Ginkgo Bioworks Holdings Inc (DNA) 2024 Q1 法說會逐字稿

Good evening. I'm Megan LeDuc, Manager of Investor Relations at Ginkgo Bioworks. I'm joined by Jason Kelly, our Co-Founder and CEO; and Mark Dmytruk, our CFO. Thanks as always for joining us. We're looking forward to updating you on our progress.

晚安.我是 Megan LeDuc，Ginkgo Bioworks 投資人關係經理。我們的共同創辦人兼執行長傑森凱利 (Jason Kelly) 也加入了我的行列。和我們的財務長馬克‧德米特魯克 (Mark Dmytruk)。一如既往地感謝您加入我們。我們期待向您通報我們的最新進展。

As a reminder, during the presentation today, we will be making forward-looking statements, which involve risks and uncertainties. Please refer to our filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission to learn more about these risks and uncertainties.

提醒一下，在今天的演示中，我們將做出前瞻性陳述，其中涉及風險和不確定性。請參閱我們向美國證券交易委員會提交的文件，以了解有關這些風險和不確定性的更多資訊。

Today, in addition to updating you on the quarter, we are going to provide more detail into our drive towards adjusted EBITDA breakeven and the necessary steps we're taking to get there. As usual, we'll end with the Q&A session, and I'll take questions from analysts, investors and the public. You can submit those questions to us in advance via X at #Ginkgoresults or e-mail investors@ginkgobioworks.com.

今天，除了向您通報本季度的最新情況外，我們還將提供更多有關我們實現調整後 EBITDA 盈虧平衡的努力的詳細信息，以及我們為實現這一目標而採取的必要步驟。像往常一樣，我們將以問答環節結束，我將回答分析師、投資者和公眾的問題。您可以透過 X #Ginkgoresults 或發送電子郵件至 Investors@ginkgobioworks.com 提前向我們提交這些問題。

All right. Over to you, Jason.

好的。交給你了，傑森。

Thanks, everyone, for joining us. We always start with our mission of making biology easier to engineer, and that's especially critical today. Ginkgo's a founder-led company, and myself and the other founders have been pouring our lives into this company for the past 15 years and many of our senior leaders for more than a decade.

謝謝大家加入我們。我們始終以讓生物學更容易設計為使命開始，這在今天尤其重要。 Ginkgo 是一家由創辦人領導的公司，我和其他創辦人在過去 15 年裡為這家公司傾注了全部心血，我們的許多高階領導也在十多年來為這家公司傾注了全部心血。

The advantage of this is we're very motivated to see the most out of Ginkgo. We've invested a ton of our lives in it. And as a consequence, we want to see the most out of the investment of your capital in Ginkgo as well.

這樣做的好處是我們非常有動力去充分利用 Ginkgo。我們為此投入了大量的生命。因此，我們也希望看到您在 Ginkgo 上的資本投資獲得最大收益。

So today, we're going to be announcing major changes to how we do our work at Ginkgo. These are going to be difficult for many on the team, and I want to say that upfront, it's going to involve substantial headcount reductions alongside important changes to improve our operations.

因此，今天，我們將宣布 Ginkgo 的工作方式發生重大變化。這些對團隊中的許多人來說都是困難的，我想說的是，首先，這將涉及大幅裁員以及改善我們營運的重要變革。

The mission of what we're doing matters at Ginkgo, to everyone at the company. And you will see us collectively take difficult but decisive action when needed to ensure we deliver on it. And today is one of those days.

在 Ginkgo，我們所做的事情對公司的每個人都很重要。您將看到我們在需要時集體採取困難但果斷的行動，以確保我們實現這一目標。今天就是其中之一。

So Ginkgo is an increasingly important part of the technology ecosystem in biotech, and that's why I think it's important we get this right. I'm really proud of this customer list. It's unbelievably broad, it showcases our core thesis that a common platform can provide biotechnology R&D services for very demanding customers across ag, food, industrial, biopharma and consumer biotech.

因此，銀杏是生物技術技術生態系統中越來越重要的一部分，這就是為什麼我認為我們正確對待這一點很重要。我對這份客戶名單感到非常自豪。它的範圍令人難以置信，它展示了我們的核心論點，即一個通用平台可以為農業、食品、工業、生物製藥和消費生物技術領域要求非常高的客戶提供生物技術研發服務。

I'm also happy with how we've been expanding this list. In particular, many of the big names in that biopharma column were added in just the last 18 months, Merck, Novo Nordisk, Boehringer or Pfizer. However, the next step for Ginkgo is to take what we've been learning across now hundreds of customer programs and make changes in the business that deliver those programs more efficiently.

我也對我們擴展此列表的方式感到滿意。特別是，生物製藥領域的許多知名企業都是在過去 18 個月內加入的，例如默克 (Merck)、諾和諾德 (Novo Nordisk)、勃林格殷格翰 (Boehringer) 或輝瑞 (Pfizer)。然而，Ginkgo 的下一步是利用我們在數百個客戶專案中學到的知識，對業務進行變革，以更有效地交付這些專案。

In particular, I'm going to talk later about how we can achieve greater scalability via simplification of the business. We want to simplify both our technology back end, ultimately consolidating -- attempting to consolidate to a single automation platform and simplify on the front end. We've gotten a lot of feedback from all the logos on this page about what they like and don't like about our deal terms. So we're going to be simplifying those, too, and that hopefully will increase sales velocity and simplify our dealmaking.

特別是，我稍後將討論如何透過簡化業務來實現更大的可擴展性。我們希望簡化我們的技術後端，最終進行整合——嘗試整合到自動化平台並簡化前端。我們從本頁上的所有標誌收到了很多回饋，以了解他們喜歡和不喜歡我們的交易條款的哪些方面。因此，我們也將簡化這些，希望能夠提高銷售速度並簡化我們的交易。

More on that in a minute, but first, Mark is going to walk you through our Q1 performance. And there are a couple of things that are indications that we do need to change course. In particular, you'll see an increase in programs without a matching increase in revenue. This is a problem that I'll be working to fix via the changes you're going to hear about today.

稍後會詳細介紹，但首先，馬克將帶您了解我們第一季的表現。有幾件事表明我們確實需要改變方針。特別是，您會發現計劃數量增加，但收入卻沒有相應增加。我將努力透過您今天將聽到的更改來解決這個問題。

We're fortunate to be in a position of financial strength as we execute these changes. We have $840 million in cash. We have no bank debt. And so we have a large margin of safety, which is really the position you want to be in when you make large changes like this. In other words, we're not doing this with our back against the wall, and that's a very deliberate choice on our part.

我們很幸運，在執行這些變革時擁有雄厚的財務實力。我們有 8.4 億美元現金。我們沒有銀行債務。因此，我們有很大的安全邊際，這確實是您在進行此類重大更改時想要處於的位置。換句話說，我們並不是在背水一戰的情況下做這件事，這是我們經過深思熟慮的選擇。

We're also setting a target of achieving adjusted EBITDA breakeven by the end of 2026. The attitude internally at Ginkgo, and I know many at the company are listening right now, will be to collectively set our plan for reaching that, which is going to involve input from all the folks on the team. And then commitment from all of us to not spend outside of that tight plan.

我們還設定了到 2026 年底實現調整後 EBITDA 盈虧平衡的目標。意見。然後我們所有人都承諾不會在這個嚴格的計劃之外進行支出。

Over the past few years, we've learned a lot by trying different avenues to drive growth. But we have all that data now on the team, and we have a team that can set the right plan and determine who are the best folks to deliver on it. And we're going to be doing that in the coming weeks internally.

在過去的幾年裡，我們透過嘗試不同的途徑來推動成長，學到了很多。但我們團隊現在擁有所有這些數據，我們的團隊可以製定正確的計劃並確定誰是實現該計劃的最佳人選。我們將在未來幾週內在內部這樣做。

This also aligns well with what we've heard from many investors, especially those of you who've been waiting on the sidelines to invest in Ginkgo. The most common thing I hear is I love the vision, I see a path where Ginkgo ends up being the horizontal services platform serving all of biotech, massively scaled up, you get better with scale. But Jason, can you get there with the capital you have on hand? And I think our plans today will give you confidence that we can.

這也與我們從許多投資者那裡聽到的情況非常吻合，尤其是那些一直在觀望投資 Ginkgo 的投資者。我聽到的最常見的事情是我喜歡這個願景，我看到了一條道路，Ginkgo 最終成為服務所有生物技術的橫向服務平台，大規模擴展，隨著規模的擴大，你會變得更好。但是傑森，你能用你手邊的資金到達那裡嗎？我認為我們今天的計劃會讓您相信我們可以做到。

Okay. I'm now going to ask Mark to share more details on our Q1 financials, and I'll follow with an explanation of how we're going to execute our targeted plan. Over to you, Mark.

好的。我現在要請馬克分享有關我們第一季財務狀況的更多詳細信息，然後我將解釋我們將如何執行我們的目標計劃。交給你了，馬克。

Thanks, Jason. I'll start with the Cell Engineering business. We added 17 new cell programs and supported a total of 140 active programs across 82 customers on the Cell Engineering platform in the first quarter of 2024. This represents a 44% increase in active programs year-over-year with solid growth across most verticals.

謝謝，傑森。我將從細胞工程業務開始。 2024 年第一季度，我們在Cell Engineering 平台上增加了17 個新的細胞計劃，並為82 個客戶的總共140 個活躍計劃提供了支持。領域都實現了穩健成長。

Cell Engineering revenue was $28 million in the quarter, down 18% compared to the first quarter of 2023. Cell Engineering services revenue, which excludes downstream value share was down 15% compared to the prior year, driven primarily by a decrease in revenue from early-stage customers partially offset by growth in revenue from larger customers. We believe the mix shift to be an overall positive and is indicative of market conditions, our refocused sales efforts on cash customers and the increased penetration of larger biopharma and government customers that we have discussed over the past few quarters.

本季細胞工程收入為 2,800 萬美元，較 2023 年第一季下降 18%。的收入成長部分抵消了大客戶的收入成長。我們認為，這種組合轉變總體上是積極的，並且表明了市場狀況，我們重新將銷售工作重點放在現金客戶上，以及我們在過去幾個季度討論過的大型生物製藥和政府客戶滲透率的提高。

That said, the revenue in the quarter was below our expectation and the pipeline indicates a weaker-than-expected revenue ramp for the rest of the year. Jason will be discussing later in the presentation both how we're thinking about demand and our offering in this environment and efforts we're taking to further focus the customer base.

也就是說，本季的收入低於我們的預期，並且管道表明今年剩餘時間的收入增幅弱於預期。 Jason 將在稍後的演示中討論我們在這種環境下如何考慮需求和我們的產品，以及我們為進一步關注客戶群而採取的努力。

Now turning to Biosecurity. Our Biosecurity business generated $10 million of revenue in the first quarter of 2024 at a gross margin of 8%. We do expect the gross margin to improve in upcoming quarters based on the revenue mix in our contracted backlog. We're continuing to build out both domestic and international infrastructure for Biosecurity, especially with our recently announced Biosecurity products, Ginkgo Canopy and Ginkgo Horizon.

現在轉向生物安全。我們的生物安全業務在 2024 年第一季創造了 1,000 萬美元的收入，毛利率為 8%。我們確實預計，根據合約積壓訂單中的收入組合，未來幾季的毛利率將有所改善。我們正在繼續建造國內和國際生物安全基礎設施，特別是我們最近推出的生物安全產品 Ginkgo Canopy 和 Ginkgo Horizo​​n。

And now I'll provide more commentary on the rest of the P&L. Where noted, these figures exclude stock-based compensation expense, which is shown separately. And we are also breaking out M&A-related expenses to provide you with additional comparability.

現在我將對損益表的其餘部分提供更多評論。如有註明，這些數字不包括基於股票的補償費用，該費用單獨顯示。我們還詳細列出了與併購相關的費用，以便為您提供額外的可比性。

OpEx. Starting with OpEx, R&D expense, excluding stock-based compensation and M&A-related expenses decreased from $109 million in the first quarter of 2023 to $94 million in the first quarter of 2024. G&A expense, excluding stock-based compensation and M&A-related expenses decreased from $71 million in the first quarter of 2023 to $51 million in the first quarter of 2024. The significant decrease in both R&D and G&A expenses was due to the cost reduction actions we completed in 2023, including cost synergies related to the Zymergen integration and subsequent deconsolidation.

營運支出。從營運支出開始，研發費用（不包括股票薪酬和併購相關費用）從2023 年第一季的1.09 億美元下降至2024 年第一季的9,400 萬美元。 ）從2023 年第一季的7,100 萬美元減少到2024 年第一季的5,100 萬美元。成本協同效應隨後的拆分。

Stock-based compensation. You'll again notice a significant drop in stock-based comp this quarter, similar to what we saw in each quarter in 2023 as we complete the roll-off of the original catch-up accounting adjustment related to the modification of restricted stock units when we first went public. Additional details are provided in the appendix to this presentation.

以股票為基礎的薪酬。您將再次注意到本季基於股票的補償大幅下降，與我們在 2023 年每個季度看到的情況類似，因為我們完成了與限制性股票單位修改相關的原始追趕會計調整的滾轉，我們首先上市。本簡報的附錄中提供了更多詳細資訊。

Net loss. It is important to note that our net loss includes a number of noncash income and/or expenses as detailed more fully in our financial statements. Because of these noncash and other nonrecurring items, we believe adjusted EBITDA is a more indicative measure of our profitability. We've also included a reconciliation of adjusted EBITDA to net loss in the appendix.

淨虧損。值得注意的是，我們的淨虧損包括一些非現金收入和/或支出，我們的財務報表中有更詳細的說明。由於這些非現金和其他非經常性項目，我們認為調整後的 EBITDA 更能說明我們的獲利能力。我們也在附錄中列出了調整後 EBITDA 與淨虧損的調節表。

Adjusted EBITDA in the quarter was negative $100 million, which was flat year-over-year as the decline in revenue was offset by a decline in operating expenses. And finally, CapEx in the first quarter of 2024 was $7 million as we continue to build out the Biofab1 facility.

該季度調整後 EBITDA 為負 1 億美元，與去年同期持平，因為收入下降被營運費用下降所抵消。最後，隨著我們繼續建造 Biofab1 設施，2024 年第一季的資本支出為 700 萬美元。

Now normally, I would speak to our guidance next, but given our plans to accelerate our path to adjusted EBITDA breakeven through both customer demand-related changes and significant cost-related restructuring, Jason is going to first walk through those plans and then discuss guidance at the end. Before I hand it over to Jason, I'd like to provide some color on the cost restructuring we are planning.

通常情況下，我接下來會談論我們的指導，但考慮到我們計劃透過與客戶需求相關的變化和與成本相關的重大重組來加速實現調整後EBITDA 盈虧平衡，傑森將首先介紹這些計劃，然後討論指導在最後。在將其交給 Jason 之前，我想先介紹一下我們正在計劃的成本重組。

High level, we are committed to taking out $200 million of operating expenses on an annualized run rate basis by the time we have completed our site consolidation actions, which we expect by mid-2025. We expect at least half of that savings target to be achieved on a run rate basis by the fourth quarter of this year. The majority of our cost structure is in our people and facilities costs. And so workforce reductions across both G&A and R&D and site rationalization are the primary focus, though we see significant opportunities in other areas of cost as well. For clarity, our cost takeout estimate includes an assumption relating to our ability to manage our lease expenses relating to space we will no longer require.

高水準上，我們承諾在我們完成站點整合行動時（預計到 2025 年中期），以年化運行率計算 2 億美元的營運費用。我們預計到今年第四季度，以運行率計算，至少一半的節省目標將實現。我們的成本結構的大部分是人員和設施成本。因此，儘管我們在其他成本領域也看到了巨大的機會，但在一般行政管理和研發方面的勞動力減少以及場地合理化是主要關注點。為了清楚起見，我們的成本支出估算包括與我們管理不再需要的空間相關的租賃費用的能力有關的假設。

As I said, Jason will speak to the overall plan in more detail, including importantly, the customer demand side of this. And so now, Jason, back over to you.

正如我所說，傑森將更詳細地談論總體計劃，包括重要的客戶需求方面。現在，傑森，回到你身邊。

Thanks, Mark. The big theme for today is how we're going to grow revenue while decreasing cost in order to reach adjusted EBITDA breakeven by the end of 2026. I'll start by talking about why we're not seeing revenue growth alongside program growth. I mentioned this earlier, and what we'll be doing to simplify our back-end automation technology to improve scalability there.

謝謝，馬克。今天的主題是我們如何在增加收入的同時降低成本，以便在 2026 年底前實現調整後的 EBITDA 盈虧平衡。我之前提到過這一點，以及我們將採取哪些措施來簡化後端自動化技術，以提高那裡的可擴展性。

Second, I want to talk about the front end, what do customers like and not like about our service terms and how we'll be simplifying on the front end to expand our offerings and simplify our offerings to reflect what we're hearing from our customers.

其次，我想談談前端，客戶喜歡和不喜歡我們的服務條款的哪些方面，以及我們將如何簡化前端以擴展我們的產品並簡化我們的產品以反映我們從我們的客戶那裡聽到的內容顧客。

And then finally, we're taking decisive action to reduce our costs. Specifically, we plan to reduce our annualized run rate OpEx by $200 million by mid-2025 in order to achieve adjusted EBITDA breakeven by the end of 2026. And we'll dive into the high-level plan of how we'll execute on this.

最後，我們正在採取果斷行動來降低成本。具體來說，我們計劃在 2025 年中期將年化營運費用減少 2 億美元，以便在 2026 年底實現調整後 EBITDA 盈虧平衡。

Okay. Let's jump in. So the charts here are a big part of what's driving our decisions today. You can see from the chart on the left, the number of active programs on our platform grew significantly over year -- over the year. This is a good thing. Really excited about this. But alongside that, we saw a decline in our revenue from service fees. And so this is -- again, ignore downstream value share. Just look at that fee number, that's gone down.

好的。讓我們開始吧。您可以從左側的圖表中看到，我們平台上的活躍程序數量逐年顯著增長。這是一件好事。對此真的很興奮。但同時，我們的服務費收入也有所下降。因此，再次忽略下游價值份額。只要看看那個費用數字，就已經下降了。

This is particularly frustrating to me because we actually have a large amount of fee bookings across these many deals. And -- but we're not converting those into revenues in the near term. And the core challenge is the rate that we're bringing these programs to full scale on our automation at Ginkgo. And I'm going to explain that, but I want to give you a little more detail so you understand that challenge because of what we're trying to fix.

這讓我特別沮喪，因為我們實際上在這麼多交易中都有大量的費用預訂。而且 - 但我們不會在短期內將這些轉化為收入。核心挑戰是我們在 Ginkgo 的自動化中全面實現這些程式的速度。我將對此進行解釋，但我想向您提供更多細節，以便您了解由於我們正在努力解決的問題而面臨的挑戰。

So on the left-hand side here is the basic process by which an R&D leader, one of our customers develops a biotech product, okay? So there, you have R&D leaders engaging with the senior scientists on their team. They're specifying a particular product scientific deliverable, okay, right? So to give some examples from Ginkgo programs of what a leader might ask for, maybe it's an mRNA design that performs a certain way in humans like we have for Pfizer. Or microbes that capture nitrogen for Bayer. Or an improved manufacturing process for Novo Nordisk. These are all scientific deliverables, all right?

左邊是研發領導者（我們的客戶之一）開發生技產品的基本流程，好嗎？因此，研發領導者與他們團隊中的資深科學家進行交流。他們指定了特定產品的科學交付成果，好吧，對吧？因此，舉一些 Ginkgo 專案的例子來說明領導者可能會要求什麼，也許這是一種 mRNA 設計，可以像我們為輝瑞所做的那樣，在人類中以某種方式發揮作用。或為拜耳捕獲氮的微生物。或諾和諾德改進的製造工藝。這些都是科學成果，好嗎？

And in the case on the left, the customer's internal scientists will then design experiments they think will help deliver that outcome to their boss. More junior researchers will perform those experiments at the lab bench by hand. And then the data will come back to be analyzed, and you go around that loop.

在左邊的例子中，客戶的內部科學家將設計他們認為有助於向老闆提供結果的實驗。更多初級研究人員將在實驗室工作台上手動進行這些實驗。然後數據將返回進行分析，然後您將繼續這個循環。

Now this is a manual process and generates small amounts of data, but it does work, right? I want to highlight, this is how all these biotech drugs are developed every year. And the strength of it is the flexibility right? The scientist can run any new experiment tomorrow very quickly that they want as long as their two hands can pull it off, all right? And again, when that data comes back to the senior scientists, they repeat this all over again, right?

現在這是一個手動過程並產生少量數據，但它確實有效，對吧？我想強調的是，這就是每年開發所有這些生物技術藥物的方式。它的優點在於靈活性，對嗎？科學家明天可以很快地進行任何他們想要的新實驗，只要他們的兩隻手能夠完成，好嗎？再說一次，當這些數據回到資深科學家時，他們會再次重複這一切，對嗎？

Now, of course, an R&D leader at Pfizer, Bayer and Novo, in these cases, are all choosing to instead pay to have a Ginkgo scientist give them the same deliverables instead of using their internal infrastructure. So why are they doing that? And the major reason is that Ginkgo scientists, they do that same loop, but they do it in a different way. They design experiments, but instead of small amounts of manually-generated lab data from a team, they get large amounts of data generated either via automation or via pooled approaches that leverage high-throughput DNA sequencing and barcoding.

當然，現在，輝瑞、拜耳和諾和諾德的研發領導者在這些情況下都選擇付費讓 Ginkgo 科學家為他們提供相同的成果，而不是使用他們的內部基礎設施。那他們為什麼要這麼做呢？主要原因是銀杏科學家，他們做同樣的循環，但他們以不同的方式做。他們設計實驗，但不是從團隊手動產生少量實驗室數據，而是透過自動化或利用高通量 DNA 定序和條碼的匯總方法產生大量數據。

And Ginkgo is a world expert in both of these large data generation approaches. That's really the big difference, small data generation versus large data generation. And that's really our expertise. So the short answer is, why was the customer choosing to use us instead of all that in-house infrastructure they have, is they're coming to us, asking for a scientific deliverable that they think will need a lot of data to get to the answer, all right? And that's not every project, but it is an increasing number, as you see.

Ginkgo 是這兩種大數據產生方法的世界專家。這確實是小數據產生與大數據產生的巨大差異。這確實是我們的專長。所以簡短的回答是，為什麼客戶選擇使用我們而不是他們擁有的所有內部基礎設施，他們來找我們，要求提供他們認為需要大量數據才能實現的科學交付成果答案，好嗎？這並不是每個項目，但如您所見，數量正在增加。

But our approach, I want to be clear, is not strictly better than doing it manually, mainly because it takes more time to get a new protocol running at large scale. And this is the heart of why we're not seeing revenue come up with our programs in the near term. It's not a perfect correlation, but generally, the faster that a Ginkgo scientist can start to order large amounts of lab data, the faster we then see revenue coming out of all those customer projects. Now fortunately, the acquisition of Zymergen and the follow-on tech development we've been doing over the past couple of years put us in a great place to resolve this issue. And so I want to talk about how we're planning to do that.

但我想明確的是，我們的方法並不比手動執行嚴格更好，主要是因為需要更多時間才能大規模地運行新協議。這就是為什麼我們的專案在短期內看不到收入的核心原因。這不是完美的相關性，但一般來說，Ginkgo 科學家開始訂購大量實驗室數據的速度越快，我們就越快從所有這些客戶專案中看到收入。幸運的是，收購 Zymergen 以及我們過去幾年一直在進行的後續技術開發使我們能夠很好地解決這個問題。所以我想談談我們計劃如何做到這一點。

Okay. So to give you a little bit of background on how lab automation works today, there's basically three levels. At the first level, that's what you're seeing at our customers often. Scientists working by hand. This is the overwhelming amount of lab data generated in product development in biotech today is at this first level, manual.

好的。因此，為了讓您了解當今實驗室自動化如何運作的一些背景知識，基本上分為三個層級。在第一個層面上，這就是您經常在我們的客戶身上看到的情況。科學家們手工工作。這是當今生物技術產品開發中產生的大量實驗室數據，處於第一級，即手冊。

Second level, a scientist walks up to a robot, puts samples on it and program it to do a specific task, okay? This is task targeted. The third level, and you'll see a lot of these around Ginkgo are work cells. And so you can work with an automation vendor and you have a robotic arm sitting in the middle of a set of equipment and it moves samples through multiple steps, but it basically does the same steps over and over, okay? And this is, again, what a majority of our foundry looks like today.

第二級，科學家走到機器人面前，將樣本放在上面，然後對其進行編程以執行特定任務，好嗎？這是有針對性的任務。第三層，你會看到Ginkgo周圍有很多都是工作單元。因此，您可以與自動化供應商合作，在一組設備中間放置一個機械手臂，它會通過多個步驟移動樣品，但基本上它一遍又一遍地執行相同的步驟，好嗎？這又是我們今天大多數鑄造廠的樣子。

And you can see on that spectrum at the top, you go from very flexible, low amounts of data per dollar to very inflexible large amounts of data per dollar, all right? And that has been the historical trade-off in lab automation.

您可以在頂部的範圍中看到，您從非常靈活的每美元少量數據到非常不靈活的每美元大量數據，好嗎？這就是實驗室自動化的歷史性權衡。

Okay. We believe that the automation paradigm invented at Zymergen and then expanded on in the last 2 years at Ginkgo since the acquisition ultimately offers flexibility and low-cost data at the same time. The simple idea is that each piece of equipment is its own removable cart. It has a robotic arm connecting it to a magnetic track to deliver samples. You can see it in the video. And when you need a new equipment, you can just add that equipment to the track. It's like adding a little Lego block to that track and incorporate it without needing to build a whole new work cell like you would in Level 3 automation.

好的。我們相信，自動化範式是 Zymergen 發明的，然後在過去兩年中在 Ginkgo 擴展，因為此次收購最終同時提供了靈活性和低成本數據。簡單的想法是，每件設備都是自己的可移動推車。它有一個機械臂，將其連接到磁軌以傳送樣品。你可以在視頻中看到它。當您需要新設備時，只需將該設備添加到軌道即可。這就像在該軌道上添加一個小樂高積木並將其合併，而不需要像在 3 級自動化中那樣建造一個全新的工作單元。

And when you want to do a different protocol on the same equipment, that can be done with the software quickly. And we've been seeing that. We've seen instances where we've taken smaller batch protocols and moved them on to the RAC system relatively fast compared to what would have been a multi-month project on a work cell.

當您想在同一裝置上執行不同的協定時，可以使用該軟體快速完成。我們已經看到了這一點。我們見過一些實例，與在工作單元上進行數月的項目相比，我們採用較小的批量協議並將其轉移到 RAC 系統的速度相對較快。

And then over the last year, we've also been seeing -- and this is early data on this, but 80% to 90% labor time reduction, 60% cycle time reduction. We have not done this for the majority of our protocols yet, but the signals are good that we could. And I'll be talking about that as part of our plans for efficiency gains in the third section of the talk today.

去年，我們也看到——這是這方面的早期數據，勞動時間減少了 80% 到 90%，週期時間減少了 60%。我們還沒有對大多數協議這樣做，但信號很好，我們可以這樣做。我將在今天演講的第三部分中討論這一點，作為我們提高效率計劃的一部分。

Since acquiring Zymergen, we also focused on simplifying the cart designs. You can see our second-generation RAC carts that were recently delivered to our facility in Boston. And if you're at Ginkgo Ferment in April, you saw these important -- in person. Importantly, these are easy to assemble. So these are in-house designs, they're proprietary to Ginkgo. So it makes it faster for us to order more manufactured as needed. We also standardized the sizes. So we have these 3 sizes here that allow us to incorporate a wide variety of different equipment while again, keeping manufacturing costs down, all right?

自從收購 Zymergen 以來，我們也致力於簡化推車設計。您可以看到我們最近交付到我們波士頓工廠的第二代 RAC 推車。如果您四月在 Ginkgo Ferment，您就會親眼目睹這些重要的內容。重要的是，它們很容易組裝。所以這些都是內部設計，它們是 Ginkgo 專有的。因此，它使我們能夠更快地根據需要訂購更多的產品。我們還標準化了尺寸。所以我們這裡有這 3 種尺寸，使我們能夠整合各種不同的設備，同時再次降低製造成本，好嗎？

So these RAC systems are made to be very scalable. It's a very different paradigm than what you see with work cell-based automation. Today, we are at the closed loop RAC system scale, that one you see there with over 15 systems. But we've been planning much larger integrated systems as part of achieving long-term efficiency goals in flexible lab data generation.

因此，這些 RAC 系統具有很強的可擴展性。這是一個與您在基於工作單元的自動化中看到的非常不同的範例。今天，我們處於閉環 RAC 系統規模，您可以看到超過 15 個系統。但我們一直在規劃更大的整合系統，作為實現靈活的實驗室數據產生的長期效率目標的一部分。

Towards that end, our purpose-built facility that we've been talking about to house these large RAC installations, Biofab1, we'll be opening in mid-2025. And the best way to think of this facility is a lab data center. Okay? So we have these big data centers in compute and what you offer there is common scale hardware that does lots of different types of compute.

為此，我們一直在討論用於容納這些大型 RAC 裝置的專用設施 Biofab1，我們將於 2025 年中期啟用。考慮該設施的最佳方式是實驗室數據中心。好的？因此，我們在計算方面擁有這些大型資料中心，而您提供的通用規模硬體可以執行許多不同類型的計算。

Very similar idea here, common scaled hardware in the form of the RACs that can generate a diverse array of lab data output quickly for customers. And hopefully, this means as we sign more programs, they can very quickly scale to generate large amounts of data. This leads to more revenue, but more importantly, to happier customers who greatly desire both speed and scale of lab data generation.

這裡的想法非常相似，RAC 形式的通用擴展硬體可以為客戶快速產生各種實驗室數據輸出。希望這意味著隨著我們簽署更多的程序，它們可以非常快速地擴展以產生大量數據。這會帶來更多收入，但更重要的是，讓那些非常渴望實驗室數據產生速度和規模的客戶更加滿意。

In other words, our customers will be more than happy if we were more rapidly extracting revenue out of our bookings because it means their programs are happening more quickly on our infrastructure. So that is a win-win for Ginkgo and for our customers, and that's what we're trying to do with this change to how we operate.

換句話說，如果我們能夠更快地從預訂中獲取收入，我們的客戶將會非常高興，因為這意味著他們的計劃在我們的基礎設施上更快地進行。因此，這對 Ginkgo 和我們的客戶來說是雙贏的，這也是我們透過改變我們的營運方式所努力實現的目標。

Okay. So that's a bit on the technology. I believe it will simplify the back end, allowing one automation platform, ultimately, the RACs to replace many different workflows at Ginkgo and work cells. And now I want to talk about the front end and how we engage with customers when we sell those cell programs.

好的。這就是技術上的一點。我相信它將簡化後端，允許一個自動化平台最終將 RAC 取代 Ginkgo 和工作單元中的許多不同工作流程。現在我想談談前端以及我們在銷售這些單元程式時如何與客戶互動。

All right. So this is a slide I showed you earlier. And as I mentioned, customers are choosing to use Ginkgo rather than their internal infrastructure when they think they need large amounts of data. However, as part of the business model, we've also asked for a few things customers don't love. You can see these up here.

好的。這是我之前給你們看過的幻燈片。正如我所提到的，當客戶認為需要大量數據時，他們會選擇使用 Ginkgo 而不是其內部基礎設施。然而，作為商業模式的一部分，我們也提出了一些客戶不喜歡的要求。你可以在這裡看到這些。

We have Ginkgo scientists run the projects. We have scientific control over the experimental design. Number two, we have IP rights. Ginkgo can reuse the data generated in our -- and keep it in our code base. And by the way, that is valuable to Ginkgo. Like don't get me wrong, us being able to reuse that is valuable. It helps us with future deals. But customers really don't like it. I'll talk about that. And then finally, downstream value share. We get milestones or royalties on your future product sales.

我們讓銀杏科學家負責這些計畫。我們對實驗設計有科學的控制。第二，我們擁有智慧財產權。 Ginkgo 可以重複使用我們產生的數據，並將其保存在我們的程式碼庫中。順便說一句，這對 Ginkgo 來說很有價值。不要誤會我的意思，我們能夠重複使用它是很有價值的。它有助於我們未來的交易。但顧客確實不喜歡它。我會談談這個。最後是下游價值份額。我們將從您未來的產品銷售中獲得里程碑或特許權使用費。

And now, look, I designed a lot of these service terms, right? Like I was responsible for our business model at Ginkgo. And I battle test it. I'm out there talking to customers every week, and it varies a little by market. So like, for example, in biopharma, there's a lot more tolerance for milestones and royalties, right? If you're doing a strategic deal with a customer, many deals are done like that. In industrial biotech, like in the chemical industry where margins are much lower, they hate them, okay, right?

現在，你看，我設計了很多這樣的服務條款，對吧？就像我負責 Ginkgo 的商業模式一樣。我對它進行了戰鬥測試。我每週都會與客戶交談，並且根據市場的不同而略有不同。例如，在生物製藥領域，對里程碑和特許權使用費的容忍度更高，對嗎？如果您正在與客戶進行策略性交易，那麼許多交易都是這樣完成的。在工業生物技術中，就像利潤率低得多的化學工業一樣，他們討厭它們，好吧，對吧？

So again, one size fits all there, not a great idea. And then second, in biopharma, there's much more sensitivity to IP, so -- given how much it makes up the competitive moats around a drug. So they have a lot of sensitivity to, wait a second, you're going to reuse some of this data that I'm paying for to potentially bring to a customer, that creates resistance in deals.

再說一次，一刀切並不是一個好主意。其次，在生物製藥領域，人們對智慧財產權更加敏感，因此——考慮到智慧財產權在很大程度上構成了藥物的競爭護城河。因此，他們非常敏感，等一下，你將重複使用我付費的一些數據，這些數據可能會帶給客戶，這會在交易中造成阻力。

So when you see us adding all these programs, know that we're fighting through that resistance with customers to get them done. And we felt that was important. And I think in the context of where we are today and the rate of revenue I'm seeing and what I'm hearing from customers, right, like we should change it.

因此，當您看到我們添加所有這些計劃時，請知道我們正在與客戶克服阻力以完成這些計劃。我們認為這很重要。我認為，考慮到我們今天的處境、我所看到的收入率以及我從客戶那裡聽到的情況，我們應該改變它。

And so we're going to stop fighting customers on these things, update our terms to give customer IP reuse rights and in many cases, not include downstream value share. There will be some exceptions where we are bringing a lot of product relevant background IP. We do have that, but by and large, remove that downstream value share. And our hope is this will speed deal making as we spend huge amounts of time negotiating these IP terms. It also allows us to scale the number of deals we do without needing to scale legal and financial resources due to reduced deal complexity.

因此，我們將停止在這些問題上與客戶作鬥爭，更新我們的條款以賦予客戶知識產權重用權，並且在許多情況下，不包括下游價值份額。會有一些例外，我們會帶來大量與產品相關的背景IP。我們確實有這個，但總的來說，刪除了下游價值份額。我們希望這將加快交易速度，因為我們花了大量時間來談判這些智慧財產權條款。它還使我們能夠擴大交易數量，而無需因交易複雜性降低而增加法律和財務資源。

Okay. So beyond the issue of IP rights and DVS, customers sometimes have a problem also giving up scientific control of their experiments. And so you'll see us working on simplifying that, too. In other words, they might say, yes, I love all the data you can generate, Jason, but like I really trust my own scientists and their expertise around this particular problem. I just wish they could use your infrastructure.

好的。因此，除了智慧財產權和 DVS 問題之外，客戶有時還會遇到放棄對其實驗進行科學控制的問題。因此，您也會看到我們正在努力簡化這一點。換句話說，他們可能會說，是的，我喜歡你能產生的所有數據，傑森，但就像我真的相信我自己的科學家以及他們在這個特定問題上的專業知識一樣。我只是希望他們可以使用您的基礎設施。

And so we announced Ginkgo Ferment in April, Lab Data as a Service, which is exactly this. The key idea is that a customer scientist can design the experiments and analyze the data, but they have Ginkgo's infrastructure, again, remember all those RACs, available to them to quickly generate large data sets that they wouldn't be able to do with their in-house research team.

因此，我們在四月發布了 Ginkgo Ferment，即實驗室數據即服務，這正是這個。關鍵的想法是，客戶科學家可以設計實驗並分析數據，但他們擁有Ginkgo 的基礎設施，再次記住所有這些RAC，他們可以使用這些RAC 來快速產生大型數據集，而這是他們無法使用自己的系統完成的。

They might still use that team for other problems that favor small batch, manual rapid work. Again, I think that is actually a valuable piece of the puzzle internal to our customers. But if it's a large data generation need, they can just order it. And this will be the best of both worlds for many customers.

他們可能仍然使用該團隊來解決其他有利於小批量、手動快速工作的問題。再說一次，我認為這對我們的客戶來說實際上是一個有價值的內部難題。但如果需要大量數據生成，他們可以直接訂購。對於許多客戶來說，這將是兩全其美。

Now there's a subtlety here that took me actually a while to understand, even though I'm at the coalface with customers all the time. When we sell our usual process, where a Ginkgo scientist is in control, that's really sold to the customer like as a strategic deal over often a couple of years, and it's coming out of a special budget, sort -- kind of sold up through corp dev that funds that kind of work, these kind of research partnerships. And we actually do a ton of those deals, right? And I think we've scaled that kind of deal making more than almost anyone in biotechnology today.

儘管我一直在煤礦工作面與客戶打交道，但這裡有一個微妙之處，我實際上花了一段時間才理解。當我們出售我們通常的流程時，由銀杏科學家控制，這實際上是作為一項戰略交易出售給客戶的，通常是幾年的，而且它是從特殊預算中出來的，有點像通過出售為此類工作、此類研究夥伴關係提供資金的公司開發人員。我們實際上做了很多這樣的交易，對吧？我認為我們在這種交易上的規模比當今生物技術領域的幾乎任何人都多。

But there's this whole other big budget, often billions of dollars at pharma companies, that is the everyday R&D budgets at the biotech company that's in the hands of internal scientists at various levels. And with Lab Data as a Service, we can see it sell smaller deals directly into those scientists. This is both a big new market for us and is also a great mission fit for Ginkgo. Our goal has always been to make biology easier to engineer. But thus far, that's been limited to Ginkgo scientists. By allowing our customers' scientists to access the foundry directly, we're making it easier to engineer for them, too. And that's really important to me. It's really important to the team. If you watch my talk at Ginkgo Ferment, I spent a fair bit of time on that.

但製藥公司還有另外一大筆預算，通常是數十億美元，即生技公司的日常研發預算，掌握在各個層級的內部科學家手中。透過實驗室數據即服務，我們可以看到它直接向這些科學家出售較小的交易。這對我們來說既是一個巨大的新市場，也是Ginkgo的一項偉大使命。我們的目標始終是讓生物學更容易設計。但到目前為止，這僅限於銀杏科學家。透過允許客戶的科學家直接訪問鑄造廠，我們也讓他們的設計變得更加容易。這對我來說非常重要。這對團隊來說真的很重要。如果你看過我在 Ginkgo Ferment 的演講，你會發現我花了相當多的時間在這上面。

Finally, I want to mention, we think we can really be the picks and shovels to all the folks that are inventing amazing new AI models in biotechnology. What we are hearing again and again, there's many new startups getting funded, large big funding rounds. Most of the large biopharmas have now a person in charge of AI strategy. And what we hear from these people again and again is that data is the missing piece for building new and better models in biology, okay?

最後，我想提一下，我們認為我們真的可以成為所有在生物技術領域發明令人驚嘆的新人工智慧模型的人的鎬和鏟子。我們一次又一次地聽到，有許多新的新創公司獲得了大規模的融資。現在大多數大型生物製藥公司都有人工智慧策略負責人。我們一次又一次從這些人那裡聽到的是，數據是建構新的、更好的生物學模型所缺少的部分，好嗎？

And again, we had huge large English language data sets and things like that to train AI models for English language or videos or images. In biology, the missing piece is actually the data. And so our Lab Data as a Service is exactly the right offering for these -- if we could generate large multimodal data sets. And we expect to do business here with customers wanting to access both our automation scale and our expertise, like I said earlier, in conducting large pooled assays. That type of assay generation is particularly important. And both of those are available right now on a fee-for-service basis. You own the IP, there's no royalties or milestones for any AI company that's tuning in. We'd love to do that work for you, and you can get that data much faster than anyone else.

再說一次，我們有大量的英語語言資料集和類似的東西來訓練英語、影片或圖像的人工智慧模型。在生物學中，缺失的部分實際上是數據。因此，如果我們能夠產生大型多模式資料集，我們的實驗室資料即服務正是適合這些的產品。我們希望在這裡與希望獲得我們的自動化規模和我們的專業知識的客戶開展業務，就像我之前所說的那樣，在進行大型匯總分析方面。這種類型的檢測產生尤其重要。現在這兩種服務都是按服務收費的。您擁有 IP，任何正在調整的人工智慧公司都無需支付版稅或里程碑。

Okay. So those are the big changes we're making, both on the back end and the front end of our platform to drive scalability through simplification. We expect these simplifications and others to allow for substantial cost takeouts in the coming months. So I want to talk about those cost savings and how all of these pieces tie to our path to adjusted EBITDA breakeven.

好的。這些就是我們在平台的後端和前端所做的重大改變，以透過簡化來推動可擴展性。我們預計這些簡化和其他簡化將在未來幾個月內節省大量成本。所以我想談談這些成本節約以及所有這些部分如何與我們實現調整後 EBITDA 盈虧平衡的道路聯繫起來。

So if you look at our Q1 numbers, our annualized OpEx comes in at approximately $500 million. This is simply too high relative to near-term revenues, right? We plan to cut this back by $100 million by Q4 2024 by significantly consolidating our footprint and reducing labor expenses across both G&A and R&D, which is enabled by the simplifications I just spoke about in the previous two sections.

因此，如果您查看我們第一季的數據，我們的年化營運支出約為 5 億美元。相對於近期收入來說，這太高了，對吧？我們計劃在 2024 年第四季之前削減 1 億美元，方法是大幅整合我們的足跡並減少 G&A 和 R&D 的勞動力支出，這是透過我在前兩節中談到的簡化實現的。

We're also targeting reducing our annualized run rate cash OpEx by another $100 million, totaling $200 million by mid-2025. The big takeaway is we plan to eliminate discretionary spending that isn't very specifically focused on how we get to adjusted EBITDA breakeven by end of year 2026. So a note on this for the team that's tuning in, there are many things we are doing at Ginkgo right now that are good things to do in the long run, but aren't good investments today given the opportunity we have to get to a breakeven business built on technology that keeps making biology easier to engineer as it scales up.

我們也計劃將年化運行率現金營運支出再減少 1 億美元，到 2025 年中期總計減少 2 億美元。最重要的一點是，我們計劃消除可自由支配的支出，這些支出並不是特別關注我們如何在 2026 年底之前實現調整後的 EBITDA 盈虧平衡。從長遠來看，這對Ginkgo 來說是件好事，但在今天，這並不是好的投資，因為我們必須有機會實現盈虧平衡的業務，這種業務建立在技術的基礎上，隨著生物學規模的擴大，技術使生物工程更容易設計。

No other company in the world, in my opinion, has pulled that off yet. So we need to sacrifice activities on that path since I think we have a good shot at hitting it at this point, and it's critical. We're going through the detailed planning process now, and input across our team is essential to get this right, but I can share some of the major places we expect to see savings.

在我看來，世界上還沒有其他公司能夠做到這一點。因此，我們需要犧牲這條道路上的活動，因為我認為我們現在有很好的機會實現這一目標，而這一點至關重要。我們現在正在經歷詳細的規劃過程，整個團隊的投入對於實現這一目標至關重要，但我可以分享一些我們期望看到節省的主要地方。

So first, facilities are a significant cost for us, both in terms of rent, but also in terms of facilities maintenance and tracking. We have 8 sites today. And with Biofab1 coming online in mid-2025, we expect we could reduce our footprint by up to 60%. These simplified operations require less ops, G&A, HR, finance, facilities, management and other overhead support, which will allow us to significantly reduce G&A costs and overall headcount.

首先，設施對我們來說是一筆巨大的成本，無論是在租金方面，還是在設施維護和追蹤方面。今天我們有 8 個站點。隨著 Biofab1 於 2025 年中期上線，我們預計可以減少多達 60% 的足跡。這些簡化的營運需要更少的營運、一般管理費用、人力資源、財務、設施、管理和其他間接費用支持，這將使我們能夠顯著減少一般管理成本和整體員工人數。

And with our movement to a more RAC-centric foundry, our technical teams will be adjusted to suit highly leveraged automated and pooled workflows. We expect that these combined initiatives will result in 25-plus percent reduction in labor expenses, which is inclusive of a reduction in force.

隨著我們轉向更以 RAC 為中心的代工廠，我們的技術團隊將進行調整，以適應高度利用的自動化和池化工作流程。我們預計，這些綜合措施將導致勞動力支出減少 25% 以上，其中包括人力的減少。

We are also taking on other cost-cutting measures to reduce nonstrategic overhead expenses through a thorough review of existing internal and external programs while also pausing and reviewing professional services spend. We know that many bioworkers will be impacted by these changes, and we're sad that we have to see many of you go, but are thankful for your patience and input throughout this restructuring and dedication to our mission of making biology easier to engineer. It's times like this when that mission dedication is tested the most.

我們也採取其他成本削減措施，透過對現有內部和外部計畫進行徹底審查，同時暫停和審查專業服務支出，減少非策略管理費用。我們知道許多生物工作者將受到這些變化的影響，我們很遺憾看到你們中的許多人離開，但感謝你們在整個重組過程中的耐心和投入，以及對我們讓生物學更容易設計的使命的奉獻。正是在這樣的時刻，最考驗奉獻精神的時候。

The last piece I will get into today is our updated guidance for 2024. You'll notice that we are no longer -- we no longer have new programs listed on this page, and that's because we're not sure as currently defined, it's the right metric for program growth going forward. With the simplifications and changes to our deal structure I've described today and particularly removing downstream value share on many deals, our prior guidance where programs depended on things like downstream value share to be counted as a program is no longer applicable.

我今天要講的最後一篇文章是我們對2024 年的更新指南。是未來計劃成長的正確指標。隨著我今天描述的交易結構的簡化和變化，特別是取消許多交易中的下游價值份額，我們之前的指導意見不再適用，即計劃依賴下游價值份額等因素來計為計劃。

Ginkgo does expect to add at least 100 new customer projects, comprising both traditional cell programs as we've thought of them as well as new offerings, including Lab Data as a Service. Due to the changes in our deal structure and focus on cost savings, Ginkgo now expects total revenue of $170 million to $190 million in 2024. Ginkgo revised its expectation for Cell Engineering services revenue to $120 million to $140 million in 2024. This guidance reflects a weaker-than-expected revenue ramp during the year, uncertainty relating to the timing of technical milestones and the potential near-term impact of the restructuring actions I just described above.

Ginkgo 預計將增加至少 100 個新客戶項目，其中包括我們所認為的傳統細胞項目以及新產品，包括實驗室數據即服務。由於我們交易結構的變化以及對成本節約的關注，Ginkgo 目前預計2024 年的總收入為1.7 億至1.9 億美元。本指引反映了年內收入成長弱於預期、與技術里程碑時間相關的不確定性以及我上面剛剛描述的重組行動的潛在近期影響。

This guidance excludes the impact of any potential downstream value share as well as potential upside from new service offerings. Ginkgo continues to expect Biosecurity revenue in 2024 of at least $50 million, representing approximately current contracted backlog with potential upside from additional opportunities in the pipeline.

該指南排除了任何潛在下游價值份額的影響以及新服務產品的潛在上行空間。 Ginkgo 繼續預計 2024 年生物安全收入至少為 5,000 萬美元，相當於目前合約積壓的訂單量，並可能因管道中的其他機會而帶來潛在成長。

Okay. In conclusion, though these are difficult changes, acting decisively now while we're in a position of strength in terms of cash in the business is critical. This will not be an easy period for our team, and we're grateful to them for their help and partnership as we make this transition.

好的。總而言之，儘管這些改變很困難，但在我們業務現金處於有利地位的情況下，現在果斷採取行動至關重要。對於我們的團隊來說，這不會是一個輕鬆的時期，我們感謝他們在我們過渡過程中提供的幫助和合作。

All right. Now I'll hand it back to Megan for Q&A.

好的。現在我將把它交還給梅根進行問答。

Great. Thanks, Jason. As usual, I'll start with the questions from the public and remind the analysts on the line. (Operator Instructions) Thanks all.

偉大的。謝謝，傑森。像往常一樣，我會從公眾的提問開始，並在線上提醒分析師。 （操作員說明）謝謝大家。

All right. Welcome back, everyone. As usual, we'll start with a retail question, and then we'll go down our list of analysts.

好的。歡迎回來，大家。像往常一樣，我們將從零售問題開始，然後我們將列出分析師名單。

So Rahul, you'll be first after our retail question. First question comes from our IR inbox, and it's for you, Jason. Can investors get some color on how data as a service is being received? A big part of the original investment thesis was downstream value revenue, but now that is gone. Can you explain why data as a service is the right pivot and how it's being received?

拉胡爾，您將首先回答我們的零售問題。第一個問題來自我們的 IR 收件匣，是給你的，Jason。投資人能否了解數據即服務的接收方式？最初的投資理論的很大一部分是下游價值收入，但現在這已經消失了。您能否解釋為什麼資料即服務是正確的樞紐以及如何接收資料？

Yes. So I touched on some of this on the call. We announced this at Ferment about a month ago. I'd say it's being received really well. We have like now tens of customers in our sales pipeline, which is pretty quick for the type of stuff we sell here.

是的。所以我在電話會議上談到了其中的一些內容。大約一個月前，我們在 Ferment 上宣布了這一消息。我想說它的反應非常好。我們的銷售管道現在有數十個客戶，對於我們在這裡銷售的產品類型來說，這是相當快的。

And I made this point on the call, but -- and it's a subtlety, we are able to sell this just to a really different pool of budget at our customers, right? Like we get to walk into the R&D department and basically say, we are an alternative to generating a collection of data yourself. So you can save that money on the reagents, you can save -- you could take that team that would have to do it and instead have them get to do something different. If you're a small biotech maybe you never build that lab or hire that team in the first place, right? So we have this kind of new thing we're able to take to people.

我在電話中提出了這一點，但是 - 這是一個微妙的問題，我們能夠將其出售給我們客戶的預算完全不同的群體，對嗎？就像我們走進研發部門並基本上說，我們是您自己產生資料集合的替代方案。所以你可以節省試劑上的錢，你可以節省——你可以讓那個必須做這件事的團隊，而不是讓他們做一些不同的事情。如果你是一家小型生技公司，也許你一開始就不會建造那個實驗室或僱用那個團隊，對吧？所以我們可以把這種新東西帶給人們。

The second thing is I get to say, hey, it's your IP, there's no royalties. Let me tell you, having sold Ginkgo's infrastructure for the last decade, that makes my life a lot easier. So I do think this is the right time. Downstream value share has been something that I think has been part of our thinking about the company. I think in the long run, it could still be part of our thinking. But in this window of time, there's just an enormous amount of research budget for us to get after. And I think we are able to tap that budget a lot faster with these terms that are a lot more customer-friendly. So I'm really excited about it. I think it's going to be a big part of the business going forward.

第二件事是我要說的是，嘿，這是你的智慧財產權，沒有版稅。讓我告訴你，在過去十年中出售了 Ginkgo 的基礎設施，這讓我的生活變得輕鬆多了。所以我認為現在是正確的時機。我認為下游價值份額一直是我們對公司思考的一部分。我認為從長遠來看，它仍然可能是我們思考的一部分。但在這個時間窗口內，我們需要獲得大量的研究預算。我認為，透過這些對客戶更友善的條款，我們能夠更快地利用預算。所以我對此感到非常興奮。我認為這將成為未來業務的重要組成部分。

And I should just mention one last thing. The point about that -- about the sort of AI companies, it's fascinating, right? Like a lot of these companies are really software first, right? They're AI experts, they're building incredible models. And they're all leveraging like the existing public data sets to do that, right? They're leveraging the protein data bank, they're leveraging GenBank to have access to genes and protein structures and so on. And eventually, that's going to get mined out, right? In fact, I'd argue it's probably pretty close to having already been mined out.

我應該提最後一件事。關於這一點——關於人工智慧公司的類型，這很有趣，對吧？就像很多這樣的公司確實是軟體第一，對吧？他們是人工智慧專家，他們正在建立令人難以置信的模型。他們都在利用現有的公共資料集來做到這一點，對嗎？他們利用蛋白質資料庫、GenBank 來獲取基因和蛋白質結構等。最終，它會被開採出來，對吧？事實上，我認為它可能已經非常接近被開採殆盡了。

And so what you're going to need is new large data sets, right? And I think the way we've structured Lab Data as a Service, where these companies can own that data, what's the point? Why build your own lab? It's just going to be faster to use Ginkgo's infrastructure and our conversations with companies are reflecting that. So I'm pretty excited about that.

所以你需要的是新的大數據集，對嗎？我認為我們建構實驗室數據即服務的方式，讓這些公司可以擁有這些數據，有什麼意義呢？為什麼要建立自己的實驗室？使用 Ginkgo 的基礎設施會更快，我們與公司的對話也反映了這一點。所以我對此感到非常興奮。

Great. Thanks, Jason. Like I said, Rahul from Raymond James, you're up first.

偉大的。謝謝，傑森。就像我說的，雷蒙德詹姆斯的拉胡爾，你先上來。

Can you hear me all right?

你聽得到我說話嗎？

Yes.

是的。

Terrific. Jason, Mark, congrats on taking a bit of a reset quarter here. So I guess by being first, I'll -- maybe I'll ask the big global question, right? So Jason, you started by talking about how you guys have been doing this a long time. And I think most folks on this call are believers in biomanufacturing synthetic biology.

了不起。傑森、馬克，恭喜你們在這裡做了一些重置。所以我想，透過成為第一，我可能會問一個全球性的大問題，對嗎？傑森，你首先談論了你們長期以來是如何做到這一點的。我認為參加這次電話會議的大多數人都是生物製造合成生物學的信徒。

So my question is, what -- given the attrition that we've seen, given the thinning in revenue, thinning in projects, what are the threads out there that you're pulling on that make you believe that you're not too early? How is Ginkgo at the right time?

所以我的問題是，考慮到我們所看到的人員流失，考慮到收入的減少，專案的減少，你正在利用哪些線索讓你相信你還不算太早？銀杏如何恰逢其時？

And then maybe a more granular question will be then, as you evolve your business model, assuming you are at the right time, how is Ginkgo not going to be categorized effectively as a big CDMO? That's it for me.

然後也許會出現一個更具體的問題，當你發展你的商業模式時，假設你在正確的時間，為什麼Ginkgo 不會被有效地歸類為大型 CDMO？對我來說就是這樣。

Yes, okay. So great. Let me speak to that. Yes. So the first point you made around biomanufacturing, so I share your concerns on this. I think what we've seen -- if you look at the -- like Ginkgo, when we took the company public, majority of our customer base was in the industrial biotechnology sector. And I think people often treat that as like a synonym to synthetic biology. It's actually not, right?

是的，好的。很好。讓我談談這一點。是的。您提出的第一點是關於生物製造的，所以我分享您對此的擔憂。我認為我們所看到的——如果你看看——比如 Ginkgo，當我們將公司上市時，我們的大部分客戶群都在工業生物技術領域。我認為人們經常將其視為合成生物學的同義詞。其實不是的，對吧？

The way to think about it is synthetic biology is it's a tools infrastructure, right? It's people that are working on new ways to make the process of designing and engineering cells faster and easier. It happened to be that a lot of the demand for that was in industrial biotech because of the complexity of the genetic engineering there. So that was sort of why there was a common like equivalency.

思考合成生物學的方式是它是一個工具基礎設施，對嗎？人們正在研究新的方法，使細胞的設計和工程過程變得更快、更容易。由於基因工程的複雜性，工業生物技術的需求量很大。這就是為什麼有一個共同的等價物。

Industrial biotech has been hit very, very hard with higher interest rates. I think that's just the reality. Like the venture capital ecosystem completely dried up for those companies. Many of those companies have gone out of business. I love this space, and it's been tough.

工業生物技術因利率上升而受到非常非常嚴重的打擊。我認為這就是現實。就像那些公司的創投生態系統完全枯竭一樣。其中許多公司已經倒閉。我喜歡這個空間，而且這很難。

And so I think one of the things that the last few years have shown is even in the face of that, which we weren't expecting, we took the company public, we were able to show that, hey, we're a tools platform. And actually, we're adding all these new programs in biopharma, which was a space that we were lightly in when we took the company public.

因此，我認為過去幾年所展示的一件事是，即使面對這種情況，我們沒有預料到，我們將公司上市，我們能夠證明，嘿，我們是一個工具平台。事實上，我們正​​在生物製藥領域添加所有這些新項目，這是我們在公司上市時很少涉足的領域。

And so I think that does speak to like the flexibility of Ginkgo as a platform. We're not really hooked exclusively on biomanufacturing or industrial biotechnology. In fact, the story of the last 2.5 years has been a pretty impressive, in my opinion, shift of our customer base from industrial biotech, start-up companies that were growing on a lot of venture capital to increasingly large biopharma, bio ag companies that have big existing research budgets, right?

所以我認為這確實說明了 Ginkgo 作為平台的靈活性。我們並不真正只專注於生物製造或工業生物技術。事實上，在我看來，過去 2.5 年的故事令人印象深刻，我們的客戶群從工業生物技術、依靠大量風險投資成長的新創公司轉向日益大型的生物製藥、生物農業公司現有大量研究預算，對嗎？

And so I will -- that would be my point on biomanufacturing. I don't -- I think it's tough. I think we need some breakthroughs in that area. I think some of the consumer biotech stuff that's happening is pretty interesting. There's 6 new GMO like house plants on the market somehow, right? Like -- and so I think that kind of stuff is exciting, but you're -- I think that sector has been hit really hard.

所以我會——這就是我對生物製造的觀點。我不——我認為這很難。我認為我們需要在該領域取得一些突破。我認為正在發生的一些消費生物技術非常有趣。市面上不知何故有 6 種新的基因改造植物，例如室內植物，對嗎？就像——所以我認為這類事情很令人興奮，但是——我認為這個行業受到了非常嚴重的打擊。

The -- you asked about whether we thought of -- when we focus on the pharma space as a large CDMO. I don't think that's the end of the world, right? So here's the basic problem with like the CROs today. They don't really improve as they scale, right? If you look at WuXi, Charles River, right, like you're essentially outsourcing -- doing that same thing, you're choosing to outsource data generation to an external lab, but they're just going to do exactly what your lab was going to do. They're going to hire a bunch of scientists, put them at lab benches and do that work by hand.

您問我們是否考慮過當我們將製藥領域作為大型 CDMO 時。我不認為那是世界末日，對吧？這就是當今 CRO 面臨的基本問題。隨著規模的擴大，它們並沒有真正改善，對嗎？如果你看看藥明康德、Charles River，對吧，就像你本質上是外包一樣——做同樣的事情，你選擇將數據生成外包給外部實驗室，但他們只會做你實驗室所做的事情將要做。他們將僱用一群科學家，把他們放在實驗室的工作台上，手工完成這項工作。

So the fundamental like philosophy of how they do the work is exactly the same as how you do it in-house. So you're really just choosing there to hand off some of the things that you don't want to do. That's different than the distinction with Ginkgo as a "CRO". People are coming to us because they want a large data asset, okay? They either want it with automation or they want it with pool.

因此，他們工作的基本理念與您在內部的工作方式完全相同。所以你實際上只是選擇在那裡放棄一些你不想做的事情。這與 Ginkgo 作為“CRO”的區別不同。人們來找我們是因為他們想要大量的數據資產，好嗎？他們要么想要自動化，要么想要池化。

They can't get that from the traditional CROs, okay? And they can't get it in-house. So the real question is, do they want it, right? If they start to want it, the advantage of my approach is I have scale economics. Like I get cheaper on the infrastructure as I do more work, right? That -- and so that's where we'll be different.

他們無法從傳統的 CRO 那裡得到這些，好嗎？而且他們無法在內部獲得它。所以真正的問題是，他們想要它嗎？如果他們開始想要它，我的方法的優點是我有規模經濟。就像我做的工作越多，基礎建設就越便宜，對嗎？這就是我們與眾不同的地方。

But like in my view, if you compare like the way lab work gets done, the overwhelming majority of research spending is going to kits and equipment and real estate and labs and all this, it's so much of a giant pile of expense. And the CROs have tapped almost none of that. And that's because they have not offered like really a compelling differentiation from what the customer can do themselves. And I'm hopeful if we can make this flexible and scalable, which is the big unlock, then you eat up more and more and more of that by-hand research budget. You really do.

但在我看來，如果你像實驗室工作的完成方式進行比較，絕大多數研究支出都花在了套件、設備、房地產和實驗室等方面，這是一筆巨大的開支。而 CRO 幾乎沒有利用這些。這是因為他們沒有提供與客戶自己可以做的事情相比真正令人信服的差異化。我希望，如果我們能夠實現這一點的靈活性和可擴展性，這是一個重大的解鎖，那麼你就會消耗越來越多的手工研究預算。你確實這麼做了。

So I don't have a problem being thought of that way at all, as long as you think of me as one that could ultimately take half of the research budgets someday if we were right about this philosophy for doing the lab work.

所以我完全不介意被這樣想，只要你認為我是一個最終可以拿走一半研究預算的人，如果我們對這種實驗室工作的理念是正確的話。

Thanks, Rahul. Next up, we have Matt Sykes at Goldman Sachs. Matt, your line is now open.

謝謝，拉胡爾。接下來是高盛的馬特·賽克斯 (Matt Sykes)。馬特，您的線路現已開通。

Great. I guess kind of a high-level question for Jason or Mark, just as you kind of look at sort of the proof points of this restructuring and shift in what you're doing, particularly from how you're approaching customers. We had moved our model away from new program growth a while ago because we felt the correlation wasn't there and focusing on active programs. Revenue is obviously going to be key KPI. But as you kind of give advice to the sell side in terms of how to measure success of this shift, what are some of the KPIs that we should really be focusing on at this point?

偉大的。我想這對傑森或馬克來說是一個高層次的問題，就像你在審視這種重組和你正在做的事情的轉變的證據點一樣，特別是從你如何接近客戶的角度來看。不久前，我們已經將我們的模型從新專案成長中移開，因為我們認為相關性不存在，並且專注於活躍專案。收入顯然將成為關鍵 KPI。但是，當您就如何衡量這一轉變的成功向賣方提供建議時，我們目前應該真正關注的一些 KPI 是什麼？

Do you want to take a swing, Mark?

馬克，你想盪鞦韆嗎？

So I think, Matt, what you heard is we're going to be focused on cash flow, first and foremost. And so cash flow is a function, of course, of cash revenue and cash OpEx. And so that's where a lot of the energy of the company is going to be. But we want to get to a place, as you heard on the call today, where we are moving towards profitability, where we're adjusted EBITDA breakeven. And that is what sets Ginkgo up for success. We have to prove that we can operate the programs economically. So I think, Matt, that's pretty important.

所以我認為，馬特，你聽到的是我們將首先關注現金流。因此，現金流當然是現金收入和現金營運支出的函數。因此，這就是公司的大量精力所在。但我們希望達到一個目標，正如您在今天的電話會議上聽到的那樣，我們正在朝著盈利方向邁進，調整後的 EBITDA 盈虧平衡。這就是 Ginkgo 取得成功的原因。我們必須證明我們可以經濟地運作這些項目。所以我認為，馬特，這非常重要。

On the sort of volume side, which is what you're getting at, is there going to be like a substitute for the program metric or something like that, we're going to need a little bit of time to figure that out. I'm not sure -- there certainly will be KPIs. They may be things that we report on, but don't guide to. We sort of need to, I think, get a feel for the types of deals that we're going to be signing under the newer sort of commercial terms that Jason outlined today and the newer offering like Lab Data as a Service.

在數量方面，也就是你所得到的，是否會有程序指標的替代品或類似的東西，我們需要一點時間來弄清楚。我不確定——肯定會有 KPI。它們可能是我們報告的內容，但不是指導的內容。我認為，我們需要了解我們將根據傑森今天概述的新商業條款以及實驗室數據即服務等新產品簽署的交易類型。

As a reminder, the way we do program counts today involve having things like downstream value share involved in order for it to count. I know a number of the analysts on the call do factor that into their modeling. And so part of what we're doing here is because we're changing the terms that they wouldn't count, and so we do want to give you all a picture of how things are going, because when we sign deals, that does imply revenue in the future. I do know that's part of the modeling. So we'll work on that.

提醒一下，我們今天進行計劃計數的方式涉及到下游價值份額等內容，以便對其進行計數。我知道一些參加電話會議的分析師確實將這一點納入了他們的建模中。所以我們在這裡所做的部分原因是我們正在改變那些不算數的條款，所以我們確實想讓你們所有人了解事情的進展情況，因為當我們簽署協議時，這確實意味著未來的收入。我確實知道這是建模的一部分。所以我們會努力解決這個問題。

Got it. And then just on the guidance commentary slide, Jason, you mentioned prioritizing quality of quantity in terms of programs. With sort of the new approach and including Lab Data as a Service, are there certain types of programs or end markets that are more attractive to achieve sort of that combination of flexibility and scale but also speed to get that program up and running?

知道了。然後，傑森，就在指導評論幻燈片上，您提到在計劃方面優先考慮數量的品質。透過某種新方法並包括實驗室數據即服務，是否有某些類型的程式或終端市場對於實現靈活性和規模以及啟動和運行該程式的速度更具吸引力？

And/or are there certain -- I think you mentioned the difference between those that are attracted to downstream value and those that are not, which is clear, but just sort of the types of customers that would maybe generate that revenue quicker in terms of either scaling on the platform or just in order to bring newer programs to the platform?

和/或是否有確定的——我想你提到了那些被下游價值所吸引的客戶和那些不被下游價值所吸引的客戶之間的區別，這是很明顯的，但只是在以下方面可能會更快產生收入的客戶類型是在平台上擴展還是只是為了將更新的程式引入平台？

Yes. Yes, great questions. So I think for starters, you will continue to see us -- I showed that slide where we're either selling to the research budget directly, that's the kind of Lab Data as a Service type model where their scientist is in control of our infrastructure or our scientist is running a program, and we're kind of doing a strategic deal with corp dev.

是的。是的，很好的問題。所以我認為對於初學者來說，你會繼續看到我們——我展示了這張幻燈片，我們要么直接向研究預算出售，這是實驗室數據即服務類型的模型，他們的科學家控制我們的基礎設施或我們的科學家正在運行一個程序，而我們正在與公司開發人員進行策略性交易。

And like I say, corp dev, because they essentially are the ones who negotiate research partnerships upstream or down -- like I acquire an asset, and I also signed a research partnership with a small biotech, right, on the large biopharma corp dev leader. Like that -- we're like the half of that deal that's like the research partnership half, right? That's what we're selling to.

就像我說的，公司開發人員，因為他們本質上是那些在上游或下游談判研究合作夥伴關係的人- 就像我收購一項資產一樣，我還與一家小型生物技術公司簽署了研究合作夥伴關係，對吧，在大型生物製藥公司開發領導者上。就像這樣——我們就像這筆交易的一半，就像研究合作夥伴的一半，對吧？這就是我們要銷售的對象。

We still have a pipeline of those. We'll still do those. I think frequently, those will still involve downstream value share. They're going to be like a whole bunch all at once. And really the customer for those is large biopharma, okay? And to a lesser degree, maybe large ag companies, all right?

我們仍然有這些管道。我們仍然會做這些。我經常認為，這些仍然涉及下游價值份額。他們會同時變成一大群。這些產品的真正客戶是大型生物製藥公司，好嗎？在較小程度上，也許是大型農業公司，好嗎？

The research budget, on the other hand, I think we have a really good opportunity with smaller biopharma start-ups and biotechs that are still getting funded and are making choices in a limited capital environment about how much they want to spend on their laboratory infrastructure, how much do they want to spend building that stuff out, how much they want to spend on equipment. All that upfront cost I think with their -- what they are uncompromising on -- this is why -- again, these are things you realize over time, we're fundamentally selling a new thing.

另一方面，我認為研究預算對於小型生物製藥新創公司和生物技術公司來說是一個非常好的機會，它們仍在獲得資金，並在有限的資本環境中選擇他們想要在實驗室基礎設施上花多少錢，他們想花多少錢建造這些東西，他們想花多少錢購買設備。我認為所有這些前期成本都是他們不妥協的，這就是為什麼，隨著時間的推移，你會意識到，我們從根本上是在銷售一種新東西。

Those small biopharma biotechs would never give up scientific control. And so with our Lab Data as a Service, where now their scientists can run our infrastructure, we can sell to those guys for the first time. So I'm really excited about that area, in particular, when it comes to Lab Data as a Service.

那些小型生物製藥生物技術公司永遠不會放棄科學控制。因此，透過我們的實驗室數據即服務，他們的科學家現在可以運行我們的基礎設施，我們可以第一次向這些人出售產品。因此，我對該領域感到非常興奮，特別是在實驗室數據即服務方面。

Last one I'll mention, in industrial biotechnology, we've had a hard time selling into the bigger companies there, okay? Because they don't really do those types of research partnerships that pharma does. Now it's a lower margin industry, but they do have research budgets, they have research teams. So I think Lab Data as a Service is also a way -- that is an entree into some of those larger chemical and other industrial biotech companies where we've had more friction selling on the strategic deals. Does that make sense?

最後我要提的是，在工業生物技術領域，我們很難向那裡的大公司銷售產品，好嗎？因為他們並沒有真正進行製藥公司所做的那種類型的研究合作。現在這是一個利潤率較低的行業，但他們確實有研究預算，他們有研究團隊。因此，我認為實驗室數據即服務也是一種方式 - 這是進入一些大型化學和其他工業生物技術公司的入口，我們在這些公司的策略交易中遇到了更多的摩擦銷售。那有意義嗎？

Yes. Appreciate it.

是的。欣賞它。

And in general, like I like it. Like I think it gives us more -- like these things also reinforce each other. I think one of the things -- people are always like, no, call yourself a CRO or something which is closer to what the Lab Data as a Service is. And that's because when we're talking to the strategic half of the house, they're like, I wouldn't do a strategic deal with a CRO, right?

總的來說，就像我喜歡的那樣。我認為它給了我們更多——就像這些東西也互相加強一樣。我認為其中一件事 - 人們總是喜歡，不，稱自己為 CRO 或更接近實驗室數據即服務的名稱。這是因為當我們與公司的策略部分交談時，他們會說，我不會與 CRO 進行策略交易，對吧？

And so they're sort of a -- when we're talking to those folks, they are evaluating our scientists, they're evaluating whether we can do a multiyear deal. And we're really great at that and we're good and engaged with those people. People already think of us that way, right? They think of us as strategic.

因此，當我們與這些人交談時，他們正在評估我們的科學家，他們正在評估我們是否可以達成多年協議。我們在這方面真的很擅長，我們與這些人相處融洽。人們已經這樣想我們了，對吧？他們認為我們具有戰略意義。

So I'm not -- so what I am excited about though is we can now walk into same customer, different part of the organization. And our reputation over here is going to help us over here. And so I am excited to cross-sell to both the kind of directly to the R&D mid-level and senior leadership as well as more strategic. That's going to help.

所以我不是——所以我感到興奮的是我們現在可以走進組織的不同部分的同一個客戶。我們在這裡的聲譽將會幫助我們。因此，我很高興能夠向研發中階和高階領導層以及更具策略意義的直接交叉銷售。這會有幫助的。

Thanks, Matt. Next up, we have Mike Ryskin at Bank of America. Mike, your line is now open.

謝謝，馬特。接下來是美國銀行的 Mike Ryskin。麥克，您的線路現已開通。

Can you hear me?

你聽得到我嗎？

Yes.

是的。

Awesome. So I kind of want to go back to, I think, kind of the crux of your argument earlier, Jason. Just kind of looking at like Slide 14, I think it captures it perfectly, the disconnect between active programs or new programs and revenues or why that's disconnected over time.

驚人的。所以我想回到你之前爭論的核心，傑森。就像幻燈片 14 一樣，我認為它完美地捕捉了活躍計劃或新計劃與收入之間的脫節，或者為什麼隨著時間的推移這種脫節的原因。

I'm just wondering, within that, we only see the total number, right, total programs, total revenues. Any success stories you can talk about? Any examples, any lessons you can give as you parse that out, where you see some of the proof points? Because you were talking a little bit about how it's about not being able to get up to full scale in cases where you are able to achieve that.

我只是想知道，其中我們只能看到總數，對吧，總節目數，總收入。有什麼成功案例可以講嗎？當你解析這個問題時，你可以給任何例子，任何教訓，你在哪裡看到一些證據點？因為你剛才談到了在能夠實現這一目標的情況下卻無法達到全面目標的情況。

And what I'm getting at is -- it's a long question, but what I'm getting at is you're putting in these cost cuts, you're trimming things. How do we know that's not just going to trim the number of programs, trim the number of revenues and just -- you're just cutting everything in half, right, by reducing headcount, reducing footprint, right? How do you know you're selecting the better approach versus just taking what you have now and cutting it in?

我的意思是——這是一個很長的問題，但我的意思是你正在削減成本，你正在削減一些東西。我們怎麼知道這不僅僅是削減項目數量，削減收入數量，而且只是將一切削減一半，對吧，通過減少員工數量，減少佔地面積，對嗎？您怎麼知道您正在選擇更好的方法，而不是僅僅採用現有的方法並進行切入？

Yes. Super clear, Mike. Yes. So I'll give a little color on it. So first off, we have now multiple years of experience with many programs, right? And again, you can see the ramp of our program. I know you -- people that have followed us since listing the company know this. And so each year, we get more and more data about what's easy to onboard and get to scale, what's hard. All right.

是的。超級清晰，麥克。是的。所以我會給它一點顏色。首先，我們現在在許多專案上擁有多年的經驗，對嗎？再次，您可以看到我們計劃的進度。我了解你——自公司上市以來一直關注我們的人都知道這一點。因此，每年，我們都會獲得越來越多的數據，了解哪些內容容易上手並擴大規模，哪些內容很難。好的。

Secondly, we are working on the back end. We're always trying to make the back end actually do this more quickly, right? And we have a substantial amount of bookings, right? Like this is the thing that frustrates me, right? Like we actually have a lot of bookings and the rate at which we're able to push them through the infrastructure into revenue is just too low, right? And so I do need to -- we need to work on that back-end problem.

其次，我們正在做後端工作。我們一直在努力讓後端實際上更快完成這項工作，對吧？我們有大量的預訂，對嗎？這就是讓我沮喪的事情吧？就像我們實際上有很多預訂，而我們能夠透過基礎設施將它們轉化為收入的速度太低了，對吧？所以我確實需要——我們需要解決後端問題。

I think when it comes to do we know like success cases, it is the types of programs that we have done previously, right? Like if we have done that type of work, particularly if we've done that type of work end-to-end and succeeded for a customer, it is much easier for us to do it again. When it's a newer thing, that creates a lot more churn, right?

我想，說到成功案例，我們知道的是我們以前做過的專案類型，對嗎？就像如果我們已經完成了此類工作，特別是如果我們端到端地完成了此類工作並為客戶取得了成功，那麼我們再次做就會容易得多。當它是一個新事物時，就會產生更多的流失，對嗎？

And then I would say across the board, there's still like a set of experiments like, for example, assay onboarding, right? Like customer comes to us, they have their specific project. And as part of it, there's a particular assay that they trust that they really want us to onboard onto the automation in order to make that project work. That remains something that like we -- you can't hand off to automation, like we have to do that pretty manually. It's pretty low throughput it ends up being a bottleneck.

然後我想說，總的來說，仍然有一系列實驗，例如，檢測入門，對吧？就像客戶來到我們這裡一樣，他們有自己的特定項目。作為其中的一部分，他們相信他們確實希望我們採用自動化以使該專案正常運轉，這是一個特殊的分析。這仍然是像我們一樣的事情——你不能交給自動化，就像我們必須手動完成一樣。它的吞吐量非常低，最終成為瓶頸。

And until you complete that, I can't turn up the dial and generate all that revenue from running that assay thousands and thousands of times. Does that make sense? And so like assay onboarding would be a great thing for us to be able to do with the RACs, right? Like being able to onboard quickly some of these things that are currently repeatedly frictional by-hand work to get the automation spun up. We know what those things are because we're doing so many programs. And those are some of the first things we're going to attack with our new focus.

在你完成這項工作之前，我無法通過成千上萬次運行該檢測來獲得所有收入。那有意義嗎？因此，對於我們來說，能夠使用 RAC 進行檢測入門將是一件很棒的事情，對嗎？例如能夠快速加入其中一些目前需要反覆摩擦的手工工作才能啟動自動化。我們知道這些是什麼，因為我們正在做很多專案。這些是我們新的重點首先要解決的一些問題。

So that really is it. And that's why we're confident that we aren't going to have the situation you're talking about. But again, the -- what we sell will be different. Like I won't be going out and saying, "Hey, I want to do a project for the first time." Not in this world, right? Now where I see a line of sight to us getting to a breakeven, we just don't need to do that anymore.

確實如此。這就是為什麼我們有信心不會出現您所說的情況。但同樣，我們銷售的產品將會有所不同。就像我不會出去說：“嘿，我想第一次做一個專案。”這個世界上不存在吧？現在，我看到我們有望實現盈虧平衡，但我們不再需要這樣做了。

And that -- we've had to do -- I think it was part of building the process here, part of building the story and helping us learn what's easy and hard over the last few years. But it's a mistake to keep selling that type of stuff. And so you'll see us tighten up the sales there, but I'm hopeful with the better terms. We get more deals of the type we like. Does that make sense?

我們必須這樣做，我認為這是建立流程的一部分，建構故事的一部分，幫助我們了解過去幾年裡什麼是容易的，什麼是困難的。但繼續銷售這類東西是錯誤的。所以你會看到我們收緊那裡的銷售，但我對更好的條款充滿希望。我們得到了更多我們喜歡的類型的優惠。那有意義嗎？

Okay. No, that does. And then just a quick follow-up on the cost reductions and the plan there, a pretty meaningful reduction in labor at 25%. Is that -- how do you ensure sort of like minimal disruption? Because you've been scaling up for a while, you are still bringing on the new foundry operations, the Biofab1. So how do you juggle both expansion and shift and meaningful headcount reduction at the same time?

好的。不，確實如此。然後快速跟進成本削減和計劃，勞動力減少 25%，非常有意義。那是——你如何確保將幹擾降到最低？由於您已經擴大規模一段時間了，因此您仍在引進新的鑄造廠 Biofab1。那麼，如何同時兼顧擴張與轉變以及有意義的裁員呢？

Yes. I think that point there is the key challenge for us, right? It is figuring out what are the things that we need to be investing in to make sure we can handle the shift and then also make sure we're supporting our key customers today, right? And so that is like a big part of what we worked on in early planning for this and what we're going to be working on in the coming weeks with the team to tighten that up.

是的。我認為這一點對我們來說是關鍵挑戰，對嗎？它正在弄清楚我們需要投資哪些東西，以確保我們能夠應對這一轉變，然後確保我們今天能夠支持我們的關鍵客戶，對吧？因此，這就像我們在早期計劃中所做的工作的一個重要部分，以及我們將在未來幾週內與團隊一起努力加強這項工作的一部分。

We do also, I will say -- like post listing, we pursued many different ways to potentially get to growth. We do a lot of internal research to try to get something that's going to pay off in the longer term. Some of that we did need to do 2 or 3 years ago, like we were very early 4 years ago in even doing mammalian cells. Of course, we needed to do internal research to bring that online. We would never be able to tap the pharma industry today like we do.

我想說，我們也這樣做——就像上市後一樣，我們尋求許多不同的方式來實現潛在的成長。我們做了很多內部研究，試圖獲得長期回報的東西。其中一些工作我們在兩三年前確實需要做，就像我們在四年前就開始研究哺乳動物細胞一樣。當然，我們需要進行內部研究才能將其上線。我們永遠無法像今天一樣進入製藥業。

The list of things like that versus the payoff in this environment is just shorter. And so a lot of that internal research is this work we shouldn't be doing and we should be focusing that on either delivering on customer projects or making it easier to onboard things onto the automation, on to the pooled screening and things like that. Like you're going to -- you'll just see us focus a little more on just the stuff that delivers revenue and allows us to sell to the types of customers we want to sell to at a faster scale. Does that make sense?

與這種環境下的回報相比，類似的事情清單更短。因此，許多內部研究都是我們不應該做的工作，我們應該專注於交付客戶項目，或更容易地將事情納入自動化、集中篩選和類似的事情。就像您將要做的那樣，您只會看到我們更專注於那些能夠帶來收入並允許我們以更快的規模向我們想要銷售的客戶類型銷售的東西。那有意義嗎？

Thanks, Mike. (Operator Instructions)

謝謝，麥克。 （操作員說明）

But next up, we have Steve Mah at TD Cowen.

接下來請來 TD Cowen 的 Steve Mah。

Steve, are we getting you from SynBioBeta?

史蒂夫，我們是從 SynBioBeta 聯絡你的嗎？

Yes. So yes, apologies for the background noise. Yes, they picked a great day. But anyway, maybe just a follow-up on Mike's question on the RIF and reduction in labor costs. I appreciate on the services business, you have good visibility on what's easy and then you'll take it on as a services project.

是的。所以，是的，對背景噪音表示歉意。是的，他們選了一個美好的日子。但無論如何，也許只是 Mike 關於 RIF 和勞動成本削減問題的後續。我很欣賞服務業務，你對什麼是簡單的事情有很好的了解，然後你會把它作為一個服務項目。

But what about 1/3 of your programs are in the harder pharma partnerships? Those are obviously more complicated. Can you give us a sense -- is the reduction in force, is it more targeted? And maybe give us -- maybe quantitate the percentage of the actual ports reduced. And I know you said 25% labor, but can you give us a sense of like what percentage of your total workforce that is?

但是，您的專案中有 1/3 是在較困難的製藥合作關係中嗎？這些顯然更複雜。您能否給我們一個感覺──減兵是不是更有針對性？也許可以量化實際連接埠減少的百分比。我知道您說的是 25% 的勞動力，但您能否讓我們了解一下，這佔勞動力總數的百分比是多少？

Yes. So we're working through those numbers now to get to exact numbers. So we don't have the exact numbers now. We are planning to take 25% out of labor inclusive of a headcount reduction, but that's the process we're going through in the coming weeks.

是的。所以我們現在正在研究這些數字以獲得準確的數字。所以我們現在沒有確切的數字。我們計劃裁員 25%，包括裁員，但這就是我們在未來幾週內要經歷的過程。

I will say that type of biopharma work is our highest priority stuff, right? So those are important long-term customers for us. We know there's a ton more business there. And so that's an area where you'll see us make sure that we can continue to serve those customers well.

我想說生物製藥工作是我們最優先考慮的事情，對嗎？所以這些對我們來說是重要的長期客戶。我們知道那裡有大量的業務。因此，在這個領域，您將看到我們確保我們能夠繼續為這些客戶提供良好的服務。

Okay. Got that. All right. And then maybe one for Mark. Can you give us your confidence level in your ability to sublease the foundry real estate and consolidating it to Biofab1? Just how confident are you to be able to do that? You put out a pretty big number of kind of reducing up to 60% of the cost of that facility.

好的。了解。好的。然後也許是給馬克的。您能否告訴我們您對轉租鑄造廠房地產並將其整合到 Biofab1 的能力的信心程度？您有多大信心能夠做到這一點？您投入了大量資金，最多可降低該設施 60% 的成本。

Yes. So first of all, I'll just make the comment that we're committed to delivering the cost savings number even if we can't get the lease savings that we're expecting. So it is a fairly -- I would say it's a nontrivial task for us to do the sort of transformation of the foundry work, so we need to kind of make that happen.

是的。首先，我只想評論說，即使我們無法獲得預期的租賃節省，我們也致力於實現成本節省。因此，我想說，對我們來說，對鑄造工作進行某種轉型是一項艱鉅的任務，所以我們需要實現這一目標。

The opportunities for subleasing or similar to sort of mitigate the costs of that lease. I mean, there's lots of those that will depend on market conditions once we're ready to sort of make that move. So yes, so we're not -- I would say we're not like just banking on that to make the number, that's the way I would put it.

轉租或類似的機會可以減輕租賃成本。我的意思是，一旦我們準備好採取這項行動，其中許多將取決於市場狀況。所以，是的，所以我們不是——我想說，我們不會僅僅指望這一點來達到這個數字，這就是我所說的方式。

Okay. That's helpful. And if I could sneak one last quick one in, Mark. On the downturn value, I appreciate you guys pulling it because of lumpiness and lack of visibility. But are you going to add that back to guidance when you have good visibility and as you kind of approach maybe a milestone?

好的。這很有幫助。如果我能偷偷溜進最後一張，馬克。關於低迷的價值，我感謝你們因為塊狀和缺乏可見性而拉動它。但是，當您具有良好的可見性並且當您接近里程碑時，您是否會將其添加回指導中？

Yes. So first of all, we do have a significant portfolio of potential downstream value share or royalty rights, milestone rights. We have not forgotten about that. And so that is the -- yes, I mean, the short answer is, yes, Steve, once that becomes something that is more predictable and steady source, I think we would start talking about it like that and maybe adding it back into revenue guidance. We're just not there sort of in this time horizon that we're talking about.

是的。因此，首先，我們確實擁有重要的潛在下游價值份額或特許權使用費、里程碑權利的投資組合。我們沒有忘記這一點。所以這就是- 是的，我的意思是，簡短的回答是，是的，史蒂夫，一旦這成為更可預測和穩定的來源，我認為我們會開始這樣討論它，也許會將其重新計入收入中指導。我們只是不在我們正在談論的這個時間範圍內。

And so we're, again, very focused on getting Ginkgo to that adjusted EBITDA breakeven level without relying on what might or might not happen in terms of downstream value share over the next 2 years.

因此，我們再次非常專注於讓 Ginkgo 達到調整後的 EBITDA 盈虧平衡水平，而不依賴未來兩年下游價值份額可能會或可能不會發生的情況。

Thanks, Steve. Next up, we have Edmund Tu at Morgan Stanley. Can you hear us Edmund?

謝謝，史蒂夫。接下來是摩根士丹利的 Edmund Tu。艾德蒙，你聽得到我們說話嗎？

Maybe not.

也許不會。

Edmund? Last call.

埃德蒙？最後一次通話。

Guys, can you hear me?

夥計們，你聽得到我說話嗎？

Now we can. Yes.

現在我們可以了。是的。

Sorry, I apologize. I'm having some lag issues here. Just a quick question from me on the implementation of your new RAC automation. How long do you think it will take to implement this new strategy? And will there be a ramp-up time associated with reaching optimal efficiency here? And how much improvement to the revenue conversion do you think you can drive with this?

對不起，我道歉。我這裡遇到一些滯後問題。我想問一個關於新 RAC 自動化實施的簡單問題。您認為實施這項新戰略需要多長時間？達到最佳效率是否需要一段加速時間？您認為這可以使收入轉換率提高多少？

Yes. So maybe I'll speak to some of the time lines. So one of the things that's great is we're already starting to do this, right? So in our current facility in Boston, we have a setup of RACs, I think now we're up to, I don't know, maybe 15 or 20 of the carts. And so we're able to start basically moving workflows onto the RACs. Obviously, the team that is designing and programming and doing final manufacture of the RACs is based out in Emeryville, California. But then they get shipped over here, and we're able to basically start to do the lab transfer and all that work well in advance of Biofab1 being open in mid-'25.

是的。所以也許我會談談一些時間線。所以，最棒的事情之一就是我們已經開始這麼做了，對吧？因此，在我們目前位於波士頓的工廠中，我們設置了 RAC，我想現在我們最多可以容納 15 或 20 輛推車，我不知道。這樣我們就可以開始將工作流程基本上轉移到 RAC 上。顯然，負責 RAC 設計、編程和最終製造的團隊位於加州埃默里維爾。但隨後它們被運送到這裡，我們基本上可以開始進行實驗室轉移以及所有在 Biofab1 於 25 年中期開放之前進行的工作。

So all that work is -- there's nothing to slow that down other than how much attention we're putting to it, what its priority is relative to other priorities in the company. So I'm actually pretty excited that some of that can move quite a lot quicker. There is still then getting -- doing like a wholesale move over into Biofab1. That's part of our plan here for cost reduction just in terms of simplification of our facilities and so on. And that is more on Biofab1 time lines, which is mid-'25.

因此，所有這些工作都是——除了我們對它的關注程度、它的優先事項相對於公司其他優先級的優先級之外，沒有什麼可以減緩它的速度。所以我實際上非常興奮，因為其中一些可以進展得更快。仍有類似大規模轉移到 Biofab1 的情況。這是我們降低成本計劃的一部分，只是在簡化我們的設施等方面。 Biofab1 的時間線更是如此，也就是 25 年中期。

Mark, I don't know if you want to speak to some of the other stuff.

馬克，我不知道你是否想談談其他一些事情。

So Edmund, the question was what impacts on revenue might we see from the sort of RAC-driven foundry, was that the question?

Edmund，問題是我們可能會從 RAC 驅動的代工廠中看到什麼對收入的影響，是這個問題嗎？

Yes. How much faster we could pull it through.

是的。我們能以多快的速度度過難關。

Yes. Yes. So I think the idea is significantly faster. So if you really look at sort of how an end-to-end cell program today is both contracted for with a customer and then how we execute on it, Ginkgo takes a lot of risk on both the technical success and the timing of that work performing. And it takes -- it does take a long time to kind of plan it and onboard it. And I mean these are just often very complex long cycle projects where Ginkgo is taking a lot of that timing and technical risk.

是的。是的。所以我認為這個想法要快得多。因此，如果您真正了解當今的端到端單元專案如何與客戶簽訂合同，以及我們如何執行它，您會發現 Ginkgo 在技術成功和工作時間安排上都承擔了很大的風險表演。確實需要很長時間來計劃並實施它。我的意思是，這些通常是非常複雜的長週期項目，Ginkgo 承擔了大量的時間和技術風險。

We're rewarded sort of along the way with kind of these micro milestone type payments. And it flows into revenue on a very laggy sort of basis. That's just the way the revenue recognition rules work. So you take out a lot of that, like these would be shorter-cycle projects to begin with. There's going to be less need to take on technical or timing risk.

我們一路走來，透過這些微型里程碑式的付款獲得了獎勵。而且它流入收入的速度非常滯後。這就是收入確認規則的運作方式。所以你拿出了很多這樣的東西，就像這些一開始就是週期較短的項目。承擔技術或時間風險的需要將會減少。

The revenue recognition, I think, will be more evenly spread over and more matched with the actual work that we're doing over a much kind of tighter time frame. It'd be sort of months instead of years. And so -- so we'll -- like I can't tell you, is it 50% faster than a sort of equivalent size project. We'll have to see. But it will be materially faster, I think, from a revenue perspective than sort of the equivalent end-to-end Cell Engineering solutions type project.

我認為，收入確認將更加均勻分佈，並且與我們在更嚴格的時間範圍內所做的實際工作更加匹配。這將是幾個月而不是幾年。所以 - 所以我們會 - 就像我無法告訴你的那樣，它是否比同等規模的專案快 50%。我們得看看。但我認為，從收入角度來看，它比類似的端到端細胞工程解決方案類型專案要快得多。

Thanks, Edmund. I'm not seeing any other questions in the queue. So Jason, do you have any closing thoughts for us?

謝謝，埃德蒙。我在隊列中沒有看到任何其他問題。 Jason，您有什麼結束語嗎？

No. As I mentioned, tough for us internally with the headcount reduction. I appreciate the support of the team. I think Ginkgo is going to come out of this in a much stronger spot to make biology easier to engineer. I think we have a chance to do that horizontal basis across the entire biotech industry. And so excited to go forward and do that.

不。我感謝團隊的支持。我認為 Ginkgo 將從中脫穎而出，使生物學更容易設計。我認為我們有機會在整個生物技術產業建立橫向基礎。很高興能夠繼續前進並做到這一點。

Thanks, everyone, for your questions.

謝謝大家的提問。

Thanks all. We'll talk to you all next quarter. Have a good one.

謝謝大家。我們將在下個季度與大家討論。祝你有個好的一天。