Strategy Inc (MSTR) 2026 Q2 法說會逐字稿

Hello, everyone, and good evening. I'm C.J., Head of Investor Relations at Strategy. I'm excited to moderate Strategy's second quarter 2026 earnings rebore for you. We will start the call with a 60-minute presentation starting with Andrew Kang, followed by Phong Le and then Michael Saylor. This will be followed by a 30-minute interactive Q&A session with four Wall Street equity analysts and four Bitcoin analysts.

各位好，晚安。我是 C.J.，Strategy 投資人關係主管。我很高興為各位主持 Strategy 2026 年第二季財報電話會議。我們將以 60 分鐘的簡報開始本次會議，先由 Andrew Kang 開場，接著是 Phong Le，然後是 Michael Saylor。之後將進行 30 分鐘的互動式問答，與四位華爾街股票分析師及四位比特幣分析師交流。

Before we proceed, I will read the safe harbor statement. Some of the information we provide in this presentation regarding our future expectations, plans and prospects may constitute forward-looking statements. Actual results may differ materially from these forward-looking statements due to various important factors, including fluctuations in the price of Bitcoin and the risk factors discussed under the caption Risk Factors and Strategy's quarterly reports on Form 10-Q filed with the SEC on May 6, 2026, and the risks described in other filings that Strategy may make with the SEC. We assume no obligation to update these forward-looking statements, which speak only as of today.

在我們開始之前，我將宣讀安全港聲明。我們在本次簡報中提供的部分資訊，涉及我們對未來的預期、計畫與展望，可能構成前瞻性陳述。由於多項重要因素，實際結果可能與這些前瞻性陳述存在重大差異，包括比特幣價格波動，以及 Strategy 於 2026 年 5 月 6 日向美國證券交易委員會（SEC）提交的 Form 10-Q 季度報告中「風險因素」標題下所討論的風險因素，及 Strategy 可能向 SEC 提交之其他文件中所描述的風險。我們不承擔更新這些前瞻性陳述的義務；該等陳述僅截至今日為止有效。

With that, I will turn the call over to Andrew Kang, CFO of Strategy.

接下來，我將把電話會議交給 Strategy 的財務長 Andrew Kang。

Thank you, C.J., and thank you all for joining our call today. Moving on to the first slide, we now hold 843,775,000 Bitcoin, representing approximately 4% of all Bitcoin that will ever exist. Bitcoin per share is currently 203,683 sets, which remains one of the cleanest measures of how we create long-term value for our shareholders. Our market cap is approximately $38 billion, and year-to-date, we have raised $17 billion of capital across common equity and digital credit. That capital gives us the strength to continue building our overall Bitcoin holdings, manage our capital structure, meet our dividend and interest obligations and support the growth of our digital credit platform.

謝謝你，C.J.，也感謝各位今天加入我們的電話會議。進入第一張投影片，我們目前持有 843,775,000 枚比特幣，約占未來將存在之全部比特幣的 4%。目前每股比特幣為 203,683 sets，這仍是衡量我們如何為股東創造長期價值最清晰的指標之一。我們的市值約為 380 億美元；年初至今，我們透過普通股權與數位信貸共募集了 170 億美元資金。這些資金使我們有能力持續擴大整體比特幣持有量、管理資本結構、履行股利與利息義務，並支持我們數位信貸平台的成長。

On this slide, we show that we adopted Bitcoin as a treasury asset beginning in Q3 of 2020. We have accumulated more Bitcoin in every single quarter across 113 acquisitions. And today, we hold again, 843,775 Bitcoin with a Bitcoin reserve value of approximately $55 billion. Our total acquisition cost is approximately $64 billion, and our average purchase price is roughly $75,000 per Bitcoin.

在這張投影片中，我們展示自 2020 年第三季起採用比特幣作為庫藏資產。我們在每一個季度、透過 113 次收購，持續累積更多比特幣。而今天，我們再次重申，目前持有 843,775 枚比特幣，比特幣儲備價值約為 550 億美元。我們的總取得成本約為 640 億美元，平均買入價格約為每枚比特幣 75,000 美元。

Strategy is now the largest institutional holder of Bitcoin in the world. Our holdings are larger than the largest Bitcoin ETF shown here. They're larger than the estimated holdings of any nation state and larger than the major DFI custody balances. That scale matters, and it reinforces Strategy's unique position in the digital assets market. We are not just participating in institutional Bitcoin adoption, we are leading it, doing so as an operating company with access to the capital markets, a growing digital credit platform and a long-term objective of increasing Bitcoin per share for our shareholders.

Strategy 現在是全球最大的機構比特幣持有者。我們的持有量大於此處所示最大的比特幣 ETF。也大於任何主權國家估計的持有量，並且大於主要 DFI 的託管餘額。這樣的規模很重要，並強化了 Strategy 在數位資產市場中的獨特地位。我們不僅參與機構採用比特幣的趨勢，我們更在引領它；我們以一家可進入資本市場、擁有成長中的數位信貸平台，並以提升股東每股比特幣為長期目標的營運公司身分來推動此事。

Now turning to the balance sheet. Q2 reflected active execution across all of our operations and our capital structure. Digital assets ended the quarter at $49.7 billion, having acquired a net 83,901 Bitcoin during the quarter, with the total balance sheet holdings now slightly lower due to the lower price of Bitcoin as of the end of Q2.

接著看資產負債表。第二季反映我們在所有營運與資本結構方面的積極執行。數位資產於季末為 497 億美元；本季淨買入 83,901 枚比特幣，但由於第二季末比特幣價格較低，資產負債表上的總持有價值目前略低。

Cash and short-term investments increased to $2.4 billion as of the quarter end and now even further to $3.75 billion current quarter-to-date. Now we hold over two years of dividend and interest coverage and also reflects our goal of continuing to replenish the USD reserve to support our digital credit instruments.

截至季末，現金與短期投資增加至 24 億美元；而在本季迄今更進一步增加至 37.5 億美元。目前我們持有超過兩年的股利與利息保障，亦反映我們持續補充美元儲備、以支持數位信貸工具的目標。

Long-term debt declined from $8.2 billion to $6.7 billion, driven by the $1.5 billion repurchase of convertible debt, which we executed at an 8% discount in Q2. And preferred equity increased from $9 billion to $14.4 billion, driven by the strong issuance of STRC during Q2. We began the quarter with just over 762,000 Bitcoin with a market value of $51.6 billion.

長期負債由 82 億美元降至 67 億美元，主要因我們在第二季以 8% 折價回購 15 億美元可轉換債。而優先股權由 90 億美元增至 144 億美元，主要受第二季 STRC 強勁發行所帶動。我們在本季初持有略高於 762,000 枚比特幣，市值為 516 億美元。

During that quarter, we accumulated more Bitcoin adding a net 83,901 bitcoin at an average price of approximately $75,500. At quarter end, we held 846,000 Bitcoin and the quarter-end Bitcoin price was approximately $58,700, resulting in a Q2 unrealized fair value loss of approximately $8.3 billion.

在該季度期間，我們持續累積更多比特幣，淨增加 83,901 枚比特幣，平均價格約為 75,500 美元。季末我們持有 846,000 枚比特幣；季末比特幣價格約為 58,700 美元，因此第二季未實現公允價值損失約為 83 億美元。

After quarter end, we have seen a recovery in the market value of our Bitcoin holdings. Quarter-to-date through July 27, we did sell 2,225 Bitcoin for approximately $135 million. And with Bitcoin price increasing to approximately $65,000 per Bitcoin, we currently would reflect an estimated fair value gain of about $5.2 billion on our total holdings. Our digital asset balance sheet will have increased to approximately $54.8 billion.

季末之後，我們看到比特幣持有部位的市值回升。本季迄今截至 7 月 27 日，我們出售了 2,225 枚比特幣，約取得 1.35 億美元。隨著比特幣價格上升至每枚約 65,000 美元，我們目前的總持有部位將反映估計約 52 億美元的公允價值收益。我們的數位資產資產負債表金額將增加至約 548 億美元。

As of July 27, our total reserve, which includes our BTC reserve and our US dollar cash reserve was $58.5 billion with a net reserve of approximately $36.3 billion, which nets out our out-of-the-money convertible debt and preferred equity balances. Here, amplification calculated as our BTC reserve of approximately $58 billion divided by net reserves of $36 billion is over 1.5 times. Amplification represents our total Bitcoin as a multiple of reserves remaining after taking into account our debt and preferred claims.

截至 7 月 27 日，我們的總儲備（包含 BTC 儲備與美元現金儲備）為 585 億美元；淨儲備約為 363 億美元，已扣除價外可轉換債與優先股權餘額。此處所計算的放大倍數為：BTC 儲備約 580 億美元除以淨儲備 360 億美元，超過 1.5 倍。放大倍數代表在考量債務與優先權利後，我們的比特幣總持有量相對於剩餘儲備的倍數。

We have $15.4 billion of preferred equity outstanding and $6.7 billion of convertible debt outstanding and a low net leverage of 5.4%, which reflects our debt, less our cash reserves divided by our BTC reserve. At a current Bitcoin price of roughly $65,000 or approximately $55 billion of Bitcoin reserves provides an 18.5 times BTC rating against our net debt of about $3 billion.

我們目前有 154 億美元的優先股權在外流通，以及 67 億美元的可轉換債在外流通；淨槓桿比率為 5.4%，其計算為負債減現金儲備後，再除以 BTC 儲備。以目前比特幣價格約 65,000 美元計算，約 550 億美元的比特幣儲備，對我們約 30 億美元的淨負債提供 18.5 倍的 BTC 覆蓋倍數（BTC rating）。

In an extreme stress case, as you can see here in the middle of the slide, even with a 95% Bitcoin price decline to roughly $4,000 per Bitcoin, our converts would remain fully covered at a 1.0 times BTC rating. Over time, our plan remains to equitize, repay or refinance existing convertible debt while continuing to maintain strong collateral coverage. And as we demonstrated in Q2, we believe the market remains open to all of these options. We plan to remain patient, monitor the market conditions, and continue to focus on the overall liability management of our outstanding debt.

在極端壓力情境下，如投影片中間所示，即使比特幣價格下跌 95% 至每枚約 4,000 美元，我們的可轉換債仍可在 1.0 倍 BTC 覆蓋倍數下獲得完全保障。隨著時間推進，我們的計畫仍是將既有可轉換債股權化、償還或再融資，同時持續維持強勁的擔保覆蓋。正如我們在第二季所展示的，我們相信市場對上述所有選項仍然開放。我們將保持耐心、監測市場狀況，並持續專注於對未償債務的整體負債管理。

Turning to the Q2 financial results. We reported an operating loss of $8.3 billion, a net loss of $8.6 billion and an EPS of negative $24.45 per share. These results were driven by the quarter-end noncash fair value mark-to-market of our Bitcoin holdings. Our focus remains on the long-term drivers we can control, which include capital allocation, balance sheet strength, the strengthening of our digital credit instruments, and increasing Bitcoin per share over the long term. And I mentioned earlier, quarter-to-date with Bitcoin price having increased to closer to $65,000, our current fair value mark-to-market of our holdings would reflect about a $5.2 billion gain.

接著看第二季財務結果。我們報告營業損失 83 億美元、淨損失 86 億美元，每股盈餘（EPS）為負 24.45 美元。這些結果主要由於季末對我們比特幣持有部位進行非現金的公允價值按市價評價（mark-to-market）。我們仍聚焦於可控的長期驅動因素，包括資本配置、資產負債表強度、強化我們的數位信貸工具，以及長期提升每股比特幣。如我先前提到，本季迄今隨著比特幣價格上升至接近 65,000 美元，我們目前對持有部位的公允價值按市價評價將反映約 52 億美元的收益。

Turning to our Bitcoin KPIs. As of July 26, bitcoin per share was 203,683 sets compared to 191,904 sets in July of 2025, which is an increase of about 6% year over year. Year-to-date BTC yield is currently 4.5% compared to about 22.8% for the full year 2025. BTC gain is approximately 30,000 Bitcoin year to date, which is about 30% of last year's full year gain. And in dollar terms, BTC dollar gain is approximately $2 billion year to date compared to about $8.9 billion for the full year 2025. Despite the significant drawdown in BTC price year over year, we continue to execute positive performance across all of our core KPIs.

接著談我們的比特幣 KPI。截至 7 月 26 日，每股比特幣為 203,683 Sats，相較於 2025 年 7 月的 191,904 Sats，年增約 6%。年初至今 BTC 殖利率目前為 4.5%，相較於 2025 全年約 22.8%。年初至今 BTC 增益約 30,000 枚比特幣，約為去年全年增益的 30%。以美元計，年初至今 BTC 美元增益約 20 億美元，相較於 2025 全年約 89 億美元。儘管 BTC 價格較去年同期出現顯著回撤，我們仍持續在所有核心 KPI 上展現正向表現。

Since 2020, our Bitcoin per share has increased from approximately 46,000 Sats to 20 on which is more than a four times increase over that period. And in 2006, we have delivered, as I mentioned, 4.5% BTC yield year to date. As you can see here, historical annual BTC performance does move sort of in conjunction with Bitcoin price. And Bitcoin, bear markets like we saw in '22 and '23, BTC yield was lower than the bull market years of '24 and '25.

自 2020 年以來，我們的每股比特幣已從約 46,000 Sats 增加到 20（此處數值如原文所示），在此期間增幅超過四倍。而在 2006 年，我們如我所提到的，年初至今已達成 4.5% 的 BTC 殖利率。如你在此所見，歷史年度 BTC 表現確實會某種程度上與比特幣價格同步變動。而在比特幣熊市（如我們在 22 年與 23 年所見），BTC 殖利率低於 24 年與 25 年的牛市年度。

That being said, BTC yield this year does have the potential to outperform the prior bear market if BTC price improves and through the support and strengthening of our digital credit instruments.

話雖如此，若 BTC 價格改善，並且在我們的數位信用工具的支撐與強化之下，今年的 BTC 殖利率仍有機會優於先前的熊市表現。

On this slide, we show here in Q2, within Q2, Bitcoin per share increased approximately -- from approximately 201,170 Sats at the end of Q1 to approximately 210,824 Sats at the end of Q2. Despite the lower price of Bitcoin and the overall market volatility in Q2, the quarter's BTC yield of 5% outperformed the Q1 BTC yield of 3.2%. So we are continuing to make good progress.

在這張投影片中，我們顯示於 Q2 期間，每股比特幣約增加——從 Q1 期末約 201,170 Sats 增至 Q2 期末約 210,824 Sats。儘管 Q2 比特幣價格較低且整體市場波動加劇，本季 5% 的 BTC 殖利率仍優於 Q1 的 3.2%。因此我們持續取得良好進展。

And lastly, I will end with a quick snapshot on the most recent view from our equity analysts. We added two new covering analysts from Barclays and Seabrook for a total coverage of now 16. Across the firms shown here the average analyst Bitcoin price target for those that have one is approximately $98,000. The average MSTR price target is approximately $296 and all with corresponding buy ratings.

最後，我將以我們股票分析師最新觀點的快速摘要作結。我們新增兩位覆蓋分析師，分別來自 Barclays 與 Seabrook，使目前總覆蓋數達到 16 位。在此所示的各家機構中，對於有提供目標價者，其分析師平均比特幣目標價約為 98,000 美元。MSTR 的平均目標價約為 296 美元，且皆對應買入評等。

While we do not endorse any third-party forecast, it's important to note that the banks are increasing their engagement with Bitcoin with digital capital and with the focus on strategies role within that market. I think the growth also reflects the deep and growing demand from investors as well for independent institutional views on Bitcoin strategy and digital credit and it helps deepen investor understanding of our business model, our capital structure and the long-term value we are pursuing for our shareholders.

雖然我們不為任何第三方預測背書，但值得注意的是，銀行正透過數位資本、並聚焦於策略在該市場中的角色，來提高其對比特幣的參與度。我認為這樣的成長也反映出投資人對於比特幣策略與數位信用的獨立機構觀點有著深且持續增加的需求，並有助於加深投資人對我們商業模式、資本結構以及我們為股東追求之長期價值的理解。

So with that, I thank you all for your time, and I will turn it over to Phong for his remarks.

那麼，我感謝各位撥冗，我將把時間交給 Phong 發表他的談話。

Thank you, Andrew. Thank you, everyone, for joining us this evening. I'm going to provide an update on our capital market strategy and our capital markets programs. And before I go into some of those details, I do also want to recap Q2 2026. We acknowledge that it was an up and down quarter for Bitcoin, and our common equity in our preferred have gone down in that period of time.

謝謝你，Andrew。也謝謝各位今晚加入我們。我將就我們的資本市場策略以及資本市場計畫提供最新進展。在我進入部分細節之前，我也想回顧一下 2026 年第二季。我們承認，比特幣在該季度走勢起伏，而我們的普通股與優先股在這段期間也下跌了。

But if I look at the key metrics that we look at for performance and health of the business, things are, generally speaking, positive. Our Bitcoin holdings over the course of the quarter increased 11% from 762,099 Bitcoin to 846,000 Bitcoin. We reduced our debt outstanding from $8.2 billion to $6.7 billion, and on a net debt basis, we reduced it even more. This was down 18%.

但若我看我們用來衡量績效與企業健康狀況的關鍵指標，整體而言是正向的。我們的比特幣持有量在本季增加 11%，從 762,099 枚比特幣增至 846,000 枚比特幣。我們將未償債務從 82 億美元降至 67 億美元；以淨負債口徑來看，降幅更大。這下降了 18%。

Our US dollar reserve is up from $2.1 billion to $2.4 billion at the end of Q2. And as Andrew noted, we're now at $3.75 billion. That's a 12% increase quarter over quarter. And our Bitcoin per share, potentially most important of our metrics, went from 201,170 Sats to 210,824 Sats, so a 5% increase. So many of these metrics show health in the overall business.

我們的美元準備金從 21 億美元增加到 Q2 期末的 24 億美元。而如 Andrew 所指出，我們目前已達 37.5 億美元。這是季增 12%。而我們的每股比特幣——可能是我們最重要的指標——從 201,170 Sats 增至 210,824 Sats，增幅為 5%。因此，許多指標都顯示整體業務的健康狀況。

How are we able to do that? Three months ago in our earnings call, we said that we were adding engines to the strategy playbook, if you will. We went from one way capital issuance, buying Bitcoin through active issuance of MSTR of our preferreds and our convertibles to, what we call, active capital management. We're able to sell MSTR to buy bitcoin US dollar debt press.

我們是如何做到的？三個月前在法說會上，我們表示我們正在為策略手冊（如果你願意這麼說）加入引擎。我們從單一路徑的資本發行——透過主動發行 MSTR 的優先股與可轉債來買入比特幣——轉向我們所稱的「主動資本管理」。我們能夠賣出 MSTR 來買入比特幣、美元債務 press（此處用語如原文所示）。

We were able to sell our press to buy Bitcoin US dollar debt MSTR we're also able to sell our Bitcoin to buy US dollars by debt by MSTR. And we were able to use those US dollars to pay off dividends and to strengthen our balance sheet.

我們能夠賣出我們的 press 來買入比特幣、美元債務、MSTR；我們也能夠賣出我們的比特幣來換取美元，並透過債務、透過 MSTR（此處語序如原文所示）。而我們也能使用這些美元來支付股利並強化資產負債表。

We continue to be net buyers of Bitcoin and net issuers of stretch. We want to be the largest buyer of bitcoin in the world and the biggest issuer of digital credit in the world. And year-to-date, 2026, we have proven to be just that.

我們仍持續淨買入比特幣，並淨發行 Stretch。我們希望成為全球最大的比特幣買家，以及全球最大的數位信用發行人。而在 2026 年年初至今，我們已證明我們正是如此。

We bought 174,895 Bitcoin year-to-date 2026. We sold 3,620 Bitcoin during that same period of time. We bought 48x more Bitcoin than we sold, and we increased our decline 25% since the beginning of 2026 until now. When it comes to digital credit and stretch, we issued $7.52 billion of digital credit. We repurchased year to date $25 million. We issued 300x more digital credit than we repurchased, and we increased Stretch's notional 250% since the beginning of the year. So I think we are carrying through on our stated objective to be the largest net buyer of Bitcoin in the world and the largest issuer -- net issuer of digital credit in the world.

2026 年年初至今，我們買入 174,895 枚比特幣。在同一期間，我們賣出 3,620 枚比特幣。我們買入的比特幣是賣出的 48 倍，且自 2026 年初至今，我們將我們的 decline 提高了 25%（此處用語如原文所示）。在數位信用與 Stretch 方面，我們發行了 75.2 億美元的數位信用。年初至今我們回購了 2,500 萬美元。我們發行的數位信用是回購的 300 倍，且自年初以來 Stretch 的名目金額增加了 250%。因此我認為，我們正在落實我們所宣示的目標：成為全球最大的比特幣淨買家，以及全球最大的數位信用淨發行人。

Another way to think about our robust access to the capital markets is to look at what we've done year-to-date 2026. So through seven months in 2026, we've now issued $17 billion of capital. As you can see here, that's approaching what we did in 2025, primarily used to buy Bitcoin. And you'll also see the percentage of capital that we issued that was digital credit, specifically primarily Stretch, was 44% of the total capital we issued versus 28% last year.

另一種理解我們強勁資本市場取得能力的方式，是看我們在 2026 年年初至今所做的事。因此在 2026 年的前七個月，我們已發行 170 億美元的資本。如你在此所見，這已接近我們在 2025 年所做的規模，且主要用於買入比特幣。你也會看到，我們所發行資本中屬於數位信用的比例——特別是以 Stretch 為主——占我們發行總資本的 44%，相較去年為 28%。

If you look at the same information on a quarter-to-quarter basis, Q2, we issued more capital than we did in Q1 of last year -- of Q1 of this year. And also we issued more capital in Q2 2026, and we did raise more capital in 2026 than we did in any quarter of last year. So $8.4 billion total, of which $5.5 billion is digital credit.

如果以逐季來看同樣資訊，Q2 我們發行的資本多於去年 Q1——也就是今年的 Q1。此外，我們在 2026 年第二季發行的資本也更多，而我們在 2026 年籌集的資本高於去年任何一個季度。總計 84 億美元，其中 55 億美元為數位信用。

Q3 2026, right? So this is the month of July of this year. We've issued about $1.3 billion of common equity. And of course, we want to see preferred equity added to that stack too. And so I'll talk a little bit more about why that's important. We talked about the flywheel in the past, but our overall objective is to double the coin per share in seven years through digital credit.

2026 年第 3 季，對吧？所以這是今年的 7 月。我們已發行約 13 億美元的普通股權。當然，我們也希望在那個資本結構中加入優先股權。因此我會再多談一點為什麼這很重要。我們過去談過飛輪效應，但我們的整體目標是透過數位信貸，在七年內將每股 coin 翻倍。

And why is this important? We want digital credit to work because we're able to sell digital credit to buy Bitcoin that generates amplification to the company. That would increase our Bitcoin per share for the company, especially as Bitcoin increases. And it allows the company ultimately to do what we have been doing and what we intend to do, which is to outperform Bitcoin, right?

那為什麼這很重要？我們希望數位信貸能運作，因為我們能夠出售數位信貸來買入比特幣，進而為公司帶來放大效應。這將提升公司的每股比特幣，尤其是在比特幣上漲時。而且最終也讓公司能夠做我們一直在做、也打算繼續做的事，也就是跑贏比特幣，對吧？

What are the inputs that can help us flex these levers, decreasing our cost of credit? And we'll talk about that in a little bit. Higher digital credit sales, this is selling more Stretch; and a higher mNAV through accretion of our common equity, MSTR.

有哪些投入可以幫助我們靈活運用這些槓桿、降低我們的信貸成本？我們稍後會談到。更高的數位信貸銷售，也就是賣出更多 Stretch；以及透過我們普通股權 MSTR 的增厚（accretion）來提高 mNAV。

So let me talk about the digital credit capital framework and how do we get this flywheel working even better than it has in the past. I'll start with our corporate objective.

所以讓我談談數位信貸的資本框架，以及我們如何讓這個飛輪比過去運作得更好。我先從我們的公司目標開始。

It's for Stretch to trade at $99 to $100 over time. We recognize that that has not occurred over the course of the last month. Stretch is now trading at about $89.50. Our goal is to get this back to $99 to $100 because that helps our digital credit engine work and it helps us increase Bitcoin per share, and ultimately, accrue value to our common shareholders.

我們的目標是讓 Stretch 長期交易在 99 到 100 美元。我們也承認，在過去一個月的期間並未發生這種情況。Stretch 目前約交易在 89.50 美元。我們的目標是把它拉回 99 到 100 美元，因為這有助於我們的數位信貸引擎運作，並幫助我們提高每股比特幣，最終為普通股股東累積價值。

So about a month ago, we issued five pillars that are going to strengthen Stretch and strengthen digital credit. The first major pillar is the US dollar reserve. We recognize the importance of the US dollar reserve to our digital credit shareholders. We had decreased that over time in the month of June, and we realize that it's important to keep it strong. And so, we've increased it now to $3.75 billion, which is about 2.1 years' worth of dividend and interest coverage, and we're going to keep one year a minimum. And I'll talk a little bit more about that in a minute.

大約一個月前，我們提出了五大支柱，用來強化 Stretch 並強化數位信貸。第一個主要支柱是美元準備金。我們認知到美元準備金對我們的數位信貸股東的重要性。我們在 6 月期間隨時間降低了該準備金，而我們也意識到維持其強度很重要。因此，我們現在已將其提高到 37.5 億美元，約可覆蓋 2.1 年的股利與利息支出，而且我們將至少維持 1 年的最低水準。我稍後會再多談一點。

Bitcoin monetization, selling Bitcoin for three purposes; one, to fund US dollar reserves; two, to fund dividends and interest expenses; and three, to support our repurchase programs. And those are our third and our fourth pillar, the ability to repurchase digital credit up to $1 billion. We repurchased $25 million so far year to date, and to repurchase MSTR up to $1 billion. And the fifth and last pillar is to manage our Stretch dividend in a way that it's thoughtful and supports the price of Stretch, while also reducing our dividend burden, and we can review that monthly.

比特幣變現：出售比特幣有三個目的；第一，為美元準備金提供資金；第二，為股利與利息費用提供資金；第三，支持我們的回購計畫。而這分別對應到我們的第三與第四支柱：回購最多 10 億美元的數位信貸。截至今年目前為止我們已回購 2,500 萬美元，並且回購最多 10 億美元的 MSTR。第五也是最後一個支柱，是以審慎的方式管理我們的 Stretch 股利，使其支持 Stretch 的價格，同時降低我們的股利負擔，而且我們可以每月檢視。

The good news is we built now an all-time high US dollar reserve, right? So we started at the beginning of the year in January at $2.25 billion. We drew that down to pay down $1.5 billion notional of our 2029 converts to $871 million. We recognized that, that was not the right level to support Stretch and to support our digital credit, and therefore, in a pretty short order, we've built it up in about two months back to $3.75 billion.

好消息是，我們現在建立了歷史新高的美元準備金，對吧？所以我們在今年年初 1 月時是 22.5 億美元。我們把它動用來償還 2029 年可轉債名目本金 15 億美元，將其降至 8.71 億美元。我們意識到那個水準不足以支持 Stretch、也不足以支持我們的數位信貸，因此在相當短的時間內，我們在大約兩個月內把它重新建立回 37.5 億美元。

Few things I'll note. One is that is the highest our US dollar reserve has ever been. And two, that on a duration basis, which is how many years of dividend interest expense coverage we have, our high in January is 2.7 years, our low end of May was 0.5 years. We're now back to 2.1 years, and our target is to be somewhere between two and three years.

我想指出幾點。第一，這是我們美元準備金歷來最高水準。第二，以存續期間（duration）的角度，也就是我們能覆蓋股利與利息費用的年數來看，我們在 1 月的高點是 2.7 年，5 月的低點是 0.5 年。我們現在回到 2.1 年，而我們的目標是介於 2 到 3 年之間。

I talked about our Bitcoin monetization program, right? Our intent is to sell Bitcoin for three reasons when we think it's appropriate for the company: one, fund the US dollar reserve up to $1.25 billion. That would take our US dollar reserve up to $5 billion if we were to do that fully using Bitcoin, which will take us up close to three years. Two, fund dividend interest payments of $1.6 billion currently annually. And we used the Bitcoin sales to fund some dividend payments in the last month or so. And three, is to fund up to $2 billion in our repurchase program.

我談到我們的比特幣變現計畫，對吧？我們的意圖是在我們認為對公司合適時，基於三個原因出售比特幣：第一，為美元準備金提供最多 12.5 億美元資金。如果我們完全透過比特幣來執行，美元準備金將提高到 50 億美元，這會讓我們接近 3 年的覆蓋水準。第二，為目前每年 16 億美元的股利與利息支付提供資金。而在過去一個月左右，我們使用比特幣出售所得來支付部分股利。第三，為我們最多 20 億美元的回購計畫提供資金。

So let's talk a little bit about more about the core monetization of Bitcoin sales. This is a subject of much discussion during the month of May and June. So I thought I would provide some more clarity on to why we did it, and what we believe the result to Bitcoin was when we did this.

所以讓我們再多談一點比特幣出售的核心變現。這是在 5 月與 6 月期間被大量討論的主題。因此我想更清楚地說明我們為什麼這麼做，以及我們認為在我們這麼做時，對比特幣造成了什麼結果。

First, our first Bitcoin sale in the week ending May 31 was 32 Bitcoin. That was 0.004% of all of our Bitcoin holdings. And why did we do it? We did it to inoculate the market and test our processes. The average cost basis of that Bitcoin was cost $125,464, which came to a $4 million total cost basis with the proceeds of $2 million and an average sale price of $77,135. We took about a $1 million realized loss in that and that gives us a potential tax asset, assuming 25% -- 29% corporate tax rate of about $400,000.

第一，我們在截至 5 月 31 日的那一週進行了第一次比特幣出售，賣出 32 枚比特幣。那只占我們全部比特幣持有量的 0.004%。那我們為什麼要這麼做？我們這麼做是為了讓市場先行適應並測試我們的流程。那批比特幣的平均成本基礎為 125,464 美元，合計成本基礎約 400 萬美元；出售所得為 200 萬美元，平均售價為 77,135 美元。我們在這筆交易中實現約 100 萬美元的損失，這使我們在假設 25%—29% 的公司稅率下，可能形成約 40 萬美元的稅務資產。

Our second Bitcoin sale was about a month later, in the weekend, July 5. We sold 3,588 Bitcoin, about 0.4% of our bitcoin holdings, so about 100x more than what we sold the month before. Why do we do that? We did that to fund our press dividends that were due June 30, 2026. The average cost basis of that Bitcoin $116,000, which came to $418 million. The sale price of $60,000. And so, our proceeds are $216 million, which we used again to fund our dividends on our preferreds at the end of June. And we took a realized loss of $203 million, which allowed us to potentially book a tax loss of $59 million.

我們第二次比特幣出售大約在一個月後，也就是 7 月 5 日那個週末。我們賣出 3,588 枚比特幣，約占我們比特幣持有量的 0.4%，大約是前一個月出售量的 100 倍。我們為什麼要這麼做？我們這麼做是為了支付於 2026 年 6 月 30 日到期的優先股股利。那批比特幣的平均成本基礎為 116,000 美元，合計約 4.18 億美元。出售價格為 60,000 美元。因此，我們的出售所得為 2.16 億美元，我們再次用它來支付 6 月底優先股的股利。我們實現了 2.03 億美元的損失，這使我們可能認列 5,900 萬美元的稅務損失。

If you see here, we have 843,000 Bitcoin. And you can see the size of the bars of our Bitcoin sales are almost not noticeable compared to our total Bitcoin holdings. Of course, then the question is -- sorry, and so the next topic I'll get into is what is our overall potential tax benefit?

如你在這裡看到的，我們有 843,000 枚比特幣。你可以看到，相較於我們的比特幣總持有量，我們出售比特幣的柱狀規模幾乎不明顯。當然，接下來的問題是——抱歉——所以我接下來要談的主題是：我們整體潛在的稅務利益是什麼？

We showed this slide last quarter. Of all of our Bitcoin, we have about $18.5 billion in unrealized losses, which equals a potential benefit of $5.4 billion on our taxes. So selling high-cost base is Bitcoin at a low price gives us the potential to take tax losses that can then offset future capital gains.

我們在上個季度展示過這張投影片。就我們全部的比特幣而言，我們約有 185 億美元的未實現損失，這相當於在稅務上可能帶來 54 億美元的潛在利益。因此，以低價格出售高成本基礎的比特幣，讓我們有機會取得可用於抵減未來資本利得的稅務損失。

So did our Bitcoin sales have an effect of Bitcoin price, right? We have two data points, so I don't think we can make a definitive statement, but I thought it would be useful to look at these two data points in a little bit more detail. Our 32 Bitcoin sale was about $2 million that week. And what happened after we sold the $2 million of Bitcoin?

那麼，我們的比特幣出售是否對比特幣價格產生了影響，對吧？我們只有兩個數據點，所以我不認為我們能做出明確的結論，但我覺得更深入地看看這兩個數據點會很有幫助。我們出售的 32 枚比特幣在那一週約為 200 萬美元。那在我們賣出這 200 萬美元的比特幣之後發生了什麼？

Well, in the week that we sold the $2 million, but coin price went down 4%. The week after we announced the $2 million sale, Bitcoin went down 11%. And as a reminder, that was 0.001% of the liquidity at Bitcoin that week. So we were 0.001% of the Bitcoin trading volume when we made those sales, right? One month later, we sold about 100x more Bitcoin. And the week that we sold 100x more Bitcoin, Bitcoin price went up 6%. The week after we announced it, Bitcoin price went down 1%, and we were at 0.104% of the liquidity of Bitcoin in the week we sold.

嗯，在我們賣出 200 萬美元的那一週，比特幣價格下跌了 4%。在我們宣布這筆 200 萬美元出售的下一週，比特幣下跌了 11%。提醒一下，那一週這只占比特幣流動性的 0.001%。所以我們在進行那些出售時，只占當週比特幣交易量的 0.001%，對吧？一個月後，我們賣出了約 100 倍更多的比特幣。而在我們賣出多 100 倍比特幣的那一週，比特幣價格上漲了 6%。在我們宣布之後的下一週，比特幣價格下跌了 1%，而我們在出售當週占比特幣流動性的 0.104%。

Did we have an impact on the price? Based on the liquidity, I would think not. Based on sentiment, perhaps, we'll continue to study this, but we thought it would be useful to share a couple of the data points. Another way to look at this, the bigger question we sometimes ask, is Strategy propping up Bitcoin price with our purchases, Strategy moving down Bitcoin price with our sales, does Bitcoin need Strategy. And I think we've said many times, Strategy needs Bitcoin.

我們對價格有影響嗎？就流動性而言，我認為沒有。就市場情緒而言，也許有；我們會繼續研究，但我們認為分享幾個數據點會很有用。另一種看法是，我們有時會問更大的問題：Strategy 是否透過購買在支撐比特幣價格、Strategy 是否透過出售在壓低比特幣價格、比特幣是否需要 Strategy。我想我們已經說過很多次：Strategy 需要比特幣。

So how I look at this. As an example, average Bitcoin liquidity has been about $26 billion of trading on a daily basis. If we look at the week where we bought the most Bitcoin in the history of the company, our average daily purchase was $363 million. That's the max, right? In that particular week, we were 1.42% of the trading volume of Bitcoin.

所以我怎麼看這件事。舉例來說，比特幣的平均流動性大約是每日 260 億美元的交易量。如果我們看公司歷史上買入比特幣最多的那一週，我們的平均每日買入金額是 3.63 億美元。那就是最大值，對吧？在那一特定週，我們占比特幣交易量的 1.42%。

If you look at the last 12 months, we would average about $56 million of Bitcoin purchases a day, which sounds like a lot. It is a lot, but as a percentage of the $26 billion of daily liquidity, we were 0.22% of the trading volume of Bitcoin. Bitcoin is extremely liquid. We are a large purchaser. But looking at these numbers, I would say we were not a material purchaser of Bitcoin.

如果看過去 12 個月，我們平均每天會買入約 5,600 萬美元的比特幣，聽起來很多。確實很多，但相對於每日 260 億美元的流動性，我們只占比特幣交易量的 0.22%。比特幣的流動性極高。我們是大型買方。但從這些數字來看，我會說我們並不是對比特幣而言具有重大影響的買方。

What about when we sell, right? The most we sold so far is $19 million a day. And in that particular week, that would mean that we were 0.08% of the trading volume of Bitcoin. And that's a pretty small number. And if we were to sell to satisfy our $1.7 billion dividend obligations, that would average to about $5 million a day, and that would be 0.02% of Bitcoin liquidity. All right. So my takeaway from this is we are a heavy participant in the Bitcoin market when we buy, but still, not a material amount of the overall Bitcoin markets. And we are a very, very small participant in the Bitcoin market when we sell.

那我們賣出時呢，對吧？到目前為止我們賣得最多的是每天 1,900 萬美元。在那一特定週，這意味著我們占比特幣交易量的 0.08%。而這是個相當小的數字。如果我們為了滿足 17 億美元的股利義務而出售，平均大約是每天 500 萬美元，這將占比特幣流動性的 0.02%。好。所以我從中得到的結論是：我們在買入時是比特幣市場的重要參與者，但即便如此，相對於整體比特幣市場仍不是一個重大的量。而在賣出時，我們在比特幣市場中是非常、非常小的參與者。

That could be other pillars. So repurchasing up to $2 billion of our securities, right? So this is $1 billion of our digital securities. We have a reach purchase program now authorized. $13 billion is our market cap right now of our digital credit. $1 billion has been authorized. We said we'll prioritize Stretch right now.

那也可能是其他支柱。例如回購最多 20 億美元的我們的證券，對吧？也就是我們的數位證券 10 億美元。我們現在已獲授權一項回購計畫。我們的數位信用目前市值是 130 億美元；其中 10 億美元已獲授權。我們表示目前會優先處理 Stretch。

When would we buy Stretch, when it's trading at a discount to par? How much of a discount is subject to management discretion. Why might we buy it? We might buy to reduce our annual dividend, or we might buy to strengthen the quality of digital credit. And we might buy to capture net EPS accretion, right?

我們何時會買入 Stretch？當它以低於面值（par）的折價交易時。折價幅度多大由管理層酌情決定。我們為什麼可能買入它？我們可能為了降低我們的年度股利，或是為了強化數位信用的品質而買入。我們也可能為了取得淨 EPS 增厚（accetion）而買入，對吧？

On MSTR, it's about $38 billion in market cap. We have an authorization to buy back up to $1 billion. We have not used it yet. Why might we buy? Or when might we buy it? We might buy it when it's trading at a discount to net equine per share, which we have not seen that occur on a sustained basis yet this year. Why might we do it? Because we think it would create long-term value by capturing that EPS accretion.

至於 MSTR，市值大約 380 億美元。我們已獲授權最多回購 10 億美元。我們尚未使用。我們為什麼可能買？或我們何時可能買？當它以低於每股淨資產價值（net equity per share）的折價交易時，我們可能會買入；但今年迄今我們尚未看到這種情況持續發生。我們為什麼要這麼做？因為我們認為透過取得那個 EPS 增厚，能創造長期價值。

How would we do this? We can buy in the open market, we could buy via block trades, tenders, exchange offers. And what's the time frame that we might do this? We have no obligation, no expiration, we can modify suspend or terminate this program at any point in time.

我們會怎麼做？我們可以在公開市場買入，也可以透過大宗交易（block trades）、要約收購（tenders）、交換要約（exchange offers）來買入。那我們可能在什麼時間範圍內做這件事？我們沒有義務、沒有到期日，我們可以在任何時間修改、暫停或終止這個計畫。

So how do we get Stretch back to par? That is the focus of the company, that's the focus of the leadership and the management team, right? To climb Stretch back to $99 to $100, we can adjust the US dollar reserve. You've seen us actively do that. We can maintain the Stretch rate. We're not planning on decreasing the Stretch rate to bring it back to power, and we found that increasing the Stretch rate is not really an effective way to bring it back to par. So our current plan is to keep the rate right at 12%. And of course, we can buy back Stretch, which we've seen us start to do.

那麼我們要如何讓 Stretch 回到面值（par）？這是公司的重點，也是領導層與管理團隊的重點，對吧？要把 Stretch 拉回到 99 到 100 美元，我們可以調整美元準備金。你們已經看到我們積極這麼做。我們可以維持 Stretch 利率。我們不打算透過降低 Stretch 利率來讓它回到面值，而且我們發現提高 Stretch 利率並不是讓它回到面值的有效方式。所以我們目前的計畫是把利率維持在 12%。當然，我們也可以回購 Stretch，而你們也看到我們已開始這麼做。

When we get back to par, we've learned a lot. We learned a lot about how Stretch trades. We learned a lot about the types of people buying Stretch. We learned a lot about the overall characteristics of digital credit leverage, what layer two players do on top of it. So what would we do?

當我們回到面值時，我們學到了很多。我們對 Stretch 的交易方式學到了很多。我們對購買 Stretch 的人群類型學到了很多。我們也對數位信用槓桿的整體特性、以及第二層（layer two）參與者在其上做了什麼學到了很多。那我們會怎麼做？

We can manage the ATM issuance, right? We could not issue necessarily as much as we have in the past. We could adjust the Stretch rate, in this case, down, right? If we see billions of dollars of demand for Stretch and we don't want to grow digital credit too quickly, we would adjust the rate down from 12% to 11% to 10% or whatever we see fit. We can manage the BTC reserve, meaning we could decide how much of our Stretch proceeds we put into Bitcoin.

我們可以管理 ATM 發行，對吧？我們不一定要像過去那樣發行那麼多。我們可以調整 Stretch 利率，在這種情況下是往下調，對吧？如果我們看到對 Stretch 有數十億美元的需求，而我們不想讓數位信用成長得太快，我們就會把利率從 12% 下調到 11%、10% 或任何我們認為合適的水準。我們可以管理 BTC 準備金，也就是我們可以決定把 Stretch 所得的多少投入比特幣。

Historically, we've put it all in the bitcoin, but we don't necessarily need to do that. We could put some of it into increase in the US dollar reserve. And of course, we can manage our overall capital structure. We can manage our convertible bonds. We can manage what else is in that capital structure, and then we can manage some of the policies, including the one that I've discussed.

歷史上我們把它全部投入比特幣，但我們不一定需要這麼做。我們可以把其中一部分用來增加美元準備金。當然，我們也可以管理我們的整體資本結構。我們可以管理我們的可轉換公司債。我們可以管理資本結構中的其他項目，然後我們也可以管理一些政策，包括我剛才討論的那一項。

The Stretch rate is adjusted by observing multiple signals, right? We have a 12% annualized dividend rate right now. And when we return to par, we'll look at things like trading levels, market yields, the Bitcoin market, the US dollar reserve coverage and the capital structure to determine what the right rate is.

Stretch 利率是透過觀察多個訊號來調整的，對吧？我們目前的年化股利率是 12%。而當我們回到面值時，我們會觀察例如交易水準、市場殖利率、比特幣市場、美元準備金覆蓋率以及資本結構等因素，以判斷什麼才是合適的利率。

And I want to reiterate our capital markets principles that we've shared in the past and there are six of them. One, we're going to continue to create long-term value for MSTR. That's the most important of our principles, and we're going to do that primarily by increase in Bitcoin per share.

我想再次重申我們過去分享過的資本市場原則，一共有六項。第一，我們將持續為 MSTR 創造長期價值。這是我們原則中最重要的一項，而我們主要會透過提高每股所對應的比特幣數量來達成。

How do we increase Bitcoin per share? We're going to do that by growing demand for Stretch, getting it back to par and observe the trading characteristics and learning from that. We're going to responsibly reduce the convertible market debt based on market conditions.

我們要如何提高每股比特幣？我們將透過提升對 Stretch 的需求、讓它回到面值，並觀察其交易特性、從中學習來做到這點。我們也會依市場狀況，負責任地降低可轉換債市場的債務。

We did that in Q2, right? And we would consider doing that on a go-forward basis. We'll monitor stretch demand and credit risk to determine the size of the US dollar reserve. I think we've learned from Q2 that keeping a robust two- to three-year US dollar reserve makes sense, and our minimum will be one year.

我們在第二季就這麼做了，對吧？而且未來我們也會考慮持續這麼做。我們會監控 Stretch 的需求與信用風險，以決定美元準備金的規模。我想我們從第二季學到的是，維持強健的 2 到 3 年期美元準備金是合理的，而我們的最低標準會是一年。

We'll adjust the amplification based on market conditions. The price of Bitcoin is a big factor to the amplification, and we'll sell Bitcoin when it's advantageous to the company, which we started to do, and you could expect that we may do that on a go-forward basis too.

我們會依市場狀況調整槓桿放大（amplification）。比特幣價格是影響槓桿放大的重要因素；當對公司有利時我們會出售比特幣——我們已經開始這麼做了——而你也可以預期，未來我們可能也會持續這麼做。

So with that, I'll pass it over to Michael Saylor.

那麼接下來，我把時間交給 Michael Saylor。

Thank you, Phong. I want to spend a moment talking about our credit products and our business model.

謝謝你，Phong。我想花點時間談談我們的信用產品與商業模式。

So let's start with digital capital. We use Bitcoin as digital capital, and we just upgraded our website, and we're making available a whole set of metrics for Bitcoin investors to track Bitcoin as the investment. So what you'll see here is on our website. We're now tracking the real-time Bitcoin price and the market cap, but we've also added the 200-week moving average. We view that as being something akin to the basis in Bitcoin or the book value at Bitcoin, and a lot of Bitcoin movements are anchored to it one way or the other. You'll see that we're actually calculating the premium to the 200-week moving average in real time on our website.

先從數位資本談起。我們把比特幣作為數位資本使用；我們剛剛升級了網站，並提供一整套指標，讓比特幣投資人追蹤比特幣作為投資標的的表現。你在我們網站上會看到這些內容。我們現在追蹤即時比特幣價格與市值，同時也新增了 200 週移動平均線。我們把它視為類似於比特幣的成本基礎（basis）或比特幣的帳面價值，而許多比特幣的波動會以某種方式圍繞它。你會看到我們在網站上即時計算相對於 200 週移動平均線的溢價。

And we've also added a pretty neat metric, time above. And what you'll see on our website is that Bitcoin right now, it's trading at a very slight premium to the 200-week moving average. And for about 91% of the history of the network, it is traded at a higher premium than that. And so I'd encourage anyone to go check out this website. It's pretty useful. We've got other metrics like Bitcoin dominance and hash rate, the fear and greed index.

我們也新增了一個相當不錯的指標：高於（time above）。你在我們網站上會看到，比特幣目前相對於 200 週移動平均線僅有非常小的溢價在交易。而在網路歷史約 91% 的時間裡，它的交易溢價都高於目前這個水準。因此我鼓勵大家去看看這個網站，它相當實用。我們還有其他指標，例如比特幣主導率與算力、恐懼與貪婪指數。

You can also see the net ETF flows. They were as high as minus $5 billion or so about a month ago. Now they're coming in. And so this is for people that really want to gauge the status of our capital base, BTC.

你也可以看到 ETF 的淨流量。大約一個月前它曾高達約負 50 億美元。現在則開始回流。因此，這些是提供給真正想衡量我們資本基礎（BTC）狀態的人使用的。

Now let's go to the next slide. And what you see here is that we're in a phase of weakness. We're sitting now resting right around the 200-week moving average. If you're a capital investor, I'd say you have to take a four-year time horizon. So the right price signal to look at is the 20-week moving average.

現在我們看下一張投影片。你會看到我們正處於一個疲弱階段。我們目前大致就在 200 週移動平均線附近盤整。如果你是資本投資人，我會說你必須採用四年的時間視角。因此，應該關注的正確價格訊號是 20 週移動平均線。

And you'll see it's a pretty up and to the right message and signal, but you can see the periods of exuberance around late 2021 there was a massive premium. Then you could see in the crypto winter, we felt a slight discount. And then you can see we traded back to a premium. Right now, we're sitting right on that moving average.

你會看到這是一個相當「向上且向右」的訊息與訊號，但你也能看到在 2021 年底的亢奮期，溢價非常巨大。接著在加密寒冬期間，我們感受到些微折價。然後你又會看到我們回到溢價交易。而現在，我們正好就在那條移動平均線上。

Now if we -- if we ask the question, what are the headwinds holding back Bitcoin? We really think there are five. There's an AI capital expansion, $1 trillion or more of capital that are flowing into the data center build-out, the AI center buildouts, with the SpaceX, the Google, the Mata, the Anthoopic, the OpenAI, and then of course, you're probably familiar with all of the Bitcoin miners and they're building out their data centers for AI and they're extremely capital intensive. That's created capital suction in the equity capital markets and also an attraction in the private credit markets where massive amounts of credit capital has been flowing. So that's a headwind. We think at some point, we'll get through the biggest phase of that buildout, and we'll settle into an equilibrium, and that headwind will become neutral attacking land or it will subside.

如果我們問：有哪些逆風在壓抑比特幣？我們認為主要有五項。其一是 AI 資本擴張：有 1 兆美元或更多資本正流入資料中心建置、AI 中心建置，包括 SpaceX、Google、Meta、Anthropic、OpenAI；當然，你也可能熟悉許多比特幣礦商，他們也在為 AI 擴建資料中心，而且資本密集度極高。這在股票資本市場造成資本吸走效應，也在私募信貸市場形成吸引力，大量信貸資本正在流入。因此這是一項逆風。我們認為在某個時間點，我們會度過這波建置的最大階段，並回到均衡；這項逆風將轉為中性，或會消退。

We also see trade tensions have been weighing on Bitcoin, all the foreign tariff wars and trade wars and uncertainty. The Gulf was disruption is a macro headwind, and it revs up in subsides, and things escalate. The Fed policy has tilted to becoming more restrictive over the past nine months. And we could see even as of yesterday, there were rumors that the Fed might raise rates and three of the Fed directors or governors actually voted to raise rates. So that restricted monetary policy from the Federal Reserve has been a headwind.

我們也看到貿易緊張正在壓抑比特幣，各種對外關稅戰、貿易戰與不確定性。海灣地區的干擾是一項總體逆風，它時而升溫、時而消退，局勢也可能升級。過去九個月，聯準會政策傾向變得更為緊縮。甚至就在昨天，市場還傳出聯準會可能升息的傳聞，而且有三位聯準會理事或總裁實際上投票支持升息。因此，聯準會的緊縮貨幣政策一直是一項逆風。

And then delays in regulatory clarity. The Clarity Bill has not moved as quickly as people have expected, and there's substantial uncertainty about when that will be resolved. So those are the headwinds that we face right now.

再來是監管明確性延宕。《Clarity 法案》的推進速度不如人們預期，對於何時能解決仍存在相當大的不確定性。所以，這些就是我們目前面臨的逆風。

We also think any one of them could become a tailwind or a catalyst. And we think, generally, Bitcoin has done pretty well in the face of those headwinds. And as we get good news in any of those areas, I think that will be very positive for the entire Bitcoin market.

我們也認為其中任何一項都可能轉為順風或催化劑。而整體而言，比特幣在這些逆風之下表現得相當不錯。只要在任何一個領域出現好消息，我認為都會對整個比特幣市場非常正面。

You can see that sentiment is near a cycle low, and this is the fear and greed index. And we track this on our website now, and you can click through and you can see it. So that sentiment reflects itself in a number of ways in our equity price and our credit prices and then the Bitcoin price.

你可以看到市場情緒接近一個週期低點，這是恐懼與貪婪指數。我們現在也在網站上追蹤它，你可以點進去查看。因此，這種情緒會以多種方式反映在我們的股價、我們的信用產品價格，以及比特幣價格上。

But there are many, many positive factors in the Bitcoin ecosystem right now in the industry that I'd like to highlight. One of them is the BTC dominance has been consistently growing since the 2021 low. It's expanded about 20%. And now if you look at Bitcoin's market cap as a percentage of all the market caps of the crypto tokens, not including stablecoins, Bitcoin is a bit more than two-thirds.

但目前在比特幣生態系與產業中，有非常非常多的正面因素，我想特別強調。其中之一是 BTC 主導率自 2021 年低點以來持續成長。它擴大了約 20%。而現在如果你看比特幣市值占所有加密代幣市值（不含穩定幣）的比例，比特幣略高於三分之二。

And we think this is an incredibly bullish sign. So when I refer to the fact that Bitcoin has won the race to be the dominant digital capital network and the dominant digital monitoring network in the world, I think this metric is one of the key signals that shows that it's won. There really is no serious discussion of flipping. No one thinks that Solana or Ethereum or any other crypto network is going to flip bitcoin. Bitcoin is the winner. And that's incredibly clarifying insight.

我們認為這是一個極度看多的訊號。所以當我提到比特幣已贏得競賽，成為全球主導的數位資本網路與主導的數位監控網路時，我認為這個指標是顯示它已勝出的關鍵訊號之一。實際上已經沒有什麼嚴肅的「翻轉」（flippening）討論了。沒有人認為 Solana、以太坊或任何其他加密網路會翻轉比特幣。比特幣是贏家。而這帶來了極其清晰的洞見。

Because if Bitcoin is the digital capital network for the next decade, it's more likely than not that it's the capital network for the next 100 years. And we are building our credit structures, and our equity structure is on top of it. So this is the biggest uncertainty taken off the table over the past four years; underappreciated by many people, but perhaps it's more important than any other week by week, month by month, year by year development in the entire digital asset space.

因為如果比特幣是未來十年的數位資本網路，那麼它很可能也是未來一百年的資本網路。而我們正在其上建立我們的信用結構，我們的股權結構也建立在其上。因此，這是過去四年中被移除出檯面的最大不確定性；許多人低估了它，但它或許比整個數位資產領域中任何按週、按月、按年推進的發展都更重要。

We keep track of banking adoption in this space. And I've noted that the real drivers of Bitcoin price are going to be the formation of credit networks, either digital credit or banking credit. And of course, the banks have the ability to create incredible mass of credit. So if the banks create credit on top of real estate, real estate values increase. And as banks create credit on top of digital capital, on top of Bitcoin, then the value of Bitcoin will increase.

我們持續追蹤這個領域的銀行採用情況。我注意到，比特幣價格真正的驅動因素將是信用網路的形成，無論是數位信用或銀行信用。當然，銀行有能力創造極其龐大的信用規模。因此，如果銀行在房地產之上創造信用，房地產價值就會上升。而當銀行在數位資本之上、在比特幣之上創造信用時，比特幣的價值就會上升。

By our own Bitcoin banking adoption index, which we just rolled out, and it looks at the top 25 leading global banks, you can see that we've advanced from 9% to 14% to 24% to 32%. And so we think this is just incredibly bullish. We will keep track of this adoption index each quarter and on our quarterly calls, we'll report back to you as to how things are developing.

依據我們自己的比特幣銀行採用指數（我們剛推出），它觀察全球前 25 家領先銀行，你可以看到我們已從 9% 提升到 14%、24%、32%。因此我們認為這極度偏多。我們將在每一季持續追蹤這個採用指數，並在季度電話會議上向各位回報發展情況。

Another great development this quarter is the formation of the Bitcoin Security Consortium. We worked in conjunction with all of the major Bitcoin investing and custody and trading institutions in the United States in order to form this consortium. And this is in response to a lot of investor requests, a broad-based sentiment across institutional investors that they have clarity about how the Bitcoin network will address future security concerns. The most well-known one that's been talked about the most over the past six months has been quantum computer risk, and lots of investors wonder how would the network react to a quantum threat. Should it materialize? And we have joined forces with all of these other institutions to make sure we stay coordinated on that.

本季另一項重大進展是比特幣安全聯盟（Bitcoin Security Consortium）的成立。我們與美國所有主要的比特幣投資、託管與交易機構合作，共同成立了這個聯盟。這是為了回應許多投資人的要求：在機構投資人之間有一種廣泛的共識，他們希望清楚了解比特幣網路將如何應對未來的安全疑慮。過去六個月討論最多、最知名的一項就是量子電腦風險，許多投資人想知道網路將如何回應量子威脅。如果它真的出現的話？我們已與這些其他機構結盟，以確保我們在此議題上保持協調一致。

There are a lot of people doing really good work in the space. The point of the consortium is to support any work that is pro Bitcoin security related. We all want Bitcoin to be a secure network for the next 100 years. And so, I personally have had a lot of enthusiasm for supporting security-related work with regard to Bitcoin. I supported security efforts starting about 2020 with my own personal funds.

在這個領域有很多人正在做非常出色的工作。聯盟的目的，是支持任何有利於比特幣安全的相關工作。我們都希望比特幣在未來一百年都是一個安全的網路。因此，就我個人而言，我一直非常熱衷於支持與比特幣安全相關的工作。我大約從 2020 年開始就用我個人的資金支持安全方面的努力。

And so this is really the natural evolution of institutional investment in the security of Bitcoin.

因此，這確實是機構投資在比特幣安全方面的自然演進。

The antennas the consortium is not really to drive the protocol or protocol changes, but really just to fund investments committed to security and stability of the protocol. And each of the various institutions involved is going to make their own decisions. However, institutional investors would like a common voice, and they would like a coordinated response. And so it will be helpful for the entire institutional community and for banking adoption, investor adoption, and to get positive regulatory adoption, and nation-state adoption of Bitcoin for us to be able to coordinate and to communicate the work that's going on and then make sure that we're ready for any security threat that may develop in the future.

聯盟的宗旨並不是推動協議或協議變更，而是為致力於協議安全與穩定的投資提供資金。參與的各個機構都將自行做出各自的決策。然而，機構投資人希望有一個共同的聲音，也希望有協調一致的回應。因此，為了整個機構社群、以及銀行採用、投資人採用、取得正向的監管採用，乃至於國家層級對比特幣的採用，我們能夠協調並溝通正在進行的工作，並確保我們已準備好應對未來可能出現的任何安全威脅，將會很有幫助。

So a few words on digital credit. Stretch, STRC is our flagship digital credit product, and we're laser-focused on Stretch. Our goal with Stretch is we want to increase the liquidity, we want to decrease the volatility, and we want to build an ecosystem of market participants. We want people that are willing to trade it. We want people that are willing to short it. We want people that are willing to go along and hold it forever.

接著談幾句數位信用。Stretch（STRC）是我們的旗艦數位信用產品，我們正全力聚焦於 Stretch。我們對 Stretch 的目標是：提高流動性、降低波動性，並建立一個由市場參與者構成的生態系。我們希望有人願意交易它。我們希望有人願意放空它。我們希望有人願意做多並永久持有它。

I'm not terribly bothered by the fact that someone might buy it at $88 and sell it at $95. We would love for that to happen. We'd love for another group of people that buy at $95 and hold until it goes to $98, and other investors that will buy whenever it falls below $99 and write it back to $100. And if they don't want to hold it $100, that's okay, they'll be creating liquidity for other buyers at $100, and that stabilizes STRC.

我並不太在意有人可能在 88 美元買入、95 美元賣出。我們很樂見這種情況發生。我們也希望另一群人在 95 美元買入並持有到 98 美元，還有其他投資人會在它跌破 99 美元時買入，並把它推回到 100 美元。如果他們不想在 100 美元持有也沒關係，他們會在 100 美元為其他買家創造流動性，而這會穩定 STRC。

So we welcome derivatives traders, long traders, short traders, anyone that has any particular view, it's fine. If someone wanted to sell $1 billion of STRC short, they would be paying the 12% dividend. And so they would be paying $120 million a year in order to create $1 billion of liquidity to the benefit of our digital credit. So again, we don't really worry about it. We would like to return to par with the broadest, most diverse ecosystem of market participants that we can possibly develop.

因此我們歡迎衍生品交易者、多頭交易者、空頭交易者，任何有特定觀點的人都可以，沒問題。如果有人想放空 10 億美元的 STRC，他們就必須支付 12% 的股息。也就是說，他們每年要支付 1.2 億美元，以創造 10 億美元的流動性，這對我們的數位信用是有利的。所以再次強調，我們並不太擔心。我們希望在盡可能廣泛、最多元的市場參與者生態系之下回到面值（par）。

And so that means sometimes instead of doing things immediately, like we could return STRC to par very quickly using our own capital, but that would exclude many of these other ecosystem participants. And we would be getting ahead of our equity investors, our credit investors, Bitcoin investors, and the like. So we will move progressively and deliberately with the thought that we want the deepest, richest derivatives market, the deepest, richest credit markets, the deepest, richest equity markets, the most clarity, the most liquidity, and the broadest reach with regard to STRC we can possibly create and that will be best for everybody involved.

因此，這也意味著有時我們不會立刻採取行動；例如我們可以用自有資本非常快速地讓 STRC 回到面值，但那會把許多其他生態系參與者排除在外。而且那會讓我們走在股權投資人、信用投資人、比特幣投資人等之前。因此我們會循序漸進、審慎推進，因為我們希望打造盡可能最深、最豐富的衍生品市場、最深最豐富的信用市場、最深最豐富的股權市場，並為 STRC 創造最大的清晰度、最大的流動性與最廣的觸及範圍；這將對所有相關方都是最好的。

You can see our progress toward this year. STRC has grown from $2.8 billion in notional value to $3 billion at the end of Q4 and then to $5.3 billion at the end of Q1 and then to $10.5 billion at the end of Q2. It's growing quite rapidly. And we're sort of in a hypergrowth phase.

你可以看到我們今年朝這個方向的進展。STRC 的名目價值已從 28 億美元成長到第四季末的 30 億美元，接著到第一季末的 53 億美元，再到第二季末的 105 億美元。成長相當快速。我們正處於某種超高速成長階段。

If we go to the next slide, you can see why it's growing. Simply put, it's the highest effective -- the highest tax equivalent yield and the highest effective yield of any major class of credit in the world. And right now, we see STRC as competing against private credit and bank preferreds and junk bonds. For the most part, those three categories, but we think over time that it will begin to compete against investment grade credit mortgage-backed credit as well.

如果我們看下一張投影片，你可以看到它為何成長。簡單來說，它是全球任何主要信用類別中最高的有效——最高的稅負等效殖利率（tax equivalent yield）與最高的有效殖利率。而目前我們認為 STRC 主要是在與私募信貸、銀行優先股（preferreds）以及垃圾債競爭。大致上是這三類，但我們認為隨著時間推移，它也將開始與投資等級信用、以及不動產抵押擔保（MBS）相關信用競爭。

The effective yield is 13.6% right now, but the tax equivalent yield is 21.6%. We think that digital credit is going to be the best credit, is the strongest credit because it's based upon the strongest capital asset, BTC, and because it's based upon the strongest business model. The digital treasury company business model based on digital capital has lots of advantages in creating the highest tax equivalent yield.

目前有效殖利率是 13.6%，但稅負等效殖利率是 21.6%。我們認為數位信用將會是最好的信用、最強的信用，因為它建立在最強的資本資產 BTC 之上，也因為它建立在最強的商業模式之上。以數位資本為基礎的數位財庫公司（digital treasury company）商業模式，在創造最高稅負等效殖利率方面具有許多優勢。

And so simply put, we think we've created one of the world's great business models for creating one of the world's great products, the product being digital credit. No, of course, I would think that, but the real question is, what does everybody else think in the world?

因此簡單來說，我們認為我們打造了世界級的商業模式，用以創造世界級的產品，而這個產品就是數位信用。當然，我會這麼想，但真正的問題是：世界上其他人怎麼看？

Well, I think the most sophisticated preferred stock investors in the world could reasonably be considered to be those running the BlackRock PFF fund, the Virtus InfraCap PFFA Fund, and the VanEck PFX funds. Those are the three largest preferred credit indexes that are publicly traded and they are custodians of billions of dollars of capital.

嗯，我認為，全球最成熟的優先股投資人，合理來說可視為那些管理 BlackRock PFF 基金、Virtus InfraCap PFFA 基金，以及 VanEck PFX 基金的人。這三者是公開交易中規模最大的三個優先股信用指數（基金），並且託管著數十億美元的資本。

One thing that you'll note here in the past 12 weeks is that STRC is now the number one holding at all three, right? So it's not a fluke. We used to be the number three holding. We crawled up past everybody in the market to be number two or number three in a hurry. But in the past few months, we've emerged as the number one holding and it's not a fluke.

你會注意到，在過去 12 週裡，STRC 現在是這三者的第一大持倉，對吧？所以這不是偶然。我們以前是第三大持倉。我們很快就一路爬升，超越市場上所有人，迅速成為第二或第三大持倉。但在過去幾個月，我們已經成為第一大持倉，而且這不是偶然。

It's universal across all three indexes. So we think this is incredibly bullish because you can develop all sorts of theories about what retail investors like and don't like, but I don't think anybody disputes that a professional money manager who's in the business of managing preferred equities and has been doing it for a long, long time is pretty good at it. And they've got a lot of skin in the game, and they're responsible to the most sophisticated institutional investors that are their investors.

這在三個指數中都是一致的。因此我們認為這非常看多，因為你可以提出各種理論來解釋散戶投資人喜歡或不喜歡什麼，但我不認為有人會否認：一位以管理優先股為業、而且做了很久的專業資產管理人，確實很擅長這件事。而且他們投入了大量真金白銀，並且要對其投資人（最成熟的機構投資人）負責。

And you can see here on this table that were the security of choice for all three and the number one security, and we've got a lot of momentum here, right? When other people were selling, they're actually buying STRC, and I think that's very positive.

你可以從這張表看到，我們是三者共同的首選標的、也是第一大標的，而且我們在這裡有很強的動能，對吧？當其他人在賣出時，他們其實在買入 STRC，我認為這非常正面。

Who's digital credit for? It's for every investor class, right? We're going to continue to refine it and we're going to offer it to retail investors, to institutional credit investors, to corporate treasuries, to hybrid and -- hybrid hedge funds and equity investors and the digital money in crypto-native investors. And we think that all five of these groups are just incredible growth opportunities for us.

數位信用是給誰用的？是給每一種投資人類別的，對吧？我們會持續精進，並提供給散戶投資人、機構信用投資人、企業財務部門、混合型與——混合型避險基金與股票投資人，以及加密原生投資人中的數位資金。我們認為這五個族群對我們而言都是極其可觀的成長機會。

If we look at a snapshot over the past three months or so, you can see that 78% of STRC was held by retail and 22% by institutional March 17, but as of July 1, the institutional holdings had grown from $1.1 billion to $3.1 billion, so tripled, and they're now 29% of STRC outstanding.

如果我們看過去三個月左右的一個快照，你可以看到在 3 月 17 日，STRC 有 78% 由散戶持有、22% 由機構持有；但截至 7 月 1 日，機構持倉已從 11 億美元成長到 31 億美元，也就是成長三倍，現在占 STRC 流通在外的 29%。

On the other hand, retail investments had not quite doubled. They were still very strong, but now they're 71%. So we think that the trend towards more institutional adoption is great for the stability of STRC. You can see on the right side of the slide that the average retail account grew from $44,000 to $48,000 over that period, and the average institutional holding went from $1.7 million to $3.5 million over that period. These are very, very bullish metrics, and they speak to the seasoning and the maturation of the asset.

另一方面，散戶投資並沒有完全翻倍。它們仍然非常強勁，但現在占比是 71%。因此我們認為，更多機構採用的趨勢，對 STRC 的穩定性非常有利。你可以在投影片右側看到，這段期間平均散戶帳戶規模從 44,000 美元成長到 48,000 美元，而平均機構持倉則從 170 萬美元成長到 350 萬美元。這些都是非常、非常看多的指標，反映了該資產的歷練（seasoning）與成熟。

When we came public with STRC, it took us about 70 trading days to reach par. And some people forget this, but when we did the IPO, we IPO-ed at $90, it took us 70 days to get to par. And if we trace the period since STRC fell below our trading range of $99 million to $100 million and where we are today, it's been 40 trading days. So if we were to trace forward 70 trading days from when STRC fell out of our trading range, that would put us around September 8.

當我們以 STRC 上市時，我們花了大約 70 個交易日才回到票面價值（par）。有些人忘了，但我們做 IPO 時是以 90 美元上市，花了 70 天才到 par。如果我們追蹤自 STRC 跌破我們 9,900 萬到 1 億美元的交易區間以來到今天的期間，已經過了 40 個交易日。所以如果從 STRC 跌出交易區間的時間點往後推算 70 個交易日，大約會落在 9 月 8 日左右。

So we're keeping track of that date, and we're keeping track of our progress. We will focus upon returning STRC to health. And we think that if we did it in 70 days after the IPO then it's reasonable to target 70 days after it fell off our trading range from May 28.

所以我們正在追蹤那個日期，也在追蹤我們的進展。我們將專注於讓 STRC 恢復健康。我們認為，如果 IPO 後 70 天能做到，那麼從 5 月 28 日跌出交易區間後的 70 天作為目標，是合理的。

We have the means to return STRC to par. Right now, you can see the market cap is $9.2 billion, and the notional is $10.5 billion. So there's about a $1.2 billion dislocation. We have allocated $1 billion to buy back STRC, about 2% of our BTC reserve. We still have $975 million of that program available to us. And so the first place we look is to use that buyback program to cure the dislocation, but I would remind everybody that the company has total reserves of $58.5 billion.

我們有能力讓 STRC 回到 par。目前你可以看到市值是 92 億美元，而名目金額（notional）是 105 億美元。所以大約有 12 億美元的價差錯位（dislocation）。我們已配置 10 億美元用於回購 STRC，約占我們 BTC 儲備的 2%。該計畫目前仍有 9.75 億美元可用。因此我們首先會考慮用這個回購計畫來修復這個錯位，但我也要提醒大家，公司總儲備為 585 億美元。

I've shown the bar on the right. And what you can see is that if the $975 million doesn't cure the problem, we have ample additional capital in order to cure the dislocation. We're currently in a discovery process to figure out how much capital it will be required on our part in order to return STRC to par. We're certain that we will return STRC to par. That is the goal, right?

我在右側展示了那個長條。你可以看到，如果 9.75 億美元無法解決問題，我們仍有充足的額外資本來修復這個錯位。我們目前正在進行探索（discovery）流程，以釐清要讓 STRC 回到 par，我們需要投入多少資本。我們確信我們會讓 STRC 回到 par。這就是目標，對吧？

So there's no question about whether or not success is returning it to par, it is returning it to part. The big question mark is, how extensive will the buyback be and how rapid will the buyback take place? And then what will be the exact open market execution strategy of the buyback? We are calibrating day by day and sometimes multiple times a day as we learn from the market.

所以，成功與否的標準毫無疑問就是讓它回到 par，就是讓它回到 par。最大的問號是：回購會有多大規模、回購會以多快速度進行？以及回購在公開市場上的具體執行策略會是什麼？我們會隨著從市場學到的資訊，逐日校準，有時甚至一天校準多次。

And of course, we have a lot of market signal every minute of the day, every day of the week. We also are getting signal back each week as we put out a new announcement about our status. We think this is one of those things where we want to do it not too slow, but not too fast, and we want to allow other investors, our credit investors, our equity investors, and the Bitcoin community to participate with us. But especially, we want our other credit investors to join us on this journey.

當然，我們每天每分鐘、每週每一天都會收到大量市場訊號。我們也會在每週發布關於我們狀態的新公告時，獲得回饋訊號。我們認為這類事情要做得不太慢、也不太快，並且希望讓其他投資人——我們的信用投資人、股票投資人，以及比特幣社群——能與我們一起參與。但尤其是，我們希望其他信用投資人能與我們一同踏上這段旅程。

We can go to the next slide. We updated our credit tab on our website, and I would encourage anyone to go check out that tab. One thing you'll see is the BTC ratings of all of our credit instruments. And you can see that -- the senior bond has got 122x over collateralization. You can see that STRF is now 12.9 BTC rated. So the BTC ratings of the instruments are improving as we build the US dollar reserve.

我們可以看下一張投影片。我們更新了網站上的 credit 分頁，我鼓勵大家去看看那個分頁。你會看到我們所有信用工具的 BTC 評級。你可以看到——高順位債券有 122 倍的超額擔保（over-collateralization）。你可以看到 STRF 現在的 BTC 評級是 12.9。因此，隨著我們建立美元儲備，這些工具的 BTC 評級正在改善。

We think this is obviously good for credit investors. You can calculate the BTC fair credit spread based upon your assumptions about forward volatility and forward Bitcoin ARR. And we've added a new metric, the BTC floor rate. And the floor rate is the rate that Bitcoin would have to fall on an annualized basis in order for these credit instruments to be collateralized one for one at the end of their duration. And so how do you get to a BTC rating of one for STRF? Bitcoin would have to fall 21% a year, more than 21.6% a year forever in order for STRF to be under collateralized at the end of its duration.

我們認為這顯然對信用投資人有利。你可以根據你對未來波動率與未來比特幣 ARR 的假設，計算 BTC 的公平信用利差。我們也新增了一個指標：BTC 底線利率（BTC floor rate）。底線利率是指：比特幣必須以年化幅度下跌到什麼程度，才會使這些信用工具在其存續期結束時，擔保品剛好能一比一覆蓋。那麼，STRF 要如何才會降到 BTC 評級 1？比特幣必須永遠每年下跌 21%——更精確地說，每年下跌超過 21.6%——STRF 才會在其存續期結束時出現擔保不足。

So this gives you a sense of how fragile or robust any given credit instrument is. And you can see, for example, with the senior bonds, Bitcoin has to almost go to 0 in a hurry in order for those bonds to be under collateralized. But you can see even with STRD the floor rate is 10.8%. And the floor rate across all of these things, all of our credit instruments is 11.8%, and we're starting to publish that on our website. We think that, that's pretty useful for our credit investor.

因此，這讓你對任何特定信用工具有多脆弱或多穩健有個概念。例如你可以看到，對於優先債券而言，比特幣必須幾乎迅速跌到 0，這些債券才會出現抵押不足。但你也可以看到，即使是 STRD，其底線利率仍為 10.8%。而在所有這些項目、我們所有信用工具之間的底線利率是 11.8%，我們也開始在網站上公布。我們認為，這對我們的信用投資人相當有用。

We can go to the next. I've got our credit model here, and it's a little bit more detailed. And I guess I'll just make a few points. If you're a skeptic, and if you think the Bitcoin is going up 0% a year forever, it's basically not going to perform, then the BTC credit spread that the model would spit out is -- for STRF is 86 basis points. So STRF would still be investment grade even if your view of Bitcoin was it's not going to perform forever.

我們可以看下一頁。我這裡有我們的信用模型，細節更多一些。我想我就提幾點。如果你是懷疑論者，並且你認為比特幣每年永遠只上漲 0%，基本上不會有表現，那麼模型吐出的 BTC 信用利差——以 STRF 來說——是 86 個基點。所以即使你對比特幣的看法是它永遠不會有表現，STRF 仍會是投資級。

The other instruments, STRC, E and K, they start to look somewhere in the intermediate level as high yield, and STRD kind of falls into distressed debt levels. But having said all that, all of those publicly traded credit instruments have a spread premium over that theoretical BTC credit spread, right? Because the market is pricing them much weaker than that. So even if you're a skeptic, they've all got very, very large, 474 basis point to 670 basis point spread premiums.

其他工具，STRC、E 和 K，看起來會落在中間層級、偏高收益（high yield）；而 STRD 則有點落在困境債（distressed debt）的層級。但話說回來，所有這些公開交易的信用工具，相對於那個理論上的 BTC 信用利差，都有利差溢價，對吧？因為市場對它們的定價比那個理論值弱得多。所以即使你是懷疑論者，它們全部都有非常、非常大的利差溢價，約 474 個基點到 670 個基點。

Now what does it take for all those credit instruments to be investment grade? Let's go to the next slide. Right. The the BTC investment-grade rate is a little bit more than 12%. So you can see a 12.5% all of the credit instruments publicly trading, STRF, C, E, K, and D, they all have credit spreads, theoretical credit spreads less than 150 basis points.

那要怎樣才能讓所有這些信用工具都成為投資級呢？我們看下一張投影片。對。BTC 的投資級報酬率略高於 12%。所以你可以看到，在 12.5% 的情境下，所有公開交易的信用工具——STRF、C、E、K 和 D——它們的信用利差、理論信用利差都低於 150 個基點。

And so if you think the Bitcoin is going to perform like the S&P index or I mean, gold's been about 12% for the past six years. The S&P has been a bit more than that. But if you have an optimistic view toward Bitcoin it's a legitimate capital asset, you can see that the credit spreads all look investment grade. The spread premiums are anywhere from 550 basis points to 1,048 basis points.

因此，如果你認為比特幣的表現會像標普指數——或者說，黃金在過去六年大約是 12%——標普則略高於此。但如果你對比特幣抱持樂觀觀點，認為它是一種正當的資本資產，你會看到這些信用利差看起來都像投資級。利差溢價大約介於 550 個基點到 1,048 個基點。

If you're a long-duration credit investor and you don't need your money back for four years or more and you just want to make a long-duration credit bet and you believe in the company then you buy STRD, and you could pay 1,048 basis points of spread premium, an effective yield in the 16% range. The company is not going to suspend its dividends because we're going to protect the digital credit business.

如果你是長天期的信用投資人，四年或更久都不需要把錢拿回來，你只是想做一筆長天期的信用押注並且相信公司，那你就買 STRD；你可以拿到 1,048 個基點的利差溢價，等效殖利率約在 16% 的區間。公司不會停止配息，因為我們會保護數位信用業務。

If we were to suspend the dividend then that would destroy the credibility of the company and digital credit. It would be devastating for the asset class. So if you believe the company's business plan and if you believe in digital credit, you can see that STRD has high effective yield and a massive spread premium.

如果我們停止配息，那會摧毀公司與數位信用的可信度。那對這個資產類別將是毀滅性的。所以如果你相信公司的商業計畫，也相信數位信用，你可以看到 STRD 具有高等效殖利率與巨大的利差溢價。

If you semitrust the company and you just want a lot of investor protection, but you're a long-term credit investor and you don't need your money for four years, STRF is showing a BTC rating north of 12 right now. So what you can see is it's senior -- the senior $1 billion in the credit stack out of $15 billion. It's got penalties, dividend penalties, it's got dividend stoppers, right? And on the other hand, you're collecting an effective yield of 10.5%, and you're getting an extraordinary spread premium, and the company doesn't have any discretion to lower that dividend.

如果你對公司是半信半疑、只想要很多投資人保護，但你是長期信用投資人且四年內不需要用到這筆錢，STRF 目前顯示的 BTC 評級在 12 以上。所以你可以看到，它是優先——在 150 億美元的信用結構中，最上層的 10 億美元。它有罰則、股利罰則，也有股利停止條款（dividend stoppers），對吧？另一方面，你拿到 10.5% 的等效殖利率，並且獲得非常可觀的利差溢價，而且公司沒有任何裁量權去降低那個股利。

So if you're a professional credit investor and you don't need your money in four years or longer, then if you trust the company, you buy STRD, if you semitrust the company, you buy STRF. But on the other hand, if you're a short-duration credit investor and you're going to want the money back in the next year or three months or six months, well, then you just don't want the volatility. You don't want to wait. And that's what STRC was built for. It was built for the shorter duration credit investor.

所以如果你是專業信用投資人，且四年或更久不需要用到這筆錢，那麼：如果你信任公司，你買 STRD；如果你對公司半信半疑，你買 STRF。但另一方面，如果你是短天期信用投資人，接下來一年、三個月或六個月內就會想把錢拿回來，那你就不想要波動。你不想等待。而這正是 STRC 的設計目的。它是為較短天期的信用投資人打造的。

I guess we would say at this point, if you think you need the money back in less than three months, you're probably a money market investor. If you need the money back in 90 days, you're probably a money market investor. You're going to put your money in the money market. But if you could wait three -- if you wait four months to four years, anywhere in that duration, then you're a short-duration credit investor like a Stretch investor. And if you don't need the money for more than four years and you're a credit investor, you might want to look at some of the other preferreds.

我想我們此刻會這麼說：如果你覺得三個月內就需要把錢拿回來，你大概是貨幣市場投資人。如果你需要在 90 天內把錢拿回來，你大概是貨幣市場投資人。你會把錢放在貨幣市場。但如果你可以等三——如果你能等四個月到四年，在那個期間的任何天期，那你就是短天期信用投資人，例如 Stretch 投資人。而如果你四年以上都不需要用到這筆錢，且你是信用投資人，你可能會想看看其他一些優先股。

And of course, if you don't need the money for more than four years, and you're a capital investor, you should buy Bitcoin. And if you don't need the money in less than four years and you're an equity capital markets investor and you want to amplify Bitcoin, you buy MSTR. But I think these models illustrate this pretty effectively.

當然，如果你四年以上都不需要用到這筆錢，而且你是資本投資人，你就應該買比特幣。如果你四年內不需要用到這筆錢，而且你是股票資本市場投資人並想放大比特幣的曝險，你就買 MSTR。但我認為這些模型把這點說明得很清楚。

And that takes me to my next point. We think digital credit is the best kind of credit. And we think that we're uniquely positioned to create digital credit and the best form of digital credit, the one that's in the greatest demand is going to be Stretch, STRC. It's going to have the greatest liquidity. It's going to have the largest AUM.

這就帶到我的下一點。我們認為數位信用是最好的信用類型。我們也認為我們具備獨特優勢來創造數位信用；而最好的數位信用形式、需求最大的那一種，將會是 Stretch，也就是 STRC。它將擁有最高的流動性。它將擁有最大的資產管理規模（AUM）。

It's the shortest duration and all of our discussions with credit investors, plus our view of the market, we've seen that what the market wants is they want the shortest duration, lowest volatility, highest liquidity, most stable, highest AUM, most broadly distributed credit. And STRC is already the most liquid and largest preferred stock in the world.

它的天期最短；結合我們與信用投資人的所有討論，以及我們對市場的看法，我們看到市場想要的是：最短天期、最低波動、最高流動性、最穩定、最高 AUM、分銷最廣的信用產品。而 STRC 已經是全球最具流動性、規模最大的優先股。

So we expect to keep laser focused on it. We're going to do everything we can to make it the most appealing credit in the entire digital credit space. And we think that if we do that, it will be incredibly compelling credit for people that might otherwise invest in private credit or (inaudible) credit or corporate credit.

所以我們預期會持續高度聚焦在它上面。我們會盡一切所能，讓它成為整個數位信用領域中最具吸引力的信用產品。我們認為，如果我們做到這點，對於那些原本可能投資私募信貸或（聽不清）信貸或公司信貸的人而言，它將會是極具吸引力的信用選擇。

A few words about our equity. We now publish the hurdle rate, the breakeven rate and the floor rate on our website. The hurdle rate represents our blended current cost of credit. And so if Bitcoin outperforms the hurdle rate, then, in our view, our BTC gain, when we sell $10 billion of credit and we book a BTC gain of x billions of dollars, let's say it is $10 billion, then if Bitcoin outperforms the hurdle rate, we're never paying back the credit, which means that the $10 billion is $10 billion of net income. So the company becomes incredibly profitable on a Bitcoin, a BTC gain basis when Bitcoin is outperforming the hurdle rate.

再談幾句我們的股權。我們現在在網站上公布門檻報酬率（hurdle rate）、損益兩平報酬率（breakeven rate）以及底線報酬率（floor rate）。門檻報酬率代表我們目前加權後的綜合信用成本。因此，如果比特幣的表現超過門檻報酬率，那麼在我們看來，當我們賣出 100 億美元的信用並認列 x 十億美元的 BTC 收益——假設是 100 億美元——如果比特幣超過門檻報酬率，我們就永遠不需要償還那筆信用，這意味著那 100 億美元就是 100 億美元的淨利。所以當比特幣的表現超過門檻報酬率時，公司在比特幣（BTC）收益的基礎上會變得極度獲利。

And you could think of this as four simple zones. If you think Bitcoin is going to outperform the hurdle rate and you're an equity investor, then our equity will capture the positive spread over the credit. We're borrowing money at the hurdle rate, we're investing and It's something that might be 15% or 20%, some premium to it. And so it's an incredibly good business. We capture the spread and then we can cover the cost of the credit with the capital appreciation.

你可以把這想成四個簡單的區域。如果你認為比特幣將跑贏門檻報酬率，而你是股權投資人，那麼我們的股權將捕捉到相對於信用的正向利差。我們以門檻報酬率借入資金，我們進行投資，而它可能是 15% 或 20%，帶有某種溢價。因此這是一門極其好的生意。我們捕捉利差，然後可以用資本增值來覆蓋信用成本。

And so the equity will thrive. But of course, the credit will also thrive because we're making a wise investment. So in that zone, equity and credit both thrive.

因此股權會蓬勃發展。但當然，信用也會蓬勃發展，因為我們做的是明智的投資。所以在那個區域，股權與信用都會蓬勃發展。

If you expect Bitcoin to appreciate between the breakeven and the hurdle rate, the equity might underperform. It may not. We have a lot of tools at our disposal. We may actually benefit from the float and the volatility, and we can do a lot of things that may be good for the equity. But it's a bit harder for us.

如果你預期比特幣的升值介於損益兩平與門檻報酬率之間，股權可能會表現不佳。也可能不會。我們手上有很多工具可用。我們實際上可能會受益於浮存金與波動性，我們可以做很多可能對股權有利的事情。但對我們來說會比較難。

We have to work at that. So there's uncertainty around the equity.

我們必須在這方面下功夫。所以股權存在不確定性。

The dividends are still covered because we're substantially north of the breakeven. As long as Bitcoin is at the breakeven rate, we can pay the dividend indefinitely, and we can do it without even selling a share of equity or without any other capital or recapitalization.

股利仍然有覆蓋，因為我們大幅高於損益兩平點。只要比特幣處在損益兩平的報酬率，我們就能無限期支付股利，而且甚至不需要賣出任何一股股權，也不需要任何其他資本或再資本化。

So you're in a pretty safe zone, a very healthy zone for the credit. And for the equity, we're in an operating zone. We have to think hard about how we can still perform, but it's harder than when we're substantially above the hurdle rate.

所以你處在一個相當安全的區域，對信用而言是非常健康的區域。而對股權而言，我們處在一個營運區間。我們必須仔細思考如何仍能有表現，但這比我們大幅高於門檻報酬率時更難。

Now if Bitcoin underperforms the breakeven rate, that's challenging for the equity, the equity will probably underperform. And the credit -- for the credit, we have to do things over the long term, like we've got at 0%. We've got like 33 years that's the duration of the company. So it's not like we don't have time, but sometime in 33 years, we're going to have to do something if Bitcoin performs 0% a year. So we start thinking about what we might do if Bitcoin falls below the breakeven rate.

現在如果比特幣表現低於損益兩平報酬率，這對股權是具挑戰性的，股權很可能會表現不佳。而信用——對信用而言，我們必須做長期的事，就像我們在 0% 的情境下那樣。公司的存續期間大約是 33 年。所以並不是說我們沒有時間，但在 33 年中的某個時點，如果比特幣每年只成長 0%，我們就必須做些事情。因此當比特幣跌破損益兩平報酬率時，我們開始思考我們可能會做什麼。

Below the floor rate, that's when we start to think it's -- that's a challenge for the equity. The equity is definitely going to underperform, but the credit is going to be impaired. And so that means we have to think about restructuring the credit. We refinance debt, we roll it forward, we would have to become creative. But you can see here just how bad things have to get before you get in that zone.

低於底線報酬率時，我們就開始認為——這對股權是一個挑戰。股權肯定會表現不佳，但信用將會受損。因此這意味著我們必須思考重整信用。我們會再融資債務、把到期展延，我們必須更有創意。但你可以看到，要糟到什麼程度才會進入那個區域。

So the beauty of a Bitcoin treasury company is there's transparency every 15 seconds to this, and you can create all of your own models, statistical models to figure out what you think is likely you can plug in your own assumptions and then you can figure out whether or not your long equity, short the equity, long the credit, short the credit, if you want to hedge these things, there are so many different ways to be long, short, straddle or take risk off the table, and we welcome it, and we encourage it.

所以，比特幣金庫公司的一個優點是：每 15 秒就有一次透明度，你可以建立你自己的各種模型、統計模型，去推算你認為最可能發生的情況；你可以代入你自己的假設，然後判斷你是否要做多股權、放空股權、做多信用、放空信用；如果你想對沖這些東西，有非常多不同的方式可以做多、做空、做跨式，或把風險從桌面上移除。我們歡迎這樣做，也鼓勵這樣做。

That's one of the reasons why our derivatives markets are so healthy and why the equity is so much (inaudible). But what I would say to anybody is check out the website, look at these rates and come to your own opinion about what you think Bitcoin is going to do.

這也是我們衍生品市場如此健康、以及股權如此之(聽不清)。但我想對任何人說的是：去看看網站，看看這些利率，然後對你認為比特幣會怎麼走形成你自己的看法。

Now the history is Bitcoin has been appreciating 33% a year for the past six years. And if you go to our website, you'll find we've got the 10-year rate as well. So you're not without resources here.

從歷史來看，比特幣在過去六年每年升值 33%。如果你到我們的網站，你也會看到我們有 10 年期的數據。所以你並不是沒有資源可用。

Where are we right now? The markets right now are pricing fear. It's a very muted market, very skeptical market. Bitcoin is trading at a very slight premium to its 200-week moving average. As you can see, our credit is paying an 870-basis-point premium above the BTC credit spread you would predict.

我們現在處於什麼位置？目前市場正在為恐懼定價。這是一個非常低迷、非常懷疑的市場。比特幣的交易價格僅略高於其 200 週移動平均線。如你所見，我們的信用支付的利差，比你根據 BTC 信用利差所預測的高出 870 個基點。

If you plugged in Bitcoin appreciating 12.5% a year and staying as volatile as it is right now, then the credit would be fairly valued at 870 basis points less than it currently pays. And so you can see the credit markets are fairly skeptical. The capital markets are fairly so. They've traded with a premium north of where we are in 90% of the history of Bitcoin. And the equity markets are fairly skeptical.

如果你代入比特幣每年升值 12.5%，且波動性維持在目前水準，那麼信用的公允價值應該比它目前支付的低 870 個基點。因此你可以看到信用市場相當懷疑。資本市場也相當如此。在比特幣歷史上 90% 的時間裡，它們的交易溢價都高於我們現在的水準。而股權市場也相當懷疑。

MSTR is trading at a 5.5% premium to our net assets. And you can see this illustrated a bit more on the next slide.

MSTR 的交易價格相對於我們的淨資產有 5.5% 的溢價。你可以在下一張投影片更清楚地看到這點。

Right. The MSTR price implies a near 0 value for the digital credit business. In essence, if you look at the market cap of the company compared to our net reserves, if we were to pay off all of our liabilities at face value, we still have $36.3 billion of net reserves. And the market cap is $2 billion in excess of that. So the real issue is what is the operating business worth?

對。MSTR 的價格意味著數位信用業務的價值幾乎為 0。本質上，如果你看公司的市值相對於我們的淨儲備，假設我們以面值清償所有負債，我們仍有 363 億美元的淨儲備。而市值只比那多出 20 億美元。所以真正的問題是：營運業務值多少？

And so our view is, if we can sell $5 billion of digital credit a year and if Bitcoin outperforms a hurdle rate, then that looks like $5 billion of net income to us and the business ought to be valued at some multiple of that depending upon robustness and growth.

因此我們的看法是：如果我們每年能賣出 50 億美元的數位信用，且比特幣跑贏門檻報酬率，那對我們而言看起來就像是 50 億美元的淨利，而這門生意應該依其穩健性與成長性，以某個倍數來估值。

If we can sell $10 billion of digital credit a year, then you could imagine the business being -- at some point, we show the market, we can do it. We show the market we can grow from there. You could put a 10 P to E on that. And so what you can see is our view is the digital credit business is dramatically undervalued. It should be worth something substantially more than $2 billion.

如果我們每年能賣出 100 億美元的數位信用，那你可以想像這門生意——在某個時點，我們向市場證明我們做得到。我們向市場證明我們能從那裡繼續成長。你可以給它 10 倍本益比。因此你可以看到，我們的觀點是：數位信用業務被嚴重低估。它的價值應該遠遠高於 20 億美元。

The market is pretty much skeptical that there is an operating business there.

市場基本上懷疑那裡是否真的存在一個營運業務。

As the market begins to realize that we have a digital credit franchise, then I think that they'll put a bigger P TO E on that. And as we show that we can stabilize SDRC and we can grow it in a stable steady fashion then I think that we'll see those multiples expand and the value of the digital credit business will expand as well. And I think that's very bullish for the equity.

當市場開始意識到我們擁有一個數位信用特許經營權時，我認為他們會給它更高的本益比。而當我們證明我們能穩定 SDRC，並以穩健、穩定的方式成長時，我認為我們會看到那些倍數擴張，數位信用業務的價值也會隨之擴張。我認為這對股權非常看多。

MSTR is built to outperform Bitcoin over the long term. And one way to see that is looking at these statistics. If you're a short-duration investor, if you're just trading on a daily basis or weekly or monthly basis or even quarterly basis, it's pretty much a coin flip whether MSTR will outperform BTC. But as your duration stretches to one year, you get a substantial advantage. When you go to two years, it's 64% likely.

MSTR 的設計目標是在長期跑贏比特幣。其中一個看法是觀察這些統計數據。如果你是短存續期投資人，只是按日、按週、按月，甚至按季交易，那 MSTR 是否能跑贏 BTC 幾乎就是五五波。但當你的持有期間拉長到一年，你就會獲得顯著優勢。當你拉長到兩年，機率是 64%。

When you get to three years, it's 87% likely, and 495 windows of four years or longer, it has -- MSTR has outperformed Bitcoin 100% at the time. So if you're a four-year investor, you've got a long-time horizon, you can see that as the time horizon extends the laws of statistics start to work in our favor and we begin to outperform. And you can see it reflected here. In the last six years from August 10, 2020, to today, Bitcoin's up 32%, MSTR is up 42%, and the MAG is up 23%, the S&P is up 14%, (inaudible) up 12%, real estate is up eight money markets give you three in bonds or a minus 4% loser. So our strategy is fairly straightforward.

當你拉長到三年時，勝出的機率是 87%；而在 495 個四年或更長的期間中，MSTR 在 100% 的時間都跑贏比特幣。所以如果你是四年期投資人、擁有長期投資視野，你會看到隨著時間跨度拉長，統計法則開始對我們有利，我們就開始跑贏。而你也可以在這裡看到反映。在過去六年，從 2020 年 8 月 10 日到今天，比特幣上漲 32%，MSTR 上漲 42%，MAG 上漲 23%，標普上漲 14%，（聽不清）上漲 12%，不動產上漲 8%，貨幣市場給你 3%，而債券則是 -4% 的輸家。所以我們的策略相當直接。

The stats seem to be telling a very clear story. We believe that we can continue to outperform Bitcoin and the engine for doing it is the digital credit engine.

這些統計數據似乎在講一個非常清楚的故事。我們相信我們可以持續跑贏比特幣，而做到這一點的引擎就是數位信用引擎。

Why do we believe in the franchise? Well, let's look at these four factors, right? We're sitting on an incredible capital stack. We have $55 billion of Bitcoin, USD 3.75 billion, and we're a well-known seasoned issuer. That gives us a big capital advantage.

我們為什麼相信這個特許經營（franchise）？好，我們來看這四個因素，對吧？我們擁有令人難以置信的資本結構。我們持有 550 億美元的比特幣、37.5 億美元現金（USD），而且我們是知名、資深的發行人。這讓我們具備巨大的資本優勢。

We also have a technology advantage. We've been in the business for a long time, 35 years, but also we invented a lot of these credit instruments. We've been trading them in the markets. We've learned a lot about how they trade. And we think that understanding how digital credit works and how digital equity works is a big tech advantage.

我們也有技術優勢。我們在這個行業已經很久了，35 年，但同時我們也發明了許多這類信用工具。我們一直在市場上交易它們。我們學到了很多關於它們如何交易的知識。而我們認為，理解數位信用如何運作、以及數位股權如何運作，是一項很大的技術優勢。

Our third pillar of our franchise is the brand. We have millions and millions of followers. They know who we are. We're well known everywhere in the world in every major capital market, and this is a big advantage. And then finally, there's a network effect, millions and millions of investors, tens of thousands of institutions, deep pools of liquidity where we've got the highest ratio of open interest to market cap in the S&P universe.

我們特許經營的第三個支柱是品牌。我們有數以百萬計的追隨者。他們知道我們是誰。我們在全球各大資本市場都非常知名，這是一個很大的優勢。最後，還有網路效應：數以百萬計的投資人、數以萬計的機構、深厚的流動性池；在標普宇宙中，我們的未平倉量相對市值的比率是最高的。

We've got a very deep I think one of the most liquid stocks in that S&P 500 universe, so deep equity liquidity, deep derivatives liquidity, we've got the most liquid preferred stock, so deep credit liquidity, lots of people trading these things lots of people making a market in them, all of the hedge funds.

我們擁有非常深的——我認為是標普 500 宇宙中流動性最好的股票之一；所以有深厚的股權流動性、深厚的衍生品流動性；我們也有流動性最高的優先股，因此有深厚的信用流動性；很多人在交易這些工具、很多人在為它們做市，所有的避險基金都在其中。

And we pride ourselves on creating lots and lots of trading pairs. So there are a lot of ways that people can be long, short, hedged, straddled in equity or credit or derivatives and that's a very, very large financial advantage and a large brand advantage for MSTR and we think that we will be able to grow that. So simply put, what is the goal of the company? What's our ambition? We want to be the world's largest company.

我們以創造大量、大量的交易對為榮。所以人們有很多方式可以在股權、信用或衍生品上做多、做空、對沖、做跨式（straddle）；這是一個非常、非常大的金融優勢，也是 MSTR 很大的品牌優勢，我們認為我們能夠把它做大。那麼簡單來說，公司的目標是什麼？我們的抱負是什麼？我們想成為全世界最大的公司。

That's our ambition. Well, largest in what terms, not the most employees, not the most products. We want to be the largest in terms of market cap, the most valuable company in the world. And what's our plan to do it, it's very simple: own the most capital is capital, we're going to own the most.

這就是我們的抱負。那麼「最大」是以什麼衡量？不是員工最多、也不是產品最多。我們想在市值意義上成為最大——成為全世界最有價值的公司。那我們的計畫是什麼？非常簡單：擁有最多的資本——資本就是資本，我們要擁有最多。

Our strategy is on the most capital. Who else would say they want to own capital, Berkshire halfway in the 20th century. I don't think they're as ambitious right now as they used to be. Since most of their capital is sitting in T-bills or sovereign credit. But in essence, Berkshire Hathaway had a strategy to hold a bunch of capital.

我們的策略就是擁有最多的資本。還有誰會說他們想擁有資本？20 世紀中期的波克夏（Berkshire Hathaway）算一個。我不覺得他們現在還像以前那麼有野心。因為他們的大部分資本都放在國庫券或主權信用上。但本質上，波克夏海瑟威曾有一個策略：持有大量資本。

We have a strategy to hold a bunch of capital most other successful companies don't have that strategy. The second prong, after we own the most capital, we're going to issue the strongest credit. If we have the world's best capital, the best-performing capital asset, BTC, we should be able to create the strongest credit, STRC. And we think for every dollar of capital, we can sell $0.10 to $0.20 of credit per year. And so the more capital, the more credit, the more credit, the more liquidity, the more stability, the stronger the brand, the lower the volatility, et cetera.

我們也有一個策略：持有大量資本；大多數其他成功公司並沒有這樣的策略。第二個支柱是在我們擁有最多資本之後，我們要發行最強的信用。如果我們擁有世界上最好的資本、表現最好的資本資產——BTC——我們就應該能創造最強的信用：STRC。而我們認為，每 1 美元的資本，我們每年可以賣出 0.10 到 0.20 美元的信用。因此資本越多，信用越多；信用越多，流動性越多；流動性越多，穩定性越高；品牌越強，波動越低，等等。

And then by issuing the strongest credit, we think we'll create the best equity, MSTR. And that just becomes a virtuous cycle, acquire capital, issue credit, create equity, (inaudible) and repeat. And we have done that. We've gone from a $600 million enterprise value six years ago to $60 billion, so by a factor of 100. and we think we're just getting started.

接著，透過發行最強的信用，我們認為我們會創造最好的股權：MSTR。這就形成一個良性循環：取得資本、發行信用、創造股權、（聽不清）然後重複。而我們已經做到了。我們從六年前 6 億美元的企業價值成長到 600 億美元，成長了 100 倍；而我們認為這才剛開始。

Now we're getting the engine tuned and the credit turbine is beginning to spin up again.

現在我們正在把引擎調校到位，而信用渦輪也開始再次加速運轉。

I will end by thanking everybody for your support, reiterate our principles that haven't changed. And with that, we'll be happy to answer questions from the panel.

最後我想感謝大家的支持，並重申我們未曾改變的原則。接下來，我們很樂意回答座談會的提問。

Thank you, Michael. We'll now start the late Q&A session. I'd like to welcome all our Q&A guests and invite them to turn on the video. We look forward to your questions. We'll go one at a time.

謝謝你，Michael。我們現在開始較晚的問答環節。我想歡迎所有問答來賓，並請大家打開視訊。我們期待你們的問題。我們會一次一位。

I'll call out your names, and you can direct your questions to the management team. For the first question, we have Mark Palmer. Please go ahead.

我會點名，你們可以把問題直接提給管理團隊。第一個問題是 Mark Palmer。請開始。

Yeah. Earlier in the call, Phong noted that management has learned a great deal about the investors in stretch and how they think. And one thing that we've seen is that the size of strategies USD reserve is important to retail investors in particular and more important than the amount of obligations ahead of stretch in the company's capital structure, such as the convertible bonds.

好的。在電話會議較早的時候，Phong 提到管理層對 Stretch 的投資人以及他們的思考方式學到了很多。我們看到的一點是，策略的美元儲備規模對散戶投資人尤其重要，而且比 Stretch 在公司資本結構中前順位的義務金額（例如可轉債）更重要。

With that said, would you consider borrowing against strategies, Bitcoin holdings, specifically with a bank with a fortress balance sheet as your counterparty and use the borrowed funds to increase the USD reserve to a size that would put to rest any concerns about dividend coverage and presumably drive the price of Stretch back up to par at which point the company could resume buying Bitcoin?

在此情況下，你們是否會考慮以策略的比特幣持倉作為抵押向外借款——特別是以一家資產負債表非常穩健的銀行作為交易對手——並用借來的資金把美元儲備提高到足以消除對股息覆蓋的疑慮的規模，從而推動 Stretch 的價格回到面值（par），屆時公司就可以恢復購買比特幣？

Phong, do you want to take that question initially start?

Phong，你要不要先回答這個問題、先開個頭？

I think the feedback is that something between two to three years from our institutional investors at that level. that we need to get the current reserve to. We're at 2.1 years. We're to continue to grow. We're doing it primarily through issuing equity at a premium to net asset value.

我認為回饋是，我們的機構投資人在那個層級上希望我們把目前的儲備提高到大約 2 到 3 年之間。我們現在是 2.1 年。我們會繼續成長。我們主要是透過以高於淨資產價值（NAV）的溢價發行股權來做到這一點。

We have considered and talked to many counterparties about borrowing against our Bitcoin, and I would say that the market is not as big and not at priced as well as you would think it would be at the size we want. So it's not something we've considered doing. The other thing we have to consider is the counterparty risk, the terms, et cetera. So it's not something we've really looked too hard into. I think we have better ways to build up the US dollar reserve.

我們確實考慮過、也和許多交易對手談過以我們的比特幣作抵押借款；但我會說，以我們想要的規模來看，市場沒有你想像的那麼大，而且定價也沒有那麼好。所以這不是我們考慮要做的事。另外我們還必須考量交易對手風險、條款等等。所以我們並沒有非常深入地研究這件事。我認為我們有更好的方式來建立美元儲備。

So I think the short answer of it, it's not on the table right now. The company has the option, right, in the future, if we ever needed to use Bitcoin, but we think that right now, it's -- it would be more complicated than it's worth. And we have more straightforward ways to build the USD reserve up that will create fewer questions or counterparty risks or uncertainties. And so our goal, I think, is we would like to show debt. We would like the existing amount of debt to be the maximum we have.

所以我想簡短的答案是：目前不在考慮範圍內。公司未來確實有選項，對吧，如果我們真的需要使用比特幣，但我們認為就現在而言——這會比它的價值更複雜。而且我們有更直接的方法來增加美元儲備，這些方法會帶來更少的疑問、交易對手風險或不確定性。因此我想我們的目標是，我們希望展示負債。我們希望現有的負債規模就是我們所擁有的最大負債。

We would like it to be progressively whittled down in a responsible way over time, and we would like to avoid any kind of appearance of a margin debt or mark-to-market loan on the balance sheet just because it tends to be an attack surface an attack narrative for short sellers, and we don't want to create anything that creates those uncertainties if we don't need to. And I don't think we're going to need to.

我們希望它能隨著時間以負責任的方式逐步被削減，並且我們希望避免在資產負債表上出現任何類似融資融券負債或按市價計價貸款的觀感，因為那往往會成為放空者的攻擊面、攻擊敘事，而我們不想在不需要的情況下製造任何會帶來那些不確定性的東西。而且我不認為我們會需要。

Thanks, Mark. Next, I'd like to invite Matt Hougan.

謝謝你，Mark。接下來，我想邀請 Matt Hougan。

Great. I have a two-part question. So watching the business evolve. You periodically added new tools to the tool kit, first equity issuance, then convertibles, then preferreds and perpetual preferred, the first part is, are we at the end of that series of innovations? Or are there more instruments coming down the road?

太好了。我有一個兩部分的問題。所以看著業務演進。你們會定期在工具箱裡加入新工具，先是增發股權，接著是可轉債，然後是優先股以及永續優先股；第一部分是，我們是否已經走到這一系列創新的終點？還是未來還會有更多工具／金融工具推出？

And then the second is a variant of that through the BTC monetization program you have effectively found a way to sell volatility and sell the volatility of investor sentiment at the securities layer. Wondering if you've considered or the reasons why you wouldn't also consider selling volatility at the derivatives layer as another tool in the toolkit to navigate always changing market environments?

第二部分是其變體：透過你們的 BTC 變現計畫，你們實際上找到了一種在證券層面賣出波動率、賣出投資人情緒波動率的方法。想請問你們是否考慮過——或是為什麼不會考慮——也在衍生品層面賣出波動率，作為工具箱中的另一項工具，以因應不斷變化的市場環境？

I'll start with that, and then you guys can chime in if you like. Right now, we have six bonds and five other credit instruments. So we have 11 credit instruments. We could issue six more tomorrow. We could do one a week, every week, and we could blow out to 18 or 24 or 36 or 48 credit instruments, we could go.

我先回答這個，然後你們如果想補充也可以加入。目前我們有六檔債券和另外五項其他信用工具。所以我們共有 11 項信用工具。我們明天就可以再發行六項。我們可以每週發一檔、每週都發，然後把規模擴到 18、24、36 或 48 項信用工具，我們都做得到。

But we're actually -- it's not hard to issue a credit instrument when you have $55 billion or $60 billion of unencumbered capital. We're going the opposite direction. We're laser focused on consolidation. So I'd rather like the business model of like the Strives.

但其實——當你有 550 億或 600 億美元的未設質資本時，發行一項信用工具並不難。我們正朝相反方向走。我們高度聚焦在整併。所以我更偏好像 Strives 那樣的商業模式。

If you look at STRIVE, they've got one equity, ASSP, they've got one credit instrument, SATA, and that's it. And it's just a question of how big will the market cap of the equity get and how big will the market AUM or the market cap or the credit get? And I think you would you probably should expect that we won't have more, we'll probably have less. So I think our 11 credit instruments will be whittled down. Our explicit plan is to whittle them down over time. I'm certain that we'll keep STRC.

如果你看 STRIVE，他們只有一檔股票 ASSP，他們只有一項信用工具 SATA，就這樣。剩下的問題只是：股權的市值會變多大，以及信用工具的市場 AUM、市值或規模會變多大？我想你大概應該預期我們不會更多，反而可能更少。所以我認為我們的 11 項信用工具會被逐步削減。我們明確的計畫就是隨時間推進把它們削減下來。我確定我們會保留 STRC。

STRC is the flagship. All the focus is STRC. We think that the other preps that publicly traded are option value if they were fairly valued. Right now, they're not fairly valued, they're way undervalued. So like my message is like, if you get this, you want to go buy STRF or you ought to buy STRD.

STRC 是旗艦。所有焦點都在 STRC。我們認為其他公開交易的優先股，如果被合理定價，會具有選擇權價值。但現在它們並沒有被合理定價，而是被嚴重低估。所以我的訊息是：如果你理解這點，你會想去買 STRF，或者你應該買 STRD。

They're incredibly compelling institutional opportunities for a long-term credit investor, they're so good that I won't sell it to you, right? Like that's how good they are.

對長期信用投資人而言，它們是極具吸引力的機構級機會，好到我都不會賣給你，對吧？就是好到這種程度。

The bonds, we don't see a strategic -- we think that we had to do the five. If I could do it again, Matt, I would just do -- I would do no bonds. I would just sell STRC. I would go directly to to go -- don't stop anywhere else, just go to the winner, if I could do it again. And I tell people generally like if you're sitting on $5 billion of capital and you're a Bikpoint treasury company, don't sell convertible bonds, don't sell long duration credit, don't sell convertible, don't sell a product like Strike or Stride or Stripe or Stream, like just create something which is short duration credit like SDRC or SATA because we know there's 50x to 100x the demand.

至於債券，我們看不到策略性的——我們認為當時不得不做那五檔。如果能重來一次，Matt，我會——我會選擇不發任何債券。我只會賣 STRC。我會直接——直接走向贏家；不要在其他地方停留，如果能重來一次我會這麼做。而且我一般會跟大家說：如果你手上有 50 億美元資本、你是一家比特幣金庫公司，就不要發可轉債、不要發長久期信用、不要發可轉、也不要發像 Strike、Stride、Stripe 或 Stream 這類產品；只要做一個短久期信用的東西，像 SDRC 或 SATA，因為我們知道需求是 50 倍到 100 倍。

So if there is 100x demand, we don't really need to create any new credit instrument to grow. And in fact, that it's like I say, just because you can do a thing, you shouldn't -- it doesn't mean you shouldn't do a thing. I actually think this is one of those examples where don't just do something stand there. right? Like the more you do, the worse it is. Because every new credit instrument robs liquidity from the one that really matters. So we're interested in combining liquidity or building liquidity. So it's more likely that we would offer you a swap to swap into STRC and pull liquidity than we would ever bifurcate it.

所以如果需求有 100 倍，我們其實不需要再創造任何新的信用工具來成長。而且事實上，就像我說的：你能做一件事，不代表你就應該做——這並不表示你不該做一件事。我其實認為這就是那種例子：不要只是做點什麼，站著就好，對吧？你做得越多，反而越糟。因為每一個新的信用工具都會從真正重要的那一個抽走流動性。所以我們關心的是把流動性合併、或建立流動性。因此更可能的是，我們會提供你一個交換（swap）讓你換進 STRC、把流動性拉回來，而不是把它再切分。

And it is true, I can imagine 100 cool things to do. I can imagine digital money in yen or Swiss francs or pounds or euros, I can imagine a 10-mall credit instrument in euros, pounds or Frank, I can imagine a zero-vol-money instrument in those and things -- we're just not going to do it. That's what I would say for everybody else. Every one of our partners, they are great ideas. You should do it -- but for us, they would be a distraction and they would dilute our focus and they would dilute liquidity.

而且確實，我可以想像 100 個很酷的事情可以做。我可以想像以日圓、瑞士法郎、英鎊或歐元計價的數位貨幣；我可以想像以歐元、英鎊或法郎計價的 100 億規模信用工具；我可以想像在那些幣別裡的零波動貨幣工具等等——但我們就是不會做。這就是我想對大家說的。我們每一位合作夥伴，那些都是很棒的點子。你們應該去做——但對我們而言，那會分散注意力、稀釋我們的專注，也會稀釋流動性。

It's like rather than -- even if I could issue, for example, Stretch in euros, I would rather issue Stretch in dollars and have someone else create Stretch in euros and by the currency hedge and get paid 200 basis points, and they make a lot of money off that business than for us to do it.

就像——即使我可以發行、例如，以歐元計價的 Stretch，我也寧願發行以美元計價的 Stretch，然後讓別人去做以歐元計價的 Stretch、再做匯率避險並賺取 200 個基點，讓他們在那門生意上賺很多錢，而不是由我們來做。

So we feel like we've got Kerosene we're not going to design the jet airplanes, the trains, the planes. We're -- everybody else can build every refined version of it that they want. So I don't think it's constructive for us to be over inventing product right now. It's kind of demonstrative when you think of Apple, they're still making the money off the iPhone. And it's like, I'm not against magical revolutionary product, but let me put it as a hurdle as this.

所以我們覺得我們手上有煤油，我們不會去設計噴射機、火車、飛機。——其他人想要把它做成各種精煉版本都可以。所以我不認為我們現在過度發明產品是建設性的。你想想 Apple 就很能說明問題，他們到現在主要還是在靠 iPhone 賺錢。而且我不是反對神奇的革命性產品，但我把門檻設在這裡。

If you came up with an idea where the demand was $100 billion of the market opportunities between $100 billion and $1 trillion, you might get my attention, and we would talk about it. But if you gave me a $10 billion idea, I would say that's a distraction. And the only ideas I can think of that are $100 billion ideas are things built on top of STRC by someone else. And I hope someone else does build a $100 billion thing on top of STRC, good for them. I hope they make billions and billions a year off of it and everybody looks happily ever after.

如果你提出一個點子，其需求是 1,000 億美元、而市場機會介於 1,000 億到 1 兆美元之間，你可能會引起我的注意，我們會談談。但如果你給我一個 100 億美元的點子，我會說那是分心。而我能想到唯一屬於 1,000 億美元等級的點子，是由別人在 STRC 之上建立的東西。而我也希望真的有人能在 STRC 之上做出一個 1,000 億美元的東西，對他們很好。我希望他們每年賺進數十億、數十億美元，然後大家從此幸福快樂。

But I'm reasonably sure that we're more likely to commit a fall by not by creating other things rather than by focusing on the one thing and making the one thing. Because the one thing is short duration, low volatility, high liquidity, stable credit. And that's a $1 trillion opportunity for us. And if that's all we do, and that's all I do in the rest of my life, then that will have been greater than I could have ever hoped for. So that's what I think of with regard to that.

但我相當確定，我們更可能犯的錯，是不斷去創造其他東西，而不是專注在那一件事上，把那一件事做好、做成。因為那一件事具備短久期、低波動、高流動性、信用穩定。而那對我們而言是一個一兆美元的機會。如果我們所做的就只有這件事，而我在餘生也只做這件事，那也將比我曾經能期待的還要更大。所以我對這件事的看法就是如此。

Now the second part of your question, selling volatility. We could go and we could sell volatility. We could sell tranche. We could sell out of the money. We could sell out of the money call options on Bitcoin. We could solve volatility against the commodity or the capital asset, BTC. We could also sell volatility against the equity. We could actually sell warrants on MSTR. And it's not lost upon us, right, that we could sell a war on a -- by the way, when we sell convertible bonds, we were selling a bond with a warrant.

現在談你問題的第二部分：賣出波動率。我們可以去賣出波動率。我們可以賣出分層（tranche）。我們可以賣出價外部位。我們可以賣出比特幣的價外買權。我們可以針對商品或資本資產 BTC 來賣出波動率。我們也可以針對股票來賣出波動率。我們其實可以賣出 MSTR 的認股權證。而且我們也很清楚，順帶一提，當我們發行可轉債時，我們賣的是一張附帶認股權證的債券。

So I could go and sell a $200 Strike on MSTR, or I could tie it into a convertible bond. But as you know, we don't want to sell bonds because bonds are senior to stretch. So that's a nonstarter.

所以我可以去賣出一張 MSTR 行使價 200 美元的權證，或者把它綁進一檔可轉債裡。但如你所知，我們不想賣債，因為債券在資本結構上優先於 STRC。所以那根本行不通。

Now if I were to sell the warrant, I'm selling volatility, but I'm stripping volatility. I'm clipping it off of the common stock. And so the point really is we are selling volatility right now, Matt. And the way we're selling volatility right now is we're selling MSTR. And so when we saw MSTR, MSTR has a 90-vol or 80-vol. And the reason people want to buy it from us is because it's non-vol. So if I turned around and I sold $1 billion of volatility on top of MSTR -- I changed the convexity the instrument and I strip the volatility from the equity and I transfer it to the other security.

現在如果我去賣權證，我是在賣出波動率，但我同時也在把波動率剝離出來。我是在把它從普通股上剪下來。所以重點其實是：我們現在就在賣出波動率，Matt。而我們現在賣出波動率的方式，就是賣 MSTR。所以當我們賣 MSTR 時，MSTR 的波動率是 90 vol 或 80 vol。而人們之所以想從我們這裡買，是因為它是「非波動」（non-vol）。所以如果我轉頭又在 MSTR 之上再賣出 10 億美元的波動率——我就改變了這個工具的凸性，把波動率從股權中剝離，並轉移到另一個證券上。

So this is kind of like I can sell five credit instruments senior to STRC, but they undermine my best idea STRC. And I could sell five warrants, so I could sell a warrant at $150, $200, $250 or $350, but I'm stripping the vol and the value off of the underlying security. And what I'm doing is fragmenting all the liquidity, and I'm creating complexity and this is something that a professional options trader at Susquehanna, or Millennium, or Citadel, or Soros, they could do all day long. And my view is they're better than us.

所以這有點像：我可以賣出五個在 STRC 之上、資本結構更優先的信用工具，但那會削弱我最好的想法 STRC。我也可以賣出五張權證，例如行使價 150、200、250 或 350 美元，但我是在把波動率與價值從標的證券上剝離。而我做的事情會把所有流動性切碎，並製造複雜性；這是 Susquehanna、Millennium、Citadel 或 Soros 那種專業選擇權交易員可以整天做的事。而我的看法是，他們比我們更擅長。

And so there's two thoughts. One is I don't want to steal an opportunity from a credit investor or an equity investor or a derivative investor. I don't want to steal it from them. I want to leave it for them. I want them to say, oh, these goofball guys, they could sell the volatility, but they don't. So I can. Like, yeah, it's like you can. That's why people that we never met. That I've never had a meeting with the derivatives traders that create the options market and our stock and yet they just spend this stuff up for us, right?

所以有兩個想法。第一，我不想從信用投資人、股權投資人或衍生品投資人那裡偷走機會。我不想把機會從他們手上拿走。我想把它留給他們。我希望他們會說，喔，這些傻瓜其實可以賣出波動率，但他們沒有。所以我可以。對，就像：你可以。這也是為什麼那些我們從未見過的人——我從來沒有跟那些建立我們股票選擇權市場的衍生品交易員開過會，但他們卻會替我們把這些東西做出來，對吧？

That's the reason they do it because that's what they do. So I don't want to steal their opportunity, and I don't want to make their job harder I want them to have complete transparency and line of sight for five years, right, as long as possible. So they can create all these things.

他們之所以這麼做，是因為那就是他們的工作。所以我不想偷走他們的機會，也不想讓他們的工作更難；我希望他們能有完全的透明度與五年的清晰可見性，對吧，越久越好。這樣他們就能創造出所有這些東西。

But the second thing is there's a general principle that we're a publicly traded company we should do things that we are uniquely able to do that they can't do. So a guy with $100 million in a Bloomberg cannot create STRC, and they can't strip -- they can't do what we're doing. They can't issue it, right? And they can't improve it. And they also can't create MSTR.

但第二點是有一個一般原則：我們是一家上市公司，我們應該做那些只有我們能做、而他們做不到的事。所以一個拿著 1 億美元、用 Bloomberg 的人無法創造 STRC，他們也無法剝離——他們做不到我們正在做的事。他們無法發行它，對吧？他們也無法把它做得更好。而且他們也無法創造 MSTR。

So we're creating securities. We can create publicly traded liquid securities globally, and they can't do that. But what they can do is they can enter on all those trades. So all of those other trades, whether it's like strip the ball, convert the currency, change the duration butterfly between one year and three year, amplify it up, damp it down, structure it, they can do it, they should do it. I welcome them to come do it.

所以我們是在創造證券。我們可以在全球創造上市、具流動性的證券，而他們做不到。但他們能做的是：他們可以參與所有那些交易。所以其他所有交易，不管是像剝離波動、兌換貨幣、在一年與三年之間做久期蝶式、把槓桿放大、把波動壓低、做結構化，他們都能做，也應該由他們來做。我歡迎他們來做。

And our representation to them, our promise is, we won't compete with you, and we won't change the convexity -- like how would you feel if I put it a press release saying, I just sold BTC call options at $75,000 a coin against $50 billion of Bitcoin. How do you think about the equity then? Like, well, he just stole the upside on equity, you see.

而我們對他們的表態、我們的承諾是：我們不會跟你們競爭，我們也不會改變凸性——比如說，如果我發一則新聞稿說，我剛剛以每枚 75,000 美元的行使價，針對 500 億美元的比特幣賣出了 BTC 買權，你會怎麼看股權？你會怎麼想？就會變成：嗯，他把股權的上行空間偷走了，你看。

And so the equity investor -- and then how do you feel about the derivative, the call option guy? It's like, wait a minute, I just created that market and they just distorted the market in derivatives and they're mucking with it. And now you've got all this issue of derivatives guidance. And so we're not trying to make the company more complicated. We're trying to make the company simple learn and it's such a good idea.

那股權投資人——再來你覺得衍生品、買權那一方會怎麼想？就像：等一下，我才剛建立那個市場，他們就扭曲了衍生品市場，還在裡面攪局。然後你就會遇到一堆關於衍生品指引（guidance）之類的問題。所以我們不是要讓公司變得更複雜。我們是要讓公司簡單、容易理解，而且這個想法本身就非常好。

My view is, yes, it is a good idea. So I leave it for someone else to do. And it's not that we're not selling the vol, we're selling the vol, right? We sold billions and billions of dollars of equity. And it's like, to a certain extent, the people that bought it from us were buying it for the volatility and for the upside.

我的看法是：是的，這確實是個好主意。所以我把它留給別人去做。而且不是說我們沒有在賣波動率，我們有在賣波動率，對吧？我們賣出了數十億、數十億美元的股權。某種程度上，從我們手上買走的人，就是為了波動率與上行空間而買的。

And when we start selling the ball, we're stripping their upside away from them. And ultimately, there'll be a price to pay. So I think it's one of those things where it's easy to do. I could raise $1 billion in two days by selling the warrant. I could raise $1 billion in two days by selling the convertible bond. I can raise $1 billion in two days selling and junk bond. And it's easy to come, but there would be a bad hangover, and the hangover would be it would change the characteristics of the other securities, and it would fragment liquidity.

而當我們開始賣出波動率時，我們是在把他們的上行空間從他們手上剝走。而最終，這會有代價要付。所以我認為這是那種很容易做的事。我可以在兩天內透過賣權證籌到 10 億美元。我可以在兩天內透過賣可轉債籌到 10 億美元。我也可以在兩天內透過賣垃圾債籌到 10 億美元。這些錢來得很容易，但之後會有很糟的宿醉；而這個宿醉就是：它會改變其他證券的特性，並且會把流動性切碎。

And also, it would undermine trust, right? And the trust is like I'm not going to do that. And so you can take advantage of that knowledge to put in whatever trade against me or trade with me. And it's more important for us that we make the biggest possible market in the equity MSTR and in the credit STRC, right, then we pursue every cool idea.

而且，它也會破壞信任，對吧？而信任就是：我不會那樣做。所以你可以利用這個認知，去做任何針對我或與我一起的交易。對我們而言，更重要的是：我們要在股權 MSTR 與信用 STRC 上建立盡可能大的市場，對吧，而不是去追逐每一個很酷的點子。

One more point I'll make. We could generate billions we can sharing billions and billions of dollars of revenue by selling volatility against BTC right now, we would also generate a multibillion-dollar tax liability. And then the equity investors absorb the tax hit, and then we pass it through to the credit investors.

我還要再補充一點。我們現在就可以透過對 BTC 賣出波動性，創造數十億、甚至數百億美元的營收，但同時也會產生數十億美元的稅負。然後由股權投資人吸收這筆稅務衝擊，接著我們再把它轉嫁給信用投資人。

So MSTR equity investors currently have a business model where they've got deferred tax on capital gains and the credit investors have a deferred tax on the credit dividend. And so we have a very tax-efficient business model. And if we start to get cute by doing all this, we create lots of complications. You're Well, maybe I don't care about deferring tax on the credit. Well, actually, it's not just that.

所以 MSTR 的股權投資人目前的商業模式是：他們在資本利得上有遞延稅負，而信用投資人則在信用股息上有遞延稅負。因此我們有一個非常具稅務效率的商業模式。如果我們開始耍小聰明做這些操作，就會製造很多複雜性。你可能會說：好吧，也許我不在乎信用端的遞延稅。但其實不只是那樣。

It also eliminates the withholding tax for foreign investors. So you might get a 30% withholding tax. So this has so many complications to the tax efficiency of the credit or to the tax efficiency of the company and introduces counterparty risk. And all of those micro reason, but to tell you the truth, the real reason that we don't do it is because I want some due with a Bloomberg to get up in the morning and lay a $500 million bet taking advantage of what he knows about volatility or she knows.

它也能消除外國投資人的預扣稅。否則你可能會被課 30% 的預扣稅。所以這會對信用端的稅務效率、或公司的稅務效率帶來非常多的複雜性，並引入交易對手風險。這些都是一些細微原因；但說實話，我們不做的真正原因是：我不希望某個拿著 Bloomberg 終端機的人早上起床就下 5 億美元的賭注，利用他或她對波動性的理解來套利。

And I want them to know that they can put that trade in, and we're not going to rugpull them by countertrading or trading against them because the most important thing, the thing that's made us successful is a very good partnership with the Citadels and the Millenniums and the Susquehanna, right, and the Soros of the world and the capital investors of the world and capital groups and then all those credit investors and all of them, they've got their own models.

而且我希望他們知道，他們可以把那筆交易做進去，而我們不會突然翻臉，透過反向交易或與他們對作來坑他們；因為最重要的事、也是讓我們成功的事，是我們與 Citadel、Millennium、Susquehanna 等機構（以及全球的 Soros 那類投資人）、各種資本投資人與資本集團，還有所有那些信用投資人之間建立了非常好的合作關係。

And the last thing in the world they need is to have to guess how we will decide to trade in the next 12 weeks. It just breaks their models and what will happen is they'll take their money and they'll go home, or They'll cut their allocation of capital. And so instead of -- instead of investing with us, they're like, well, I can't -- the company is too opaque. It's a black box. And I was like, that's just not the right way to build a network.

而他們最不需要的，就是還得去猜我們接下來 12 週會怎麼決定交易。那會直接破壞他們的模型；結果就是他們會把錢收回去、回家，或是降低他們的資本配置。於是他們就不再跟我們一起投資，而是覺得：我不行——這家公司太不透明。它像個黑盒子。我就想，這絕對不是建立網路的正確方式。

And we don't -- we could do it. I could generate $1 billion like this, but we're not playing for $1 billion, Matt, we're playing for $1 trillion. We want to create a $1 trillion company and a $1 trillion asset class, and that requires that we think very long term strategically, and we can't do it alone. We need people with more money than us to trust us.

我們不——我們確實可以這麼做。我可以用這種方式創造 10 億美元，但我們不是為了 10 億美元在玩，Matt，我們是在為 1 兆美元而戰。我們想打造一家 1 兆美元的公司，以及一個 1 兆美元的資產類別；而這要求我們以非常長期、策略性的角度思考，而且我們不可能單打獨鬥。我們需要比我們更有錢的人信任我們。

Next, we have Ramsey El-Assal Candor Fitzgerald.

接下來是 Cantor Fitzgerald 的 Ramsey El-Assal。

I think it was Andrew that mentioned in the prepared remarks, plans to either equitize repay or refinance the existing convertible debt. Can you all collectively help us think through the scenarios where you would opt to or be compelled to deploy these different approaches and also comment on the general timing of your actions when it comes to addressing the upcoming convertible debt maturities?

我想在事先準備的發言中是 Andrew 提到的：計畫要把現有的可轉債股權化、償還或再融資。你們能否一起幫我們梳理一下：在什麼情境下你們會選擇、或被迫採用這些不同做法？另外也請談談在處理即將到期的可轉債到期日方面，你們行動的大致時點安排。

I can start. I would say, Ramsey, the simple answer is that we have all of those options available to us, right? And so in terms of monitoring the market, being able to understand what the right action is at the right time. I think all of the options are open. In terms of timing, I don't think there's any prescribed rush right now.

我可以先說。Ramsey，我會說最簡單的答案是：我們有所有這些選項可用，對吧？因此在監測市場、理解在正確時間採取正確行動方面，我認為所有選項都保持開放。至於時點，我不認為目前有任何既定的急迫性。

I think we're continuing to be very disciplined in how we think about it. I think the activity in Q2 showed that we're able to go out and repurchase the debt and there is an active convert market that's very active right now. But really, it's just about waiting and seeing when the right time is.

我想我們會持續以非常嚴謹的方式來思考這件事。第二季的活動顯示，我們能夠到市場上回購債務，而且目前可轉債市場非常活躍。但本質上就是等待並觀察何時是正確的時機。

Right now, our priority is to get stretched back to par. As we said. And so I think the broader message is simply that liability management options remain open. There is no set time line. We will be disciplined in how we think about it, and we'll move forward in that manner.

目前我們的優先事項是把狀態拉回到面值（par）。如同我們所說的。所以更廣泛的訊息很簡單：負債管理的選項仍然開放。沒有固定時間表。我們會以嚴謹的方式思考，並以此方式推進。

I can give you an example, Ramsey. Our next convertible debt put date is September of next year. It's our 2028 converts with a conversion price of $183. My expectation is that in September of next year, we'll be north of that conversion price. We won't get put and then a year later we'll equitize it because it will be north of $183.

Ramsey，我可以給你一個例子。我們下一個可轉債的回售日（put date）是在明年 9 月。那是我們 2028 年到期的可轉債，轉換價是 183 美元。我預期到明年 9 月，我們的股價會高於那個轉換價。那麼就不會被回售；再過一年我們就會把它股權化，因為股價會高於 183 美元。

Let's say a year from now, we're not north of $183, we get put that our options are either to sell MSTR at a premium to pay it down, our options are to sell Bitcoin to pay it down or we could just refinance it, right? The terms of convertible notes right now, we get asked every single week by a bank, are we willing to do a 0 up 40 $4 billion eight-year convert? The terms are actually better now than they were when we entered into most as converted in the last five years. So there's a lot of options, and that's the next line that comes up, and that's how we would think about it.

假設一年後我們沒有高於 183 美元、而被回售，那我們的選項要嘛是以溢價賣出 MSTR 來償還；要嘛是賣出比特幣來償還；或是我們也可以直接再融資，對吧？以目前可轉債的條件來看，我們幾乎每週都會被銀行問：我們是否願意做一筆 0 息、上檔 40、40 億美元、8 年期的可轉債？實際上，現在的條件比我們過去五年做大多數可轉債時還要好。所以選項很多；而那就是下一個會遇到的節點，我們也會用這樣的方式來思考。

Thank you, Ramsey. Next we have Samson Mow.

謝謝你，Ramsey。接下來是 Samson Mow。

Okay. It's great to be here with this lovely big Bitcoin group of heavyweight intellectuals. So I have a compound question, if you don't mind. It's a bit of a follow-on to Matt's question. So I understand you want to keep things simple.

好的。很高興能在這個可愛、龐大的比特幣重量級智囊團中。如果你們不介意，我有一個複合式問題。這有點延續 Matt 的問題。所以我理解你們想保持簡單。

You don't want to be trading against the guy with the Bloomberg Terminal and $500 million. But do you think there is any benefit in this sort of new shift to an active capital management strategy to do things like cell covered calls because there is now a price point at which following you said is advantageous to sell Bitcoin.

你們不想跟那個拿著 Bloomberg 終端機、手上有 5 億美元的人對作交易。但你們是否認為，在這種轉向更主動的資本管理策略的新變化下，做一些像是賣出備兌買權（covered calls）之類的事會有任何好處？因為現在存在一個價格點，依你所說，在那個價格點賣出比特幣是有利的。

So you could deploy some capital in those markets just to optimize your acquisition or possibly create like a side pocket for selling cash cured puts to buy a bit on cheaper at times, too. Do you view that as conflicting with the current strategy of keeping it simple? Or is it -- is there room for optimization in there for the Bitcoin accumulation because that's a very it's a hard market, especially when Bitcoin is...

所以你們可以在那些市場部署一些資本，來優化你們的收購；或者可能建立一個側袋（side pocket），透過賣出現金擔保賣權（cash-secured puts），在某些時候以更便宜的價格買入一些比特幣。你是否認為這會與目前「保持簡單」的策略相衝突？或者——在比特幣累積上是否仍有優化空間？因為那是一個非常——那是一個很難的市場，尤其當比特幣……

I'll give you a quick answer on Samson, which is just right now, that's not part of the plan. We just think it would generate counterparty risk complications, change the convexity of the equity change, the tax characteristics of the company, change the tax characteristics or it might create a tax complication for the credit and aren't our view is the single most lucrative thing we can do with the stack of Bitcoin is cell credit against it, not sell volatility against it.

Samson，我給你一個簡短的回答：目前這不在計畫之內。我們認為這會帶來交易對手風險的複雜性、改變股權的凸性（convexity）、改變公司的稅務特性、改變稅務特性，或可能為信用端帶來稅務上的複雜性；而我們的看法是：我們能用這一疊比特幣做的最有利可圖的事，是在其上賣出信用（credit），而不是賣出波動性。

So anybody with $1 billion of Bitcoin can sell $100 million or $500 million of coverage of covered calls like anybody can do it, a private citizen to do it. There's only two companies in the world right now that have shown that they can actually sell digital credit against Bitcoin, us and STRIVE. And there's only one company in the world that can sell credit at our scale, and that's us.

所以任何持有 10 億美元比特幣的人，都可以賣出 1 億或 5 億美元規模的備兌買權覆蓋——任何人都能做，私人也能做。但目前全世界只有兩家公司證明他們真的能在比特幣之上賣出數位信用：我們和 STRIVE。而全世界只有一家公司能以我們這個規模賣出信用，那就是我們。

And we -- I don't know why we couldn't sell. We were selling $2 billion a month of it. We could sell $1 billion a month of it. So our focus is get the digital credit reactor up and running and don't do anything to confuse the matter and don't do anything to create opacity. And again, they're all options like in the future, if I had to do it, if I had to do it for some reason, I would do it.

而我們——我不知道為什麼我們賣不掉。我們當時每個月在賣其中的 20 億美元。我們也可以每個月賣其中的 10 億美元。所以我們的重點是把數位信用反應器啟動並運轉起來，不要做任何會讓事情混淆的事，也不要做任何會造成不透明的事。再說一次，未來它們都是選項；如果我必須做、如果因為某些原因我必須做，我會去做。

But right now, we think the best business in the world is selling STRC and the most useful thing we can do that the path to become a $1 trillion company, that the path to become the world's most valuable company is not selling call options on Bitcoin. The path to becoming the world's most valuable company is creating the credit money on top of Bitcoin. And everything we do that is complication to the credit that makes it confusing (inaudible), that undermines the creditworthiness of STRC, and it distracts the management team. So it's not on the table right now, and we're just going to focus on returning Stretch to health. Did you have a second part to your question?

但就目前而言，我們認為世界上最好的生意就是賣 STRC，而我們能做的最有用的事——通往成為一家 1 兆美元公司的道路、通往成為全球最有價值公司的道路——不是在比特幣上賣買權。成為全球最有價值公司的道路，是在比特幣之上創造信用貨幣。而我們做的任何會讓信用變得複雜、讓它變得令人困惑（聽不清）、削弱 STRC 的信用度、並分散管理團隊注意力的事情，都是不利的。所以現在不在考慮範圍內，我們只會專注於讓 Stretch 恢復健康。你的問題還有第二部分嗎？

Yes. Sort of related to Stretch, so just a disclaimer. I'm a big believer. I think Stretch is a brilliant product. We try to do the same structuring instruments for nation states like Stretch.

有。算是和 Stretch 有點相關，所以先聲明一下。我是很大的信仰者。我覺得 Stretch 是個很出色的產品。我們也嘗試為民族國家做出像 Stretch 這樣的同類結構化工具。

But there is marketing around Stretch saying we make Bitcoin money. And in the Bitcoin space, there are people that are kind of wondering what is your view? Is Bitcoin an asset? Is it digital property? Is it digital Manhattan?

但 Stretch 的行銷有在說我們在做「比特幣貨幣」。而在比特幣圈子裡，有些人有點在想你的看法是什麼？比特幣是一種資產嗎？它是數位財產嗎？它是數位曼哈頓嗎？

Or is it money? And do you feel these instruments like the preferred squeeze out people from discovering real bare Bitcoin? And I think it'd be cathartic for people to hear what your view is on that.

還是它是貨幣？你是否覺得像這些工具（例如優先股）會把人們擠出、讓他們無法去發現真正的「裸」比特幣（直接持有的比特幣）？我想讓大家聽到你對此的看法，會很有釋放與淨化的效果。

Yes, it's a good point. I think the thing to keep in mind is, our marketing is to the 99% of the people that don't own Bitcoin that don't want to buy it, right? So when -- when we talk about Bitcoin and what we're going to do with it, we're selling products, credit products to people that would never ever in a million years buy the Bitcoin. They just won't buy, either they won't buy it because it's illegal for them to buy it, they don't buy it because it's against their mandate to buy it, they don't buy it because they don't want to hold it, they don't buy it because they literally can't -- that they don't have the ability to punch the button and buy it. So it's either technically impossible or it's just impossible.

是的，這點說得很好。我認為要記住的是，我們的行銷對象是那 99% 不持有比特幣、也不想買比特幣的人，對吧？所以當——當我們談比特幣以及我們要用它做什麼時，我們是在向那些一百萬年也不會去買比特幣的人銷售信用產品。他們就是不會買：要嘛因為對他們來說買它是違法的；要嘛因為買它違反他們的投資授權；要嘛因為他們不想持有；要嘛因為他們真的不能——他們沒有能力按下按鈕去買。所以不是技術上不可能，就是根本不可能。

So we're creating a product for them. And when we create a product for them, we need to market it in a package that they can buy.

所以我們是在為他們創造一個產品。而當我們為他們創造產品時，我們需要用他們能買的包裝方式來行銷。

I think that the issue with money is, the Austrian perspective on money and the JPMorgan perspective on money is a nonsovereign store value bare instrument is money. So gold is money. Everything else is credit. A famous JPMorgan quote from more than 100 years ago in a congressional hearing, and I've said Bitcoin is money, everything else is credit. If you're an Austrian economist, and if you're a Bitcoiner, then you would understand that, that resonates with you and you would be 1% of the money in the world or 1% of the opinion.

我認為關於「貨幣」的問題在於：從奧地利學派對貨幣的觀點，以及摩根大通（JPMorgan）對貨幣的觀點來看，非主權的、作為價值儲藏的「裸」工具就是貨幣。所以黃金是貨幣。其他一切都是信用。一段超過 100 年前摩根大通在國會聽證會上的名言——我也說過——比特幣是貨幣，其他一切都是信用。如果你是奧地利學派經濟學者、如果你是比特幣信仰者，你就會理解這點；這會引起你的共鳴，而你大概只占全球貨幣或全球觀點的 1%。

The rest of the world doesn't agree with us, right? The 99% of the world, they think that money is is a zero vol pegged to a fiat currency. It's a money market or it's actually a stack of dollars. They think of money as the most salable good as a media exchange in account store of value, but in the fiat frame of reference.

世界上其餘的人並不同意我們，對吧？世界上 99% 的人認為，貨幣是與法幣掛鉤、波動為零的東西。它是貨幣市場基金，或其實就是一疊美元。他們把貨幣理解為最具可售性的商品，作為交換媒介、記帳單位與價值儲藏，但都是在法幣的參照框架之下。

And it's not hard to point toward that. There's $30 trillion in money markets. And it's literally a regulated term, like, for example, it's illegal to market -- you think there's a money market, right, because it's a regulated banking term. And so the rest of the world has defined money as an asset pegged to a fiat currency, in yens, euros, dollars, Frank's pounds. That's how the rest of the world is, okay?

而要指出這一點並不難。貨幣市場規模有 30 兆美元。而且它字面上是一個受監管的術語；例如，違法去行銷——你之所以認為有「貨幣市場」，是因為它是受監管的銀行業術語。因此，世界其他地方把貨幣定義為與法幣掛鉤的資產，以日圓、歐元、美元、法郎、英鎊計價。世界其他地方就是這樣運作的，好嗎？

So when you're creating marketing, there's no point in marketing to people that are 100% invested in Bitcoin that they should buy Bitcoin. Because they don't have any additional money to buy Bitcoin with, number one. And number two, they don't need to hear that, right? Like no one that's 100% invested in Bitcoin needs to hear from me that they should buy Bitcoin. They would say, I already did that.

所以當你在做行銷時，對那些 100% 投資在比特幣裡的人行銷、叫他們去買比特幣，是沒有意義的。因為第一，他們沒有額外的錢可以再買比特幣了。第二，他們也不需要聽這個，對吧？像是，沒有任何一個 100% 投資在比特幣裡的人需要聽我說他們應該買比特幣。他們會說：我早就買了。

So when we're marketing, we're marketing to the people that wanted to buy equity or wanted to buy credit or wanted to be invested in something different. So to the conventional institutional investor, we would position Bitcoin as digital capital because it's capital asset, and it competes with real estate and equity portfolios and credit portfolios other liquid instruments like that. So they think of it as capital asset and then they would recognize STRC as a credit instrument. And there will be a little bit of -- and some people think, well, it's preferred, that's not credit. Won't the truth is it is credit.

所以我們在行銷時，是在對那些想買股票、或想買信用、或想投資於不同東西的人行銷。因此，對傳統的機構投資人，我們會把比特幣定位為「數位資本」，因為它是資本資產，並且與不動產、股票投資組合、信用投資組合，以及其他類似的流動性工具競爭。所以他們會把它視為資本資產，然後他們會把 STRC 認作一種信用工具。而會有一點——有些人會想：嗯，它是優先股，那不是信用。但事實是，它就是信用。

It's just not a bond. And so they would view a preferred equity as a credit instrument, and we would deliver that. Now in the fiat frame of reference, gold is capital, a gold-backed bond would be credit and an instrument that was pegged to the US dollar, a note, would be currency or would be money in a fiat frame of reference. And that's the world for the last 100 years, and that's just the way it operates.

它只是不是債券。因此他們會把優先股視為一種信用工具，而我們會提供那樣的產品。現在在法幣的參照框架下，黃金是資本；黃金擔保的債券會是信用；而與美元掛鉤的工具——一張票據——在法幣框架下會被視為貨幣或金錢。而這就是過去 100 年的世界，也就是它運作的方式。

So when we think about how you grow the business, if you're going to grow Bitcoin from $1 trillion to $100 trillion, you can't just convince all the people that have invested everything in Bitcoin that they should keep investing in Bitcoin because you're going to get a trickle of cash flows. You're going to have to go find $99 trillion of other money or monetary volume.

所以當我們思考如何成長這門生意時，如果你要把比特幣從 1 兆美元成長到 100 兆美元，你不能只去說服那些把一切都投在比特幣裡的人繼續投比特幣，因為你只會得到涓滴般的現金流。你必須去找到另外 99 兆美元的其他資金或貨幣量。

And sort of by definition, it's somewhere else. It's invested in real estate. It's invested in bonds. It's invested in the equity capital markets. That's like a $1,000 trillion stack of capital, and we're $1 trillion where that makes us 10 basis points, like we're 0.1%.

而按定義來說，它在別的地方。它投在不動產。它投在債券。它投在股票資本市場。那是一疊大約 1,000 兆美元的資本，而我們是 1 兆美元，這讓我們只占 10 個基點，也就是 0.1%。

So when you go get that money, you're either going to create a Bitcoin backed credit instrument like STRC, or are you going to create a Bitcoin backed equity instrument like MSTR, or you're going to create a wrapped Bitcoin backed fund like IBIT, and all of those are channeling capital into the Bitcoin ecosystem that could not -- they could not contractually, maybe they could not legally, technically could not ethically, they would not economically buy the underlying crypto asset, they just wouldn't.

所以當你去把那筆錢拿過來時，你要嘛會創造一個像 STRC 這樣的比特幣擔保信用工具，要嘛會創造一個像 MSTR 這樣的比特幣擔保股權工具，或者你會創造一個像 IBIT 這樣的包裝式比特幣擔保基金；而這些都在把資本導入比特幣生態系——那些資本可能在契約上不允許、在法律上不允許、在技術上做不到、在道德上不願意、在經濟上不划算去買底層加密資產；他們就是不會買。

And you can -- the irony is always seeing people that are Bitcoin maximal is to get angry that were actually -- that BlackRock is selling wrapped a Bitcoin to sovereign wealth funds, or that we're selling amplified Bitcoin to an equity investor, or we're selling digital credit, credit interest backed by Bitcoin to a credit investor. But I guarantee you, there's like there's no one that buys those instruments that sold Bitcoin to buy the instruments because they didn't want to. It's like all the demand is coming from people that they say, I have a pool of money, and I can't put it in the 40-vol crypto asset. And so their choices put it in a money market or put it in a credit a diversified credit fund.

而你可以——諷刺的是，總是看到那些比特幣極端主義者會生氣，因為實際上——因為貝萊德正在把包裝過的比特幣賣給主權財富基金，或者我們把槓桿放大的比特幣賣給股票投資人，或者我們把由比特幣作為支撐的數位信用、信用利息賣給信用投資人。但我向你保證，買這些工具的人裡，幾乎沒有人是賣掉比特幣去買這些工具，因為他們本來就不想那樣做。需求全部都來自這些人：他們說，我有一筆資金池，但我不能把它放進那種 40 波動率的加密資產。所以他們的選擇是放進貨幣市場，或放進一個信用、分散化的信用基金。

So we see the expansion as digital credit will allow us to tap into the multi-hundred trillion credit mark. And then if you can take that credit and create an instrument pegged to a fiat currency, if you can peg it to the yen or the Swiss franc or the euro or the pound or the dollar and you can offer a spread higher than the risk-free rate, the conventional rate, then you will start to divert capital from the money market instruments. And we talk about digital money. What is digital money? Digital money is a Swiss franc that pays you 4% in a world where the fiat out money is the Swiss franc that pays you zero or negative, right?

所以我們看到的擴張是：數位信用將讓我們能切入數百兆美元規模的信用市場。然後如果你能把那個信用拿來創造一種與法幣掛鉤的工具——如果你能把它掛鉤到日圓、瑞士法郎、歐元、英鎊或美元，並且你能提供高於無風險利率、傳統利率的利差——那麼你就會開始把資本從貨幣市場工具那邊分流過來。而我們談數位貨幣。什麼是數位貨幣？數位貨幣就是：在一個法幣世界裡，瑞士法郎本來付你零或負利率，數位貨幣則是一個付你 4% 的瑞士法郎，對吧？

And we can debate semantics and the crypto community, but it's kind of irrelevant because all the money is not in the crypto community. The money is in fiat community. So if there's $1 trillion invested in Swiss francs that yield zero, and you want $100 billion of it, you have to offer them a Swiss franc that yields 4% backed by a digital credit instrument backed by Bitcoin.

我們可以在語意上、在加密社群裡爭論，但其實有點無關緊要，因為所有的錢不在加密社群裡。錢在法幣社群裡。所以如果有 1 兆美元投在收益為零的瑞士法郎上，而你想要其中 1,000 億美元，你就必須提供他們一個收益 4% 的瑞士法郎，而它是由一個數位信用工具支撐、並由比特幣作為支撐。

So when we use the phrase digital money, we're creating a product to sell to the people that have the hundreds of trillions of dollars of fiat backed securities or money instruments or credit instruments because that's what they understand. And we use the word digital credit, we're creating a product to sell to people that have credit that is fiat based that they understand. and What is Bitcoin? Well, yes, it is money. It's a non -- it's digital gold.

所以當我們使用「數位貨幣」這個詞時，我們是在打造一個產品，賣給那些持有數百兆美元法幣支撐證券、貨幣工具或信用工具的人，因為那是他們理解的東西。而我們使用「數位信用」這個詞時，我們是在打造一個產品，賣給那些持有、且理解以法幣為基礎的信用的人。那比特幣是什麼？嗯，是的，它是貨幣。它是一種非——它是數位黃金。

As much as gold was metallic money, Bitcoin is crypto money or digital money, but it's also digital property. It's also digital capital. It's also digital energy. It's also trust, digital trust. If you want to establish or authenticate digitally, how do you prove your identity without a trusted third party?

就像黃金曾經是金屬貨幣一樣，比特幣是加密貨幣或數位貨幣，但它同時也是數位財產。它也是數位資本。它也是數位能量。它也是信任，數位信任。如果你想在數位世界建立或驗證，沒有可信第三方時，你要如何證明你的身分？

It's one thing to transfer money without a trusted third party, it's another thing to prove that you (inaudible) without a trusted third party. The answer with both of those is using a public-private key combination. I mean that's (inaudible) approach this and I think public-private key cryptography is a critical thing. But even with public-private key cryptography, the ability to anchor it into the most energetic, most secure global blockchain is important.

在沒有可信第三方的情況下轉移金錢是一回事；在沒有可信第三方的情況下證明你（聽不清）又是另一回事。這兩者的答案都是使用公鑰—私鑰的組合。我的意思是，這就是（聽不清）看待這件事的方式，我認為公私鑰密碼學是非常關鍵的。但即便有了公私鑰密碼學，把它錨定到全球最具能量、最安全的區塊鏈上之能力也很重要。

So I think that Bitcoin is important to understand as a trust network, a monitoring network, a capital network and information network, right? And what is the highest best use? I think the market has clearly spoken that the highest best use is for store of value as a capital network. We have proven whether the shadow of doubt that Bitcoin functions if you want to store your monetary energy for four years or longer. And the way we've shown it is like while we're moving $50 million a day, you're selling $1 billion a week of something, right?

所以我認為，比特幣重要之處在於要把它理解為一個信任網路、監控網路、資本網路以及資訊網路，對吧？那最高、最佳用途是什麼？我認為市場已經很清楚地表態：最高、最佳用途是作為資本網路的價值儲存。我們已經證明，幾乎沒有任何疑慮：如果你想把你的貨幣能量儲存四年或更久，比特幣是可行的。而我們展示的方式是：當我們每天在移動 5,000 萬美元時，你們每週在賣 10 億美元的某種東西，對吧？

So clearly, that's a killer app, but there are other applications, right, medium exchange applications and authentication applications and the like. They're not nearly as valuable right now. And it will be whatever it will be. But our view is we like Bitcoin to become 100x bigger than it is, and that means we need 100x more money and it's other people that have the money. And right now, they're invested in Fiat denominated credit equity and monetary instruments and we need to create products that appeal to them, and we need to market them and with words that they understand.

所以很明顯，那是一個殺手級應用，但還有其他應用，對吧，例如交換媒介的應用、身分驗證的應用等等。它們目前的價值遠沒有那麼高。未來會變成什麼就讓它自然發展。但我們的看法是：我們希望比特幣變得比現在大 100 倍，而那意味著我們需要 100 倍的資金，而錢在其他人手上。而現在，他們投資在以法幣計價的信用、股權與貨幣工具上；我們需要創造能吸引他們的產品，也需要用他們聽得懂的詞彙去行銷。

And the most important thing is get the money. Awesome. I think people will be happy hearing us talk about Bitcoin is money for 10 minutes.

而最重要的事情是把錢拿到。太棒了。我想大家會很高興聽我們花 10 分鐘談「比特幣就是貨幣」。

Thank you, Samson. Next, we have Nik Cremo from Barclays.

謝謝你，Samson。接下來是來自巴克萊的 Nik Cremo。

The first, I just wanted to ask on STRC, it's good to see the dividend coverage is over two years now, well ahead of the 12-month minimum and the USD reserve from your digital credit capital framework. Just wanted to ask if you would consider raising the minimum number of months of coverage to say, maybe 18 or 24 months this as a mechanism to get TRC closer to par if later this year, it's kind of still trading in the high 80s range?

第一個，我想先問 STRC。很高興看到股利覆蓋期現在已經超過兩年，遠高於你們數位信用資本框架中 12 個月的最低要求，而且美元準備金也符合。想請問你們是否會考慮把最低覆蓋月數提高到例如 18 或 24 個月，作為一種機制：如果今年稍晚它仍在 80 多（美分）的區間交易，讓 TRC 更接近面值？

I think we'd consider it, Nick. I think the best thing to get is to trade to par is our commitment to a US dollar reserve and increasing the actual number, not necessarily increasing the minimum. I think the other thing we can do to get trade back to par is a study repurchase program, which you've seen. And then another thing is just Bitcoin price going up.

我想我們會考慮的，Nick。我認為讓它回到面值交易的最佳方式，是我們對美元準備金的承諾，以及提高實際的準備金數字，而不一定是提高最低門檻。我認為我們還能做的另一件事，是研究回購計畫，你也看到了。然後另一件事就是比特幣價格上漲。

I think those are some of the levers. Would we increase the minimum US dollar reserve? Maybe at some point, but I think a year is a good spot. Really, how much we have in the US

我想這些是一些槓桿。我們會提高最低美元準備金嗎？也許在某個時間點會，但我認為一年是個不錯的位置。真正關鍵的是，我們在美元裡有多少

dollar reserve, I think, matters even more and our commitment only to use it for dividends and interest.

準備金，我認為那更重要，而且我們承諾只把它用於股利與利息。

Thank you, Nick. Next, we have in Lyn Alden.

謝謝你，Nick。接下來是 Lyn Alden。

My question is, do you have current guidance on kind of a target level of overall amplification or leverage for the company as part of the capital structure? And kind of a related question, is the countercyclicality or procyclicality of capital issuance? And so for example, when STRC has a lot of demand, which tend to happen along with the other instruments during bull markets, there's a choice when it starts to go above our either to issue more STRC or to potentially ratchet down the div.

我的問題是：就資本結構而言，你們對公司整體的放大倍數或槓桿，有沒有目前的指引或目標水準？以及一個相關問題：資本發行是逆週期還是順週期？例如，當 STRC 需求很大時——這通常會在多頭市場中與其他工具一起發生——當它開始高於我們的（某個門檻）時，就會有一個選擇：要發行更多 STRC，或是可能把股利往下調整。

So far, the choice has been made to issue more, accumulate more Bitcoin historically at these kind of pro cyclical price when they happen as most treasury companies do. Going forward, do you have kind of just overall guidance of what you think that kind of the ideal (inaudible) structure is or like level is?

到目前為止，選擇是發行更多，並在這些順週期的價格出現時，歷史上累積更多比特幣，就像大多數財庫型公司所做的那樣。往前看，你們是否有整體上的指引：你們認為理想的（聽不清）結構或水準大概是什麼？

And then do you plan on trying to find ways to -- now that you have kind of multiple different levers to pull to be somewhat more countercyclical in your approach or take a view on whether Bitcoin is maybe oversold or overbought and therefore, leaning in or leaning out of? Or is that not really how you view what you're offering to investors?

另外，你們是否計畫嘗試找方法——現在你們有多種不同的槓桿可以拉動——在做法上變得更偏逆週期一些，或是對比特幣是否可能超賣或超買採取某種觀點，因而更積極或更保守地操作？還是說，你們並不是用這種方式來看待你們提供給投資人的產品？

I guess I can start and then following you quite have some comments. You noticed on our website, we added those Bitcoin metrics. And one of the metrics we added is the 200 week moving average. And then we added the premium the 200 week moving average, and we started tracking it and we started tracking the percentage of the time is above that number. And so I think traditionally, we've always wanted to be long Bitcoin, but I think we underestimated the value of US

我想我可以先開始，然後接著你應該也有一些評論。你有注意到在我們的網站上，我們新增了那些比特幣指標。而我們新增的其中一個指標是 200 週移動平均。接著我們又新增了相對於 200 週移動平均的溢價，並開始追蹤它，也開始追蹤價格高於該數值的時間占比。所以我認為傳統上，我們一直都想做多比特幣，但我想我們低估了美元的價值。

dollars. And now I think we've developed an appreciation for actively managing the mixture between USD and BTC. And obviously, we have more US dollars today we've ever had in the history of the company. And we saw that when we went 98% or 99% BTC, 1% USD the Bitcoin investors didn't like it.

美元。而現在我認為我們已經培養出對於主動管理美元與 BTC 之間配置組合的重視。而且很明顯地，我們今天持有的美元比公司歷史上任何時候都多。我們也看到，當我們配置到 98% 或 99% BTC、1% USD 時，比特幣投資人不喜歡。

The equity investors didn't like it. The credit investors didn't like it. So it actually was -- it actually was counterproductive to be focus. So I think you could expect that we're going to be staring at metrics like the premium to the 200 week moving average and I think that although in the past, we've had a 100% allocation to BTC. I don't think it will be the 100% in the future.

股票投資人不喜歡。信用投資人也不喜歡。所以那其實是——其實是適得其反，過度聚焦。因此我想你可以預期，我們會盯著像是相對於 200 週移動平均的溢價這類指標；而且我認為，雖然過去我們曾經 100% 配置在 BTC。我不認為未來會是 100%。

I think it will be a mix and to your point, if you're sitting at 100% premium to the 200 week moving average, then the likelihood that Bitcoin is going to trade the opposite way goes up, right?

我認為會是混合配置；而如你所說，如果你正處於相對於 200 週移動平均 100% 的溢價，那麼比特幣往相反方向交易的可能性就會上升，對吧？

And so I think that when we're sitting at premiums, we probably will be countercyclical and enter more toward dollars, and we're sitting at discounts or we're sitting at very small premiums, we would be more bullish on BTC.

所以我認為當我們處於溢價區間時，我們可能會逆週期操作、把更多配置轉向美元；而當我們處於折價，或是處於非常小的溢價時，我們會更看多 BTC。

And the reason that we publish that on our website is we wanted people to see the metric that we're staring at. So yes, so that's a long-winded answer to your question, which is sort of yes, yes we are going to actively manage it. And one aspect is what is the credit coverage. And the other aspect is what is the mix between USD and BTC? Do we have 10% of our reserves in USD irregardless of credit obligation.

而我們之所以把那個指標公布在網站上，是因為我們希望大家看到我們正在盯著的指標。所以是的，這是對你問題的一個冗長回答，大致上就是：是的，是的，我們會主動管理。其中一個面向是信用覆蓋程度是什麼。另一個面向是 USD 與 BTC 之間的配置組合是什麼？不論信用義務如何，我們是否要把 10% 的準備金放在 USD。

And do we have 36 months or 24 months of dividends, right? So there are both interesting factors to be managed I'm the opinion with the credit. If you want strong credit like creating chromium steel or stainless steel, you want 20% to 30% chromium and iron and just a smudge of carbon -- but is it 20%, or is it 30%? That's the question of, do you have 24 months or 36 months of dividends.

以及我們是否要準備 36 個月或 24 個月的股利，對吧？所以這兩者都是值得管理的有趣因素，我的看法是就信用而言。如果你想要強健的信用，就像製造鉻鋼或不鏽鋼，你需要 20% 到 30% 的鉻與鐵，再加上一點點碳——但到底是 20% 還是 30%？那就是你要準備 24 個月還是 36 個月股利的問題。

So we want to actively manage to create the strongest possible credit and we're trying to figure out exactly what that alloy is. But the other piece is irregardless is the company better if we're sitting on $55 billion, $5 billion in cash. And if we had $100 billion of Bitcoin, we want to be sitting on $10 billion of cash, even without thinking about the credit. I think the answer to the question of how much cash is probably going to be driven by market sentiment and the market premium and I don't want to simplify it down to it's as simple as just looking at the premium for the 20-week moving ambers because A lot of people will come up with a few other metrics. You may have a number of your own metrics, right?

所以我們想要主動管理，以打造最強可能的信用，我們正在試著找出那個合金配方到底是什麼。但另一個部分是不論如何，公司是持有 550 億美元、其中 50 億是現金比較好嗎？如果我們有 1,000 億美元的比特幣，我們希望持有 100 億美元的現金，即使不去考慮信用也是如此。我認為現金要持有多少，可能會由市場情緒與市場溢價所驅動；我不想把它簡化成只看相對於 20 週移動平均的溢價就那麼簡單，因為很多人會提出其他一些指標。你可能也有你自己的一些指標，對吧？

And there's a debate in the community about what's the best way to calculate whether Bitcoin is at the top of the cycle or at the bottom of the cycle. But I think we're going to start to look at those signals and that will drive the allocation of cash flow. If we saw $1 billion of credit, I don't think you'll see 100% BTC 0 as the norm. I think it will be a ratio and what the ratio is? Well, it will be a function of the equity capital markets, the Bitcoin markets, the credit markets and what are people telling us if the credit investors still want more cash then we're we'll probably lean toward dollars because the credit markets want it, regardless of where BTC is.

而社群裡也在辯論，計算比特幣是在週期頂部還是週期底部的最佳方法是什麼。但我認為我們會開始看那些訊號，而那將驅動現金流的配置。如果我們看到 10 億美元的信用，我不認為你會把 100% BTC、0（美元）視為常態。我認為會是一個比例，而比例是多少？嗯，它會是股權資本市場、比特幣市場、信用市場的函數，以及人們在告訴我們什麼；如果信用投資人仍然想要更多現金，那我們可能會偏向美元，因為信用市場想要它，不管 BTC 在哪裡。

But if the credit is strong, and there's no issue there and it's stable, then it will be a function of where is Bitcoin in the cycle and what are the forward yield curves or the forward vol curves look like and and that will Barry. Phong, do you have anything to add on the subject or any thoughts?

但如果信用很強，沒有任何問題而且穩定，那就會取決於比特幣處於週期的哪個位置，以及遠期殖利率曲線或遠期波動率曲線看起來如何——而且那會有所變化。Phong，你對這個主題有沒有要補充的，或有任何想法？

Yes. I think we're at the one-year birthday of Stretch, which is a brand-new asset class digital credit. At about nine months, we learned the hard way that we shouldn't let our left brain Bitcoin bull, say that everything we can issue is just pour into Bitcoin. And I think we've learned that holding US dollars makes a lot more sense.

是的。我想我們正好來到 Stretch 的一週年生日，這是一個全新的資產類別：數位信用。大約在九個月時，我們用慘痛的方式學到，我們不應該讓左腦的比特幣多頭想法，認為我們能發行的一切都應該全部倒進比特幣。而我想我們也學到，持有美元更有意義。

We also have learned a lot more about our investor base, the retail versus institutional base, the leverage they take on what is important to them. And so we've talked to a lot of them to figure this out. I think reducing the rate when we see a strong Bitcoin price, a strong premium to the 200-week moving average makes sense, right? So I think that's something we consider doing, too.

我們也更了解我們的投資人基礎：散戶相對於機構的組成、他們使用的槓桿，以及對他們而言什麼最重要。所以我們和很多人談過，來把這件事弄清楚。我認為當我們看到比特幣價格很強、相對於 200 週移動平均的溢價很強時，降低利率是合理的，對吧？所以我想這也是我們會考慮去做的事情。

So yes, I think we agree with all your points, Lyn, that we need to look at the cyclicality. We need to look at the demand and you look at the price, the interest rate, how much US dollars we hold, we'll be a lot more thoughtful and methodical this time around about growing the digital credit base. I'm excited to see stretch get back to par so we can exercise all that we have learned.

所以是的，我想我們同意你所有的觀點，Lyn：我們需要看週期性。我們需要看需求，也要看價格、利率，以及我們持有多少美元；這一次在擴大數位信用規模方面，我們會更周全、更有方法、更有紀律。我很期待看到 stretch 回到面值，這樣我們就能運用我們所學到的一切。

Great. I appreciate the guidance.

很好。感謝你提供的指引。

It's worth noting that with credit we've noted that the market would probably rather pay us a lower dividend rate with more currency backing it that a higher dividend rate with more Bitcoin back in it. And so there's this circularity there, which is if we you don't want to carry dollars because they underperform BTC, but you do want to carry dollars because otherwise, you have to overpay to issue the credit. And so to find the sweet spot of how do you create strong credit that has a dividend that's somewhat better than junk bonds, that's compelling enough to have a high demand, but is lower. We could see people don't want the thing paying 14% if they don't feel secure, right? But on the other hand, a lot of our credit investors told us, I'd be happy to be paying you 9% if I just didn't have any anxiety.

值得注意的是，就信用而言，我們注意到市場可能寧可用較低的股利率來支付我們、但有更多貨幣作為支撐，而不是用較高的股利率、但有更多比特幣作為支撐。因此這裡存在一種循環性：你不想持有美元，因為它們表現落後於 BTC；但你又想持有美元，因為否則你就必須為了發行信用而付出更高的成本。所以要找到甜蜜點：如何打造強健的信用，讓股利率略優於垃圾債、足夠有吸引力以帶來高需求，但同時又更低。我們可以看到，如果人們覺得不安全，他們不想要那種支付 14% 的東西，對吧？但另一方面，很多信用投資人告訴我們：如果我不再焦慮，我很樂意付你 9%。

So finding our way to the right balance is all consistent with the dynamic equilibrium because if you find the right credit point, then that lowers the cost of capital that lowers the hurdle rate, which is better for the equity. So the equity benefits if we issue the most efficient credit and the credit benefits. And we know for sure that it's this balance of dollars and BTC. And we know that we have been underweighted dollars before. Now we're in this discovery.

所以找到正確的平衡點，完全符合動態均衡的概念；因為如果你找到正確的信用定位，就能降低資本成本、降低門檻報酬率，這對股權更有利。因此，如果我們發行最有效率的信用，股權會受益，信用也會受益。而我們非常確定，關鍵就在於美元與 BTC 的平衡。我們也知道過去我們對美元的配置偏低。現在我們正處於探索與摸索之中。

And we're talking to our investors every week right? Like every day, we're talking to them, but every week, there's a new announcement.

而且我們每週都在和投資人溝通，對吧？幾乎每天都在跟他們談，但每週都會有新的公告。

And so every single time we make an adjustment in the capital structure, we watch to see how the credit settles, then we go and we talk to our investors to see how they feel about it. And of course, we have other moving parts like the Bitcoin price is a massive moving part of it. If it falls $20,000 or rises 30%, but also SOFR and the federal the monetary policy of the Fed there's the second moving part and in the private credit markets and the equity capital markets.

所以每一次我們對資本結構做出調整時，我們都會觀察信用狀況如何穩定下來，然後再去和投資人溝通，看看他們對此的感受。當然，我們還有其他變動因素，例如比特幣價格就是其中一個巨大的變動因素。如果它下跌 20,000 美元或上漲 30%，此外還有 SOFR，以及聯準會的貨幣政策，這是第二個變動因素，另外也包括私募信貸市場與股權資本市場。

So I think it's a moving target, but what we've learned over the past 12 weeks is we need to actively manage those ratios, and we need to be humble and maybe -- and this is a hard thing for a lot of people to understand. Maybe the best way to buy the most bitcoin is not to buy the most bitcoin Like if it was an 80-20 split or a 90-10 split, we'll actually get more bitcoin over the long term because it's all about sustainable growth. And of course, it's very difficult to explain this on X because people want you -- they don't like nuance of I'm going to sell one and buy 10. They want to hear that you're going to sell none and buy 11 and do it with money you conjured from a genie under the desk. We don't quite have that.

所以我認為這是一個不斷變動的目標，但我們在過去 12 週學到的是：我們需要主動管理那些比率，而且我們需要保持謙遜，並且也許——這對很多人來說很難理解。也許買到最多比特幣的最佳方式，並不是「買最多的比特幣」。如果是 80-20 的分配或 90-10 的分配，長期來看我們反而會得到更多比特幣，因為重點在於可持續的成長。當然，在 X 上要解釋這點非常困難，因為人們希望你——他們不喜歡那種細微差別：我賣 1 個再買 10 個。他們想聽的是你一個都不賣、要買 11 個，而且用的是你從桌子底下的精靈變出來的錢。我們並沒有那種能力。

Thank you, Lyn. Next, we have Lance Vitanza from TD Cowen.

謝謝你，Lyn。接下來是 TD Cowen 的 Lance Vitanza。

That's a great segue to my question. Over the years, investors have come to associate strategy with a number of principles that at one point, seemed absolute, but later proved more flexible in practice, Bitcoin monetization, obviously, one example. Today, management has been clear that it does not intend to issue stretch below par. My question is under what circumstances would you reconsider that position more broadly, how should investors distinguish between principles that are foundational to the model and those that are contingent on market conditions?

這正好銜接到我的問題。多年來，投資人逐漸把 Strategy 與一些原則連結在一起，這些原則在某個時點看似絕對，但後來在實務上證明更具彈性；例如比特幣變現（Bitcoin monetization）就是一個例子。今天，管理層已明確表示不打算以低於面值（below par）的價格發行 Stretch。我的問題是：在什麼情況下你們會更廣泛地重新考慮這個立場？投資人應如何區分哪些原則是模型的基石、哪些則取決於市場條件？

I think we learned that the market wants -- they don't want volatility in their credit, they want lots of liquidity, low volatility, short duration, stability. They want to buy it around par. They want to sell it around par. They want to collect the dividend. That's what they want, and that's what they expect us to give them.

我想我們學到的是：市場希望——他們不希望自己的信用工具出現波動，他們想要大量流動性、低波動、短存續期、穩定。他們希望在接近面值的水準買入。他們希望在接近面值的水準賣出。他們希望領取股息。這就是他們想要的，也是他們期待我們提供的。

And if we do that, then they make a decision in 10 seconds. I'm just going to buy $1 million or I'm going to sell $1 million. If we allow it to flex plus or minus $1, that order becomes a 3-day process. Like I placed a limit order -- we've allowed it to flex $0.40 in the past. People put in limit orders and they wait from -- they put in the order on Wednesday and they're waiting on Friday and the order isn't filled and what would have been a 5-second decision became a 3-day decision.

如果我們能做到這點，他們可以在 10 秒內做決定。「我就是要買 100 萬美元」或「我要賣 100 萬美元」。如果我們允許它上下浮動 1 美元，那張訂單就會變成一個 3 天的流程。例如我下了一張限價單——我們過去曾允許它浮動 0.40 美元。人們下限價單後就等著——週三下單，週五還在等，訂單也沒成交；原本 5 秒鐘的決策變成了 3 天的決策。

But if you let it flex plus or minus $5, we have an example like STRF. STRF is objectively a better credit instrument, like it's 12x overcollateralized. It's got super dividend stoppers and it's got nonpayment penalties. And if you're a credit investor, in theory, it's 10x better. And yet it trades with 120th or 130th the liquidity.

但如果你讓它上下浮動 5 美元，我們就有像 STRF 這樣的例子。STRF 客觀上是更好的信用工具，例如它有 12 倍的超額擔保。它有非常嚴格的股息停止條款（dividend stoppers），也有未付款罰則。如果你是信貸投資人，理論上它好 10 倍。然而它的成交流動性卻只有 1/120 或 1/130。

And I scratch my head and I'm like, why is it nobody wants this thing? And so whenever people say, why don't you just at TRC float up $2 or float down to hours, I think, well, because I've already got that. It's called STRF or STRD, and it's got 130th or 150th of liquidity.

我就很困惑，我想：為什麼沒有人想要這個東西？所以每當有人說，為什麼你不讓 TRC 上浮 2 美元或下浮到某個程度，我就會想：嗯，因為我已經有那種東西了。它叫 STRF 或 STRD，而它的流動性只有 1/130 或 1/150。

And so the answer to the question is, we're never going to -- if it trades -- if you offered me $10 billion to sell you the instrument at $99.9 and take %0.01 off, I wouldn't give you the penny, Lance. I would not give you -- I would not knock off $0.01, if you put $10 billion in front of my face because it's a matter of principal and credibility. If we can't create it such that the trades at par, and we can't sell it at par, we're not going to sell it at all. Our backup is, we just do nothing, the hippocratic oath, do no harm, right? And if we can't -- like we're not going to sell Stride, Strike, we're not selling Strike, we're not selling Stripe, we're not solving Stream, and we're not selling stretch right now.

所以這個問題的答案是：我們永遠不會——如果它以那樣的方式交易——就算你出 100 億美元要我以 99.9 美元把這個工具賣給你、只打 0.01% 的折扣，我也不會給你那一分錢，Lance。就算你把 100 億美元放在我面前，我也不會少收 0.01 美元，因為這關乎原則與可信度。如果我們無法把它做成能以面值交易、也無法以面值賣出，那我們就乾脆完全不賣。我們的備案是：什麼都不做，希波克拉底誓言——不造成傷害，對吧？而且如果我們做不到——例如我們現在不會賣 Stride、Strike，我們不賣 Strike，我們不賣 Stripe，我們不解決 Stream，我們現在也不賣 stretch。

And that's okay. At some point, Stretch will return to par. And the only question is how much money or time will we have to exert to get it to par. But I guess I would say it's it's not worth doing if we can't do it right. So I come back to (inaudible).

這也沒關係。在某個時點，Stretch 會回到面值。唯一的問題是：我們需要投入多少資金或時間，才能把它推回到面值。但我想我會說，如果不能把它做好，就不值得做。所以我回到(聽不清楚)。

It's like the recent standard oil was successful was because it was standard and it didn't blow up in the engine and it didn't burn you to death. It didn't start a fire. It used to be that people created oils and they were impure. Like if you ever put bad diesel or bad oil and your fuel tank of a boat or a plane, like I'd like to store the engine. So the impurities render the product useless.

就像當年 Standard Oil 之所以成功，是因為它「標準化」，而且不會在引擎裡爆炸，也不會把你燒死。它不會引發火災。以前人們製造的油品不純。比如你如果在船或飛機的油箱裡加了劣質柴油或劣質油品，就可能把引擎弄壞。所以雜質會讓產品變得毫無用處。

So here's my analogy to you, which is, if it's a little bit bad, I could either say, okay, well, here's some kerosine. You should test it in your own factory or in your own (inaudible) before you put it in the engine because it might blow up. And I put the disclaimer on it. Or I could just not sell it to you. And my point really is, if you can't create this stuff so it's pure, like it's got to be pure, and it's got to be what the market wants or just sell nothing at all.

所以我給你的類比是：如果它有點不好，我可以選擇說，好吧，這裡有一些煤油。在你把它加進引擎之前，你應該先在你自己的工廠或你自己的（聽不清楚）裡測試，因為它可能會爆炸。然後我在上面加上免責聲明。或者我也可以乾脆不賣給你。而我真正的重點是：如果你無法把這東西做得很純——它必須是純的，而且必須是市場想要的；否則就乾脆什麼都不要賣。

And if we can't create pure short-duration credit at par, we'd rather just sell nothing at all until we get it right because the demand is -- in my opinion, it's 100x more for short duration credit, 100x more and maybe the ultimate market is 100x bigger. And so it's like we're just playing to win here. And it would be very easy to -- it's like, oh, I could let it float between -- I could sell it at 98 or 97 some days or 99. What would happen would be the market would shrink by a factor of 100, and you would basically turn people from -- it's like what if your bank took a 1% commission every time you deposited money or they didn't, and it was random and it came and it went, and you weren't quite sure. Or what if the trading fee, it changed from five basis points to 5% randomly from week to week. It's like, yes, it's like I put my hand on the light switch and sometimes I get a shock and sometimes I don't get a shock.

而且如果我們無法以面值創造出純粹的短天期信用產品，我們寧可先什麼都不賣，直到把它做對為止，因為需求——以我之見——對短天期信用的需求是 100 倍，100 倍之多，而且最終市場規模可能也大 100 倍。所以這就像是我們在這裡就是要贏。而且要——很容易就——就像，喔，我可以讓它在——我可以有些日子以 98 或 97 賣出，或以 99 賣出。結果會是市場規模縮小 100 倍，你基本上會把人們從——就像如果你的銀行每次你存款都收 1% 手續費，或是不收，而且是隨機的、時有時無，你也不太確定。或者如果交易費用從 5 個基點到 5% 每週隨機變動。就像，是的，就像我把手放在電燈開關上，有時會被電到，有時不會被電到。

And it's like, you don't want to touch the switch. And so that's how we feel about this thing.

那就像，你就不想去碰那個開關。所以這就是我們對這件事的感受。

It's like you would be so angry at me if it's like you bought it at $100, you sold it at $100, but you could have sold it at $105, or you bought it at $100, but then you could have bought it at $98, It's like that kind of thing. It just destroys the product. And we've discovered, we've inadvertently tripped over what we think is the magic product, the greatest product in the world. The marketplace wants us to strip the volatility of it. They want it to trade at par.

就像如果你以 100 美元買進、以 100 美元賣出，但其實你本來可以以 105 美元賣出；或者你以 100 美元買進，但其實你本來可以以 98 美元買到——就是那種情況，你會對我非常生氣。它會直接摧毀這個產品。而我們發現——我們是無意間——碰到了我們認為是魔法般的產品、世界上最棒的產品。市場希望我們把它的波動性剝離掉。他們希望它以面值交易。

They want it to be liquid. That's our job. If we punt, if we aggregate on our responsibility, it's just like someone shipping you a beer and saying, well, here's the six pack. One of them is spoiled, but the other five are good, just check before you drink. It's not acceptable, right? It's a failure, right, to create -- we're creating a failed, flawed product, and we're telling -- we're lowering our standards and telling ourselves it's okay.

他們希望它具備流動性。那是我們的工作。如果我們推託、如果我們在責任上打折扣，就像有人寄給你一箱啤酒，然後說，好，這裡是六罐裝。其中一罐壞了，但另外五罐是好的，你喝之前自己檢查一下。這不可接受，對吧？這就是失敗，對吧——去打造——我們是在打造一個失敗、有缺陷的產品，然後——我們降低標準、告訴自己這樣也可以。

It's not okay. It needs to trade at par. We won't sell it below par, right? If we have to spend an extra $1 billion to get it to par, it's an extra $1 billion. If it took an extra $2 billion, an extra $2 billion. If it took an extra $4 billion, spend $4 billion. It's like how much is it worth spending to make the airplane that flies across the Atlantic without crashing on the way? It's like just make the thing work, right?

不可以。它必須以面值交易。我們不會以低於面值賣出，對吧？如果我們必須多花 10 億美元才能讓它回到面值，那就多花 10 億美元。如果要多花 20 億美元，就多花 20 億美元。如果要多花 40 億美元，就花 40 億美元。就像要花多少錢才值得做出一架能跨越大西洋、途中不會墜毀的飛機？就像把它做能用就對了，對吧？

And that's what we've discovered. We've got a thing, everybody wants it, we need to make it work. I can't guarantee you exactly how many dollars it takes for me to get it to work or how many days it takes me to get it to. But what I can say is that it is so clear in our mind that this is what the market wants. And this is what we can create, and this is the thing that will make the company worth hundreds of billions and then trillions of dollars that there's nothing else worth considering. Everything else is a distraction or waste of time. We just need this thing to work as designed.

而這就是我們所發現的。我們有一個東西，大家都想要，我們需要讓它運作起來。我無法向你保證到底要花多少美元才能讓它運作，或要花多少天才能做到。但我能說的是，我們非常清楚這就是市場想要的。而這也是我們能打造的東西；這個東西會讓公司價值達到數千億，然後到數兆美元，除此之外沒有任何值得考慮的事。其他一切都是分心或浪費時間。我們只需要讓這個東西按設計運作。

Thank you, Lance. Last but not the least, James Straton.

謝謝你，Lance。最後但同樣重要的是，James Straton。

I love seeing the 200-week moving average on the dashboard, and it would be great to see also like on chain metrics that are complementary, like the realized price and true market mean? I think it gives a much greater indicator of support levels. I've got kind of a two-pronged question. So like looking back over the cycle, is your guys' second cycle. What assumption about the capital markets proved you guys wrong lease certain that you expected?

我很喜歡在儀表板上看到 200 週移動平均線，也很希望能看到一些互補的鏈上指標，例如已實現價格（realized price）和真實市場均值（true market mean）？我認為這能更好地指示支撐位水準。我有一個有點雙管齊下的問題。所以回頭看這一輪週期，這是你們的第二個週期。你們對資本市場的哪個假設被證明是錯的，至少跟你們原先預期的不一樣？

And then as capital markets start to move on chain, do you think this can create new opportunity to strategy, whether to tokenize securities, which would obviously reach a broader global investor base or even issue a strategy stable point in the future? Is this something that you guys think about?

然後，當資本市場開始上鏈時，你認為這是否能為策略帶來新的機會——不論是把證券代幣化（tokenize securities），這顯然能觸及更廣泛的全球投資人基礎，或甚至未來發行一個 strategy 的穩定幣？這是你們會思考的事情嗎？

Phong, do you want to start?

Phong，你要先開始嗎？

Yes, I can cover the first one, maybe Mike will cover the second one. In our first (inaudible) cycle in 2022, some might recall, we had secured debt that had covenants on it that were quite restricted to the company. And we had a Bitcoin backed loan that had a margin requirement on it. And our biggest lesson learned for 2022 is don't do either of those. So here we sit in 2026, and we're fully convertible notes and preferred.

好的，我可以先回答第一個，第二個也許 Mike 來回答。在我們第一個（聽不清）週期、也就是 2022 年時，有些人可能記得，我們有附帶契約條款（covenants）的擔保債務，對公司限制相當多。而且我們還有一筆以比特幣作擔保的貸款，帶有保證金要求。我們從 2022 年學到的最大教訓就是：兩種都不要做。所以到了 2026 年，我們現在的結構是全數以可轉換公司債（convertible notes）和特別股（preferred）為主。

And so that was a big lesson from 2022, and I think we upgraded our capital structure as a result. The biggest lesson so far for 2026 is the importance of holding liquid US dollars to fund our dividend and to overfund our dividend until people have confidence in the preferred dividends. And I think we thought that liquid Bitcoin would be important.

所以那是 2022 年的一個重大教訓，我認為因此我們升級了資本結構。到目前為止，2026 年最大的教訓是：持有具流動性的美元來支付股利的重要性，並且要超額準備股利資金，直到市場對特別股股利有信心為止。而我們原本以為持有具流動性的比特幣會很重要。

But what Mike mentioned earlier is the people who are holding these preferreds don't look at Bitcoin the way they look at US dollars. So that was a major lesson learned. And we did a lot of things in May, June that I think looking back at that, we can execute things better. So we learned a lot. And so the next bear market, four years from now, wherever it is, we'll go from that too.

但如同 Mike 先前提到的，持有這些特別股的人看待比特幣的方式，並不像他們看待美元那樣。所以那是一個重大的教訓。而我們在 5 月、6 月做了很多事，我想回頭看，我們可以把執行做得更好。所以我們學到了很多。所以下一次熊市，四年後不管在哪裡，我們也會從中再學到更多。

Yes. I would add, I think, yes, in the capital markets, sometimes the equity capital markets correlate with Bitcoin and they trade in lockstep. But sometimes the correlation is broken like with the AI bubble forming equity capital markets diverged from the digital capital market. And so they will converge and diverge and generally things that are good for risk assets are good for all of us. But sometimes they'll get a boost from their -- from the demand for AI and then sometimes we'll get a boost as a very pro Bitcoin dynamics evolve.

是的。我會補充一點：在資本市場裡，有時候股票資本市場會與比特幣相關，並且同步交易。但有時候這種相關性會被打破，例如 AI 泡沫形成時，股票資本市場就與數位資本市場出現分歧。所以它們會時而收斂、時而分歧；一般來說，對風險資產有利的事情，對我們所有人也都有利。但有時候股市會因為——因為 AI 的需求而得到提振；而有時候我們會因為非常偏多比特幣的動態演變而得到提振。

So I think as a company, we've realized that we're straddling the equity markets when the equity capital markets are rallying, that's certainly good for our equity, but it's not necessarily good for our capital asset BTC. And so we're also struggling the credit markets. And sometimes, there are things that are credit positive or credit negative, the way the yield curve moves and SOFR. And then sentiment in private credit or other sorts of corporate credit, they have their own dynamic. And then there's the digital capital markets, and that's Bitcoin and it has its own dynamic and drivers.

所以我認為，作為一家公司，我們已經意識到我們同時跨在股票市場上：當股票資本市場上漲時，這當然對我們的股票有利，但不一定對我們的資本資產 BTC 有利。而我們也同時跨在信用市場上。有時候，殖利率曲線的變動與 SOFR 會帶來信用面正向或負向的因素。此外，私募信貸或其他類型的公司信用，其情緒也有其自身的動態。然後還有數位資本市場，也就是比特幣，它也有自己的動態與驅動因素。

And what we need to do is just be in a position to exploit and arbitrage the various opportunities. And when one market is mispriced, we're buying the cheap one, selling the well valued one. And then occasionally, we just have to put the engine in reverse and go the opposite direction. And I think that 2, three years ago, we had a much simpler business model and now we realize we -- sometimes you sell credit, sometimes you buy credit, sometimes you sell capital, sometimes you buy capital, sometimes you sell equity, some tone buy equity. And the more nimble you are with regard to that and then the more shareholder value you can create.

而我們需要做的，就是讓自己處於能夠利用並在各種機會之間進行套利的位置。當某個市場出現錯價時，我們就買進便宜的那個、賣出估值合理的那個。然後偶爾，我們只需要把引擎倒檔，往相反方向操作。我認為在兩、三年前，我們的商業模式要簡單得多，而現在我們意識到——有時你賣出信用，有時你買入信用；有時你賣出資本，有時你買入資本；有時你賣出股權，有時你買入股權。而你在這方面越靈活，就越能創造更多股東價值。

With regard to the issue of tokenization, I think the security of tokenized is digital credit. If you look at what's going on right now, people have been tokenizing money market funds, and they are yielding 3.5%. And and they put them in a looping protocols and everybody wants yield and yield drives the entire DFI economy. But if you can plug a 10% yielding instrument into a tokenized asset instead of a 3% yielding instrument, there's so much more energy that you can do a lot more with it.

關於代幣化（tokenization）這個議題，我認為代幣化的證券本質上是數位信用。如果你看看現在正在發生的事，人們一直在把貨幣市場基金代幣化，而它們的收益率是3.5%。然後他們把它們放進循環（looping）協議裡，大家都想要收益，而收益驅動了整個DeFi經濟。但如果你能把一個10%收益率的工具接到一個代幣化資產上，而不是3%收益率的工具，你就能做更多事，能量大得多。

So ultimately, I think that the real interesting killer application is going to be looping digital credit, either stepping it up 2x, 3x, 4x or stepping it down stripping the vol. And if you tokenize STRC and then you step it down and transform it, there's a market for 4% yielding yen as a yield coin or 5% yielding euros or 4% yielding Swiss franc or 6% yielding dollars. And the way you're going to get to that is you can't create that with money markets. You can't take a 1% yielding yen money market and step it up to 3% with any kind of economic responsibility or rationale. It's just -- it's crazy.

所以最終，我認為真正有趣、具殺手級應用潛力的，將會是循環運用數位信用：要嘛把槓桿放大到2倍、3倍、4倍，要嘛把它降槓桿並剝離波動率。如果你把STRC代幣化，然後把它降槓桿並加以轉換，就會出現市場：例如4%收益率的日圓作為收益幣（yield coin），或5%收益率的歐元，或4%收益率的瑞士法郎，或6%收益率的美元。而你要達到那一步，不能靠貨幣市場來做到。你不可能把1%收益率的日圓貨幣市場工具，在任何具經濟責任或合理性的前提下，拉升到3%。那就是——太瘋狂了。

But you can take a 10% yielding or 12% yielding digital credit instrument and you can transform it into any currency, stabilize it, step it down, provide liquidity, give it daily liquidity or hourly liquidity and you can stream a yield and strip the vol off it.

但你可以把一個10%或12%收益率的數位信用工具，轉換成任何貨幣、使其穩定、降槓桿、提供流動性，給它每日流動性或每小時流動性，並且可以把收益串流化，同時把波動率剝離掉。

So I actually think that the more tokenized securities we see and the more money flows into that, the better that's going to be for digital credit. And I think that what does the world want? The world wants -- well, probably the world wants $1 trillion worth of stable coin that pays 6%. And what the world has right now is $250 billion of stable coin that yields nothing, right? And then they jump through hoops trying to make the stablecoins of the yields, not thing yield something.

所以我其實認為，我們看到的代幣化證券越多、資金流入越多，對數位信用就越有利。而我認為世界想要什麼？世界想要——嗯，可能世界想要1兆美元規模、能支付6%收益的穩定幣。但世界現在擁有的是2,500億美元的穩定幣，而且沒有任何收益，對吧？然後他們就得費盡周折，試著讓這些穩定幣——本來不產生收益的東西——能產生一些收益。

But -- and so how are you going to actually create $1 trillion of stable tokens that yield something that's more than SOFR? You're going to do a digital credit. So I think that, that's really the killer thing.

但是——那麼你要如何真正創造出1兆美元、收益率高於SOFR的、會產生收益的穩定代幣？你會透過數位信用來做。所以我認為，那才是真正的殺手級關鍵。

With regard to all the other tokenized securities, real -- the idea -- the killer idea of tokenization is creating a free market in custody and credit. Like if I have $1 million of Apple stock, can I actually transfer it to a custodian that will pay me a 4% yield on it? Because right now, I don't get yield on it. And if I have $1 million of Apple stock and my bank will give me a advance ratio and charge me 8%, while someone could be an 80% advance ratio and charge me 4%. So in theory, you could see those markets form.

至於其他所有代幣化證券，代幣化真正——這個想法——的殺手級概念，是在託管與信用上創造一個自由市場。例如，如果我有100萬美元的蘋果股票，我能不能把它轉到一個託管機構，對它支付4%的收益？因為現在我持有它是拿不到收益的。而如果我有100萬美元的蘋果股票，我的銀行願意給我某個預支比率（advance ratio）並向我收8%，但也許有人可以給我80%的預支比率並只收4%。所以理論上，你可能會看到那些市場形成。

In practice, I don't see them happening in the US right now, and there's still a lot of obscurity. There's a lack of clarity about what kind of tokenized use cases will be allowed for securities. But one thing is clear, stablecoins are going to tripled in their ability to generate yield. So the path to generating yield and fixed income is going to be through tokenized securities, not through tokenized currency or the like.

但在實務上，我目前不認為它們會在美國發生，而且仍然有很多不透明之處。對於證券允許哪些代幣化使用情境，缺乏明確性。但有一件事很清楚：穩定幣在產生收益的能力上將會提升到三倍。因此，產生收益與固定收益的路徑，將會透過代幣化證券，而不是透過代幣化貨幣或類似方式。

And I think we're really well positioned for that. And I think ultimately, it's -- the one thing that they're really good at in DeFi is they're really good at looping something 2x 3x, 4x or they're good at tranching risk and stripping it down to zero vol. So that's financial engineering tokenized.

而我認為我們在這方面的布局非常到位。我想最終——DeFi真正擅長的一件事，是把某個東西循環槓桿2倍、3倍、4倍；或者擅長把風險分層（tranching）並把它剝離到零波動。所以那就是被代幣化的金融工程。

And the one thing you want to engineer is, if I give you a 10-vol, 10% dividend yielding asset in dollars, then in DeFi, in theory, you can create any currency, any monetary instrument pegged to any currency and you can step it up and step it down with transparency. And so I really see as something like STRC is like the universal fuel source for the digital asset economy, and that's really an opportunity for us should that economy become material.

而你想要工程化的一件事是：如果我給你一個以美元計價、波動率10、股息收益率10%的資產，那麼在DeFi裡，理論上你可以創造任何貨幣、任何錨定於任何貨幣的貨幣工具，並且可以在透明的情況下加槓桿或降槓桿。因此我真的把STRC這類東西視為數位資產經濟的通用燃料來源；如果那個經濟體量變得重要，這對我們就是一個機會。

To be clear, right now, it's only 0.1% of the money is in DeFi. So 99.9% of the money is TradFi. And so we don't need it. And it won't -- and the truth is 100x more money is solving this problem in the credit markets and the equity capital markets. But I do think that DeFI and digital assets and tokenization is interesting because the people involved are more progressive, more innovative, they move much faster.

先說清楚，現在只有0.1%的資金在DeFi裡。所以99.9%的資金都在傳統金融（TradFi）。因此我們不需要它。而且——事實是，有多100倍的資金正在信用市場與股權資本市場中解決這個問題。但我確實認為DeFi、數位資產與代幣化很有意思，因為參與的人更進步、更具創新性，他們行動更快。

They're much more creative. They'll take risk they're not so crippled with tradition and custom and incumbency that they fear to do something, which is an obvious thing to do.

他們更有創造力。他們願意承擔風險，不會被傳統、慣例與既有勢力束縛到不敢做一些其實很明顯該做的事。

And so all of the really cool innovative products will probably come out of the digital asset space first. And then it becomes a regulatory struggle and a political struggle to see whether you can get approval to sell a compliant version of that thing in the capital market where you're operating. And we don't have any time to go into that. That's a podcast in and of itself. But that's what I think.

所以所有那些很酷、很創新的產品，可能會先從數位資產領域出現。接著就會變成一場監管上的拉鋸與政治上的角力，看你是否能獲准在你所運作的資本市場中，銷售那個東西的合規版本。我們沒有時間深入談這個。那本身就可以做成一集Podcast。但這就是我的看法。

And sorry, I have a quick question as well. On June 26, Stretch traded down to $70, is there any insight you had on that? Is that forced liquidations from the DeFI? Or was there something else?

抱歉，我也有個簡短的問題。6月26日，Stretch跌到70美元，有沒有你能提供的見解？那是來自DeFi的被迫清算嗎？還是有其他原因？

Tell me, I didn't hear the first part of your question because you cut out on June 26, when what --

跟我說一下，我沒聽到你問題的第一部分，因為你斷線了：6月26日，當什麼--

On 26th June when stretch traded down to, I think, $70, is there any insight you can give on that day? Was it both liquidations or --?

6月26日，當stretch跌到——我想是70美元——那天你能提供一些見解嗎？是因為兩邊的清算，還是--？

What I think happened is that there are a number of broker-dealers unnamed, and we can't even identify them all that we're actually creating credit 3x or 4x credit against STRC under very favorable terms, so they were giving very high -- like a 70% advance ratio or an 80% advance ratio against STRC based upon its previous trading dynamic. And then when it traded down and the ball spiked, I think that those entities change -- they dial back their credit lines from an 80% advance ratio to a 20% advance ratio or they pull those credit lines, and they created, in essence, the equivalent of a margin call or a liquidation event.

我認為發生的情況是，有若干家未具名的券商自營商（broker-dealers），我們甚至無法把它們全部辨識出來；它們實際上是在非常有利的條件下，針對 STRC 創造了 3 倍或 4 倍的信用額度，所以它們基於 STRC 先前的交易動態，提供了非常高的——例如 70% 的預支比率或 80% 的預支比率。然後當它價格下跌、波動飆升時，我認為那些機構改變了作法——把信用額度從 80% 的預支比率調降到 20% 的預支比率，或是直接撤回那些信用額度；本質上等同於造成了一次追繳保證金或清算事件。

But see, to call it a margin call would be misleading. It's not like someone got overlevered and margin called, it was a second order thing. The credit lines creating the leverage got withdrawn. And one of the lessons we learned is, it's important for us to offer the instrument in such a stable way so that the second order and third order credit lines backing the investor that took on the trade don't get pulled away from the investor, right? And that was kind of a -- it was an unexpected thing that we learned.

但你看，把它稱為追繳保證金會有誤導性。這不像是有人過度加槓桿然後被追繳保證金；那是第二層效應。用來創造槓桿的信用額度被撤回了。而我們學到的一個教訓是，我們必須以非常穩定的方式提供這個工具，讓支撐承作該交易之投資人的第二層、第三層信用額度不會被抽走，對吧？這算是——我們意外學到的一件事。

So it wasn't DeFi, by the way. The simplistic notion would be, oh, yes, some retail guys over-borrowed or some DeFi did generate like took on too much leverage. That's not what happened. Some TradFi organization said, well, we'll give an 80% advance ratio when it's trading with a vol of less than 10. And then when the vol spike to 20, they changed the advance ratio and it created this second order and third order rippling effect where you then had someone sell or liquidate and that created a downdraft in the price, which created another liquidation.

順帶一提，這不是 DeFi。一種過於簡化的看法會是：喔，是的，一些散戶借太多，或是某些 DeFi 造成——承擔了過多槓桿。實際上不是這樣。是某個傳統金融（TradFi）機構說，好，當它的波動率低於 10、以那樣的波動交易時，我們就給 80% 的預支比率。然後當波動率飆到 20 時，他們改了預支比率，於是產生第二層、第三層的連鎖漣漪效應：有人賣出或被清算，導致價格下挫，進而又引發另一輪清算。

And so it was a second order, third order reflexive contraction in credit in the system, we believe that cause it to trade into the 70s. And that created -- when I got into 70s, that created anxiety for first order investors then reacted to it. So it's kind of like an amplified reflexivity through a lot of different parts of the market, all working at the same time on a novel asset

因此我們認為，這是系統內信用的第二層、第三層反身性收縮，導致它跌到 70 多。而當它跌到 70 多時，又引發第一層投資人的焦慮，接著他們也做出反應。所以這有點像是市場許多不同部分在同一時間運作，對一個新型資產產生的放大式反身性效應。

I'll turn the call over to Phong for any closing remarks.

我把電話會議交給 Phong 做最後的結語。

Thanks to the analyst, both on the Bitcoin side and the banking side for joining us. Thank you, everyone, for joining us for our earnings call and looking forward to seeing you all again in three months.

感謝分析師們——無論是比特幣端或銀行端——加入我們。也謝謝各位參加我們的財報電話會議，期待三個月後再與各位見面。