Match Group Inc (MTCH) 2014 Q1 法說會逐字稿

Good day, and welcome to the IAC reports Q1 2014 results conference call. Today's conference is being recorded. At this time, I would like to turn the conference over to Jeff Kip, Executive Vice President and CFO. Please go ahead, sir.

大家好，歡迎參加IAC 2014年第一季業績電話會議。今天的會議正在錄影。此時，我謹將會議交給執行副總裁兼財務長傑夫‧基普先生。請繼續，先生。

Thanks, operator. Good morning, everybody. Welcome to our first-quarter earnings call. With me today is Barry Diller, our Chairman and Senior Executive; Greg Blatt, Chairman of The Match Group; and Joey Levin, CEO of our Search & Applications segment.

謝謝接線生。大家早安。歡迎參加我們第一季財報電話會議。今天與我一同出席的有：我們的董事長兼高級執行官巴里·迪勒；Match Group 董事長格雷格·布拉特；以及我們的搜索與應用部門首席執行官喬伊·萊文。

Barry will start the call with some introductory comments, then I will give a review of our first-quarter financial performance and our expectations for the second quarter and the year. Then Greg and Joey will discuss The Match Group's and Search & Applications segments' performance and outlook, respectively. And then I will conclude with some color on the Media and eCommerce segments.

Barry 將首先作一些介紹性發言，然後我將回顧我們第一季的財務表現以及我們對第二季和全年的預期。然後，Greg 和 Joey 將分別討論 The Match Group 和 Search & Applications 部門的表現和前景。最後，我將重點放在媒體和電子商務領域。

Before we get to our results, though, I'd like to remind you that during this call we may discuss our outlook and future performance. These forward-looking statements typically may be preceded by words such as we expect, we believe, we anticipate, or similar statements. These forward-looking views are subject to risks and uncertainties, and our actual results could differ materially from the views expressed today. Some of these risks have been set forth in our first quarter 2014 press release and our periodic reports filed with the SEC.

不過，在公佈結果之前，我想提醒各位，在本次電話會議中，我們可能會討論我們的展望和未來業績。這些前瞻性陳述通常會以「我們預期」、「我們相信」、「我們預期」或類似表述開頭。這些前瞻性觀點存在風險和不確定性，我們的實際結果可能與今天表達的觀點有重大差異。其中一些風險已在 2014 年第一季的新聞稿和我們向美國證券交易委員會提交的定期報告中列出。

We will also discuss certain non-GAAP measures, which will include our new financial metric, adjusted EBITDA, which Barry will discuss in a moment, and which we will refer to as EBITDA for simplicity during this call. I will refer you to our press release in the Investor Relations section of our website for all comparable GAAP measures and full reconciliations for all material non-GAAP measures. Barry?

我們也將討論一些非GAAP指標，其中包括我們的新財務指標－調整後EBITDA，Barry稍後會對此進行討論，為了簡單起見，我們在本次電話會議中將其簡稱為EBITDA。有關所有可比較的 GAAP 指標以及所有重要非 GAAP 指標的完整調整表，請參閱我們網站投資者關係部分的新聞稿。巴里？

Thank you. It is nice to be with you all. For me, I think that the story this quarter is not on the consolidated earnings, but on the growth of our largest businesses, and also some great stories in some of our developing ventures.

謝謝。和大家在一起真好。對我來說，我認為本季的重點不在於合併收益，而在於我們最大業務的成長，以及我們一些新興企業所取得的令人矚目的成績。

What I want to do is just simply make four points before my colleagues fill you in more fully on the quarter. First, on our accounting changes. There shouldn't be any worries. There's nothing nefarious going on here. We are simply changing from OIBA to EBITDA because it will allow easier comparisons to the other companies in our sector. And we are also reorganizing our businesses under their more appropriate leadership, that's it.

在我的同事們更全面地向你們介紹本季的情況之前，我只想簡單地提四點。首先，關於我們的會計變更。不必擔心。這裡沒有什麼不可告人的秘密。我們之所以將 OIBA 改為 EBITDA，是因為這樣可以更方便地與同行業的其他公司進行比較。我們也在對業務進行重組，由更合適的領導人來領導，僅此而已。

Second, as we said last quarter, Greg Blatt has become the Chairman of The Match Group. We broke this out because we love this team and its expertise in subscription Internet products. We added two new ventures to the group because of their expertise, Tutor in the revolutionary Internet education space, and DailyBurn, in the high-growth fitness area.

其次，正如我們上個季度所說，格雷格·布拉特已成為 The Match Group 的董事長。我們之所以單獨列出這份名單，是因為我們喜歡這個團隊及其在訂閱網路產品方面的專業知識。由於他們的專業知識，我們為集團新增了兩家企業：一家是革命性的網路教育領域的 Tutor，另一家是快速成長的健身領域的 DailyBurn。

Third, note the healthy status of Search with sequential growth. These are our two large businesses, but we have two fine stories in other parts of the Company. Our home grown Vimeo is seeing tremendous adoption, and HomeAdvisor is turning around and will be a substantial earner this year.

第三，請注意搜尋功能的健康狀態及其持續成長。這是我們兩大主要業務，但公司其他部門也有兩個不錯的故事。我們自主開發的 Vimeo 獲得了巨大的成功，HomeAdvisor 也正在扭轉頹勢，今年將成為重要的收入來源。

Finally, a word on Aereo. While this is a small investment, it certainly created an awful lot of comment and noise as the beginning or the end of television as we know it. It's fate is not material to IAC, but there is a lot of interest and controversy. We went to the Supreme Court last week, and, of course, no one knows what its decision is going to be, but I would just like to make one comment.

最後，簡單說說Aereo。雖然這只是一筆小投資，但它無疑引起了廣泛的討論和關注，因為這標誌著我們所知的電視時代的開始或結束。它的命運對IAC來說並不重要，但這件事引起了許多人的注意和爭議。我們上週去了最高法院，當然，沒有人知道它會做出什麼決定，但我只想說一點。

Aereo has been criticized as a gimmick, as way of avoiding copyright rules. In fact, it was built to comply with copyright law. And I'm really tired of being accused of stealing anyone else's programming when we are not. And I'd never be part of any service that was doing so.

Aereo 被批評為一種噱頭，一種規避版權規則的方式。事實上，它的建造是為了遵守版權法。我真的厭倦了總是被指控竊取他人的程序，而我們根本沒有這樣做。我絕不會參與任何這樣做的機構。

We are no more stealing programming then the person who puts up an antenna to receive the signals he's entitled to receive. It is kind of obnoxious for broadcasters to take away the signals they promise the public that they could receive directly simply because they want to squeeze every dollar they can from consumers. Think if the 30-year-old Supreme Court ruling on video recording went in reverse, abolishing video recording, what the world would have been like.

我們竊取節目內容，並不比架設天線接收自己有權接收的訊號的人更甚。廣播公司為了榨取消費者的每一分錢，就取消他們承諾公眾可以直接接收的訊號，這種做法實在令人反感。想想看，如果最高法院30年前關於錄影的裁決被推翻，廢除了錄影，世界會變成什麼樣子。

Stop Aereo when you stop technology. Thank you all, I had to get that out. And now we turn it back to Mr. Kip and my colleagues who will talk about everything else.

當您停止使用科技產品時，Aereo 也應停止運作。謝謝大家，我必須把這件事說出來。現在我們把時間交還給基普先生和我的同事們，讓他們談談其他事情。

Thanks, Barry. In the first quarter, on a consolidated basis, IAC earned revenues of $740 million and EBITDA of $108 million, about flat and down 15%, respectively, from the first quarter last year. Taking the segments one by one, in the first quarter, The Match Group's revenues increased nearly 10% and the segment's EBITDA decreased 1% versus the prior year.

謝謝你，巴里。第一季度，IAC 合併後的營收為 7.4 億美元，EBITDA 為 1.08 億美元，分別與去年同期持平和下降 15%。逐一分析各個業務板塊，第一季度，Match Group 的營收成長了近 10%，而該板塊的 EBITDA 與上年同期相比下降了 1%。

Although segment EBITDA growth was impacted by $11 million of losses this year in our investment businesses, Tutor, DailyBurn and Tinder, versus approximately $3 million last year, as well as a positive $3.9 million adjustment for VAT taxes this year. Excluding those impacts, segment EBITDA would be up mid-single digits over last year and dating EBITDA by itself would be up, as well.

儘管今年投資業務 Tutor、DailyBurn 和 Tinder 虧損 1,100 萬美元（去年虧損約 300 萬美元），加上今年增值稅調整帶來 390 萬美元的收益，導致分部 EBITDA 成長受到影響。排除這些影響，分部 EBITDA 將比去年成長個位數中段，而單獨來看，EBITDA 也將成長。

In the second quarter, we expect The Match Group's revenue growth to be modestly higher than in the first quarter, with EBITDA growth mid-single digits after taking into account high-single digits to low double-digits millions of investment in Tutor, DailyBurn and Tinder during the quarter. For the full-year 2014, revenue and EBITDA growth will accelerate from 2013 for both The Match Group in total and the dating business by itself, even at expanded levels of investment for Tutor and DailyBurn within the group and significant expansion of investment at Tinder within the dating business.

我們預計，第二季度 The Match Group 的營收成長將略高於第一季度，考慮到本季對 Tutor、DailyBurn 和 Tinder 的高個位數到低兩位數百萬美元的投資，EBITDA 成長將達到中等個位數。2014 年全年，Match Group 整體以及約會業務本身的收入和 EBITDA 成長速度將比 2013 年更快，即使集團內部對 Tutor 和 DailyBurn 的投資水平有所提高，並且約會業務中的 Tinder 的投資也大幅增加。

In terms of overall investment levels, which could change, we are currently expecting to expand investment to roughly $25 million to $30 million in 2014 across Tutor, DailyBurn and Tinder combined. The Search & Applications segment had a solid first quarter growing revenue sequentially on both an as reported and an organic basis. Growth was driven by the websites business. The Applications business was about flat sequentially.

就整體投資水準而言（可能會有所變化），我們目前預計 2014 年 Tutor、DailyBurn 和 Tinder 三家公司的投資總額將擴大到約 2,500 萬美元至 3,000 萬美元。搜尋與應用程式業務部門第一季業績穩健，無論以報告數據或自然成長來看，營收均達到季增。網站業務是推動成長的主要動力。應用業務環比基本持平。

Adjusted EBITDA margin was down approximately 400 basis points in the segment from first-quarter 2013, primarily driven by significant marketing spend in the B2C business, spend which will be ROI positive for the year. Our full-year outlook for 2014 remains the same for websites, mid-single digit sequential growth in revenue each quarter, resulting in modest growth for the year. Our Applications outlook has changed somewhat, however, based first on some softness in the business.

該業務部門的調整後 EBITDA 利潤率較 2013 年第一季下降了約 400 個基點，主要原因是 B2C 業務的營銷支出大幅增加，而這些支出將在今年帶來正的投資回報率。我們對 2014 年全年網站的展望與之前相同，預計每個季度的收入將實現中等個位數的環比增長，從而實現全年的溫和增長。然而，由於業務略顯疲軟，我們的應用前景發生了一些變化。

We expected it to be modestly up sequentially in the first quarter and we were flattish. And, secondly, on the accounting impacts from the acquisition of SlimWare, a small but rapidly growing PC software subscription business which Joey will discuss in more detail shortly. We purchased SlimWare for a low-single-digit multiple of actual cash flow. The deal is accretive on a cash basis. However, the deal has two accounting impacts which will make the deal mid-single-digits percent dilutive to Search & Applications EBITDA in 2014.

我們預期第一季業績會環比小幅成長，但實際情況卻基本持平。其次，關於收購 SlimWare（一家規模雖小但成長迅速的 PC 軟體訂閱業務）對會計方面的影響，Joey 稍後將對此進行更詳細的討論。我們以實際現金流的個位數倍數收購了 SlimWare。從現金流角度來看，這筆交易將帶來收益成長。然而，該交易對會計處理有兩項影響，這將導致該交易在 2014 年對搜尋與應用業務的 EBITDA 產生中等個位數百分比的稀釋。

The majority of dilution is from purely an M&A accounting impact and not reflective of the Company's ongoing profitability on either a cash or an accounting basis. The remainder of the dilution is the impact of deferring the subscription revenue over the subscription's life, which at this stage of the Company's growth turns positive operating cash flow into a negative impact to EBITDA.

大部分股權稀釋純粹是併購會計影響造成的，並不反映公司在現金或會計基礎上的持續獲利能力。剩餘的稀釋是由於訂閱收入在訂閱期內遞延所致，在公司發展的現階段，這將使正的經營現金流對 EBITDA 產生負面影響。

So we now expect that Search & Applications will see flat to modest revenue growth this year, and that, although free cash flow will benefit from the SlimWare deal, EBITDA will be modestly down year-over-year given the SlimWare accounting impacts first and then, additionally, softness in the Applications business. In the second quarter, we expect modest sequential revenue growth and flattish margins for the segment, flattish in the first quarter that is.

因此，我們現在預計搜尋和應用程式業務今年的收入將持平或略有增長，雖然自由現金流將受益於 SlimWare 的交易，但考慮到 SlimWare 的會計影響，以及應用程式業務的疲軟，EBITDA 將同比略有下降。我們預計第二季該業務部門的營收將實現溫和的環比成長，利潤率也將保持平穩，與第一季持平。

Media and eCommerce revenue together fell 14% year-over-year. If you exclude Newsweek and CityGrid, however, the segments together grew 6% driven by growth at Vimeo first and also HomeAdvisor. EBITDA in the two segments combined was about minus $5 million, a significant improvement from the first quarter of 2013 if we exclude one-time pickups related to the closure of Newsweek print.

媒體和電子商務收入合計年減 14%。但如果排除 Newsweek 和 CityGrid，這些細分市場合計成長了 6%，這首先得益於 Vimeo 的成長，其次是 HomeAdvisor 的成長。這兩個部門合計的 EBITDA 約為 -500 萬美元，如果排除與《新聞周刊》印刷版關閉相關的一次性收入，則比 2013 年第一季有了顯著改善。

In the second quarter, we expect about $160 million of revenue from the two segments, and a few million in EBITDA losses. And for the year, we expect mid-single-digits growth in revenue, high teens, though, excluding Newsweek and CityGrid, and low-double-digit millions in EBITDA losses driven primarily by expanded investment in marketing and mobile product at Vimeo. I'll now turn it over to Greg, and then Joey, to discuss performance at The Match Group and in the Search & Applications segment, respectively. Greg?

第二季度，我們預計這兩個部門的營收約為 1.6 億美元，EBITDA 虧損為數百萬美元。我們預計全年營收將實現個位數中段成長，但不包括 Newsweek 和 CityGrid，預計 EBITDA 虧損將達到兩位數低段，這主要是由於 Vimeo 在行銷和行動產品方面的投資增加所致。現在我將把發言權交給 Greg，然後交給 Joey，分別討論 The Match Group 和搜尋與應用部門的表現。格雷格？

Thanks, Jeff. Happy to be here talking about The Match Group for the first time, I guess, in this configuration. Things are going well. We are excited about both where we are now and where we are headed.

謝謝你，傑夫。我想，這是我第一次以這種形式在這裡談論 The Match Group。一切進展順利。我們對現狀和未來發展方向都感到興奮。

Obviously, we've changed the segment reporting, which is apparent from the release. We've also gone ahead and taken this opportunity to rationalize the metrics that we report to help shed light on performance. Originally in the dating business, when we started with the notion of Core and Developing, developing was really a euphemism for other in that Core contained all the economically relevant businesses that we had, and Developing was a mix of declining businesses and small early-stage growth businesses that swings in PMC revenue really didn't affect economic value of the business.

顯然，我們已經更改了分部報告方式，這一點從發布的內容中可以明顯看出。我們也藉此機會對我們報告的指標進行了合理化調整，以幫助更好地了解業績。我們最初從事約會業務，當我們開始將業務分為核心業務和發展中業務時，「發展中」實際上是「其他」的委婉說法，因為核心業務包含了我們所有具有經濟意義的業務，而發展中業務則是衰退業務和小型早期增長業務的混合體，這些業務的私人營銷收入波動實際上並不影響其經濟價值。

Since then we acquired OkCupid, have built that up, Twoo, have built that up. We then we acquired Meetic, which was its own public entity, and so it reported discretely. And the reality is, it sort of no longer made sense in that in the Core grouping there were 30 different businesses. OkCupid was in Developing, but if you moved to OkCupid into Core it would've been the third biggest business in Core. So to call the one Developing and the other Core really didn't make sense, and breaking out Meetic as a standalone entity didn't really make sense.

從那時起，我們收購了 OkCupid，並將其發展壯大；之後又收購了 Twoo，並對其進行了發展。然後我們收購了 Meetic，它本身就是一個上市公司，因此它的財務報告是秘密進行的。而現實情況是，這樣做已經不再有意義了，因為核心集團中有 30 個不同的業務部門。OkCupid 當時處於開發階段，但如果將 OkCupid 移至核心業務，它將成為核心業務中第三大業務。所以把一個稱為開發版，另一個稱為核心版，這其實沒什麼意義；把 Meetic 單獨拿出來作為一個實體，也沒什麼意義。

So what we did is we changed it to how we actually think about the businesses, which is dating is a local business and each country is its own market. Each market has its own mix of products and services, business models, et cetera, that we build, acquire, grow, for the sole purpose of building revenue and profit within that market. We think that's the right way to report geographically. For simplicity's sake, we've broken it into two groupings, North America and International.

所以我們改變了對這項業務的看法，認為約會是一項在地業務，每個國家都是自己的市場。每個市場都有其自身的產品和服務組合、商業模式等等，我們建構、收購、發展這些產品和服務，其唯一目的就是在該市場內創造收入和利潤。我們認為這是按地理位置進行報告的正確方法。為了簡單起見，我們將其分為北美和國際兩大類。

Currently, Europe is the substantial majority of International, although we hope that the non-European pieces expand and that substantial majority lessens over time. For now, obviously, we are reporting that the segment in full, but our metrics are going to be limited to the dating business until the education and fitness business become more material, although we will talk about performance and growth in those businesses supplementally as circumstances dictate.

目前，歐洲在國際市場中佔了絕大多數，但我們希望非歐洲市場能夠擴大，隨著時間的推移，這一絕對多數會減少。目前，我們顯然會全面報道該業務板塊，但我們的指標將僅限於約會業務，直到教育和健身業務變得更加重要為止，儘管我們會根據情況補充討論這些業務的業績和增長情況。

Let's talk about dating. Dating is something we're really excited about right now. The market has been really growing. We think it is going to continue to grow, and it really grows on three separate vectors.

我們來聊聊約會吧。我們現在對約會這件事感到非常興奮。市場發展快速。我們認為它將繼續增長，而且它的增長實際上是沿著三個不同的方向進行的。

One is adoption, one is engagement, and one is monetization, and I want to talk a little bit about each of the three, sort of where we've been, and where we think we are going. If you look back over the last five years on adoption, the number of US singles who have tried dating, a dating product at least once, it is up about 20% during that time period.

一個是用戶採納率，一個是用戶參與度，一個是獲利模式，我想分別談談這三個方面，說說我們過去的經歷，以及我們認為未來的發展方向。回顧過去五年，美國單身人士嘗試過約會產品（至少使用過一次）的人數增加了約 20%。

That's a result of declining stigma, the Internet generation coming-of-age, et cetera, plus just regular growth in the single population. And we think that both those dynamics will continue. We know that the growth in the single population is expected to continue and we think that the decline in stigma, increasing Internet adoption in all generations, although it is crazy to even talk about that, there is still that adoption going on. We think that's going to propel that 20% growth over five years to higher levels going forward.

這是社會偏見減少、網路世代的成長等等因素，加上單身人口的正常成長所致。我們認為這兩種趨勢都將持續下去。我們知道單身人口的增長預計還會繼續，我們認為隨著社會對單身人士的歧視減少，以及各年齡層對互聯網的接受度提高（儘管現在談論這個話題很瘋狂，但這種接受度仍在提高）。我們認為這將推動未來五年20%的成長水準進一步提高。

There's also engagement, and this is really where a lot of the spectacular sort of growth has come, and the [use] over the same five-year period are up 20% -- sorry, up 50%, two-and-a-half times the adoption increase. That's really driven by a couple things. One of them is mobile. The huge migration to mobile has just made everything higher, engaging, stickier. It is just easier to use these products and keep using them. It takes less effort to do so, and that dynamic is, obviously, going to continue.

此外，用戶參與度也很高，這才是真正帶來驚人成長的地方，五年內使用率成長了 20%——抱歉，是 50%，是採用率成長的兩倍半。這主要受兩方面因素驅動。其中一台是行動裝置。向行動端的大規模遷移讓一切變得更好、更具吸引力、更黏人。使用這些產品更方便，而且可以持續使用。這樣做更省力，而且這個趨勢顯然還會持續下去。

Also, we've got better products that yield better results. And that keeps people in the category longer. The favorite stat we have is that over this five-year period the number of relationships in the US that start on these products is up three times over this period, now to more than one-third of all US relationships starting on one of these products, which is a statistic we are excited about both from a business perspective, but also just generally. It is a great thing to be doing and seeing the rewards come through are a big part of what keeps us going here.

此外，我們還有效果更好的產品。這樣一來，人們就會在該類別中停留更長時間。我們最喜歡的統計數據是，在過去的五年裡，美國因這些產品而建立的戀愛關係數量增加了三倍，現在超過三分之一的美國戀愛關係都是因這些產品而建立的。無論從商業角度還是從整體來看，我們都對這項統計數據感到興奮。做這件事很有意義，看到成果也是我們堅持下去的動力之一。

Then I think the final piece is monetization. We've talked about monetization a lot. We've made really big strides in this area. This is a metric that's hard to talk about from a market perspective. We really have to look at our own products because we don't really know, given the private nature of most of the people in this business, what other people are doing. But within each of our business lines, we've been able to meaningfully increase the number of people paying for our products over the last five years. All while holding or increasing the rates at which they pay us.

我認為最後一塊拼圖是獲利模式。我們已經多次討論過獲利模式。我們在這領域取得了巨大的進步。從市場角度來看，這是一個很難討論的指標。我們真的需要好好審視一下自己的產品，因為考慮到這個行業大多數人的隱私性質，我們並不真正了解其他人在做什麼。但在過去五年裡，我們每個業務線的付費用戶數量都顯著增加。同時，他們支付給我們的報酬卻保持不變甚至提高。

Most notable in this is the free to communicate category of OkCupid and Twoo, where two years ago, three years ago, no one was paying for these products, and now the number of people paying for these products is significant. This is generally driven by paywall optimization. In the beginning, there was the standard subscription pay to communicate wall. Since then, that wall has continued to thrive, but we've developed other means of developing subscription businesses, transactional fees, et cetera, and we don't see that stopping.

其中最值得注意的是 OkCupid 和 Twoo 的免費交流類別，兩年前、三年前，沒有人為這些產品付費，而現在為這些產品付費的人數相當可觀。這通常是由付費牆優化驅動的。最初，交流牆採用的是標準的訂閱付費模式。從那以後，這種壁壘繼續蓬勃發展，但我們已經開發出其他發展訂閱業務、交易費等的方式，而且我們認為這種發展不會停止。

We keep getting better at it, and as I talked about last time, the things we are learning in one place we're migrating over to other places, and we see big advantages there. This is all very contrary to an analyst's report that came out in the last couple weeks talked about that we were driving advertising revenue, degrading customer experience. The reality is that less than 5% of the revenue in our dating business comes from advertising.

我們在這方面不斷進步，正如我上次所說，我們在一個地方學到的東西正在遷移到其他地方，我們看到了巨大的優勢。這與最近幾週發布的一份分析師報告完全相反，該報告指出，我們雖然提高了廣告收入，但卻降低了客戶體驗。事實上，我們約會業務的收入中只有不到 5% 來自廣告。

In fact, in the formerly Developing businesses where that report was focused, the percentage of revenue that comes from advertising has declined meaningfully over the last few years. What's driving this business is subscription revenue. These are people who are paying for services that they want.

事實上，在報告重點關注的先前發展中企業中，過去幾年裡，廣告收入佔比顯著下降。推動這項業務發展的是訂閱收入。這些人是在為自己想要的服務付費。

And the overall majority of it, especially on the growth side, OkCupid, Twoo, is coming from adding discretionary features that people can choose to use or not. It is really an optimized paywall and if they have a good experience, if they don't pay, and if they pay, they get enhanced features, enhanced placement, et cetera. And it is not affecting retention, it is not degrading user experience. It is really the fuel that's been driving this business. So we are really, really excited about that.

而整體而言，大部分成長，尤其是在成長方面，像 OkCupid 和 Twoo 這樣的公司，都是透過添加用戶可以選擇使用或不使用的可選功能來實現的。這實際上是一個優化過的付費牆，如果用戶體驗良好，他們就不會付費；如果他們付費，他們就能獲得增強的功能、更好的展示位置等等。而且它不會影響用戶留存率，也不會降低用戶體驗。這才是真正推動這項業務發展的動力。所以，我們對此真的非常非常興奮。

I think the key thing here is, it sounds a little cheesy, but helping someone find someone special is a very high value proposition. What we are learning is that if you find the right place, the right time and the right way to ask people to pay for that value, they will do so, and do so gladly. From an overall category perspective, we are very excited.

我認為關鍵在於，雖然聽起來有點老套，但幫助別人找到另一半是一件非常有價值的事情。我們逐漸意識到，如果你找到合適的地點、合適的時間和合適的方式，讓人們為這種價值付費，他們就會這樣做，而且會很樂意這樣做。從整個品類角度來看，我們非常興奮。

Let's talk a little bit about Tinder, which is doing a lot of work on two of those three fronts, which is engagement and adoption. A large number of Tinder users, as I think you know, are new to the dating category. This is driven by a large number of under 25-year-old users, which has never been a demo that we've been able to attract effectively before.

讓我們來談談 Tinder，它在上述三個方面中的兩個方面都做了很多工作，那就是用戶參與度和用戶採納率。如你所知，許多 Tinder 用戶都是約會新手。這是由於 25 歲以下用戶數量龐大所致，而我們以前從未有效地吸引過這一用戶群。

This drives a lot of incremental adoption. This is bringing new people into the category that would not otherwise be there. It is also a big driver of engagement. Tinder users who are not new to the category are approximately 50% more likely to use multiple products than category users generally.

這推動了大量的漸進式普及。這使得一些原本不屬於這個類別的人也進入了這個類別。它也是提升用戶參與的重要驅動因素。對於 Tinder 用戶來說，如果他們並非該類別的新用戶，那麼他們使用多種產品的可能性比該類別的一般用戶高出約 50%。

So you have got your two dynamics there, which is new users coming in, and existing users using Tinder in addition to multiple products. That's really great for engagement, really driving up both of those metrics. This is not on small numbers. Tinder is getting to be a meaningful business.

所以這裡有兩種動態，就是新用戶的加入，以及現有用戶除了使用 Tinder 之外還使用其他產品。這對於提升用戶參與度非常有利，能夠大幅提高這兩項指標。這並非小數目的問題。Tinder正在發展成為一項有意義的業務。

March global downloads were up 15% sequentially over February, and up 300% over the 2013 average monthly number. The US momentum continues strong, seven consecutive months of sequential download increases. And given that Tinder has generally better retention characteristics than other products in the category this is getting to be a very, very big user base.

3 月全球下載量較 2 月較上季成長 15%，較 2013 年平均每月下載量成長 300%。美國市場動能依然強勁，下載量已連續七個月成長。鑑於 Tinder 的用戶留存率通常比同類產品更高，因此它的用戶群正在變得非常非常龐大。

I think it remains unclear what Tinder will ultimately be. It is clearly a very effective dating product. I think there's a chance that it's something more messaging, social discovery beyond dating, other forms of discovery. It is really so early in its existence that I think it is definition has not yet been written.

我認為Tinder最終會發展成什麼樣子仍然不明朗。這顯然是一款非常有效的約會產品。我認為有可能它更多的是一種資訊交流，一種超越約會的社交探索，一種其他形式的發現。它出現的時間還非常短，我認為它的定義還沒有被寫出來。

Yes, we are not yet monetizing the business, but really that's just a matter of time. Even if all we did was take our existing monetization playbook, with discretionary subscriptions, a la carte transactions, background advertising, we would generate huge returns off these numbers. And given the unique nature of Tinder, we think it presents its own unique monetization opportunity, as well. We have very little reservation about the ability for this to be a meaningful business.

是的，我們目前還沒有實現業務盈利，但這只是時間問題。即使我們只是沿用現有的獲利模式，例如自願訂閱、按需付費、後台廣告，我們也能從這些數字中獲得巨大的回報。鑑於 Tinder 的獨特性，我們認為它也提供了其自身獨特的獲利機會。我們幾乎毫不懷疑這能成為一項有意義的業務。

Turning to the quarter, I think we said in the last call, Q1 would be our lowest of the year. Jeff walked through some of the numbers. Generally, where we anticipated, North American business was really driven by declines in acquisition efficiency driven by changes in our Yahoo! deal, which I mentioned previously, general inflation and advertising pricing which was up about 5%, 6% offline and on, and, frankly, aging creative, which we will be turning out.

展望本季度，我想我們在上次電話會議上說過，第一季將是我們全年業績最差的季度。傑夫逐一分析了一些數字。總體而言，正如我們預期的那樣，北美業務的下滑實際上是由收購效率下降所致，而收購效率下降又是由我們在雅虎的業務變化所導致的。正如我之前提到的，交易、普遍的通貨膨脹和廣告價格上漲了約 5%（線上和線下分別上漲了 6%），坦白說，還有我們即將推出的過時創意。

And we also had a decrease in renewal rates. Part of that was due to comps, but because we had a substantial package mix shift and People Media [on] the longer packages, which push terms into future quarters and we took a hit on that Q1. We also had an unexpected hit from a significant amount of credit card turnover resulting from the Target security breach and some others which knocked some people out of the pool when the regular renewals come up.

續約率也有所下降。部分原因是由於同店銷售情況，但更重要的是，我們的套餐組合發生了重大變化，而且 People Media 推出了更長的套餐，將期限推遲到未來幾個季度，因此我們在第一季度受到了衝擊。由於 Target 安全漏洞和其他一些事件導致大量信用卡週轉，我們也遭受了意想不到的打擊，這使得一些人在常規續費時被排除在外。

And lower rate, lower monetization rate, which we talked about, as we said, over the course of last year monetization rates came down. Over the course of this year, we expect them to build back up and that's really the timing of the dynamic pricing initiatives that we've talked about. International was driven by very similar things, with the addition of anniversarying the acquisition of Twoo which came in Q1 last year.

而且利率更低，貨幣化率也更低，正如我們之前所說，去年貨幣化率有所下降。我們預計今年內他們的業務將逐步恢復，而這正是我們之前討論過的動態定價舉措的時機。國際業務的成長動力與此非常相似，此外還包括慶祝去年第一季收購 Twoo 週年。

For the rest of year, we've got a host of monetization, acquisition and conversion initiatives rolling out which give us a lot of confidence about the trajectory we foresee. Just as a example, Match launched its iPhone app last Thursday. We actually didn't have an iPhone app, we have -- as we've mentioned -- a big mobile business, but for various reasons we did not have an app in the iO store. In just a few days, it is already the number four highest grossing app overall excluding the gaming category.

今年剩下的時間裡，我們將推出一系列獲利、獲客和轉換計劃，讓我們對預期的發展軌跡充滿信心。舉個例子，Match 上週四推出了 iPhone 應用程式。實際上我們並沒有 iPhone 應用，我們擁有龐大的行動業務——正如我們之前提到的——但由於各種原因，我們沒有在 iOS 應用商店中上架應用程式。短短幾天內，它就成為了遊戲類應用程式外收入排名第四的應用。

And given the average lag time that we have in Match between downloads and subscriptions, you are not grossing until you get the subscription, we, frankly, expect that number four ranking to increase. That is translating into real numbers. Sunday and Monday, which is the sample size, a few days in, our overall regs were up week-over-week by 25% with 20% of all those regs -- sorry, 20% of all regs come from the iO store. So this is meaningful lift in our business. While I don't expect that level to sustain itself, clearly, this and several things like it are giving us a lot of confidence.

考慮到 Match 中下載和訂閱之間存在的平均延遲時間，只有獲得訂閱才能獲得收入，坦白說，我們預計第四名的排名會上升。這就要轉化為實際數字了。週日和週一（樣本量）幾天后，我們的整體監管額比上週增長了 25%，其中 20% 的監管額——抱歉，是所有監管額的 20%——來自 iO 商店。所以這對我們的業務來說是一個意義重大的提升。雖然我不認為這種水平能夠持續下去，但很顯然，這件事以及其他類似的事情都給了我們很大的信心。

Just wrapping up, in dating [MAUs] for our business overall are up approximately 50% year-over-year. As we know, MAU growth leads to payer growth, which in turn, leads to revenue growth, sort of in sequence. So we feel really good about the tailwinds that this gives our business going forward. And as Barry mentioned at the beginning, on top of the dating business, not as meaningful contributors this year or probably even next, but thereafter, we've got great entrance in the $50 billion fitness market, $10 billion education market. These are markets where technology has not yet implemented real transformation. We like our entrance in it, and we feel really good about the long-term growth prospects it give us. Joey?

最後總結一下，我們業務的整體約會用戶數（MAU）比去年同期成長約 50%。我們知道，MAU 的成長會導致付費用戶的成長，進而導致收入的成長，這大致是依序發生的。因此，我們對這將為我們未來的業務發展帶來的利好感到非常樂觀。正如巴里在開頭提到的那樣，除了約會業務之外，雖然今年甚至明年可能不會成為重要的貢獻者，但之後我們將很好地進入價值 500 億美元的健身市場和 100 億美元的教育市場。在這些市場中，科技尚未帶來真正的改變。我們很喜歡我們進入這個領域的契機，並且對它帶給我們的長期發展前景感到非常樂觀。喬伊？

Thanks, Greg. Q1 was a solid quarter for the segment. We returned to sequential revenue growth and we continue to be excited about the progress and prospects we see for high-quality content publishing on the Web.

謝謝你，格雷格。第一季該業務類股表現穩健。我們恢復了營收的連續成長，我們對網路上高品質內容發布的進展和前景感到興奮。

Websites revenue was up 14% sequentially on the strength of About.com and with the help of the acquisition of the assets from ValueClick. As result, our mix of profits from the content sites, excluding Ask, continues to grow as a percent of total, and is now nearly one-third of the full segment EBITDA. With the added focus on the new content properties, we also switched our metric from queries to page views. The prior metric wasn't able to tell a full story because it didn't reflect audience engagement on the content side. So we felt it important to update the page views.

由於 About.com 的強勁表​​現以及收購 ValueClick 的資產，網站收入較上季成長 14%。因此，除 Ask 外，我們內容網站的利潤佔總利潤的比例持續成長，目前已接近整個業務部門 EBITDA 的三分之一。由於更重視重新的內容屬性，我們也把衡量指標從查詢次數改為頁面瀏覽量。先前的指標無法全面反映情況，因為它沒有反映受眾在內容方面的參與度。因此，我們認為有必要更新頁面瀏覽量。

Page views at websites were up sequentially on both desktop and mobile, with mobile and tablet growing much faster, and now combined representing 44% of total websites page views. We now have traffic growing sequentially at About, Dictionary, and Urbanspoon. Ending Q1, as you know, we added Investopedia and PriceRunner to the group. While mobile was a meaningful contributed to the growth, we also continued to work through that playbook upgrading the best practices across the sites.

網站的頁面瀏覽量在桌面端和行動端均呈現逐年上升趨勢，其中行動端和平板電腦端的成長速度更快，目前兩者合計佔網站總頁面瀏覽量的 44%。目前，About、Dictionary 和 Urbanspoon 的流量正在逐一增加。如您所知，在第一季末，我們將 Investopedia 和 PriceRunner 加入了我們的團隊。雖然行動端對成長做出了重要貢獻，但我們也繼續按照既定策略，在各個網站上升級最佳實踐。

This effort included successful expansion in the marketing driven user acquisition, one of our core strengths and key competitive advantages. We're also seeing some nice wins on organic traffic as we've been cleaning up the basics, improved site speed, lighter and cleaner pages, responsive design, and, of course, most importantly, more and better content.

這項努力包括成功擴大以行銷為導向的用戶獲取，這是我們的核心優勢和關鍵競爭優勢之一。隨著我們不斷完善基礎工作，提高網站速度，優化頁面，採用響應式設計，當然，最重要的是增加更多更好的內容，我們在自然流量方面也取得了一些不錯的進展。

At About.com, we added over 150 new experts to our rigorous recruiting and screening process since we began a focused effort at the beginning of Q4 allowing us to open or reopen over 100 new categories and continue to improve in others. The new experts added in Q1 exceeded new adds in any quarter for years, and coupled with the technology and process improvements in our content management system, we're driving double-digit growth in our high-quality long form content creation.

自第四季初開始集中精力以來，About.com 已透過嚴格的招募和篩選流程新增了 150 多名專家，這使我們能夠開設或重新開放 100 多個新類別，並在其他類別中繼續改進。第一季新增的專家數量超過了多年來任何一個季度的新增數量，再加上我們內容管理系統的技術和流程改進，我們高品質長篇內容創作實現了兩位數的成長。

So we continue to move vigorously along the lines we outlined, transforming and delivering best practices to a great set of branded content properties, and we've got an exciting road map for further improvements in innovation.

因此，我們將繼續沿著我們制定的方向大力推進，將最佳實踐應用於一系列優秀的品牌內容資產，並且我們已經制定了一個令人興奮的路線圖，以進一步改進創新。

We continue to experiment on mobile monetization, and we saw small lifts in mobile RPMs in the quarter as result. On monetization across the board, we're also starting to benefit from investments we have been making to our ad systems, particularly as we look to optimize delivery across a stack of direct sold programmatic, native ads and search. On About.com in Q1 we were able to lift CPM on ads sold programmatically by 13% sequentially over Q4, and over 46% year-over-year, all without increasing the number of ads we show. And we still believe we have upside here as programmatic tech continues to improve and we start to nail the opportunity in direct-sold premium ads.

我們繼續嘗試行動端變現，結果本季行動端每千次展示收入略有提升。在整體獲利方面，我們也開始從對廣告系統的投資中受益，尤其是在我們尋求優化直接銷售的程序化廣告、原生廣告和搜尋等一系列廣告形式的投放方面。在 About.com 上，我們第一季透過程式化方式銷售的廣告的 CPM 比第四季環比提高了 13%，同比增長超過 46%，而我們展示的廣告數量並沒有增加。我們仍然相信，隨著程式化技術的不斷進步，以及我們在直銷高階廣告領域開始把握機遇，我們在這裡還有上漲空間。

Turning to Applications, we continue working our way back toward growth. The momentum has continued in our business over the last few quarters, which grew double-digits sequentially and offset continued challenges in our B2B business. While we expect to resume sequential growth on the B2B business in Q2, the lengthening sales cycles in a tough competitive market there may continue to be a drag on earnings growth for the year.

再來看應用程式方面，我們正努力恢復成長。在過去的幾個季度裡，我們的業務保持了強勁的成長勢頭，實現了兩位數的環比成長，抵消了 B2B 業務持續面臨的挑戰。雖然我們預計 B2B 業務將在第二季度恢復環比增長，但該地區競爭激烈的市場中銷售週期不斷延長，可能會繼續拖累全年的盈利增長。

We are also excited to officially announce the acquisition of SlimWare, a small but rapidly growing subscription software business with a respected product suite, a solid team and great momentum. SlimWare represented a very attractive opportunity for us, not only because of the price, but strategically because they figured out how to make a consumer subscription model work successfully with downloadable software.

我們也很高興正式宣布收購 SlimWare，這是一家規模雖小但發展迅速的訂閱軟體公司，擁有備受推崇的產品套件、強大的團隊和良好的發展勢頭。SlimWare 對我們來說是一個非常有吸引力的機會，不僅是因為價格，更重要的是，從戰略角度來看，他們找到瞭如何讓消費者訂閱模式與可下載軟體成功結合的方法。

SlimWare software products today deliver PC maintenance and optimization tools, and combine a desktop application with a cloud-based set of back end services that enable consumers to keep their computers up to date. As an added bonus, the team has cultivated a strong community of users that provide meaningful crowd-sourced data, including product reviews and technical analysis to enable a more accurate and effective service.

SlimWare 軟體產品目前提供 PC 維護和最佳化工具，並將桌面應用程式與基於雲端的後端服務相結合，使消費者能夠保持其電腦的最新狀態。此外，該團隊還培養了一個強大的用戶社區，這些用戶提供了有意義的眾包數據，包括產品評論和技術分析，從而能夠提供更準確、更有效的服務。

As a subscription model rather than a search or ad-supported model, SlimWare is currently cash flow positive and we expect the business to continue to grow nicely and profitably standalone. I also believe we can further accelerate the growth once we plug it into our distribution platform.

SlimWare 採用的是訂閱模式，而不是搜尋或廣告支援模式，因此目前現金流為正，我們預計該業務將繼續保持良好的獨立成長動能並獲利。我也相信，一旦將其連接到我們的分銷平台，我們就能進一步加速其成長。

Jeff will walk through the accounting issues that will impact the P&L this year, so I won't rehash those. But in sum, we are really excited about the Search & Applications business. I think we are in the first or second inning in our content strategy, and we're already seeing the fruits of our efforts with the strong momentum in that business. And we see new and exciting opportunities in the Applications business, especially with things like SlimWare. With that, I will turn it over to Jeff.

Jeff 將會詳細解說今年會影響損益表的會計問題，所以我就不再贅述了。總而言之，我們對搜尋和應用程式業務感到非常興奮。我認為我們的內容策略還處於第一局或第二局，但我們已經看到了努力的成果，該業務發展勢頭強勁。我們看到了應用軟體業務領域新的、令人興奮的機遇，尤其是像 SlimWare 這樣的產品。接下來，我將把麥克風交給傑夫。

Thanks, Joey. We are obviously feeling extremely positive about the developments in our two larger businesses. We also continue to be very happy with the returns we're seeing on our investments in our Media and eCommerce businesses. In Media, Vimeo continues its strong growth trajectory. ComScore unique viewers are up 56% to an all-time high of 171 million in March. Vimeo's audience has expanded across all devices. Vimeo's mobile audience actually exceeded desktop for the first time this quarter, and we are making significant investments in our mobile product and platform this year.

謝謝你，喬伊。顯然，我們對旗下兩家規模較大的企業的發展前景感到非常樂觀。我們對在媒體和電子商務業務方面的投資回報也一直非常滿意。在媒體領域，Vimeo 繼續保持強勁的成長勢頭。ComScore 數據顯示，3 月獨立觀眾人數成長 56%，達到歷史新高 1.71 億。Vimeo 的使用者群體已擴展到所有裝置。Vimeo 的行動端用戶數量在本季度首次超過了桌面端用戶數量，我們今年將對行動產品和平台進行大量投資。

Vimeo revenues were up 60% in the first quarter, and Vimeo now has over 470,000 paying subscribers with increasing per-customer value and life. The Vimeo On Demand open VOD distribution business launched in the first quarter last year is also gaining real traction without any significant marketing or promotion. Vimeo On Demand now has over 8,000 paid titles in its catalog, and monthly transactions have tripled over the last six months.

Vimeo 第一季的營收成長了 60%，目前 Vimeo 擁有超過 47 萬名付費用戶，每個用戶的價值和生命週期都在不斷提高。Vimeo On Demand 去年第一季推出的開放式視訊點播發行業務，在沒有進行任何大規模行銷或推廣的情況下，也獲得了真正的發展勢頭。Vimeo On Demand 目前在其目錄中擁有超過 8,000 部付費影片，並且在過去六個月中，每月交易量增長了兩倍。

During the first quarter, we also announced plans to invest in more high-profile content for the platform. A recent example is the film In Your Eyes by Joss Whedon, released exclusively through Vimeo On Demand immediately following its world premiere screening at the Tribeca Film Festival. We view the development of Vimeo On Demand as the online equivalent of the rise in premium pay television: great content, no advertising, premium pricing. We plan to continue to invest in the VOD platform and content catalog throughout 2014.

第一季度，我們也宣布了投資更多高規格平台內容的計畫。最近的例子是喬斯韋登執導的電影《在你眼中》，該片在翠貝卡電影節全球首映後，立即透過 Vimeo On Demand 獨家發行。我們認為 Vimeo On Demand 的發展相當於線上付費電視的興起：內容優質，無廣告，價格高昂。我們計劃在 2014 年繼續投資視訊點播平台和內容庫。

Likewise, HomeAdvisor had a great quarter, registering its first quarter of double-digit revenue growth since the first quarter of 2012, and its first quarter of double-digit EBITDA growth since the third quarter of 2012. Additionally, both service requests and accepts saw positive growth for the first time since the first quarter of 2012, and active service providers grew 15% year-over-year. After a difficult rebranding last year, the business is recovering well and we are very optimistic about its prospects.

同樣，HomeAdvisor 也取得了不錯的季度業績，實現了自 2012 年第一季以來的首次兩位數營收成長，以及自 2012 年第三季以來的首次兩位數 EBITDA 成長。此外，自 2012 年第一季以來，服務請求和接受量均首次出現正成長，活躍服務供應商年增 15%。經過去年艱難的品牌重塑，公司目前恢復良好，我們對前景感到非常樂觀。

We have several other bright spots among our Media and eCommerce businesses. Just to mention two, we've seen great traffic growth at The Daily Beast with unique viewers up over 30% year-over-year to roughly 18 million, and at CollegeHumor, where we saw monthly unique viewers rise 70% to an average of 19 million for the quarter.

我們的媒體和電子商務業務還有其他幾個亮點。僅舉兩例，我們看到《每日野獸》的流量大幅增長，獨立訪客同比增長超過 30%，達到約 1800 萬；而 CollegeHumor 的月度獨立訪客增長了 70%，季度平均達到 1900 萬。

We continue to be excited about our entire portfolio of businesses. With that, we will take your questions. Operator?

我們對旗下所有業務都充滿信心。接下來，我們將回答您的問題。操作員？

Thank you.

謝謝。

(Operator Instructions)

（操作說明）

Ross Sandler with Deutsche Bank.

羅斯‧桑德勒，德意志銀行。

Thanks. I just had one question for Jeff, and then maybe one for Joey. Jeff, a question on capital allocation, you guys didn't buy back any stock in the quarter, yet the liquidity position is over $1 billion, and looking back in history, the only time you haven't bought back shares is when there's some kind of strategic situation going on.

謝謝。我只想問傑夫一個問題，然後可能還會問喬伊一個問題。傑夫，關於資本配置有個問題，你們這個季度沒有回購任何股票，但流動資金卻超過 10 億美元，回顧歷史，你們沒有回購股票的唯一情況就是存在某種戰略情勢。

So can you just give us an update on capital allocation, and maybe what would've prevented you guys from doing buybacks given the market environment right now?

那麼，您能否簡單介紹一下資本配置情況，以及在當前的市場環境下，是什麼原因導致您們沒有進行股票回購？

And then, Joey, you mentioned a bunch of new initiatives. Can you give us a little bit more color on which of those is driving the strength that you are seeing in the website's revenue sequentially? Are those initiatives organic versus paid traffic, and where do you think we are in terms of Google smart pricing, and our we over the hump on those issues? Thank you.

然後，喬伊，你提到了一系列新措施。您能否詳細說明一下，是什麼因素推動了網站收入的環比成長？這些舉措是自然流量還是付費流量？您認為我們在Google智能定價方面進展如何？我們是否已經克服了這些問題的難關？謝謝。

On capital allocation, just to take your first question, our view today is no different than it has ever been. We will buy back opportunistically, and in any given quarter. We didn't buy any this quarter, we didn't buy any in the third quarter last year, but we have, obviously, bought back a tremendous amount, $230 million approximately last year in share buyback, $716 million in 2012, and almost $3 billion since the beginning of 2009. So I think we are just the same.

關於資本配置，只回答你的第一個問題，我們今天的觀點與以往並無不同。我們將擇機回購，並且每季都會進行回購。本季我們沒有買任何股票，去年第三季也沒有買任何股票，但顯然我們已經回購了巨額股票，去年回購了約 2.3 億美元的股票，2012 年回購了 7.16 億美元，自 2009 年初以來回購了近 30 億美元。所以我覺得我們其實是一樣的。

We only talk about what we've done or not done, so to speak. We don't predict. We don't comment on why or whatever. We are opportunistic and nobody should read anything into whether we buy or not. Over time, we've just been very clear that we are buyers of our stock and that's been true for more years than my little brain can count. So there that is. Joey?

我們只會談論我們已經做過或沒做過的事情。我們不做預測。我們不評論原因或其他任何細節。我們秉持著機會主義，所以大家不必對我們是否買進做任何解讀。多年來，我們一直非常明確地表示，我們是自己股票的買家，而且這種情況已經持續了多年，多到我都數不清了。事情就是這樣。喬伊？

On the website side, it is a few things. It is both organic and acquired. About is doing very well. We continue to be pleased with all the progress we are seeing there in terms of how they are growing content, how they are growing traffic on both an organic and a paid side. Obviously, we added ValueClick in the quarter, and so that helped on the growth too, sequentially.

網站方面，有幾點要注意。它既有自然形成的，也有後天獲得的。About 的表現非常出色。我們對他們在內容成長、自然流量和付費流量成長方面取得的所有進展都感到非常滿意。顯然，我們在本季收購了 ValueClick，這也有助於環比成長。

As it relates to Google smart pricing, for that change, we are -- sequentially we are clearly growing that, which is good. I think we are still -- if you go back to comping to Q3 2013, I think we still have a few more quarters to comp to on a year-over-year basis to something better. But sequentially, we are making progress and clearly improving there.

就Google智慧定價而言，為了這項變化，我們正在逐步擴大規模，這是好事。我認為我們仍然——如果回顧到 2013 年第三季度，我認為我們還有幾個季度的時間可以與去年同期相比有所改善。但從各個方面來看，我們正在取得進展，而且明顯有所改善。

John Blackledge with Cowen and Company.

John Blackledge 與 Cowen and Company 合作。

Great, thanks, just a couple questions. Maybe, Greg, if you could just discussed timing of Tinder monetization, and what are the unique monetization opportunities for Tinder, aside from using the traditional Match monetization playbook? And what's the current user base? And then, separately, how should we think about prior local media and other guidance to the new Match Group and Media and eCommerce segment guidance? Thank you.

太好了，謝謝，我還有幾個問題。格雷格，或許你可以談談 Tinder 的獲利時機，以及除了採用傳統的 Match 獲利模式之外，Tinder 還有哪些獨特的獲利機會？目前的使用者群體有多大？此外，我們應該如何看待先前的地方媒體和其他指導意見對新的 Match Group 和媒體及電子商務部門的指導意見的影響？謝謝。

All right, on monetization of Tinder, I think, this still an early business. I think you'll see us begin to monetize it soon, but I think that will be more in terms of nailing the business model as opposed to a push for maximum revenue. I think when that comes will depend on a whole host of things. It's really a question of -- it is certainly big enough that you can start to monetize it now, but I think there's priorities, this is a small start-up like team that we are building, and everything you do comes at the expense of something else. So I think that you'll start to see certain things, but I wouldn't be looking for big P&L impact in the near future.

好吧，關於 Tinder 的商業化，我認為這仍然是一個早期階段。我認為你們很快就會看到我們開始獲利，但我認為這更多的是為了完善商業模式，而不是追求最大收益。我認為何時到來取決於許多因素。這其實是一個問題——它當然已經足夠大了，現在就可以開始盈利了，但我認為要分清輕重緩急，我們正在組建一個小型創業團隊，你做的每一件事都會以犧牲其他事情為代價。所以我認為你會開始看到一些變化，但我不會指望在不久的將來對損益表產生重大影響。

I think in terms of what opportunities Tinder presents itself that others don't, I think there are a couple of ways. One, advertising has not been a great monetization vehicle in this category traditionally. I think Tinder has the possibility of changing that. I think the nature of the Tinder user experience presents itself -- presents real opportunities for native advertising that certain of our other products don't. I also think that just, each business, because of the way its feature set works and product works, presents its unique opportunities for discretionary feature monetization, and I think Tinder's are unique in that way.

我認為，就 Tinder 提供的其他應用所不具備的機會而言，主要體現在以下幾個方面。第一，傳統上，廣告並不是這個領域很好的獲利手段。我認為 Tinder 有可能改變這種現狀。我認為 Tinder 的使用者體驗本身就具有獨特的優勢——它為原生廣告提供了我們其他一些產品所不具備的真正機會。我也認為，每個企業由於其功能集和產品運作方式的不同，都具有其獨特的自主功能貨幣化機會，我認為 Tinder 在這方面是獨一無二的。

I think just the pure engagement levels of Tinder, which are just so much higher than our other businesses, provide more a la carte, lower price transactions, priced through the app store, but in high volume create meaningful revenue, whereas a Match, with its hard subscription law just does not present those types of opportunities. Why don't you take the bridge question, Jeff?

我認為，Tinder 的用戶參與度遠高於我們其他業務，它提供了更多按需付費、價格更低的交易，這些交易透過應用程式商店定價，但交易量巨大，創造了可觀的收入，而 Match 由於其嚴格的訂閱制度，無法提供這類機會。傑夫，你為什麼不回答橋牌的問題呢？

Listen, I think what we said last time was that we spent $15 million or so investing in DailyBurn and Tutor a year ago, and that we would expand that investment this year, and that the rest of our investments in what are now the Media and eCommerce segments were going to be low-double-digit millions which is what I think I just said.

聽著，我想我們上次說過，一年前我們花了大約 1500 萬美元投資 DailyBurn 和 Tutor，今年我們將擴大這項投資，而我們在現在的媒體和電子商務領域的其餘投資將是數千萬美元，我想這就是我剛才說的。

And I think we commented on, if you throw Tinder in with Tutor and DailyBurn we get to 25 to 30. Although that number could change, to Greg's point, these are early stage businesses that we only have interest in making great, and so we're going to opportunistically invest and then we could pull in here or there, or we could expand.

我認為我們之前也提到過，如果把 Tinder、Tutor 和 DailyBurn 都算進去，那就有 25 到 30 個了。雖然這個數字可能會改變，但正如格雷格所說，這些都是早期企業，我們只對將其發展壯大感興趣，所以我們會抓住機會進行投資，然後我們可能會在這裡或那裡吸收資金，或者我們可以擴張。

The nature of these businesses is such that the loss numbers tend to go up when things are going well at this stage. So if you see momentum, you double down. I will give an example, DailyBurn this year, Q1 is a big quarter in the fitness business, and we invested in marketing and we grew Q1 ended subs seven times higher than the prior year, and just over the course of the quarter alone we grew subs by 300%.

這些企業的性質決定了，在現階段業務發展順利的時候，虧損額往往會上升。所以，如果看到勢頭強勁，就加倍投入。我舉個例子，DailyBurn 今年第一季是健身產業的大季度，我們投資了行銷，第一季末的訂閱用戶數量比上一年增長了七倍，僅在第一季度，我們的訂閱用戶數量就增加了 300%。

That's on loss marketing. That is lifetime value, subscription marketing, that's a loss number, but that kind of -- but it is profitable on a lifetime basis. So that kind of thing enthuses and drives further investment not less. Tinder has got great momentum. Jeff gave you the numbers for right now and we will update you as we go, but certainly not numbers that we can lock into at this point.

這是虧本行銷。這是終身價值，訂閱行銷，這是一個虧損的數字，但是——但是從終身角度來看，它是有利可圖的。因此，這類事情反而會激勵並推動進一步的投資，而不是減少投資。Tinder發展勢頭強勁。Jeff 已經給出了目前的數據，我們會隨時更新情況，但目前肯定無法給出確切的數字。

Thank you.

謝謝。

Jason Helfstein with Oppenheimer.

Jason Helfstein 與 Oppenheimer 合作。

Thanks. One housekeeping and then just a few questions on Match. Can you talk about that $30 million purchase, of now controlling interest on the cash flow statement? Does that have anything to do with Tinder, and are you willing to comment?

謝謝。先交代一些家務事，然後問幾個關於Match的問題。你能談談那筆價值 3000 萬美元的收購案嗎？它現在對現金流量表產生了控制性影響。這和 Tinder 有關嗎？您願意對此發表評論嗎？

Then, secondly, on Match, is a fair way to think about the fourth -- the first quarter sub change versus the fourth quarter, so basically North American subs were up 11% in this quarter, paid subs. Core were up 9% the way you previously reported it. Is that the right way to think about it? Did 9% go to 11%, or just help us bridge that? And then just lastly, can you just talk about the long-term guidance for Match, previously it was $500 million of OIBA. In 2016 -- you're moving to EBITDA, if you just want to give some color around that? Thank you.

其次，就 Match 而言，考慮第四個季度的情況是一個合理的方法——第一季訂閱用戶變化與第四季度相比，所以基本上北美訂閱用戶在本季度增長了 11%，付費訂閱用戶。核心業務成長了 9%，正如你之前報導的那樣。這種思考方式正確嗎？9% 升到了 11%，還是只是幫我們彌補了這個差距？最後，您能否談談 Match 的長期指導方針？先前 OIBA 的指導方針是 5 億美元。2016年－你們開始轉向使用EBITDA指標，如果可以的話，我想簡單介紹一下這方面的狀況？謝謝。

Sure. On the $30 million question, I will confirm that over the course of the quarter we bought in all the minority interest in Tinder, such that today we together with management own 100% of the business. I will say that we bought in -- the amount we spent to buy that in was greater than that $30 million in the cash flow statement.

當然。關於價值 3000 萬美元的問題，我可以確認，在本季度我們收購了 Tinder 的所有少數股權，因此，如今我們與管理層共同擁有該公司 100% 的股份。我想說的是，我們確實進行了收購——我們為收購所花費的金額超過了現金流量表中的 3000 萬美元。

The accounting does not match up with the economic reality. I'm not going to tell exactly with the valuation was, I'm not going to tell exactly how much we spent, there are confidentiality agreements, et cetera. But I know that people have tried to back into that $30 million and it is not doable. Let me put it that way. But we do now own 100% together with management.

帳目與經濟現實不符。我不會透露具體的估值是多少，也不會透露我們具體花了多少錢，因為有保密協議等等。但我知道有人試圖倒推算出那3000萬美元，但這是不可能的。這麼說吧。但我們現在與管理階層共同擁有100%的股份。

On the Core issue, or the Core to North America issue, look, I think whatever you do it changed like this -- it is a little hard to bridge. I will say that the big shifts in North America are that OkCupid and Match Canada, effectively both of which are big grown businesses, came into Core is the way to think about it. And then on the other side, Twoo, which was in Developing went into International, and then you have LatAm and all that sort of thing.

關於核心問題，或者說核心到北美的問題，你看，我認為無論你做什麼，它都會變成這樣——這有點難以彌合。我想說，北美最大的變化在於 OkCupid 和 Match Canada 這兩家公司（實際上都是規模龐大的成熟企業）的崛起。核心才是關鍵所在。另一方面，Twoo 從發展中轉型為國際，然後進入了拉丁美洲等等領域。

I think in that 11%, I think that there is higher growth at OkCupid and Match Canada, and lower growth in what was traditionally Core, and that gets you to the 11%. And that lower growth in traditional Core was driven by the things that I talked about, which was the decrease in acquisition efficiency, the increase in terms, and we think, as I said on the last call, I think that Core, although we are not going to continue to report it, will have a comparable year this year to last year, that's what we think.

我認為在這 11% 的成長中，OkCupid 和 Match Canada 的成長較高，而傳統核心業務的成長較低，這就導致了 11% 的成長。傳統核心業務成長放緩是由我剛才提到的因素造成的，即收購效率下降、交易條款增加等等。正如我在上次電話會議上所說，我們認為，雖然我們不會繼續公佈核心業務的業績，但今年的核心業務表現將與去年相當，我們就是這麼認為的。

Things like the App Store entry last week and a whole bunch of other things are going to drive that number back up, and over the course of year we expect the PMC growth numbers to rise. What was the final question there?

上週 App Store 的上線以及其他許多因素都將推動這一數字回升，我們預計今年 PMC 的成長數字將會上升。最後一個問題是什麼？

The final question was about the $500 million --

最後一個問題是關於那5億美元——

The $500 million was always EBITDA. I've always talked about it from a EBITDA perspective. Again, my statements stand, but I do want people to re-examine them, which is it is not a $500 million absolute stake in the ground. It is a way of looking at the growth of the business. And I think that -- I still feel very good about fact that is a reasonable way to look at the opportunity.

這5億美元一直都是EBITDA。我一直以來都是從 EBITDA 的角度來談論這個問題的。我再次重申我的觀點，但我希望人們重新審視這些觀點，那就是這並非5億美元的絕對賭注。這是看待企業發展的一種方式。而且我認為——我仍然對這個事實感到非常滿意，這是一種看待這個機會的合理方式。

We are not including fitness and education in that number, so that's exclusive of fitness and education. I think it becomes, depending on what we do with Tinder, it becomes easier or more difficult depending on -- there's a bunch of different ways to get there. I feel good about it, and as I said, I think, last quarter, I don't know whether this going to be $479 million or $521 million, it is three years away, but as a general way of thinking about the size, nothing has diminished our enthusiasm or confidence in that outlook.

該數字不包括健身和教育，因此不包括健身和教育。我認為，這取決於我們如何利用 Tinder，事情會變得更容易或更難——有很多不同的方法可以達到目的。我對此感覺很好，正如我所說，我認為，上個季度，我不知道最終會是 4.79 億美元還是 5.21 億美元，畢竟還有三年時間，但就規模而言，沒有什麼能削弱我們對這一前景的熱情和信心。

Thank you.

謝謝。

Peter Stabler with Wells Fargo.

Peter Stabler，來自富國銀行。

Good morning. Question for Joey. You called out some of progress you have been making on pricing and the websites business. I'm wondering if you could just talk a little bit broadly about programmatic? The shift to programmatic hasn't been universally hailed as a positive across the industry. It sounds like you guys are getting some good traction on pricing year-on-year. Any additional color would be appreciated. Thanks very much.

早安.問喬伊一個問題。您提到了您在定價和網站業務方面取得的一些進展。我想請您簡單談談程序化廣告？整個產業對程序化購買的轉變並非普遍認為是件好事。聽起來你們在定價方面取得了不錯的逐年成長。如果能添加其他顏色就更好了。非常感謝。

Yes, it really depends on your starting point, so I think the biggest place where we are doing programmatic is at About.com, and I think that when we picked up the asset, and for the first period that we owned it, it was woefully behind the market. We didn't have the premium ad sales group really communicating with the programmatic ad sales group in any way, and we didn't have that whole stack of things optimized.

是的，這真的取決於你的起點，所以我認為我們進行程序化廣告的最大地方是 About.com，而且我認為當我們接手這個資產時，在我們擁有它的第一個時期，它遠遠落後於市場。我們之前沒有讓高階廣告銷售團隊與程式化廣告銷售團隊進行任何形式的溝通，也沒有對整個流程進行最佳化。

So just putting that all together and having it all work on a common system where you can basically optimize a waterfall of ads really dramatically changed it. We were in -- I think that we were years behind the market in looking at programmatic and using programmatic technologies. So where we've improved there is really just getting up to market, and now I think we can start to really innovate on things.

所以，把所有這些整合起來，讓它們在一個通用的系統中運行，從而可以優化廣告瀑布，這真的帶來了巨大的改變。我認為，我們在程序化廣告和程序化技術的應用方面，比市場落後了好幾年。所以，我們在這方面取得的進步主要體現在產品上市速度上，現在我認為我們可以開始真正進行創新了。

But, again, all that by the way, has been with the same number of ads. So we are not increasing the number of ads about.com at all, except actually in one small area, the search results pages. But other than that, the article pages that get the vast majority of the traffic, we are not increasing the ads. What we are doing generally is improving the ads, improving the placement of the ads.

但話說回來，所有這些，廣告數量都保持不變。因此，我們並沒有增加 about.com 上的廣告數量，實際上只在搜尋結果頁面這一小塊區域增加了廣告數量。但除此之外，對於獲得絕大部分流量的文章頁面，我們不會增加廣告投放量。我們所做的整體工作是改進廣告，改進廣告投放位置。

We are on a one ad in, one ad out policy, so when we bring in a unit we will take an old unit out, and just that optimization has really dramatically transformed that. I think as we start to roll that out to the other properties, we will start to see more efficiencies there.

我們實行「一進一出」的廣告投放策略，也就是說，當我們引進一台新設備時，就會撤掉一台舊設備，而這種優化措施確實大大改變了廣告投放效果。我認為，隨著我們將這項技術推廣到其他物業，我們將開始看到效率的提升。

One quick follow-up, if I could, on the websites business, could you offer any color about query growth and revenue per query there? We understand the restructuring, but any color would be great. Thanks.

如果可以的話，我想快速補充一個關於網站業務的問題，您能否提供一些關於查詢成長和每次查詢收入的具體資訊？我們理解重組的必要性，但任何顏色都可以。謝謝。

I think on revenue per query there is -- I'm trying to remember exactly. I think what we said last quarter still stands in terms of what we think of the trend in query growth, which is, we will be growing from here on queries. And revenue per query is, again, it is not a totally relevant metric anymore, which we explained. Queries really only cover the search businesses and didn't meaningfully cover the content business -- so we really should focus on page views now. But revenue per query, I believe --

我認為按查詢次數計算的收入是有的——我正在努力回憶確切的數字。我認為我們上個季度對查詢成長趨勢的看法仍然成立，那就是，從現在開始，查詢量將會成長。而每次查詢的收入，正如我們之前解釋過的，已經不再是一個完全相關的指標了。查詢實際上只涵蓋了搜尋業務，並沒有真正涵蓋內容業務——所以我們現在真的應該關注頁面瀏覽量。但我相信，每次查詢的收入—

It is up in Q1 in both businesses over Q4, and we expect it be at roughly the levels it is now through the year. Things could change, but that's our current expectation.

第一季兩項業務的業績均較第四季有所成長，我們預計全年業績將大致維持在目前的水平。情況可能會有所變化，但這是我們目前的預期。

Thank you.

謝謝。

Mark Mahaney with RBC Capital Markets.

馬克‧馬哈尼，加拿大皇家銀行資本市場。

I just wanted to ask a basic question about the potential spin for all the Match businesses. Let me ask the question this way. Is there anything structurally, is there anything about the business itself that you think makes it not yet ready for a spin, or do you think the conditions are all there to spin the asset if you wanted to do so today? Thanks.

我只是想問一個關於Match旗下所有業務可能出現轉機的基本問題。我換個方式問吧。從結構上看，或從業務本身來看，您認為有哪些因素導致該業務尚未做好分拆的準備？還是您認為如果今天想分拆該資產，所有條件都已具備？謝謝。

Well, it is not a precise measurement. We have a lot of experience in this area, as you all know. When and if, when and if are really accurate. We don't have a when, and even to proceed with that, we don't have an if. There's no way -- speculation here is lovely, but as I said, there's no precise measurement.

嗯，這並不是一個精確的測量結果。如大家所知，我們在這領域擁有豐富的經驗。何時以及如果，何時以及如果，都非常準確。我們沒有「何時」這個問題，甚至連「是否」這個問題都沒有。不可能－在這裡推測固然美好，但正如我所說，沒有精確的測量方法。

And, again, I just repeat, when and if we do, we will. And I can't say any more than that. There is nothing more to say to it than that. What do you want to add, Mr. Blatt?

我再次重申，如果真是此事，我們一定會去做。我不能透露更多資訊了。除此之外，沒什麼好說的了。布拉特先生，您還有什麼要補充的嗎？

The direct answer to the question, though, I think is I don't think there's any major structural problems to do it, meaning, if we wanted to do it -- the issue, the decision-making process is the same as it is always been. It is a subjective process. There is a right time and a wrong time and there's an if --

不過，我認為對這個問題的直接回答是，我認為這樣做並沒有什麼重大的結構性問題，也就是說，如果我們想這樣做——問題在於，決策過程與以往一樣。這是一個主觀過程。凡事都有對錯之分，凡事都有「如果」——

Or there is a no time.

或者根本沒有時間。

That's right. And there is an if, and there's a whole bunch of things that go into it. But certainly I think that there's no structural deficit to doing so.

這是正確的。當然，這其中也存在一個“如果”，而且涉及很多因素。但我認為這樣做肯定不會造成任何結構性缺陷。

There's never been a structural reason. We've always structured everything so that we can spin anything off, and God knows, we have gone in that direction seven times so far.

從來沒有結構性原因。我們一直以來都將一切架構成可以隨時剝離任何業務，天知道，到目前為止，我們已經朝這個方向發展了七次。

Thanks, Barry, thanks, Greg.

謝謝巴里，謝謝格雷格。

Heath Terry with Goldman Sachs.

Heath Terry，高盛員工。

Great, thanks. Just a couple of questions. Greg, completely understand the decision to pull back on some of the disclosure around Match, but with the deceleration in paid subscriber growth, can you just give us some context around where the growth in the business is happening, whether it is in the kind of recurring subscribers that you have at Match versus the premium subscribers at sites like OkCupid?

太好了，謝謝。幾個問題。Greg，我完全理解你決定減少對 Match 的一些資訊揭露，但是隨著付費用戶成長放緩，你能否給我們介紹一下業務成長的來源，例如是 Match 的定期訂閱用戶，還是像 OkCupid 這樣的網站的付費用戶？

And then, Joey, I guess, can you give us any sort of sense of the contribution from ValueClick to the Search business this quarter? I guess, if we assume roughly $34 million in contribution, which is what we are assuming for Q4, then it would suggest that the Search business declines actually accelerated this quarter. That's really rough math, so I'm sure it is probably wrong, if you could help correct us there, I'd appreciate it?

那麼，Joey，我想請你介紹一下ValueClick在本季對搜尋業務的貢獻吧？我想，如果我們假設貢獻金額約為 3400 萬美元（這是我們對第四季度的假設），那麼這表明搜尋業務的下滑在本季實際上加速了。這計算非常粗略，所以我確信結果很可能是錯的，如果您能幫忙糾正一下，我將不勝感激。

On the first half question, again, not to quibble, I don't think we've really pulled back on disclosure. We've just moved basically -- again, we basically moved OkCupid into Core and Twoo into Developing because to call big business to Developing that are bigger than Cores didn't make sense anymore. So we are trying to give the same level of disclosure and there's a temporary dislocation, but then you will have this disclosure and it is as fulsome as the last, I think. So I don't think there's an issue there.

關於前半部的問題，我再次強調，我不想吹毛求疵，我認為我們並沒有真正減少資訊揭露。我們基本上已經——再說一遍，我們基本上把 OkCupid 移到了 Core 部門，把 Twoo 移到了 Developing 部門，因為把比 Core 部門規模更大的大企業稱為 Developing 部門已經沒有意義了。所以我們正在努力提供相同程度的資訊揭露，雖然出現了一些暫時的混亂，但之後你們就會看到這次的資訊揭露，而且我認為這次的資訊揭露和上次一樣全面。所以我認為這方面不存在問題。

I think that clearly, though, as we've said for awhile, different [ones] of our businesses have different growth trajectories within each market. Over the last 12 months, OkCupid has grown faster than Match and PeopleMedia. There was a time PeopleMedia was growing faster than Match. But these things sort of rise and fall based on a variety of things. I think there is an error in your question, which is the OkCupid subscriber is not different than the Match subscriber, meaning, it is literally the exact same thing, it is a monthly subscription, they pay it every month, there are packages.

不過，我認為很明顯，正如我們之前所說，我們不同的業務在每個市場中都有不同的成長軌跡。在過去 12 個月裡，OkCupid 的成長速度超過了 Match 和 PeopleMedia。曾經有一段時間，PeopleMedia 的成長速度超過了 Match。但這些事情的興衰受多種因素影響。我認為你的問題有誤，OkCupid 的訂閱用戶與 Match 的訂閱用戶並無不同，也就是說，它們本質上是一回事，都是按月訂閱，每月都要付費，而且有不同的套餐。

The only difference is the bundle of features that you pay for. In Match, you pay for one set of features, on OkCupid, you pay for another. In fact, the net contribution of an OkCupid subscriber over a lifetime is equivalent to the net contribution lifetime of a Match subscriber in terms of lifetime value. It is why these distinctions don't really make sense.

唯一的差別在於你付費購買的功能包。在 Match 上，你為一套功能付費；在 OkCupid 上，你為另一套功能付費。事實上，從終身價值來看，OkCupid 用戶的終身淨貢獻與 Match 用戶終身的淨貢獻是相等的。這就是為什麼這些區別實際上沒有意義的原因。

We've got a market, we've got a bunch of different products. The nature and quality of the revenue coming from OkCupid is the same as from Match in really virtually every way. But certainly OkCupid and Twoo, in their respective, North America and International, have been growing faster for a while then the rest of the business, although, again, it jumps around.

我們有市場，我們有很多不同的產品。OkCupid 帶來的收入性質和品質與 Match 幾乎在所有方面都相同。但可以肯定的是，OkCupid 和 Twoo 分別在北美和國際市場，其成長速度已經比其他公司快了一段時間，儘管成長速度也有波動。

The launch of the iPhone app in the App Store, we've sustained that kind of growth, that reversed itself. We've got four other things coming online. These are about feature sets. Unfortunately, given so many businesses, we can't launch everything we have planned at the same time. And last year, we launched subscription and other things on OkCupid that drove big growth.

iPhone 應用程式在 App Store 上線後，我們一直保持著那種成長勢頭，但後來情況發生了逆轉。我們還有四項其他功能即將上線。這些是關於特徵集的。遺憾的是，由於業務量如此之大，我們無法同時推出所有計劃中的項目。去年，我們在 OkCupid 上推出了訂閱服務和其他功能，推動了巨大的成長。

This year, the road map is much more focused on the Match business and PeopleMedia, things that are going to drive growth there. And so I expect those growth rates to merge over the course of this year.

今年的發展路線圖更著重於 Match 業務和 PeopleMedia，這些業務將推動這兩個領域的成長。因此，我預計這些成長率將在今年內趨於一致。

On ValueClick and organic -- sequential growth. The websites grew organically sequentially, meaning, excluding ValueClick, websites grew organically. I think low- to mid-single-digits. Then in terms of EBITDA overall, if you look at the down 16% year-on-year for the quarter, the big contributor to that was the spend we did in B2C marketing.

ValueClick 和自然流量－持續成長。這些網站是自然而然地逐步發展的，也就是說，除了 ValueClick 之外，其他網站都是自然成長的。我認為是低個位數到中個位數。那麼就整體 EBITDA 而言，如果看本季同比下降 16%，造成這一結果的主要原因是我們在 B2C 行銷方面的支出。

We saw a big opportunity to, for ROI positive spend. When we see those we spend into them, and we are generally very good at predicting the ROI of those, and we fell good about that spend. That was really more of a choice in terms of what we decided to do there in terms of profit. Jeff, you can add to that, but I think that answers the question.

我們看到了獲得正投資報酬率的巨大機會。當我們看到這些投資機會時，我們會投入資金，而且我們通常很擅長預測這些投資的回報率，我們對這筆支出感到滿意。這其實更多的是一種選擇，取決於我們決定在那裡做什麼才能獲得利潤。傑夫，你可以補充一些內容，但我認為這已經回答了這個問題。

That's right.

這是正確的。

Okay, great. Thank you.

好的，太好了。謝謝。

Brian Fitzgerald with Jefferies.

Brian Fitzgerald 與 Jefferies 合作。

Thanks, guys. We were hoping you could help us think about the strategy around Vimeo as you incubate it. Right now, are you trying to aggressively grow user levels, maybe maximizing the user base, or are you more focused on driving near-term revenue potential, maybe both? And then on the monetization side of Vimeo, how do you think about pre-roll advertising versus the efficacy of in-stream versus display versus subscription? Thanks.

謝謝各位。我們希望您在孵化 Vimeo 的過程中，能夠幫助我們思考相關的策略。目前，您是想積極提高用戶數量，盡可能擴大用戶群，還是更注重提高近期收入潛力，還是兩者兼具？那麼，在 Vimeo 的獲利模式方面，您如何看待前置廣告、串流廣告、展示廣告和訂閱廣告的有效性？謝謝。

Last first, which is Vimeo is not an advertising product. We do not do -- the only kind of advertising we do, we do not do display. We will never do display advertising. But the only kind of advertising we do would be the deepest kind of native advertising where an advertiser has a story to tell and there is some sort of underneath, so to speak, mostly indirect, relationship to the products that they have.

首先要說明的是，Vimeo 不是一個廣告產品。我們不做－我們只做一種廣告，我們不做展示廣告。我們絕對不會做展示廣告。但我們唯一做的廣告類型就是最深入的原生廣告，廣告商要講述一個故事，並且與他們的產品之間存在某種潛在的、可以說是間接的聯繫。

We feel very strongly that Vimeo is a differentiated product, particularly from YouTube. And part of that differentiation, one of the strongest parts, is that it is clean, it is safe, there's nothing there other than the video, which is protected by the person who puts it up. And we feel very much that that is why Vimeo is having such growth is because it is emerging as the trusted video brand for user-generated video.

我們堅信 Vimeo 是一款與眾不同的產品，尤其與 YouTube 截然不同。這種差異的一部分，也是最強有力的部分之一，是它乾淨、安全，除了影片之外什麼都沒有，而且影片還受到上傳者的保護。我們深信，Vimeo之所以能取得如此巨大的成長，是因為它正在成為用戶生成影片領域值得信賴的影片品牌。

In terms of what the strategy is, the strategy is on all fronts. We are absolutely after building continued to build our audience, which we have been doing. We are after subscriptions, which we have been growing. I think it is remarkable where we have this many subscriptions and this short of time, being in the subscription side of Vimeo, the tools and services part of Vimeo.

至於戰略是什麼，那就是全方位戰略。我們絕對致力於繼續擴大我們的受眾群體，而我們也一直在這樣做。我們追求的是訂閱用戶，而我們的訂閱用戶數量一直在增加。我認為，在 Vimeo 的訂閱業務方面，以及 Vimeo 的工具和服務方面，在這麼短的時間內就擁有如此多的訂閱用戶，這非常了不起。

And we are starting to build video on demand, so there's really three strategies. They each, I think, reinforce the other. And we are very, very aggressive, and intend to be aggressive, in furthering those strategies. The goal here is not anything to do with near-term revenue extraction. It is to build this brand into something that is not only enduring, but that is a real differentiator in the whole space of video.

我們正在著手建立視訊點播服務，所以實際上有三種策略。我認為它們彼此相輔相成。我們非常積極主動，並且打算繼續積極主動地推進這些策略。我們的目標與短期內獲取收入無關。目的是將這個品牌打造成為一個不僅經久不衰，而且在整個影片領域真正具有差異化的品牌。

Awesome, thank you, Barry.

太棒了，謝謝你，巴里。

Eric Sheridan with UBS.

瑞銀集團的艾瑞克·謝裡丹。

Thanks for taking the question. Barry, following up on that, with respect to Vimeo, you have talked a little bit recently about original programming for Vimeo, and we've seen a big push by a lot of parties around online video to invest in original content. Maybe help us understand your plans around investing in original content as the driver for the subscription element of that business?

感謝您回答這個問題。巴里，接著剛才的話題，關於 Vimeo，你最近談到了 Vimeo 的原創節目，我們看到許多線上影片領域的參與者都在大力投資原創內容。或許您可以幫我們了解您關於投資原創內容以推動訂閱業務發展的計劃？

Sure. This is a very long-term project of ours on video on demand. We've really just begun. We are not at this time going to announce doing television series or announce doing, let's call it, a House of Cards like program, though I would hope in time we would be able to.

當然。這是我們面向視訊點播領域的長期專案。我們才剛開始。我們目前不會宣布製作電視劇，也不會宣布製作類似《紙牌屋》的節目，但我希望將來我們能夠做到。

What we are doing is we're really in the middle part of the long tail where independent film is ripe for us. Joss Whedon is a recent example. The Avenger series is -- and made his own film and is offering it $5 a pay-per-view. These are all relatively small efforts until we build our base, know what our audience is interested in. We have said that we are going to put probably $10 million into program development of various kinds, that's not a big number in video terms.

我們現在所處的階段，實際上是處於獨立電影長尾市場的中段，而獨立電影市場對我們來說正是一片沃土。喬斯·韋登就是一個近期的例子。《復仇者聯盟》系列電影——他自己也拍了一部電影，並以 5 美元的價格提供付費觀看。在建立起用戶基礎、了解受眾興趣之前，這些都是相對較小的努力。我們說過，我們可能會投入 1000 萬美元用於各種類型的節目開發，就視頻行業而言，這並不是一筆巨款。

But we absolutely believe over time that we will build up a substantial video on demand business, but the flavor of the day, everybody and their mother plunging into high cost video over-the-top programming, I think is great. But for us, it is, in our way of doing it step-by-step-by-step, find out what our audience is interested in, acquire products, stimulate production, et cetera.

但我們堅信，隨著時間的推移，我們將建立一個相當規模的視訊點播業務，但目前大家都熱衷於高成本的OTT視訊節目，我認為這很棒。但對我們來說，我們採取的方式是循序漸進地了解受眾的興趣所在，獲取產品，刺激生產等等。

Jordan Monahan with Morgan Stanley.

喬丹·莫納漢就職於摩根士丹利。

I think we will take one more question after this and then wrap up.

我想我們之後再回答一個問題，然後就結束今天的會議。

Well, great. Thank you for taking the question. Actually, just two quick ones if I can. I know Match has been discussed quite a bit, but I had just a higher level, bigger picture question about online dating. I think if we looked at online dating 10 years ago, it seems like one of the big barriers to entry was actually generating an ecosystem that had enough participants to have effective matches.

太好了。感謝您回答這個問題。其實，如果可以的話，就兩個簡單的問題。我知道Match這個平台已經被討論過很多次了，但我只是想問一個關於網路約會更高層次、更宏觀的問題。我認為，如果我們回顧 10 年前的線上約會，就會發現當時最大的進入門檻之一實際上是建立一個擁有足夠多參與者的生態系統，從而實現有效的匹配。

Now with Facebook's ability to use its API, and anyone's ability to develop an app on top of that, has that changed in your view the barriers to entry, to building a successful dating app? And do you actually see the competitive environment as any different than it might have been pre-Facebook?

現在，Facebook 可以使用其 API，任何人都可以基於此開發應用程序，您認為這是否改變了開發成功的約會應用程式的准入門檻？你認為現在的競爭環境與Facebook出現之前有什麼不同嗎？

Then just a quick question on Search. I'm wondering if you have any updates on your distribution strategy, just given some of the changes toward mobile tablet and so on in the last couple of years?

那麼，關於搜尋功能，我還有一個小問題。鑑於過去幾年行動平板電腦等領域的種種變化，我想知道你們的分銷策略是否有任何更新？

I think it is an interesting question, and it's a question that we -- we were preoccupied with four or five years ago. Which is where are the fundamental dynamics of liquidity, construction going to change with Facebook and every else. And the reality is it hasn't. If you look back over the last 10 years there have been hundreds, if not thousands, entrants into the category. There was a time when I was first at Match where I just had to stop reading like TechCrunch because every day there were five new sites coming in and I just couldn't -- it was just ridiculous.

我認為這是一個有趣的問題，也是我們四、五年前就非常關注的問題。這就是流動性、結構和Facebook等因素將如何改變其基本動態。但事實並非如此。回顧過去十年，該類別至少有數百甚至數千名參賽者。當我剛到 Match 工作的時候，我必須停止像 TechCrunch 那樣閱讀新聞，因為每天都有五個新網站湧入，我根本忙不過來——這太荒謬了。

But very few have come up and achieved that scale. Over the last 10 years, really the only ones are OkCupid and Tinder. And OkCupid did it over a long period of time, and they did it brick by brick, and Tinder did it very quickly. But Tinder is the only one who's done it very quickly. And Tinder didn't do it using Facebook distribution.

但很少人能達到這樣的規模。過去十年裡，真正算是主流的約會軟體只有 OkCupid 和 Tinder 了。OkCupid 花了很長時間才做到這一點，而且是一步一步地實現的，而 Tinder 很快就做到了。但只有 Tinder 做到了這一點，而且速度非常快。Tinder 並沒有利用 Facebook 來推廣。

There was a period two or three years ago where users, for instance, took big advantage of this when the window was open, where Facebook virality enabled people to build these businesses very quickly. They then shut that down. You can no longer use the feed in that way. You can't spam people.

例如，兩、三年前，用戶們曾充分利用這項優勢，在 Facebook 病毒式傳播的窗口期迅速建立起這些業務。然後他們關掉了那個系統。你不能再以這種方式使用該資訊來源了。你不能向別人發送垃圾郵件。

All these tactics that were usable for a brief window are now gone. And Tinder has grown through creating brand, and they did it themselves. They used Facebook to authenticate identity. But they don't get distribution on Facebook, they got distribution through word of mouth. People telling other people, and using it. That's magic, but it is very hard to do, and it is as hard to do today as it was 10 years ago.

所有這些曾經在短時間內有效的戰術現在都失效了。Tinder 的發展壯大得益於品牌建設，而這一切都是他們自己完成的。他們使用Facebook進行身份驗證。但他們的傳播並非透過 Facebook，而是透過口碑傳播。人們告訴其他人，並使用它。那很神奇，但很難做到，而且今天做起來和10年前一樣難。

So I think the concern/opportunity we once had about Facebook and virality, that window is, I think, is gone. And I think that it is as hard if not harder than it ever was because you just have that many more big powerful brands in this space. And it is a brand business. OkCupid is a brand, Match is a brand. Tinder is now a brand, a very powerful, quickly built brand, but it is hard to do.

所以我覺得我們曾經對 Facebook 和病毒式傳播的關注/機遇，那個窗口期已經過去了。我認為這和以前一樣難，甚至更難，因為這個領域裡有更多實力雄厚的大品牌。這是一家品牌企業。OkCupid是一個品牌，Match也是一個品牌。Tinder 現在已經成為一個品牌，一個非常強大、迅速建立起來的品牌，但這並非易事。

So we actually don't -- when we look at this all the time. We have new entrants into the category, et cetera. And it is not to say that there will never be another new entrant, I'm sure there will be, that's the history of this. But it is very rare that one breaks through and becomes something enduring. There are still only a handful of them in the entire space, and other than Tinder they've all been around for a long, long time. Joey?

所以，當我們一直觀察這個問題時，實際上我們並沒有意識到這一點。這個類別又新增了一些參與者，等等。這並不是說以後就不會有新的競爭者了，我相信一定會有，歷史就是如此。但能夠突破重圍並成為永恆之物的情況非常罕見。整個領域中這類平台仍然屈指可數，而且除了 Tinder 之外，其他平台都已經存在了很長時間。喬伊？

On the website side in terms of distribution strategy, it is, our content really is fundamentally what we call pull content as opposed to push content. Meaning, we make the kind of content that people are looking for and our job is to get it in front of people wherever they are. And I think we've done a very nice job getting that in front of people on mobile devices, as well as on desktops, et cetera.

就網站分發策略而言，我們的內容本質上是我們所謂的拉式內容，而不是推送式內容。也就是說，我們製作人們正在尋找的內容，而我們的工作就是讓這些內容出現在人們面前，無論他們身在何處。我認為我們做得很好，讓使用者可以透過行動裝置、桌上型電腦等裝置看到這些內容。

I think we have a huge portion of our traffic now coming from mobile and tablet to all the websites. And we continue to look for new forms of distribution there, but wherever people are doing searches, wherever people are doing queries, wherever people are asking questions we find a way to put our content there.

我認為現在我們所有網站的流量有很大一部分來自行動裝置和平板電腦。我們將繼續尋找新的分發方式，無論人們在哪裡進行搜尋、查詢或提問，我們都會找到方法將我們的內容放置在那裡。

On the application side, there isn't a perfect analog in terms of that business model, and that business model being search monetized, but one service that that application provides in addition to distribution for our services is that the application model offers a monetization solution for developers.

在應用程式方面，雖然沒有完全類似的商業模式（即搜尋變現），但該應用程式除了為我們的服務提供分發管道外，還為開發者提供了變現解決方案。

And developers on mobile, as much or maybe more so than on a desktop, need monetization solutions. They need help in monetization, and while we don't have anything to report yet there, we are continuing to experiment with things there, we are continuing to work with various developers and hope to have something to discuss there soon.

行動裝置開發者對獲利解決方案的需求，可能比桌面端開發者更為迫切。他們在獲利方面需要幫助，雖然我們目前還沒有任何進展可以匯報，但我們正在繼續進行這方面的試驗，繼續與各種開發者合作，希望很快就能在這方面有所進展。

Okay, last question.

好的，最後一個問題。

Kerry Rice with Needham and Company.

Kerry Rice 與 Needham and Company 合作。

Thanks a lot. A quick question on HomeAdvisor. It appears that the marketing has been ratcheted up with that business. I wondered if you could talk a little bit more about the strategy and what you plan on doing to continue the turnaround there, and if you're going to continue to raise your marketing levels?

多謝。關於HomeAdvisor的一個簡單問題。看來這家公司的行銷力道已經加大了。我想請您再詳細談談貴公司的策略以及您計劃如何繼續扭轉局面，還有您是否會繼續提高行銷水平？

Yes, listen, the increase in marketing last year and the increase [so far] this year is largely TV advertising. On national cable TV advertising, we've had very positive ROIs, has led us to choose to expand it, and it is been very effective at attracting both SPs and consumers, so we are pleased there. Our strategy is what it is, I think, with most of our business which is to differentiate and build a great product and to build a great brand. And we think that the business has turned the corner on building its brand, we hope, and it is on its way on a good trajectory.

是的，聽著，去年行銷支出的成長以及今年（到目前為止）行銷支出的成長主要來自電視廣告。我們在全國有線電視廣告方面獲得了非常積極的投資回報率，這促使我們選擇擴大投放範圍，而且它在吸引服務提供者和消費者方面都非常有效，因此我們對此感到滿意。我認為，我們大部分的商業策略都是如此，那就是差異化，打造優秀的產品，打造優秀的品牌。我們認為，這家企業在品牌建立方面已經取得了突破性進展，我們希望它能走上一條良好的發展道路。

Great, thank you.

太好了，謝謝。

Thanks. And thanks, everybody, for joining.

謝謝。感謝各位的參與。

This does conclude today's presentation. We thank you all for your participation.

今天的演講到此結束。感謝各位的參與。