快扣 (FAST) 2019 Q4 法說會逐字稿

Greetings. Welcome to the Fastenal 2019 Annual and Fourth Quarter Earnings Results Conference Call. (Operator Instructions) Please note, this conference is being recorded.

問候。歡迎參加 Fastenal 2019 年及第四季收益業績電話會議。（操作員說明）請注意，本次會議正在錄音。

At this time, I'll turn the conference over to your host, Ellen Stolts, Assistant Controller. Ellen, you may now begin.

現在，我將把會議交給主持人，助理財務總監艾倫·斯托爾茨。艾倫，你可以開始了。

Welcome to the Fastenal Company 2019 Annual and Fourth Quarter Earnings Conference Call. This call will be hosted by Dan Florness, our President and Chief Executive Officer; and Holden Lewis, our Chief Financial Officer. The call will last for up to 1 hour, and we'll start with a general overview of our annual and quarterly results and operations, with the remainder of the time being open for questions and answers.

歡迎參加 Fastenal 公司 2019 年年度及第四季財報電話會議。本次電話會議將由我們的總裁兼執行長丹·弗洛內斯和我們的財務長霍爾頓·劉易斯主持。本次電話會議時長最多為 1 小時，我們將首先概述年度和季度業績及營運情況，剩餘時間將用於問答環節。

Today's conference call is a proprietary Fastenal presentation and is being recorded by Fastenal. No recording, reproduction, transmission or distribution of today's call is permitted without Fastenal's consent. This call is being audio simulcast on the Internet via the Fastenal Investor Relations home page, investor.fastenal.com. A replay of the webcast will be available on the website until March 1, 2020, at midnight Central Time.

今天的電話會議是 Fastenal 的專有演示，並由 Fastenal 進行錄音。未經 Fastenal 同意，不得對今天的通話進行任何錄音、複製、傳輸或分發。本次電話會議將透過 Fastenal 投資者關係主頁 investor.fastenal.com 在網路上進行音訊同步直播。網路直播的回放將在網站上提供，直至2020年3月1日中部時間午夜。

As a reminder, today's conference call may include statements regarding the company's future plans and prospects. These statements are based on our current expectations, and we undertake no duty to update them. It is important to note that the company's actual results may differ materially from those anticipated. Factors that could cause actual results to differ from anticipated results are contained in the company's latest earnings release and periodic filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission, and we encourage you to review those factors carefully.

提醒各位，今天的電話會議可能涉及公司未來的計劃和前景。這些聲明是基於我們目前的預期，我們不承擔更新這些聲明的義務。值得注意的是，公司的實際業績可能與預期業績有重大差異。可能導致實際結果與預期結果不同的因素已包含在公司最新的收益報告和定期向美國證券交易委員會提交的文件中，我們建議您仔細閱讀這些因素。

I would now like to turn the call over to Mr. Dan Florness.

現在我將把電話交給丹‧弗洛內斯先生。

Thank you, Ellen, and thank you, everybody, for joining us for our fourth quarter earnings call. Last -- we'll be filing our annual report here in the early part of -- first half of February. And so last weekend, I was drafting the letter to shareholders and employees for inclusion in that annual report. And one of the observations contained in that letter is a comparison of 2019 and 2015 because when I was -- when I'm writing that letter, I typically will go back and reread a few letters, and one reason to do that is so you're not too repetitive. Another reason to do that to see what observations jumped out at the time.

謝謝艾倫，也謝謝各位參加我們的第四季財報電話會議。最後——我們將在二月初——二月上半月提交年度報告。所以上週末，我正在起草一封給股東和員工的信，準備將其納入年度報告中。那封信中包含的一個觀察結果是對 2019 年和 2015 年的比較，因為當我寫那封信的時候，我通常會回頭重讀幾封信，這樣做的一個原因是避免重複太多內容。這樣做的另一個原因是想看看當時有哪些值得注意的現象。

Back in 2015, we started out the year with a PMI index of 52.6%. That's the average of the first 3 months of the year as we disclosed back then. Not sure if there's been adjustments to the PMI since then. We ended the year just shy of 49. I believe it was 48.6. And in 2019, we started the year a little bit higher. It was at 55.4 in the first quarter. In Q4, we were at 47.9. So -- and we've been sub-50 since August.

2015 年年初，PMI 指數為 52.6%。正如我們當時公佈的那樣，這是今年前三個月的平均值。不確定此後採購經理人指數（PMI）是否有調整。我們年底的成績略低於 49。我記得是48.6。2019 年，我們年初的排名略高一些。第一季為 55.4。第四季度，我們的數字是 47.9。所以——而且自八月以來，我們的氣溫一直低於50。

If I look at it using an internal benchmark or an internal yardstick and I look at our top 100 customers, this group represents about 25% of our revenue historically. In the first quarter of 2015, about 72% of those 100 customers were growing. By the fourth quarter, that number was 49%. And given our sizable relationship with each of these customers, the change in trends in a window like that is usually more about their underlying business than Fastenal gaining or losing market share with that customer. If I look at that same statistic in 2019, we started the year at 81%. We had finished the year at 57%. Again, it's looking at the percentage of our top 100 customers that are growing with us. And I think that's a great barometer on the marketplace.

如果我使用內部基準或內部標準來衡量，並查看我們前 100 位客戶，這個群體歷史上約占我們收入的 25%。2015 年第一季度，這 100 位客戶中約有 72% 實現了成長。到第四季度，這個數字是 49%。鑑於我們與每位客戶都保持著密切的合作關係，這種時間段內的趨勢變化通常更反映了他們自身的業務狀況，而不是 Fastenal 在該客戶中獲得或失去市場份額。如果我查看 2019 年的相同統計數據，我們年初的比例為 81%。我們年底的完成率為 57%。同樣，我們關注的是與我們共同成長的100家頂級客戶中所佔的百分比。我認為這是一個很好的市場晴雨表。

If I -- yesterday, in our Board meeting, one of our directors asked, if you're looking at Q4, and the question was about Q4, my comments here a second ago was on 2019 in general, what would you give for a grade on the quarter? And without giving it a second of thought, I looked at him and I said, you know what, I'd give it a B. And the biggest reason for the B is we did not leverage our earnings. In other words, our operating income growth was less than our sales growth. And I just can't give an A to that performance. So I graded it a B.

昨天，在我們的董事會會議上，一位董事問，如果你正在關注第四季度，而這個問題是關於第四季度的，我剛才的評論是關於2019年整體情況的，你會給這個季度打多少分？我幾乎沒怎麼思考，就看著他說：「你知道嗎，我會給它打B。」而之所以只給B，最大的原因是我們沒有利用槓桿來提高收益。換句話說，我們的營業收入成長低於銷售額成長。我實在無法給那場表演打A。所以我給它打了B。

However, if I look at our team, leaders throughout Fastenal and the execution of the team throughout the organization, I think given the subdued activity as indicated externally in the PMI index as well as internally in our top 40 -- or top 100, I believe the Blue Team executed well in the fourth quarter. December, as you all know from reading our release, December was a tough month. We grew 1%. The midweek holiday over Christmas was not our friend. The January and -- I've been doing this -- I've been at Fastenal now for 24 years, and that means I have done just shy of 100 earnings calls.

但是，如果我審視我們的團隊、Fastenal 的各級領導以及整個組織的團隊執行情況，考慮到 PMI 指數所顯示的外部活動以及我們公司前 40 名（或前 100 名）的內部活動都較為低迷，我認為藍隊在第四季度表現出色。正如大家從我們的新聞稿中了解到的，12月是一個艱難的月份。我們成長了1%。聖誕節期間的周中假期對我們來說並不友善。一月份——我一直在做這件事——我在 Fastenal 工作了 24 年，這意味著我已經參加了近 100 次財報電話會議。

And there's one thing we don't do, and we don't talk about current month in the current month. I'm going to break that rule. January started with a midweek holiday. That Thursday and Friday, the 2nd and 3rd, was not our friend, and we really haven't recovered from that. And I expect at this point January will feel a lot like December. I don't know if that means we'll be 1%, but I think it's going to feel like December did. Our sales team is adamantly opposed to that. They see reasons why we'll do better, and time will tell. I genuinely hope they prove my expectation wrong at this juncture of the month, but I'm just sharing that.

還有一件事我們不會做，那就是我們不會在當月談論當月的事。我要打破這條規則。一月以周中假期開始。那週四和週五，也就是2號和3號，對我們來說並不友好，我們至今還沒有從中恢復過來。我預計到那時，一月份的感覺會很像十二月份。我不知道這是否意味著我們會達到1%，但我認為感覺會和12月一樣。我們的銷售團隊堅決反對這一點。他們看到了我們未來會做得更好的理由，時間會證明一切。我真心希望他們能在本月這個時候推翻我的預期，但我只是分享我的想法。

This has absolutely no bearing on my thoughts for February or for 2020 in general. Time will tell what the economy is going to provide for us and what headwinds are created or tailwinds are created. But December ended with a midweek holiday. In January, we started with one. So I want to make that observation.

這完全不會影響我對二月或2020年的整體想法。時間會證明經濟將為我們帶來什麼，以及會出現哪些逆風或順風。但12月以周中假期結束。一月份，我們從一台機器開始。所以我想提出這一點。

Flipping over to Holden's flipbook, the -- I've touched on that second bullet where we really talked about December weakness and the impact of the holiday timing. Despite everything that's going on and my comment about my belief in the Blue Team and being impressed by their executing ability, we leveraged our operating costs in the fourth quarter. We continue to focus on controlling our costs, not as a means just for the expense but to put us in a position where we can continue to invest in our growth drivers because we still have incredible opportunities for growth, we have a relatively small market share and I truly believe we have a better supply chain model for our customers.

翻到霍爾頓的翻頁書，——我已經提到了第二點，我們真正討論了 12 月的疲軟以及假期時間的影響。儘管發生了種種事情，儘管我表達了對藍隊的信心，並對他們執行能力的讚賞，但我們在第四季還是有效控制了營運成本。我們將繼續專注於控製成本，這不僅是為了控制支出，更是為了讓我們能夠繼續投資於我們的成長動力，因為我們仍然擁有巨大的成長機會，我們的市場份額相對較小，而且我堅信我們為客戶提供了更好的供應鏈模式。

The -- as we talked about last quarter, the moderation in challenges of inflation and tariffs and our ability to manage through it has stabilized the price/cost. Holden violated a rule last quarter in that he talked about his expectations for gross profit. I suspect he won't do that again. But time will tell.

正如我們上個季度所討論的，通貨膨脹和關稅挑戰的緩和以及我們應對這些挑戰的能力，已經穩定了價格/成本。霍爾頓上個季度違反了規定，因為他談到了他對毛利的預期。我懷疑他不會再那樣做了。但時間會證明一切。

But one observation I'd have for everybody listening to this call, don't get caught up in the minutiae. The real issue in Q4, our sales fell off a bit more than we expected, and we have an incredibly large fixed cost trucking fleet that operates. And whether we're bringing 1 pallet or 3/4 of a pallet of product to a branch, we're running a truck, it's still a stop. And that delevered more in the fourth quarter than we expected.

但我對所有收聽這通通話的人有一點建議，不要太糾結於細節。第四季真正的問題是，我們的銷售額下降幅度比預期要大一些，而且我們還有一支規模龐大的固定成本卡車車隊在運作。無論我們運送 1 托盤還是 3/4 托盤的產品到分店，只要我們開著卡車，就仍然是一次停靠。第四季去槓桿化程度超出了我們的預期。

To add a little to that pain, our freight revenue also weakened. That's a short-term execution issue. If I were to attribute to anything, I think there's a bit of fatigue in the organization from all the tariffs and pricing and inflation, energy that we expelled in the summer and fall months, and I think it showed up in our fourth quarter. That's an execution issue on Fastenal, and that's on me. But don't get caught up in the minutiae of a gross profit, 0.1% or 20 basis points. It's deleveraging of the freight network. And that happens always in the fourth quarter. This year was a little bit more acute.

雪上加霜的是，我們的貨運收入也下降了。這是短期執行問題。如果要歸因於什麼，我認為是因為夏季和秋季幾個月我們消耗了大量精力，加上各種關稅、價格和通貨膨脹，導致公司內部有些疲憊，我認為這在第四季度有所體現。這是 Fastenal 的執行問題，也是我的責任。但不要太糾結於毛利的細枝末節，無論是 0.1% 還是 20 個基點。這是降低貨運網路槓桿率的過程。這種情況總是發生在第四節。今年情況更加嚴峻。

Flipping to the Page 4 of Holden's flipbook. Onsites, we signed 362 for the year. Our stated goal was 375 to 400, came in just shy of that. We ended the year with 1,114 active sites, about a 25% increase from end of last year. Sales growth with this group, and this is excluding transferred sales. So this is looking at pure growth. So if we have a $30,000 customer that pulls all the branch and we go Onsite, it's looking at dollars above $30,000. It was up in the low double digits. As you can appreciate, in our more mature Onsites, we did see some degradation, and that's the sign of the economy. Going into 2020, our goal remains 370 to 400. We're really excited about this growth driver in our business.

翻到霍爾頓翻頁書的第4頁。今年，我們在現場簽訂了 362 份合約。我們設定的目標是 375 到 400，結果略低於這個目標。到年底，我們共有 1114 個活躍站點，比去年年底成長了約 25%。該集團的銷售額成長，且不包括轉讓銷售額。所以這裡只關注純粹的成長。所以，如果我們有一個 30,000 美元的客戶，他把所有業務都拉到分支機構，然後我們上門服務，那麼最終的金額將超過 30,000 美元。漲幅在兩位數左右。正如您所看到的，在我們較成熟的現場服務中，我們確實看到了一些退化，這是經濟情勢的標誌。進入 2020 年，我們的目標仍然是 370 到 400。我們對這項業務成長動力感到非常興奮。

Total end market locations were 3,228 versus 3,121 at the end of last year. We closed or converted 36 locations of traditional branches. We also closed 26 Onsites in the fourth quarter. Now that probably raises a few questions in many of your eyes. Here's a couple of things to always keep in mind with Fastenal. Some organizations prefer only showing pretty pictures. Some organizations only prefer talking about good things. We talk about the real. We talk about the things that change. We address today's issues today.

終端市場總位置數為 3,228 個，而去年底為 3,121 個。我們關閉或改造了36家傳統分支機構。第四季我們也關閉了 26 個現場服務點。現在，這可能會在你們許多人心中引發一些疑問。使用 Fastenal 產品時，有幾點需要隨時記住。有些機構喜歡只展示漂亮的圖片。有些組織只喜歡談論好事。我們談論的是真實的。我們談論那些會改變的事情。我們今天就解決當今的問題。

One of the things the team at Fastenal has learned to live with over the last 5 years is every year, I share with them what I consider my top 10 suggestions on life, things that I learned from friends and family as a kid, and that includes -- where I grew up, family was also your neighbors. It includes teachers and coaches I was blessed to have in my life. It also includes the people you associate with in your adulthood. It starts with your spouse, extends to your kids, but it also extends to friends and associates you come across. Number five on that top 10 list is make great decisions, share the reason why and start today. If we have an Onsite location where that customer's business has downsized, maybe they closed that facility, maybe the economics don't work and we decided to take that relationship and move it back into the branch, that's not a sign of failure.

在過去 5 年裡，Fastenal 團隊逐漸習慣的一件事是，每年我都會和他們分享我認為人生最重要的 10 條建議，這些建議是我小時候從朋友和家人那裡學到的，其中包括——在我成長的地方，家人也是你的鄰居。其中包括我生命中遇到的老師和教練，我為此感到無比幸運。它也包括你成年後交往的人。它始於你的配偶，延伸到你的孩子，但也會延伸到你遇到的朋友和同事。十大建議中的第五條是：做出明智的決定，分享原因，並從今天開始。如果我們有一個現場服務點，而該客戶的業務規模縮小了，也許他們關閉了該設施，也許經濟效益不佳，我們決定將該客戶關係轉移回分支機構，這並不代表失敗。

That's a sign of wisdom. That's a sign of saying, how are we allocating our resources and what's the best resource allocation for our customer, for our next customer, for our people and for our business. And I consider those decisions to close an Onsite that doesn't meet the requirements to be a good decision, provided we don't think it's going to recover in a reasonable time frame. Exiting an Onsite doesn't mean you don't come back, doesn't mean you lost a customer relationship. It just means the economics for being Onsite aren't holding true right now. You take a step back. I think that's a great decision, and we will make those decisions every day.

這是智慧的體現。這顯示我們在思考：我們如何分配資源？對於我們的客戶、下一個客戶、我們的員工和我們的業務來說，最佳的資源分配方案是什麼？如果我們認為某個不符合要求的現場服務項目在合理的時間範圍內無法恢復，那麼我認為關閉該項目是一個明智的決定。退出現場活動並不意味著您不會再回來，也不代表您失去了客戶關係。這只是意味著目前現場辦公的經濟效益並不理想。你後退一步。我認為這是一個非常好的決定，我們每天都會做出這樣的決定。

From a vending perspective, we signed 5,144 devices in the fourth quarter, essentially in line with our -- and 21,857 for the year, essentially in line with our goal of 22,000 devices. Our installed base ended up at 89,937, an increase of about 11% from last year, and our product sales through those devices were up in the low double digits. In the order of avoiding confusion, earlier in the year, we celebrated vending machine number 100,000. This 89,937 includes machines that are principally producing product sales. We have another 15,000 devices out there that are leased out to customers for check-in/checkout purposes. Just to clarify that.

從自動販賣機的角度來看，我們在第四季度簽約了 5,144 台設備，基本上符合我們的預期——全年簽約了 21,857 台設備，基本上符合我們 22,000 台設備的目標。我們的安裝基數最終達到 89,937，比去年增長了約 11%，透過這些設備實現的產品銷售額也實現了兩位數的低成長。為避免混淆，今年早些時候，我們慶祝了第 10 萬台自動販賣機的投產。這 89,937 台機器主要用於生產產品銷售。我們還有 15,000 台設備出租給客戶辦理入住/退房手續。澄清一下。

Finally, e-commerce. Our sales grew at 25% Q4-to-Q4. For the full year, we were up 32%, and this includes a 35% increase with our national account customers. The way we think about e-commerce, it's about making our business a little bit more efficient every day because as our supply chain partnership with our customer grows, most of our business activity is coming from vending, from bin stocks, where we're -- where the customer really isn't ordering the product and we keep stepping deeper and deeper into the business. Today, those 2 pieces are about 30% of our revenue. I believe in the future, that number will more than double as a percentage of our business as we come more entrenched in our customers' business. This is really a reflection of stuff that customers order outside of that supply chain window but nonrecurring stuff.

最後，是電子商務。我們的銷售額較上季成長了 25%。全年來看，我們的業績成長了 32%，其中全國客戶的成長率為 35%。我們認為電子商務就是讓我們的業務每天都變得更有效率一點，因為隨著我們與客戶的供應鏈合作關係不斷發展，我們的大部分業務活動都來自自動販賣機和貨架庫存，也就是客戶實際上並沒有訂購產品的地方，而我們卻不斷地深入到業務的更深處。如今，這兩款產品約占我們收入的 30%。我相信，隨著我們與客戶業務的聯繫日益緊密，未來這個數字在我們業務中所佔的比例將會翻倍以上。這實際上反映了客戶在供應鏈窗口期之外訂購的非重複性商品。

With that, I'm going to turn it over to Holden.

接下來，我要把任務交給霍爾頓了。

Great. Thanks, Dan. Good morning. Let's just jump right into Slide #5. Total sales were up 3.7% in the fourth quarter, which included a particularly poor December growth of just 1%. December was affected by holiday timing and extended customer shutdowns. But even setting these aside, business activity was generally soft throughout the quarter. This was reflected as well in the macro statistics, with the leading U.S. Purchasing Managers' Index averaging a contractionary 47.9 in the fourth quarter and printing a 47.2 in December.

偉大的。謝謝你，丹。早安.我們直接進入第5張投影片。第四季總銷售額成長了 3.7%，其中 12 月的成長尤為糟糕，僅為 1%。12月受到假日和客戶長時間停工的影響。但即便撇開這些因素不談，本季商業活動整體而言依然疲軟。宏觀統計數據也反映了這一點，美國主要採購經理人指數在第四季度平均為收縮的 47.9，12 月為 47.2。

U.S. industrial production swung to a decline of 1.1% in October and November. Manufacturing was up 5.1%. Heavy equipment lagged at 1.4% growth with weakness as well in oil and gas, metals and transportation. Construction was up 3.1% in the fourth quarter, consistent with the third quarter. Larger construction customers, again, outgrew smaller ones, though we have seen a moderation in the rate of contraction in those smaller customers.

美國工業生產在10月和11月轉為下降，降幅達1.1%。製造業成長5.1%。重型設備成長率僅 1.4%，表現疲軟，石油天然氣、金屬和運輸業也同樣疲軟。第四季建築業成長3.1%，與第三季持平。規模較大的建築客戶再次超越了規模較小的客戶，儘管我們已經看到規模較小的客戶的萎縮速度放緩。

In the fourth quarter of 2019, we sustained the pricing that was implemented and realized in the third quarter of 2019 as a means of offsetting general inflation and tariffs. Clearly, things could change, but as we enter 2020, weaker end market demand and a more encouraging tone around trade policy has reduced inflationary pressure.

2019 年第四季度，我們維持了 2019 年第三季實施和實現的定價策略，以抵銷普遍的通貨膨脹和關稅。顯然，情況可能會發生變化，但隨著我們進入 2020 年，終端市場需求疲軟以及貿易政策方面更加積極的氛圍降低了通膨壓力。

From a product standpoint, non-fasteners continue to lead but did decelerate with 5.1% growth in the third quarter, while our more cyclical fastener line was up 1.8%. From a customer standpoint, national accounts were up 8.2% in the quarter, with 57 of our top 100 accounts growing. Non-national account sales actually contracted in the period with just 54% of our branches growing in the fourth quarter.

從產品角度來看，非緊固件產品繼續保持領先地位，但第三季增速放緩至 5.1%，而我們週期性更強的緊固件產品線則增加了 1.8%。從客戶角度來看，本季全國性客戶的業務量成長了 8.2%，前 100 名客戶中有 57 名實現了成長。非國民型客戶的銷售額在此期間實際上有所下降，第四季度只有 54% 的分支機構實現了成長。

November and December can be difficult months from which to draw conclusions about the future, and that is certainly the case this year. However, business conditions clearly remain sluggish, and the feedback from our regional leadership remains cautious on the early part of 2020. It remains our intention to take advantage of this environment to continue to invest in our growth drivers even as others pull back.

11月和12月往往是難以對未來做出判斷的月份，今年更是如此。然而，商業環境顯然依然低迷，我們區域領導對 2020 年初的回饋仍然謹慎。即使其他企業縮減投資規模，我們仍將利用當前環境繼續投資於我們的成長動力。

Now to Slide 6. Our gross margin was 46.9% in the fourth quarter, down 80 basis points versus last year. This annual decline is primarily a function of product and customer mix. The 30 basis points decline sequentially was in line with normal seasonality, though we were a bit shy of our expectation that gross margin would be at least 47%. This is primarily attributable to freight, as Dan commented on. While the cost of maintaining our captive truck fleet is fairly stable quarter-to-quarter, our ability to charge for freight to partly offset those costs can vary depending on market conditions. In the fourth quarter of 2019, our freight sales declined 7.5%, which resulted in less absorption of our fleet costs than anticipated.

現在來看第 6 張投影片。我們第四季的毛利率為 46.9%，比去年同期下降了 80 個基點。這種年度下滑主要是產品和顧客組合變化造成的。環比下降 30 個基點符合正常的季節性規律，儘管我們未能達到至少 47% 的毛利率預期。正如丹所說，這主要是由於貨運造成的。雖然我們自有卡車車隊的維護成本在每個季度都相當穩定，但我們收取運費以部分抵消這些成本的能力會因市場情況而異。2019 年第四季度，我們的貨運銷售額下降了 7.5%，導致我們的車隊成本吸收量低於預期。

With our pricing sticking from the third to the fourth quarter and with weakening demand causing inflationary pressures to moderate, price/cost was not a meaningful variable, one way or the other, affecting gross margin in the fourth quarter of 2019.

由於我們的定價從第三季到第四季保持不變，且需求疲軟導致通膨壓力有所緩解，因此價格/成本在 2019 年第四季對毛利率沒有產生任何實質影響。

Our operating margin was 18.7% in the fourth quarter, down 30 basis points year-over-year. We believe the Blue Team did a good job controlling expenses as SG&A as a percent of sales of 28.2% was better by 60 basis points and a record low for our fourth quarter. However, as we have commented before, given our intention to continue to invest in growth drivers even as conditions slow, it will be difficult to defend the operating margin when growth eases into the low single digits. Our inability to leverage occupancy costs in the fourth quarter of 2019 are a perfect example of this, with current growth not being sufficient to produce leverage over the vending investments that drive our market share gains.

第四季我們的營業利潤率為 18.7%，年減 30 個基點。我們認為藍隊在控制費用方面做得很好，銷售、一般及行政費用佔銷售額的百分比為 28.2%，比上一季降低了 60 個基點，創歷史新低。然而，正如我們之前評論的那樣，鑑於我們打算即使在經濟放緩的情況下也繼續投資於成長驅動因素，當成長放緩至個位數時，捍衛營業利潤率將變得十分困難。2019 年第四季度，我們未能有效利用佔用成本，這就是一個很好的例子。目前的成長不足以產生槓桿效應，無法抵銷推動我們市場佔有率成長的自動販賣機投資。

Looking at the other pieces of SG&A, we achieved 20 to 30 basis points of leverage over employee-related costs, which were up 2.4%. This was largely due to reduced FTE growth of 1.4%, combined with lower performance-based compensation in the period. In the current environment, we would expect further low single-digit growth going forward. We realized 30 to 40 basis points of leverage over general corporate costs, with lower bad debt expense and the absence of certain legal and structural expenses incurred in the fourth quarter of 2018 offsetting our higher IT spending in the fourth quarter of 2019. Putting it all together, we reported third quarter 2019 EPS of $0.31, up 5.4% from $0.29 in the fourth quarter of 2018.

從其他 SG&A 專案來看，我們在員工相關成本方面實現了 20 至 30 個基點的槓桿效應，而員工相關成本則上漲了 2.4%。這主要是由於 FTE 成長率下降 1.4%，以及該時期基於績效的薪酬降低。在當前環境下，我們預計未來將繼續保持個位數低成長。我們實現了對一般公司成本 30 至 40 個基點的槓桿率，壞帳支出減少，並且 2018 年第四季度發生的某些法律和結構性費用取消，抵消了我們在 2019 年第四季度較高的 IT 支出。綜合來看，我們公佈 2019 年第三季每股收益為 0.31 美元，比 2018 年第四季的 0.29 美元增加了 5.4%。

Turning to Slide 7, looking at cash flow. We generated $252 million in operating cash in the fourth quarter or 141% of net income. Higher earnings combined with lower working capital needs produced the cash flow. Full year cash conversion was 107%. Net capital spending in 2019 was $240 million, exceeding our targeted range of $195 million to $225 million. The sources of higher capital spending in 2019, vending, trucks and hub capacity, were planned. The overshoot related to our addressing a number of facilities in 2019 as a means of managing a sharp increase in our volumes over the past 3 years and a couple of those facilities simply costing more to complete than we anticipated. In light of weaker macro conditions, we expect net capital spending of $180 million to $205 million in 2020.

翻到第 7 張投影片，看看現金流。第四季度，我們產生了 2.52 億美元的營運現金流，佔淨利的 141%。更高的獲利能力加上更低的營運資金需求產生了現金流。全年現金轉換率為107%。2019 年淨資本支出為 2.4 億美元，超過了我們設定的 1.95 億美元至 2.25 億美元的目標範圍。2019 年更高的資本支出來源，自動販賣機、卡車和樞紐容量，都已規劃好。超支的原因在於，為了因應過去 3 年業務量的急劇增長，我們在 2019 年對多個設施進行了改造，而其中一些設施的完工成本比我們預期的要高。鑑於宏觀經濟情勢疲軟，我們預期 2020 年淨資本支出為 1.8 億美元至 2.05 億美元。

We paid nearly $500 million in dividends in 2019 and increased our dividend for the first quarter of 2020 by 13.6%. We finished the quarter with debt at 11.5% of total capital, below last year's 17.8%. Inventories were up 6.9% in the fourth quarter of 2019. Nearly 3/4 of this growth related to inventory to support Onsites. Hub inventory growth slowed sharply, a function of both deliberate efforts to reduce inventory as well as weaker demand, while field inventories were slightly down. Setting aside the impact of demand, we believe there remains further opportunity to improve our inventory days in 2020.

2019 年，我們支付了近 5 億美元的股息，並將 2020 年第一季的股息提高了 13.6%。本季末，我們的債務佔總資本的 11.5%，低於去年同期的 17.8%。2019年第四季庫存成長6.9%。其中近四分之三的成長與支援現場服務的庫存有關。樞紐庫存成長大幅放緩，這既是由於有意減少庫存，也是由於需求疲軟；而現場庫存略有下降。撇開需求的影響不談，我們相信 2020 年我們的庫存週轉天數仍有進一步改善的空間。

Accounts receivable grew 3.9% in the fourth quarter of 2019, the slowest rate of increase in more than 3 years, which largely reflects slowing demand. Mix and customer behavior will likely continue to influence AR days in 2020 with our expectations being flat to slightly higher days. We believe these factors will continue to produce good operating and free cash flow in 2020.

2019 年第四季應收帳款成長 3.9%，這是 3 年多來最慢的成長速度，這主要反映了需求放緩。2020 年，產品組合和客戶行為可能會繼續影響應收帳款週轉天數，我們預計週轉天數將與去年持平或略有上升。我們相信這些因素將在 2020 年繼續帶來良好的營運現金流和自由現金流。

That's all for our formal presentation. So with that, operator, we'll take questions.

我們的正式報告就到此為止。那麼，操作員，我們開始接受提問。

(Operator Instructions) And our first question is coming from the line of Ryan Merkel with William Blair.

（操作員說明）我們的第一個問題來自瑞安·默克爾和威廉·布萊爾的連線。

So first off, in terms of price capture, you said it was consistent with last quarter. So I just want to confirm, does this mean pricing was up 90 to 120 basis points? And then sort of a related question, I recall that you thought you'd get some incremental price into fourth quarter. Did this not materialize? And why was that, if that's the case?

首先，就價格走勢而言，您說它與上個季度保持一致。所以我想確認一下，這是否意味著價格上漲了 90 到 120 個基點？然後還有一個相關的問題，我記得你認為第四季價格會上漲。這件事最終沒有發生嗎？如果真是那樣，那又是為什麼呢？

No. So what I would say is if -- the impact of price in the fourth quarter was probably in the neighborhood of 70 to 100 basis points, which would have backed off a little bit from where Q3 was. But again, much as we saw much of the year, that reflected having to grow above some increases from last year. If I look at the overall price level in our business in fourth quarter, it was slightly up from where we were in the third quarter. So we looked at the overall pricing activity from Q3. And for the most part, I would characterize Q4 as living up with our expectations as it relates to the price side.

不。所以我想說的是，如果——第四季的價格影響可能在 70 到 100 個基點左右，這將比第三季度有所回落。但正如我們今年大部分時間所看到的那樣，這反映出成長必須超過去年的一些成長幅度。如果我看一下我們公司第四季的整體價格水平，它比第三季略有上漲。因此，我們查看了第三季的整體定價活動。總的來說，我認為第四季在價格方面符合我們的預期。

Okay. So the bottom line as I was maybe picking up, there was maybe a little price pressure starting to materialize, but that doesn't seem to be the case just yet.

好的。所以，總的來說，在我入場的時候，可能出現了一些價格壓力，但目前看來這種情況還沒有發生。

We aren't seeing price pressure materialize. Now what we're commenting on has more to do with inflation. Remember, what we've said is we've had 2 things affecting us over the past 12 months. One was the generalized inflation. The second was the tariffs. And frankly, the generalized inflation was a much more significant impact on us than the tariffs were. What we are seeing is with some of the activity around tariffs of late and with the overall sort of slower demand level, some of those inflationary pressures that have been a part of our business for the past 12 to 18 months have begun to moderate. But that shouldn't be read to suggest that we haven't maintained our pricing that we achieved in Q3 because we have.

我們並未看到價格壓力真正出現。現在我們所討論的更多的是關於通貨膨脹的問題。記住，我們說過，在過去的 12 個月裡，有兩件事影響了我們。其中之一是普遍通貨膨脹。第二點是關稅。坦白說，普遍的通貨膨脹對我們的影響比關稅的影響要大得多。我們看到，最近圍繞關稅的一些活動以及整體需求水準的放緩，使得過去 12 到 18 個月來一直困擾我們業務的一些通膨壓力開始緩解。但這並不意味著我們沒有保持第三季實現的定價策略，因為我們做到了。

Just to add a slight color to that. When I -- first off, there is always price pressure. That's a constant in life, and it's intense. Now if I -- but I'd make that comment again any quarter. So one element that does exist in the fourth quarter that does exist in the first quarter is keeping the fact straight and the confusion at a minimum. And what I mean by that is we've talked in prior calls and we've talked internally continuously about the tariff and antidumping duties that are out in the marketplace. You have the 232 antidumping as it relates to steel and aluminum that was put in place. And then you have the 301 tariffs. So the 301 tariffs -- and I get an update on this every 2 weeks. And even that's not enough in many ways because there's so many pieces that are flying around. I suspect if I'm in a branch in Fastenal, I'm having a customer talking to me in December and saying, geez, the tariffs were just eliminated. Now the List 4B that never went into effect, that was -- had been postponed, was canceled on December 13 but then never went into effect, and that was largely consumer goods. So that -- the impact of that is less in our world.

只是想為它增添一點色彩。首先，價格壓力始終存在。這是生活中永恆不變的真理，影響深遠。現在如果我——但我隨時都會再次發表這樣的評論。因此，第四季與第一季一樣存在的一個要素是：保持事實清晰，並將混亂降到最低。我的意思是，我們之前在電話會議中討論過，而且公司內部也一直在討論市場上存在的關稅和反傾銷稅。針對鋼鐵和鋁，已經推出了第 232 條反傾銷法規。另外還有301條款關稅。所以，關於 301 關稅——我每兩週都會收到關於這方面的最新消息。即使這樣在很多方面也還不夠，因為有太多碎片四處飛濺。我懷疑如果我在 Fastenal 的某個分店，12 月的時候會有顧客跟我說，哎呀，關稅剛剛取消了。現在，從未生效的 4B 清單——該清單曾被推遲，於 12 月 13 日被取消，但後來從未生效，該清單主要涉及消費品。因此，這種影響在我們這個世界較小。

Then the next comment might be, well, List -- I thought it went from 15% to 7.5%. Well, it was just announced that List 4A is going from 15% to 7.5%, and it's digging through that piece. For us, the bigger one was frankly List 3. Nothing's changed on List 3. So our biggest challenge internally is to make sure that an individual in a branch, a branch manager, a district manager, a regional leader, a national accounts person, is as familiar with these pieces as what I just laid out because when you're familiar with the facts, you can have a discussion. If you're not, it's very difficult to have a discussion about it.

接下來的評論可能是，嗯，清單——我以為它從 15% 降到了 7.5%。剛剛宣布，第 4A 類清單的稅率將從 15% 降至 7.5%，我們正在深入研究這項條款。對我們來說，更關鍵的是清單 3。清單 3 的內容沒有任何變化。因此，我們內部面臨的最大挑戰是確保分行員工、分行經理、區域經理、區域領導、全國客戶經理等都像我剛才列出的內容一樣熟悉這些方面，因為只有了解事實，才能進行討論。如果你不是，就很難就此展開討論。

So that pressure is there primarily because of all the noise and confusion that can come into the marketplace and a lot of the misinformation that can float around. But the fact is 4B never went into effect. 4A was just announced that it's dropping. And -- but List 3 is where the dollars are, at least for our marketplace. List 1 and List 2 are less meaningful.

因此，這種壓力主要源自於市場上可能出現的各種噪音和混亂，以及大量流傳的錯誤訊息。但事實是，4B 從未生效。剛剛宣布4A即將下架。但是——至少對我們的市場來說，第三類商品才是真正賺錢的。列表 1 和列表 2 的意義不大。

Yes, that's helpful color. Yes, I think we're all sort of interested to see how that materializes. If tariffs are removed, what happens with pricing and such. But I guess TBD on that. And then on the Onsite, you mentioned the closings and you mentioned the economics. I'm curious, is the reason for the worse economics due to the slowing economy? Or is this more the local team didn't assess the opportunity correctly and this is something you can fix?

是的，這個顏色很有幫助。是的，我想我們都很想看看這件事最終會如何發展。如果取消關稅，價格等方面會發生什麼變化？但我想這還有待確定。然後在現場訪談中，你提到了關店潮，也提到了經濟因素。我很好奇，經濟狀況惡化的原因是否是經濟放緩？或者說，這比較是本地團隊沒有正確評估機會，而這是你們可以解決的問題？

I think it's typically economic. I'm sure there's examples of ones that we decided either to pull it back because it didn't materialize as what we thought. Keep in mind -- and I've used this example before. I remember traveling with a district manager several years ago. And he had an Onsite that when we were driving to the Onsite, he said, yes -- and this individual knows as much about Onsite as anybody in our company. He's based in Wisconsin. And he said, I'm taking you to this one, and I'm not really sure if it was a good idea or a bad idea, but here's why I did it. And he talked about going Onsite. He talked about what the relationship was, and he talked about where he thought he could get it to. And he thought he could get it to $75,000 a month, which is a small Onsite for us. But he had a real frank discussion with the customer that, I'm only going to be able to staff it this many days a week. But it gave him the freedom to move the branch a little bit further north, and it was a better location for the branch.

我認為這通常是經濟因素造成的。我相信肯定有一些例子，我們因為專案沒有達到預期效果而決定撤回。請記住——我以前也用過這個例子。我記得幾年前曾和一位區域經理一起出差。當他帶著 Onsite 設備前往 Onsite 的路上，他說，是的——這個人對 Onsite 的了解不亞於我們公司裡的任何人。他居住在威斯康辛州。他說：“我要帶你去這個地方，我不太確定這到底是好主意還是壞主意，但我這麼做的原因如下。”他還談到了現場工作。他談到了這段關係是什麼，也談到了他認為這段關係能發展到什麼程度。他認為他可以把收入提高到每月 75,000 美元，這對我們來說只是一個很小的現場服務項目。但他與客戶進行了一次非常坦誠的討論，客戶表示：“我每週只能安排這麼多天的員工上班。”但這讓他可以自由地將分部向北移動一點，而北邊也是一個更適合分部的位置。

There, he was looking at it and saying, if it doesn't work out, I pull that back into the branch. As it turned out, he got it to $75,000. And a couple of months later, he sent me a message and said, hey, we picked up some OEM parts, and we want to get it over $100,000. That change occurred because the customer loved what we were doing, and they figured out ways to buy more from us. That doesn't always happen. And so sometimes, you might have one where you're going in on an Onsite and you think you can get it to x, and you find out that you can only get halfway there. That $30,000, you got to $80,000, but you can't get to $130,000. And you pull it back. I don't consider that a failure. We just took a $30,000 relationship, grew it to $80,000. We're having a frank discussion with the customer. It's easier for us to service it from the branch. I consider that we're engaging with that customer to win. And if that's 1 of the 26, I'm fine with that.

他當時看著它說，如果不行，我就把它拉回樹枝裡。結果，他最終籌到了 75,000 美元。幾個月後，他給我發了一條訊息說，嘿，我們得到了一些原廠零件，我們想讓它的價格超過 10 萬美元。這種變化的出現是因為顧客喜歡我們所做的一切，他們想辦法向我們購買更多產品。這種情況並非總是發生。所以有時候，你可能會遇到這種情況：你參加現場項目，你認為你可以達到 x 目標，但你發現你只能達到一半。那3萬美元，你賺了8萬美元，但你賺不到13萬美元。然後你把它拉回來。我不認為這是失敗。我們把一段價值 3 萬美元的合作關係發展成了價值 8 萬美元的合作關係。我們正在與客戶進行坦誠的討論。從分行進行維修對我們來說更方便。我認為我們與該客戶互動是為了贏得客戶。如果那是26個中的1個，我沒意見。

I'll add a little color to that as well. I mean I think looking at the causes of the closures this quarter, there were really no differences versus the ones that we covered with you last quarter, right? So it's all sort of the same reasons. And we have to remember that in those, as Dan alluded to, some of those are simply taking business that we had in Onsite and moving it to a branch. So we didn't see anything different in sort of the character of those closures.

我也會為它增添一些色彩。我的意思是，我認為從本季關閉的原因來看，與我們上個季度討論的原因並沒有什麼不同，對吧？所以原因其實都差不多。我們必須記住，正如丹所暗示的那樣，其中一些業務只是將我們在 Onsite 的業務轉移到了分公司。所以，我們在這些案件的性質上並沒有看到任何不同之處。

And I think you have to think about the larger installed base. Once you get to a certain level, you do review that base for underperformers. And again, as Dan is saying, I think that's a healthy transition. But I think you should also think a little bit about the culture of the business. I mean if you think back to vending, I think we started that initiative in 2009. It really began to get legs in 2011. And in 2016, we sort of went through and we looked at all the machines we put in and said, should this machine really be here, right? And in that year, we had a higher-than-normal sort of removal rate than we had seen in previous years as we sort of evaluated the installed base.

我認為你必須考慮到更大的用戶基數。一旦達到一定水平，你就需要對錶現不佳的員工進行審查。正如丹所說，我認為這是一個健康的過渡。但我認為你也應該稍微考慮一下公司的文化。我的意思是，如果你回想一下自動販賣機，我想我們是在 2009 年啟動這項計畫的。它真正開始發展壯大是在 2011 年。2016 年，我們仔細檢查了所有安裝的機器，然後問自己，這台機器真的應該放在這裡嗎？那一年，我們的拆除率比往年都要高，因為我們對已安裝的設備進行了評估。

And we're in fifth year of this Onsite push. And I think that our culture in some respects is to sort of find these growth drivers, run fast, grab ground and clean up a little bit later. And at the end of the day, what you're seeing right now is we built a good installed base, we're evaluating what we have, the churn has gone up a little bit. It's down from Q3. And frankly, I think we're expecting a lower rate of churn in 2020. We'll see how that plays out. But in the end, we wind up getting, much as we did with vending is, a great business where we're ahead of the field in terms of being able to implement it, and it contributes to gaining market share. And we're looking at this very much the same way.

我們推進現場服務已經進入第五年了。我認為，在某種程度上，我們的文化就是找到這些成長動力，快速行動，搶得先機，然後再慢慢清理。歸根結底，你現在看到的是，我們已經建立了一個良好的用戶基礎，我們正在評估我們所擁有的，用戶流失率略有上升。比第三季有所下降。坦白說，我認為我們預計 2020 年的客戶流失率會降低。我們拭目以待。但最終，就像我們之前在自動販賣機領域一樣，我們獲得了一項很棒的業務，我們在實施方面領先於其他領域，這有助於我們獲得市場份額。我們看待這個問題的方式也基本上相同。

The other thing, to your point, about opportunity, this past quarter, the Onsite team actually sampled 400 locations. I'm not sure which 400 those are. But they wanted to sort of get to the same question that you're asking. And these were decently sized 400 Onsites in terms of the average. But they found that in the products that we currently deal in, there's still more than 2x the revenue potential than we already have in those Onsites. And again, these aren't smaller Onsites. So the potential -- we don't see any diminishment in the potential for this business. And I think what you're seeing us transition to, I would say, is historically consistent with how we execute our growth drivers and is leading to have a great business.

關於您提到的機會，還有一點需要說明，上個季度，現場團隊實際上對 400 個地點進行了抽樣調查。我不確定那400是哪400。但他們其實也想探討你提出的同一個問題。平均而言，這些現場活動規模相當可觀，共有 400 個。但他們發現，在我們目前經營的產品中，還有超過我們目前在現場服務中獲得的收入潛力的兩倍以上。而且，這些都不是規模較小的現場活動。所以，我們認為這項業務的潛力不會減弱。我認為，你們現在看到的我們正在進行的轉型，從歷史上看，與我們執行成長驅動因素的方式是一致的，並且正在引領我們走向輝煌的業務。

Our next question is from the line of Robert Barry with Buckingham Research.

我們的下一個問題來自白金漢研究公司的羅伯特·巴里。

Could you say or could you -- how much the freight was a headwind to gross margin?

您能否具體說明一下—運費對毛利率造成了多大的不利影響？

It probably impacted us by 10 to 20 basis points relative to the expectations.

與預期相比，這可能對我們造成了 10 到 20 個基點的影響。

And you think it now -- that just goes away or that persists as long as the sales growth is low single digits?

你現在認為這種情況會消失，還是只要銷售成長率維持在個位數低點就會持續存在？

Well, I think as long as sales growth is low single digits, there's going to continue to be some pressure there, for sure. And that's not new and that's not necessarily unexpected. I think Dan also talked about we just have some focus to bring to that, right? We spent a lot of effort in the last 12 months on pricing discipline on the product side of our business. And the degree to which you've seen us not really have to talk about price/cost is a direct result of the success of that, right? We've been able to mitigate some of those inflationary pressures. We need to bring some of that discipline to the freight side of it as well. And that's going to be a focus and a goal for 2020. And the degree to which it is or is not a drag will depend on our level of success. But again, we always have to put this into perspective. We're talking about 10 to 20 basis points. Now we want those 10 to 20 basis points, right? But we're not talking about 100 basis points of risk here or 150 basis points.

我認為，只要銷售成長率維持在個位數低位，就肯定會繼續面臨一些壓力。這並非新鮮事，也並非完全出乎意料。我想丹也說過，我們需要在這方面集中精力，對吧？過去 12 個月，我們在產品定價方面投入了大量精力。而你們現在看到的我們幾乎不需要談論價格/成本，正是這種成功帶來的直接結果，對吧？我們已經能夠緩解部分通膨壓力。我們也需要將這種嚴謹的態度運用在貨運方面。這將是2020年的工作重點和目標。而它是否會成為一種阻礙，取決於我們所取得的成功程度。但是，我們始終需要正確看待這件事。我們說的是10到20個基點。現在我們想要的就是那10到20個基點，對吧？但我們在這裡討論的不是 100 個基點的風險，也不是 150 個基點的風險。

I mean we're also talking about something which is related to an asset, that being our captive fleet, which is a huge competitive advantage for us. So there's things that we have to do better. It's -- focusing on that will be something we do in 2020. We do have to address the market. That doesn't make it easier, but there's some things that we can do from a self-help standpoint. And that's probably how I'd characterize the situation with freight.

我的意思是，我們現在討論的也是與資產相關的事情，那就是我們的自有船隊，這對我們來說是一個巨大的競爭優勢。所以有些事情我們需要做得更好。2020年，我們將重點放在這一點上。我們確實需要關注市場。這並不會讓事情變得更容易，但從自助的角度來看，我們可以做一些事情。我大概就是這樣形容貨運現況的。

Rob, the only element I'd add to that is part of it is about year-over-year growth, but part of it is about sequential. So if you think about where we were in October to November, December, the delever that occurs because you have this infrastructure to support that and it falls off. History has shown where January is relative to October. And depending on what the start of January will be in that normal landscape will still come into play. But once you emerge from that slowdown that you get around the holidays and you get further away from that and the dollars climb back, then that delever that occurs from our distribution, our trucking freight, our trucking fleet, that dissipates because we not only want that 10 to 20 basis points back. Message to our team is here is when we expect to get it back.

羅布，我唯一要補充的是，一部分是關於同比成長，一部分是關於連續成長。所以，如果你想想我們在 10 月到 11 月、12 月所處的位置，你會發現，由於有基礎設施支撐，而這種基礎設施又會衰落，導致槓桿效應的出現。歷史已經顯示了一月相對於十月的地位。而一月初的正常情況如何，仍會起到作用。但是，一旦我們度過了假日期間的經濟放緩期，並且遠離了假日，美元匯率回升，那麼我們分銷、卡車貨運、卡車車隊所獲得的去槓桿化就會消失，因為我們不僅想要恢復那 10 到 20 個基點。給團隊的訊息是：我們預計何時能收到回覆。

And then to Dan's point, don't forget seasonality as well, right? Again, the crux of the issue is that you have relatively stable costs in your fleet. And seasonality, as you get into Q2 and Q3, you get a seasonal uptick as well just naturally. So Dan's right. Part of this reflects simply the seasonal nature exacerbated by the cyclicality. So that is an element of it. But we're going to work on executing it better as well.

還有一點，正如丹所說，別忘了考慮季節性因素，對吧？再次強調，問題的關鍵在於你的車隊成本相對穩定。而且，隨著進入第二季和第三季度，季節性成長也是自然而然的。所以丹說得對。部分原因只是反映了季節性因素，而這種因素又因週期性變化而加劇。這是其中一個因素。但我們也會努力改進執行方式。

Got it. I guess bigger picture, where do you see price/cost going from here? It sounds like if the nontariff inflation was actually the bigger piece and we're seeing commodity deflation, I don't know, how do you think about the puts and takes? Because I think you said the tariff inflation will peak in 2Q. But if you're seeing some meaningful commodity deflation like steel, I mean, could you see price/cost, I don't know, even be modestly positive? Do you see any line of sight to that? Or how should we think about it tracking?

知道了。我想從更宏觀的角度來看，您認為價格/成本未來的走勢會是怎麼樣的？聽起來，如果非關稅通膨實際上是更大的因素，而我們又看到大宗商品通貨緊縮，我不知道，你如何看待賣出和賣出操作？因為我記得你說過關稅通膨將在第二季達到高峰。但是，如果你看到像鋼鐵這樣的大宗商品出現明顯的通貨緊縮，我的意思是，價格/成本，我不知道，甚至有可能略微上漲嗎？你看到有視線通往那裡嗎？或者我們應該如何看待追蹤這件事？

Rob, I'll make a deal with you. If you can tell me what tariffs are going to do in the next 6 months, I'll tell you what I think our reaction is going to be. I've had numerous times over the last year where I have a discussion on Friday. And by Monday, what we just talked about, it completely changed and the discussion became irrelevant. So I'm going to respectfully decline to answer that only because I don't know sometimes from week-to-week and month-to-month what's going to happen with tariffs. It makes it -- the economy, I can look at trends and look at prior years in Fastenal, and I could at least give an informed thought on tariffs, we really can't. I mean all I know is we focus every day on shedding the best light we can for our customers, on building the best supply chain for our customers and where appropriate, moving sources of supply. And that we've done quite aggressively in the last 10 to 15 months.

羅布，我跟你做個交易。如果你能告訴我未來六個月關稅政策將會產生什麼影響，我就能告訴你我認為我們會如何應對。過去一年裡，我有很多次在星期五參加討論會。到了周一，我們剛才討論的內容完全改變了，討論變得毫無意義了。因此，恕我無法回答這個問題，因為我有時無法預測關稅政策每週或每月會發生什麼變化。關鍵在於——經濟方面，我可以看看趨勢，看看 Fastenal 過去幾年的情況，至少我可以對關稅發表一些有見地的看法，但我們真的做不到。我的意思是，我所知道的就是，我們每天都專注於為我們的客戶提供最好的服務，為我們的客戶建立最好的供應鏈，並在適當的時候轉移供應來源。在過去的 10 到 15 個月裡，我們在這方面採取了相當積極的措施。

And the only thing that I would probably add to that is over the past 6 to 9 months, the pricing teams, the way they've been sort of structured the work they've done to sort of surface a lot of our challenges, the tools that they've deployed to allow us to react to events, we're in a far better position today than we were a year ago to manage whatever happens, right? So to the extent that tariffs go up or go down, we'll be able to adjust to that in the way that we promised our customers that we would. And that would be with an eye towards maintaining that price/cost dynamic.

我唯一想補充的是，在過去的 6 到 9 個月裡，定價團隊調整了他們的工作結構，以發現我們面臨的許多挑戰，並部署了工具來幫助我們應對各種事件，因此，我們現在比一年前更有能力應對任何可能發生的情況，對吧？因此，無論關稅上漲或下降，我們都能以我們向客戶承諾的方式進行調整。這樣做是為了維持價格/成本的平衡。

Inflation, deflation, again, we'll just have to see how that plays out. But I think that it really is -- it's the other side of the same coin, right? I mean many of our national account contracts have terms in it that are linked to specific steel price indices or what have you. And so those conversations get had. In the end, the question that we have to deal with, with our customers is what's the right action to, again, be able to neutralize the impact on gross margin. We're not trying to take advantage of our customers. But at the same time, we're just looking to deploy the tools that we've developed in the last few months, last couple of quarters, to essentially neutralize the impact, and that would be the intention. But again, we'll have to see how things play out as the year goes on.

通貨膨脹、通貨緊縮，我們只能拭目以待了。但我認為這確實是同一枚硬幣的兩面，對吧？我的意思是，我們許多國民帳戶合約中都有與特定鋼鐵價格指數或其他指標掛鉤的條款。於是，這些對話就展開了。最終，我們必須與客戶一起解決的問題是，採取什麼正確的措施才能再次抵銷對毛利率的影響。我們並非想佔客戶的便宜。但同時，我們也正著手部署我們在過去幾個月、幾季中開發的工具，以從根本上消除這種影響，這就是我們的目標。但是，我們還要看看今年接下來的發展。

Got it. Okay. Just lastly, could you say how December was impacting...

知道了。好的。最後，您能否談談十二月對您有何影響…

Rob, you can take 2, so let's go to the next.

羅布，你可以拿2，所以我們去下一個。

Our next question is from the line of David Manthey with Baird.

我們的下一個問題來自 David Manthey 與 Baird 的對話。

Over the past couple of years, your gross margin has pretty consistently been down 100 basis points year-over-year. And some of that is secular or some cyclical. Just as we look ahead to 2020, if the decline is less than that, what would be the factors you would see as driving a better outcome?

過去幾年，您的毛利率一直在較去年同期下降 100 個基點。其中一些是世俗的，一些是周期性的。展望 2020 年，如果下降幅度小於預期，您認為哪些因素會促成更好的結果？

Yes. So I think there's 2 things to think about next year in terms of big, big sections, and assuming that the price/cost dynamic remains neutral as it has been in the last couple of quarters. And that obviously depends on anything that occurs that we have to react to, but we don't know what that looks like. And based on what we know today, I think that with the slower small customer business where we have fairly good margins and the expectations for growth on the Onsites, I think you're looking at mix probably being a 50, 60, 70 basis points drag next year. Now that could change depending on the relative growth between the small customer and the large customer, but that seems like a decent range to me.

是的。所以我認為明年在大方面有兩件事需要考慮，假設價格/成本動態像過去幾季一樣保持中立。這顯然取決於我們需要應對的任何情況，但我們不知道具體情況會如何。根據我們目前所了解的情況，我認為，由於小型客戶業務成長放緩（但我們的利潤率相當不錯），以及對現場服務成長的預期，我認為明年業務組合可能會拖累 50、60 或 70 個基點。現在，這可能會根據小型客戶和大客戶之間的相對增長而有所改變，但在我看來，這似乎是一個合理的範圍。

I think that we also have to think just about the cadence of the price trend from 2019, right? I think in the first half, we did not do a great job addressing inflation and addressing tariffs, actually a better job on tariffs than we did inflation. But the -- in the second half, I think we did a very good job on that. And I think that success will carry over into the first half of 2020, so you might have some easier comps in the first half of 2020 before that sort of normalizes in the back half. And I think those are the 2 big things to think about when you're thinking about how to model our gross margin next year. And then, yes, I think those are the 2 big things to think about at this point.

我認為我們還需要考慮 2019 年以來的價格走勢節奏，對吧？我認為上半年我們在應對通貨膨脹和關稅方面做得都不好，實際上我們在關稅方面做得比應對通貨膨脹方面要好一些。但是——在下半場，我認為我們做得非常好。我認為這種成功勢頭會延續到 2020 年上半年，所以 2020 年上半年你可能會遇到一些比較輕鬆的比賽，之後下半年情況會逐漸恢復正常。我認為，在考慮如何建構明年的毛利率模型時，這兩點是需要考慮的重點。是的，我認為目前需要考慮的就是這兩件大事。

The -- what I'd add is if we're able to channel that out, it's from things that we're doing specifically inside the organization related to some of the products. For example, we're challenging -- and this is ongoing. We're always challenging our folks from the standpoint if I think of our vending platform. So that's highly repetitive transactions. How do we channel much of the spend to our -- to a select group of preferred branded suppliers and our own exclusive brands, our private labels.

我想補充的是，如果我們能夠把這種能量釋放出來，那麼它就來自我們在組織內部針對某些產品所做的事情。例如，我們正在提出挑戰——而且這項工作仍在進行中。從我們的自動販賣機平台角度來看，我們一直在挑戰我們的員工。所以這是高度重複的交易。我們如何將大部分支出引導至我們——一組精選的優選品牌供應商和我們自己的獨家品牌，也就是我們的自有品牌。

From the standpoint of it, it's not just about the cost of the product. It's about the cost of the whole supply chain because it's product we have on the shelf. If it's on the shelf, our distribution centers operate more efficiently. Our trucking network and our freight costs are more efficient. Our local labor costs are more efficient. And the first 2 of those 3 pieces impact our gross margin. The third obviously is in operating expenses, the branch labor. But it allows us to have a product offering in that machine or in our ongoing supply chain offering where we can offer a better price to the customer because our cost structure is inherently lower, and that typically helps our gross margin. So we're sharing some of the benefit with the customer. So it's a win-win scenario. And we're driving more spend to our preferred suppliers.

從這個角度來看，這不僅僅是產品成本的問題。這關係到整個供應鏈的成本，因為這是我們貨架上的產品。如果商品有現貨，我們的配送中心就能更有效率地運作。我們的貨運網絡和貨運成本更有效率。我們本地的勞動成本效率更高。這三項因素中的前兩項都會影響我們的毛利率。第三項顯然是營運費用，即分公司人工成本。但這使我們能夠在該機器或我們持續的供應鏈產品中提供更優惠的價格，因為我們的成本結構本身就更低，這通常有助於提高我們的毛利率。所以我們要與客戶分享部分收益。所以這是一個雙贏的局面。我們正在加大對首選供應商的支出。

Our next question is from the line of Nigel Coe with Wolfe Research.

我們的下一個問題來自沃爾夫研究公司的奈傑爾·科伊。

Great color on the gross margins, Holden. Just thinking about -- you normally give forward quarter guidance. We normally see gross margins in 1Q pretty flat. It feels like -- Q-to-Q, it sounds like that holds true in 1Q '20. Any comments on that?

霍爾頓，毛利率的顏色真漂亮。我只是在想——你們通常會給出未來一個季度的業績指引。我們通常看到第一季的毛利率相當穩定。感覺就像——從季度到季度來看，這在 2020 年第一季似乎仍然成立。對此有何評論？

Well, a couple of things. First, I would dispute the idea that I normally give forward guidance. Dan commented on how we rarely talk about the current month in the current month because it's hard for us to know what's going to play out until it's all said and done. But sometimes, things are moving in a direction where you deserve a little bit of guidance. And for the last 2 quarters, I've given you a little bit of forward guidance on the next quarter because we had a lot of moving pieces as it related to the inflation, the tariffs, our success around pricing, et cetera. And when your second quarter gross margin is down, I think it was 180 basis points, I think you all needed a little bit of guidance about what we were seeing and expecting. And so I provided a little bit of that color. But the idea that we usually provide that color, I would disagree with. And I'm not going to get into that game now that, frankly, I think most of these moving pieces are kind of stabilizing out. So I'm going to remove myself from that game until a future period where there's a lot of volatility that you need a little bit of guidance on.

嗯，有兩件事。首先，我不同意我通常會給出前瞻性預測的說法。丹評論說，我們很少在當月談論當月的事情，因為在一切塵埃落定之前，我們很難知道會發生什麼。但有時候，事情的發展方向需要一些指引。在過去的兩個季度裡，我為你們提供了一些關於下一個季度的前瞻性指引，因為與通貨膨脹、關稅、我們在定價方面的成功等相關的諸多因素都在變化。當你們第二季的毛利率下降了180個基點時，我想你們都需要一些指導，了解我們當時的觀察和預期。於是，我增添了一點那種色彩。但我不同意我們通常會提供那種顏色的說法。坦白說，我現在不想捲入這場爭論，因為我認為大部分變數都已經趨於穩定了。所以，我打算暫時退出這個領域，直到未來某個波動性較大、需要一些指導的時期到來。

But you asked about the seasonality. At this point, if I assume that the trends in the back half of 2019 are sort of the ones that will carry over into 2020 with sort of a neutral price/cost dynamic and then our usual mix piece and all that, I think that judge what you think the seasonality is going to look like, and I think that's a reasonably -- that's a reasonable way to approach the cadence of the quarters.

但你問的是季節性問題。就目前而言，如果我假設 2019 年下半年的趨勢將延續到 2020 年，價格/成本動態保持中性，再加上我們通常的組合等等，我認為你可以判斷季節性會是什麼樣子，我認為這是一種合理的——這是一種合理的方法來把握季度節奏。

Okay. Got it. And I didn't mean to put words in your mouth. Just -- look, my question is around the attrition on the Onsite. So I'm just -- now that we've got to a base of over 1,000, some level of attrition is normal and should be expected. So I'm just curious if you can think about what do you consider to be, as a CEO, CFO, a normal rate of attrition going forward. Is 2% per quarter the right number? Or is it lower than that? But maybe also, can you just clarify the freight issue? It sounds like that's -- I understand the seasonality and the absorption, but this sounds like it's more of a price. And obviously, we're seeing LTL and TL rates obviously down. So I'm just curious if we should be tracking price of freight volumes as a proxy for what's going on, on that side of your business. But my real question is on the attrition on the Onsites.

好的。知道了。我並非有意曲解你的意思。我的意思是——我的問題是關於現場員工的流動率。所以，既然我們已經擁有超過 1000 名員工，那麼一定程度的人員流動是正常的，也是可以預期的。所以我很好奇，身為CEO、CFO，您認為未來正常的員工流動率是多少？每季2%是合適的數字嗎？還是比這還要低？另外，您能否澄清一下運費問題？聽起來像是——我理解季節性和吸收率，但這聽起來更像是價格問題。很明顯，我們看到零擔貨運和整車貨運的貨運量都在下降。所以我很好奇，我們是否應該追蹤貨運量的價格，以此作為衡量貴公司這方面業務狀況的指標。但我真正的問題是關於現場培訓人員的流失率。

I'll touch on the Onsite attrition. And the second one might count as a third. So I'll let Holden (inaudible).

我將談談現場人員流失問題。第二個或許可以算第三個。所以我會讓霍爾頓（聽不清楚）。

We'll think through that one, Nigel.

我們會仔細考慮的，奈傑爾。

Yes. If I think of -- I'm going to answer it first in the context of vending. And then I'll transition to Onsite. So if I go back a few years ago, Holden mentioned in '16, the number of vending machines were moving. It actually started before that. So in 2012, our vending really took off. And we pulled out -- if you look at the number we had at the end of 2012 and how many we pulled out in 2013, it was 20-some percent of the devices we pulled out because we had gone from a handful of district managers doing vending to a big chunk of district managers doing vending and a big chunk of our branches doing vending. And we really haven't dialed in where they should go and -- because it was a new industry we're creating. And that 20-some number was 20-some percent the next year. And then it dropped, I think, to 17%. I don't have the stats in front of me, but -- then it dropped to 16%. We believe, long term, that number is going to settle in around 10%. Right now, we're at about 14%. So 14% of the installed base, that 89,000 we cited a few minutes ago, I would expect would get removed based on history in 2020. And our goal is can we get that down to 10%.

是的。如果我想到──我會先從自動販賣機的角度來回答這個問題。然後我會轉為現場辦公。所以，如果我回顧幾年前，霍爾頓在 2016 年提到，自動販賣機的數量正在改變。實際上，這件事開始得更早。因此，在 2012 年，我們的自動販賣機業務真正起飛了。我們撤出了——如果你看看我們在 2012 年底的數量和我們在 2013 年撤出的數量，就會發現我們撤出了大約 20% 的設備，因為我們從少數幾個地區經理負責自動售貨機，變成了很大一部分地區經理負責自動售貨機，以及很大一部分分支機構負責自動售貨機。我們還沒有真正確定它們應該去哪裡發展——因為我們正在創造一個全新的產業。第二年，這個二十多歲的數字變成了二十多個百分點。然後，我想，它下降到了 17%。我手頭上沒有具體統計數據，但是——後來下降到了 16%。我們認為，從長遠來看，這個數字最終會穩定在 10% 左右。目前，我們大約在 14% 左右。因此，根據 2020 年的歷史數據，我預計安裝基數的 14%（即我們幾分鐘前提到的 89,000 台）將被移除。我們的目標是能否將這個數字降到 10%。

If I looked at Onsite historically, this is back when we had a couple of hundred of them, we've closed about 10 a year. That's about 5%. I think if Kris Van Dalen were sitting here, and Kris leads our team that really drives and hones our Onsite model, the team that is involved with evaluating our Onsites, I think the number he typically thinks for this it is about 6%. So how that plays out quarter-to-quarter is anybody's guess. But it's probably in that neighborhood. History has said it's going to be -- it's probably 5%. A person who's more informed than me thinks it's going to be 6%.

如果我回顧 Onsite 的歷史，那時我們有幾百家這樣的門市，我們每年大約關閉 10 家。那大約是5%。我想，如果克里斯·範·達倫 (Kris Van Dalen) 坐在這裡，克里斯領導著我們真正推動和完善現場模式的團隊，也就是負責評估我們現場模式的團隊，我想他通常認為這個數字大約是 6%。所以每季的具體情況如何，誰也說不準。但很可能就在那附近。歷史表明，這種情況可能會發生——大概是 5%。一位比我更了解情況的人認為會是 6%。

In the interest, Nigel, of not encouraging people to ask one question with 12 parts. We'll address your second question when we talk after the fact.

奈傑爾，為了避免鼓勵人們提出一個包含 12 個部分的問題。你的第二個問題我們之後再談。

Our next question is from the line of Hamzah Mazari with Jefferies.

我們的下一個問題來自 Hamzah Mazari 與 Jefferies 的對話。

My first question is, Dan, a number of years ago, you had something called pathway to profit, and 23% op margin was sort of the goal. So maybe, do you view that as achievable still? And any thoughts on that target as you look long term?

丹，我的第一個問題是，幾年前，你有一個叫做「獲利之路」的東西，23% 的營業利潤率是當時的目標。所以，你認為這仍然可行嗎？從長遠來看，您對這個目標有什麼看法？

Yes. So that was pretty close to that one back in the day. I'll touch on that. In fact, I talked about pathway to profit in this year's letter to shareholders. So there will be a little bit more insight you can gain from that in early February.

是的。所以，這跟當年的情況非常接近。我會稍微談到這一點。事實上，我在今年的致股東信中談到了獲利途徑。所以，二月初你就能從中獲得更多資訊了。

But the pathway to profit was about our branch network and about the fact that as our average branch revenue went from $70,000 to $80,000 -- and I'm talking about the revenue per month, so $70,000 a month to $80,000 a month to $90,000 to $100,000 and beyond. As that number went up, we had a whole bunch of branches out there that were doing $120,000, $150,000, $200,000 a month. And we already know what the profitability is of that group. So what we talked about in 2007 when we introduced pathway to profit was we're opening fewer branches today, which means the dilution factor is going to go away and the average revenue per month is going to keep climbing. And as it's climbing, the inherent profitability of our branch-based model will shine through. We had a whole bunch of branches that were deep into the 20s. But a branch that does $50,000 a month doesn't have that kind of operating margin. A branch that does $70,000 or $80,000 a month doesn't have that kind of operating margin. So that 23% is still true for our branch network, but branches represent about 70% of our business today and the other 30% is Onsite.

但獲利的關鍵在於我們的分公司網絡，以及我們平均分行收入從 7 萬美元成長到 8 萬美元——我指的是每月收入，也就是每月 7 萬美元到 8 萬美元，再到 9 萬美元到 10 萬美元甚至更高。隨著這個數字的成長，我們有許多分行每月營業額達到 12 萬美元、15 萬美元、20 萬美元。我們已經知道該集團的獲利能力如何。因此，我們在 2007 年推出獲利途徑時談到，如今我們開設的分行數量減少，這意味著稀釋因素將會消失，每月平均收入將會持續攀升。隨著股價上漲，我們這種以分行為基礎的模式的固有獲利能力將會顯現出來。我們有很多分行都深入了20多歲。但是，月營業額為 5 萬美元的分行沒有那麼高的營業利潤率。每月營業額達到 7 萬或 8 萬美元的分行，不可能有那麼高的營業利益率。因此，23% 這個數字對於我們的分公司網路仍然適用，但如今分公司約占我們業務的 70%，其餘 30% 為現場服務。

For Onsite, that number is down in the upper teens from the standpoint of where the profitability is. There's still a pathway to profit element of it. When we go from having 200 Onsites at the end of 2014 to having just over 1,100 Onsites today, that's a massive takeoff. And so our revenue per Onsite actually dropped because we opened so many new ones. And so we've been living through that for the last 4 years of that deleverage of our Onsite business because our average revenue dropped. We're approaching now an inflection point where our steady-state of how many we're adding is going to kind of neutralize, and our revenue per Onsite when we get later into 2020 and into 2021 is actually going to start inching up. And so that will still come into play.

對於現場服務而言，從獲利能力的角度來看，這個數字已經下降到十幾個百分點。它仍然包含盈利的途徑。從 2014 年底的 200 個現場服務點到如今的 1,100 多個現場服務點，這是一個巨大的飛躍。因此，由於我們開設了太多新店，我們的每家門市的收入實際上下降了。因此，在過去的 4 年裡，我們一直經歷現場業務去槓桿化的過程，因為我們的平均收入下降了。我們現在正接近一個轉折點，新增用戶數量的穩定狀態將趨於平衡，而到了 2020 年下半年和 2021 年，我們每個現場用戶的收入實際上將開始緩慢增長。所以這一點仍然會發揮作用。

On a previous call, I believe I cited the fact that I think our branch network -- over time, that branch network moves ever closer to $200,000 a month. Today, it's in the -- I forget the exact number we cited, but it's in the $130,000, $135,000 neighborhood, I believe. But as that moves up, I would expect that profitability piece to improve. As the mix changes, I see a path to an operating margin where you have a 50-50 business of a branch and Onsite in that low 20s. I've said a number at 22%. Time will tell if I'm right or I'm full of it. But your -- the number you cite, Hamzah, was really about the branch network, which is a subset of our business.

在之前的電話會議中，我相信我曾提到過，我認為隨著時間的推移，我們的分公司網路將越來越接近每月 20 萬美元的目標。今天，它的價格在——我忘了​​我們當時提到的確切數字，但我相信是在 13 萬美元到 13.5 萬美元之間。但隨著這一比例上升，我預計獲利能力也會有所改善。隨著業務組合的變化，我認為營業利潤率有可能達到 20% 左右，屆時分公司和現場服務的業務量將各佔 50%。我說過這個數字是 22%。時間會證明我是對的還是在胡說八道。但是，哈姆扎，你引用的那個數字實際上是指分支機構網絡，而分支機構網絡只是我們業務的一個子集。

Got it. Very helpful. My follow-up question, I'll turn it over, is on freight. How much of a cost advantage is your captive fleet? And do you view that cost advantage as offsetting execution risk? Just any broad, high-level thoughts there.

知道了。很有幫助。我的後續問題，我稍後再問，是關於運費的。自有船隊能帶來多大的成本優勢？您是否認為這種成本優勢可以抵銷執行風險？只是一些比較寬泛、高層次的想法。

Look, well, the cost advantage is a constant, so it doesn't offset execution risk. Execution risk stands on its own. But the cost advantage, we've always felt that running on a highly utilized trucking network where you have products going -- and by highly utilized, I mean, there's products going both directions. The number we've often cited, if you contrast what it costs to move it on our trucking network versus shipping industrial products, small parcel. And shipping of relatively low-value product, small parcel, is incredibly expensive, and that's where the e-commerce world lives. And that's why they keep trying to build different types of networks to change that dynamic. We've often cited the relationship with 10 to 1, that it's about 90% cheaper. But again, we're moving a relatively low product on a captive trucking network.

你看，成本優勢是恆定的，所以它無法抵銷執行風險。執行風險本身就是一個獨立的問題。但是，我們一直認為，在充分利用的卡車運輸網路上運營，產品能夠雙向運輸，從而獲得成本優勢。所謂充分利用，我的意思是產品是雙向運輸的。我們經常引用的數字，如果你對比一下透過我們的卡車運輸網絡運輸它的成本與運輸工業產品、小包裹的成本。而運送價值相對較低的產品（小包裹）成本卻非常高，這正是電子商務的生存之道。這就是為什麼他們不斷嘗試建立不同類型的網路來改變這種局面。我們經常提到 10 比 1 的關係，也就是說，它便宜了大約 90%。但話說回來，我們運輸的產品種類相對較少，而且我們使用的是自有的卡車運輸網絡。

1/3 of our products, so if I look at our fastener products, there's a big chunk of that product category that has secondary operations. So it isn't just that we're moving it from supplier to the branch, to the customer, from the supplier to the customer with the Onsite. We might be sending that fastener product out for secondary operations. It's going to go get heat-treated. It's going to go get plated. And what it means in our fastener industry and the reason we built the captive network to start with is many of our competitors, because they're using a lot of LTL shippers and other parties don't have that advantage, and so their freight costs, in many cases, can become equal to, if not greater than, their product cost. And so one of the reasons we enjoy the gross margins we do in fasteners and the reason we built the trucking network is we've just built a better means to move product around. But execution risk, they're disconnected in the standpoint of what you're doing and what your habits and behaviors every day.

三分之一的產品，所以如果我看一下我們的緊固件產品，就會發現該產品類別中有很大一部分需要二次加工。所以，我們不僅僅是透過現場服務將產品從供應商轉移到分支機構，再轉移到客戶，然後再從供應商轉移到客戶。我們可能會將該緊固件產品送去進行二次加工。它將被送去進行熱處理。它要去裝盤了。而這在我們緊固件行業意味著什麼，以及我們當初建立專屬網絡的原因，是因為我們的許多競爭對手，因為他們使用了大量的零擔貨運公司，而其他公司沒有這種優勢，所以他們的貨運成本在很多​​情況下可能等於甚至超過他們的產品成本。因此，我們之所以能在緊固件領域獲得如此高的毛利率，以及我們之所以建立卡車運輸網絡，其中一個原因是我們建立了一種更好的產品運輸方式。但執行風險與你每天所做的事情以及你的習慣和行為是脫節的。

But I think it's fair to say, Hamzah, that the value that affords us because of our captive truck fleet is well in excess of a 1 quarter, 10 or 20 basis point lower result than we expected. We get huge dividends from the ownership of our captive fleets.

但我認為公平地說，哈姆扎，我們自有卡車車隊帶來的價值遠遠超過了我們預期的 1 個季度、10 或 20 個基點。我們從擁有自有船隊中獲得了巨大的收益。

Speaking of dividends, we raised our [dividends].

說到分紅，我們提高了分紅。

The next question comes from the line of Josh Pokrzywinski with Morgan Stanley.

下一個問題來自摩根士丹利的 Josh Pokrzywinski。

Dan, if you don't mind commenting on how we should think about mix in kind of historical recoveries. Dan, you led off talking about maybe the analog to 2015 that you saw. If I were to look at similar points in time or other periods where you think it feels like today, what is the mix on the way out? Is it that the Onsites recover faster because they're captive? Is it that the -- kind of the smaller customers or non-national accounts where there's higher mix recover faster? Just trying to calibrate how we should think about mix as markets eventually recover.

丹，如果你不介意的話，能否談談我們該如何看待歷史復甦中的混合因素。丹，你一開始就談到了你看到的與 2015 年類似的情況。如果我回顧過去類似的時期，或其他你認為與今天感覺相似的時期，那麼最終的結果是什麼？是因為現場工作人員被困在現場，所以恢復得更快嗎？是那些規模較小的客戶或非全國性客戶，由於其業務組合較為多元化，所以恢復速度更快？只是想弄清楚隨著市場最終復甦，我們應該如何看待投資組合的組成。

Yes. So if I think about my comparison, 2015 was more about just a trend than what we're seeing in the numbers. The other observation I'd make looking at 2015 is in 2019, we started at a higher point and we finished at a higher point. And I really attribute that to the success we've enjoyed taking market share at a faster clip and the backlog we have and energy. I mean in the last 3 years, we've signed either renewals or new contracts for about 1,500. And that's an incredible tear that we've been on, and that builds a certain level of just market share gains you get.

是的。所以，如果我回顧一下我的比較，2015 年更多的是一種趨勢，而不是我們從數字中看到的情況。我對 2015 年的另一個觀察是，2019 年我們從更高的起點開始，也以更高的起點結束。我認為這主要歸功於我們更快地佔領了市場份額，以及我們積壓的訂單和充沛的精力。我的意思是，在過去的3年裡，我們續約或新簽了大約1500份合約。我們一直保持著令人難以置信的成長勢頭，這為我們帶來了一定程度的市佔率成長。

And so when I look at our relative outperformance in 2019 versus 2015 in a similar PMI index scenario, it's what the team has done to engage with our customers. And we have a massive footprint. So to the extent that the percentage of our top 100 snaps back and it moves into the 60s and it moves into the 70s because there's a bit of a lift in the economy, that piece will snap back pretty fast. And our large account, our accounts with a contract relationship, would grow disproportionately faster because they've contracted disproportionately faster. And that's just a reflection of recovery in the underlying market. So I would expect that to play out, the speed at which is going to be dependent on what the market is doing, and maybe Holden has more insight.

因此，當我在類似的 PMI 指數情境下，比較 2019 年和 2015 年的相對優異表現時，我認為這都歸功於團隊與客戶的互動。而且我們的業務規模非常龐大。因此，如果前 100 名的百分比回升到 60% 甚至 70% 以上，因為經濟有所好轉，那麼這部分百分比就會很快回升。而我們的大客戶，也就是與我們有合約關係的客戶，成長速度會不成比例地快，因為它們的萎縮速度也不成比例地快。這正反映了基礎市場的復甦。所以我預計這種情況會得到解決，解決速度將取決於市場走向，也許霍頓對此有更深刻的見解。

Yes. I mean I think this is an area that I think can be overthought many times. I mean the fact is whether it's an Onsite, whether it's non-fasteners, fasteners, most of our businesses, essentially, all of our businesses are cyclical. And so when you see an upswing -- it's fun talking about upswing, by the way, I hope it happens. But if you see an upswing, what happens is you see the growth rate at -- particularly our older Onsites get better, just as you see the growth rate in our smaller customers get better, just as you see the growth rate in our fasteners and non-fasteners get better.

是的。我的意思是，我認為這是一個很容易被過度思考的領域。我的意思是，事實是，無論是現場作業、非緊固件還是緊固件，我們的大多數業務，本質上，我們所有的業務都是週期性的。所以，當你看到市場回升時——順便說一句，談論市場回暖很有趣，我希望它能發生。但如果你看到上升趨勢，你會發現成長率——特別是我們較老的現場服務——有所改善，就像你看到我們的小客戶增長率有所改善一樣，就像你看到我們的緊固件和非緊固件的增長率有所改善一樣。

Now does non-fastener growth coming out typically maybe outpace -- sorry, does fastener growth coming out outpace non-fastener growth? Probably, just like it outpaces it going in. But if you look at Page 5 and you kind of look at the non-fastener and fastener lines, there's not a difference in how they move, right? They really move in the same direction. The gap may narrow or widen, depending on the cycle. But as long as we're successful with Onsite, as long as we're successful with vending, I don't think you're going to get a period where mix works in your favor, frankly. And that's just how the math works out.

現在，非緊固件的增長速度通常會超過——抱歉，是緊固件的增長速度超過非緊固件的增長速度嗎？可能就像它入場時的速度比它快一樣。但是，如果你看第 5 頁，看看非緊固件線和緊固件線，你會發現它們的移動方式沒有區別，對吧？它們確實朝著同一個方向發展。根據週期變化，差距可能會縮小也可能擴大。但只要我們的現場銷售業務取得成功，只要我們的自動販賣機業務成功，坦白說，我認為你不會遇到混合銷售對你有利的時期。這就是數學計算的結果。

This is always where I always feel the need as well, however, to point out that if mix is going to continue to work against us, if we're successful or when we're successful with our Onsites and vending and our growth drivers, you have to remember that we get good leverage over SG&A. One piece of perspective I might offer you is if you think about our gross margin, fourth quarter '16 to fourth quarter '19, I think it's down something like 300 -- almost 300 basis points. If you think about our fourth quarter operating margin over that same period of time, it's down 60. There is inherent leverage in Onsites. There's inherent leverage in the pathway to profit that was asked about earlier. And so I wouldn't expect that mix is going to start pushing our margins up because I expect we'll be really successful with our growth drivers. I wouldn't conclude from that, that our operating margins are at risk because there's inherent leverageability in the growth drivers at the operating expense line as well.

不過，我也總是覺得有必要指出，如果混合模式繼續對我們不利，如果我們成功了，或者當我們的現場銷售、自動販賣機和成長驅動因素取得成功時，你必須記住，我們在銷售、一般及行政費用方面擁有很好的優勢。我可以給你一個視角，如果你看看我們的毛利率，從 2016 年第四季到 2019 年第四季度，我認為下降了大約 300 個基點。如果看看我們第四季同期的營業利潤率，就會發現下降了 60%。現場服務本身就具有優勢。先前提到的獲利途徑中蘊含著固有的槓桿作用。因此，我不認為這種組合會開始推高我們的利潤率，因為我預期我們的成長動力將會非常成功。我不會由此得出結論，認為我們的營業利潤率面臨風險，因為營業費用的成長驅動因素也具有內在的槓桿作用。

Say, we're coming up on the -- say, Josh, I'm going to -- we're coming up on the hour, so I'm going to call it to a close. I'll just close with one thought, and that is -- and I often bring a personal touch into this, and I apologize for those people that are rolling their eyes right now. But last weekend, I had the opportunity to go to a funeral, a funeral for a very dear individual. Her name was Lillian Peterson. She was known as Til to family and friends. For me, she was both in a way, while she was a neighbor, she was also my godmother. And I consider that family. She was 88 years old. She's married to her husband for 67 years. She and her husband had 6 children. As you can appreciate, a multiple of that in grandchildren and great grandchildren. She was my Sunday school teacher. She was a giver of great advice and affection. She was the writer of many letters. Over the years, I've received many letters from her and as did many others. Simply, she was a second mom. I alluded to earlier the top 10 suggestions I shared with folks over the years.

比如說，我們快到整點了──比如說，喬希，我要──我們快到整點了，所以我要宣布結束。最後我只想補充一點——我經常會把一些個人觀點帶入我的發言中，對於現在可能正在翻白眼的人們，我深表歉意。但上週末，我有機會去參加一場葬禮，一個我非常親近的人的葬禮。她的名字叫莉蓮‧彼得森。家人和朋友都叫她蒂爾。對我來說，她既是我的鄰居，也是我的教母，這兩者兼具。我把他們視為家人。享年88歲。她和丈夫結婚已有67年了。她和丈夫育有6個孩子。你應該能想像到，這在孫輩和重孫輩方面是這個數字的數倍。她是我主日學的老師。她給了別人很多很好​​的建議和關懷。她寫過很多信。多年來，我收到她很多封信，其他很多人也一樣。簡而言之，她就像我的第二個媽媽。我之前提到我多年來與大家分享的十大建議。

And as I was at her funeral and hearing the story about her life and learning a whole bunch of things that I didn't know, it dawned on me that she was an incredible influencer on 3 of them. Number eight on that list is trust people. By exposure, Bob Kierlin, put a little adder on that, and that is incubate and cherish ideas. Number nine on that list is cherish, embrace the special words. Say please and thank you. Always say you're welcome, be willing to say you're sorry and show respect for all. And finally, enjoy something outdoors in all 4 seasons. She loved to ride bikes. She loved to go for walks, and she loved cross-country ski in the winter. And if you're foolish enough to live in Wisconsin or Minnesota, you better do all -- you better enjoy all 4 seasons. I'll close on that note. Thanks, everybody.

當我參加她的葬禮，聽到關於她一生的故事，並了解到很多我不知道的事情時，我突然意識到，她對其中三件事產生了巨大的影響。清單上的第八條是信任他人。Bob Kierlin 補充道，透過接觸，我們可以培養和珍惜各種想法。清單上的第九條是珍惜、擁抱這些特別的字。請說“請”和“謝謝”。永遠說“不客氣”，隨時準備道歉，並尊重所有人。最後，一年四季都享受戶外活動。她喜歡騎自行車。她喜歡散步，冬天喜歡越野滑雪。如果你傻到住在威斯康辛州或明尼蘇達州，那你最好把所有季節都體驗一遍——你最好好好享受四季。我就說到這裡吧。謝謝大家。

Thanks, everyone.

謝謝大家。

Thank you. This concludes today's conference. You may disconnect your lines at this time. Thank you for your participation.

謝謝。今天的會議到此結束。您可以在此時斷開線路。感謝您的參與。