Strategy Inc (MSTR) 2026 Q1 法說會逐字稿

Hello, everyone, and good evening. I'm CJ, Head of Investor Relations at Strategy. It's an honor to kick off Strategy's first-quarter 2026 earnings webinar. I'll be your moderator today. We will start the call with a 60-minute presentation, starting with Andrew Kang, followed by Phong Le and then Michael Saylor. This will be followed by a 30-minute interactive Q&A session, with four Wall Street equity analysts and four Bitcoin analysts.

各位好，晚安。我是 CJ，Strategy 投資人關係主管。很榮幸為 Strategy 2026 年第一季財報網路說明會揭開序幕。今天我將擔任主持人。我們將以 60 分鐘的簡報開始本次電話會議，先由 Andrew Kang 開場，接著是 Phong Le，然後是 Michael Saylor。之後將進行 30 分鐘的互動式問答環節，參與者包括四位華爾街股票分析師與四位比特幣分析師。

Before we proceed, I will read the Safe Harbor statement. Some of the information we provide in the presentation regarding our future expectations, plans, and prospects may constitute forward-looking statements.

在我們開始之前，我將宣讀「安全港」聲明。我們在簡報中提供的部分資訊，涉及我們對未來的預期、計畫與展望，可能構成前瞻性陳述。

Actual results may differ materially from these forward-looking statements due to various important factors, including fluctuations in the price of Bitcoin and the risk factors discussed under the caption, Risk Factors, in Strategy's annual report on Form 10-K filed with the SEC on February 19, 2026, and the risks described in other filings that Strategy may make with the SEC. We assume no obligation to update these forward-looking statements, which speak only as of today.

由於多項重要因素，實際結果可能與這些前瞻性陳述存在重大差異，包括比特幣價格波動，以及 Strategy 於 2026 年 2 月 19 日向美國證券交易委員會（SEC）提交的 Form 10-K 年度報告中「風險因素」章節所討論的風險，並包括 Strategy 可能向 SEC 提交之其他文件中所描述的風險。我們不承擔更新這些前瞻性陳述的義務；此等陳述僅截至今日有效。

With that, I will turn the call over to Andrew Kang, the CFO of Strategy.

接下來，我把電話會議交給 Strategy 的財務長 Andrew Kang。

Thank you, CJ. First off, I'd like to officially welcome CJ, Jain, to his new role as Strategy's Head of Investor Relations. I also want to take a moment to thank Shirish Jajodia, our Corporate Treasurer, for helping establish and lead our IR function for the last 20 quarters. As our team grows, I know we will strive to continue to provide transparent and relevant information to all of our shareholders and stakeholders. So welcome, CJ.

謝謝你，CJ。首先，我想正式歡迎 CJ Jain 出任 Strategy 投資人關係主管的新職務。我也想藉此感謝我們的公司財務主管（Corporate Treasurer）Shirish Jajodia，在過去 20 個季度協助建立並領導我們的投資人關係職能。隨著團隊成長，我相信我們將持續努力，為所有股東與利害關係人提供透明且具相關性的資訊。所以，歡迎你，CJ。

Now turning to the quarter's results, we are off to a very strong start in 2026. We now hold 818,334 bitcoin which is about 3.9% of all bitcoin that will ever exist. That keeps Strategy in a clear leadership position as the largest corporate bitcoin holder in the world.

接著談本季成果，2026 年我們有一個非常強勁的開局。我們目前持有 818,334 枚比特幣，約占未來將存在之全部比特幣的 3.9%。這使 Strategy 明確保持領先地位，成為全球持有比特幣最多的企業。

Our market cap is now $62 billion. And Stretch, STRC, has grown to $8.5 billion outstanding, showing strong market fit and investor demand, and filling a gap that has existed for investors seeking stable price and attractive yields backed by Bitcoin. So far, in 2026, we raised about $11.7 billion of capital, giving us more flexibility to keep our Bitcoin position and creating long-term value for our shareholders.

我們的市值目前為 620 億美元。而 Stretch（STRC）未償餘額已成長至 85 億美元，顯示強勁的市場契合度與投資人需求，並填補了長期以來投資人對「由比特幣支撐、價格穩定且具吸引力收益」產品的缺口。截至目前，2026 年我們已募集約 117 億美元資金，使我們在維持比特幣部位方面更具彈性，並為股東創造長期價值。

Turning to Q1 financial results, we reported an operating loss of $14.5 billion and a net loss of $12.8 billion. As you would expect, these results were primarily driven by the decline in Bitcoin's fair value during the quarter. And as these are largely noncash market-driven impacts tied to Bitcoin's quarter-end price, our underlying strategy remains unchanged: raise capital responsibly, buy and hold Bitcoin over the long term, and grow Bitcoin per share for our shareholders.

談到第一季財務結果，我們報告營業損失 145 億美元，淨損 128 億美元。如各位所預期，這些結果主要由本季比特幣公允價值下跌所驅動。由於這些影響多屬非現金、且由市場驅動並與季末比特幣價格連動，我們的核心策略維持不變：負責任地籌資、長期買入並持有比特幣，並為股東提升每股比特幣持有量。

On slide 8 here, Bitcoin per share increased from 181,030 sats per share in May 2025 to 213,371 sats per share in May 2026, which is roughly an 18% year-over-year increase. Year to date, we have delivered 9.4% BTC yield compared to 22.8% for the full-year 2025, showing acceleration year to date compared to the same point last year.

在第 8 頁投影片中，每股比特幣由 2025 年 5 月的每股 181,030 聰（sats）增加至 2026 年 5 月的每股 213,371 聰，約為年增 18%。年初至今，我們已實現 9.4% 的 BTC 收益率（BTC yield），相較於 2025 全年的 22.8%，顯示截至目前相較去年同期呈現加速。

We've also generated 63,410 BTC gain so far in 2026 compared with 101,873 BTC for all of 2025, having already achieved about 62% of last year's full BTC gain in just the first four months of the year. In dollar terms, that represents approximately $5 billion of BTC dollar gain year to date versus $8.9 billion for the full-year 2025.

截至目前，2026 年我們也已產生 63,410 枚 BTC 的增益（BTC gain），相較 2025 全年的 101,873 枚 BTC；也就是說，僅在今年前四個月就已達成去年全年 BTC 增益的約 62%。以美元計，這相當於年初至今約 50 億美元的 BTC 美元增益（BTC dollar gain），相較 2025 全年為 89 億美元。

Since 2020, Bitcoin per share has grown to 213,371 sats per share as of May 2026, which is nearly a 4x increase since the beginning, delivering positive BTC yield every year across multiple market environments. In 2025, we delivered 22.8% BTC yield. And so far in '26, we've already added another 9.4%. We remain focused on consistently increasing Bitcoin per share over time through our disciplined treasury operations and long-term conviction in Bitcoin.

自 2020 年以來，截至 2026 年 5 月，每股比特幣已成長至每股 213,371 聰，較起點幾乎成長 4 倍，並在多種市場環境下每年都交出正向的 BTC 收益率。2025 年我們實現 22.8% 的 BTC 收益率。而在 2026 年截至目前，我們已再增加 9.4%。我們仍專注於透過嚴謹的資金庫存（treasury）運作，以及對比特幣的長期信念，持續、穩定地提升每股比特幣持有量。

Here on slide 11, our track record remains constant, having acquired additional Bitcoin in every quarter since 2020 across 108 separate acquisitions. As of May 4, we held over 818,000 bitcoin for a total value of approximately $64 billion and a total acquisition cost of about $62 billion. Our average purchase price is approximately $76,000 per bitcoin. And our holdings now represent, as I mentioned, 3.9% of all the Bitcoin that will ever exist.

在第 11 頁投影片中，我們的紀錄一貫穩定：自 2020 年以來，我們每一季都增持比特幣，累計 108 次獨立收購。截至 5 月 4 日，我們持有超過 818,000 枚比特幣，總價值約 640 億美元，總取得成本約 620 億美元。我們的平均買入價格約為每枚比特幣 76,000 美元。如我先前提到，我們的持有量目前約占未來將存在之全部比特幣的 3.9%。

Turning here to the balance sheet, digital assets ended the quarter at $51.6 billion compared to $58.9 billion at year-end, having acquired 89,599 bitcoin in Q1. The change reflects the lower price of Bitcoin at the end of the quarter versus at the end of last year. Cash and cash equivalents were $2.2 billion, which largely reflects our USD cash reserve.

接著看資產負債表，數位資產於季末為 516 億美元，相較於年末的 589 億美元；我們在第一季增購了 89,599 枚比特幣。此變動反映季末比特幣價格低於去年年末價格。現金及約當現金為 22 億美元，主要反映我們的美元現金準備。

Regarding taxes, the change this quarter was driven by the quarter-end mark-to-market movement in Bitcoin. And as Bitcoin moved from an unrealized gain at the year-end to an unrealized loss at the end of Q1, our deferred tax liability of $1.9 billion shifted to a deferred tax asset. A full valuation allowance against that tax asset brought the net balance sheet tax position to zero, which also resulted in a noncash tax benefit on the income statement, which partially offset the pretax loss for Q1.

關於稅務，本季的變動主要由季末比特幣按市價（mark-to-market）的變動所驅動。由於比特幣從年末的未實現收益轉為第一季末的未實現損失，我們 19 億美元的遞延所得稅負債轉為遞延所得稅資產。對該稅務資產提列全額估值備抵（valuation allowance）後，使資產負債表上的淨稅務部位為零；同時也在損益表上形成一項非現金的稅務利益，部分抵銷第一季的稅前損失。

Long-term debt remained unchanged at $8.2 billion, while preferred equity increased to $9 billion, driven by strong Stretch issuance in the quarter. Overall, the balance sheet remains highly liquid and extremely well capitalized. At the end of Q4, the market value of our Bitcoin was approximately $59 billion, which is based on a Bitcoin price of about $87,500.

長期負債維持不變，為 82 億美元；而特別股權益增加至 90 億美元，主要受本季 Stretch 強勁發行所帶動。整體而言，資產負債表仍具高度流動性，且資本結構極為穩健。在第四季末，我們的比特幣市值約為 590 億美元，係以比特幣價格約 87,500 美元計算。

During Q1, we recognized that unrealized fair value loss of about $14.5 billion. And despite Bitcoin price volatility, we continued to execute having purchased an additional 89,599 bitcoin in the quarter for approximately $7.3 billion at an average price of about $80,900. We ended the quarter with a digital asset value of $51.6 billion based on a Q1 ending Bitcoin price of about 67,800.

在第一季，我們認列約 145 億美元的未實現公允價值損失。儘管比特幣價格波動，我們仍持續執行策略，本季以約 73 億美元增購 89,599 枚比特幣，平均價格約 80,900 美元。我們以第一季季末比特幣價格約 67,800 美元計算，季末數位資產價值為 516 億美元。

In Q2 so far, we are illustrating an unrealized fair value gain of approximately $8.3 billion as of May 1. We purchased an additional 56,235 bitcoin quarter to date for approximately $4.1 billion at an average price of roughly $73,400 for that period. Those purchases benefiting from the increase in Bitcoin price adds approximately $300 million of positive fair value.

截至目前第二季，我們示意截至 5 月 1 日的未實現公允價值收益約 83 億美元。本季迄今我們以約 41 億美元增購 56,235 枚比特幣，該期間平均價格約 73,400 美元。由於比特幣價格上升，這些購買帶來約 3 億美元的正向公允價值變動。

And as of May 1, our Bitcoin held a market value of approximately $64 billion based on a Bitcoin price of $78,350. (technical difficulty) Bitcoin reserve, implying an mNAV of 1.27, which has expanded since the beginning of the year. We have $13.5 billion of preferred equity, representing 34% amplification and net leverage of 9% made up of the $8.2 billion of convertible debt.

截至 5 月 1 日，以比特幣價格 78,350 美元計算，我們持有的比特幣市值約為 640 億美元。（技術問題）比特幣儲備，意味著 mNAV 為 1.27，且自年初以來已擴大。我們有 135 億美元的特別股權益，代表 34% 的放大效應（amplification），以及由 82 億美元可轉換債務構成的 9% 淨槓桿。

Strategy is building around Bitcoin as digital capital. We have approximately $58 billion of equity. You can see here large traditional banks operate with liabilities-to-asset ratios above 90%. Our ratio is a mere 9%. That gives us a very different foundation made up of a very large equity base, substantial Bitcoin reserves, and structurally lower balance sheet risk.

Strategy 正在圍繞比特幣作為數位資本來打造。我們約有 580 億美元的股東權益。你可以看到，大型傳統銀行的負債對資產比率高於 90%。而我們的比率僅為 9%。這使我們擁有非常不同的基礎：由非常龐大的股東權益基礎、可觀的比特幣儲備，以及結構性更低的資產負債表風險所構成。

We can issue Bitcoin-backed credit products to support investors with strong collateral and continue accumulating Bitcoin over the long term from a position of strength and durability. We have approximately $6 billion of net debt, which represents just 9.3% net leverage against our Bitcoin reserve, which is effectively a 10.8 times BTC rating.

我們可以發行以比特幣作為擔保的信貸產品，以支援具備強勁抵押品的投資人，並在強健且具韌性的基礎上，長期持續累積比特幣。我們約有 60 億美元的淨負債，僅相當於相對於我們比特幣儲備的 9.3% 淨槓桿，等同於 10.8 倍的 BTC 評級。

Our strategy is based on a disciplined balance sheet construction, modest leverage, strong collateral, and permanent capital to grow our Bitcoin over time. Our net leverage is lower than the average of the investment-grade S&P universe and lower than every major industry sector across most S&P 500 companies.

我們的策略建立在嚴謹的資產負債表建構、適度槓桿、強勁抵押品，以及永久資本之上，以隨時間推進比特幣成長。我們的淨槓桿低於投資級 S&P 覆蓋範圍的平均水準，也低於 S&P 500 多數公司中各主要產業部門的水準。

At the current Bitcoin price, our reserve is valued as -- our Bitcoin reserve is valued at approximately $64 billion compared to $6 billion of net debt, which translates to the 10.8 times BTC rating. The stress case on the right shows that even after a 91% Bitcoin price decline to roughly about $7,300 per Bitcoin, our Bitcoin reserve would still be sufficient to cover our net debt at a 1 times BTC rating.

以目前的比特幣價格計算，我們的儲備價值為——我們的比特幣儲備價值約為 640 億美元，相較之下淨負債為 60 億美元，這對應到 10.8 倍的 BTC 評級。右側的壓力情境顯示，即使比特幣價格下跌 91% 至每枚約 7,300 美元，我們的比特幣儲備仍足以在 1 倍 BTC 評級下覆蓋我們的淨負債。

Our USD cash reserve has remained consistent at $2.25 billion. And while the years of coverage has shifted down with the growth of Stretch this year, we believe the stable cash, along with our Bitcoin reserves and ability to raise additional capital, continues to provide us with the flexibility to continue supporting our dividends for the foreseeable future.

我們的美元現金儲備一直維持在 22.5 億美元。雖然隨著今年 Stretch 的成長，覆蓋年數有所下降，但我們相信，穩定的現金水位，加上我們的比特幣儲備以及籌集額外資本的能力，仍將持續為我們提供彈性，以在可預見的未來繼續支持股利發放。

On the next slide, the $64 billion of BTC reserves adds an additional 43 years of coverage. Another way to look at this at today's reserve size, Bitcoin would need to grow by only 2.3% annually for the reserve growth to cover our current obligations. If Bitcoin grows at or faster than the breakeven ARR here, the BTC reserve alone can support our dividends without requiring any additional capital.

在下一張投影片中，640 億美元的 BTC 儲備可額外提供 43 年的覆蓋。換個角度看，以今日的儲備規模，比特幣每年只需成長 2.3%，儲備的成長就能覆蓋我們目前的義務。若比特幣成長率達到或高於此處的損益兩平年化成長率（ARR），僅靠 BTC 儲備就能支持我們的股利，而無需任何額外資本。

Before I turn it over to Phong's remarks, I'd like to highlight the amendment to Stretch that we have asked for your voting. We are proposing to move Stretch dividends from monthly to semimonthly, with payments twice per month on the 15th and the last day of the month, while keeping the economics unchanged.

在我把時間交給 Phong 的發言之前，我想強調我們已請各位投票表決的 Stretch 修訂案。我們提議將 Stretch 股利由每月改為半月一次，在每月 15 日與月底各支付一次，同時維持經濟條件不變。

Our goal is to make Stretch work better for investors by reducing reinvestment lag, improving liquidity, dampening the impact of a single monthly record date, and helping Stretch trade more efficiently around the target price. Today, Stretch pays out 12 times per year with one payment at month-end.

我們的目標是讓 Stretch 對投資人更好用：縮短再投資的時間落差、提升流動性、降低單一每月除息基準日的影響，並協助 Stretch 更有效率地在目標價格附近交易。目前 Stretch 每年支付 12 次，於月底支付一次。

Under the proposed amendment, Stretch would pay 24 times a year with payments around the 15th and the last day of the month. Again, total dividend economics are unchanged, and payments would simply be about half the size and paid twice as often. Under the proposed change, there would be two record dates, one on the 15th and one at the end of the month, with the related payment dates made on the next scheduled record date.

在所提修訂案下，Stretch 將每年支付 24 次，約在每月 15 日與月底支付。再次強調，股利的總體經濟條件不變，單次支付金額約為原來的一半，但支付頻率加倍。在所提變更下，將有兩個除息基準日：一個在 15 日，一個在月底；相對應的支付日將在下一個排定的除息基準日進行。

If the vote is approved, the first record date would be June 30 and the first payment date would be July 15. The mechanics are pretty straightforward: same dividend economics, more frequent payments, and a clear transition timeline. We believe this change creates the highest-frequency credit instrument in the world and makes a great product twice as better. And we look forward to your support.

若投票獲得通過，第一個除息基準日將是 6 月 30 日，第一個支付日將是 7 月 15 日。運作機制相當直接：相同的股利經濟條件、更頻繁的支付，以及清楚的轉換時程。我們相信這項變更將創造全球支付頻率最高的信貸工具，並讓一個很棒的產品變得加倍出色。我們期待各位的支持。

With that, I will turn it over to Phong.

接下來，我把時間交給 Phong。

Thank you, Andrew. Thank you, everyone, for joining us on this evening's earnings call. I have a few updates to make on our capital markets, on our equity, on our digital credit, and then I'll conclude with updates on our capital market strategy overall.

謝謝你，Andrew。也謝謝各位今晚參加我們的財報電話會議。我將就我們的資本市場、股權、數位信貸做幾點更新，最後再就我們整體資本市場策略提供最新進展。

If you had asked us at the beginning of the year, what was our target for the year in terms of capital markets raises, we would have said it was uncertain. And it really depended on the success of the Stretch product. And I think four months in, we can say that Stretch has been more successful than we had expected at the beginning of the year.

如果你在年初問我們，今年在資本市場募資方面的目標是什麼，我們會說仍不確定。而這很大程度取決於 Stretch 產品的成功與否。我想在四個月後，我們可以說 Stretch 的成功程度超出我們年初的預期。

And one representation of that is the amount of capital that we've been able to raise for the company and ultimately for Bitcoin. And you'll see here, year-to-date 2026, we've raised $11.7 billion, as Andrew had mentioned, notably, about half from issuances of our common equity; half from issuances of our preferred, primarily Stretch. And no longer are we issuing convertible debt to raise capital.

其中一個體現就是我們為公司、最終也為比特幣所募集到的資金規模。你會看到，截至 2026 年迄今，我們已募集 117 億美元，如 Andrew 所提到的，其中約一半來自普通股發行；另一半來自優先股發行，主要是 Stretch。而我們也不再透過發行可轉換債來募資。

How does that compare to the rest of the US capital markets, equity capital markets? You'll see last year, we represented about 8% of the equity capital markets in the full-year 2025. We're the largest issuer. And we are, again, this year, the largest issuer in the equity capital markets, about 10% total, 6% of common equity -- 60% notably of preferred equity.

這與美國其他資本市場、股權資本市場相比如何？你會看到，去年我們約占 2025 全年股權資本市場的 8%。我們是最大的發行人。而今年我們同樣是股權資本市場最大的發行人，總占比約 10%，其中普通股約 6%——值得注意的是，優先股約占 60%。

And we're doing what we said we would do and what we were trying to do, which was to shift our ATM more towards credit. And you see this even pronounced as we look at each month of the year 2026. We started in January with 20% of our equity issuances using digital credit, 88% using MSTR. And we've largely flipped that number in April, with 17% using MSTR and 83% using digital credit, which, of course, is also less dilutive to our overall shareholders.

我們正在做我們說過要做、也一直想做的事，也就是把我們的 ATM（隨市發行）更多地轉向信貸。而當我們觀察 2026 年每個月份時，這點更為明顯。我們在 1 月開始時，股權發行中有 20% 使用數位信貸、88% 使用 MSTR。到了 4 月，我們基本上把這個比例翻轉：17% 使用 MSTR、83% 使用數位信貸；當然，這對我們整體股東而言也較不具稀釋性。

Research analysts have been consistently supportive as we look to exit the Bitcoin bear cycle that we're in. The average price target of all of the equity analysts covering Strategy for Bitcoin is $138,000, which is about a 70% increase. The average MSTR price target is about $323, which is an 80% increase from current levels.

研究分析師在我們準備走出目前所處的比特幣熊市循環之際，持續給予支持。所有覆蓋 Strategy 的股票分析師對比特幣的平均目標價為 138,000 美元，約有 70% 的上漲空間。MSTR 的平均目標價約為 323 美元，較目前水準約有 80% 的上漲空間。

So let's talk about digital equity and MSTR overall. We show this chart every quarter. You can find it on our website, strategy.com. But this is our annualized asset performance since we adopted the Bitcoin standard. August 10, 2020, is when we look back to. We've outperformed Bitcoin by about 50%. Bitcoin has outperformed the Mag 7 by about 50%. And the Mag 7 has outperformed the S&P 500.

接著談談數位股權與整體 MSTR。我們每季都會展示這張圖表。你可以在我們的網站 strategy.com 找到它。這是我們自採用比特幣標準以來的年化資產表現。我們回溯至 2020 年 8 月 10 日。我們的表現比比特幣高出約 50%。比特幣的表現比 Mag 7 高出約 50%。而 Mag 7 的表現又優於 S&P 500。

So our ultimate objective is for our common to outperform Bitcoin by accreting Bitcoin per share. And based on this chart, we've continued to deliver on that performance. As Andrew mentioned, our Bitcoin per share is also accreting. That's our business objective ultimately. And we're at 9.4% Bitcoin per share increase so far this year.

因此，我們的最終目標是透過提升每股比特幣（Bitcoin per share）來讓我們的普通股表現優於比特幣。而根據這張圖表，我們持續交付這樣的表現。如 Andrew 所提到的，我們的每股比特幣也在增加。這最終就是我們的業務目標。而今年迄今，我們的每股比特幣增加了 9.4%。

And you'll see that's also accelerated in the last month, right? We started off a little bit slow in January and February, 0.4% and 0.1%; increase in the month of March with 3%; and really increased double in the month of April with 6%.

而且你會看到這在最近一個月也加速了，對吧？我們在一月和二月起步有點慢，分別是 0.4% 和 0.1%；三月單月增加到 3%；而四月則幾乎翻倍大幅提升到 6%。

Last quarter on this call, we said our objective is to double Bitcoin per share in seven years. Doubling Bitcoin per share in seven years implies about a 10% annualized BTC yield. And as I mentioned, so far this year, we've increased 9.4% our BTC yield. So we're well on to our annual target, and we've been happy with the success of Stretch so far this year.

上個季度在這通電話中，我們說我們的目標是在七年內把每股比特幣翻倍。七年內每股比特幣翻倍，意味著約 10% 的年化 BTC 殖利率。而如我所提到的，今年迄今我們的 BTC 殖利率已提高 9.4%。所以我們正穩步達成年度目標，而且我們對 Stretch 今年迄今的成果感到滿意。

And ultimately, MSTR continues to be one of the most widely held equities around the world and the most widely held Bitcoin proxy in the world. And we're able to reach 1,400 institutions, 927,000 retail accounts, 1,300 ETFs and funds, over 100 million beneficiaries that share nearly 4% of the Bitcoin in the world. So I don't think about this as concentrated amongst one company, a set of leaders, but really amongst 100 million people that we're sharing Bitcoin with per share around the world.

而最終，MSTR 仍然是全球持有最廣泛的股票之一，也是全球持有最廣泛的比特幣代理標的。我們能觸及 1,400 家機構、927,000 個零售帳戶、1,300 檔 ETF 與基金，以及超過 1 億名受益人；他們合計分享了全球近 4% 的比特幣。所以我不把這視為集中在某一家公司或一群領導者身上，而是視為我們在全球以每股的形式與 1 億人共享比特幣。

So let's talk about digital credit, our favorite topic so far this year. Look, the idea of preferred capital and preferred credit is not a new idea. And in fact, the industrial revolution was built on the railroads, which was built on digital credit -- sorry, built on analog credit through preferred capital.

那我們來談談數位信用，這是我們今年迄今最喜歡的主題。你看，優先資本與優先信用的概念並不是新概念。事實上，工業革命是建立在鐵路之上，而鐵路是建立在數位信用之上——抱歉，是建立在透過優先資本的類比信用之上。

At that point in time, during the late 1800s and early 1900s, 20% to 40% of the capital structure around the world was preferred capital. What happened in the mid-1900s and the early 2000s is the rise of liquid debt markets, increased regulation, pushing preferred capital into what I would call niche use. Now as people are waking up to preferred capital and digital credit, especially, we're seeing a reemergence.

在那個時期，也就是 1800 年代末到 1900 年代初，全球資本結構中有 20% 到 40% 是優先資本。到了 1900 年代中期與 2000 年代初，流動性債務市場興起、監管增加，將優先資本推向我所稱的利基用途。如今，隨著人們重新認識優先資本，尤其是數位信用，我們正看到它再度興起。

And my analogy here is we're -- preferred capital helped build the railroads, which helped drive the industrial revolution. Now digital credit will help drive the digital railroads or the digital rails. It will drive the digital revolution, including the AI revolution. So we're excited about bringing this back to the forefront of the world.

我的類比是——優先資本曾幫助建造鐵路，而鐵路推動了工業革命。現在，數位信用將幫助推動數位鐵路或數位軌道（digital rails）。它將推動數位革命，包括 AI 革命。所以我們很興奮能把這件事重新帶回世界舞台的前沿。

If you look at an overview here, we have five preferreds. We've mostly been focused on a Stretch so far this year. I think there's an opportunity for the remaining preferreds to start to perform as Bitcoin starts to perform. But Strategy is clearly the tip of the arrow as far as digital credit. And so that's what I'll talk about primarily.

如果你看這裡的概覽，我們有五檔優先股。今年迄今我們主要聚焦在 Stretch。我認為隨著比特幣開始表現，其餘的優先股也有機會開始表現。但就數位信用而言，Strategy 顯然是箭頭的尖端。所以我主要會談這個。

We're up to 11.5% dividend yield. Notably, we've kept this flat for the last two months, right? So we've increased the dividend yield from 9% to 11.5%, and now we're flat for the last two months because what we've seen is the volatility has started to decrease. The price has started to remain stable, and we've seen an increase in Sharpe ratio, 2.53. So the notional value is up to $8.5 billion, and we're trading $375 million a day. And I'll share how that compares to other preferred equities and also common equities in general.

我們的股息殖利率已達 11.5%。值得注意的是，過去兩個月我們把它維持在持平，對吧？我們已把股息殖利率從 9% 提高到 11.5%，而過去兩個月之所以持平，是因為我們看到波動性開始下降。價格開始保持穩定，我們也看到夏普比率上升至 2.53。名目價值已達 85 億美元，而我們每日成交約 3.75 億美元。我也會分享這與其他優先股，以及一般普通股相比如何。

The first thing I'll note is the rapid growth of Stretch, right? In just nine months, we've raised $8.5 billion of capital. We had a running start with $2.8 billion. It slowed down, and it's really accelerated over the course of the last couple of months. Comparatively, this is one of the most successful financial instruments ever created in terms of capital inflows. It's second only to IBIT.

我首先要指出的是 Stretch 的快速成長，對吧？短短九個月，我們就募集了 85 億美元資本。我們以 28 億美元的基礎起跑。之後一度放緩，而在過去幾個月真的加速了。相較之下，就資金流入而言，這是史上最成功的金融工具之一。僅次於 IBIT。

Compared to other products, it has seen faster growth in terms of capital inflows and famous products like the iPhone or Google AdWords. So we're very proud of the acceleration of the product. And it means that we built something that is resonating with people in the US and people around the world.

與其他產品相比，它在資金流入方面的成長更快，甚至超過 iPhone 或 Google AdWords 這類知名產品。所以我們對這個產品的加速成長感到非常自豪。這意味著我們打造的東西，正在與美國以及全球各地的人產生共鳴。

Stretch is, by far, the largest tradable preferred in the world, right? We're nearly two times the size of Wells Fargo's preferred. And you'll see here, what's interesting is almost all of these other preferreds save us and another one, our bank preferreds. So this has gone from being an industrialized product that's building the industrial revolution to a niche financial product. And we're excited to bring it back to being a major product in the world.

Stretch 無疑是全球最大、可交易的優先股，對吧？我們的規模幾乎是富國銀行優先股的兩倍。而你會看到這裡有趣的是，除了我們和另一檔之外，幾乎所有其他優先股都是銀行優先股。因此，這已從一個用來建設工業革命的工業化產品，變成一個利基金融產品。而我們很興奮能把它帶回成為全球的重要產品。

The liquidity of Stretch, so this is the average -- 30-day average trading volume is 25x, the second largest preferred. So where Wells Fargo is about half our size, is trading 1/25th of what we're trading at $15 million versus $375 million.

Stretch 的流動性——也就是 30 日平均成交量——是第二大優先股的 25 倍。所以富國銀行的規模約為我們的一半，但成交量只有我們的 1/25：也就是 1,500 萬美元對比 3.75 億美元。

And what that means is with that liquidity, the turnover of the next best preferred, we're at 4.4%, 10x of what Wells Fargo is and some of these other products like Bank of America products. So we think we really found a new product category, digital credit, based on an old product category, preferred capital. And we're excited about where this is going.

這代表在這樣的流動性下，我們的周轉率相較於次佳的優先股為 4.4%，是富國銀行的 10 倍，也高於美國銀行等其他產品。所以我們認為，我們確實找到了一個新的產品類別：以舊的產品類別「優先資本」為基礎的「數位信用」。而我們對它的發展方向感到興奮。

Interestingly, and as we've pointed out before, Stretch is performing not just as one would expect in a bull market, but it's performing in a Bitcoin bear market. So while Bitcoin has gone down 37% since the beginning of October -- now it's starting to rise again -- we're seeing Stretch trade essentially near par and paying dividends that are increasing and then monthly. So we've increased the dividend, as I mentioned, from 9% to 11.5% and kept it steady at 11.5% for two months now, going on three months, while Bitcoin has been decreasing.

有趣的是，而且如我們之前指出的，Stretch 的表現不僅符合人們對牛市的預期，它甚至在比特幣熊市中也在表現。因此，雖然比特幣自十月初以來下跌了 37%——現在又開始回升——我們看到 Stretch 基本上接近票面價交易，並且支付的股息在提高，而且是按月提高。所以如我所提到的，我們已把股息從 9% 提高到 11.5%，並在兩個月內維持在 11.5% 不變、即將進入第三個月，而此期間比特幣一直在下跌。

And so with that, we've also seen the ATM velocity of Stretch has accelerated. And the ATM velocity is really the net inflows into the product, right? This is the demand of the product overall. And you'll see it -- notably in April, we had a week where we raised $1 billion. And then the subsequent week, we raised $2.2 billion. And so we've seen tremendous demand coming into Stretch.

因此，我們也看到 Stretch 的 ATM 速度加快。而 ATM 速度其實就是流入該產品的淨資金，對吧？這代表整體對該產品的需求。你會看到——特別是在四月，我們有一週募集了 10 億美元。接著下一週，我們募集了 22 億美元。所以我們看到大量需求湧入 Stretch。

And at the same time, we're seeing the volatility decrease. And so our target price range for Stretch is $99 to $101. We've actually seen it trading in a much tighter range. And for the last three months, March, April, May, it sat in that price range for 100% of the time.

同時，我們也看到波動性下降。因此，我們對 Stretch 的目標價格區間是 99 美元到 101 美元。實際上我們看到它在更窄的區間內交易。而在過去三個月——三月、四月、五月——它有 100% 的時間都落在該價格區間內。

I mentioned here the daily liquidity is pretty significant, but it's also growing, right? So from $54 million to $120 million in January to $250 million in March to $360 million in April. So for those who are interested in getting into the product and size, if you're a corporate or if you're a large institution, you need to have confidence that when you need to trade in and out, you need liquidity, our product is showing that level of liquidity.

我在這裡提到每日流動性相當可觀，但它也在成長，對吧？從一月的 5,400 萬美元到 1.2 億美元，三月到 2.5 億美元，四月到 3.6 億美元。所以對於有興趣進入該產品並做出一定規模配置的人來說，如果你是企業或大型機構，你需要有信心在需要進出交易時具備流動性；我們的產品正展現出這樣的流動性水準。

I'll go through a series of analyses of Sharpe ratio. Because Sharpe ratio ultimately is a measure of the returns above the risk-free rate given the volatility of the instrument. And ultimately, if you're an investor, people are looking for high Sharpe ratios, right?

我將逐一進行一系列關於夏普比率的分析。因為夏普比率最終衡量的是：在考量該工具波動度的情況下，超越無風險利率的報酬。而且歸根結底，如果你是投資人，大家都在尋找高夏普比率，對吧？

So compared to traditional credit, junk bonds, investment-grade bonds, bank preferreds, we outperformed pretty notably. Compared to traditional asset classes, the S&P 500, even Bitcoin, Nasdaq, et cetera, we also outperformed very notably. And then obviously, if you're looking for Sharpe ratio, a lot of folks go to the Mag 7 equities, right?

因此，相較於傳統信用資產、垃圾債、投資級債券、銀行優先股，我們的表現相當明顯地更好。相較於傳統資產類別，例如標普500，甚至比特幣、那斯達克等等，我們同樣也非常顯著地跑贏。然後很明顯地，如果你在找夏普比率，很多人會去看「科技七雄」（Mag 7）股票，對吧？

And Nvidia is obviously on a hot tear because of the AI trade. Google runs essentially a digital monopoly and has been a very solid equity over the course of the last 20 years. Stretch has outperformed all of those and all of the Mag 7.

而輝達顯然因為AI交易題材而一路狂飆。Google基本上運作著一個數位壟斷，並且在過去20年一直是一檔非常穩健的股票。Stretch的表現已經超越上述所有標的以及所有「科技七雄」。

Another place people typically go to find a high Sharpe ratio are hedge funds, right? Hedge funds are built with different strategies, different analyses, different quant strategies. And typically, they are built to outperform the S&P 500 and with lower volatility. And here, what you'll see is, looking at different hedge fund strategies, Stretch to date, notably and understandably early in its maturity, is already outperforming these different hedge fund strategies, whether you're in multi-strat, whether you're a macro, equity, arbitrage, et cetera.

另一個人們通常會去尋找高夏普比率的地方是避險基金，對吧？避險基金是以不同策略、不同分析、不同量化策略所建構。而且通常它們的設計目標是：在較低波動度下跑贏標普500。在這裡你會看到，觀察不同的避險基金策略，截至目前，Stretch——雖然其成熟度尚早，這點也合理——已經在跑贏這些不同的避險基金策略，不論是多策略、宏觀、股票、套利等等。

So we see a lot of benefits to this emerging category of digital credit, right, when compared to hedge funds, private credit, private equity. One is extremely liquid, right, to get these levels of returns and these levels of Sharpe ratio. Sometimes, people subject themselves to 90-day lockups for hedge funds, 3 to 7 years for private credit, 7 to 10 years for private equity.

因此，當我們把這個新興的「數位信用」類別與避險基金、私募信貸、私募股權相比時，我們看到很多優勢。其中之一是流動性極高，對吧？要取得這樣的報酬水準與夏普比率水準，有時人們必須接受避險基金90天的鎖定期、私募信貸3到7年、私募股權7到10年。

We charge no fee, right? These other strategies often charge a management fee of 1% to 2% and a 10% to 20% carry, right, a 2% and 20%, if you will, right? Digital credit is homogenous. You know exactly what's behind it. It's Bitcoin. These other strategies are sometimes heterogeneous with many different asset groups -- assets grouped together, making it very hard to ultimately assess the risk.

我們不收任何費用，對吧？其他策略通常會收取1%到2%的管理費，以及10%到20%的績效分成（carry），也就是你常聽到的「2%加20%」，對吧？數位信用是同質性的。你完全清楚其背後是什麼。就是比特幣。而其他策略有時是異質性的，包含許多不同資產群組——把資產打包在一起——使得最終要評估風險變得非常困難。

Ours is scalable through an ATM mechanism that allows people to buy the product. And hedge funds and other strategies are discrete. We're accessible, traded via a four-letter ticker on the Nasdaq, and now, interestingly, trading on many tokenized exchanges and tokenized products.

我們的產品可透過ATM（At-The-Market）機制擴張規模，讓人們能買到這個產品。而避險基金與其他策略則是離散式的。我們具可近性：在那斯達克以四個字母的股票代號交易；而且有趣的是，現在也在許多代幣化交易所與代幣化產品上交易。

The other ones are typically restricted to those who are accredited institutional investors or high-net-worth individuals. And we're transparent, right? We disclose our performance, our holding, through weekly 8-Ks and websites that update every 15 seconds.

其他產品通常只對合格的機構投資人或高淨值人士開放。而我們是透明的，對吧？我們透過每週的8-K以及每15秒更新一次的網站，揭露我們的績效與持倉。

So one of the big questions, as we have seen Stretch perform over the last four months, essentially the year 2026, is what does this mean for our capital market strategy, right? And I'll introduce this topic, and Mike will talk about it a lot, right?

因此，一個重大問題是：在我們看到Stretch在過去四個月——基本上是2026年——的表現之後，這對我們的資本市場策略意味著什麼，對吧？我會先引入這個主題，而Mike會更深入談很多，對吧？

And so we said our objective is to double Bitcoin per share in seven years through the success of digital credit. And so what does that mean? We sell digital credit, right? And we said that we target about 10% to 20% of Bitcoin reserves annually in digital credit volume. And of course, we'll analyze that and assess that to see if that target makes sense.

因此我們說，我們的目標是透過數位信用的成功，在七年內把每股比特幣數量翻倍。那這代表什麼？我們出售數位信用，對吧？而我們說，我們的目標是每年讓數位信用的交易量約等於比特幣儲備的10%到20%。當然，我們會分析並評估這個目標是否合理。

But that will generate amplification to our common stock, right, which should increase the Bitcoin per share in our common stock, which is ultimately our goal. As we increase Bitcoin per share, that allows MSTR to outperform Bitcoin, which is what you've seen happen over the last six years, right?

但這將對我們的普通股產生放大效應，對吧？這應該會提高我們普通股的每股比特幣數量，而這最終就是我們的目標。當我們提高每股比特幣數量時，就能讓MSTR跑贏比特幣——這正是你在過去六年所看到的情況，對吧？

What allows us to flex these levers even better if our cost of credit goes down, right, if we're able to decrease the yield from 11.5% to lower for a variety of factors, if we're able to sell more Stretch that increases amplification, and if our mNAV goes higher. And I'll talk a little bit about our mNAV, but that also creates benefits, for example, our cost of paying our dividend.

如果我們的信用成本下降，對吧——如果因為各種因素，我們能把殖利率從11.5%降到更低；如果我們能賣出更多Stretch以提高放大效應；以及如果我們的mNAV上升——那麼就能讓我們更有效地運用這些槓桿。我會稍微談一下mNAV，但這也會帶來好處，例如我們支付股息的成本。

What has happened in the last four months is, we have increased optionality for strategy of the company, right? We have more sources of capital, and we have more uses of capital than we ever had before. And the success of Stretch gives us options to do different things from a capital markets and treasury operations perspective to benefit our common shareholders.

過去四個月發生的事情是：我們提高了公司策略的選擇權，對吧？我們的資金來源比以往更多，資金用途也比以往更多。而Stretch的成功，讓我們在資本市場與財務庫務操作的角度，有更多選項去做不同的事，以使普通股股東受益。

Our traditional sources of capital, sell MSTR, sell Stretch, right? We could sell our US dollar reserve, right, to pay dividends, which we added in November. We also have Bitcoin that we have the opportunity and the option of selling. We can see our other prefs start to perform and sell those into the market. And we've talked in the past about also being able to potentially sell BTC or Bitcoin derivatives.

我們傳統的資金來源是：賣MSTR、賣Stretch，對吧？我們也可以賣出我們的美元儲備，對吧，用來支付我們在11月新增的股息。我們也持有比特幣，並且有機會與選擇權去出售。我們可以看到其他優先股開始表現，並把它們賣到市場上。而且我們過去也談過，可能也能出售BTC或比特幣衍生品。

What are our uses of capital? Primarily, today, we bought Bitcoin. We used Capital Pay, our US dollar dividends. And we use capital to build up the US dollar reserve. We have used capital in the past to pay down our convertible debt, our secured loans, our Bitcoin-backed loans. We can continue to do that in the future. And then we could also use capital if we want to in the right time to retire any of our other preferreds, right?

我們的資金用途是什麼？主要在今天，我們買了比特幣。我們用資金支付我們的美元股息。我們也用資金來建立美元儲備。過去我們也曾用資金償還可轉換債、擔保貸款、比特幣抵押貸款。未來我們也可以繼續這麼做。然後，如果在適當時點我們也想要的話，我們也可以用資金去贖回任何其他優先股，對吧？

So what does this really mean? This means we had three trades that we have executed. And really, before 2025, two trades. We sold MSTR; we bought Bitcoin. We sold MSTR; we bought US dollars. Last year, we added Stretch in preferreds, and we sell Stretch and we bought Bitcoin. Now we're really seriously thinking about and contemplating, we want to introduce the concept of a few more trades, right?

那這到底代表什麼？這代表我們已經執行了三筆交易。而實際上，在2025年之前是兩筆交易。我們賣MSTR；我們買比特幣。我們賣MSTR；我們買美元。去年我們在優先股中加入了Stretch，我們賣Stretch並買比特幣。現在我們正在非常認真地思考並考量：我們想引入幾筆更多交易的概念，對吧？

Selling MSTR at the right mNAV, whereas Bitcoin per share [accrete] to buy back debt. What does that mean? Considering retiring, potentially early, some of our convertible notes using our common stock. Selling Stretch to buy US dollars, right?

在適當的mNAV水準賣出MSTR，同時讓每股比特幣數量增加（accrete），用以回購債務。這是什麼意思？考慮用普通股，可能提前，去清償我們部分可轉換公司債。賣出Stretch來買美元，對吧？

We haven't done that much to date. But, perhaps, reserving part of our Stretch proceeds to build up our US dollar reserve. And then selling Stretch to buy back debt, right? You can see how that will be an accretive trade to Bitcoin per share because Stretch inherently on sale is not dilutive in buying back future dilutive convertible shares.

截至目前我們還沒有做太多這件事。但是，或許可以保留部分Stretch的募集所得，用來建立我們的美元儲備。然後賣出Stretch來回購債務，對吧？你可以看到，這會是一筆能增加每股比特幣數量的增益性交易，因為Stretch在出售時本質上不會稀釋，反而是在回購未來可能造成稀釋的可轉換股份。

All right. And then the third sort of set of interesting trades that I sort of previewed on the last slide is selling Bitcoin, right? And this is a big sort of statement. But our ability to sell Bitcoin either to buy US dollars or sell Bitcoin to buy debt if it's accretive to Bitcoin per share, right, is something that we would consider doing going forward.

好。接著我在上一張投影片先預告的第三類有趣交易，是賣出比特幣，對吧？這是一個相當重大的表述。但我們未來會考慮：賣出比特幣以買入美元，或在能提高每股比特幣（對每股比特幣具增益）的前提下，賣出比特幣以買入債務，對吧。

So how do we make these decisions? Ultimately, there are two sides of the same coin, if you will. One side is our equity performance, right? And to our common shareholders, the most important thing is to accrete Bitcoin per share, which results in higher BTC yield, which ultimately those together result in a higher BTC gain, right? Adding more Bitcoin and BTC gain on a dollar basis is the closest proxy to earnings per share.

那我們如何做出這些決策？歸根結底，這就像同一枚硬幣的兩面。一面是我們的股權表現，對吧？對普通股股東而言，最重要的是提高每股比特幣，這會帶來更高的 BTC 收益率（BTC yield），而這兩者最終會帶來更高的 BTC 增益（BTC gain），對吧？以美元計增加更多比特幣與 BTC 增益，是最接近每股盈餘（EPS）的替代指標。

So those are the three KPIs we look to assess equity performance. On the risk side, the other side of the coin, right, we have a BTC rating, which is the amount that our debt and our leverage is overcollateralized by Bitcoin. We have an MSTR duration, which is the average duration of all of our instruments, right?

因此，這就是我們用來評估股權表現的三項關鍵績效指標（KPI）。在風險面，也就是硬幣的另一面，對吧，我們有一個 BTC 評級（BTC rating），也就是我們的債務與槓桿被比特幣超額抵押的程度。我們還有 MSTR 存續期間（MSTR duration），也就是我們所有工具的平均存續期間，對吧？

And so if you look at our perpetual preferreds, they have the longest duration based on a Macaulay duration basis, 10, 15 years out. And then we have our convertible debt, which has a shorter duration. So swapping longer duration for shorter duration is a good trade for us, right? And then we have MSTR risk, right? And so the BTC rating and the MSTR rating together influence the total risk profile to the company. And so we'll talk through a little bit more about this framework later.

因此，如果你看我們的永久型優先股（perpetual preferreds），以麥考利存續期間（Macaulay duration）衡量，它們的存續期間最長，可達 10 年、15 年以上。接著是我們的可轉換債（convertible debt），其存續期間較短。所以，用較長存續期間換成較短存續期間，對我們而言是一筆好交易，對吧？然後我們還有 MSTR 風險（MSTR risk），對吧？因此，BTC 評級與 MSTR 評級共同影響公司的整體風險輪廓。我們稍後會再更深入說明這個架構。

A couple of things I want to note before I hand it off to Mike. One is Bitcoin per share accretion is our primary goal. mNAV is an input, right? The threshold for Bitcoin per share accretion when selling our equity and buying Bitcoin is increasing over time, right? So where it used to be a 1x mNAV, as we add debt and as we add preferred primarily to our structure, the breakeven increases.

在我把話題交給 Mike 之前，我想先補充幾點。第一，提高每股比特幣是我們的首要目標。mNAV 是一個輸入變數，對吧？當我們賣出股權並買入比特幣時，「每股比特幣具增益」的門檻會隨時間提高，對吧？過去門檻可能是 1 倍 mNAV；但隨著我們在資本結構中增加債務、以及主要增加優先股，損益兩平點就會上升。

Right now, it's about 1.22x. That means at 1.22x or higher mNAV, it's accretive for us to sell MSTR and buy Bitcoin. Below 1.22x mNAV, it's actually more accretive for us to sell Bitcoin, right, and pay off our dividends than it is above 1 to 2x mNAV. And so that's a note, and we'll talk more about this and we'll explain it further. But it's important point because I think there is a misconception that the breakeven point is 1.0x.

目前大約是 1.22 倍。也就是說，當 mNAV 在 1.22 倍或更高時，對我們而言賣出 MSTR 並買入比特幣是具增益的。當 mNAV 低於 1.22 倍時，實際上對我們而言，賣出比特幣並支付股利，比起在 1 到 2 倍 mNAV 以上時更具增益，對吧？這點先記下來，我們會再多談並進一步解釋。但這很重要，因為我認為市場上有一個誤解，以為損益兩平點是 1.0 倍。

Next thing I'll note, there are benefits to the way we bought Bitcoin and the holdings of Bitcoin that we have by cost basis here. And you'll have this here, taking $20,000 tranches here at $20,000; $20,000 to $40,000, $40,000, $60,000; $60,000, $80,000 and beyond. We bought Bitcoin at every price level. Below current price -- it's about $80,000 -- we have an unrealized gain from a tax basis on that Bitcoin. Above $80,000, we have unrealized losses.

接下來我要提的是，依我們的成本基礎（cost basis）來看，我們買入比特幣的方式與持倉結構有其好處。你會在這裡看到，我們以每 20,000 美元為一個區間：20,000 美元；20,000 到 40,000；40,000 到 60,000；60,000 到 80,000，以及更高。我們在每個價格區間都買過比特幣。低於目前價格——大約 80,000 美元——的部分，從稅務基礎來看有未實現收益。高於 80,000 美元的部分，則有未實現損失。

If we were to sell Bitcoin, our objective would be to sell high-cost-basis Bitcoin to capture some of those unrealized losses and to take some of those unrealized tax benefits, of which on our balance sheet, there's about $2.2 billion, right, estimated of tax benefits. So there is a tax benefit if we were to sell high-cost-basis Bitcoin as an example, right, to pay down some of our dividends over time.

如果我們要賣出比特幣，我們的目標會是賣出高成本基礎的比特幣，以實現部分未實現損失，並取得部分未實現的稅務利益；在我們的資產負債表上，估計約有 22 億美元的稅務利益，對吧？因此，舉例來說，如果我們賣出高成本基礎的比特幣，用以隨時間償付部分股利，將會有稅務上的好處。

Amplification, we're currently at about 34% amplification. A portion of that, about 10% of that, is driven by our convertible debt. The ability for us to increase amplification to the company is higher when we have a long-duration digital credit than it is when we have short-duration convertible debt.

關於放大（amplification），我們目前大約在 34%。其中約 10% 是由我們的可轉換債所驅動。相較於短存續期間的可轉換債，當我們擁有長存續期間的數位信用（digital credit）時，公司提高放大程度的能力會更強。

So as the company starts to cycle over time from convertible debt to digital credit, we can take on more amplification with lower risk levels. And so we could see ourselves getting 50%, 60% amplification levels over time, and still feel like we have a high credit quality and a high risk quality to the company.

因此，隨著公司隨時間從可轉換債轉向數位信用，我們可以在較低風險水準下承擔更高的放大。所以我們可能會看到，隨時間放大水準達到 50%、60%，同時仍然覺得公司具備高信用品質與高風險品質。

And the last thing I'll share here before I get to some of our principles is the US dollar reserve, right? We have built up the USD2.25 billion reserve, which at that point, represented over two years of dividends and interest payments. And now we're with the same exact US dollar reserve at about 1.5 years.

在我談到一些原則之前，最後我想分享的是美元準備金（US dollar reserve），對吧？我們已建立 22.5 億美元的美元準備金，當時相當於超過兩年的股利與利息支付。而現在，在同樣的美元準備金水準下，大約只相當於 1.5 年。

Adding to the US dollar reserve reduces Bitcoin per share but improves the credit quality of the company. And so it's something that we'll continue to evaluate over time, what the right level of US dollar reserve is. We feel like at a minimum, it should be $2.25 billion. But likely, as we grow our digital credit in Stretch, we will want to add to this at a certain level.

增加美元準備金會降低每股比特幣，但會提升公司的信用品質。因此，這是我們會持續隨時間評估的事項：美元準備金的適當水準應該是多少。我們認為至少應該是 22.5 億美元。但很可能，隨著我們在 Stretch 中擴大數位信用規模，我們會希望在某個水準上增加這個準備金。

So I'll summarize what I shared here because, hopefully, it addresses a lot of questions from our shareholders. How do we think about managing capital markets and our balance sheet? One, our objective is to create long-term value for MSTR, right? We want to increase Bitcoin per share, which will increase the price of the common equity and ultimately be better for our common shareholders.

我總結一下我剛才分享的內容，因為希望這能回答股東的許多問題。我們如何看待資本市場操作與資產負債表管理？第一，我們的目標是為 MSTR 創造長期價值，對吧？我們希望提高每股比特幣，這將推升普通股股價，最終對普通股股東更有利。

Two, we're going to continue to grow demand for Stretch. We've seen it to be a very popular product in the market and very beneficial to our balance sheet. And we'll continue to improve the features as we can, for example, moving the semimonthly dividends.

第二，我們將持續擴大 Stretch 的需求。我們看到它在市場上非常受歡迎，且對我們的資產負債表非常有利。我們也會在可行的情況下持續改善其功能，例如調整為半月配息（semimonthly dividends）。

Three, we are going to proactively reduce convertible debt based on market conditions? And that could mean actively purchasing back, through whatever means we think appropriate, some of the convertible debt before it comes due, right?

第三，我們將依市場狀況主動降低可轉換債？這可能意味著在到期之前，透過我們認為適當的任何方式，主動回購部分可轉換債，對吧？

Fourth, we're going to look at the Stretch demand and credit risk to determine the size of the US dollar reserve. There's a natural market mechanism that as the US dollar reserve in months to cover or years to cover decreases, the credit risk of Stretch goes up nominally and could decrease the demand. And so we will monitor that to decide what is the right US dollar reserve size.

第四，我們將觀察 Stretch 的需求與信用風險，以決定美元準備金的規模。市場上存在一個自然機制：當美元準備金可覆蓋的月數或年數下降時，Stretch 的信用風險名目上會上升，並可能降低需求。因此，我們會監控這些因素，以決定美元準備金的適當規模。

Fifth, similarly, the appropriate amplification for the company will also base on market conditions. Mike and I and Andrew and the entire team are looking literally every day at what are the trades that are accretive to Bitcoin per share, what are the trades that create the right equity accretion, and what are the right trades that manage the credit risk at the right levels.

第五，同樣地，公司適當的放大程度也將以市場狀況為依據。我、Mike、Andrew 以及整個團隊每天都在看：哪些交易能提高每股比特幣、哪些交易能帶來適當的股權增益，以及哪些交易能在適當水準下管理信用風險。

And six, not necessarily most importantly, but maybe most notable, we will sell Bitcoin when it's advantageous to the company, right? We're not going to sit back and just say, we'll never sell the Bitcoin. We want to be net aggregators of Bitcoin, increasing our total Bitcoin, but more importantly, increasing our Bitcoin per share. Because we think that is what is going to be most accretive long term for MSTR and for the company.

第六點，不一定是最重要的，但可能是最值得注意的：當對公司有利時，我們會出售比特幣，對吧？我們不會坐視不管，然後說我們永遠不會賣比特幣。我們希望成為比特幣的淨累積者，提升我們的比特幣總持有量，但更重要的是，提高我們的每股比特幣持有量。因為我們認為，從長期來看，這將對 MSTR 以及公司最具增益效果。

And with that, I will hand it over to Michael Saylor to complete the presentation.

接下來，我把時間交給 Michael Saylor 來完成簡報。

Thank you, Phong. I thought I'd elaborate on some of the things set up until now and just give you an overview of the BTC market and then our capital market strategy. Everything is based on digital capital, and Bitcoin is digital capital and that means global legitimate collateral, global property. So we keep track of Bitcoin as digital capital and the consensus in the market.

謝謝你，Phong。我想就目前為止鋪陳的一些內容再多做些說明，並給各位一個比特幣市場的概覽，然後談談我們的資本市場策略。一切都建立在數位資本之上，而比特幣就是數位資本，這意味著它是全球合法的擔保品、全球性的財產。因此，我們將比特幣視為數位資本來追蹤，並關注市場上的共識。

What you can see here is the US government has embraced it. All of our key financial regulators, the head of Treasury, the head of the SEC, the head of the CFTC, and now the incoming head of the Fed are all digital assets, enthusiasts, innovators, and Bitcoin believers, as is the President of United States, Donald Trump; and the Vice President, JD Vance, along with many, many other cabinet members. And I think that's a very important fact.

你們在這裡可以看到，美國政府已經接納了它。我們所有關鍵的金融監管機構——財政部主管、SEC 主席、CFTC 主席，以及即將上任的聯準會主席——都是數位資產的愛好者、創新者與比特幣的信仰者；美國總統 Donald Trump 也是如此；副總統 JD Vance 亦然，還有許多、許多其他內閣成員。我認為這是一個非常重要的事實。

There are a lot of bills still working their way through Congress. The most notable one right now is CLARITY. The real key here is that Bitcoin is a priority in the House and the Senate, on the Hill, at the White House. And there's bipartisan support and bipartisan agreement for Bitcoin as digital capital and for legislation that supports the adoption of Bitcoin as digital capital in the world.

目前仍有許多法案正在國會推進中。眼下最值得注意的是 CLARITY。這裡真正的關鍵在於：比特幣在眾議院與參議院、在國會山莊、在白宮，都是優先事項。而且對於把比特幣作為數位資本，以及支持在全球採用比特幣作為數位資本的立法，兩黨都有支持、也有共識。

Really exciting. A few months ago, at our Bitcoin for Corporations conference, we saw major announcements by systemically important banks, Morgan Stanley, Citi, TD, all with intent to integrate Bitcoin into their operations. This is something we only hoped for three or four years ago, and now it's a reality. And at the point that Bitcoin is integrated in the banking system, then it's digital capital here to stay.

真的令人振奮。幾個月前，在我們的「Bitcoin for Corporations」大會上，我們看到具系統重要性的銀行發布重大公告——Morgan Stanley、Citi、TD——都表明有意將比特幣整合進其營運之中。這是三、四年前我們只敢期待的事，而現在已成為現實。而當比特幣被整合進銀行體系時，它就會成為會長久存在的數位資本。

You can just see the announcements across your ticker, right, everywhere in the world. This is a global phenomenon. It turns out whatever happens in the US and with the US banks is spreading to Europe to the UAE to Hong Kong to South America, et cetera. I think you're going to see these announcements accelerate, but we've crossed the event horizon. And it's pretty clear that you can't put the genie back in the bottle. Bitcoin has arrived.

你只要看你的跑馬燈就知道了，對吧？全世界到處都是這類公告。這是一個全球現象。事實證明，美國以及美國銀行發生的事情，正在擴散到歐洲、阿聯、香港、南美洲等等。我認為你會看到這些公告加速出現，但我們已經跨過了事件視界。而且很明顯，你不可能把精靈再塞回瓶子裡。比特幣已經到來。

We try to be systemic, so we track it. And we track the 15 largest or most systemically visible banks in the world, and we look at their embrace of Bitcoin as a creditworthy instrument. Will they trade it? Will they offer credit against it? Will they custody it? Will they handle the derivatives, et cetera? And what you can see here is that adoption has actually advanced since even last quarter. And everywhere in the world across all of these banks, there are active efforts to improve Bitcoin support.

我們嘗試以系統性的方式來看待，所以我們會追蹤它。我們追蹤全球 15 家最大或在系統層面最具可見度的銀行，並觀察它們是否將比特幣視為具信用價值的工具而加以接納。它們會交易嗎？會以它作為抵押提供信貸嗎？會提供託管嗎？會處理衍生品等等嗎？你在這裡可以看到，即便相較於上一季，採用程度其實也已經有所推進。而在全球各地、在所有這些銀行之中，都有積極的努力在提升對比特幣的支援。

If you track the number of accounts that support Bitcoin access, you can see we're marching up into the high hundreds of millions. 840 million crypto exchange accounts, nearly 1 billion neobank accounts, nearly 1 billion brokerage accounts, they all have access to some sort of Bitcoin derivative.

如果你追蹤支援比特幣存取的帳戶數量，你會看到我們正一路邁向數億的高位：8.4 億個加密交易所帳戶、接近 10 億個新型銀行（neobank）帳戶、接近 10 億個券商帳戶——它們都能接觸到某種形式的比特幣衍生品。

ETFs, of course, continue to embrace Bitcoin. There's now been 125 ETFs with about $126 billion of capital. The capital flowing into these ETFs continues to accelerate. And as you can see, we were the first company to embrace Bitcoin, and now we're up to 194 public companies.

當然，ETF 也持續擁抱比特幣。目前已有 125 檔 ETF，資本規模約 1,260 億美元。流入這些 ETF 的資金仍在加速。而如你所見，我們是第一家擁抱比特幣的公司，而現在已經增加到 194 家上市公司。

We anticipate this will continue to grow. Lots and lots of IPOs. The public markets have embraced Bitcoin. And this is just an example of some of the notable companies that have come public just recently that have substantial Bitcoin exposure.

我們預期這將持續成長。大量、非常大量的 IPO。公開市場已經擁抱比特幣。這只是一些值得注意的例子：近期剛上市、且具有相當比特幣曝險的公司。

The digital credit ecosystem has been a very pleasant surprise. It has grown very rapidly and has become very diverse. And the way that we know the digital credit is working is that companies and economic actors everywhere in the world that we've never met face-to-face are discovering this, and they're building products and businesses around it.

數位信貸生態系是一個非常令人驚喜的發展。它成長非常迅速，並且變得非常多元。而我們判斷數位信貸正在運作的方式是：全球各地、我們從未面對面見過的公司與經濟參與者正在發現它，並圍繞它打造產品與事業。

So right now, what we see is very enthusiastic support with retail investors, with corporate treasurers, with institutional investors, with crypto-native innovators, and with TradFi innovators. So five different groups of capitalists, but they're all getting very heavily involved enthusiastically and rapidly.

所以目前我們看到，散戶投資人、企業財務主管、機構投資人、加密原生創新者，以及傳統金融（TradFi）創新者，都給予非常熱烈的支持。也就是五個不同的資本家群體，但他們都在非常積極、熱情且快速地投入。

If we drill into retail, 80% of all STRC shares is held by retail as of our last check. This is an extraordinary fact. Normally, it's very difficult to get broad, deep retail support for a common stock and/or a public stock. And yeah, we've been very pleasantly surprised. We're able to trace about 120,000 individual retail accounts.

如果我們深入看散戶，截至我們上次檢視，STRC 的股份有 80% 由散戶持有。這是一個非同尋常的事實。通常要讓一檔普通股和／或上市股票獲得廣泛且深度的散戶支持是非常困難的。而是的，我們對此感到非常驚喜。我們能追蹤到大約 12 萬個個別散戶帳戶。

Word of mouth is spreading this. It's spreading virally. Based upon our studies, we see that anybody that buys STRC is generally telling their friends, their family, their parents, their working associates about it. And it continues to spread word of mouth.

口耳相傳正在推動這件事。它正在以病毒式方式擴散。根據我們的研究，我們看到任何買入 STRC 的人，通常都會告訴他們的朋友、家人、父母、工作夥伴。而這種口碑傳播仍在持續擴散。

You can also see Schwab is a big distribution channel. 23% of Stretch is held in Schwab accounts. Fidelity is a channel. Robinhood is a channel. Morgan Stanley and E*TRADE are channels. BlackRock is a channel. Interestingly enough, Vanguard, that won't let their investors buy Bitcoin natively, they actually are a channel for Stretch.

你也可以看到，Schwab 是一個重要的分銷通路。Stretch 有 23% 由 Schwab 帳戶持有。Fidelity 是一個通路。Robinhood 是一個通路。Morgan Stanley 和 E*TRADE 是通路。BlackRock 是一個通路。有趣的是，Vanguard 不讓其投資人直接買比特幣，但它實際上也是 Stretch 的一個通路。

And so it's pretty exciting that we have wrapped Bitcoin into a credit instrument that is being distributed through all sorts of traditional finance channels to types of investors that otherwise would never be able to buy a Bitcoin itself or would never want to.

因此，能把比特幣包裝進一個信貸工具，並透過各式各樣的傳統金融通路分銷給那些原本不可能自己買比特幣、或根本不想買比特幣的投資人，這真的相當令人振奮。

We actually have traced Stretch exposure, and we estimate that there are about 3 million households that are benefiting from Stretch right now. So think of it as powering a savings account for 3 million households. Phong mentioned about 100 million beneficiaries of MSTR, while 3 million beneficiaries of STRC in eight months is a pretty good start to the race. Our ambition is to spread this to tens of millions and then hundreds of millions of people. So we're off to a good start, but we're just really enthusiastic about the retail support.

我們實際追蹤了 Stretch 的曝險，並估計目前大約有 300 萬個家庭正從 Stretch 中受益。所以你可以把它想成是在為 300 萬個家庭提供一個「儲蓄帳戶」的動力來源。Phong 提到 MSTR 約有 1 億名受益者，而 STRC 在八個月內就有 300 萬名受益者，這作為起跑算是相當不錯。我們的企圖心是把它擴展到數千萬人，然後到數億人。所以我們有個好的開始，但我們對散戶的支持真的非常振奮。

We're also very enthusiastic about corporate support. Corporations -- unprompted by us. We didn't go and sell this to them. They just figured out that it was a good idea for them. But corporate treasurers and corporate CFOs with working capital have been allocating some of their treasury capital to Stretch. And this is a really pleasant development. And we're starting to think that there might be thousands of companies that might allocate some amount of their treasury capital to Stretch.

我們也對企業端的支持感到非常振奮。企業——並非由我們促成。我們沒有去向他們推銷。他們只是自己發現，這對他們而言是個好主意。但擁有營運資金的企業財務主管與企業 CFO，已經把部分庫存資金配置到 Stretch。這是一個非常令人欣喜的發展。而我們開始認為，可能會有成千上萬家公司，會把某個比例的庫存資金配置到 Stretch。

And I've had a lot of experience selling BTC to corporations. What I found is that tends to be a Board-level decision. It goes all the way the Board of Directors. The CEO has to be way behind it. And if one director on the Board has concerns, the cycle slows down. But with STRC, it's not a Board-level decision; it's more like a CFO-level decision.

而且我在把 BTC 賣給企業方面有很多經驗。我發現那通常是董事會層級的決策。會一路上到董事會。執行長必須非常支持。而如果董事會裡有一位董事有疑慮，整個流程就會放慢。但對 STRC 而言，這不是董事會層級的決策；更像是財務長（CFO）層級的決策。

If the treasurer is enthusiastic, the CFO can greenlight it. They might or might not give the CEO a heads up. But this is a very different value proposition. It's maybe a five-minute conversation with the CEO instead of a two-hour conversation with the entire Board. For that reason, we think that STRC really is Bitcoin for corporations, so it's going to spread very rapidly now.

如果財務主管（treasurer）很有熱情，CFO 就可以放行。他們可能會、也可能不會先跟執行長打聲招呼。但這是非常不同的價值主張。可能只需要跟執行長談五分鐘，而不是跟整個董事會談兩個小時。因此，我們認為 STRC 確實是企業版的比特幣，所以它現在會非常快速地擴散。

The other thing that's very exciting is that STRC is spread into credit indexes. BlackRock's PFF is a $14 billion credit ETF, and Stretch is the number two holding. VanEck's PFXF is another credit ETF, and Strategy's Stretch is also the number two holding.

另一件非常令人振奮的事是，STRC 正被納入信用指數。BlackRock 的 PFF 是一檔 140 億美元的信用 ETF，而 Stretch 是其第二大持倉。VanEck 的 PFXF 是另一檔信用 ETF，而 Strategy 的 Stretch 也同樣是第二大持倉。

And so imagine an instrument coming out of the blue, didn't exist 12 months ago, and in less than 12 months, we've gone from nonexistent to number two. Next up, number one, we're enthusiastic about seeing Stretch embedded in lots and lots of institutional credit indexes and lots of institutional credit funds.

所以想像一下，一個工具憑空出現，12 個月前還不存在，而在不到 12 個月內，我們就從不存在變成第二名。接下來要挑戰第一名；我們很期待看到 Stretch 被嵌入到大量的機構信用指數以及大量的機構信用基金之中。

Third-party ETFs have been finding Stretch, and they're building innovative ETFs. Strive is building a digital credit ETF. 21Shares created an ETF with Stretch and took it public in Europe. There's a number of ETF providers that are working with us that are in the pipeline right now; I think active discussions with four right now. And so we would think that over time, there'll be more ETFs to build STRC into their fund offering.

第三方 ETF 一直在發掘 Stretch，並且在打造創新的 ETF。Strive 正在打造一檔數位信用 ETF。21Shares 創建了一檔包含 Stretch 的 ETF，並在歐洲上市。目前有多家 ETF 供應商正在與我們合作，正在管線中；我想現在有四家正在積極討論。因此我們認為，隨著時間推移，會有更多 ETF 把 STRC 納入其基金產品。

So here, I'd like to talk about digital money and digital yield. We start with digital capital. Bitcoin is 34% vol on a rolling 30-day average. It's 39% ARR. The one-year trailing vol of Bitcoin is almost 40%. So think of it as a 40% vol, 40% ARR asset, raw economic energy. We split that asset into STRC, which is 3% vol, 11.5% yield. And then MSTR, which is 71% vol, 59% ARR. So one is an amplified Bitcoin, we call digital equity, and the other one is damped digital credit.

所以在這裡，我想談談數位貨幣與數位收益。我們從數位資本開始。比特幣以 30 日滾動平均計算的波動率是 34%。它的 ARR 是 39%。比特幣的一年期歷史波動率接近 40%。所以把它視為一個 40% 波動率、40% ARR 的資產，是原始的經濟能量。我們把這個資產拆分成 STRC（3% 波動率、11.5% 收益率）。以及 MSTR（71% 波動率、59% ARR）。所以其中一個是放大版的比特幣，我們稱之為數位股權；另一個則是被抑制波動的數位信用。

Now digital credit, we believe, is like the kerosene of finance, right? It is the monetary fuel and is a universal monetary fuel. It's high grade, highly distilled. But from here, you can build all manner of products. And we see the layer three as digital money and digital yield.

現在我們相信，數位信用就像金融界的煤油，對吧？它是貨幣燃料，而且是通用的貨幣燃料。它是高等級、經高度提煉的。但從這裡，你可以打造各式各樣的產品。而我們把第三層視為數位貨幣與數位收益。

Neither of them would really be possible without digital credit. It's just too difficult to distill pure 0% vol, 8% money from a 40% vol, 40% ARR asset. You have to crack it. You have to have a crypto reactor, and you have to have $50 billion -- billions of dollars of equity capital to do it, and that's what we did to create Stretch.

沒有數位信用，這兩者其實都不太可能實現。要從一個 40% 波動率、40% ARR 的資產中，提煉出純粹的 0% 波動率、8% 的貨幣，實在太困難。你必須把它裂解。你必須有一個加密反應器，而且你必須有 500 億美元——數十億美元的股權資本來做到這件事，而這正是我們為了創造 Stretch 所做的。

So a simple definition, digital money in our lexicon is 0% volatility, daily liquid instruments built on digital credit, like 0% vol, 8% yield coin. And then digital yield, that's non-zero volatility, or it might be illiquid. It might be a three-month-lockup, 5x levered 35% yielding fund that loops digital money four, five, six times in order to get there. And so digital yield is a levered construct, and digital money is the strip down construct.

所以用一個簡單的定義：在我們的用語中，數位貨幣是指 0% 波動率、每日可流動的工具，建立在數位信用之上，例如 0% 波動率、8% 收益率的幣。而數位收益則是非零波動率，或可能是不具流動性。它可能是一個三個月鎖定期、5 倍槓桿、35% 收益率的基金，透過把數位貨幣循環（loop）四次、五次、六次來達到那個結果。因此，數位收益是一種槓桿化的結構，而數位貨幣則是去除（strip down）後的結構。

We think digital credit is programmable across lots of dimensions. So a lot of ways to add value to it. You can tokenize it, put it in a private fund, put in a public fund, put it in a bank account. You can deploy it on a crypto exchange, on a neobank.

我們認為數位信用可以在很多維度上被程式化。因此有很多方式可以為它增加價值。你可以把它代幣化，放進私募基金，放進公募基金，放進銀行帳戶。你可以把它部署在加密交易所、在新型銀行（neobank）上。

You can deploy it on a real bank. You can deploy it on a crypto network. You can program it to volatility of 0% or let it float up to a volatility of 10%. You could program the liquidity to be continuous or daily or monthly. But you could also put in a quarterly lockup or an annual lockup in order to put more leverage on it or create a different characteristic.

你可以把它部署在傳統銀行。你可以把它部署在加密網路上。你可以把它的波動率程式化為 0%，或讓它浮動到 10% 的波動率。你可以把流動性程式化為連續、每日或每月。但你也可以設定季度鎖定或年度鎖定，以便加更高的槓桿，或創造不同的特性。

You can program the yield from 5% up to 25% reasonably. Some people might go beyond that, but we think 5% to 25% is reasonable. And then you can convert the currency. You can create great British pounds or euros or yen or Swiss francs with digital credit starting from STRC.

你可以把收益率合理地程式化在 5% 到 25% 之間。有些人可能會做到更高，但我們認為 5% 到 25% 是合理的。然後你可以進行幣別轉換。你可以從 STRC 的數位信用出發，創造英鎊、歐元、日圓或瑞士法郎等。

And so when you think about all these different forms, the question is, do you want to create a yield coin, like a digital money coin? Do you want to create a yield fund? Do you want to create an account, right? And depending upon what your assets are, if you're the biggest bank in Australia or if you're a Deutsche Bank, you probably would do it one way. But if you're a crypto exchange, you might do a different way.

所以當你思考所有這些不同形式時，問題是：你想創造一個收益幣（yield coin），像數位貨幣幣那樣嗎？你想創造一個收益基金嗎？你想創造一個帳戶嗎？而這取決於你的資產是什麼；如果你是澳洲最大的銀行，或你是德意志銀行，你可能會用一種方式來做。但如果你是加密交易所，你可能會用另一種方式。

The math is pretty straightforward. You start with 11.5% performance in like 3% vol right now. If we're lucky, maybe we'll be able to get our vol to 2% or to a one handle. I mean, that's the goal of our proposal to the shareholders. But I doubt seriously we get below 1.5 or a 1 vol.

數學其實很直接。你從目前大約 3% 波動率下的 11.5% 表現開始。如果我們夠幸運，也許能把波動率降到 2%，或降到 1 字頭。我的意思是，這就是我們向股東提出的提案目標。但我非常懷疑我們能降到 1.5 以下或 1 的波動率。

1 vol is sort of what publicly traded money market funds look like right now. But getting to zero vol takes a bit of work. So one approach to add value is to step it down, strip the vol to 0, and maybe instead of 3% vol, 11%, you offer zero vol, 8%. And that's a digital money.

1 的波動率大概就是目前公開交易的貨幣市場基金看起來的樣子。但要做到 0 波動率需要做一些工作。所以一種增加價值的方法是把它往下調，將波動剝離到 0；也許你不是提供 3% 波動率、11% 的產品，而是提供 0 波動率、8% 的產品。那就是數位貨幣。

And the other approach is step it up, right? Lever it 3:1; pay 5% for the capital. And maybe you end up with something that's paying you like $35. You pay $10 on the capital, and you get a 25% yielding -- levered yield fund. And these are all opportunities. We are not going to do it ourself.

另一種方法是把它往上調，對吧？用 3:1 的槓桿；為資金支付 5% 的成本。然後也許你最後得到的是大約 35% 的支付。你在資金上付出 10%，而你得到一個 25% 收益率的——槓桿化收益基金。而這些都是機會。我們不會自己去做。

Our laser-like focus is make Stretch the deepest, most liquid, most stable, least volatile, highest Sharpe ratio credit instrument in the world. And that's a mission. But what we think is there are a lot crypto innovators. And you see right here on the screen, a lot of very impressive companies that are moving fast right now. Apyx has had enormous success early on. Saturn is doing the same thing.

我們如同雷射般聚焦的目標，是把 Stretch 打造成全球最深度、流動性最高、最穩定、波動性最低、夏普比率最高的信用工具。而這就是一項使命。但我們認為，市場上有很多加密創新者。你在螢幕上就能看到，現在有許多非常令人印象深刻、正在快速前進的公司。Apyx 早期就取得了巨大的成功。Saturn 也在做同樣的事情。

But Hermetica, Kraken, Roxom, Ondo, Pendle, Spreads, Strata, they're all doing very interesting things right now, and they're very innovative. And they're moving about 10x faster than the TradFi complex normally moves on these sort of initiatives. But having said it, there's a lot of interesting TradFi initiatives, things you can do in a traditional finance environment either with a private fund or a public fund. And we see those things happening as well.

但 Hermetica、Kraken、Roxom、Ondo、Pendle、Spreads、Strata，他們現在都在做非常有意思的事情，而且非常創新。在這類倡議上，他們的推進速度大約比傳統金融（TradFi）體系通常的速度快 10 倍。不過話說回來，也有很多有趣的 TradFi 倡議，在傳統金融環境中，無論是透過私募基金或公募基金，你都能做很多事。我們也看到這些事情正在發生。

Eight weeks ago, there was no Stretch in the DeFi industry. And in those eight weeks, we have rapidly grown to something like $270 million of exposure. So this is just really extraordinary, the rate at which money is flowing. Sometimes, money is flowing in at this complex $1 million an hour, $2 million an hour. It's starting to feel to me like we may very well see more than $1 billion of Stretch enter the DeFi industry in the near future. It's moving very fast, and it's very dynamic.

八週前，DeFi 產業裡還沒有 Stretch。而在這八週內，我們迅速成長到大約 2.7 億美元的曝險規模。所以這真的非常非凡，資金流入的速度之快。有時候，資金以每小時 100 萬美元、200 萬美元這種量級流入這個體系。我開始覺得，在不久的將來，我們很可能會看到超過 10 億美元的 Stretch 進入 DeFi 產業。它推進得非常快，而且非常動態。

So let's speak about outlook and our vision. We are a structured finance company. And you can see here, we're taking raw capital, digital capital 40% vol, 40% ARR, $1.6 trillion market comp of Bitcoin. We are stripping the currency risk. We are reducing the credit risk. We are reducing -- we are compressing the duration risk.

所以我們來談談展望與我們的願景。我們是一家結構性金融公司。你在這裡可以看到，我們把原始資本、數位資本（40% 波動率、40% ARR、比特幣 1.6 兆美元市值）拿來運作。我們正在剝離貨幣風險。我們正在降低信用風險。我們正在降低——我們正在壓縮久期風險。

We are distilling a yield. We are damping a volatility in order to create various instruments. And our greatest product and bigger success right now is Stretch. As you can see, it's taking a 71% vol down to a 3% vol, and we're targeting a 1% vol.

我們在萃取收益。我們在抑制波動，以創造各種工具。而我們目前最重要的產品、也是最大的成功，就是 Stretch。如你所見，它把 71% 的波動率降到 3%，而我們的目標是 1% 的波動率。

Some important items to be aware. The Bitcoin breakeven ARR, we calculate it all the time. It's very significant for this reason. If Bitcoin grows more than 2.3% a year, that breakeven ARR, we can fund our dividends forever. We can fund our dividends forever without selling a single share of stock. It is a very critical point. If Bitcoin does not grow at all forever, we can fund the dividends for 43 years. We're very clear about this. You'll see we publish it on our website, and we update it every 15 seconds.

有幾個重要事項需要注意。比特幣損益兩平 ARR（breakeven ARR），我們一直在計算。它之所以非常重要，原因在於：如果比特幣每年成長超過 2.3%，也就是那個損益兩平 ARR，我們就能永遠支付股利。我們可以在不賣出任何一股股票的情況下，永遠支付股利。這是一個非常關鍵的點。如果比特幣永遠都不成長，我們也能支付股利 43 年。我們對此非常清楚。你會看到我們把它公布在網站上，並且每 15 秒更新一次。

So let's go to the next slide. Here, you see, this is our website. If you go to the credit tab, you're going to see we show you the Bitcoin reserve. We show you the years of dividends. That's the years we have of coverage of Bitcoin appreciate 0% a year.

那我們看下一張投影片。在這裡你看到的是我們的網站。如果你到 credit（信用）分頁，你會看到我們展示比特幣儲備。我們會展示可支付股利的年數。那是指在比特幣每年升值 0% 的情況下，我們仍有多少年的覆蓋能力。

And then we show you the Bitcoin breakeven ARR, 2.27%. It's updated every 15 seconds. So for those people that are wondering, what is the credit risk in all of these instruments, I encourage you to go the credit tab.

然後我們會展示比特幣損益兩平 ARR：2.27%。它每 15 秒更新一次。所以對於那些在想「這些工具的信用風險是什麼」的人，我建議你去看 credit 分頁。

You can go and you can type in -- you can assume the Bitcoin price crashes to $30,000. You can change your vol outlook. You can change your ARR outlook. The model will recalculate all of the risk and credit spreads for every credit instrument and especially for STRC. And as I said, we're updating all of these things in real time, every 15 seconds.

你可以進去輸入——你可以假設比特幣價格崩跌到 30,000 美元。你可以改變你對波動率的展望。你可以改變你對 ARR 的展望。模型會重新計算每一個信用工具的所有風險與信用利差，尤其是 STRC。而如我所說，我們每 15 秒即時更新所有這些數據。

There's a misnomer. Sometimes, people think, well, Bitcoin has to appreciate 11% or 11.5% for us to be successful or cover the dividend. Not true, 2.3%. Or they think 30%. Now that's what we think it will do. The number that really matters is 2.27%, the big BTC breakeven ARR.

這裡有一個常見的誤解。有時候人們會想：「嗯，比特幣必須升值 11% 或 11.5%，我們才會成功或才能覆蓋股利。」不對，是 2.3%。或者他們以為是 30%。當然，那是我們認為它可能會做到的。真正重要的數字是 2.27%，也就是 BTC 的損益兩平 ARR。

Now it's important for another reason. The BTC breakeven ARR is also the inflection point where Stretch issuance results in more Bitcoin being stacked by our company than the Bitcoin we use to pay dividends if we choose to pay dividends with Bitcoin.

而它重要還有另一個原因。BTC 損益兩平 ARR 也是一個拐點：當 Stretch 的發行達到該水準時，若我們選擇用比特幣支付股利，則 Stretch 發行所帶來、由公司累積（堆疊）的比特幣數量，會超過我們用來支付股利的比特幣數量。

So this chart here, what it illustrates is that we don't have to sell a single share of stock. We could stop selling MSTR common stock right now. We can fund the dividends with Bitcoin sales. And if Stretch issuance is greater than that BTC breakeven number, not only will we fund the dividends forever; we will increase the amount of Bitcoin that we hold forever at the same time.

所以這張圖表所說明的是：我們不必賣出任何一股股票。我們現在就可以停止出售 MSTR 普通股。我們可以透過出售比特幣來支付股利。而如果 Stretch 的發行量高於那個 BTC 損益兩平數字，我們不僅能永遠支付股利；同時也會永遠增加我們持有的比特幣數量。

So you would say, well, how much is that? Well, you can see, if we were to sell $1.5 billion of Stretch per year, we can sell Bitcoin, pay the dividends, buy more Bitcoin than we sell, grow our Bitcoin stack, and generate Bitcoin yield. Now of course, we saw $1.5 billion of Bitcoin and like -- sorry, $1.5 billion in Stretch in two days a few weeks ago. So yeah, I think we can definitely stay above that breakeven point.

所以你可能會問：「那是多少？」你可以看到，如果我們每年賣出 15 億美元的 Stretch，我們就能賣出比特幣、支付股利、買回比我們賣出的更多比特幣、增加我們的比特幣持倉，並產生比特幣收益。當然，幾週前我們在兩天內就看到 15 億美元的比特幣——抱歉，是 15 億美元的 Stretch。所以是的，我認為我們絕對可以維持在那個損益兩平點之上。

What you see here on this slide is that if we actually have Stretch issuance equal to 20%, that would equate to $12.8 billion of Stretch sales this year. And we're kind of on the path of that if we look at the first four months of performance. We might exceed it, who knows; we might be less.

你在這張投影片上看到的是：如果我們的 Stretch 發行量實際上等於 20%，那就相當於今年 Stretch 銷售額達 128 億美元。如果看前四個月的表現，我們大致正走在那條路徑上。我們可能會超過它，誰知道；也可能會低於它。

But if we actually run at a 20% issuance rate, then the first order model shows or indicates that we generate a BTC yield of 17.7%. We accumulate an additional 144,000 bitcoin, and that's after we pay all the dividends by selling Bitcoin. So again, the most important point here is there are occasionally some short narratives.

但如果我們真的以 20% 的發行率運行，那麼一階模型顯示或指出，我們可以產生 17.7% 的 BTC 收益率。在透過出售比特幣支付完所有股利之後，我們仍能額外累積 144,000 枚比特幣。所以再次強調，這裡最重要的一點是：市場上偶爾會出現一些短線敘事。

People would say things like, well, if they sell the Bitcoin, that's bad for the business or it proves the business doesn't work or something. But we look at it as, if you're a real estate development company and you bought land for $10,000 an acre and you sold it at $100,000 an acre and then you bought more land with the profit, or if you sold $100,000 an acre to pay some interest expense on debt that you used to buy more land, nobody would say that that's bad for the price of real estate. And no one would say that that proves the business doesn't work.

人們會說像是：「嗯，如果他們賣出比特幣，這對生意不好」或「這證明這個商業模式行不通」之類的話。但我們的看法是：如果你是一家房地產開發公司，你以每英畝 10,000 美元買地、以每英畝 100,000 美元賣出，然後用利潤再買更多土地；或者你以每英畝 100,000 美元賣地來支付你用於買更多土地的債務利息支出，沒有人會說那對房地產價格不利。也沒有人會說那就證明這門生意行不通。

Real estate development companies literally exist to buy land cheap and sell it expensively. We're like a Bitcoin development company. We buy it cheap. We sell it dear. Where do the dividends come from? Capital gains fund credit dividends, right? That is the essence of the business. We invest in digital capital, Bitcoin. The capital gains from the investment fund the credit dividends. They will do it in perpetuity if you -- if the capital appreciates at that breakeven rate.

房地產開發公司本質上就是低價買地、高價賣出。我們就像一家比特幣開發公司。我們低買。我們高賣。股利從哪裡來？資本利得為信用股利提供資金，對吧？這就是這門生意的本質。我們投資於數位資本——比特幣。投資產生的資本利得為信用股利提供資金。只要——只要資本以那個損益兩平的成長率升值，他們就能永續地這麼做。

And it turns out that, sometimes, we will sell a Bitcoin derivative because it's in the best interest of the company, but it's not necessary. This chart really illustrates that you can strip the business down to something very simple. You buy back coin with credit, you let it appreciate, and then you sell Bitcoin to pay the dividend. And as long as you're issuing credit in excess of the breakeven point, then this business works and grows forever.

事實上，有時候我們會賣出比特幣衍生品，因為那符合公司的最大利益，但並非必要。這張圖很清楚地說明，你可以把這門生意簡化成非常單純的模式。你用信用回購幣，讓它升值，然後賣出比特幣來支付股利。只要你發行的信用高於損益兩平點，這門生意就能運作並永續成長。

So how do we decide what to do? Because every single day, we've got a bunch of trading decisions. Well, we have a very sophisticated equity and risk model. We calculate the benefits of the equity and the deltas to the risk for every single capital markets transaction. And that means we're making these decisions, not just every day, oftentimes every minute of every day based upon all the fluctuating prices of the trading pairs.

那我們如何決定要做什麼？因為每天我們都有一堆交易決策。我們有一個非常精密的股權與風險模型。我們會針對每一筆資本市場交易，計算股權的效益以及風險的變動量（delta）。這表示我們做決策不只是每天，很多時候是每天的每一分鐘，因為所有交易對的價格都在波動。

Right now, our BTC rating corporately is about 3.3. The duration of our liabilities is 10.9. That's the stochastic duration. It's our estimate of the stochastic duration of all the debt and prefs. The risk that we've centered on works out to 818 basis points. And that works out to a fair credit spread of 61 basis points.

目前，我們公司層級的 BTC 評等大約是 3.3。負債的存續期間是 10.9（年）。那是隨機存續期間（stochastic duration）。這是我們對所有債務與特別股（prefs）之隨機存續期間的估計。我們所聚焦的風險換算為 818 個基點。而這對應到合理的信用利差為 61 個基點。

818 basis points of risk means that there's an 8% chance at the end of the duration of the liabilities that you're trading at a BTC rating of 1. And 61 basis points is the credit spread a rational investor needs to be paid to offset the risk. What you can see here is two things.

818 個基點的風險，代表在負債存續期間結束時，你的 BTC 評等落在 1 的機率是 8%。而 61 個基點，是理性投資人為了抵銷該風險所需要獲得的信用利差報酬。你在這裡可以看到兩件事。

First of all, the assumptions we plug into the model to estimate that centerline risk is 10% BTC ARR. We assume that Bitcoin will perform about at the level of the S&P 500 over the last 100 years. It's a fairly conservative, realistic view. And we plug in 40% vol. We assume that the asset will remain volatile ad infinitum.

首先，我們放進模型、用來估計中線風險（centerline risk）的假設是 BTC 年化報酬率（ARR）10%。我們假設比特幣的表現大致相當於過去 100 年的標普 500 指數。這是相當保守且務實的觀點。另外我們輸入 40% 的波動率。我們假設該資產將無限期地維持高波動。

So we see that as two conservative estimates. But even with those estimates, what pops out is a credit spread of 61 basis points. The investment-grade credit spread is like 88. And so this is investment-grade credit even with very realistic pragmatic inputs.

因此我們把這視為兩個保守估計。但即便在這些估計下，模型得出的信用利差是 61 個基點。投資等級的信用利差大約是 88 個基點。所以即使採用非常寫實、務實的輸入，這仍然是投資等級信用。

Let's delve a bit more into this. Here's the risk model. What you can see, of course, is that if you're a Bitcoin maxi and you think Bitcoin is gone up 30% a year, there is no risk, right? The more bullish you are in Bitcoin, the more the risk drops away. If you're a tech investor and you think Bitcoin is as good as a Mag 7 stock and it goes up 20% a year, the risk is fairly de minimis.

我們再更深入一點。這是風險模型。你當然可以看到，如果你是比特幣極端多頭（Bitcoin maxi），你認為比特幣每年漲 30%，那就沒有風險，對吧？你對比特幣越看多，風險就越下降。如果你是科技投資人，覺得比特幣跟「七巨頭」（Mag 7）股票一樣好、每年漲 20%，那風險就相當微不足道（de minimis）。

If you're a trader and you think Bitcoin is no different than the S&P, well, then you're on that 10% ARR line. And then if you think that the volume stays constant, you've got that 818 basis points. If you're a skeptic and you think Bitcoin is going up 0% forever, the risk increases.

如果你是交易員，覺得比特幣和標普沒有差別，那你就落在 10% ARR 那條線上。然後如果你認為波動率維持不變，你就會得到 818 個基點。如果你是懷疑論者，覺得比特幣永遠只會上漲 0%，風險就會上升。

And if you're a hater, a pessimist, and you just think that Bitcoin is going down ad infinitum, then the risk actually explodes. There's a lot of risk here, and you can see it in the model. We will show you risk numbers here with that realistic view as though you're an agnostic trader. You don't love Bitcoin. You just think it's just as good as any other equity capital asset that's diversified.

如果你是討厭者、悲觀者，覺得比特幣會無限期地下跌，那風險其實會爆炸性上升。這裡有很多風險，你可以在模型中看見。我們會用那個寫實觀點來展示風險數字，就好像你是一個不可知論的交易員。你不愛比特幣。你只是認為它和其他分散化的股權資本資產一樣好。

You can see you can calculate the risk with various Bitcoin prices, and you'll get the answer you would expect. Bitcoin price going up is good; Bitcoin vol going down is good. And on the next slide, you can see you can slice this with various assumptions about the outlook of Bitcoin as well.

你可以用不同的比特幣價格來計算風險，得到的答案也會符合直覺。比特幣價格上漲是好事；比特幣波動率下降是好事。而在下一張投影片，你也可以用對比特幣前景的不同假設來切分分析。

So let's look at some trades. If we decide to sell $1 billion of MSTR stock and buy $1 billion of Bitcoin, if you do that at less than 1.2 mNAV, when you do it at 1 mNAV, you can see it's dilutive. It's a minus 48-basis-point yield. It costs the shareholders $310 million. For that reason, not very good idea.

那我們來看一些交易。如果我們決定賣出 10 億美元的 MSTR 股票並買入 10 億美元的比特幣，若在低於 1.2 倍 mNAV 時進行——當你在 1 倍 mNAV 進行時，你可以看到它是稀釋性的。殖利率是負 48 個基點。這會讓股東付出 3.10 億美元的成本。因此，這不是個好主意。

What you can see here is that as the mNAV goes to 2 or 2.25, it becomes a screamingly accretive deal. Two, you make $457 million in gains on the trade. We've broken it down [2] basis points of yield. It's also another point; 57 basis points of BTC yield is a lot of money. It's worth a third of $1 billion.

你可以看到，當 mNAV 上升到 2 或 2.25 時，這就變成一筆極度增厚（accretive）的交易。在 2 的情況下，你在這筆交易上可獲得 4.57 億美元的收益。我們把它拆解為 [2] 個基點的殖利率。另外還有一點：57 個基點的 BTC 殖利率是很大一筆錢。它相當於 10 億美元的三分之一。

So it's not that complicated to see whether something is accretive or dilutive when you're swapping common for Bitcoin. You can also see here what it does to the credit risk. It improves our BTC rating. It decreases the risk. So whenever we're swapping MSTR for Bitcoin, it's credit positive. It's probably equity positive unless we're trading below that 1.22 breakeven.

所以，當你用普通股換比特幣時，要判斷是增厚還是稀釋，其實沒那麼複雜。你也可以看到它對信用風險的影響。它改善了我們的 BTC 評等。它降低了風險。因此，只要我們是在用 MSTR 換比特幣，對信用就是正向（credit positive）。除非我們在低於 1.22 的損益兩平點交易，否則對股權大概率也是正向（equity positive）。

Now let's consider whether we want to use equity to pay the dividends or whether or not we want to use Bitcoin to pay the dividends. If we fund $1 billion of dividends with Bitcoin, it costs us $1 billion. It's $1 billion of cost to the shareholders.

現在來考慮：我們要用股權來支付股利，還是要用比特幣來支付股利。如果我們用比特幣來支付 10 億美元的股利，成本就是 10 億美元。也就是股東承擔 10 億美元的成本。

Look at the lowest line; you'll see it. It's a 12,763 bitcoin loss, 156 basis points. And what you can see here is that's pretty comparable to funding the dividends with common equity at 1.22 mNAV. They are pretty much the same.

看最下面那條線，你會看到。那是損失 12,763 顆比特幣，156 個基點。你可以看到，這和在 1.22 倍 mNAV 時用普通股來支付股利的成本相當接近。兩者幾乎一樣。

If you fund the dividends with equity below that breakeven, it gets more expensive for the shareholders. It costs you an extra $290 million to fund at 1 mNAV. So you'd be better off to sell the Bitcoin than to sell the equity on this analysis if the equity is trading weak. On the other hand, if the equity is trading at 2 mNAV, then it only costs $535 million. So it's an 83-basis-point hit instead of 156-basis-point hit.

如果你在低於那個損益兩平點時用股權來支付股利，對股東而言會更昂貴。在 1 倍 mNAV 融資支付時，你會多付出 2.90 億美元。因此，若股價走弱，依這個分析，你賣比特幣會比賣股權更好。另一方面，如果股權在 2 倍 mNAV 交易，那成本就只有 5.35 億美元。因此衝擊是 83 個基點，而不是 156 個基點。

So as you can see, we're always considering to use MSTR, to use BTC, to fund obligations of the company. What you'll notice is, if you do use equity, it doesn't change the credit metrics at all because you're expanding the capital base of the company. With Bitcoin, it may be less dilutive, but it does slightly increase the credit risk. It drives down the BTC rating. The risk goes up 13 basis points. That would equate to like a 1-basis-point increase in the credit spread.

如你所見，我們一直在考慮使用 MSTR、使用 BTC 來為公司的義務提供資金。你會注意到，如果你使用股權融資，信用指標完全不會改變，因為你是在擴大公司的資本基礎。使用比特幣可能較不稀釋，但確實會略微提高信用風險。它會拉低 BTC 評級。風險上升 13 個基點。這相當於信用利差大約增加 1 個基點。

Now what about funding the US dollar reserve to the tune of $1 billion? What you can see is, well, it's a lot more efficient for the shareholders to fund it at a high mNAV, like 2.25 or 2, than it is to fund it at a lower mNAV. And of course, it's constant to fund it at BTC.

那麼，如果要為 10 億美元規模的美元準備金提供資金呢？你可以看到，對股東而言，在較高的 mNAV（例如 2.25 或 2）時提供資金，效率遠高於在較低的 mNAV 時提供資金。當然，以 BTC 來提供資金則是固定不變的。

And that's the negative from the equity point of view. The positive from the credit point of view is it extends our duration dramatically, 160 days of duration. It decreases MSTR risk by 55 basis points and improves the rating.

這就是從股權角度來看的負面影響。從信用角度來看的正面影響是，它會大幅延長我們的存續期間，增加 160 天的存續期間。它會將 MSTR 風險降低 55 個基點並改善評級。

Next, now what if we actually buy back one of the converts or some of the converts? You can see here, if we go and we sell $500 million of Stretch to buy $500 million of convertible bond, we actually generate substantial BTC gains. We get a yield of anywhere from 22 basis points on the 2029 convert to 63 basis points of yield on the 2030 convert in the middle. So why? Because different converts have different equity content in them. And so some converts are more dilutive to the common than others.

接下來，如果我們實際回購一檔可轉債或部分可轉債呢？你可以看到，如果我們賣出 5 億美元的 Stretch 來買回 5 億美元的可轉債，我們實際上會產生可觀的 BTC 收益。我們可獲得的殖利率大約介於：2029 年到期可轉債的 22 個基點，到中間那檔 2030 年到期可轉債的 63 個基點。為什麼？因為不同可轉債所含的股權成分不同。因此，有些可轉債對普通股的稀釋程度比其他的更高。

And you can see here all the analytics. You can see the impact on the rating. You can see the impact on the risk. Generally, we'll stretch the duration. We'll dramatically decrease the leverage. We'll slightly increase the risk, and we'll, of course, generate massive BTC gains through this trade. You have to evaluate this, of course, every day because the price of all the converts will be changing every day. And so this is an illustrative of the model we use.

你可以在這裡看到所有分析數據。你可以看到對評級的影響。你可以看到對風險的影響。一般而言，我們會拉長存續期間。我們會大幅降低槓桿。我們會略微提高風險，並且當然會透過這筆交易產生巨大的 BTC 收益。當然你必須每天評估，因為所有可轉債的價格每天都在變動。因此，這是我們所使用模型的一個示例。

So what if we actually sold Bitcoin to buy the common stock back? This is not something that we have considered before, but I'd like to illustrate it. Because what you can see here is that below 1.22 mNAV, it's actually extremely accretive to the investors to swap BTC for MSTR.

那如果我們實際賣出比特幣來回購普通股呢？這不是我們以前考慮過的事情，但我想示範一下。因為你可以看到，當 mNAV 低於 1.22 時，用 BTC 換 MSTR 對投資人而言其實是極具增益的。

And so if you have an irrational market -- let's say, some crazy short sellers shorted our stock to 0.5 mNAV. Well, the most profitable trade in the entire model is to actually swap BTC for a common stock at a massive discount to mNAV. And you pick up 636 basis points of yield, massive amounts of BTC gain.

因此，如果市場是非理性的——例如，有些瘋狂的放空者把我們的股票放空到 0.5 mNAV。那麼，整個模型中最有利可圖的交易，其實就是以相對於 mNAV 的巨大折價，用 BTC 交換普通股。你可以獲得 636 個基點的殖利率，以及大量的 BTC 收益。

And of course, the opposite is intuitive. If you're trading at a high mNAV and you're swapping BTC for the stock, you're generating a dilution. So you won't see us swap BTC at a high mNAV, but you might see us swap at a low mNAV in the future. And you can see all of these trades, they have a small impact on risk, but it's fairly de minimis. It's primarily an equity dilution or accretion.

當然，反過來也很直觀。如果你在高 mNAV 交易，卻用 BTC 去換股票，你會造成稀釋。所以你不會看到我們在高 mNAV 時用 BTC 交換，但未來你可能會看到我們在低 mNAV 時進行交換。而且你可以看到，所有這些交易對風險的影響都很小，基本上可忽略不計。主要影響在於股權的稀釋或增益。

And you can see we can swap BTC for MSTR. But here, another very powerful tool the company has is, we can swap STRC. We can sell credit to buy MSTR. So over time, as the business model becomes more well understood, the company has the ability to do its own levered buyout or LBO on its own common stock. We can create amplification.

你可以看到我們可以用 BTC 換 MSTR。但在這裡，公司還有另一個非常強大的工具：我們可以交換 STRC。我們可以賣出信用工具來買入 MSTR。因此，隨著商業模式逐漸被更充分理解，公司有能力對自己的普通股進行自我槓桿收購（LBO）。我們可以創造放大效應。

I'm not going to use the word leverage because leverage implies that you've got a debt obligation that comes due. Really, it's amplification on the equity. And if we wanted to amplify the returns of the equity, we would simply sell the credit and buy back the common equity. And of course, we get to take advantage of market mispricing. If the market perfectly prices everything, we don't have great arbitrage opportunities.

我不打算使用「槓桿」這個詞，因為槓桿意味著你有到期需償還的債務義務。實際上，這是對股權的放大。如果我們想放大股權報酬，我們只需要賣出信用工具並回購普通股權。而且當然，我們可以利用市場錯價。如果市場把一切都完美定價，我們就沒有很好的套利機會。

I mean, but you can see here, even if the equity was trading at 2 mNAV, we can generate 85 basis points of yield by swapping $1 billion of credit for $1 billion of equity. But if the market trades down to 0.5 mNAV, we can generate 800 basis points of yield. So it starts to become pretty accretive, and this is an option in the future that we have as an operator.

我的意思是，你可以看到，即使股權以 2 倍 mNAV 交易，我們也能透過以 10 億美元的信用工具交換 10 億美元的股權，產生 85 個基點的殖利率。但如果市場跌到 0.5 倍 mNAV，我們可以產生 800 個基點的殖利率。因此它會開始變得相當具增益，而這是我們作為經營者未來可運用的一個選項。

And of course, we can actually sell dollars to buy common equity. So you can see the impact of this. And of course -- probably one of the more expensive programs we have is to carry the US dollar reserve. It's dilutive to the equity. It's equity negative, but it's credit positive.

當然，我們也可以實際賣出美元來買入普通股權。所以你可以看到其影響。而且當然——我們其中一個成本較高的計畫，可能就是持有美元準備金。它會稀釋股權。它對股權不利，但對信用有利。

And you can see we do have the option. If the equity were to trade to a discount to actually swap the dollars back for the common, it would be extremely profitable for the common stock shareholders to do that. So we've got some scenarios here.

你可以看到我們確實有這個選項。如果股權交易出現折價，將美元再換回普通股，對普通股股東而言會極為有利可圖。所以我們這裡有一些情境。

We can continue with our conventional strategy at 1 times mNAV. So even if the stock was trading at a discount to breakeven, we're selling credit and selling equity. And we use the equity to fund the dividends, and we hold the US dollar reserve constant at 1.5 years. We would run a 10.6% BTC yield, and we would accrete up to 263,000 BTC per share or satoshis per share over the next three years.

我們可以在 1 倍 mNAV 下延續我們的傳統策略。因此，即使股價以低於損益兩平的折價交易，我們仍在賣出信用工具並賣出股權。我們用股權來支付股利，並將美元準備金維持在 1.5 年不變。我們將實現 10.6% 的 BTC 殖利率，並在未來三年把每股比特幣（或每股聰）增益累積到 263,000。

So you can see even if the market conditions aren't great, right, we have a business to deliver 10.6% yield. The duration would stretch out a bit. The risk would increase a bit. The fair credit spread, it looks like 94 basis points. But it's still just a shade off of investment grade. So that's a conservative case.

所以你可以看到，即使市場條件不佳，我們仍有一門業務可以交付 10.6% 的殖利率。存續期間會稍微拉長。風險會稍微上升。合理的信用利差看起來是 94 個基點。但仍然只比投資級略低一點。所以這是一個保守情境。

Should the market continue, if we were a 1.22 mNAV, you can see that the yield expands to 12.2%. The credit metrics don't change, but this is really positive for the equity investors. So now here at 1.5 mNAV, you can see that the BTC goes to 13.4%.

如果市場持續走強，假設我們在 1.22 倍 mNAV，你可以看到殖利率擴大到 12.2%。信用指標不變，但這對股權投資人非常正面。因此在 1.5 倍 mNAV 時，你可以看到 BTC 殖利率上升到 13.4%。

So you can see market sentiment and confidence in our ability to maintain this business. Or belief in digital capital, belief in digital credit, is going to drive an expansion of the mNAV, which is going to actually drive an increase in the rate of accretion of Bitcoin per share. It's going to drive the BTC yield up. It's going to drive Bitcoin per share aggressively. And then at 2 mNAV, you see the BTC yield of this strategy gets you to 14.6%.

所以你可以看到，市場情緒與對我們維持這門業務能力的信心——或對數位資本、對數位信用的信念——將推動 mNAV 擴張，進而實際推動每股比特幣增益速度的提升。

So those are just different scenarios showing how market sentiment drives the business. But negative sentiment, it's a pretty good business. We'll double Bitcoin per share over seven years. And positive sentiment means that we will double Bitcoin per share faster.

所以這些只是不同的情境，用來說明市場情緒如何驅動這門生意。但在負面情緒下，這其實是一門相當不錯的生意。我們會在七年內把每股比特幣數量翻倍。而正面情緒則意味著我們會更快把每股比特幣數量翻倍。

Now the company, as I said before, it can fund its dividends without selling any equity. We can fund the dividends by selling Bitcoin, and we can still grow Bitcoin holdings continuously. So here's a scenario where what we do is we fund the dividends. We fund the USD reserve at 1.5 years. We do it by selling Bitcoin, and you can see we drive a 12.2% BTC yield.

現在這家公司，如我先前所說，可以在不出售任何股權的情況下為股利提供資金。我們可以透過出售比特幣來支付股利，同時仍能持續增加比特幣持有量。所以這裡有一個情境：我們所做的是為股利提供資金。我們在 1.5 年內把美元準備金補足。我們透過出售比特幣來做到這點，而你可以看到我們帶來 12.2% 的 BTC 收益率。

We go from the 670,000 BTC level to 850,000 to 950,000 to 1 million. So we'll go through 1 million Bitcoin held on the balance sheet in the next 36 months. And we'll do that while funding all of our obligations with Bitcoin. You can see the impact. The impact that's measurable is a slight increase in credit risk and a slight increase in credit spread. But I think it would be a second-order effect to the market. So this is interesting to keep in mind.

我們從 670,000 BTC 的水位提升到 850,000、950,000，再到 1,000,000。因此在未來 36 個月內，我們的資產負債表上持有的比特幣將突破 100 萬枚。而且我們會在用比特幣為所有義務提供資金的同時做到這點。你可以看到其影響。可衡量的影響是信用風險略微上升、信用利差略微擴大。但我認為對市場而言，那會是次要效應。所以這點值得記住。

Now what happens if we fix the US dollar dividend and fund dividends with Bitcoin? Here, what we do is we just hold the dividend at $2.25 billion. And we pay all of our obligations by selling Bitcoin, and what you see is we get to a 14.7% BTC yield, again, a slight increase in credit spreads, a slight increase in risk. But this is without accessing the equity capital markets at all to drive the business.

那如果我們固定美元股利，並用比特幣來支付股利，會發生什麼？在這裡，我們只是把股利維持在 22.5 億美元。我們透過出售比特幣來支付所有義務，而你看到的是我們達到 14.7% 的 BTC 收益率，同樣地，信用利差略微上升、風險略微增加。但這是在完全不進入股權資本市場來推動業務的情況下做到的。

And we're looking at first-order effects. We're not really showing the second-order effect and the third-order effect. There are tax credit advantages that are second-order effect. There's reflexivity in the common stock itself. It might very well be that if people decided, we weren't going to sell any common stock, they might actually decide that the rational mNAV should go to 2 or 3 or 4.

而我們在看的是一階效應。我們並沒有真正呈現二階效應與三階效應。有一些稅務抵減優勢屬於二階效應。普通股本身也存在反身性（reflexivity）。很可能如果人們認定我們不會出售任何普通股，他們反而會認為合理的 mNAV 應該上升到 2、3 或 4。

And so we can't really model those. What we can just illustrate here is that even the first-order model, it's pretty clear that the company has the option to run on the Bitcoin engine or on the Bitcoin derivative engine. MSTR is a bit coin derivative, and either of them are options.

因此我們無法真正把那些建模。我們在這裡能說明的是，即使只看一階模型，也很清楚公司可以選擇用「比特幣引擎」或「比特幣衍生品引擎」來運作。MSTR 是一種比特幣衍生品，而兩者都是選項。

Here's a scenario where we just retire all the converts. And if have we diverted 20% of the Stretch issuance to retire debt, we retire all the debt in the next three years. We'll go from $8.2 billion of debt to zero. Net leverage goes to zero. The duration of our instruments goes up to 15 years.

這裡有一個情境：我們把所有可轉債全部買回註銷。如果我們把 Stretch 發行量的 20% 挪用來償還債務，我們會在未來三年內清償所有債務。我們會把 82 億美元的債務降到零。淨槓桿降為零。我們工具的存續期間（duration）提高到 15 年。

There's 114 basis points of credit spread on the digital credit, but there is zero leverage. And we run with a 12.4% yield, and we maintain this constant 1.5-year USD reserve. And so you can see that's kind of interesting as well and an option that's available to us.

數位信用（digital credit）的信用利差是 114 個基點，但槓桿為零。而我們以 12.4% 的收益率運作，並維持固定的 1.5 年期美元準備金。所以你也可以看到，這同樣相當有意思，也是我們可用的一個選項。

So here's a table that just shows all the various options. And of course, there's a lot of other things. We've got a sophisticated model. We can plug in any possible trade in any size on any day of the week. And rest assured, we're continuing -- or we're considering this every single day. And we're programming trading algorithms to trade all these instruments sometimes every single second.

所以這裡有一張表，展示所有不同的選項。當然，還有很多其他事情。我們有一個精密的模型。我們可以在一週任何一天，輸入任何可能的交易、任何規模。請放心，我們每天都在持續——或說我們每天都在考量這些。而且我們正在編寫交易演算法，有時甚至每一秒都在交易所有這些工具。

And so the key point that Phong made is the optionality in the business is expanding dramatically. You can see on the equity side, our assumptions are 30% BTC ARR, 20% Stretch issuance, 11% dividend rate. On the credit side, we're much more pessimistic or conservative, or you could call it realistic, if you want, 10% BTC ARR, high vol. If Bitcoin vol starts to fall as Bitcoin price appreciation accelerates, we have a lot of other options we can take advantage of. And rest assured, we'll jump on top of those.

因此 Phong 提出的關鍵點是：這門生意的選擇權（optionalities）正在大幅擴張。你可以看到在股權端，我們的假設是 BTC ARR 30%、Stretch 發行 20%、股利率 11%。在信用端，我們更悲觀或更保守——你也可以稱之為更貼近現實——假設 BTC ARR 10%，高波動。如果比特幣波動率開始下降、同時比特幣價格升值加速，我們還有很多其他選項可以加以利用。請放心，我們會立刻把握那些機會。

I thought I'd show one last slide of interest here, which is -- sometimes, people have this misnomer. They think that we're borrowing money at 11.5%, and it's a fixed obligation. That's not correct. We're not borrowing money. When we sell $1 billion of Stretch, we're never paying it back. And so the first obligation is Stretch is a perpetual swap. It is not a loan.

我想在這裡再展示最後一張有意思的投影片——因為有時人們有個誤解。他們以為我們是在以 11.5% 借錢，而且那是固定義務。那不正確。我們不是在借錢。當我們賣出 10 億美元的 Stretch，我們永遠不需要把它還回去。因此第一個義務是：Stretch 是一種永續交換（perpetual swap）。它不是貸款。

And the second observation is the cost of capital is not 11.5%. There is a stochastic cost of capital. What Stretch is, is a perpetual swap where the issuer agrees to pay SOFR plus a credit spread, a variable credit spread adjustable each month. And then the issuer invests that in Bitcoin.

第二個觀察是，資本成本不是 11.5%。資本成本是隨機性的（stochastic）。Stretch 的本質是一種永續交換：發行人同意支付 SOFR 加上信用利差，而信用利差是可每月調整的浮動利差。然後發行人把這筆資金投資於比特幣。

So we are paying SOFR plus the credit spread. We are taking back the Bitcoin return. And the company, the issuer, has a couple of very powerful options. One powerful option the company has is over time to reduce the credit spread. That is an option. And of course, the credit spread is probably at a high point when you're early in the industry when digital credit is not understood.

所以我們支付 SOFR 加上信用利差。我們取得比特幣的報酬。而公司——也就是發行人——有幾個非常強大的選項。其中一個強大的選項是：隨著時間推移降低信用利差。那是一個選項。當你處於產業早期、數位信用尚未被理解時，信用利差很可能處於高點。

But you would think after three years or after six years or after nine years, the credit spreads will compress as confidence in Bitcoin grows, as confidence in Stretch grows, as AUM grows, as confidence in the business model grows. The credit spread should compress.

但你會認為三年後、六年後或九年後，信用利差會隨著對比特幣的信心提升、對 Stretch 的信心提升、AUM 成長、以及對商業模式的信心提升而收斂。信用利差應該會收斂。

The second option is the company has the option to lower the dividend to a floor of SOFR. So as SOFR falls -- when SOFR is 375 basis points, that's the floor. But if SOFR goes to 200 basis points, the company gained 175 basis points of additional optionality. SOFR has gone to 0 or 25 basis points in the past. So the fact that SOFR generally fluctuates between 500 basis points and 25 or 50 basis points on an eight-year cycle is a very important point.

第二個選項是：公司可以把股利下調到以 SOFR 為下限。因此當 SOFR 下跌時——當 SOFR 為 375 個基點時，那就是下限。但如果 SOFR 降到 200 個基點，公司就獲得額外 175 個基點的選擇權價值。SOFR 過去曾降到 0 或 25 個基點。因此，SOFR 通常在 8 年週期中於 500 個基點與 25 或 50 個基點之間波動，這是一個非常重要的點。

And when you consider those two options, the stochastic cost of capital for Stretch has to be modeled as something less than 11.5%, maybe more than the long-term rate. If you imagine SOFR is 2% or 3% and we have a 300-basis-point credit spread 20 years out, that might be 6%. So somewhere between 6% and 11.5% gets you to like a blended rate of 875 basis points.

而當你把這兩個選項納入考量時，Stretch 的隨機性資本成本必須被建模為低於 11.5%，可能高於長期利率。如果你想像 20 年後 SOFR 是 2% 或 3%，而我們的信用利差是 300 個基點，那可能就是 6%。所以介於 6% 與 11.5% 之間，會得到大約 875 個基點的混合利率。

So when we think about the cost of capital, we think that it's probably 875 basis points, and the debt is never coming due. And I think that's an important point to make to the world, and it colors your thinking. And so with that, I'll just end with our capital markets principles.

所以當我們思考資本成本時，我們認為它大概是 875 個基點，而且這筆債務永遠不會到期。我認為這是需要向外界強調的一個重要觀點，它會影響你的思考方式。那麼，接下來我就以我們的資本市場原則作結。

And I'll reiterate what Phong said. We're here to drive Bitcoin per share up, and we're doing everything we can to drive Bitcoin per share up. We think the best product and the best tool to do it is Stretch. And it's clear the market is telling us that. And so we will focus laser-like on making Stretch the best digital credit instrument.

我會重申 Phong 所說的。我們在這裡是要推升每股比特幣（Bitcoin per share），而且我們正盡一切所能推升每股比特幣。我們認為達成這件事的最佳產品與最佳工具是 Stretch。而市場顯然也在告訴我們這一點。因此，我們將以雷射般的專注，讓 Stretch 成為最好的數位信用工具。

We do see a world where we're debt-free and sooner rather than later. We're going to adjust our amplification and our credit metrics and our US dollar reserves and our use of proceeds based upon market feedback. We get market feedback every minute. We're literally staring at all these signals every minute. And of course, we're talking to every credit investor and every equity investor continuously.

我們確實看得到一個世界：我們將在不久的將來、而且是越快越好地達到零負債。我們會根據市場回饋，調整我們的槓桿放大（amplification）、信用指標、美元準備金，以及資金用途（use of proceeds）。我們每分鐘都在接收市場回饋。我們真的每分鐘都盯著所有這些訊號。當然，我們也持續與每一位信用投資人與每一位股權投資人保持溝通。

And again, with Bitcoin, the company has got more than $60 billion of Bitcoin, and the Bitcoin market has $20 billion or more of daily liquidity. If we were to be boxed in by a troll or a cynic or a skeptic into agreeing that we're never going to sell the Bitcoin and we're never going to tap the liquidity, we would be impairing the asset, which accounts for 99% of the future of the company.

再說一次，就比特幣而言，公司持有超過 600 億美元的比特幣，而比特幣市場每日流動性有 200 億美元或更多。如果我們被酸民、悲觀者或懷疑論者逼得同意「我們永遠不會賣出比特幣、也永遠不會動用流動性」，那等於是在損害這項資產；而這項資產占了公司未來的 99%。

So it's kind of like a real estate developer saying, I'm just never going to sell any real estate ever at any price. It's kind of a silly thing. If a wealthy person -- if a billionaire sells $1 million or spends $1 million to make $1 billion, nobody says they're poor. And nobody would lament that spending a few million dollars is going to crash the US currency either.

這有點像房地產開發商說：我永遠不會以任何價格賣出任何房地產。這其實很荒謬。如果一個有錢人——如果一位億萬富翁——賣出 100 萬美元或花 100 萬美元去賺 10 億美元，沒有人會說他變窮了。同樣地，也不會有人哀嘆花幾百萬美元就會讓美元崩盤。

I don't think that if we spend $100 million of Bitcoin or sell $100 million of Bitcoin to pay a dividend, I don't think it's going to negatively impact the Bitcoin network. I think it's probably good for the Bitcoin network. It definitely doesn't impair our business model. If anything, it just creates more optionality in second- and third-order effects.

我不認為我們花 1 億美元的比特幣，或賣出 1 億美元的比特幣來支付股利，會對比特幣網路造成負面影響。我反而認為這可能對比特幣網路是好事。這絕對不會損害我們的商業模式。如果有什麼影響，那也只是透過第二、第三層效應創造更多選擇權（optionalities）。

So the management team's practice is to run the company in the best interest of all the stakeholders. And that means there are three that we laser-like focus on. Whenever we're making a decision, we ask the question, is it good for the common equity MSTR? And we ask the second question, is it good for the creditors, especially STRC investors? And the third question we ask is, is it good for the capital investors, BTC investors?

因此，管理團隊的做法，是以所有利害關係人的最佳利益來經營公司。這代表我們會以雷射般的專注聚焦在三個對象。每當我們做決策時，我們會問：這對普通股 MSTR 好嗎？第二個問題：這對債權人好嗎，尤其是 STRC 投資人？第三個問題：這對資本投資人、也就是 BTC 投資人好嗎？

And we happen to believe that running our business in such a way as to commercialize digital credit in the most efficient fashion is the best thing we can do for Bitcoin and Bitcoin investors, the best thing we can do for digital credit investors, and the best thing that we can do for our common equity investors.

而我們恰好相信：以最高效率將數位信用商業化來經營我們的業務，是我們能為比特幣與比特幣投資人做的最佳事情，也是我們能為數位信用投資人做的最佳事情，同時也是我們能為普通股投資人做的最佳事情。

There is no conflict between those three goals. Because if we suboptimize to the benefit of one to the detriment of the other two, the entire machine doesn't work. And so when we balance the interest of the three, the more credit we sell, the higher the equity mNAV. The higher the equity mNAV, the more credit we can sell. The less the credit risk, the more Bitcoin we can buy. The better it is for Bitcoin, the better is for the price of Bitcoin. The less risky the credit is, the more profitable the equity is.

這三個目標之間並不存在衝突。因為如果我們為了讓其中一方受益而犧牲另外兩方、進行次優化（suboptimize），整台機器就無法運作。因此，當我們平衡三方利益時：我們賣出的信用越多，股權的 mNAV 就越高。股權 mNAV 越高，我們就能賣出更多信用。信用風險越低，我們就能買進更多比特幣。對比特幣越有利，就越有利於比特幣價格。信用越不具風險，股權就越有利可圖。

There really are concentric flywheels here, feedback loop within feedback loop within feedback loop. And when we're in harmony, all three -- all of those feedback loops are working really well. And you can see that happening in the market. We monitor it.

這裡確實存在同心式的飛輪：回饋迴路之中還有回饋迴路、回饋迴路之中再有回饋迴路。當我們處於協調一致的狀態時，這三個——所有這些回饋迴路都運作得非常好。你可以在市場上看到這正在發生。我們也在監控。

And indicia of everything working is when the mNAV is expanding and the equity is healthy and the equity is outperforming Bitcoin, when the volatility of Stretch is falling and liquidity is increasing, right, that is indicia of the success of the credit. And when Bitcoin prices appreciating and Bitcoin support and liquidity in the world is appreciating, that's indicia of success of the capital.

一切運作良好的跡象包括：mNAV 正在擴張、股權狀況健康、股權表現優於比特幣；同時 Stretch 的波動性正在下降、流動性正在上升——這些都是信用成功的跡象。而當比特幣價格上漲、全球對比特幣的支撐與流動性也在提升時，這些就是資本成功的跡象。

And so that's what we've been doing. That's what we're continuing to do, and we thank you for your support. Now I think we'll open it up for Q&A.

所以這就是我們一直在做的事。這也是我們將持續做的事，並感謝各位的支持。現在我想我們將開放 Q&A。

Thank you, Michael. So before we jump into the Q&A, I'd like to just share with all our investors that we're organizing a special Q&A for retail investors next week on May 13. You can scan this QR code if you'd like to submit questions. We'll share the link on X, and we'll share more details as well.

謝謝你，Michael。在我們進入 Q&A 之前，我想先與所有投資人分享：我們正在為散戶投資人安排一場特別的 Q&A，時間在下週 5 月 13 日。如果你想提交問題，可以掃描這個 QR code。我們會在 X 上分享連結，也會提供更多細節。

With that said, let's jump into the Q&A. I'd like to invite all our guests to turn on their cameras, get ready to ask some tough questions.

話不多說，我們進入 Q&A。我想邀請所有來賓打開鏡頭，準備提出一些尖銳的問題。

Let's get started with Pete Christiansen from Citi. Please go ahead.

我們先從花旗（Citi）的 Pete Christiansen 開始。請。

Thank you, CJ. I'm trying to start the video here. I think it's disabled. Anyway, hop right in here.

謝謝你，CJ。我正在嘗試開啟視訊。我想它被停用了。不管怎樣，我直接開始。

Michael, I just want to -- I was just hoping we just can take this call and how you've laid out, I think, both of these scenarios and think about like -- historically, I guess, -- well, I'm pointing to last year, at the end of last year, that there was a false signal that Strategy was selling Bitcoin. And it was taken negatively in the marketplace.

Michael，我只是想——我原本希望我們可以沿著你剛才的說法來看待這通電話，因為我覺得你把這兩種情境都講得很清楚，並思考像是——從歷史來看，我想——我指的是去年、去年底，當時市場出現一個錯誤訊號，認為 Strategy 在賣出比特幣。而市場對此是負面解讀。

Today, you outlined a lot of different optionality scenarios that Strategy now has to optimize its capital stack. Should we take today's call as a signal to the market that, yes, Strategy is willing to be more proactive with its capital stack, which may include the sale of Bitcoin, maybe for tax purposes or maybe for other optimization purposes, credit, what have you.

今天你概述了 Strategy 現在擁有許多不同的選擇權情境，用以最佳化其資本結構（capital stack）。我們是否應將今天這通電話視為對市場的訊號：是的，Strategy 願意更主動地管理其資本結構，其中可能包括出售比特幣——也許是出於稅務目的，或其他最佳化目的、信用等各種用途。

Should we take today's call as a signal that, yes, Strategy is going to be more tactical with its capital stack going forward?

我們是否應將今天這通電話視為一個訊號：是的，Strategy 未來將更具戰術性地管理其資本結構？

Yeah, you should. I think the company got much healthier when we proactively began to utilize the equity ATM -- and we said it; we're going to do it. We're not ashamed of it. We'll probably do it again -- and then when the company started proactively executing on the Stretch, the credit ATM. And we said we're going to -- we're not ashamed of it. We're going to keep doing it. We think it's good, and we've got a plan for it.

是的，你應該這麼理解。我認為當我們主動開始運用股權 ATM（at-the-market）時，公司就健康得多——而且我們也說過：我們會這麼做。我們不以此為恥。我們可能還會再做——接著當公司開始主動執行 Stretch，也就是信用 ATM 時也是如此。我們說過我們會做——我們不以此為恥。我們會持續做下去。我們認為這是好事，而且我們對此有計畫。

And now I think at this point to say we're turning on the BTC drive, we're not ashamed of it. We got $65 billion -- we have a $2.2 billion tax credit that's lying on the floor. We ought to go find a way to pick up the $2.2 billion, right? And just like with everything else, the more optionality we create and the more tools we have at our disposal, I think the better it is for the equity investors.

而現在我認為，在這個時間點說我們要啟動 BTC 驅動（BTC drive），我們也不以此為恥。我們有 650 億美元——我們有一筆 22 億美元的稅額抵免（tax credit）就躺在地上。我們應該想辦法把那 22 億美元撿起來，對吧？而且就像其他所有事情一樣，我們創造的選擇權越多、手上可用的工具越多，我認為對股權投資人就越有利。

We'll probably sell some Bitcoin to fund a dividend just to inoculate the market, just to send the message that we did it; look, the company is fine. The Bitcoin is fine. The industry is fine. The world didn't come to an end. And if you're a short seller and your thesis is the company has got to sell equity in order to fund the dividends, I would like nothing better than to rip your wings off.

我們可能會賣出一些比特幣來資助股利，目的只是為了讓市場「接種」一下，只是要傳達一個訊息：我們做到了；你看，公司很好。比特幣也很好。產業也很好。世界沒有終結。而如果你是放空者，你的論點是公司必須賣股權才能資助股利，那我最樂見的就是把你的翅膀硬生生扯下來。

I like that term, inoculate. Very well. Thank you.

我喜歡那個詞，「接種」。很好。謝謝你。

Thank you, Pete. I'd like to invite [Jeff Bak] next.

謝謝你，Pete。接下來我想邀請[Jeff Bak]。

Hello. First off, congrats to the team, particularly on Stretch's accelerated [region]. Happy to be a part of this. Thanks for having me here.

大家好。首先，恭喜團隊，特別是在Stretch加速的[region]方面。很高興能參與其中。謝謝邀請我來到這裡。

My question is focused on understanding how macro factors may influence the firm's Bitcoin acquisition strategy and particularly in regards to interest rates. As we all know, we're just about a few weeks away now from Kevin Warsh's official inauguration. And even though rate cuts odds are a little lower this year, Strategy now does have like an explicit growing interest rate sensitivity, right, as we just saw from the stochastic model.

我的問題聚焦在理解總體因素如何影響公司收購比特幣的策略，特別是就利率而言。眾所周知，我們距離Kevin Warsh的正式就任大概只剩幾週。而且即使今年降息機率稍微低一些，Strategy現在確實對利率的敏感度在明確上升，對吧？就像我們剛從隨機模型看到的。

And so if, hypothetically, we see interest rates being lowered, Stretch has this momentum that it will likely trade above par more aggressively, given the nature of like the floating rate dynamic. And now the company has like a really, really interesting fork.

所以假設我們看到利率下調，Stretch會因為類似浮動利率機制的特性而延續動能，更積極地交易在面值以上。而現在公司面臨一個非常、非常有意思的分岔點。

You can either, one, issue more Stretch and push the price back down to par. Or you can actually use that moment to reduce the interest burden itself right on what's outstanding. And there's a healthy tension between these two things.

你可以選擇：第一，發行更多Stretch，把價格再壓回面值附近。或者你也可以利用那個時點，去降低已發行在外部位本身的利息負擔。這兩者之間存在一種良性的拉扯。

I guess, my question is, can you help us understand that risk framework a little better to calibrate that particular trade-off, right, lowering the coupon versus selling more STRC? It changes a little bit of the Bitcoin acquisition velocity, but it also cuts interest expenses, especially in that lower rate interest environment. And any specific like input parameters that you might say takes priority here in your calculation?

我想問的是，你能否幫我們更好地理解那個風險框架，以便校準這個特定取捨：降低票息 versus 賣出更多STRC？這會稍微改變收購比特幣的速度，但也會降低利息費用，尤其是在較低利率的環境下。以及在你的計算中，有沒有任何你會說優先考量的特定輸入參數？

I'll start, and then Phong or Andrew may have some comments. So first of all, when the macro indicators are moving against us, we've got a headwind, everything slows down, right? And when we go to a restrictive monetary policy, that's bad for Bitcoin. That's really bad for Bitcoin. It's bad for risk assets. Bitcoin is risk asset squared. MSTR is risk assets cubed.

我先開始，之後Phong或Andrew可能會補充。首先，當總體指標朝不利於我們的方向移動時，我們就會遇到逆風，一切都會放慢，對吧？而當我們進入緊縮的貨幣政策時，這對比特幣不利。這對比特幣非常不利。這對風險資產不利。比特幣是風險資產的平方。MSTR是風險資產的立方。

So I feel like we're like tech cubed and big tech cubed, and Bitcoin is big tech squared in a risk-off environment, and you could see that. In a risk-on environment or a more accommodative monetary economy, I expect you'll see the opposite. I think Bitcoin will rally hard as squared. Our equity should rally as tech cubed. The credit, presumably, we have more optionality if SOFR falls.

所以我覺得我們像是科技股的立方、以及大型科技股的立方；而在避險（risk-off）環境下，比特幣像是大型科技股的平方，你可以看到那一點。在偏好風險（risk-on）的環境或更寬鬆的貨幣經濟下，我預期你會看到相反的情況。我認為比特幣會以「平方」的力道強勁上漲。我們的股權應該會以「科技股立方」的力道上漲。而信用端，假設SOFR下滑，我們大概會有更多選擇權。

Our bias is to grow the business responsibly, but as rapidly as we can. And our bias is to grow Bitcoin. So if we have the ability to accelerate our capital raising and we could twice as much capital in a risk-on or a more -- a looser, more accommodating monetary policy, we will run the vehicle as hard as we can. But we won't run it so hard that the capital structure doesn't keep up with it.

我們的偏好是在負責任的前提下成長業務，但也要盡可能快速。而我們的偏好是增加比特幣。所以如果我們有能力在risk-on或更——更寬鬆、更具支持性的貨幣政策下加速募資，甚至能募到兩倍的資金，我們就會把這台車開到能開多快就多快。但我們不會開到資本結構跟不上。

So the circumstances under which we would slow down or want to throttle the credit would be if Bitcoin -- if we go to risk-on and Bitcoin doesn't rally and our equity doesn't rally, but the credit rallies. So if the demand for the credit triples and somehow Bitcoin -- and Bitcoin doesn't react to the interest rate macro environment or MSTR doesn't, then we might very well say, well, we're going to want to adjust the dividend rate down because we're getting too much demand for the credit.

因此，我們會放慢或想要節流信用端的情況，會是：如果比特幣——如果我們進入risk-on，但比特幣沒有上漲、我們的股權也沒有上漲，但信用端卻上漲。所以如果對信用產品的需求暴增三倍，而不知為何比特幣——而比特幣對利率的總體環境沒有反應，或MSTR沒有反應，那我們很可能會說：我們想把股利率往下調，因為信用端需求太旺了。

By the way, Jeff, I don't think that will happen, right? I think the likelihood that we go to a risk-on environment and Bitcoin doesn't rally is small. So then if Bitcoin rallies, then our capital stack and our collateral base expands and then we can accommodate more credit. So the rate of Stretch issuance or credit sales is a function of the BTC growth rate or ARR.

順帶一提，Jeff，我不認為那會發生，對吧？我認為我們進入risk-on環境而比特幣不反彈的機率很小。所以如果比特幣反彈，那我們的資本堆疊與擔保品基礎就會擴大，接著我們就能承接更多信用。因此，Stretch的發行速度或信用銷售量，取決於BTC成長率或ARR。

If Bitcoin grows 30%, we can expand credit aggressively. If it grows 50%, we could go faster. And then the second order is, really, the equity capital market's enthusiasm for our business model. So if the equity capital markets looked at our business and said, okay, we're going to run a BTC yield of 20% a year and I'm going to give you a P to E of 10, I'm going to give you a 200% premium of mNAV and you're trading at 3x mNAV. Well, that would be better than we are right now.

如果比特幣成長30%，我們就能積極擴張信用。如果成長50%，我們可以更快。接著第二層因素，實際上是股權資本市場對我們商業模式的熱情程度。所以如果股權資本市場看著我們的業務說：好，我們要跑每年20%的BTC收益率，我給你10倍本益比（P/E），我給你相對mNAV 200%的溢價，而你交易在3倍mNAV。那會比我們現在的狀況更好。

If the equity capital markets did that, gave us a 10 P to E on BTC yield or BTC gain, then, of course, our optionality increases; we grow faster. And the countervailing view is, well, you've only been doing this for a year or two years, and so the Lindy effect says, I'm only going to put a P to E of 2 on that.

如果股權資本市場真的那樣做，對BTC收益或BTC增益給我們10倍P/E，那當然，我們的選擇權就增加了；我們會成長得更快。而相反的觀點是：嗯，你們這才做了一年或兩年，所以Lindy效應告訴我，我只願意給它2倍P/E。

And so if we get a P to E of 2, we could have a Bitcoin rally that gets us a collateral stack, but the equity doesn't go as fast. And that might govern the rate at which we run the credit engine. But the bottom line is if Bitcoin -- if the macro environment turns risk on and expands and Bitcoin rallies or equity rallies, it's go time, we're going to go. And we're going to go with the credit.

所以如果我們拿到2倍P/E，我們可能會遇到比特幣上漲、讓我們的擔保品堆疊增加，但股權漲得沒那麼快。而那可能會決定我們運轉信用引擎的速度。但總結來說，如果比特幣——如果總體環境轉為risk-on並擴張，而比特幣上漲或股權上漲，那就是出發時刻，我們會衝。而且我們會搭配信用一起衝。

Like we're going to use the credit. Make no mistake about it. We want to see the mNAV -- the equity is undervalued. We want to see the mNAV expand to 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. And nothing would make me happier than to rip the faces off of all the skeptics and the shorts, and drive the equity to the moon.

我們會使用信用。毫無疑問。我們希望看到mNAV——股權被低估。我們希望看到mNAV擴張到2、3、4、5或6。沒有什麼會比把所有懷疑者和放空者的臉都撕下來、把股價推上月球更讓我開心的了。

And I think the question you've got to ask yourself is, is this company going to sell $10 billion of Stretch this year or $20 billion or $40 billion or $80 billion, right? And the answer to how much we can sell responsibly is a function of where the Bitcoin price is and to a lesser extent, how the equity capital markets react.

而我認為你必須問自己的問題是：這家公司今年會賣出100億美元的Stretch，還是200億、400億或800億，對吧？而我們能以負責任的方式賣出多少，取決於比特幣價格的位置，以及在較小程度上取決於股權資本市場的反應。

If the equity capital markets are accommodating and supportive and Bitcoin rallies, the company has a lot of tools to manage the BTC rating and the collateral coverage. And we can add more equity capital. And you could see -- I just showed you -- we can put equity capital in the market fast. We're the biggest equity issuer last year and this year.

如果股權資本市場寬鬆、支持，而比特幣上漲，公司就有很多工具來管理BTC評級與擔保覆蓋率。而且我們可以加入更多股權資本。你也看到了——我剛剛展示過——我們可以很快把股權資本投放到市場。我們是去年和今年最大的股權發行人。

We could also take common equity out of the market if we decided to. What we're going to look at is, we're going to look at the interest rate forward yield curve. We're going to look at how Bitcoin performs if Bitcoin keeps performing as big tech squared. We're going to look at the forward curve or the forward expectation curve of BTC. We're going to look at the forward vol curve, right?

如果我們決定要這麼做，我們也可以把普通股從市場上撤出。我們要看的，是利率的遠期殖利率曲線。我們要看的是，如果比特幣持續表現得像「大型科技股的平方」，比特幣會如何表現。我們要看 BTC 的遠期曲線或遠期預期曲線。我們要看遠期波動率曲線，對吧？

Bitcoin at vol 40% or 35% is different than vol at 50% or vol at 20%. When Bitcoin vol falls to 20% or 25%, you can lever these things and still have investment grade. You can lever 2, 3, 4, 5x more and still of investment grade. So that's -- by the way, Bitcoin vol being 30% right now is not the same as institutional credit investors expecting Bitcoin vol to be 30% for a decade, right?

比特幣在 40% 或 35% 的波動率，和在 50% 或 20% 的波動率時，是不一樣的。當比特幣波動率降到 20% 或 25% 時，你可以對這些部位加槓桿，同時仍然維持投資級。你可以加 2、3、4、5 倍以上的槓桿，仍然是投資級。所以那就是——順帶一提，比特幣波動率現在是 30%，並不等同於機構信用投資人預期比特幣波動率會在未來十年都維持 30%，對吧？

So the forward yield curve, the forward vol curve, the forward price curve, the forward equity curve, all that stuff gets discounted back. And we get up and we ask ourselves the question, what is the rational thing to do? But at the end of the day, what we're wanting to do is to drive the mNAV to the sky and drive the Bitcoin price to the sky and to build Stretch into the biggest credit instrument in the world. Because the higher Stretch AUM we have, the more liquidity.

所以遠期殖利率曲線、遠期波動率曲線、遠期價格曲線、遠期股權曲線，所有這些東西都會折現回來。然後我們起身問自己一個問題：理性上該做什麼？但歸根結底，我們想做的是把 mNAV 推到天上、把比特幣價格推到天上，並把 Stretch 打造成全世界最大的信用工具。因為我們的 Stretch AUM 越高，流動性就越強。

And if we can get to $1 billion of liquidity for STRC, the vol will keep coming off, adoption will expand, and we get a network effect. So I think -- you know how Amazon gave like free shipping or shipping for $10 a month, and everybody said you're losing money on that. And they lost money on that for a decade, and then one day, they just raised the price and they were the only player in the world. They made a fortune, and people thought, well, I guess, that was a good idea.

而如果我們能讓 STRC 的流動性達到 10 億美元，波動率就會持續下降，採用會擴大，然後我們會得到網路效應。所以我認為——你知道亞馬遜曾經提供像是免運，或每月 10 美元的運費方案，大家都說你這樣在賠錢。他們為此賠了十年，然後有一天，他們就把價格調高，而他們成了全世界唯一的玩家。他們賺了大錢，人們就想，嗯，我想那確實是個好主意。

I think we would like -- if you gave me a choice, do I want to sell $500 billion of Stretch and pay 11%? Or do I want to solve $50 billion in pay 9%? If you know me and the company, I think you can guess which of the two we want? At the end of the day, our long-term view is Bitcoin is going to go up more than 11%. It's going to go up 30%, and if we're wrong, it's 20%.

我想我們會希望——如果你讓我選，我是想賣出 5,000 億美元的 Stretch 並支付 11%？還是想做 500 億美元並支付 9%？如果你了解我和公司，我想你可以猜到我們想要哪一個。歸根結底，我們的長期觀點是，比特幣的漲幅會超過 11%。它會上漲 30%，如果我們錯了，那也會是 20%。

200 basis points won't make the difference one way or the other. But I'd rather think that if we gather an extra $100 billion of capital, I think the war to determine the future of the credit markets and the war in terms of the future of money is going to be fought and won with money. And so we're going to get the money if we can do it in a responsible way, right?

200 個基點不會在任何一個方向上造成決定性差異。但我更願意相信，如果我們能多募集 1,000 億美元資本，我認為決定信用市場未來的戰爭，以及關於貨幣未來的戰爭，將會用金錢來打、也用金錢來贏。所以只要我們能以負責任的方式做到，我們就會把資金拿到手，對吧？

And at some point, if you have this perverse random situation where Bitcoin price is not reacting and MSTR is not reacting but everybody -- I can't imagine that credit investors are more bullish on Bitcoin credit than equity investors or Bitcoin investors.

而在某個時點，如果出現這種反常、隨機的情況：比特幣價格沒有反應、MSTR 也沒有反應，但所有人——我無法想像信用投資人會比股票投資人或比特幣投資人更看多比特幣信用。

But if you construct that tortured scenario, then maybe we would slow down the credit machine. But if equity investors are more bullish than capital investors and if capital or Bitcoin investors are more bullish than credit investors, then I think the entire system solves its own problems. Because we're probably not going to be able to keep up with the expansion of our BTC collateral stack.

但如果你構建出那種牽強的情境，那也許我們會放慢信用機器的速度。但如果股票投資人比資本投資人更看多，而資本或比特幣投資人又比信用投資人更看多，那我認為整個系統會自行解決它自己的問題。因為我們大概無法跟上我們 BTC 抵押品堆疊的擴張速度。

I'll add one short thing to this, Jeff. I think the scenario you lay out is in a maturation of the digital credit market, right, 5, 10 years out, when digital credit is $3 trillion or $30 trillion on a $300 trillion market. We would run into this issue of, how do you manage the demand for Stretch?

Jeff，我再補充一點。我認為你提出的情境，是數位信用市場成熟後才會出現的，對吧，大概是 5 到 10 年之後，當數位信用在 300 兆美元的市場中達到 3 兆或 30 兆美元時。我們會遇到這個問題：你要如何管理對 Stretch 的需求？

I think 10 months into it, I think our issue is not so much, what interest rate or are we paying -- or what is the Fed due to interest rates? I think the demand is going to be driven by awareness and marketing of the product right now. So I don't think that scenario is going to be much of an issue for the short term.

我認為在推行 10 個月之後，我覺得我們的問題不太是利率是多少，或我們在付多少——或聯準會對利率做什麼。我認為目前需求會由產品的認知度與行銷來驅動。所以我不認為那個情境在短期內會是太大的問題。

Got it. Thank you for those thoughtful responses. We'll take a note.

了解。謝謝你們那些深思熟慮的回覆。我們會記下來。

Thank you, Jeff. Next, I'd like to invite Andrew Harte from BTIG.

謝謝你，Jeff。接下來，我想邀請來自 BTIG 的 Andrew Harte。

Hey, thanks for the question. I think the optionality in the business really came through clearly today. Maybe just shifting gears a bit, earlier in the slide, Michael, you talked about Bitcoin being digital capital and MicroStrategy being digital equity and Stretch being digital credit. Then you also talked about kind of innovators kind of building digital money down the road, you call it like a layer three in that example.

嗨，謝謝這個問題。我覺得今天業務的選擇權價值（optionalitiy）表現得非常清楚。也許稍微換個話題，Michael，你在先前的投影片裡談到比特幣是數位資本（digital capital）、MicroStrategy 是數位股權（digital equity），而 Stretch 是數位信用（digital credit）。然後你也談到，某種意義上，創新者未來會建立數位貨幣，你在那個例子裡把它稱作第三層（layer three）。

I guess, considering Stretch is going to be the foundation or the building blocks for digital money at some point as the market continues to mature, I guess, what do you think that solution looks like? Are you having conversations with innovators who are out there looking to build on top of Stretch and create these digital money solutions? Thanks.

我想，考量到 Stretch 在某個時點會成為數位貨幣的基礎或積木，隨著市場持續成熟，我想問，你認為那個解決方案會長什麼樣子？你們是否正在和一些創新者對話，他們正在尋求在 Stretch 之上建構並創造這些數位貨幣解決方案？謝謝。

Hold on. Sorry, can you hear me?

等一下。抱歉，你聽得到我嗎？

Yeah, I can hear you.

對，我聽得到你。

You hear me fine. Okay. So, yeah, I think you see it with Apyx and Saturn and Hermetica and a lot of the token issuers that are creating these yield coins that are powered by Stretch. And so they are rapidly innovating. I think if you look at some of the DeFi protocols that are offering 2x, 3x, 5x, 10x leverage and looping, Pendles of the world and the like, I think they're also innovating pretty rapidly.

你聽我很清楚。好。所以，是的，我想你可以從 Apyx、Saturn、Hermetica，以及許多代幣發行方身上看到，他們正在創造由 Stretch 驅動的這些收益幣（yield coins）。因此他們正在快速創新。我認為如果你看看一些提供 2 倍、3 倍、5 倍、10 倍槓桿與循環（looping）的 DeFi 協議，像是 Pendle 這類，我認為他們也在相當快速地創新。

We don't know the final shape. I think there's 1,000 different combinations of digital money and digital yield. I think there's a different -- for example, there's a different currency in every country. I think you can create various yield coins in different currencies. I think that in Australia, you can deploy it via a regulated bank or by a token that can sell in Australia or via an ETF taken public in Australia or via private fund in Australia.

我們不知道最終會是什麼形態。我認為數位貨幣與數位收益有 1,000 種不同的組合。我認為——例如，每個國家都有不同的貨幣。我認為你可以用不同貨幣創造各種收益幣。我認為在澳洲，你可以透過受監管的銀行來部署，或透過能在澳洲銷售的代幣，或透過在澳洲上市的 ETF，或透過澳洲的私募基金來部署。

So when you take the combination of currencies and platforms and containers, the sky's the limit. But what I do notice is the people that seem to be moving the fastest and the most enthusiastically right now are the DeFi players. And it's people that are launching stable coins that have to compete with Tether and Circle.

所以當你把貨幣、平台與載體（containers）的組合放在一起，潛力無上限。但我注意到的是，目前看起來動得最快、也最熱情的，是 DeFi 玩家。以及那些正在發行必須與 Tether 和 Circle 競爭的穩定幣的人。

And the issue is, how do I convince people to put AUM or put capital into my stable coin? And I need to create either a digital monetary, a yield coin, 0% vol, 8% yielding. I mean, that's kind of compelling. Or I need to create like a 25% ARR stake -- lock up your money for a month. And I'll give you 25% on three or four turns on the capital or something.

而問題是：我要如何說服人們把 AUM 或把資本放進我的穩定幣？我需要創造某種數位貨幣、某種收益幣，0% 波動率、8% 收益率。我的意思是，那相當有吸引力。或者我需要創造像是 25% ARR 的質押——把你的錢鎖一個月。然後我在資本上做三、四次周轉之類的，給你 25% 的回報。

And obviously, the market's going to decide who it trusts and is going to decide what form of that it wants to buy. And it votes with its money, and you can literally watch the money flowing every hour in that system. I think you'll see some ETF players, but they'll come slower because they're a little bit more -- there's more regulatory friction there.

而且很明顯，市場會決定它信任誰，也會決定它想以什麼形式去買。市場會用資金投票，而你真的可以逐小時地看著資金在那個系統裡流動。我想你會看到一些 ETF 參與者，但它們會來得比較慢，因為那邊的監管摩擦稍微大一些。

And we hold out hope that we'll see a neobank offer a digital yield account. There's no reason why a bank or any neobank that has a mobile up couldn't just say, hey, we'll just give you 8% on your money in this yield account if you want it. Each one of these things, it's a different counterparty, a different platform, a different regulatory container.

我們也仍抱持希望，能看到某家新型銀行（neobank）推出數位收益帳戶。其實沒有理由一家銀行或任何已經有行動 App 的新型銀行不能直接說：嘿，如果你願意把錢放在這個收益帳戶，我們就給你 8% 的利率。這些選項各自對應不同的交易對手、不同的平台、不同的監管容器。

What I would say is we had none of these conversations going on 8 weeks ago or 12 weeks ago. And now I see like three dozen, like three dozen initiatives. And so I think there's Cambrian explosion. And check back in 12 more weeks, I think we'll have some exciting news and some exciting partners.

我想說的是，8 週前或 12 週前，我們根本沒有在談這些事。但現在我看到大概三打、差不多三打的倡議。所以我認為這是一場寒武紀大爆發。再過 12 週回來看，我想我們會有一些令人振奮的消息和令人振奮的合作夥伴。

Or just watch my X feed because I retweet some of the more interesting digital yield, digital money offerings, that are literally happening. A lot of times, people are inventing stuff. And I'm finding out, at the same time you are, but the market is evolving in real time right now.

或者你也可以直接看我的 X 動態，因為我會轉推一些正在發生、比較有意思的數位收益、數位貨幣產品。很多時候，人們正在發明新東西。而我也是跟你一樣同時才知道，但市場此刻正在即時演進。

Thank you, Andrew. Next, I'd like to invite Eric Balchunas. Eric, please go ahead.

謝謝你，Andrew。接下來，我想邀請 Eric Balchunas。Eric，請開始。

Yeah. Hi. Thank you for having me today. Great presentation. My question is maybe a little more philosophical. I think it impacts the price in the future, but it's about the changing ownership and identity of Bitcoin.

好的。嗨。謝謝今天邀請我。簡報很精彩。我的問題可能比較偏哲學層面。我認為它會影響未來的價格，但它關乎比特幣所有權與身分認同的變化。

So according to River, in the past 16 months, you've had businesses buying 560,000 bitcoin, ETFs bought another 208,000, governments bought 160,000. So that's 1 million total bitcoin by those entities. Meanwhile, individuals sold 730,000 bitcoin. Some have called this a silent IPO, and it's arguably the reason for that 45% drawdown.

根據 River 的資料，在過去 16 個月裡，企業買了 56 萬枚比特幣，ETF 又買了 20.8 萬枚，政府買了 16 萬枚。也就是這些實體合計買了 100 萬枚比特幣。同時，個人賣出了 73 萬枚比特幣。有人把這稱為一場無聲的 IPO，而這也可以說是那次 45% 回撤的原因。

This changing ownership is being reflected, I think, at the recent Bitcoin conferences where you see an increasing number of suit corners, as some have called them, which you highlighted in the slide on the government and the banks.

我認為這種所有權的變化，也反映在近期的比特幣大會上：你會看到越來越多所謂的「西裝角落」（suit corners），你在政府與銀行那張投影片裡也提到了。

And I've noticed it's made some of the native Bitcoiners a little uncomfortable and conflicted regarding the original mission, given it was made to bypass governments and banks. To me, it feels like Facebook 10 years ago. When everyone's parents joined, some people left the platform, although the user base did grow from 1 billion to 3 billion since then.

我注意到，這讓一些原生的比特幣人（native Bitcoiners）感到有點不舒服、也有些矛盾，因為比特幣最初的使命是要繞過政府與銀行。對我來說，這感覺像 10 年前的 Facebook。當大家的爸媽都加入後，有些人離開了平台，儘管使用者基數此後也從 10 億成長到 30 億。

And I just want to get your read on this transition and the sort of mainstream [of occasion] of Bitcoin and how important it is to keep the original base of investors, keep them along for the ride and keep the sort of cypher-punk edge of Bitcoin as it goes more mainstream and gets adopted by companies, asset managers, governments, and boomers in general.

我想聽聽你對這個轉變的看法：比特幣走向主流（mainstream）的這種「主流化」有多重要？以及在它更主流、被公司、資產管理機構、政府，以及一般婴兒潮世代採用的同時，維持原本那群投資人、讓他們一路同行，並保留比特幣那種 cypherpunk 的鋒芒，有多重要？

Maybe it doesn't matter given the size of the institutional advisory market for that price, maybe hitting $1 million, but maybe it does. Just curious your thoughts.

也許就價格而言，考量到機構顧問市場的規模，這些並不重要——也許價格會到 100 萬美元——但也許又很重要。只是想聽聽你的想法。

Well, I'll make a quick point. Since we got in the space, there's been something like, call it, $1.4 trillion of wealth created for people other than the suit corners. So I don't know who got the money, but there's certainly 80 -- I think we can trace 4% to BlackRock investors, and they must have 50 million to 100 million beneficiaries. You can trace almost 4% to our investors. We've got 100 million beneficiaries.

好，我先快速講一點。自從我們進入這個領域以來，大概可以說，已經為「不是西裝角落」的人創造了約 1.4 兆美元的財富。所以我不知道錢到底都到了誰手上，但可以確定的是——大概 80——我想我們可以追溯到 4% 是 BlackRock 的投資人持有，而他們可能有 5,000 萬到 1 億名受益人。你也可以追溯到將近 4% 是我們的投資人持有。我們有 1 億名受益人。

So if you look at the corporates, they're representing thousands of institutions and tens of millions of investment accounts and hundreds of millions of beneficiaries. And the network is decentralizing. It is distributing through them. And it is maturing through them and finding its way into retiree accounts and insurance beneficiaries and trust funds and three-year-old trust-fund babies.

所以如果你看企業端，它們代表的是數千家機構、數千萬個投資帳戶，以及數以億計的受益人。而這個網路正在去中心化。它正透過這些管道被分散出去。它也透過這些管道走向成熟，並進入退休帳戶、保險受益人、信託基金，以及三歲的信託基金寶寶。

Everybody in the world is getting exposure now. But when everybody criticizes the centralization of the network, I note that 85% of the network is held by others. It's held by the crypto OGs. And we don't know how many people that is. But it almost certainly represents fewer beneficiaries than the beneficiaries that rely upon BlackRock ETF or a common public stock.

現在全世界每個人都在獲得曝險。但當每個人都在批評網路的中心化時，我會注意到其實有 85% 的網路是由其他人持有。是由加密 OG（早期玩家）持有。而我們不知道那到底是多少人。但幾乎可以確定，他們代表的受益人數，少於依賴 BlackRock ETF 或一般公開股票的受益人數。

So the corporations have been spreading exposure to Bitcoin by an order of magnitude or orders of magnitude right now. I do think that -- if you ask, well, who owns the $1 trillion of Bitcoin that's not public? And the Chinese -- there are Chinese, there are Russians, there are Americans, there are Europeans or South Americans or Ukrainians, there are Iranians.

所以企業正在以一個數量級、甚至多個數量級的幅度，把比特幣的曝險擴散出去。我確實認為——如果你問：那麼那 1 兆美元、非公開持有的比特幣是誰擁有的？有中國人、有俄羅斯人、有美國人、有歐洲人或南美人或烏克蘭人，也有伊朗人。

When you wonder who's selling it, well, it's $1 trillion of capital held by crypto OGs that are unbanked. Maybe they're selling it because the currency in Iran crashed. Maybe they're selling it because of some fear of some Chinese government memo. If the Chinese mined half a Bitcoin in the first like 15 years, it's kind of impossible that there aren't a lot of people with Bitcoin in China, you would figure, since they mined a great deal of it.

當你想知道是誰在賣時——那是由未進入銀行體系的加密 OG 持有的 1 兆美元資本。也許他們賣是因為伊朗的貨幣崩盤了。也許他們賣是因為害怕某份中國政府的備忘錄。如果中國在最初大概 15 年裡挖出了接近一半的比特幣，那幾乎不可能中國沒有很多人持有比特幣——你會這麼推論，因為他們挖出了很大一部分。

So I think, generally, the industry is maturing. It's rotating from the crypto OGs, but they're not going away, right? We spent $62 billion to get to less than 4%. It's pretty expensive to not get to the other 96%. And if you look at all the money that BlackRock and us put in this together, right, the $150 billion or $200 billion of capital that flowed from the institutions, it didn't get 90% of the network. So 90% of the network is still in global crypto OG hands.

所以我認為，整體而言，這個產業正在成熟。它正在從加密 OG 手中輪轉，但他們不會消失，對吧？我們花了 620 億美元才拿到不到 4%。要拿到另外 96% 是很昂貴的。而如果你看 BlackRock 和我們一起投入的所有資金——也就是從機構流入的 1,500 億或 2,000 億美元資本——並沒有拿到網路的 90%。所以網路的 90% 仍然在全球加密 OG 手上。

And I meet people -- I go everywhere in the world. I'll walk down the beach, and there's someone that's like slapping me on the back, thanking me for making them a lot of money, right? And it's because -- literally, people that you will never know who they are, and they will never announce it, they're sitting on $1.2 trillion of capital gains right now in the crypto ecosystem.

而我會遇到一些人——我走遍世界各地。我走在海灘上，就會有人拍著我的背，感謝我讓他們賺了很多錢，對吧？而那是因為——真的，有些你永遠不會知道他們是誰的人，而且他們也永遠不會公開宣告——他們此刻正坐擁加密生態系裡 1.2 兆美元的資本利得。

So I guess, what I'm saying is I'm not worried that the crypto ethos is being squashed. People with $1 trillion probably have a lot of power to do whatever they're going to do, and they're continuing to do it. The Bitcoin network is still highly decentralized. The miners are decentralized. This is a global phenomenon.

所以我想，我要說的是：我不擔心加密的精神（ethos）會被壓制。擁有 1 兆美元的人大概有很大的力量去做他們要做的事，而他們也正在持續這麼做。比特幣網路仍然高度去中心化。礦工是去中心化的。這是一個全球性的現象。

If anything, what's happening is the corporates are just powering up the network. We're the people that invest the $100 billion or $200 billion of capital to drive the price from $10,000 to $80,000 or from $10,000 to $100,000. But when we do it, 90% of the gain goes to other crypto actors, and they power the entire decentralized digital economy. And good for them. That's good. They'll do whatever they're going to do.

如果說有什麼正在發生，那就是企業只是把這個網路的能量再往上加。我們才是那些投入1,000億或2,000億美元資本、把價格從10,000美元推升到80,000美元，或從10,000美元推升到100,000美元的人。但當我們這麼做時，90%的漲幅會流向其他加密領域的參與者，而他們為整個去中心化的數位經濟提供動力。而且對他們來說很好。這是好事。他們會做他們要做的事。

I think that if you want to -- I don't use the analogy: it's like Facebook when your parents came along. I used the analogy: it's like the Internet when it used to be a girl or a dude in a dorm posted their blog on their web page, and then all of a sudden, Amazon started selling hundreds of billions or trillions of dollars of products on the Internet, right?

我認為如果你想要——我不使用那個類比：就像你父母加入Facebook那樣。我用的類比是：就像早期的網際網路，當時只是宿舍裡的一個女生或男生把自己的部落格貼在網頁上，然後突然之間，亞馬遜開始在網際網路上賣出數千億甚至數兆美元的商品，對吧？

It's just we started doing business with digital assets. And ultimately, the killer app of Bitcoin that we see is digital credit. And the way you know it's a good app is when someone wants to buy $1 billion of your product today, right?

只是我們開始用數位資產來做生意。而最終，我們看到比特幣的殺手級應用是數位信用。而你知道它是個好應用的方式，就是當有人今天就想買你10億美元的產品時，對吧？

That's -- I mean, everybody in the entire crypto ecosystem has always dreamed about, let's invent the killer app. And a good product is something that people will buy $1 billion a day of, and there aren't that many in the history of the world and we found one.

也就是說——整個加密生態系的人一直都夢想著：讓我們發明那個殺手級應用。而一個好產品，是人們每天願意買10億美元的東西；世界歷史上這樣的產品並不多，而我們找到了一個。

So I think that the networks are going to grow. We're going to power it up. You're going to see an explosion of all the other crypto ideas. Whatever crypto idea didn't catch fire over the past decade, now they've got 10 times as much money and opportunity to catch fire. And some of them will, and the ones that don't won't because the market doesn't want them.

所以我認為這些網路會成長。我們會把它的能量拉高。你會看到其他各種加密想法的爆發。過去十年沒有燒起來的任何加密點子，現在有10倍的資金與機會可以燒起來。其中一些會成功；而不成功的那些就不會，因為市場不需要它們。

But the industry is -- the network's evolving in every direction simultaneously. And I would take issue with anybody that ever said it's centralizing. It's absolutely not. It's decentralizing. The truth of the matter today is that there's a lot of people with money and power and influence in the world that are going to support this network and defend this network because of the success of all the corporations, whether it's Coinbase or whether it's BlackRock or whether it's Strategy, right?

但這個產業——這個網路正同時朝各個方向演化。而我會反對任何曾說它正在中心化的人。絕對不是。它正在去中心化。事實是，今天世界上有很多有錢、有權力、有影響力的人，會支持並捍衛這個網路，因為所有企業的成功，無論是Coinbase、BlackRock，還是Strategy，對吧？

And if you're going to lobby for things that are good for digital assets, in Washington, DC, It's not going to be a Chinese crypto synonymous billionaire hiding off the grid that's going to do that lobbying, right? So the $1 trillion of crypto OG money is not going to fix the accounting, fix the tax code, fix the banking system, and build the technologies that actually commercialize these apps to 1 billion people.

而如果你要在華盛頓特區為對數位資產有利的事情遊說，做這件事的不會是一個與中國加密同義、躲在離線世界的億萬富翁，對吧？所以那1兆美元的加密OG資金，不會去修正會計制度、修正稅法、修正銀行體系，也不會去打造那些真正把這些應用商業化、推向10億人的技術。

They're not going to give a bank account to 1 billion people that pays them 10%. And they're not going to put -- the crypto OGs are not going to put Bitcoin on every iPhone and every Android phone in the world. That's going to be corporate actors.

他們不會給10億人一個能支付10%利息的銀行帳戶。他們也不會——加密OG不會把比特幣裝到世界上每一支iPhone和每一支Android手機裡。那會是企業參與者來做。

And so the corporations are doing their part; the crypto OGs did their part. Everybody is in the system. There's tension. It's healthy tension. We welcome the healthy tension. It's what -- the global geo -- the fact that someone is going to sell Bitcoin because they're in Iran and some missiles got launched, right, that's a feature, not a bug.

因此企業在做他們的部分；加密OG也做了他們的部分。每個人都在這個系統裡。有張力。這是健康的張力。我們歡迎這種健康的張力。這就是——全球地緣——有人因為身在伊朗、發射了幾枚飛彈就要賣比特幣，對吧？那是一個特性，不是缺陷。

It's just -- people are trading based upon things that have nothing to do with the way Wall Street trades the S&P Index. And I think that's what makes Bitcoin special, and that's why we welcome it as global digital capital.

只是——人們在基於一些與華爾街交易標普指數完全無關的事情進行交易。我認為這正是比特幣特別之處，也因此我們歡迎它作為全球數位資本。

Thank you, Eric. Next, we'll invite Ramsey El-Assal from Cantor.

謝謝你，Eric。接下來我們邀請來自Cantor的Ramsey El-Assal。

Hi, thanks for taking my question tonight. Michael, you mentioned that if Bitcoin volatility were to fall as the asset price accelerates, you'd have some options and cards to play to preserve the attractiveness of the model. I'm just wondering if you can kind of elaborate a little further on what you meant there.

嗨，謝謝今晚讓我提問。Michael，你提到如果比特幣的波動率在資產價格加速上升時下降，你會有一些選項和牌可以打，以維持這個模型的吸引力。我只是想知道你能否再進一步說明一下你那句話的意思。

And then completely separately, I was wondering if you could just give us a quick update on the BTC security initiative. How has that been received? And has there been any developments on the quantum risk topic worth calling out? Thank you.

然後完全另外一件事，我想請你快速更新一下BTC安全倡議。市場反應如何？另外在量子風險這個議題上，有沒有任何值得特別提出的進展？謝謝。

I'll answer the first. I'll let Phong answer the second. If you go to our credit tab on our website and you type in a vol of like 40% and you have a BTC rating at 3, stuff starts to look sort of investment grade. When the vol falls to 30%, you can have a BTC rating of 1.5 and it looks investment-grade. When the vol falls below 30%, your amplification can triple, quadruple. And so as the vol falls, the credit risk falls.

我先回答第一個。第二個我讓Phong來回答。如果你到我們網站的credit分頁，然後輸入像40%的波動率，並且BTC評等設為3，整體看起來就有點像投資等級。當波動率降到30%時，你可以把BTC評等設為1.5，看起來也像投資等級。當波動率低於30%時，你的放大倍數可以變成三倍、四倍。因此隨著波動率下降，信用風險也會下降。

So I think that the forward volatility curve changes the view of credit investors, and it's going to create more demand amongst more traditional credit investors. And it's also going to change the view of banking regulators and credit rating agencies and the like.

所以我認為，遠期波動率曲線會改變信用投資人的看法，並在更多傳統信用投資人之間創造更大的需求。同時也會改變銀行監管機構、信用評等機構等對它的看法。

So there's a certain [gift] here or a certain -- what is the word -- like nuance. If the vol is high, it's equity positive. Today, I think on CNBC at like [350], they said the largest options trade in the entire market, in the entire stock market today was an MSTR options trade.

所以這裡有某種[禮物]，或某種——那個詞是什麼——像是一種微妙之處。如果波動率高，對股權是正向的。我想今天在CNBC大概[350]的時候，他們說今天整個市場、整個股市裡最大的一筆選擇權交易，是一筆MSTR的選擇權交易。

Someone traded hundreds of millions of our options today in the market. Number one of all companies in the entire United States. That's because of the vol. So when vol is high, it feeds the equity market, and that's good and it's equity positive. When the vol falls, it won't be so good for the equity, but it's very credit positive.

今天有人在市場上交易了數億美元的我們的選擇權。在美國所有公司裡排名第一。那是因為波動率。所以當波動率高時，它會餵養股權市場，這很好，對股權是正向的。當波動率下降時，對股權就沒那麼好，但對信用非常正向。

And the conclusion you come to is, is you're going to get performance through volatility on the vol side. And you're going to get performance through more amplification and more intelligent leverage as the vol falls. And of course, the entire asset class is going to expand. And people's view of it is going to improve as the vol develop -- as the vol falls.

而你得到的結論是：你會在波動率高的那一側，透過波動率獲得表現。而當波動率下降時，你會透過更高的放大倍數與更聰明的槓桿來獲得表現。當然，整個資產類別也會擴張。而隨著波動率發展——隨著波動率下降——人們對它的看法也會改善。

I do think, over time, over the long time for horizon, if the assets 40% ARR, 40% vol, it's reasonable for it to eventually mature to be 20% ARR, 20% vol. I mean, it's just kind of common sense that as it gets bigger and it gets more liquid, the law of large numbers and the inertia of the market and its relative size to all the other pools of capital are going to damp the ball.

我確實認為，隨著時間推移、在很長的時間視野下，如果這個資產是40% ARR、40%波動率，那麼它最終成熟為20% ARR、20%波動率是合理的。我的意思是，這有點常識：當它變得更大、流動性更高時，大數法則、市場的慣性，以及它相對於其他資本池的規模，會抑制那顆球。

I think it will always be more volatile than the S&P and always be more useful. But I think that if you're a credit issuer and a credit investor, you just want to be sensitive to it. And certainly, right now, the single number one issue in the entire market is, what is your forward volatility curve for Bitcoin?

我認為它永遠會比標普500更具波動性，也永遠更有用。但我認為，如果你是信用發行人與信用投資人，你只需要對它保持敏感。而且可以肯定的是，眼下整個市場最首要的單一問題是：你對比特幣的遠期波動率曲線是什麼？

Because if you think that Bitcoin is a 30% vol asset, everything we sell is investment grade and it should be priced double or triple what it is, if that's what you think. And so your view of volatility will control how much of this you want.

因為如果你認為比特幣是一個30%波動率的資產，我們賣的所有東西都是投資級，若你真這麼想，它的定價就應該是現在的兩倍或三倍。因此，你對波動率的看法將決定你想要配置多少這類產品。

If the ball starts to fall, there's just no reason why there shouldn't be a 10x bid on all this stuff. And then you might decide, rather than levering at 3:1, you lever it 8:1, right, or something. So it will change the behavior of all the downstream players as the volume increases or as it changes.

如果球開始下落，就沒有理由這些東西不應該出現10倍的買盤。然後你可能會決定，與其用3:1加槓桿，不如用8:1加槓桿，對吧，或類似這樣。所以，隨著成交量增加或發生變化，它會改變所有下游參與者的行為。

Okay. So, Phong, do you want to talk about security?

好的。那麼，Phong，你想談談安全性嗎？

Yes, Ramsey. We started to bring together a group of folks calling it the Bitcoin Security Program or Counsel. And the objective is to bring together institutions that represent custodians, exchanges, large Bitcoin treasury companies, who have a vested interest in the success of Bitcoin and share combined point of view on what is the potential risk and time horizon of quantum, what activities are underway in the development community, how do we get to consensus?

是的，Ramsey。我們開始把一群人聚集起來，稱之為比特幣安全計畫（Bitcoin Security Program）或顧問團。目標是把代表託管機構、交易所、大型比特幣財庫公司的機構聚在一起；這些機構都對比特幣的成功有切身利害關係，並共同分享對量子風險的潛在風險與時間跨度的綜合觀點、開發社群正在進行哪些活動，以及我們如何達成共識？

And so likely in the next month or so, we'll share who's in that group and what is our combined point view. Right now, I'd say there is a lot of divergent point of views. And I thought it would be useful to those who are interested in the success of Bitcoin bring something together. And so you'll hear from the Bitcoin Security Program likely in the next month or so.

因此，可能在接下來一個月左右，我們會分享這個團體有哪些成員，以及我們的綜合觀點是什麼。就目前而言，我會說存在許多分歧的觀點。我認為，對於那些關心比特幣成功的人來說，把這些內容整合起來會很有用。所以你大概會在接下來一個月左右聽到比特幣安全計畫的消息。

Excellent. Thank you. Appreciate it.

太好了。謝謝你。感謝。

Thank you, Ramsey. Next, [Jeff Walton]. Please go ahead.

謝謝你，Ramsey。接下來，[Jeff Walton]。請開始。

Thank you for including me, and very appreciative of your leadership. And I've got a bit of a two-parter here.

謝謝你邀請我參與，也非常感謝你的領導。我這裡有一個分成兩部分的問題。

So you spent a lot of the presentation talking about risk of the credit instruments. You've created a really unique arbitrage surface between all of the different instruments and a really unique incentive structure. It's resulted in people buying and selling the instruments right below par on STRC and some of the other instruments.

你在簡報中花了很多時間談信用工具的風險。你在各種不同工具之間創造了一個非常獨特的套利面，以及非常獨特的激勵結構。這導致人們在STRC以及其他一些工具上，以略低於面值的價格買賣這些工具。

So first question is, do you find that the market agrees with you? This is kind of in line with the answer to the last question on forward-looking volatility there. Do you find that the market agrees with you and the instruments are trading in tandem with each other? What's the biggest hurdle in communicating that relative risk profile? And then part two is what is the biggest hurdle in accelerating the adoption of the digital credit instruments into the future?

所以第一個問題是，你覺得市場同意你的看法嗎？這有點呼應上一題關於前瞻性波動率的回答。你覺得市場同意你、而且這些工具彼此之間是同步交易的嗎？在傳達這種相對風險輪廓時，最大的障礙是什麼？第二部分是：要加速未來數位信用工具的採用，最大的障礙是什麼？

Well, I think all the credit instruments are undervalued. So no, the market doesn't agree with us. If the market agreed with us, then STRF would be trading $200 a share right now, not where it is. So I think all of the -- I think the equity is trading weak. I think it's undervalued. I think all the credit instruments are undervalued. I think all the bond instruments are way undervalued.

嗯，我認為所有信用工具都被低估了。所以不，市場不同意我們。如果市場同意我們，那麼STRF現在應該會以每股200美元交易，而不是現在這個價位。所以我認為所有的——我認為股權交易偏弱。我認為它被低估了。我認為所有信用工具都被低估。我認為所有債券工具都被嚴重低估。

So I would say the market is much more skeptical and biased pessimistically than we are. And that's why, for example, we're not selling STRF, STRD, STRK, STRE. And we don't really have much interest in selling MSTR. We think all of those assets are undervalued.

所以我會說，市場比我們更懷疑、也更偏向悲觀。這也是為什麼，例如，我們不賣STRF、STRD、STRK、STRE。而且我們其實也沒有太大興趣賣MSTR。我們認為所有這些資產都被低估了。

The STRC is special because as we pointed out, it's a variable monthly preferred. And so the stochastic cost of that capital is hard to determine over 20 years. But you're not locking in a mispriced trade. And so I have a lot more enthusiasm to sell $1 billion of STRC at 11.5% than I have enthusiasm to sell $1 billion of STRF at 10%, right?

STRC比較特別，因為如我們指出的，它是每月浮動的優先股。因此，這筆資本在20年期間的隨機資金成本很難判定。但你並不是把一筆錯價交易鎖死。所以，相較於以10%賣出10億美元的STRF，我對以11.5%賣出10億美元的STRC更有熱情，對吧？

So no, I think we're embryonic. I would say -- how do we fix it? It's a lending effect. There's a lot of education. We have to go and educate the market. So you could say part of it is, we have to tell the story. And you could say part of it is -- people are just going to have to wait, right? Like, after we've been in the market for three years, they'll say, well, it's worked for three years. And so I guess, it's better than we thought it was.

所以不，我認為我們還在萌芽階段。我會說——我們怎麼修正？這是一種借貸效應。需要大量教育。我們必須去教育市場。所以你可以說其中一部分是，我們必須把故事講清楚。你也可以說其中一部分是——人們就是得等待，對吧？比如，在我們進入市場三年之後，他們會說，嗯，它已經運作三年了。所以我想，它比我們原先以為的更好。

So I think we'll be continually rerated up. I mean, the risk will be rated down, and the opportunity will be rated up as time goes by. And we won't be sitting on our hands, right? We'll be out there communicating the message, displaying it. Well, partly, we'll do it through publishing. Partly, we'll do it through investor outreach. Partly, we'll do it through partners. I think as our partners create compelling digital money products or the like, I think that's helpful.

所以我認為我們會持續被上調評級。也就是說，風險會隨時間被下調評級，而機會會隨時間被上調評級。而且我們不會袖手旁觀，對吧？我們會在外面溝通訊息、展示它。嗯，部分我們會透過發表出版物來做。部分我們會透過投資人外展來做。部分我們會透過合作夥伴來做。我認為，當我們的合作夥伴打造出有吸引力的數位貨幣產品或類似產品時，這會很有幫助。

And I think if you just asked the question, how long will it take -- how long did it take before the market thought that Amazon had a good business, right? It took 10 years after they started doing what they were doing.

而且我認為，如果你只是問這個問題：需要多久——市場花了多久才認為亞馬遜有一個好生意，對吧？在他們開始做他們在做的事情之後，花了10年。

And so you could be a pessimist and say, it took 10 years for that. And how long did it take before Netflix was deemed to be good? The truth is Apple was mispriced and misunderstood for many, many years. So I think if you have a revolutionary business, I think that the market will be bias skeptical because that's just what it is. It's going to be skeptical.

所以你可以當個悲觀者說，這花了10年。那麼，市場花了多久才認定Netflix是好的？事實是，蘋果在很多很多年裡都被錯誤定價、被誤解。所以我認為，如果你有一個革命性的商業模式，我認為市場會偏向懷疑，因為它就是這樣。它會懷疑。

The market was skeptical of Google. Google -- the market was skeptical of NVIDIA, skeptical of Apple, skeptical of whatever. It will be skeptical of digital credit and digital treasuries for a while. And then there'll be some point when it isn't. And just like Warren Buffett comes in and buy some Apple and the stock price doubles and the multiples expand from 10 to -- PDs of 10 to PDs of 20 or 25 or 30.

市場曾經懷疑Google。Google——市場曾經懷疑NVIDIA，懷疑蘋果，懷疑任何東西。它也會在一段時間內懷疑數位信用與數位財庫。然後會有某個時間點，它不再懷疑。就像華倫・巴菲特進來買一些蘋果，股價翻倍，估值倍數從10——從10倍本益比擴張到20或25或30倍本益比。

It will happen at some point when we least expect it to happen. But we have to do all the hard work of performing, laying down the track record, and educating the market and managing the risk of the business and the like. And so that's what we're doing.

它會在某個我們最意想不到的時刻發生。但我們必須把所有艱苦的工作都做完：把業績做出來、建立可追溯的績效紀錄、教育市場、管理業務風險等等。所以這就是我們正在做的事。

I think if you want the optimistic observation, well, the fact that the market is willing to buy more of that -- STRC is the most successful preferred stock in the world in the century. I think that's an indicia that maybe some people get it, right? So there are a lot of indicators that it's working and it's spreading fast and virally, but we still have a lot of work to do.

我想如果你要一個樂觀的觀察，那就是市場願意買更多這個——STRC 是本世紀全球最成功的優先股。我認為這是一個跡象，表示也許有些人懂了，對吧？所以有很多指標顯示它正在奏效，而且正在快速、病毒式地擴散，但我們仍然還有很多工作要做。

Thank you, Jeff. Next, I'd like to invite Randy Binner from Texas Capital. Randy, go ahead.

謝謝你，Jeff。接下來，我想邀請來自 Texas Capital 的 Randy Binner。Randy，請說。

Yeah, thanks. Michael, I think this one is for you. And hopefully, you can hear me okay. The question I have is, we talked about a lot of the CLARITY Act a lot. And it's -- yeah, I think it's important for the broader crypto ecosystem or -- this bipartisan compromise is good news.

好的，謝謝。Michael，我想這題是問你的。也希望你聽得到我說話。我的問題是，我們談了很多關於《CLARITY 法案》的內容。而且——是的，我認為這對更廣泛的加密生態系很重要，或者說——這個兩黨妥協是個好消息。

But for MSTR for MicroStrategy, for your world, what would be the most important regulatory or policy change or impact? I think we've talked about bank and insurance companies being lobbied to -- recognize crypto as a statutory asset. Is it something like that?

但對 MSTR、對 MicroStrategy、對你們的世界而言，最重要的監管或政策變化／影響會是什麼？我想我們談過銀行和保險公司被遊說去——把加密貨幣認列為法定資產。會是像那樣的事情嗎？

And the follow-up question, in case you covered this along the way is, did -- at this point, with so many arrows pointing in the right direction for crypto regulation and guardrails, do the midterms matter that much? And for that matter, does the next presidential election matter much from kind of a policy and regulation perspective?

以及追問一題，以防你一路上已經提到：在這個時間點，既然有這麼多跡象都指向加密監管與護欄正朝正確方向前進，那期中選舉還有那麼重要嗎？同樣地，下一次總統大選，從政策與監管的角度來看，影響還大嗎？

Bitcoin is in a safe harbor. There's global consensus as digital capital. MSTR is sitting in a safe harbor. It's a publicly traded, well-known, seasoned issuer. It came public in 1998, governed by securities laws that date back 100 years.

比特幣處在一個安全港之中。全球已形成共識，把它視為數位資本。MSTR 也坐落在安全港裡。它是一家上市公司、知名且成熟的發行人。它在 1998 年上市，受可追溯至 100 年前的證券法規所規範。

STRC is in a safe harbor. It's a publicly traded preferred stock based on 100-year-old tax law, 100-year-old securities law trading on the Nasdaq exchange, which has been around for who knows how long, longer than many of us have been alive.

STRC 也在安全港之中。它是一檔上市優先股，建立在 100 年的稅法、100 年的證券法之上，在那斯達克交易所交易；那個交易所存在了多久誰知道，反正比我們很多人活得都久。

So everything that we're doing is sitting in a zone of regulatory clarity. I don't think we need any change in a law or a rule in order to 10x or 100x. We can probably be 100x bigger from here without any change in any law or any rule. We're not asking or looking for anything.

所以我們正在做的一切，都處在監管明確的區域。我不認為我們需要任何法律或規則的改變，才能做到 10 倍或 100 倍成長。在不改變任何法律或規則的情況下，我們大概就能從這裡再大 100 倍。我們沒有在要求或尋求任何東西。

I think that CLARITY is pretty important to the dynamic and the balance of power with regard to token issuers, DeFi exchanges, stable coin issuers, crypto exchanges. And it determines the balance of power between the crypto industry, the neobanks, and the regional banks and the systemic -- the big banks.

我認為《CLARITY 法案》對於代幣發行人、DeFi 交易所、穩定幣發行人、加密交易所等相關的動態與權力平衡相當重要。而且它會決定加密產業、新型銀行（neobanks）、區域性銀行，以及系統性——大型銀行之間的權力平衡。

And so there's a lot of dynamics there that are almost too nuanced to get into right now. The significance to us is just ignorant skeptics will gloat if it slows down. And they will all flip to uninformed cheerleaders or acknowledgers if it passes. But there's not anything that we need. It's just going to change sentiment. It's going to be a positive bullish sentiment as it goes through.

所以其中有很多動態，細緻到現在幾乎不太適合深入。對我們而言的重要性只是：如果它放慢腳步，無知的懷疑者就會幸災樂禍。而如果它通過，他們就會全部轉成資訊不足的啦啦隊，或至少承認它。但我們並不需要它帶來什麼。它只是會改變市場情緒。在推進過程中，它會帶來正面、偏多的情緒。

Long term, if I look at my laundry list of things that are good for Bitcoin and good for us, it's a second order, not a first order, but the second order is the Basel Rules to the extent that they're upgraded to recognize Bitcoin as legitimate collateral and not haircut it.

長期來看，如果我列一張對比特幣、對我們有利的清單，這是第二順位而非第一順位；第二順位是《巴塞爾規則》（Basel Rules）若能升級到把比特幣視為合法抵押品，且不對它打折扣（haircut）。

It would be positive for banking adoption and especially credit adoption. Because right now, there's still a bit of haircutting of it by the credit rating agencies and the very conservative regulated entities that they want a gatekeeper or they want a regulator to tell them it's okay.

這會對銀行採用、尤其是信貸採用帶來正面影響。因為目前信評機構以及非常保守的受監管機構，仍然會對它做一些折扣處理；他們希望有個把關者，或希望由監管機關告訴他們「這樣做沒問題」。

And so I think that at some point, if you want an insurance company portfolio manager to buy the product without knowing what it is or why they bought it, then it would be beneficial for the Basel Rules to evolve and get an embrace of Bitcoin as a legitimate asset.

所以我認為在某個時間點，如果你希望保險公司的投資組合經理在不了解它是什麼、也不知道為什麼要買的情況下就去買這個產品，那麼《巴塞爾規則》演進並接納比特幣作為合法資產，會是有幫助的。

Right now, we're selling to informed investors that want to buy the best thing. And if you look at that market, if we just -- if we slurped up 10% of private credit, that's $370 billion right there. And so we've got plenty of runway for the next decade.

目前我們賣給的是有認知的投資人，他們想買最好的東西。如果你看那個市場，我們只要——如果我們吞下私人信貸的 10%，那就是 3,700 億美元。所以我們未來十年有非常充足的跑道。

But my wish -- if I had one wish is for Basel Rules to be fixed and then for the world to recognize Bitcoin as legitimate collateral, pari-passu to gold or to other capital assets on banking balance sheets and regulated entities. Then it should spread faster through the banks as a reserve asset and through insurance companies and the like.

但我的願望——如果我只能許一個願望，就是把《巴塞爾規則》修好，然後讓全世界把比特幣視為合法抵押品，在銀行資產負債表與受監管機構中，與黃金或其他資本資產同等順位（pari-passu）。那麼它就應該能更快地在銀行間以準備資產的形式擴散，並進入保險公司等機構。

But it's not necessary to us. We could be a multitrillion-dollar company and sell $400 billion of STRC and not have that fixed.

但這對我們並非必要。就算不修好這件事，我們也可以成為一家數兆美元的公司，並賣出 4,000 億美元的 STRC。

One thing I'll add, Randy, is Stretch is already a rapidly accelerating product in the category of digital credit. And that is without CLARITY as it relates to tokenization of securities, which I think will either be created through the passage of CLARITY or rulemaking by the SEC. That will only accelerate things.

Randy，我再補充一點：Stretch 在數位信貸這個類別中，已經是一個快速加速的產品。而且這還是在尚未就證券代幣化取得《CLARITY 法案》相關明確性之下；我認為這個明確性要嘛會透過《CLARITY 法案》通過而建立，要嘛會透過美國證券交易委員會（SEC）的規則制定而建立。那只會讓事情更快。

So we showed $270 million of layer two tokenized Stretch from companies like Apyx and StockX (sic - xStocks) by Kraken. Those are sold outside the US, not in the US, right? And so when we get CLARITY, that will only accelerate things and will accelerate layer two development on top of Stretch and just accelerate digital credit overall. So it's exciting to see what may come on something that's already an exploding asset class.

所以我們展示了 2.7 億美元的第二層（layer two）代幣化 Stretch，來自像 Apyx 和 Kraken 的 StockX（原文如此 - xStocks）這類公司。那些是在美國境外銷售，不是在美國，對吧？因此當我們取得《CLARITY》時，只會讓事情更快，並加速在 Stretch 之上建立第二層的開發，也會加速整體數位信貸的發展。所以很令人興奮，看看在一個已經爆發成長的資產類別上，接下來可能會發生什麼。

(multiple speakers)

（多位講者）

Thank you, Randy. I was just saving the best for last, [James Lavish].

謝謝你，Randy。我只是把最精彩的留到最後，[James Lavish]。

Thank you, CJ. Congratulations on your new role. Phong, Michael, Andrew, thank you for having me and allowing us to ask questions. So -- but first, congratulations also on your success with Stretch. I'm a believer in the digital credit world. And I appreciate you all sharing the many levers that you can now use to create value for the common shareholders while protecting creditors.

謝謝你，CJ。恭喜你擔任新職務。Phong、Michael、Andrew，謝謝你們邀請我，並讓我們提問。那麼——不過首先，也恭喜你們 Stretch 的成功。我相信數位信貸的世界。也感謝你們分享，現在你們可以運用許多槓桿，在保護債權人的同時，為普通股股東創造價值。

But on that, with Strategy's energy and focus on Stretch, which you've said before is the security you landed on through iteration, what do you see as the optimal future balance sheet structure for maximizing the accretion of value for common shareholders?

不過就此延伸，Strategy 對 Stretch 投入了能量與專注；你們之前說過，這是你們透過反覆迭代最終落定的證券。那麼你們認為，為了最大化普通股股東的價值增厚（accretion），未來最理想的資產負債表結構平衡會是什麼？

And would that include retiring most or all of the debt and preferreds currently outstanding? And do you believe that that's ultimately necessary to attract more of the largest institutions to invest in Stretch in lieu of traditional yield-generating securities?

那是否也包括讓目前尚未償還的大部分或全部債務與優先股退場？以及您是否認為，為了吸引更多最大型機構改投資 Stretch、而非傳統的收益型證券，這在最終是必要的？

Yeah. We think we want to be debt-free completely. So all six of the converts, we make go away by either swapping them for a Stretch or swapping them for equity or paying them off with cash. So I think there's consensus on that. I think there's consensus that Stretch is the killer strong credit instrument.

是的。我們認為我們希望完全沒有負債。所以那六檔可轉債，我們會透過把它們換成 Stretch、或換成股權、或用現金償還，讓它們消失。所以我想在這點上有共識。我想也有共識認為 Stretch 是極其強大的信用工具。

I think the jury is still out on the other four credit instruments. They're all long-duration credit instruments, and they represent important optionality for the company. And they -- and so I think that our policy will be to retire the six convertible bonds to promote and to polish the jewel in the crown, which is STRC; and then to watch and nurture the other four and improve them as we can and then observe whether or not they're material in generating demand.

至於另外四種信用工具，我認為目前仍未有定論。它們都是長久期的信用工具，並且代表公司重要的選擇權價值。因此我認為我們的政策會是：先讓那六檔可轉債退場，以推廣並打磨皇冠上的寶石，也就是 STRC；然後再觀察並培育另外四種工具，盡可能加以改善，並觀察它們在帶動需求方面是否具有實質重要性。

I think right now, you can imagine the company -- if I was designing a Bitcoin treasury company from a clean sheet of paper, the company would consist of one common equity, one monthly or semi-monthly variable preferred equity, and a big stack a Bitcoin and nothing else, right? And that's my advice I give freely to anybody that ever asks me.

我認為就目前而言，你可以想像這家公司——如果我要從一張白紙設計一家比特幣金庫公司，這家公司會由一種普通股、一種每月或半月配息的浮動利率優先股，以及一大堆比特幣構成，除此之外什麼都不要，對吧？這就是我對任何向我請教的人都會坦率給出的建議。

The other things that are interesting, maybe but not necessary; we'll watch them. It's very difficult to create a publicly traded instrument like Stripe or Stride or Strike. So we won't retire it because it represents giving up billions of dollars of optionality.

其他那些東西也許有趣，但不是必要；我們會持續觀察。要創造一個像 Stripe 或 Stride 或 Strike 這樣的公開交易工具非常困難。所以我們不會讓它退場，因為那等於放棄數十億美元的選擇權價值。

But on the other hand, what really is critical for us is, manage the common stock carefully to get the mNAV up and the premium up, manage the Bitcoin stack, and then manage the monthly variable rate preferred, the digital credit instrument. Those are the things that really matter.

但另一方面，對我們真正關鍵的是：謹慎管理普通股，把 mNAV 和溢價拉高；管理比特幣持倉；然後管理每月浮動利率優先股，也就是數位信用工具。這些才是真正重要的事情。

Thank you, everyone. That brings us to the end of the Q&A session. I'd like to thank everyone for their questions and all the attendees for joining and listening to the earnings call. I'll hand it back to Phong for any closing remarks.

謝謝各位。問答環節到此結束。我要感謝大家的提問，也感謝所有與會者加入並收聽本次財報電話會議。我把時間交回給 Phong，請他做結語。

Yeah. I want to first thank everybody for attending our earnings call. I know there's tens of thousands of you out there spending 2 hours and 15 minutes of your evening with us. And we find that to be very gracious and flattering.

好的。我想先感謝大家參加我們的財報電話會議。我知道有數以萬計的各位，在晚上花了 2 小時 15 分鐘與我們一起。我們覺得這非常慷慨，也令人受寵若驚。

Many of you are shareholders of our common MSTR and our perpetual preferred Stretch. And as many of you know, we have a shareholder vote coming up that's due early June to primarily modify Stretch to go from, as Andrew mentioned, a monthly dividend to a semi-monthly, twice-a-month dividend.

你們當中許多人是我們普通股 MSTR 與我們永續優先股 Stretch 的股東。如同許多人所知，我們即將進行一項股東投票，預計在 6 月初到期，主要是要修改 Stretch，使其如 Andrew 所提到的，從每月股利改為半月、也就是每月兩次的股利。

We believe this is beneficial to our shareholders. As we mentioned, one of our principles is to make Stretch better and more attractive. So we would appreciate you all voting early so that we can start to tabulate the votes. And this is how you can do it. If you have additional questions on how to vote for Stretch and for the common, you can also go to our website.

我們相信這對股東是有利的。如我們所提到的，我們的原則之一是讓 Stretch 變得更好、更具吸引力。因此我們希望各位能儘早投票，讓我們可以開始統計票數。以下是你可以採取的方式。如果你對如何為 Stretch 與普通股投票還有其他問題，也可以到我們的網站查詢。

And with that, I really appreciate your time. Thank you for all the interest and the attention, and we'll talk to you again, if not before then, at our next earnings call three months away.

最後，我非常感謝各位的時間。謝謝大家的興趣與關注；我們會再與各位交流——如果不是更早的話——那就是三個月後的下一次財報電話會議。