldman Sachs.

Heath Terry，高盛集團。

Great. Just a few questions. On the B2B side of the search business, can you give us an idea who the biggest partners are there? Where you are seeing the most traction in the business at the moment, given the way that we've seen so much evolution in that business over the last couple of years? And then on the Match side, just a couple of numbers that would be useful. Can you give us a sense of the contribution level from Princeton Review, just so we can try to get some sense of the organic growth rate? With the Match spin coming, any interest in being more specific about your ownership level at Tinder? And then given the comments around the challenges of Tinder being part of a public company and the fact that we've got a very friendly private market valuation environment out there, why not take advantage of what seems to be that fit to allow them to grow as a private company as opposed to continuing to have to deal with the pressures of being part of a public company?

好的。我還有幾個問題。在B2B搜尋業務方面，您能否透露一下最大的合作夥伴有哪些？鑑於過去幾年該業務的快速發展，您目前認為哪些業務成長最為強勁？另外，關於Match方面，能否提供一些有用的數據？您能否大致介紹普林斯頓評論的貢獻比例，以便我們了解其自然成長率？隨著Match即將分拆，您是否願意更具體地說明您在Tinder的持股比例？此外，考慮到Tinder作為上市公司所面臨的挑戰，以及目前私募市場估值環境的友善性，為何不利用這項有利條件，讓Tinder作為一家私人公司發展壯大，而不是繼續承受上市公司帶來的壓力呢？

I will go first and then turn it to Greg. On B2B partners, we're not going to disclose who our biggest partners are. We've talked about areas that have been and are important to us. Antivirus is a big one and likely will continue to be a big one. In terms of specific partners, we are not going to get into that.

我先說，然後輪到格雷格。關於B2B合作夥伴，我們不會透露最大的合作夥伴是誰。我們已經討論過一些對我們過去和現在都很重要的領域。防毒軟體是一個重要的領域，而且很可能會繼續保持重要地位。至於具體的合作夥伴，我們不打算深入探討。

On contribution level, PPR this year is flattish in terms of overall contribution. Ownership level of Tinder. Look, again, we own 100% of Tinder. There is then management equity as well, which gets reflected in our IAC fully diluted share number. So effectively, it's not unlike IAC stock options. It gets reflected in there when we file with Match there will be whatever disclosure is attendant upon that. It will then be in the -- presumably in the Match fully diluted share number, and we will give whatever disclosure is necessary there. But we own 100%, and then the rest is compensatory equity.

就貢獻水準而言，PPR今年的整體貢獻基本上持平。關於Tinder的持股比例，我們再次強調，我們擁有Tinder 100%的股份。此外，還有管理權益，這部分權益會反映在我們的IAC完全稀釋股份數。實際上，這與IAC的股票選擇權類似。當我們向Match提交文件時，這些權益會體現在文件中，屆時會揭露所有相關資訊。這些權益也會體現在－大概會反映在Match的完全稀釋股份數中，我們會提供所有必要的揭露資訊。總之，我們擁有100%的股份，其餘部分是補償性權益。

In terms of the private company markets, look, we think there are big advantages of being part of the Match Group. I think that from the monetization we've done and the speed and efficacy with which we've been able to do it, I think there are big advantage that flow both ways. Could we raise some money in those markets? Sure, but to what end? To actually de-consolidate the business and alleviate it of the pressures you're talking about would be to effectively sell Tinder, and we just don't think that makes any sense.

就私人公司市場而言，我們認為加入 Match Group 有很大的優勢。從我們實現的獲利模式以及我們實現獲利的速度和效率來看，我認為這種優勢是雙向的。我們能否在這些市場籌集資金？當然可以，但目的是什麼？實際上，要拆分業務並減輕您所說的壓力，就相當於出售 Tinder，我們認為這樣做毫無意義。

Again, I manage whatever public company pressures there are. Over time those will dissipate. And we think the trade-off is a no-brainer. That keeping those assets together, at least at this stage of development, makes a lot of sense.

再次強調，我會盡力應付上市公司面臨的各種壓力。隨著時間的推移，這些壓力會逐漸消散。我們認為這樣的權衡是顯而易見的。至少在現階段，將這些資產保留在一起是非常明智的。

Okay, great. Thanks.

好的，太好了，謝謝。

Chris Merwin, Barclays Capital.

克里斯·默溫，巴克萊資本。

Thank you. In the prepared remarks you mentioned how as online dating increasingly moves to mobile it is changing the way that you acquire customers and the efficiency of certain channels, like TV. Do you think the unit economics of customer acquisition on mobile can still be as good or better as those of more traditional channels, and has the competitive environment changed those unit economics in any way? And secondly for Vimeo, I think you called out some investments that you made during the quarter. Can you maybe just provide some clarity on what those investments are and what the impact of those could be to either user growth or monetization?

謝謝。您在準備好的演講稿中提到，隨著線上約會越來越多地轉移到行動設備，這正在改變您獲取客戶的方式以及某些管道（例如電視）的效率。您認為行動端客戶獲取的單位經濟效益是否仍能與傳統通路一樣好，甚至更好？競爭環境是否對這些單位經濟效益產生了任何影響？其次，關於 Vimeo，我認為您提到了本季進行的一些投資。您能否詳細說明這些投資的具體內容，以及它們對用戶成長或獲利能力可能產生的影響？

Sure. On the marketing side, there's a bunch of dynamics at play here that go into our marketing. The first is the cost at which we can acquire new users and the second is our ability to monetize those users. And what's happening here is on both sides of that. Our opportunities to get volume new users from the traditional channels of desktop advertising and television advertising is definitely being constrained at the kind of rates that we've seen before. At the same time, new channels are opening up, particularly on mobile. We have not yet really cracked the code in digital video, although we are certainly starting to look at it.

當然。在行銷方面，有很多因素在起作用。首先是取得新用戶的成本，其次是我們能否將這些用戶變現。而目前的情況是，這兩方面都存在問題。我們透過傳統管道（例如桌面廣告和電視廣告）獲取大量新用戶的機會，其速度確實受到了前所未有的限制。與此同時，新的通路正在湧現，尤其是在行動端。雖然我們已經開始著手研究數位視頻，但尚未真正掌握其運作模式。

The net effect of that so far has been that we are actually able to acquire more users at a lower cost than we've been able to in the past, because we're getting pretty good on the mobile side. The challenge is that mobile users that we are acquiring tend to be younger, and younger tends to monetize less well. As well as the fact that our mobile products are so nascent still in terms of development, they just don't have the conversion to monetization capacity that our desktop products have had. And while we are improving that as we go, we haven't been able to keep up with the mix shift to mobile.

到目前為止，最終結果是，我們能夠以比以往更低的成本獲取更多用戶，因為我們在行動端的表現相當不錯。但挑戰在於，我們獲取的行動用戶往往較年輕，而年輕用戶的消費能力通常較弱。此外，我們的行動產品在開發方面仍處於起步階段，其獲利能力遠不及桌面產品。儘管我們正在不斷改進，但仍未能跟上用戶結構向行動端轉變的步伐。

The net effect of that is effectively neutral, meaning we're acquiring more customers cheaper but they convert lower, and the net effect is basically even. So we are used to historically increasing the effectiveness of our marketing every year. That allows us to market more and still grow profit. For the last year or so we've been sort of in neutral. We've still been increasing our marketing spend, but increasing our marketing spend without incremental yields. That's been the case. But as I've talked about before, I think it's transitional, which is the migration to mobile is more behind us than in front of us. We already -- this quarter Match acquired 65% of its new users on mobile.

最終結果其實是中性的，也就是說，我們獲取客戶的成本降低了，但轉換率卻降低了，最終結果基本上持平。我們過去一直致力於逐年提高行銷效率，這使我們能夠增加行銷投入並實現利潤成長。但在過去一年左右的時間裡，我們的行銷效果一直處於中性狀態。我們仍在增加行銷支出，但並沒有帶來相應的收益成長。情況就是這樣。但正如我之前所說，我認為這只是過渡階段，行動端的遷移已經過去，而非即將到來。本季度，Match 65% 的新用戶都是透過行動端獲得的。

It's not going to go to 100% anytime soon. It may some day, but desktop continues. So the room it has to go versus where it's been is smaller. Once that comps and that mix shift slows, and as we continue to improve the conversion feature to mobile, this whole thing reverses. And we feel that over time we should be able to start increasing the profitability of our marketing again, which then starts that flywheel.

短期內不可能達到 100%。也許將來會實現，但桌面端仍然佔據主導地位。因此，行動端的成長空間相比以往已經縮小。一旦這種競爭格局和組合變化放緩，並且隨著我們不斷改進行動端的轉換率，整個趨勢就會逆轉。我們相信，隨著時間的推移，我們應該能夠再次提升行銷獲利能力，從而啟動良性循環。

We've been able to grow despite (inaudible) our contributions from non-paid channels on products like OkCupid and Tinder, which have allowed us to grow and continue to increase our marketing spend, even though we are not increasing the market efficiency. But we are not losing overall marketing efficiency. And we do think that that will rebound. So I have used the word, transitional period, for three or four quarters now. I am not going to predict exactly when that is. We are at 65% mobile on Match now. You guys can guess as well as I can where that's going to go and over what period of time. But certainly with 65% behind us, it's more behind us than in front of us. So we feel good long term about that dynamic.

儘管我們透過OkCupid和Tinder等產品上的非付費管道做出了貢獻（聽不清楚），但我們仍然實現了成長，並得以繼續增加行銷支出，即便我們並未提高市場效率。但我們的整體行銷效率並未下降。而且我們認為這種情況會反彈。因此，我在過去三、四個季度裡一直在使用「過渡期」這個詞。我不會準確預測過渡期何時會到來。目前Match的行動端佔比已達65%。你們和我一樣，都能猜到這個數字未來的走向以及需要多長時間才能達到。但可以肯定的是，65%的行動端佔比已經過去，未來發展空間遠大於挑戰。因此，我們對這種長期趨勢感到樂觀。

On Vimeo, we are really investing in three things. Marketing is one, for sure. Content is the other, and creator tools is the third. Creator tools is really the backbone to the business, because that is what drives the creators into the business which gets them to upload their content, which gets the subscribers and users, et cetera. So that's investment in the product fundamentally.

在 Vimeo，我們主要投資三件事。首先是行銷，其次是內容，第三是創作者工具。創作者工具是業務的真正支柱，因為它能吸引創作者加入，促使他們上傳內容，從而獲得訂閱者和用戶等等。所以，從根本上來說，這是對產品的投資。

Content, we've been dabbling in content investments. We are not investing massively there. But it is something where we have been filling out the suite of content on Vimeo with some investments there in terms of backing creators.

內容方面，我們一直在嘗試進行一些投資。雖然投資規模不大，但我們確實在Vimeo上進行了一些內容上的投資，以支持創作者。

And then marketing. So we've done a bit of marketing. We have grown our marketing this year as against last year. Probably all three of those things continue.

然後是市場行銷。我們做了一些行銷工作。與去年相比，我們今年的行銷投入有所增加。這三方面可能都會持續下去。

Just one -- someone in an earlier question, I had said that I thought international rate on Tinder was about 50% of North America. It's actually a little better than that. I wasn't far off, but it's a little better.

就一個問題──之前有人問過我，我當時覺得Tinder的國際用戶比例大概是北美用戶的50%。實際上比這還要高一些。我之前估計得差不多，但確實更高一些。

I think we can go to the next question.

我認為我們可以進入下一個問題了。

Eric Sheridan, UBS.

瑞銀集團的艾瑞克·謝裡丹。

Thanks for taking the questions. Two following up with Greg. Greg, when you look at the portfolio of assets you now have inside the Match Group, do you feel you own that whole stack through the demographics of niches that you want to own for the long term in Match? Or how should we think strategically about some of the areas you might still want to address? And then you have also talked on and off over the last year about the potential or worries about cannibalization as some of the niches sort of creeped into other areas, and maybe properties like Tinder became mainstream. What are you seeing in terms of spending on dating and whether grows in one area is stymieing growth in another, or have you not seen any signs of cannibalization? Thanks.

感謝您回答這些問題。接下來有兩個問題想問格雷格。格雷格，您審視一下Match Group目前擁有的資產組合，您是否認為您已經完全掌控了Match Group想要長期發展的各個細分市場？或者，我們應該如何從策略角度思考您可能仍然想要拓展的領域？此外，在過去一年裡，您也斷斷續續地談到了一些細分市場可能出現的蠶食效應，例如某些細分市場逐漸滲透到其他領域，以及像Tinder這樣的平台逐漸成為主流。您如何看待約會消費的現況？一個領域的成長是否會抑制其他領域的成長？或者您沒有看到任何蠶食效應的跡象？謝謝。

I think I've said for a while now that there is nothing that we need to own strategically. PlentyOfFish is a business that we've looked at for a long time. It's a great business. It became available. We were able to get it at a good price in a good process, and we feel really good about the acquisition. But if we hadn't gotten it, it wouldn't have -- it wasn't missing in some fundamental way.

我之前說過，我們並沒有什麼策略性需要持有的資產。 PlentyOfFish 是我們關注已久的公司，它是一家很棒的公司。後來它正好待售，我們以合理的價格透過良好的流程完成了收購，我們對這次收購非常滿意。但即便我們沒收購它，它也不會對我們造成任何實質的影響。

I think that continues to be true in North America. Internationally there are certain geographies that we could get into where we are not. We recently bought a small business in Japan that really, we think has the potential to crack the code there for the first time. So that's exciting. And there are other opportunities like that.

我認為這種情況在北美依然存在。在國際上，我們還有一些尚未涉足的地區可以進入。我們最近在日本收購了一家小型企業，我們認為它真的很有潛力，能夠首次在日本打開市場。這令人振奮。類似的機會還有很多。

In Europe, generally I would say our portfolio is not as fleshed out as it is in North America. So there are probably more opportunities there as well. But I think they all fall into the, is it a good deal? Does it solve some fundamental -- does it allow us to acquire a new group of customers at a more profitable basis than our existing products? You do the math, and all of those things filter in. It's either something that is worth doing or not.

在歐洲，總的來說，我認為我們的產品組合不如北美那麼完善。所以，那裡可能也存在更多機會。但我認為，所有機會最終都歸結於一點：這筆交易是否划算？它是否能解決一些根本性問題——它能否讓我們以比現有產品更高的利潤率獲得新的客戶群？你需要仔細計算，所有這些因素都會影響最終結果。要嘛值得做，要嘛不值得做。

So do I expect there to be more acquisitions? Yes. Is there anything that we need or that I feel there is a risk we might overpay for or pay aggressively for? I think that is unlikely. We feel pretty good about our ability to grow what we've got. I think that's unlikely.

所以我預計會有更多收購嗎？是的。有沒有我們需要的，或者我覺得我們可能會出價過高或出價過高的目標？我認為不太可能。我們對現有業務的成長能力很有信心。我認為不太可能。

In terms of cannibalism. I guess we think about it the following way. I've said this earlier. When we're looking at acquisitions, we look at, does this acquisition or new product launch give us the opportunity to acquire a meaningful group of customers on a more profitable basis than what we've got? And to the extent the answer is yes and that size is big enough and the cost of getting in either acquisition or launch, makes sense in relation to the opportunity, we will go in there.

就「蠶食」而言，我想我們是這樣考慮的。我之前也說過，當我們考慮收​​購時，我們會看，這次收購或新產品發布能否讓我們以比現有客戶更高的利潤率獲得一大批有意義的客戶？如果答案是肯定的，而且規模足夠大，收購或發布的成本與機會相比也合理，我們就會進行收購。

And what that does is that allows us with some new property to acquire a group of users that would have cost us more on another property to acquire. The net result of that is a more profitable consolidated company. But it is inevitably that any given one of our products is probably smaller than it would otherwise have been. By buying OurTime and launching that product in the over-50 crowd, there is no question that we pulled back marketing spend on Match for that crowd because it is easier to acquire some group of that crowd on OurTime. So in that way does OurTime cannibalize Match? Yes.

這樣做的好處在於，我們可以透過收購新平台來獲取一群用戶，如果收購其他平台，取得這部分用戶的成本會更高。最終結果是，合併後的公司獲利能力更強。但不可避免的是，我們任何一款產品的規模都可能比原本小。在收購 OurTime 並將其推向 50 歲以上人群市場後，我們無疑減少了在 Match 上針對該人群的營銷支出，因為在 OurTime 上獲取這部分用戶更容易。那麼，OurTime 是否會蠶食 Match 的市佔率呢？答案是肯定的。

Same with Tinder, lower cohort. Invariably our approach leads to certain of our products being smaller than they would be as standalone businesses, but overall larger and more profitable. I guess that is the best way I can answer that question.

Tinder也是如此，使用者群體較小。我們的做法總是會導致某些產品規模小於獨立營運時的情況，但總體而言，它們的規模更大，獲利能力也更強。我想這就是我能回答這個問題的最佳方式了。

I think we can go to the next question.

我認為我們可以進入下一個問題了。

Kerry Rice, Needham and Company.

Kerry Rice，Needham and Company。

Thanks a lot. One question on HomeAdvisor. More of a high-level question, is have you seen any changes in the competitive dynamics in the home services market, particularly as you see companies like Amazon enter the market? And then maybe what are your thoughts about consolidation in the home services market?

非常感謝。關於HomeAdvisor，我有一個問題。更確切地說，是一個比較宏觀的問題：您是否觀察到家政服務市場的競爭格局發生了任何變化，尤其是在像亞馬遜這樣的公司進入市場之後？另外，您對家事服務市場的整合有何看法？

Yes. It's obviously something we're watching very closely and there's been another bunch of announcements over the last few months in terms of new players entering the market or speculated to enter the market. Look, one thing we know from being in this business for 10-plus years is this is a very hard business. You have to build a real, high-quality service professional network. You have to deliver real high-quality value to those service professionals. And you have to deliver a comprehensive experience to the consumer.

是的。我們當然非常關注這一點，在過去幾個月裡，又有很多新玩家宣布或傳聞將進入市場。我們在這個行業摸爬滾打了十多年，深知這是一個競爭非常激烈的行業。你必須建立一個真正高品質的服務專業人員網絡，必須為這些服務專業人員提供真正高品質的價值，並且必須為消費者提供全面的體驗。

That's not an easy thing to do, even for really massive companies. Companies whose business model is built on getting their providers high volume and low margin, that doesn't work for a service professional. A service professional has to make margin on every job. You have to give them a service that enables them to do that.

即使對於規模龐大的公司來說，這也不是一件容易的事。那些商業模式建立在讓供應商獲得高銷售量、低利潤基礎上的公司，對服務專業人員來說行不通。服務專業人員必須在每項工作中都獲得利潤。你必須為他們提供能夠幫助他們實現這一目標的服務。

Service professionals don't want to compete with a fly-by-night random person who may be able to fix your sink, but won't deliver that sort of quality job because they will do a poor job at a low price. So being able to evaluate the quality and ensure the quality of a service professional network is a hugely valuable thing. And again, not just something that shows up when you have a huge source of traffic. I don't want to underestimate any of the competitors, and I think that having a huge source of traffic is certainly valuable, but there is a lot more to it than that.

服務專業人員不想和那些來路不明的臨時工競爭，這些人或許能修好你的水槽，但因為價格低廉，所以無法提供高品質的服務。因此，能夠評估並確保服務專業人員網路的品質至關重要。而且，這並非只取決於流量的大小。我並不想低估任何競爭對手，我也認為擁有龐大的流量固然重要，但這其中還有更多因素。

A lot of the people -- some of the news lately is there are players who are learning this. Some people have gotten into the business, raised a ton of money, and gotten out or gotten rescued at deals that look like rescues. So we are taking the competitive marketplace very seriously, but we are also very confident in our product and the uniqueness of our product, and the value of the network that we've built over time. We have also probably invested over time, I am making up the number, but $1 billion of infrastructure or something like that, hundreds of millions of dollars in infrastructure on that, which is real money and real time we've invested in that.

最近一些新聞報導說，很多玩家都在意識到這一點。有些人進入這個行業，籌集了大量資金，然後退出，或透過一些看似救助的交易被收購。所以我們非常重視競爭激烈的市場，但我們也對我們的產品及其獨特性，以及我們多年來建立的網路價值充滿信心。我們可能也投入了相當多的資金（我舉個例子），例如10億美元，或是類似的數億美元，這些都是我們實實在投入的資金和時間。

In terms of consolidation, there are arguments for consolidation in terms of the value of growing an SP network. But all of those things really have to be evaluated on an individual basis. And they have to have business models that work or assets that work. And we will always be looking at those things, for sure.

就整合而言，從發展服務提供者 (SP) 網路價值的角度來看，整合確實有其道理。但所有這些都必須具體問題具體分析。而且，它們必須擁有行之有效的商業模式或資產。當然，我們始終會關注這些因素。

Okay. Thank you very much.

好的，非常感謝。

Mark Mahaney, RBC Capital.

Mark Mahaney，RBC Capital。

Thanks. Two questions. Could you talk about what sort of pricing power you think you may have in the dating space? Any evidence of pricing power? And then secondly, could you just talk about the timing of the close of the PlentyOfFish acquisition versus the Match IPO and the logic for having one precede the other? Thank you.

謝謝。我有兩個問題。您能否談談您認為您在約會領域擁有怎樣的定價權？是否有任何定價權方面的證據？其次，您能否談談PlentyOfFish收購完成的時間與Match IPO的時間安排，以及為何前者會先於後者？謝謝。

On pricing power, we've got -- most of our product experience is free. And that will continue to be so forever. So we don't think about it in terms of pricing power. I think our businesses, frankly compete with each other. And they are each trying to optimize their own LTVs and everything else. I actually don't think -- it's not a situation where we have a single product that has our market. Our market position is an aggregation of multiple products that compete with each other and outsiders with different price points and features. And again, I think in a world where there are multiple products that have a complete and viable free option and will continue to, I don't really think about the world in that way. I don't think that sort of logic really applies.

就定價權而言，我們的大部分產品體驗都是免費的，而且這種情況將永遠持續下去。所以我們不會從定價權的角度來考慮這個問題。坦白說，我認為我們各個業務部門之間存在競爭，它們都在努力優化自身的用戶終身價值（LTV）和其他各項指標。實際上，我認為我們並非依賴單一產品來壟斷市場。我們的市場地位是由多個相互競爭的產品以及擁有不同價格和功能的外部競爭對手組成的。而且，我認為在一個擁有完整且可行的免費選項，並且未來仍將如此的產品層出不窮的世界裡，我不會從定價權的角度來思考這個問題。我認為那種邏輯並不適用。

In terms of the sequencing of PlentyOfFish, it totally -- PlentyOfFish became available. We wanted to buy it. We bought it. That takes the amount of time that it takes. We wanted to go public. That takes the amount of time it takes. We expect PlentyOfFish to be done prior to the IPO. If it had gone the other way, it would have gone the other way. I think there's no strategy there. I think it's irrelevant, basically. And we are just doing each of them as quickly as we can. And that's the way it lays out.

關於 PlentyOfFish 的收購順序，事情是這樣的——PlentyOfFish 上市了，我們想收購它，我們也收購了它。這需要時間。我們想上市，這也需要時間。我們預計 PlentyOfFish 會在 IPO 之前完成。如果順序相反，我們也會按照順序來。我認為這裡沒有什麼策略可言，基本上無關緊要。我們只是盡可能快地完成每一項工作。事情就是這樣安排的。

Thanks, Greg.

謝謝你，格雷格。

Victor Anthony, Axiom.

Victor Anthony，公理。

Thanks. Maybe I could prod you about the media segment a bit. There's some assets in there (inaudible) films. Unsure about the rationale for continuing to own these assets. Maybe you could enlighten us on that. And second, just on the decision to float less than 20% of the shares on Match. What went behind that decision versus ultimately doing a full spinoff?

謝謝。或許我可以再問您一些關於媒體板塊的問題。那裡有一些資產（聽不清楚）是電影。我不確定繼續持有這些資產的理由是什麼。您能否解釋一下？其次，關於在Match交易所上市不到20%股份的決定。您做出這個決定的原因是什麼？最終是否應該進行全面分拆？

I got the first question, which is I think what are we doing in [electives] in the media segment? I did not get the second question.

我收到了第一個問題，我想問的是，我們在媒體方向的選修課上要學些什麼？我沒有收到第二個問題。

Second question was why float less than 20% of Match instead of a spinoff?

第二個問題是，為什麼不分拆上市，而是讓 Match 的股份只持有不到 20%？

Got it. On electives, it's something that we have some history in. It's something that we have some expertise in. And it's something that we seem to be doing a decent job at. You look at independent television producers that have the volume of shows that we have on television, is a pretty remarkable accomplishment. We can do that. We've done that relatively efficiently on capital.

明白了。在選修課方面，我們有一些經驗，也有些專業知識，而且我們似乎做得還不錯。看看那些能製作出和我們一樣多節目的獨立電視製作人，這的確是一項了不起的成就。我們也能做到，而且我們用相對有效率的資金做到了。

The game that we are in there, is you need some of those shows to really break out as hits. And if or when they do, you make real money. And if they don't, it doesn't cost you a lot of money to stay in there. So we're making some bets there based on a good team and a good history in that business.

我們現在面臨的情況是，你需要一些節目真正走紅。如果它們真的火了，你就能賺大錢。如果沒火，繼續營運下去也不會花太多錢。所以我們在這個行業裡押注，是因為我們擁有優秀的團隊和良好的過往業績。

On the second question, which is why less than 20%? I think less than 20% is pretty typical to create an active trading market -- oh sorry. The question was versus a spinoff. At any given point when a business reaches a certain level of scale, it's actually drowned out the dialogue at the rest of IAC. We look at how to give investors access to that business directly, unlock some value, et cetera. There was a range of things on the table. And when we look at how to optimize that decision across all the assets at IAC, an IPO was the one that made the most sense.

關於第二個問題，也就是為什麼持股比例低於20%？我認為低於20%的比例對於建立活躍的交易市場來說相當正常——哦，抱歉。我的問題是關於分拆上市的對比。當一家公司發展到一定規模時，它實際上會淹沒IAC其他部門的討論。我們會考慮如何讓投資人直接參與這家公司來，釋放一些價值等等。當時有許多方案可供選擇。當我們考慮如何優化IAC所有資產的決策時，IPO是最合理的選擇。

We think It's a good time to raise capital. We think we can unlock some shareholder value there. We think Match gets an independent currency which is going to be useful for them. And IAC retains the heft of Match in that. So that's really the thinking. Of course, we preserve the ability to spin at some point in the future. And that's the way we are thinking about it.

我們認為現在是籌集資金的好時機。我們相信能夠藉此釋放股東價值。我們認為Match將擁有獨立的貨幣，這對他們來說將大有裨益。而IAC也能持續保持Match的強大影響力。這就是我們的想法。當然，我們也保留了未來某個時間點進行分拆的可能性。這就是我們目前的考慮。

Thank you.

謝謝。

I think, operator, we will take one last question.

操作員，我想我們可以回答最後一個問題了。

Ignatius Njoku, JMP Securities

Ignatius Njoku，JMP證券

Thank you for taking my question. Can you talk about the advertising platform for Tinder? How is that ramping? Can you give us some feedback in terms of advertiser fee? How that's going? And how should we expect the ad platform develop throughout the year?

感謝您回答我的問題。能談談Tinder的廣告平台嗎？它的進展如何？能否就廣告費用方面提供一些回饋？目前情況如何？我們該如何預期廣告平台在今年的發展？

And next is, can you talk about the technology overhaul for the dating business? I know you mentioned delays, but can you give a sense of where you are? Thanks.

接下來，您能談談約會產業的技術革新嗎？我知道您提到過一些延誤，但您能否簡要說明目前的進展？謝謝。

On the advertising question, this is one of the things that we have sort of pushed back. There is some ad revenue this year. We have done a few deals. But again, in a world of scarce resources we opted not to devote meaningful time this year to developing the road map necessary to really maximize that ad business. I think that will come, unquestionably come. There is huge demand from advertisers. And again, if we had 1000 engineers, even 100 engineers we would be able to do a lot more things at once than we are.

關於廣告方面，這是我們一直有所保留的事情之一。今年確實有一些廣告收入，我們也達成了一些交易。但是，在資源有限的情況下，我們選擇今年不投入大量時間來製定真正最大化廣告業務所需的路線圖。我相信這方面一定會有進展，毋庸置疑。廣告商的需求非常旺盛。而且，如果我們有1000名工程師，就算只有100名，我們也能同時處理比現在多得多的事情。

We are scaling our resource capacity, but it is not there. And just in the ranking of things, we know the ad demand is there, our capitalization on it this year is limited. It will grow next year, I am sure. But am not prepared to lay out any quantification of that at this time. Things are moving too quickly.

我們正在擴大資源容量，但目前還不夠。光從排名來看，我們知道廣告需求是存在的，但今年我們能利用的資源有限。我相信明年需求會成長，但我現在還不準備給出任何量化數據。一切變化太快了。

In terms of technology project, there's a lot going on. We have consolidated a bunch of offices in Europe. We went from seven, I think now we are at four, but we will soon be at three. Huge reorganization involved in that. We have restructured a lot of the tech teams, are overhauling sort of the basic infrastructures of the mass technology, the [Me-Tick] technology. We will consolidate that on the US side. And I think that it's going well. It's just you predict -- it's going great. It's just you predict over a multi-quarter period how long it will take. And as you get into it, you realize it will take you a few more months. And that's basically where we are.

在技​​術項目方面，有很多事情正在進行。我們整合了歐洲的一些辦公室。之前有七個，現在好像是四個，但很快就會減少到三個。這涉及到大規模的重組。我們重組了許多技術團隊，正在全面改造大規模技術（Me-Tick 技術）的基礎架構。我們會把這些整合到美國。我認為進展順利。就像你預測的那樣——進展非常順利。只是你預測需要幾個季度的時間。但當你真正投入其中時，你會發現還需要幾個月的時間。這就是我們目前的狀況。

Thanks.

謝謝。

Thanks very much everybody. As always, if you have follow-on questions, we're here for you.

非常感謝大家。像往常一樣，如果您還有任何後續問題，歡迎隨時與我們聯繫。

Free Tom Brady. Have a good one, guys.

釋放湯姆·布雷迪。祝各位一切順利。

This concludes today's program. You may disconnect at this time. Thank you, and have a great day.

今天的節目到此結束。您可以斷開連線了。謝謝收聽，祝您有美好的一天。