Deutsche Bank AG (DB) 2015 Q2 法說會逐字稿

Welcome and thank you for joining the second-quarter 2015 analyst conference call of Deutsche Bank.

歡迎並感謝您參加德意志銀行2015年第二季分析師電話會議。

(Operator Instructions)

（操作員指示）

I would now like to turn the conference over to John Andrews, Head of Investor Relations. Please go ahead.

現在我想將會議交給投資者關係主管約翰安德魯斯 (John Andrews)。請繼續。

Thank you and good morning and good afternoon and good evening to everybody. Thank you very much for joining us. On behalf of Deutsche Bank I'd like to welcome you to our second-quarter analyst call. This morning I have the pleasure to be joined by our new Co-CEO John Cryan and our new CFO Marcus Schenck. John will open momentarily with some brief comments and then Marcus will take you through the analyst presentation which is available on our website. Then we'd be happy to respond to your questions. Let me also provide the normal health warning that we urge you to pay particular attention to the cautionary statements regarding forward-looking comments that you will find at the end of the investor presentation. With that and without further ado, let me welcome John and Marcus to the earnings process. John let me hand it over to you please.

謝謝大家，早安、下午好、晚上好。非常感謝您加入我們。我謹代表德意志銀行歡迎您參加我們的第二季分析師電話會議。今天上午，我很高興與我們的新任聯席執行長約翰·克萊恩 (John Cryan) 和新任財務長馬庫斯·申克 (Marcus Schenck) 一起出席會議。約翰將立即發表一些簡短的評論，然後馬庫斯將帶您瀏覽我們網站上的分析師簡報。那我們很樂意回答您的問題。我還想提供正常的健康警告，我們敦促您特別注意投資者在演示結束時有關前瞻性評論的警告聲明。閒話少敘，現在讓我歡迎約翰和馬庫斯加入收益流程。約翰，請讓我把它交給你。

Thank you, John. And let me add my welcome to everyone today. As John said, I will keep my remarks brief.

謝謝你，約翰。今天，我要向各位來賓表示熱烈的歡迎。正如約翰所說，我的發言會很簡短。

We continue to develop the implementation plans for our Strategy 2020 which the Bank announced in the spring. We aim to provide you with a more detailed description of the steps we're taken to execute our strategy at the latest by the end of October. Our second quarter results show both the strength of and the challenges facing Deutsche Bank. The potential earnings power of our businesses is evident in the solid top line results in all four of our core operating segments. These results support our contention that in broad terms we're on the right strategic path. As announced we'll be making adjustments to our portfolio, including pressing on with the deconsolidation of Deutsche Postbank. We're also making headway in trimming the balance sheet usage of CB&S including exiting some business lines and tightening our perimeter. My belief is that our principal challenges are not strategic. Our challenge has been and continues to be the unsuccessful execution of our strategic intent and the continuing burden of costs relating to past events.

我們繼續制定銀行於春季宣布的2020戰略實施計畫。我們的目標是最遲在十月底向您提供我們為執行策略所採取的步驟的更詳細說明。我們第二季的業績顯示了德意志銀行的實力和麵臨的挑戰。我們四大核心營運部門的穩健營收績效充分證明了我們業務的潛在獲利能力。這些結果支持了我們的觀點，即從整體上看，我們走在正確的策略道路上。正如我們所宣布的那樣，我們將對投資組合進行調整，包括繼續推進德國郵政銀行的拆分。我們也在削減 CB&S 的資產負債表使用方面取得了進展，包括退出一些業務線和收緊我們的業務範圍。我認為我們面臨的主要挑戰不是戰略性的。我們面臨的挑戰一直是、並將繼續是我們的策略意圖無法成功執行，以及與過去事件相關的成本負擔持續存在。

We have a structural cost problem. That's obvious to all of you who followed the Bank for some time. We will not succeed on our own terms until we simplify our overly complex operating model. It stifles efficiency and it frustrates and delays decision making. I believe we understand the principle root causes of our inefficiency. We must overhaul our antiquated, fragmented, and incomplete technology platform. We have to wean ourselves off an over-reliance on manual processes. And we have to rectify our poor record of managing significant infrastructure investments. We will be strict in eliminating businesses, exiting countries, and terminating client relationships, especially where they generate costs, complexity, and operating risk without producing adequate and sustainable economic returns. We also have two large and complex a balance sheet currently earning returns that do not fund our levees or generate an acceptable risk-adjusted return on leveraged base capital. This is particularly true for long-dated contracts. Although we've made some progress, we need to tackle the balance sheet more proactively and more aggressively. This will help us to improve our efficiency and should ultimately free up capacity for growth. In this context let me address specifically the issue of capital adequacy. I am aware that there has been some speculation that we might be considering raising additional capital. It's my firm opinion that raising additional capital would not solve our core problem of reversing our low financial returns and our poor organic capital generation. While we can never guarantee against an adverse externality that we currently cannot foresee forcing us to change our course, I can tell you from a business strategy and planning perspective I do not see raising capital to be in the interest of shareholders.

我們面臨結構性成本問題。對於長期關注該銀行的各位來說，這一點是顯而易見的。除非我們簡化過於複雜的營運模式，否則我們將無法以自己的方式取得成功。它會抑制效率、阻礙和延遲決策。我相信我們了解效率低下的根本原因。我們必須徹底改革我們過時、分散和不完整的技術平台。我們必須擺脫對手動流程的過度依賴。我們必須糾正我們在管理重大基礎設施投資方面的糟糕記錄。我們將嚴格淘汰業務、退出國家和終止客戶關係，特別是當它們產生成本、複雜性和營運風險，而無法產生足夠且可持續的經濟回報時。我們還有兩個龐大而複雜的資產負債表，目前獲得的回報並不能為我們的堤防提供資金，也不能產生可接受的槓桿基礎資本風險調整回報。對於長期合約來說尤其如此。儘管我們已經取得了一些進展，但我們需要更積極主動、更積極地解決資產負債表問題。這將有助於我們提高效率，並最終釋放成長能力。在此背景下，讓我具體談談資本充足率的問題。我知道有人猜測我們可能正在考慮籌集更多資金。我堅信，籌集額外資金並不能解決我們扭轉低財務回報和不良有機資本生成這一核心問題。雖然我們永遠無法保證不會出現目前無法預見的不利外部因素迫使我們改變方向，但我可以從商業策略和規劃的角度告訴你，我認為籌集資金並不符合股東的利益。

The final topic I'd like to address is the significant burden of litigation costs, regulatory imposts, and audit an investigation expenses and the reputational damage that we suffer as a result of misconduct on the part of certain of our people. I assure you that resolving these issues is a personal priority and it goes without saying that closing down opportunities for misconduct to occur remains a critical goal of the entire Bank. All that I've just described to you is obvious. Addressing these challenges however will not be easy and will take years to deliver. But I'm determined that we will get this done. I fully understand this is no longer about words but deeds. So while I ask for your patience until we complete the review of our action plans, rest assured that we are already in implementation mode. We will announce in October the details of what we attend to achieve in the coming years, and I expect you to hold me and the Management team accountable for our commitments.

我想談的最後一個主題是，由於我們某些員工的不當行為，我們承受著巨大的訴訟費用、監管稅、審計調查費用以及聲譽損害的負擔。我向你們保證，解決這些問題是我個人的首要任務，而且毋庸置疑，消除不當行為發生的機會仍然是整個銀行的關鍵目標。我剛才向你描述的一切都是顯而易見的。然而，應對這些挑戰並非易事，需要數年時間才能實現。但我決心我們一定能完成這項任務。我完全理解這不再只是言語的問題，而是行動的問題。因此，雖然我請求您耐心等待我們完成對行動計劃的審查，但請放心，我們已經進入實施模式。我們將在十月宣布未來幾年要實現的目標的細節，我希望你們能讓我和管理團隊對我們的承諾負責。

With that let me turn this over to Marcus to take you through the quarterly results, and then Marcus and I will be happen to respond to your questions.

接下來，讓我將這個任務交給馬庫斯，讓他向您介紹季度業績，然後我和馬庫斯將會回答您的問題。

Thank you, John. Good morning and good afternoon also from my side. It's a great pleasure for me to speak to you on my first quarterly call. As John pointed out this call is about the last quarter, so let me go straight into the content. Page 2 summarizes the key financials for our second quarter which I would describe as solid from an operational perspective but still burdened by litigation charges. Net income of EUR818 million is up by EUR580 million relative to prior year. Whilst ROE is up it is at a disappointing 4.5%. The core reason for this is an unacceptable cost income ratio of 85% driven by EUR1.2 million litigation charge. As John pointed out, we actively managed our risk weighted assets which strengthened our CET1 ratio to 11.4%. Tangible book value per share however declined to EUR39.42 driven by lower shareholders' equity and a slightly higher number of shares outstanding. The decrease in shareholders' equity despite positive net income results from the EUR1.3 billion payment of dividend and 81 coupon as well as a circa EUR1.8 billion of negative OCI result which has two components: EUR1 billion of currency translation and EUR0.8 billion of unrealized losses on AFS assets mainly driven by higher interest rates in longer [tenors].

謝謝你，約翰。我這邊也祝大家早安、下午好。我很高興在我的第一次季度電話會議上與大家交談。正如約翰指出的那樣，這次電話會議是關於上個季度的，所以讓我直接進入內容。第 2 頁總結了我們第二季度的主要財務狀況，我認為從營運角度來看，該季度的財務狀況穩健，但仍然受到訴訟費用的負擔。淨收入8.18億歐元，較前一年增加5.8億歐元。儘管 ROE 有所上升，但卻只有令人失望的 4.5%。其核心原因是120萬歐元的訴訟費用導致成本收入比高達85%，令人無法接受。正如約翰所指出的，我們積極管理風險加權資產，這使我們的 CET1 比率提高到 11.4%。然而，由於股東權益減少和流通股數量略有增加，每股有形帳面價值下降至 39.42 歐元。儘管淨收入為正，但股東權益仍減少，這是由於支付了 13 億歐元的股息和 81 張息票，以及約 18 億歐元的負 OCI 結果，該結果由兩部分組成：10 億歐元的貨幣換算和 8 億歐元的 AFS 資產未實現損失，這主要是由於較長[期限]的利率上升所致。

Before I move into the divisional results let me cover four topics. Drivers of net income change, a quick review of our cost base, I'm going to give you some backgrounds to the litigation charge, and then finally we'll take a closer look at the development of our capital position. Shot 4 gives you the bridge for our net income of the quarter relative to prior year. This quarter was yet another I would say typical Deutsche Bank quarter where we see robust top line performance across all segments but still not enough feeding through into the bottom line. In detail; good revenue growth of 17%, or FX adjusted 9% with CB&S being the main contributor. But also AWM had a strong quarter. For NCOU please remember that revenues in last year's second quarter were burdened by a EUR300 million loss from the restructuring of the Maher Terminals' debt. LLP remains at low levels and are almost EUR100 million lower than last year. Our adjusted cost base increased 3% currency adjusted, not a result asset before that we find to be acceptable. This quarter we had a EUR1.2 billion litigation charge which exceeded last year's charge by EUR700 million. On CTA, we were lower than last year to the tune of about EUR300 million and our tax burden was lower by EUR310 million since we benefited from tax reviews of prior-year periods. FX movements in the quarter netted in essence out and had basically no impact on that income.

在討論部門結果之前，請容許我先討論四個主題。淨收入變化的驅動因素，對我們的成本基礎的快速回顧，我將向您介紹一些訴訟費用的背景，最後我們將仔細研究我們的資本狀況的發展。圖 4 顯示了我們本季淨收入相對於上一年度的對比情況。我認為本季是德意志銀行的另一個典型季度，我們看到所有部門的營收表現強勁，但對利潤的貢獻仍然不夠。詳細;收入成長良好，達到 17%，或外匯調整後達到 9%，其中 CB&S 是主要貢獻者。但 AWM 本季也表現強勁。對於 NCOU，請記住，去年第二季的收入受到 Maher Terminals 債務重組造成的 3 億歐元損失的影響。LLP 仍處於較低水平，比去年低近 1 億歐元。我們的調整後成本基礎根據貨幣調整後增加了 3%，這不是我們認為可以接受的結果資產。本季我們的訴訟費用為 12 億歐元，比去年同期高出 7 億歐元。在 CTA 方面，我們比去年降低了約 3 億歐元，由於我們受益於前一年期間的稅務審查，我們的稅負降低了 3.1 億歐元。本季的外匯變動實質上抵銷了該收入，基本上沒有影響。

On page 5 you find the same walk for half year. The pattern is quite similar. Very solid revenue performance particularly in CB&S and asset wealth management. In NCOU again we have the non-repetition of charges from Maher from last year. C&A results mainly driven by valuation and timing differences, and LLP also as for the quarter remained at cyclical lows. Our adjusted cost base was EUR400 million worse than last year on a currency adjusted basis. Please be mindful of the fact that we booked EUR577 million charges for the bank levy in the first half of 2015 versus less than EUR100 million in the prior-year period. And then the positive revenue momentum was eaten up by EUR2.2 billion higher litigation cost. In the first half total litigation charges were at a level of EUR2.8 billion. CTA is EUR372 million lower than last year and FX had a net EUR100 million positive impact on our results.

在第 5 頁，您會發現半年的相同步行。模式十分相似。收入表現非常穩健，尤其是在 CB&S 和資產財富管理方面。在 NCOU，我們再次看到 Maher 不再重複去年的指控。C&A 的業績主要受估值和時間差異的影響，而 LLP 在本季也仍處於週期性低點。根據貨幣調整後的數據，我們的調整後成本基礎比去年減少了 4 億歐元。請注意，我們在 2015 年上半年提列了 5.77 億歐元的銀行稅費用，而去年同期則不到 1 億歐元。隨後，積極的收入動能被高達 22 億歐元的訴訟成本所吞噬。上半年訴訟費用總額達 28 億歐元。CTA 比去年低 3.72 億歐元，外匯對我們的業績產生了淨 1 億歐元的正面影響。

Briefly on cost on page 6, adjusted for changes in FX rates non-interest expenses for the quarter moved up due to litigation by EUR700 million as said before. We spent about EUR300 million less on CTA. We did realize about EUR300 million of OPEC savings, but this was more than offset in our adjusted cost base by an increase in compensation due to a higher population of about 2,000 FTE and cost inflation. Non-compensation expense came down slightly but mainly due to the sale of Cosmo which had EUR0.2 billion in non-comp expenses in last year's second quarter. Let me now come to our update on litigation. Reserves are now at EUR3.8 billion. We used EUR2.2 billion for the IBOR sentiment in the quarter and we booked another EUR1.2 billion mainly for legacy US mortgage related matters. Mortgage repurchase demand came down materially from last quarter on the back of a favorable ruling concerning the statute of limitations for certain claims.

第 6 頁簡要介紹了成本，如前所述，由於訴訟，本季度非利息支出根據外匯匯率變化進行了調整，增加了 7 億歐元。我們在 CTA 上的支出減少了約 3 億歐元。我們確實實現了約 3 億歐元的 OPEC 節省，但由於人口增加約 2,000 FTE 和成本上漲導致薪資增加，這在我們調整後的成本基礎中被抵消了。非薪資支出略有下降，但主要由於出售 Cosmo，該公司去年第二季的非薪資支出為 2 億歐元。現在讓我來介紹一下訴訟的最新進展。目前儲備金為38億歐元。本季度，我們使用了 22 億歐元來衡量 IBOR 情緒，另外還預留了 12 億歐元，主要用於美國傳統抵押貸款相關事宜。由於對某些索賠時效作出了有利的裁決，抵押貸款回購需求較上一季大幅下降。

On page 8 we highlight selected cases. Let me first point out that we have settled some major cases. Examples include the Kirch disputes, IBOR where we settled the investigations in the US and the UK and also the largest civil matters on US RMBS. But there are a number of items still open which are not possible to predict in terms of timing and outcome. We list on the page the US regulatory investigations on ABS, OFAC, and three class action lawsuits in the US on FX matters where the Bank is vigorously defending itself. We are fully cooperating with certain regulatory authorities investigating the FX trading markets, but we were not named in the two major industry enforcement actions taken to date. On IBOR there certain civil actions pending as well as investigations by Swiss authorities. The Bank is furthermore investigating suspicious trades in Russia and in the UK which were partially cleared in US dollar. We have self-reported those traits and we've taken disciplinary measures and are fully cooperating with regulators. Let me be clear on the topic of litigation. Both timing and quantity of potential charges remain very difficult to predict. We're working through the cases and want to be constructive with all authorities. And we continue to be cautious on the near-term outlook.

我們在第 8 頁重點介紹了一些精選案例。首先我要指出的是，我們已經解決了一些重大案件。例如，我們在美國和英國解決了 Kirch 糾紛、IBOR 調查，以及美國 RMBS 的最大民事案件。但仍有許多事項懸而未決，其時間和結果尚無法預測。我們在頁面上列出了美國對 ABS、OFAC 的監管調查，以及美國三起有關外匯問題的集體訴訟，銀行正在積極為自己辯護。我們正在全力配合某些監管機構對外匯交易市場的調查，但在迄今為止採取的兩項重大行業執法行動中，我們並未被點名。IBOR 上存在某些未決民事訴訟以及瑞士當局的調查。該銀行也正在調查俄羅斯和英國的部分以美元結算的可疑交易。我們已經自我報告了這些特徵，並採取了紀律措施，並正在全力配合監管機構。讓我清楚地談談訴訟問題。潛在指控的時間和數量仍然很難預測。我們正在處理這些案件，並希望與所有當局保持建設性的關係。我們對近期前景持續保持謹慎。

Let us move to the development of Tier 1 capital. CET1 is down EUR0.4 billion from end of last quarter and now stands at EUR47.4 billion with additional Tier 1 capital of EUR4.6 billion. This decline was driven by FX movements which caused a decline by EUR0.5 billion. Let me again highlight the peculiar effect on this bridge. The positive affect of EUR0.8 billion net income is offset by dividend accruals to the tune of 89%. New ECB rules enacted in February requires to accrue dividend at the average payout ratio for the last three years which is 2012 until 2014. As you know this is not our payout ratio ambition, and hence our current results reflect over-accruing for our dividend. Approval, we expect it to hit in the second half of the year. It's highlighted before the impact. We expect to be around EUR1.5 billion to EUR2 billion negative. However it will be partially mitigated by about EUR0.5 billion as the more conservative valuations on approval with reduced the existing capital reductions taken for expected loss short form.

讓我們來談談一級資本的發展。CET1較上季末下降了4億歐元，目前為474億歐元，額外一級資本為46億歐元。這一下降是由外匯波動引起的，導致下降了 5 億歐元。讓我再強調一下這座橋的奇特效果。8億歐元淨收入的正面影響被89%的股利應計額所抵銷。歐洲央行於二月頒布的新規則要求依照過去三年（即2012年至2014年）的平均股息率提列股利。如您所知，這不是我們的派息率目標，因此我們目前的表現反映了我們的股利過度累積。批准，我們預計它將在今年下半年實現。它在撞擊前突出顯示。我們預計負值約為15億歐元至20億歐元。然而，由於批准時更保守的估值以及預期損失簡稱所採取的現有資本減少，這項損失將部分減輕約 5 億歐元。

Let me move to page 10. We managed to reduce RWA by EUR15 billion. How did we do that? Market risk is down EUR10 billion due to the reduced securitization inventory, lower VAR, and reduced default risk exposure. Currency movements reduce RWA by another EUR6 billion. RWA reduction from currency movements also has an impact on capital and the net effect on our ratios is actually small as we strive to be hedged. Credit risk and CVA, RWA came down EUR5 billion mainly through increased hedging. Only Op risk increased by EUR5 billion reflecting recent industry and DB litigation costs which impact the Op risk calculation. As we highlighted during our April strategy announcement, we expect further headwinds in the coming years, most notably in 2018 and 2019, from Basel 4 reforms and ECB harmonization efforts. That said, as John said we will continually manage our RWA to mitigate as much of the expected impact as possible. Furthermore we expect risk-weighted assets pressure in the near term to continue in particular from Op risk. On page 10 you also see the breakdown of RWA into the segments. CB&S was the main area where RWA declined contributing to the increase in the CET1 ratio to 11.4%. Page 11 gives a similar breakdown for leverage exposure which declined by EUR88 billion, EUR29 billion of which was driven by currency. The rest is mainly in derivatives with the biggest contributors being CB&S and NCOU. Our leverage ratio improved by 16 basis points to now 3.6%.

讓我翻到第 10 頁。我們成功將風險加權資產減少了 150 億歐元。我們是如何做到的？由於證券化庫存減少、VAR 降低以及違約風險敞口減少，市場風險下降了 100 億歐元。貨幣變動導致風險加權資產再減少 60 億歐元。貨幣變動導致的風險加權資產減少也會對資本產生影響，而且由於我們努力對沖，對我們的比率的淨影響實際上很小。信用風險和CVA、RWA下降了50億歐元，主要透過增加對沖。只有營運風險增加了 50 億歐元，反映了近期行業和 DB 訴訟成本對營運風險計算的影響。正如我們在 4 月策略公告中所強調的那樣，我們預計未來幾年將面臨進一步的阻力，尤其是在 2018 年和 2019 年，這主要源於巴塞爾協議 4 改革和歐洲央行協調努力。話雖如此，正如約翰所說，我們將繼續管理我們的 RWA，以盡可能減輕預期的影響。此外，我們預期短期內風險加權資產壓力將持續存在，尤其是來自營運風險的壓力。在第 10 頁，您也可以看到 RWA 細分為各個部分。CB&S 是 RWA 下降的主要領域，導致 CET1 比率上升至 11.4%。第 11 頁給出了類似的槓桿敞口細分，下降了 880 億歐元，其中 290 億歐元是由貨幣推動的。其餘主要為衍生性商品，其中最大的貢獻者是 CB&S 和 NCOU。我們的槓桿率提高了16個基點，目前達到3.6%。

Let's take a look into the segments starting with CB&S on page 13. With EUR1.2 billion of EBIT CB&S had a strong quarter. Revenues grew 23% year on year supported by solid performance across all businesses and favorable FX which accounted for about half of the growth. Let me stress that we achieved these results with continued resource discipline in RWA and FX reduction relative to Q1 of this year. What was disappointing was costs which increased year on year by 15%. While currency was the biggest driver, higher regulatory spend remained a challenge and again realized OpEx saves did not translate into actual cost reduction. Nonetheless the cost income ratio improved to 70% driven by the strong revenue performance. As a reminder, the half-year result was burdened by litigation of EUR1.4 billion as well as the bank levy which was charged back to the divisions throughout the year. In the first half of 2015 CB&S bank Levy was EUR209 billion.

讓我們來看看第 13 頁以 CB&S 開頭的部分。CB&S 本季業績表現強勁，息稅前利潤達 12 億歐元。由於所有業務的穩健表現和有利的外匯因素，營收年增 23%，約佔成長的一半。我要強調的是，我們之所以取得這些成果，是因為與今年第一季相比，我們在風險加權資產和外匯減少方面繼續嚴格資源管理。令人失望的是成本年增了15%。雖然貨幣是最大的驅動因素，但更高的監管支出仍然是一個挑戰，並且再次意識到營運支出的節省並沒有轉化為實際的成本降低。儘管如此，在強勁的收入表現的推動下，成本收入比仍提高至 70%。需要提醒的是，半年業績受到 14 億歐元訴訟以及全年向各部門收取的銀行稅的影響。2015年上半年，CB&S銀行稅額為2,090億歐元。

Let's take a brief look into the different businesses in CB&S starting with sales and trading on page 14. On the debt side our FX and rates business benefited from increasing volatility in a constructive trading environment. On the credit side spread widening a difficult market conditions led to lower results. We also made less on emerging market debt, but we did see a strong improvement in distressed products. Equities was a strong performer, producing its strongest second quarter since 2009. In origination and advisory, revenues grew 6% with debt origination and advisory contributing positively. Equity origination was weaker and overall we benefited from currency translation. Whilst the numbers look good in a stronger context, our market shares declined in some areas in both EMEA and the US, but we remain focused on working against that development in the coming quarters. Moving onto PBC, revenues were stable in a difficult environment while EBIT grew to nearly EUR500 million. Deposit products continued to be under pressure whilst we improved in investment and insurance products as well as credit. Loan loss provisions remained at cyclical low levels and this quarter benefited from some portfolio sales. So please do not use the EUR100 million of the quarter as a proxy for the coming quarters. Our cost base came down a bit as we benefit from them non-recurrence of EUR32 million loan processing fee charges which we saw in Q2, 2014.

讓我們從第 14 頁的銷售和交易開始，簡單了解一下 CB&S 的不同業務。在債務方面，我們的外匯和利率業務受益於建設性交易環境中波動性的增加。信貸方面，利差擴大，艱困的市場環境導致績效下降。我們在新興市場債務上的收益也有所減少，但我們確實看到不良產品有了強勁改善。股市表現強勁，創下 2009 年以來第二季最強勁表現。在發起和諮詢方面，收入增長了 6%，其中債務發起和諮詢做出了積極貢獻。股權發起較弱，整體而言，我們受益於貨幣轉換。雖然在更強勁的背景下這些數字看起來不錯，但我們在歐洲、中東和非洲地區以及美國某些地區的市場份額有所下降，但我們仍將致力於在未來幾季扭轉這種局面。談到 PBC，在困難的環境中，收入保持穩定，而息稅前利潤增長至近 5 億歐元。存款產品持續承壓，而投資、保險產品和信貸方面則有所改善。貸款損失準備金仍處於週期性低水平，本季受益於一些投資組合銷售。因此，請不要將本季的 1 億歐元作為未來幾季的代表。由於 2014 年第二季的 3,200 萬歐元貸款處理費不再發生，我們因此受益，成本基礎略有下降。

Let us look at the components on page 17. EBIT from the so-called blue bank PBC in Germany was EUR137 million. This business is the most exposed to deposit products which continue to be pressured by the unfavorable interest rate environment. This also holds true for Postbank. We also a saw a drop in EBIT year on year versus Q1 of 2015. The sharp drop from Q1 is primarily related to some specific revenue items in the first quarter which were not repeated. Our advisory banking international business, ABI, performed well as it had less exposed to the weak deposit product businesses. ABI EBIT, excluding Russia, almost doubled year on year. Also the contribution from Russia grew by almost 40%. Let us move over to GTB which reported EUR283 million of EBIT. Like last year the second quarter was impacted by litigation cost. Whilst the market environment with low interest rates remains challenging, GTB did see some growth outside favorable currency movements. In fact GTB had its highest quarterly revenues. Net interest expense was up due to litigation and currency movements. In summary, 50% of the EUR62 million increase in EBIT is FX driven. The rest is driven by some release in LLP.

讓我們來看看第 17 頁的元件。德國所謂藍色銀行PBC的息稅前利潤為1.37億歐元。該業務受存款產品影響最大，且持續受到不利利率環境的壓力。對於郵政銀行也是如此。我們還發現，與 2015 年第一季相比，息稅前利潤 (EBIT) 出現年減。與第一季相比的大幅下降主要與第一季的一些特定收入項目沒有重複有關。我們的顧問銀行國際業務 ABI 表現良好，因為它較少受到疲軟的存款產品業務的影響。ABI EBIT（不包括俄羅斯）比去年同期幾乎翻了一番。俄羅斯的貢獻也成長了近40%。讓我們來看看 GTB，其報告的息稅前利潤為 2.83 億歐元。與去年一樣，第二季受到訴訟成本的影響。儘管低利率的市場環境依然充滿挑戰，但除了有利的貨幣走勢之外，GTB 確實實現了一定成長。事實上，GTB 實現了其最高的季度收入。由於訴訟和貨幣變動，淨利息支出增加。綜上所述，息稅前利潤 6,200 萬歐元的成長中有 50% 是由外匯驅動的。其餘部分則由 LLP 中的一些版本所驅動。

Over to asset wealth management. EBIT doubled year on year driven in particular by strong revenue growth in the active and the alternative business. The cost income ratio keeps improving despite investments we made in hiring and the revenue related increase in expenses. Net new money for the quarter was EUR15 billion, actually the sixth time in a row that we had net new money inflow mainly in passive, active, and wealth across all regions. We do expect asset wealth management favorable trajectory to continue. NCOU continued to de-risked and deliver capital accretion from asset sales. As highlighted, RWA came down EUR2 billion compared to Q1 and EUR13 billion relative to prior year's second quarter. As a reminder again prior year included the EUR300 million charge from Maher which has significantly impacted the year-on-year comparison EBIT this quarter was dominated by litigation charges for US RMBS matters. Further details, I'll refer you to page 33 in the appendix.

轉向資產財富管理。息稅前利潤較去年同期翻番，主要得益於主動和替代業務的強勁收入成長。儘管我們在招聘方面進行了投資並且與收入相關的支出有所增加，但成本收入比仍在不斷改善。本季淨新增資金為 150 億歐元，實際上這是我們連續第六次在所有地區實現淨新增資金流入，主要集中在被動、主動和財富領域。我們確實預期資產財富管理的良好軌跡將會持續下去。NCOU 持續透過資產出售來降低風險並實現資本增值。正如所強調的，風險加權資產與第一季相比下降了 20 億歐元，與去年同期第二季相比下降了 130 億歐元。再次提醒一下，上一年包括了來自 Maher 的 3 億歐元費用，這對同比 EBIT 產生了重大影響，本季 EBIT 主要由美國 RMBS 事宜的訴訟費用所主導。更多詳細信息，請參閱附錄第 33 頁。

Let me skip the last page 21 and say a few words regarding the rest of the year. Whilst we have had a pretty solid first half of the year on the revenue side, we do see material headwinds going into the second half. Let me highlight a few topics. Whilst seasonality is no longer as pronounced in our CB&S business as it was some years ago, it has not gone away. We expect revenues to be weaker in the second half of 2015. We have already observed that the Greek crisis has led to lower volumes in many areas. And of course we expected the typical summer drop in activity in Q3. With that said, in particular in our markets, business, revenues as you know are difficult to predict. Litigation remains a key challenge for us. This will not only affect profitability but also burden capital through higher Op risk in the coming quarters. Costs will remain a near-term challenge. Furthermore, current costs do not yet reflect any potential impact from the strategy implementation. As we informed you, cost management will be a key area of focus and this will likely initially come with some upfront charges such as provisions for items like severance. In addition the cost pressure from the regulatory side keeps going and we must continue or even increase our efforts to improve our technology infrastructure. As we expect the second half of the year to be challenging, these trends alongside [pruval] will also pressure our near-term capital ratios, and we will continue to actively manage our risk-weighted assets to ensure healthy capital ratios, although we do expect the ratio to decline in the coming quarters.

讓我跳過最後一頁 21，並就今年剩餘的時間說幾句話。雖然我們上半年的收入表現相當穩健，但我們確實看到下半年將面臨重大阻力。讓我重點談談幾個主題。雖然我們的 CB&S 業務的季節性不再像幾年前那麼明顯，但它並沒有消失。我們預計 2015 年下半年的收入將會下降。我們已經觀察到希臘危機導致許多地區的交易量下降。當然，我們預計第三季的活動將出現典型的夏季下降。話雖如此，特別是在我們的市場、業務中，收入是很難預測的。訴訟仍然是我們面臨的一個重大挑戰。這不僅會影響獲利能力，還會因未來幾季營運風險增加而加重資本負擔。成本仍將是近期的挑戰。此外，當前成本尚未反映該策略實施的任何潛在影響。正如我們向您告知的，成本管理將是一個重點關注領域，並且最初可能會產生一些前期費用，例如遣散費等項目的準備金。此外，來自監管方面的成本壓力持續存在，我們必須繼續甚至加強改善我們的技術基礎設施。由於我們預計下半年將充滿挑戰，這些趨勢以及[pruval]也將對我們的短期資本比率造成壓力，我們將繼續積極管理我們的風險加權資產，以確保健康的資本比率，儘管我們確實預計該比率在未來幾個季度會下降。

Thank you for being patient with all those details. Now John, John and I are happy to take your questions. And as always, John Andrews will manage the Q&A.

感謝您耐心地提供所有這些詳細資訊。現在，約翰，約翰和我很樂意回答你們的問題。像往常一樣，約翰·安德魯斯將負責主持問答環節。

(Operator Instructions)

（操作員指示）

Kian Abouhossein, JPMorgan.

摩根大通的 Kian Abouhossein。

Thank you for taking my questions. The first question is more of a general one. Could you just give us an overview, John, of your first impression of running Deutsche Bank? I'm sure you had a lot of other offers to become CEO since you left UBS. Why Deutsche?

感謝您回答我的問題。第一個問題比較普遍。約翰，您能否向我們概述一下您對經營德意志銀行的第一印象？我確信自從你離開瑞銀以來，已經收到了很多其他的執行長職位邀約。為什麼選擇德意志銀行？

The second question is related to leverage. You have given a very detailed divisional slide on leverage, which is very helpful. If I assume a Tier 1 of 11 in the IB, your leverage ratio, 11%, and allocate capital your leverage ratio in the IB is about 2.6%. And, as you know, US peers are at 5% plus. So, I'm just wondering, how do you think about the IB franchise in light of almost double the leverage of some of the peers? And in that context, the 5% leverage ratio target for the group, is that still a target which you aim to achieve, or would you say that is too high and unnecessary?

第二個問題與槓桿有關。您提供了有關槓桿作用的非常詳細的部門幻燈片，這非常有幫助。如果我假設 IB 中的一級資本為 11，您的槓桿率為 11%，並且分配資本，那麼您在 IB 中的槓桿率約為 2.6%。而且如您所知，美國同行的比例也超過了 5%。所以，我只是想知道，考慮到一些同行的槓桿率幾乎翻了一番，您如何看待 IB 特許經營權？在此背景下，集團 5% 的槓桿率目標是否仍是您想要實現的目標，還是您認為這個目標太高且沒有必要？

And, the third question is on cost. It sounds to me very much this first upfront cost before we see any cost synergies. By October, though, will we have a union agreement where you can actually tell us details of how many people will leave the Bank, enhancing that cost-saving plan?

第三個問題是關於成本。在我看來，這很可能是我們看到任何成本協同效應之前的首期成本。但是，到十月份，我們是否會達成工會協議，您可以告訴我們有多少人將離開銀行，從而加強成本節約計劃？

And, lastly, if I may, just on international retail Europe, what is your view around those operations? Thank you.

最後，如果可以的話，關於歐洲國際零售業，您對這些業務有何看法？謝謝。

Kian, hello, it's John. Let me at least take the first one, given that it was addressed to me. I think you know that I've been on the Supervisory Board at the Bank for a couple of years. And I was in the position of chairing the audit committee and I sat on the risk committee. So, the transition into the management team was reasonably logical when an opening came up. And I do feel that I've -- although as a non-executive director you get an exposure to the Bank, and sitting on the audit committee you never get much good news. It was, nevertheless, fairly logical and seamless in the transition from Supervisory Board to the management.

Kian，你好，我是 John。鑑於這是寄給我的，至少讓我選第一個吧。我想你知道我已經在該銀行擔任監事會成員幾年了。我擔任審計委員會主席，並擔任風險委員會成員。因此，當出現空缺時，轉入管理團隊是合理合乎邏輯的。我確實覺得──儘管身為非執行董事，你會接觸到銀行的情況，但身為審計委員會成員，你永遠不會得到太多好消息。儘管如此，從監事會到管理層的過渡還是相當合乎邏輯和無縫的。

Why the Supervisory Board? Well, after I'd left UBS I spent some time -- not literally -- on the beach, and thought that I'd gained some experience that might be helpful elsewhere. And the opportunity at Deutsche Bank came up and I took it. So, there was nothing untoward, and it all was fairly seamless and took place over two or three years.

為什麼要設立監事會？好吧，離開瑞銀之後，我在海灘上度過了一段時間——不是字面意義上的——我認為我獲得的一些經驗可能會在其他地方有所幫助。德意志銀行的機會出現了，我抓住了它。所以，沒有什麼不愉快的事情，一切都相當順利，持續了兩三年。

On the other points, Marcus, do you want to take the one on leverage?

關於其他觀點，馬庫斯，你想從槓桿角度考慮嗎？

Yes. Kian, on leverage I guess what I would say is, as we, I think, already announced in April, there are going to be some material reductions in leverage in our investment bank, in total, to the tune of -- when you look at the gross number -- about EUR200 billion, which obviously is not yet reflected in full in those numbers. And we will certainly scrutinize all businesses and see where can we be even more efficient. And John was, in his introductory remarks, referring to that as well. So, we're not saying that we're going to be at the 5% in the very near future. But this is what we are, long term, striving for. And the planned reductions will take us a long way.

是的。Kian，關於槓桿率，我想說的是，正如我們在 4 月已經宣布的那樣，我們的投資銀行的槓桿率將大幅削減，總計將達到——從總數來看——約 2000 億歐元，這顯然還沒有完全反映在這些數字中。我們一定會仔細審查所有業務，看看哪些方面可以提高效率。約翰在他的開場白中也提到了這一點。所以，我們並不是說我們很快就會達到 5% 的目標。但這正是我們長期奮鬥的目標。計劃中的減排將對我們大有裨益。

On cost, yes, there will be upfront cost. And, just technically, you can't avoid that. As you pointed out, the moment you have an agreement with employee representative unions on, for example, potential headcount reductions in Germany, you will have to book a provision for that. So, you have sort of the full cost in one goal. And then the savings only kick in over time. Will we have those by October? We cannot comment on this at this stage. We are in discussions on several items and we'll give you an update on that.

就成本而言，是的，會有前期成本。從技術上來說，你無法避免這種情況。正如您所指出的，一旦您與員工代表工會達成協議，例如，就德國可能裁員，您就必須為此預留準備金。因此，您已經將全部成本投入到一個目標中。隨著時間的推移，儲蓄才會開始顯現。我們能在十月之前得到這些嗎？目前我們無法對此發表評論。我們正在討論幾個問題，我們將向您通報最新情況。

On your last question regarding retail Europe -- I don't know, John, you want to take that?

關於您關於歐洲零售業的最後一個問題——我不知道，約翰，您想回答這個問題嗎？

Yes. Well, we obviously don't want to steal our own thunder from what we announced in October, but we're clearly looking at our retail operations. Germany is absolutely cool. And we will retain the blue bank. I think that goes without saying. The other operations in Europe vary in their maturity and the market share, and their self sustainability. But we will be taking a look at that and we'll give you more details in October when we speak to you.

是的。好吧，我們顯然不想搶走我們十月份宣布的消息的風頭，但我們顯然在關注我們的零售業務。德國絕對很酷。我們將保留藍色銀行。我想這是不言而喻的。歐洲的其他業務在成熟度、市場份額和自我可持續性方面各不相同。但我們會對此進行研究，並在十月與您交談時提供更多詳細資訊。

And just to follow up on the CB&S asset reduction. On my calculation I think I get to about EUR140 billion net when you announce the restructuring plan or the 2020 plan, and, ex-the currency impact, you've already done EUR50 billion, roughly. Should we assume that there's a lot more juice in there after your initial assessment?

只是為了跟進 CB&S 資產減少的情況。根據我的計算，我認為當您宣布重組計劃或 2020 年計劃時，我的淨收入將達到約 1400 億歐元，並且，除去貨幣影響，您已經達到了大約 500 億歐元。在您進行初步評估後，我們是否應該認為其中還有更多潛力？

I would not say that there's a lot more juice, as you pointed out. I think I would, at this stage, want to leave it at, first, we will see the reduction -- and, as we also pointed out in April, the way this is going to work is, yes, there shall be growth, but first there shall be reduction. So we're going to do that first. You're going to see the gross impact first, and once we are there, then we will start to partially reinvest where it makes sense.

正如您所指出的，我不會說果汁的量會大得多。我認為，在現階段，我想首先看到減少——而且，正如我們在四月份指出的那樣，這一進程將會是，是的，會有增長，但首先會出現減少。因此，我們首先要這樣做。您將首先看到整體影響，一旦我們達到這一目標，我們就會開始在合理的領域進行部分再投資。

And, in the meantime, yes, we will indeed see where there are further possibilities to optimize the balance sheet in a sense that, as John pointed out, that we will really focus on the higher-return activities in that space. But, at this stage, there are no more details that we can share with you on that.

同時，是的，我們確實會看到在哪些方面有進一步優化資產負債表的可能性，正如約翰指出的那樣，我們將真正專注於該領域的高回報活動。但目前，我們無法與您分享更多細節。

If I may, one more -- and apologies, but this is important. John, you mentioned you see the potential clearly in Deutsche taking the top job. What do you think the IB can make in terms of RE, i.e. what do you see as cost of equity for CB&S?

如果可以的話，我再說一句——抱歉，但這很重要。約翰，你提到你清楚地看到了德意志銀行擔任最高職位的潛力。您認為 IB 在 RE 方面能扮演什麼角色？您認為 CB&S 的股權成本是多少？

I think we generally don't like to comment too much on the divisional cost of equity. We like to look at our cost of equity as a group as a whole. Because you can't buy CB&S in the market. You can only buy Deutsche Bank. It's a [core to] our business.

我認為我們一般不喜歡對部門股權成本發表過多評論。我們喜歡將我們的股權成本視為一個整體。因為你在市場上買不到 CB&S。你只能買德意志銀行。這是我們業務的核心。

And, the question that we ask ourselves is how to run it better, not what targets to aim for. We do think that it can substantially improve its returns. But, as I said in my opening remarks, some of our issues are to do with our operating costs as much as to do with our financial costs. I think that's not quite answering your question, but it's the most I think that we could say on a divisional basis.

而且，我們問自己的問題是如何更好地運行它，而不是要追求什麼目標。我們確實認為它可以大幅提高其回報。但是，正如我在開場白中所說，我們的一些問題與我們的營運成本和財務成本有關。我認為這並沒有完全回答你的問題，但我認為這是我們在部門基礎上所能說的最多的話。

Very helpful. Thank you for your time.

非常有幫助。感謝您抽出時間。

Omar Fall, Jefferies.

奧馬爾·福爾，傑富瑞。

Good afternoon. Firstly, looking at RWAs and the EUR10-billion decline in market risk, can you just give us some more detail here, please? And how much of this, if any, was a function of the credit business and CB&S being weak this quarter and how much was actual active reduction of exposures? I guess I want to know if there's any more of this we can expect in coming quarters as it would clearly be a helpful buffer to all the RWA headwinds you highlight?

午安.首先，看看風險加權資產和 100 億歐元的市場風險下降，您能否在這裡向我們提供更多細節？其中，如果有的話，有多少是由於本季度信貸業務和 CB&S 表現疲軟造成的，又有多少是實際主動減少風險敞口造成的？我想了解未來幾季我們是否還能期待更多這樣的情況，因為這顯然可以對您強調的所有 RWA 逆風起到有益的緩衝作用？

Secondly, in PBC you mentioned the negative impact on revenues from non-operating activities. Apologies if I missed this, but what exactly does this refer to, please? And are these elements nonrecurring?

第二，在人民銀行，您提到了非經營活動對收入的負面影響。如果我錯過了這一點，請問這到底指的是什麼？這些元素都是不重複的嗎？

And then, finally, a broader question for John. There's clearly a very popular thesis in the market that you have the most challenging role of the raft of new CEOs in the sector because there's no element of shrinking to greatness here. Because, even if the restructuring is successful, what you're left with at the end will barely cover its cost of capital in terms of ROE. You obviously disagree with this or I guess you would not have taken the job. What do you think all these people are missing here, please? Thanks.

最後，我要問約翰一個更廣泛的問題。市場上顯然有一個非常流行的觀點，即該行業中眾多新任執行長所扮演的角色最具挑戰性，因為這裡不存在任何從萎縮到偉大的因素。因為，即使重組成功，最後剩下的資金以 ROE 的形式也幾乎無法涵蓋其資本成本。你顯然不同意這一點，否則我猜你不會接受這份工作。請問您認為這些人都忽略了什麼？謝謝。

Okay, maybe I start with the numeric questions first. Market risk RWA, I was alluding to three core drivers and I'm also happy to provide the breakdown there -- EUR5.5 billion of the EUR10 billion are due to reduced securitization inventory that we have; lower VAR contributes about EUR2 billion; and then we have reduced default risk exposure of another EUR2.5 billion, which makes up the EUR10 billion.

好的，也許我先從數字問題開始。市場風險 RWA，我指的是三個核心驅動因素，我也很樂意提供具體細節——100 億歐元中的 55 億歐元是由於我們的證券化庫存減少；較低的 VAR 貢獻約 20 億歐元；然後我們又減少了25億歐元的違約風險敞口，總計100億歐元。

In PBC, what happened there was, in the first quarter of 2015, we had six or seven items which, in total, add up to something like EUR70 million to EUR75 million, which I would categorize as one of items that we will not see themselves repeat. And that is what I was referring to when I said when you look at the quarter-on-quarter development in 2015 it looks like there is quite a material decline but it's actually when you then compare it also with prior year, PBC is -- sorry, Postbank is very stable. It was Q1 that stands out, and it stands out because of those roughly EUR70 million, EUR75 million of one-off items that we had in the first quarter.

在 PBC，2015 年第一季度，我們有六到七個項目，總額約為 7000 萬歐元至 7500 萬歐元，我將其歸類為不會重複的項目之一。這就是我所說的，當你查看 2015 年季度環比發展情況時，似乎出現了相當大的下降，但實際上，當你將其與上一年進行比較時，中國人民銀行 — — 抱歉，郵政銀行非常穩定。第一季尤為突出，因為我們在第一季有大約 7000 萬歐元至 7500 萬歐元的一次性項目。

John, on the third one?

約翰，第三個呢？

On the third one, Omar, it's a good question. But I think the answer, to me at least, is clear. I am familiar with the approach of looking at banks from the perspective of a cost of equity and the return on equity. And I think that is the right way to look at the Deutsche Bank that was and is. But we've got to change Deutsche Bank so that you can look at it in a different way. And I think, in each of our core divisions, we have the ability to wean ourselves off, as I said earlier, this over-alliance on balance sheet.

關於第三個問題，奧馬爾，這是一個很好的問題。但我認為答案至少對我來說是明確的。我熟悉從股權成本和股權回報率的角度看待銀行的方法。我認為這是看待德意志銀行過去和現在的正確方式。但我們必須改變德意志銀行，以便您能夠以不同的方式看待它。我認為，在我們的每個核心部門中，我們都有能力擺脫這種資產負債表上的過度聯盟，正如我之前所說的。

We can earn revenues, which don't necessarily always have to attach to the fact that we've put onto the books a risk position. And so, in each of our four core operating segments, there is the opportunity, when we're building new technology, because we know that we -- as I said, our technology is pretty antiquated -- when we roll out new technology, we can reconsider how we conduct those businesses. And I think we can re-engineer our cost base to the point where it becomes less of a constraint on our businesses.

我們可以賺取收入，但這並不一定意味著我們必須承擔風險。因此，在我們的四個核心營運部門中，當我們建立新技術時，都有機會，因為我們知道——正如我所說，我們的技術相當過時——當我們推出新技術時，我們可以重新考慮如何開展這些業務。我認為我們可以重新設計我們的成本基礎，使其不再成為我們業務的限制因素。

At the moment our operating leverage is so high, it's difficult to break into the circle the way you invest because we're constantly -- with an 85% cost income ratio, we don't leave ourselves much flexibility to make working capital investments. And we've got to take that courage to re-engineer our businesses so that each one of the four of them can be much less reliant on us putting balance-sheet risk on. So we'd like to be able to persuade you at some stage in the future, as we probably could today on our asset management business, that return on equity versus cost of equity is not necessarily the only way of looking at the Bank. In asset management today, even, it isn't the principal metric by which you should think about valuing that business, in my view.

目前，我們的經營槓桿非常高，很難打破投資的循環，因為我們的成本收入比一直高達 85%，我們沒有太多的彈性來進行營運資本投資。我們必須拿出勇氣來重新設計我們的業務，以便這四家公司中的每一家都可以減少對我們承擔資產負債表風險的依賴。因此，我們希望能夠在未來的某個階段說服您，就像我們今天在資產管理業務中可能做到的那樣，股本回報率與股本成本的對比不一定是看待銀行的唯一方法。在我看來，即使在當今的資產管理中，它也不是評估該業務價值的主要指標。

So we just need to get ourselves into a position where we can increase the proportion of fee and other income, and reconsider the way that we establish a cost base so that, yes, there will always be a relationship on the balance sheet between the cost and the return and that will drive the price-to-book equivalent. But there are other ways of us generating revenues. And we don't have to spend 85% of them on costs. So I think that's the opportunity for us, and I think the Bank is up for it. So, that's why I'm here.

因此，我們只需要讓自己處於可以增加費用和其他收入比例的位置，並重新考慮建立成本基礎的方式，這樣，資產負債表上的成本和回報之間總是存在一種關係，這將推動市淨率的提高。但我們還有其他方式來創造收入。而且我們不必將其中的 85% 花在成本上。所以我認為這對我們來說是一個機會，而且我認為銀行已經準備好了。這就是我來這裡的原因。

Great. Thank you. Sorry, just one very quick follow-up. I know you can't give numbers, but could you tell us whether the rates business in CB&S was up sequentially Q on Q? I just ask this as I'd like to get a sense of whether the strong performance there was in spite of the leverage exposure decline in the quarter. Thanks.

偉大的。謝謝。抱歉，我只想快速跟進。我知道您無法給出數字，但您能否告訴我們 CB&S 的利率業務是否較上季成長？我問這個問題是因為我想了解一下，儘管本季槓桿率下降，但業績是否依然強勁。謝謝。

The answer to your question is, yes. I think we even highlighted on the page that, indeed, both our FX and the rates business have been performing quite well in the second quarter, whilst we didn't see a great quarter on the credit side.

你的問題的答案是肯定的。我認為我們甚至在頁面上強調，事實上，我們的外匯和利率業務在第二季度都表現良好，而在信貸方面我們並沒有看到一個出色的季度。

Got it. Yes. You've got rates up year on year. I was just wondering if they were also up sequentially Q on Q. That's fine. Thank you.

知道了。是的。利率逐年上漲。我只是想知道它們是否也按 Q 的順序上升。沒問題。謝謝。

More or less flat is the answer.

答案是或多或少是平的。

Thanks.

謝謝。

Jernej Omahen, Goldman Sachs.

高盛的傑內傑·奧馬亨（Jernej Omahen）。

Good afternoon from my side as well. Welcome to Deutsche Bank, John. I would just like to start with the following question. I think you gave as comprehensive answer as you could, John, why you took the job. But can I ask you, a few weeks into your job, what is the one business of Deutsche Bank that you think is exciting and you think could make a difference going forward in the new strategy?

我這邊也向大家問好。歡迎來到德意志銀行，約翰。我想從以下問題開始。約翰，我認為你已經盡可能全面地回答了你接受這份工作的原因。但是，我能否問一下，在您上任幾週後，您認為德意志銀行的哪一項業務​​最令人興奮，並且您認為哪一項業務​​能夠對新策略的發展產生影響？

The second question I'd like to ask, probably directed to the both of you, relates to pages 7 and 8. You show a litigation reserve of EUR3.8 billion. And then, on page 8, a long list of issues which is still to be settled. I was wondering, when you think about the future litigation charges, to what extent do you think that this EUR3.8-billion figure might fall short? And, the reason why I'm asking the question, just for the purposes of being transparent, is that you, John, offered some very strong statements on the need -- or rather no need for Deutsche Bank to raise capital. I guess to make that statement you would have to have a very clear idea as to what the potential scope of future litigation would be as well. And I'll just leave it at that. Thank you very much.

我想問的第二個問題，可能針對你們兩位，與第 7 頁和第 8 頁有關。你們顯示的訴訟儲備金為 38 億歐元。然後，第 8 頁列出了一長串尚待解決的問題。我想知道，當您考慮未來的訴訟費用時，您認為這個 38 億歐元的數字可能在多大程度上不足？我之所以問這個問題，只是為了透明起見，是因為約翰，你對德意志銀行籌集資金的必要性——或者更確切地說，德意志銀行不需要籌集資金——做出了非常強烈的聲明。我想，要做出這樣的聲明，你必須對未來訴訟的潛在範圍有一個非常清晰的認知。我就不多說了。非常感謝。

On your first question, I learned this a long time ago -- the biggest constituency that's listening to this call is the way over 100,000 people we have working in the Bank at the moment. So if I were rather like a parent to choose a favorite child, all I'd do is upset everyone else. It's a difficult question to answer. So I have to say I love all of my offspring. I think on each of our businesses there are ways that we can develop them and make them different from how they are today. Some are more challenged than others.

關於你的第一個問題，我很久以前就了解到這一點——聆聽這項呼籲的最大群體是我們目前在銀行工作的十多萬名員工。因此，如果我像父母一樣選擇一個最喜歡的孩子，我所做的就是讓其他人不高興。這是一個很難回答的問題。所以我不得不說我愛我的所有後代。我認為，我們每項業務都有可以發展的方式，使它們與現在有所不同。有些人面臨的挑戰比其他人更大。

I read things in the press that I'm pro-investment banking because I used to work in an investment bank, or I'm now against investment banking because I left an investment bank. Its all very confusing. Essentially, I want Deutsche Bank to succeed. And there are businesses we should deemphasize because they don't work anymore, either because the market has gone away or the rules of the game have changed and they are no longer viable.

我在媒體上看到一些報導，說我支持投資銀行，因為我曾經在一家投資銀行工作過，或者說我現在反對投資銀行，因為我離開了一家投資銀行。一切都非常令人困惑。從本質上來說，我希望德意志銀行能夠成功。有些業務我們應該淡化，因為它們不再有價值，要不是因為市場消失了，就是因為遊戲規則改變了，它們不再可行。

But I think all of the businesses that we, in Strategy 2020, for which I do take a degree of responsibility -- it was not my invention but I was on the Supervisory Board at the time, and the Supervisory Board did not object to it, which is what they were asked whether they did or not. And so, I do buy into it. It's a pragmatic view anyway. It's where we start from and obviously, over time, we will develop our businesses. And we may find new ones to build up and we will find other ones, over time, we deemphasize. And we should be managing and recalibrating our business as time goes on. But there are plenty of businesses that we could change quite significantly.

但我認為，我們在 2020 年策略中的所有業務，我確實都承擔了一定程度的責任——這不是我的發明，但當時我是監事會成員，而監事會並不反對，這就是他們被問及是否反對的原因。所以，我確實相信它。無論如何，這是一種務實的觀點。這是我們的起點，顯然，隨著時間的推移，我們將發展我們的業務。我們可能會找到新的來建立，也會找到其他的，隨著時間的推移，我們會不再強調。隨著時間的推移，我們應該管理和重新調整我們的業務。但對於很多企業來說，我們可以做出相當大的改變。

German banking, as you probably know, is not inherently terribly profitable, but there are ways that we can look at that business to try to create a much more profitable engagement. Wealth management is a business I know very well and there's an opportunity for us, with our brand and our base in Germany, to build that business. In the investment bank, even in the markets business, we can move with the trends. The trading markets are changing enormously. You've only got to read the market reforms that are coming on to be able to see that there are opportunities there which we can grab to change the way we do business. So I think on all of them we have the opportunity to make a big difference.

您可能知道，德國銀行業本身的獲利能力並不高，但我們可以透過一些方法來嘗試創造更有利可圖的業務。我非常了解財富管理業務，憑藉我們的品牌和在德國的基地，我們有機會發展這項業務。在投資銀行，甚至在市場業務中，我們都可以順應趨勢。交易市場正在發生巨大的變化。您只需了解即將進行的市場改革，就能發現其中蘊藏著我們可以抓住的機遇，從而改變我們的經營方式。所以我認為在所有這些方面我們都有機會做出重大改變。

Now, on litigation, we clearly need to be extremely careful about everything we say. We've been a little more open than we have been in the past and we do that because it is an important driver of our view of the world and your view of the Bank. I was categoric on my view about the need to raise capital, but I used my words very carefully. At the moment, I don't think it's the right thing for shareholders. But we cannot assume that there will be an absence of external events that may force us to change that view.

現在，關於訴訟，我們顯然需要對我們所說的一切極其謹慎。我們比過去更加開放，這樣做是因為這是我們對世界的看法以及您對銀行的看法的重要驅動力。我明確表示需要籌集資金，但我的措辭非常謹慎。目前，我認為這對股東來說不是一件好事。但我們不能假設不存在迫使我們改變這種觀點的外在事件。

Now, in litigation, we've shown you the reserves. We have EUR3.8 billion which we've reserved under the strictures of IFRS. That doesn't mean we think that's the amount we're going to pay because that's not what the IFRS guides us to do or what it means. But it does mean that we've set aside those reserves, and we've also set up EUR3.2 billion of contingencies which are not reserved but which you can think of as management's view of possible future reserves and possible future charges.

現在，在訴訟中，我們已經向您展示了儲備金。我們根據國際財務報告準則 (IFRS) 的規定預留了 38 億歐元。這並不意味著我們認為這就是我們要支付的金額，因為這不是《國際財務報告準則》指導我們要做的事情或它的意義。但這確實意味著我們已經撥出了這些儲備金，而且我們還設立了 32 億歐元的應急資金，這些資金不是儲備金，但你可以將其視為管理層對可能的未來儲備金和可能的未來費用的看法。

That's the position at the moment. But, as Marcus stressed in his remarks, it's extremely difficult to gauge the quantum and it's even more difficult to gauge the timing of the use of those reserves and actually paying any amount, if at all, and then the conversion of contingencies, or even matters for which we've not yet been able to establish a contingency, into reserves and/or charges.

目前的情況就是這樣。但是，正如馬庫斯在演講中所強調的那樣，衡量數量極其困難，而衡量使用這些儲備金的時間和實際支付任何金額（如果有的話）則更加困難，然後將意外事件，甚至是我們尚未建立意外事件的事項轉換為儲備金和/或費用。

So, on the impact of capital, the arithmetic answer is, the impact on capital to date is EUR3.8 billion because if we'd not established those reserves we'd have taken them to capital. That might have been a tax effect. But we don't know how much we're going to have to pay. And we don't know to what extent we have to pay something, when we're going to have to pay it. I know that is a frustratingly vague answer, but it has the benefit of being true and it frustrates us just as much as it frustrates you.

因此，關於資本的影響，算術答案是，迄今為止對資本的影響為 38 億歐元，因為如果我們沒有建立這些儲備，我們就會將它們計入資本。這可能是一種稅收效應。但我們不知道要付多少錢。我們不知道需要付出多少，也不知道什麼時候需要付出。我知道這是一個令人沮喪的模糊答案，但它的好處是真實，它讓我們感到沮喪，就像它讓你感到沮喪一樣。

I think it is a clear answer. If I understand you correctly, your message is it's the wrong thing to do to raise capital at this point in time, but circumstances could change that would force you to change your view. Particularly on the unpredictable (technical difficulty).

我認為這是一個明確的答案。如果我理解正確的話，您的意思是，在目前這個時間點籌集資金是錯誤的做法，但情況可能會發生變化，迫使您改變觀點。特別是在不可預測的事情（技術難度）上。

That's correct. Because, if external impacts are of a sufficient magnitude, we won't be able to recalibrate our business. We won't be able to reduce our risk engagement rapidly enough to free up capital. So we would possibly have to resort to the market. But that's not what we're thinking at the moment.

沒錯。因為，如果外部影響足夠大，我們將無法重新調整我們的業務。我們將無法迅速降低風險承擔以釋放資本。所以我們可能不得不求助於市場。但我們現在並不是這麼想的。

I promised John Andrews I'd be brief. But I can't help myself to add one more question, which is, you endorsed the 2020 strategy -- if I understand it correctly, are you endorsing the targets in that strategy as well or are those under review?

我向約翰安德魯斯保證我會簡短發言。但我忍不住再問一個問題，那就是，您認可了 2020 年策略——如果我理解正確的話，您是否也認可該策略中的目標，還是這些目標正在審查中？

Well, a few -- may be from a former life. I'm very loathe always to give hard and fast targets, particularly when our biggest business is a trading business where, quite frankly, I couldn't predict what's going to happen in the rest of the third quarter because much of what we recognize is the fair value of things we carry on the balance sheet. And our results are very much exposed to the value of assets. It's exposed to the volatility of assets, it's exposed to client activity levels and volatility levels. And we can't predict any of those.

嗯，有一些——可能是來自前世的。我非常不願意總是給出硬性的目標，特別是當我們最大的業務是貿易業務時，坦白說，我無法預測第三季剩餘時間會發生什麼，因為我們確認的大部分是我們資產負債表上項目的公允價值。我們的業績很大程度上受到資產價值的影響。它受到資產波動性的影響，也受到客戶活動水準和波動性水準的影響。我們無法預測其中任何一個。

What we need to do is take management judgment as to what generally we think our business can produce roughly over a period of time. That then helps us to set a budget for our costs. And the reason that we do financial planning in the Sales and Trading business is not to try to predict what our revenues are going to be because you can't do that. You need to come to a management and business judgment as to the capacity of the Company to earn revenues.

我們需要做的是進行管理判斷，大致了解我們的業務在一段時間內可以產生什麼。這有助於我們制定成本預算。我們在銷售和貿易業務中進行財務規劃的原因並不是為了預測我們的收入是多少，因為你無法做到這一點。您需要對公司賺取收入的能力做出管理和商業判斷。

Once you've alighted on that, you risk assess it, and then you calibrate a cost base that generates a return. So you vaguely know how much you can afford to invest in the business. Then you set a course for where you think, strategically, businesses are going to be successful in the future, based on what you have today. And then you allocate capital accordingly.

一旦你意識到這一點，你就會對它進行風險評估，然後校準產生回報的成本基礎。因此，您大概知道自己能負擔得起多少業務投資。然後，根據您目前所擁有的條件，制定您認為未來企業能夠取得成功的策略方針。然後你相應地分配資本。

And so I think what we'd much rather due in October is tell you, in a fair amount of detail, what it is that management intends to do and generally give you a direction of travel for what we think the impact of that will be. But there's no way I'm going to be able to tell you, or Marcus is going to be able to tell you, with any conviction or credibility whatsoever what our revenues from Sales and Trading are going to be in 2020.

因此，我認為我們更希望在十月向您詳細告知管理階層打算做什麼，並大致告訴您我們認為這樣做會產生什麼影響的行動方向。但我或馬庫斯都無法以任何確信或可信的方式告訴您 2020 年我們的銷售和交易收入會是多少。

Now, some of our businesses are more predictable and we need to apply much less in the way of business judgment to the likely development of the revenues and the revenue capacity of those business lines. So we'll be able to give you a little bit more detail on some of our businesses, but our biggest block of business, which is derivatives and securities training, unfortunately, is in the former category and it is very difficult to do. But we will try to help you. We know that we need to deliver, so there's a degree to which what we say will be discounted anyway and we agree it should be because we haven't delivered in the past. And we're concerned that we need to set ourselves a set of objectives and a set of tasks which we are able to staff and resource and capitalize and therefore deliver on.

現在，我們的一些業務更加可預測，我們需要更少地以商業判斷的方式對這些業務線的收入和收入能力的可能發展進行判斷。因此，我們可以向您提供有關我們部分業務的更多詳細信息，但我們最大的業務板塊，即衍生品和證券培訓，不幸的是，屬於前者，而且很難做到。但我們會盡力幫助您。我們知道我們需要兌現承諾，因此無論如何，我們所說的話在某種程度上都會受到質疑，我們也同意這是理所當然的，因為我們過去沒有兌現承諾。我們關心的是，我們需要為自己設定一系列目標和任務，以便我們能夠配備人員、資源並加以利用，從而實現這些目標和任務。

So that's what we're trying to do and that's why we're taking the luxury of a little bit more time to take a thorough look. Not to revisit the strategy per se, because it's broadly what we said it was going to be, but to try and convince you that we actually have some discrete tasks which we can talk about which help us to achieve those objectives and improve the returns of the Company.

這就是我們正在嘗試做的事情，這也是我們花更多時間進行徹底研究的原因。不是要重新審視策略本身，因為大致上這就是我們所說的，而是試圖讓您相信我們實際上有一些可以討論的獨立任務，這些任務可以幫助我們實現這些目標並提高公司的回報。

Okay. Thank you very much.

好的。非常感謝。

Kinner Lakhani, Citi.

花旗銀行的 Kinner Lakhani。

Hi. My first question was really to, again, talk about the cost structure. Just wanted to get a sense that, at this stage, do you have a view on the net cost savings that are attached to the EUR3.5-billion gross cost savings target that was set about in Strategy 2020?

你好。我的第一個問題實際上是再次談論成本結構。只是想了解一下，在現階段，您對 2020 年策略中設定的 35 億歐元總成本節約目標所帶來的淨成本節約有何看法？

And, maybe separately, we're really seeing a trend across this space of elevated regulatory spend. Obviously Deutsche is no exception. So I wondered if you could help us quantify the regulatory spend that is ongoing today? And also help us understand the profile of that? So how long it can be elevated for? Here I guess I'm talking about things like the resolution, recovery planning, Basel IV, et cetera.

而且，也許單獨來看，我們確實看到了監管支出增加的趨勢。顯然德意志銀行也不例外。所以我想知道您是否可以幫助我們量化目前正在進行的監管支出？並幫助我們了解其概況？那麼可以升高多久呢？我在這裡談論的是決議、復甦計劃、巴塞爾協議 IV 等等。

And then, just on the capital side, I appreciate your frank comments. Just on Postbank IPO, which I guess is the other side of the coin to raising capital. In light of the weaker trends that we're seeing from Postbank, obviously because of pressure from lower interest rates, how confident are you that the previous assumptions that we made on the Postbank IPO as part of the capital plan are still intact? In other words, do you see any risk of impairment on regulatory capital as part of whatever price you get for that?

然後，就資本方面而言，我很感謝您的坦率評論。就郵政銀行首次公開發行而言，我猜這是籌集資金的另一面。鑑於我們看到的郵政銀行的趨勢較弱，顯然是因為來自較低利率的壓力，您是否相信我們之前在郵政銀行 IPO 作為資本計劃的一部分所做的假設仍然有效？換句話說，無論您為此付出什麼代價，您是否認為存在監管資本減損的風險？

And, finally, on litigation, which I know is a sensitive topic, I guess the words that intrigued me on the Russia issue, which has been added onto the list, is many of which cleared in US dollars. I guess you see those as higher risks. And just wanted to get a sense if you think that has a knock-on effect on other cases like OFAC? Thank you.

最後，關於訴訟，我知道這是一個敏感話題，我想引起我興趣的有關俄羅斯問題的詞語（已添加到列表中）很多都是以美元結算的。我猜您認為這些風險更高。我只是想知道您是否認為這會對 OFAC 等其他案件產生連鎖反應？謝謝。

Let me start with your first question on cost structure and the reference you made to what was announced in April. Obviously, my answer is going to be disappointing, but please really be patient with us. We'll give you really -- we think, we are going to give you details on this in terms of what is the gross impact, our inflation assumptions, and net savings that we're targeting by October. But let us work through this, as John said.

首先我想問您關於成本結構的問題以及您提到的四月宣布的內容。顯然，我的回答會令人失望，但請大家耐心等待。我們會向您提供——我們認為，我們將向您提供有關這方面的詳細信息，包括總體影響、我們的通膨假設以及我們 10 月份設定的淨儲蓄目標。但正如約翰所說，讓我們努力解決這個問題。

Number two, on direct spend, I don't have a total number. If I looked at the last 12 months there are obviously some big jumps we have to see, in particular in the context of the bank levy that I highlighted. When I look at this year and then probably also the period 2016, 2017 and maybe even into 2018, I think we, and likely many other banks, are still going through this process of a lot of in a way projects that we have that are caused by regulation. We have that in particular in the US where we're setting up the IHC, where we're going through the CCAR processes.

第二，關於直接支出，我沒有總數。如果我回顧過去 12 個月，顯然我們會看到一些大幅成長，特別是在我強調的銀行稅方面。當我回顧今年，然後可能還有 2016 年、2017 年甚至 2018 年時，我認為我們以及許多其他銀行仍在經歷這個過程，其中許多項目是由監管引起的。我們在美國尤其如此，我們正在設立 IHC，並正在進行 CCAR 流程。

And what you see there is obviously a material increase in our cost. Part of that I would expect to disappear when we get into 2018 because some of the cost we currently have is really putting systems in place. There's a lot of, as we call it, change-the-bank activity, in that. But, yes, we will also have a certain cost block, which I can't quantify for you now, but it's something where we'll probably try to be more granular next time. Part of the direct spend is going to be sustainable, i.e. there is going to be a material run-the-bank portion of our direct spend.

而您所看到的顯然是我們的成本大幅增加。我預計，到 2018 年，部分成本將會消失，因為我們目前的部分成本實際上是用來建立系統。其中有許多我們稱之為「改變銀行」的活動。但是，是的，我們也會有一定的成本塊，我現在無法為您量化，但下次我們可能會嘗試更詳細地說明。部分直接支出將是可持續的，即：我們的直接支出中將有很大一部分用於擠佔銀行。

Postbank IPO, I cannot foresee this to have a negative impact on our reg capital. What it will do, it will definitely improve our CET1 ratio.

郵政銀行首次公開募股，我無法預見這會對我們的註冊資本產生負面影響。它肯定會提高我們的 CET1 比率。

I meant it more in terms of the impact on the numerator just on the capital. Could there be an impairment? I understand that the RWAs will obviously come off. But it was more the price relative to where the asset is carried today.

我更多的是指對資本的分子影響。可能會有損害嗎？我知道 RWA 顯然會取消。但它更多的是相對於資產目前所在位置的價格。

Look, we're planning to sell the asset either by way of an IPO or a trade sale. Let's see what the outcome is and then we will see whether or not that will bring about an impairment. I can't judge that now.

瞧，我們計劃透過 IPO 或交易出售的方式出售該資產。讓我們看看結果如何，然後看看是否會帶來損害。我現在無法判斷。

I think your last question was on the Russia case that we highlighted. John, do you want to take that?

我想你的最後一個問題是關於我們強調的俄羅斯問題。約翰，你想接受這個嗎？

I do, but I'm not going to say very much, unfortunately. I think we have highlighted that there is a US nexus to this matter and I think we should leave it at that.

我知道，但不幸的是，我不會說太多。我認為我們已經強調了此事與美國有關，我認為我們應該就此打住。

Great. Thank you.

偉大的。謝謝。

Stuart Graham, Autonomous Research.

史都華‧格雷厄姆，自主研究。

I have three questions, please. The first one is, I'd like to get a sense of how you think about the goal of the 10% ROE in 2020? How would you categorize it? Do you see that as the stretch target in your mind, the bare minimum a group like Deutsche should target? How would you describe that?

我有三個問題請問。第一個問題，我想了解一下，您對於2020年達成10%的ROE目標是怎麼看的？您會如何對其進行分類？您是否認為這就是您心中的延伸目標，是德意志銀行這樣的集團應該達到的最低目標？您會如何描述呢？

And, the second is maybe, John, you can talk about your pay incentives. Because looking at your last annual report, you only own I think 5,500 shares of Deutsche. I'm guessing that's changed when you were made CEO so that you got more skin in the game? Maybe you could update us on that?

第二，約翰，也許你可以談談你的薪酬激勵。因為從您上一份年度報告來看，我認為您只擁有 5,500 股德意志銀行股票。我猜想當您擔任執行長時情況發生了變化，以便您在遊戲中獲得更多利益？也許您可以向我們更新一下情況？

And then, the third question is, Deutsche has been trying to cut costs for as long as I can remember. You've had some good people trying their best; it hasn't worked. What concretely is going to be different this time around that we'll really believe that you will get those cost savings out?

第三個問題是，據我所知，德意志銀行一直在努力削減成本。一些優秀的人已經盡了最大努力；它沒有起作用。這次具體會有什麼不同，讓我們真正相信您能夠節省成本？

Stuart, hello. We were just debating who should answer your first question, and the one about my pay (laughter). The 10% ROE goal, I think we'd like to think it was a minimum. But, as I said earlier, in response to one of the questions, I would like to be in a position where ROE wasn't the only metric by which you looked at Deutsche Bank as well. We do need to move away from just earning a margin on assets on the balance sheet and liabilities on the balance sheet.

斯圖爾特，你好。我們剛才還在爭論誰該回答你的第一個問題，以及關於我的薪水的問題（笑聲）。10% 的 ROE 目標，我想我們認為這是一個最低限度。但是，正如我之前在回答其中一個問題時所說的那樣，我希望 ROE 並不是衡量德意志銀行的唯一指標。我們確實需要擺脫僅僅透過資產負債表上的資產和負債來賺取利潤的模式。

So, it is a target. We thought in the context of Strategy 2020 that was the right number to put in because the model showed that, that's where we could get to. But if you're asking whether or not we'd be satisfied by getting there and would then stop and reap the benefits, the answer is, no. We will try to improve it.

所以，這是一個目標。我們認為，在 2020 戰略的背景下，這是正確的數字，因為模型顯示，這是我們可以達到的目標。但如果你問我們是否會對到達那裡感到滿意，然後停下來享受其中的利益，答案是，不會。我們將盡力改進它。

Okay.

好的。

On my pay and rations, I'm not entirely doing this for the pay and rations. I don't actually think I own any Deutsche Bank shares. What you may referring to is, I think, on the Supervisory Board, the very modest remuneration that I enjoyed there I think was in part deferred and deferred by some synthetic exposure to Deutsche Bank. But it was a very small amount. Your number of 5,000 does not ring a bell, but it might be the right amount. Again, that's not a role you do for the sake of your own personal finances.

關於我的餉銀和口糧，我這麼做並不完全是為了餉銀和口糧。我其實並不認為我擁有任何德意志銀行的股份。您可能指的是，我認為，在監事會中，我所享受的非常微薄的薪酬，我認為部分是由於對德意志銀行的一些綜合風險敞口而推遲的。但數量非常少。您的 5,000 這個數字聽起來可能不太清楚，但可能是正確的數字。再說一遍，這不是為了你自己的個人財務而扮演的角色。

But I guess shareholders like to see --.

但我想股東們喜歡看到──。

I'm not the wealthiest CEO in the world and I am obliged on the terms of the normal contract for Board members to accumulate a stake in Deutsche Bank. I think the rate at which I'm meant to accumulate it exceeds the net pay that I'm likely to receive.

我不是世界上最富有的首席執行官，我有義務按照董事會成員的正常合約條款積累德意志銀行的股份。我認為我應該累積的速度超過了我可能收到的淨工資。

But I will try to expose myself to the Bank, but if you think that I will only come into work the 18 to 20 hours a day I've been doing recently because I'm going to earn lots of money and invest it in Deutsche Bank shares, you don't need to worry about that. I will be as committed as I can whether I own shares or not. But I do understand the point and I will hopefully, over time, be able to afford to buy some Deutsche Bank shares or perhaps, at some stage, maybe even given some as part of my remuneration.

但我會嘗試讓自己接觸銀行，但如果你認為我最近每天只會工作 18 到 20 個小時，因為我要賺很多錢並將其投資於德意志銀行的股票，那麼你不必擔心這一點。無論我是否擁有股份，我都會盡我所能。但我確實明白這一點，並且希望隨著時間的推移，能夠負擔得起一些德意志銀行的股票，或者在某個階段，甚至可以將一些股票作為我薪酬的一部分。

Okay. And on the costs?

好的。成本方面呢？

What would make us credible on the cost side? I think the whole point about efficiency, I think, what I've learned over the years is that if you just take horizontal slices out of costs, you don't get anywhere. You just irritate people. So I think what we said we are going to have to look at businesses, however you define them. Sometimes that means markets, sometimes it means product types. It can mean all sorts of things.

什麼能讓我們在成本上值得信賴？我認為效率的關鍵在於，根據我多年來的經驗，如果你只是從成本中抽取水平部分，那麼你將一事無成。你只會激怒別人。所以我認為，正如我們所說的，我們必須審視企業，無論你如何定義它們。有時這意味著市場，有時這意味著產品類型。它可以表示各種各樣的意思。

You take a long hard look at them at their current condition, at the likely future development of whatever business it is or whatever product it is. Look at it on a risk-based basis. So make an assessment of the operational risk, the likely change in regulation. All of that, form a business judgment and determine whether or not it makes sense to continue in that business. And normally it won't, because the cost base attached to it, or the regulatory spend, or the investment required to make it run to a standard that we expect is such that we don't think we'll get an attractive return.

你要仔細觀察他們的現狀，觀察他們所從事的業務或產品的未來發展前景。從風險的角度來看它。因此，要對操作風險和可能的監管變化進行評估。所有這些，形成一個商業判斷，並確定是否有必要繼續從事該業務。但通常情況下不會，因為與之相關的成本基礎、監管支出或使其達到我們預期的標準所需的投資使得我們認為我們不會獲得有吸引力的回報。

So we are prepared to change our historic view, which is to give up on the optionality of holding lots and lots of businesses open, and we'll close them. And that should have a disproportionately positive effect on us because we'll reduce costs to a greater degree than we reduce revenues.

因此，我們準備好改變我們的歷史觀點，即放棄讓大量企業繼續營業的選擇權，我們將關閉它們。這會對我們產生非常正面的影響，因為我們降低成本的程度將大於減少收入的程度。

If I can maybe add one point, John. Obviously, whether or not we will be delivering against the cost targets, you will only be able to judge after the fact and not just by what we're going to tell you. But I think one thing that we can highlight is that -- and John in a way explained it when he was talking about how we see the overall economic model for the Bank and we're trying to figure out what is the cost base in a way that in total we should be having. So our focus will be not so much on, hey, here's a cost save and we will continue to report against the cost save.

如果我可以補充一點的話，約翰。顯然，我們是否會實現成本目標，您只能在事後判斷，而不能僅根據我們告訴您的內容來判斷。但我認為我們可以強調的一件事是——約翰在談論我們如何看待銀行的整體經濟模式時以某種方式解釋了這一點，我們正試圖弄清楚總體上我們應該擁有的成本基礎是什麼。因此，我們的重點將不再是「嘿，這裡有成本節省，我們將繼續報告成本節省情況」。

What we will be doing is we will be targeting also some absolute cost targets that we're trying to achieve. And, hopefully, that will give you also a better way to then really track how we are performing against that. But more to that in October.

我們要做的是，我們也將瞄準一些我們試圖實現的絕對成本目標。並且，希望這也能為您提供更好的方法來真正追蹤我們的表現。但十月的情況會更糟。

Okay. Thank you.

好的。謝謝。

Jon Peace, Nomura.

野村證券的喬恩‧皮斯（Jon Peace）。

Yes. Good afternoon, John and Marcus. Thank you taking our questions. I'm afraid have one more on costs. I realize you're still working through the specifics, but Strategy 2020 was the first five-year plan we'd had from Deutsche in many years, rather than three years. I just wondered, do you think it's going to take that long to squeeze out meaningful cost savings, or do you think we might see some return earlier than that? I'm just trying to think of the profile of the cost improvements.

是的。下午好，約翰和馬庫斯。感謝您回答我們的問題。恐怕我還需要再問一個有關成本的問題。我知道您仍在研究具體細節，但 2020 年策略是德意志銀行多年來製定的第一個五年計劃，而不是三年。我只是想知道，您是否認為需要花那麼長時間才能實現有意義的成本節約，或者您是否認為我們可能會在那之前看到一些回報？我只是在思考成本改進的概況。

And then I just had a second question on capital planning. How should we think about your dividend policy, both in the short term and in the longer term as you approach your leverage goal? Thank you.

然後我剛剛問了關於資本規劃的第二個問題。當您接近槓桿目標時，我們應該如何考慮您的短期和長期股利政策？謝謝。

On your first question on the cost targets, I don't think we actually said in April that all these metrics we want to achieve in 2020. It was the name of the -- what we called our strategy was Strategy 2020. What we're obviously striving for is, in particular on the cost side, to see that we can become efficient -- more efficient, rather sooner than later. Now, today, we're not in a position to give you details on this, as we highlighted, but it is certainly not our objective to achieve material cost savings only in the year 2020. We want to definitely see material improvement way earlier than that.

關於成本目標的第一個問題，我認為我們實際上在 4 月並沒有說過我們希望在 2020 年實現所有這些指標。這就是——我們把我們的戰略稱為「2020戰略」。顯然，我們正在努力實現高效化，特別是在成本方面，越快越好。正如我們所強調的，今天我們無法向您提供這方面的詳細信息，但我們的目標肯定不是僅在 2020 年實現材料成本節約。我們確實希望能夠更早看到材料的改善。

On the second question, John, you want to take that?

關於第二個問題，約翰，你想回答嗎？

On the outlook for the dividend, there's not much to say at this stage. I think that we've made it relatively clear that although we are not planning to raise new capital as part and parcel of our strategy, I don't think we're giving impressions that we feel over-endowed with capital at the moment. We do need to start investing in order to be able to achieve these cost savings that Marcus just mentioned.

關於股利前景，現階段還沒有太多可說的。我認為我們已經相對清楚地表明，儘管我們並不打算將籌集新資本作為我們策略的重要組成部分，但我不認為我們目前給人的印像是我們擁有過多的資本。我們確實需要開始投資，以便能夠實現馬庫斯剛才提到的這些成本節約。

And so I think it's finally balanced and we should leave it at that until we see the outcome for the rest of the year. But we are planning a lot and the accounting impacts and the uncertainty for the rest of the year will weigh on that.

所以我認為它最終是平衡的，我們應該保持現狀，直到我們看到今年剩餘時間的結果。但我們計劃了很多，會計影響和今年剩餘時間的不確定性將對此造成影響。

Sure. Thank you.

當然。謝謝。

It's not going to be 89% payout ratio. That I would dare to say.

派息率不會達到 89%。我敢這麼說。

I think you already said that earlier, yes, but you're right. It won't be an 89% payout ratio.

是的，我想您之前已經說過了，但是您是對的。派息率不會達到 89%。

Thanks.

謝謝。

Huw van Steenis, Morgan Stanley.

休·範·史蒂尼斯，摩根士丹利。

Thanks as much. Two questions. One for John. As you've been on the Board for two years, what have you learned about why Deutsche has not been more successful in cutting costs so far? Now here you mentioned in your (technical difficulty) you talk about running too much optionality, but I'm even struck over the last three years Deutsche has actually added even more personnel to the group headcount. So, what's your diagnosis and therefore maybe give us some hints about what you're going to do differently?

非常感謝。兩個問題。一個給約翰。您已在董事會任職兩年，您認為德意志銀行為何至今未能在削減成本方面取得更大成功？現在，您在（技術難題）中提到了運行過多的可選性，但我什至感到震驚的是，在過去三年中，德意志銀行實際上為集團員工總數增加了更多人員。那麼，您的診斷是什麼？能否給我們一些提示，告訴我們您將採取哪些不同的措施？

And then, secondly, in the quarter, Deutsche got a two-notch downgrade from one of the agencies. I was just wondering what impact that may have had on collateral agreements and any sort of prospective view on what you're doing to mitigate any potential impact? Thank you.

其次，在本季度，德意志銀行的評級被一家評級機構下調了兩個等級。我只是想知道這會對抵押貸款協議產生什麼影響，以及您正在採取什麼措施來減輕任何潛在影響？謝謝。

Huw, just so I understand, you mentioned on the two-notch downgrade. The impact on what exactly? Was it collaterally?

休，據我了解，你提到了降級兩級。究竟有何影響？這是附帶的嗎？

Okay, sorry, so on any collateral agreements or any impact on the financial arrangements you got with counterparts?

好的，抱歉，那麼有任何抵押協議或對您與對方達成的財務安排有任何影響嗎？

Sorry, it was just to clarify what you'd said. Shall I take the first one first? I think I might give you two perspectives on the cost base. These go back for a decade or more. But I have a sense that, in the past, where we have found that we have cumbersome manual processes, that we have -- and you would probably know this from the way we're structured, we've had a tendency to move that manual process offshore to make it cheaper. And that has two or three consequences.

抱歉，我只是想澄清一下你所說的話。我先拿第一個好嗎？我想我可以給你兩個關於成本基礎的觀點。這些可以追溯到十年或更久以前。但我有一種感覺，在過去，我們發現我們的手動流程很繁瑣，而且您可能從我們的結構方式中知道這一點，我們傾向於將手動流程轉移到海外以降低成本。這會產生兩三個後果。

The first is, it costs in concrete, that process, because you've moved it offshore and for a while you feel you've ticked the box. The second is that it doesn't fix the fundamental problem, which is that you probably shouldn't have been doing it manually in the first place, and you should have computerized the process. The third piece being, if you had computerized it, you probably would have reduced the process and operational risk, but moving it offshore introduces operational risk because you've got to move things around the world. And we've a lot of very complex operations and process flows that I think, over the years, have led to this complexity that I talked about earlier.

首先，這個過程是需要花費具體成本的，因為你已經把它轉移到海外，並且有一段時間你感覺你已經完成了這個任務。第二，它沒有解決根本問題，也就是說，你可能一開始就不應該手動執行此操作，而應該將整個過程電腦化。第三點是，如果你將其電腦化，你可能會減少流程和營運風險，但將其轉移到海外會帶來營運風險，因為你必須將事物轉移到世界各地。我們有許多非常複雜的操作和流程，我認為多年來，這些操作和流程導致了我之前談到的這種複雜性。

So it takes a little bit of courage to go back and re-engineer those processes. The good thing is, when you're computerizing things these days, you can do it relatively quickly, because of advances in technology, and you can do it relatively cheaply, because hardware doesn't tend to cost that much. And, at the moment, we're running an estate of quite -- as I used the phrase earlier -- its a little rude -- but antiquated computer systems. They generally need a lot of manual intervention.

因此，回過頭來重新設計這些流程需要一點勇氣。好消息是，如今當你進行電腦化時，由於技術的進步，你可以相對較快地完成，而且你可以相對便宜地完成，因為硬體的成本往往不是那麼高。目前，我們正在管理一個相當 — — 正如我之前所說 — — 有點粗糙 — — 但過時的計算機系統。它們通常需要大量的人工幹預。

So where they've lost their currency, where they're not delivering the information to the standards we need, where the demands from third parties, which are perfectly reasonable, aren't met by the data we hold and the processes we currently have, then the only opportunity we have is to apply manpower to it. So one of the challenges in running a large complex institution is that you are constantly up against the decision as to whether you choose to do something that is important or you choose to do something that is urgent.

因此，當他們失去貨幣時，當他們沒有按照我們需要的標準提供資訊時，當第三方的要求（這些要求完全合理）無法透過我們持有的數據和我們目前擁有的流程來滿足時，我們唯一的機會就是投入人力。因此，經營大型複雜機構的挑戰之一是，你必須不斷做出選擇：是選擇做重要的事情還是選擇做緊急的事情。

And all too often the urgent wins out over the important. And that means you very often go for tactical fixes, which are quite manual, as opposed to long-term industrial-strength strategic fixes, which are more technology led. And it's not a criticism of anyone. It's actually where I think a lot of the industry has got to.

而緊急的事情往往比重要的事情更重要。這意味著你經常會尋求戰術性的解決方案，這些解決方案非常手動，而不是長期的工業強度戰略解決方案，而後者更多地由技術主導。這並不是對任何人的批評。事實上，我認為這是很多行業必須做的事情。

But the urgency that has been imposed on us to meet deadlines to improve the control we have over our businesses is something we should welcome, but it does mean, at times, that the urgency, as I said, trumps the important. And therefore we've found ourselves in a position where we're hiring consultants and we're hiring people on a short-term basis, at relatively high expense, to achieve remediation of processes that are still manual themselves. And the remediation is manual instead of being able to automate. And that's where the opportunity lies, in my view -- the core opportunity.

但是，我們應該歡迎強加給我們的緊迫感，要求我們在最後期限前完成任務，以加強對業務的控制，但有時，正如我所說，這確實意味著緊迫性勝過重要性。因此，我們發現自己處於這樣的境地：我們需要聘請顧問，並以相對較高的費用短期僱用人員，以修復仍然手動的流程。而且補救措施是手動的，而不是自動化的。在我看來，這就是機會所在——核心機會。

And then we can just change the way we do business, so that the business changes. It becomes much more technological and we get more -- to use these buzzwords -- front to back, where the front office system feeds directly into the ledgers as opposed to going through a very complex series of steps, many of which are intervened manually. So I think that's the opportunity for us.

然後我們就可以改變我們的經營方式，從而讓業務改變。它變得更加技術化，我們獲得更多——使用這些流行語——從前端到後端，前台系統直接將數據輸入分類賬，而不是經過一系列非常複雜的步驟，其中許多步驟都是手動幹預的。所以我認為這對我們來說是一個機會。

But, as I said in my introductory remarks, that doesn't take months to fix -- that can take years. But the prize at the end is very attractive.

但是，正如我在開場白中所說的那樣，解決這個問題並不需要幾個月的時間，而可能需要幾年的時間。但最後的獎品非常誘人。

On your second question, overall, actually the impact on incremental collateral postings so far has been pretty marginal. Obviously, several contracts are being renegotiated also in light of the downgrades, which, by the way, just as a reminder it's not a DB-specific one but one that has affected the entire industry. So you know there's not a special Deutsche Bank topic here. It did have some negative impact on our P&L. The biggest portion of that to the tune of around EUR100 million we've actually seen in DVA, FEA. And I think that's probably what we can say to that.

關於您的第二個問題，總體而言，到目前為止，對增量抵押品發布的影響實際上相當小。顯然，考慮到降級，幾份合約也正在重新談判，順便說一句，提醒一下，這不是 DB 特有的，而是影響了整個行業的。所以您知道這裡沒有關於德意志銀行的特別話題。它確實對我們的損益產生了一些負面影響。其中最大的一部分，約 1 億歐元，實際上是我們在 DVA、FEA 中看到的。我想這可能就是我們可以說的。

Great. Thank you. That was very helpful.

偉大的。謝謝。這非常有幫助。

We could refer you to some of our fund raising and the average spreads. In Q1, we raised just under EUR17 billion at an average spread over the relevant floating index. So around -- just under 50 basis points, 49 basis points or so. In Q2, which wouldn't have reflected all of the downgrade, we raised less and actually didn't need it less -- EUR5.5 billion, or just under 60 basis points. About 59 or so. But it's hard to define what proportion of that is actually due to a downgrade and how much is due just to general spread widening. We think there's general spread widening anyway. So I would imagine we would see our spreads continue to widen for a while. And, Marcus, I don't know if you've got a sense of where they are today?

我們可以向您介紹我們的一些融資情況和平均利差。在第一季度，我們按照相關浮動指數的平均利差籌集了近 170 億歐元。所以大約——略低於 50 個基點，49 個基點左右。在第二季度，我們籌集的資金較少，但實際上所需的資金也沒有減少——55 億歐元，或略低於 60 個基點，但這並沒有反映出所有的降級影響。大概59左右。但很難確定其中有多少比例實際上是由於評級下調造成的，又有多少只是由於總體利差擴大造成的。我們認為無論如何，利差普遍會擴大。因此我可以想像，我們的利差將在一段時間內繼續擴大。馬庫斯，我不知道你是否知道他們現在在哪裡？

I think we'd probably now be more in the 80s.

我認為我們現在可能更接近 80 年代了。

Thank you, John. Thanks a lot.

謝謝你，約翰。多謝。

Jeremy Sigee, Barclays.

巴克萊銀行的傑里米·西吉 (Jeremy Sigee)。

Just a couple of follow-on questions. One is continuing on cost but actually more about the one-off cost. I thought it was quite a striking feature of the April strategy, the amount of CTA and investment spend. I think it was EUR18.5 billion or something that you're planning, which is quite an impediment to profitability and to capital build. I just wondered what your thoughts on that are, John? Whether you take more time with some of that spend or whether you think you have to crack on and do the necessary things and incur the spend regardless. So that's the first question, just on execution of the strategy.

僅有幾個後續問題。一是繼續關注成本，但實際上更多的是專注於一次性成本。我認為四月份策略的一個顯著特徵是 CTA 的數量和投資支出。我認為您計劃的金額是 185 億歐元左右，這對盈利能力和資本建設來說是一個很大的障礙。我只是想知道你對此有何看法，約翰？無論您是否花費更多時間來處理這些支出，或者您是否認為您必須繼續努力並做必要的事情並承擔支出。這是第一個問題，僅關於戰略的執行。

The second question was much more of a numbers clarification. The EUR1.2-billion litigation charge in Q2 relating to US mortgages, was all of that for the civil cases or was any of that for a potential DOJ settlement that may be coming?

第二個問題更多的是數字澄清。第二季與美國抵押貸款相關的 12 億歐元訴訟費用是否全部用於民事案件，還是用於可能即將達成的司法部和解？

Marcus and I can answer your first question. I think you addressed it to me, so I'll have a first go. First of all, on our investment in fixing the Bank, we've already started. So, as I said, we're already in implementation mode. As Marcus mentioned in his address, IFRS guides us to some extent as to the timing of one-off charges for restructuring. We haven't, in the second quarter, posted those.

馬庫斯和我可以回答你的第一個問題。我想你已經向我提出了這個問題，所以我會先嘗試一下。首先，關於修復銀行的投資，我們已經開始了。因此，正如我所說，我們已經處於實施模式。正如馬庫斯在演講中提到的那樣，國際財務報告準則在一定程度上為我們確定重組一次性費用的時機提供了指導。我們在第二季還沒有發布這些內容。

As a consequence of developing our strategy, particularly in developing any reduction in our footprint, there will be almost inevitably a time when we are required to post specific restructuring provisions. So they will, by definition, because of the way the accounting works, be to some extent front loaded. So as soon as we identify in specifics where those cost savings and where those investments in cost savings occur, then we're required to make a provision. Marcus, I don't know if there's anything you want to add?

在製定我們的策略時，特別是在減少我們的足跡時，幾乎不可避免地會有需要我們發布具體的重組條款的時候。因此，根據會計工作的方式，它們將在某種程度上被預先加載。因此，一旦我們具體確定了這些成本節約和這些成本節約投資發生在哪裡，我們就需要做出準備。馬庫斯，我不知道您是否還有什麼要補充的？

Maybe it's worth highlighting one point which we think was partially misinterpreted and maybe it's probably our fault because we haven't been clear enough in communicating part of what was announced in April. The EUR8.5 billion that you're referring to in terms of investments was technically correct. What we, for example, did not want to imply is that we were now on top of our existing cost. Add another EUR1 billion in digital, another EUR1 billion in GTB, and another EUR1 billion in asset wealth management.

也許值得強調的是，我們認為這一點被部分誤解了，也許這可能是我們的錯，因為我們在傳達 4 月宣布的部分內容時還不夠清楚。您提到的85億歐元投資從技術上來說是正確的。例如，我們不想暗示的是，我們現在已經超出了現有的成本。在數位領域再增加10億歐元，在GTB領域再增加10億歐元，在資產財富管理領域再增加10億歐元。

Those EUR3 billion we view -- they have to come out of our ongoing cost position, which at the same time we want to improve. So, it's not that we're saying take an 85% cost income ratio and add on top of that EUR3 billion. That is not what the game plan is. I think this was really more meant to highlight that these are the areas where we want to invest, but do not expect us -- invest in the sense we want to grow there. But do not expect huge upfront cost in those areas. That is definitely not our plan.

我們認為這 30 億歐元必須從我們目前的成本狀況中支出，同時我們也希望改善這種狀況。因此，我們並不是說要採用 85% 的成本收入比，然後再增加 30 億歐元。這並不是比賽計劃。我認為這實際上更多的是為了強調這些是我們想要投資的領域，但不要指望我們以想要在那裡發展的方式進行投資。但不要期望這些領域的前期成本龐大。這絕對不是我們的計劃。

On your second question, details on the EUR1.2-billion litigation charge, really, be patient with us. I think we're trying to be really more transparent on this item because it is a very important topic, but I think we would be ill advised to provide the details on what exactly we have a provision for. I highlighted that US RMBS is a material point in this, but we don't want to go into more details there. Hope for your understanding.

關於您的第二個問題，有關 12 億歐元訴訟費用的詳細信息，請耐心等待。我認為我們正試圖在這個問題上更加透明，因為這是一個非常重要的主題，但我認為我們不宜提供有關我們具體規定的具體內容的細節。我強調過，美國人民幣抵押債券 (RMBS) 是其中的一個關鍵點，但我們不想在此深入討論細節。希望您能理解。

Okay. Fully understand. Thank you very much.

好的。完全理解。非常感謝。

Andrew Stimpson, Bank of America Merrill Lynch.

美銀美林的安德魯‧斯廷普森 (Andrew Stimpson)。

Thanks, hello, guys. One more on litigation. If you can't answer, that's fine, and I do appreciate the transparency you've given already today. If you are allowed to tell us what the trigger was for you to be able to provision this quarter? What was it that changed? Was it peer provisions or was it sat and talked more progressed? Or was it a particular court case? Any particular color there would be welcome.

謝謝，大家好。再說一個關於訴訟的問題。如果您無法回答，那也沒關係，我非常感謝您今天所表現出的透明度。如果可以的話，您可以告訴我們是什麼促使您能夠在本季提供資金？到底是什麼發生了改變？這是同行的規定還是坐下來談談更進步？或者這只是一個特定的案件？任何特定的顏色都會受到歡迎。

And then, secondly, on repricing. Some of your peers have spoken about repricing starting to come through and leverage constrained products. Just wondering if you guys are seeing the same. And if you are, would you say that repricing is significant enough to justify those businesses? Or is the repricing coming from such a low base that many of those products just don't make sense any longer?

其次，關於重新定價。您的一些同行談到重新定價開始發揮作用並利用受限產品。只是想知道你們是否看到了同樣的情況。如果是的話，您是否認為重新定價足以證明這些業務的合理性？還是說重新定價的基準太低，以至於許多產品已經不再有意義了？

And then, following from that, a more philosophical question I suppose. What do you think the future holds for some of those products, long term, as all banks are seeming to want to exit the same products? And you said that you want to move maybe some of those products to a more balance sheet-light model. But if Deutsche Bank is not doing it, then maybe no one does it in the end. Just wondering what you think the market, in the end, ends up looking like and whether -- do corporates and clients just do -- just hedge less risks because the economic advantage ends up being below the cost due and the industry needs to charge to make those products worthwhile for you and shareholders? Thanks.

然後，我想由此引出一個更哲學的問題。鑑於所有銀行似乎都想退出相同的產品，您認為從長遠來看，這些產品的前景如何？您說過，您可能想將其中一些產品轉向更輕資產的模式。但如果德意志銀行不這麼做，那麼最終可能就沒有人會這樣做了。只是想知道您認為市場最終會是什麼樣子，以及企業和客戶是否會減少對沖風險，因為經濟優勢最終低於成本，而行業需要收費才能使這些產品對您和股東來說有價值？謝謝。

Let me start with the litigation question. Look, there are several effects, and I can't go into the details, but it's obviously looking at other cases we see in the industry. There are, on some of the matters, obviously there's ongoing discussions that we have with authorities and findings from those. We always need to reflect upon end data and find their way into our balance sheet. And that's probably as precise as I can be at this stage.

我先從訴訟問題開始。看，有幾種影響，我無法詳細說明，但顯然我們正在研究行業中看到的其他案例。就某些問題而言，我們顯然正在與當局進行討論，並得出相關結論。我們總是需要反思最終數據並將其納入我們的資產負債表。這可能是我目前能做到的最精確的了。

Appreciate that.

非常感謝。

On the repricing points, I would say early stages. The area where we have seen some is maybe in FX but not terribly pronounced. I would say it's still early stage and, as far as I'm aware, we haven't really seen a lot of repricing.

關於重新定價點，我認為還處於早期階段。我們看到的一些區域可能在 FX 中，但不是很明顯。我想說現在還處於早期階段，據我所知，我們還沒有看到太多的重新定價。

And, Andrew, all I'd add there is that, for some products, which currently aren't really very valuable given the change in the manner in which capital is required to be put up against them, there is essentially no means of repricing them that then makes them attractive to a counterparty. And that's why there are products which were only viable when they were capital light. And so, it's a bit asymmetric how to reprice for products that are socially useful and real clients need. There's still a lot of competition between banks and other providers, and so we don't see much in the way of repricing.

安德魯，我想補充的是，對於某些產品來說，由於資本要求方式的變化，它們目前的價值並不是很高，基本上沒有辦法重新定價，從而使它們對交易對手具有吸引力。這就是為什麼有些產品只有在輕資本的情況下才可行。因此，對於具有社會實用性且客戶真正需要的產品，如何重新定價有點不對稱。銀行和其他供應商之間仍然存在著激烈的競爭，因此我們看不到太多的重新定價的跡象。

Where we've seen more esoteric product in the past that have been of a more proprietary nature, which are now capital heavy, they're just not viable if you reprice them to cover a cost of capital to produce an attractive return. So I think that asymmetry is important. That doesn't mean there's no flex in all products. But, at the moment, banking is still as competitive as it ever was.

我們過去見過一些更深奧的產品，它們具有更專有的性質，現在資本密集，如果你重新定價以覆蓋資本成本並產生有吸引力的回報，那麼它們是不可行的。所以我認為不對稱很重要。這並不意味著所有產品都沒有彈性。但目前，銀行業仍像以前一樣具有競爭力。

Sure. Okay. Thank you.

當然。好的。謝謝。

Andrew Lim, Societe Generale.

法國興業銀行的 Andrew Lim。

Hi. Good morning, John and Marcus. Thanks for the call. I've got a few questions, please. First of all, just a bit of clarity on the return on tangible equity target of 10% upgrades. I think, given that we don't have clarity on a cost income ratio and payout ratio and so forth, is that something that you're saying we should step away from for the time being and that you'll come back with a new target later on in October?

你好。早上好，約翰和馬庫斯。謝謝您的來電。我有幾個問題請問。首先，稍微澄清一下有形資產報酬率 10% 升級的目標。我認為，鑑於我們對成本收入比和派息率等尚不明確，您是否認為我們應該暫時放棄這些目標，而您會在 10 月下旬再提出新的目標？

And then, secondly, on the Strategy 2020 plan, there was a lot of focus last time around on the CET1 ratio target of around 11%. But the leverage ratio target of 5% upgrades and the implied completion of financial or RWA inflation. I was just wondering what your thoughts were on that topic? Is that something that we should be thinking about? Or should we step away from that as well?

其次，關於 2020 戰略計劃，上次重點關注的是 CET1 比率目標 11% 左右。但5%的槓桿率目標上調，隱含著金融或風險加權資產通膨的完成。我只是想知道您對這個主題有何看法？這是我們該思考的事情嗎？或者我們也應該遠離它？

And then, thirdly, on the leverage ratio, the previous management used to say that issuance of AT1 capital was restricted to about 150 basis points on risk-weighted assets. So, not much more capacity to issue more AT1 capital from where it currently stands. Is that still something that you hold to as well?

第三，關於槓桿率，前管理階層曾經表示，AT1 資本的發行被限制在風險加權資產的 150 個基點左右。因此，從目前的情況來看，發行更多 AT1 資本的能力並不大。您還堅持這一點嗎？

And then, lastly, just a little question on the NCOU. You've had some gains there on sale of maybe EUR100 million. Is there more low-hanging fruit there that you can achieve gains on, or is that it for the time being? And just wondering also what the quarterly run rate for the NCOU revenues are going forward? Many thanks.

最後，我再問一個關於 NCOU 的小問題。你們透過銷售獲得了大約 1 億歐元的收益。那裡是否有更多唾手可得的成果可供您獲取收益，還是暫時只有這些？並且還想知道 NCOU 未來季度的收入運行率是多少？非常感謝。

Okay. Let me start maybe with the last question on NCOU. Actually, I think our guys there wouldn't necessarily agree with the fact that there are low-hanging fruits. They're actually doing a very nice job in trying to drive this down. But, having looked into the portfolio that is still there, it is not an easy portfolio to work through. That said, we do have some ambition to see how we can really eventually then also come to a point where, at some stage, we no longer have to report about an NCOU, but that obviously will still take some time. But, no, there are no low-hanging fruits. It is a difficult portfolio but we are very actively working through this and expect further decline in the coming quarters.

好的。我先從關於 NCOU 的最後一個問題開始。實際上，我認為我們的人不一定會同意有唾手可得的成果這一事實。他們確實在努力降低這一水平，並且取得了很好的成績。但是，在研究了仍然存在的投資組合後，我們發現這並不是一個容易處理的投資組合。話雖如此，我們確實有一些雄心壯志，想看看我們最終如何才能達到這樣的程度，在某個階段，我們不再需要報告有關 NCOU 的信息，但這顯然還需要一些時間。但是，沒有唾手可得的成果。這是一個困難的投資組合，但我們正在積極努力解決這個問題，預計未來幾季將進一步下降。

On the first question, the ROTE targets and is there going to be an update? Look, again, we ask for patience. We'll come to you in August -- sorry, in October, and give you details which will be more focused on the things that we believe we control, which is to some extent our balance sheet and it's our cost position. And then, obviously, we will translate that into an ambition level that we have on the return side. And the 10% plus, as John highlighted, that's certainly the minimum we're targeting there.

關於第一個問題，ROTE 目標是否會有更新？瞧，我們再次請求大家耐心。我們將在八月份（抱歉，應該是十月份）與您聯繫，向您提供詳細信息，這些詳細信息將更多地側重於我們認為我們能夠控制的事情，從某種程度上來說，也就是我們的資產負債表和成本狀況。然後，顯然，我們會將其轉化為我們在回報方面的雄心水平。正如約翰所強調的那樣，10% 以上肯定是我們所追求的最低目標。

I'm not entirely sure I understood your question two on -- yes, we did mention RWA inflation to the tune of about EUR100 billion that we expect in particular for the period 2018/2019. So not in the near future. This is really driven by the -- basically Basel IV. There's this debate, is this already going to hit in 2018? Is it more in 2019 topics? So, it is kind of in that time window. At this stage, we would stick to the numbers that we highlighted. We have no further insight that would suggest that these numbers ought to look different from what we communicated in April.

我不完全確定我是否理解了你的第二個問題——是的，我們確實提到了 RWA 通膨約為 1000 億歐元，我們預計特別是在 2018/2019 年期間。所以近期不會。這實際上是由《巴塞爾協議 IV》推動的。存在這樣的爭論，這會在 2018 年發生嗎？2019 年的話題更多嗎？所以，它就處於那個時間窗口內。在這個階段，我們會堅持我們所強調的數字。我們沒有進一步的見解表明這些數字應該與我們 4 月傳達的數字有所不同。

And then I think your third question was on AT1.

然後我認為你的第三個問題是關於 AT1 的。

Yes, sir. Do you have more --

是的，先生。你還有更多嗎——

Can you repeat it maybe? You were mentioning -- can you just repeat the question?

你能再說一次嗎？您剛才提到—您能重複一下這個問題嗎？

What's the maximum AT1 capital that you can issue? Is it restricted to a maximum 150 basis points on risk-weighted assets?

您能發行的最大 AT1 資本是多少？風險加權資產的最高限額是否為150個基點？

Okay. Yes.

好的。是的。

To improve your leverage ratio through this angle.

透過這個角度來提高你的槓桿。

Basically, you should always suspect there is some buffer on top. We've not taken any of the assertions with regard to AT1 volumes beyond this. Basically, we think that there is still some room we have on the AT1 side.

基本上，您應該始終懷疑頂部存在一些緩衝區。除此之外，我們還沒有採納任何有關 AT1 數量的斷言。基本上，我們認為 AT1 方面仍然有一些空間。

Marcus, I think the only other point that I would add on AT1, and actually on the core equity Tier 1, is that it's important, over the plan period that we're talking about -- up to 2020 -- to shift the focus from just the core -- the group consolidated ratio to some of the more important booking centers we have. And I would encourage you to look at the IHC because in the context of having to set up the bank within a bank there's of course the potential demand that we are issuing AT1 out of our US business. Or at least constructing a form of AT1 internally that will essentially offset the parent company AT1. So when we -- the reason that -- we're not being obscure on these, but on the way the SREP works, we have to look at legal entities as well as the group consolidated picture.

馬庫斯，我認為關於 AT1，實際上是關於核心股權一級資本，我唯一想補充的一點是，在我們討論的計劃期間（到 2020 年），將重點從核心（集團合併比率）轉移到我們擁有的一些更重要的預訂中心，這一點很重要。我鼓勵您了解 IHC，因為在必須在銀行內設立銀行的背景下，我們當然有從美國業務發行 AT1 的潛在需求。或至少在內部建構一種 AT1 形式，從本質上抵消母公司 AT1。因此，當我們 — — 原因 — — 我們不會對這些含糊其辭，而是在 SREP 的工作方式上，我們必須考慮法人實體以及集團合併情況。

So although we've been -- in the past banks have been generally relatively open on the group consolidated number, one of the things we have to take into account is where the capital is, as much as how much we have on a group consolidated basis. And it's difficult for us to speak to that in more detail until we've alighted on the ultimate structure of the group and where our risk assets are, where our CRD4 leverage is, and then where the SREP and equivalents set the targets and trigger ratios for individual entities within the group.

因此，儘管我們——過去銀行對集團合併數字通常比較開放，但我們必須考慮的事情之一是資本在哪裡，以及我們在集團合併基礎上擁有多少。在我們確定集團的最終結構、風險資產所在、CRD4 槓桿率所在，以及 SREP 和等價物為集團內各個實體設定目標和觸發比率的地方之前，我們很難更詳細地談論這一點。

And so that 1.5% of RWA that you mentioned I imagine is the amount that you are wondering about whether we could issue that into the market at rates that give us at least an ability to leverage the return. Whereas we're thinking of AT1 in a much more granular fashion within the group as well, on a legal-entity basis. The other point on AT1 that we should highlight is the potential for rulings that allow us structural and statutory subordination of existing unsecured term debt that reconstituted by operation of statute as effective AT1.

所以我想您提到的 1.5% 的風險加權資產就是您想知道的金額，我們是否可以以至少讓我們有能力利用回報的利率將其發行到市場上。而我們也在集團內部以法人實體為基礎，以更細緻的方式考慮 AT1。關於 AT1，我們應該強調的另一點是，有可能做出裁定，允許我們對根據法規運作重組為有效的 AT1 的現有無擔保定期債務進行結構性和法定性從屬排序。

Right. Thanks a lot for that.

正確的。非常感謝。

In TLAC terms, specifically, I'm talking about, rather than issued AT1s. So, if a role of AT1 is effectively to be a contributor to the TLAC -- the TLAC is a very large number -- then the core TLAC may be met by existing debt.

具體來說，就 TLAC 而言，我談論的是，而不是已發行的 AT1。因此，如果 AT1 的角色實際上是成為 TLAC 的貢獻者（TLAC 是非常大的數字），那麼核心 TLAC 可能由現有債務來滿足。

Just to avoid any misunderstanding, there is -- you should not have -- if that was the background to your question, you should not have the expectation that we're going to come out with significant AT1 issues here. In a way, the same also holds true here for other questions that we answered before. Focus is on managing the balance sheets rather than throwing capital at the situation.

為了避免任何誤解，你不應該——如果這是你問題的背景，你不應該期望我們會在這裡提出重大的 AT1 問題。從某種程度上來說，這同樣適用於我們之前回答過的其他問題。重點在於管理資產負債表，而不是投入資金。

We should give the health warning on AT1 that we gave on core equity Tier 1 which is that we are not minded at the moment to issue unless the rules of the game change or unless there's an exogenous event that causes us to do that.

我們應該對 AT1 發出健康警告，就像我們對核心股權一級資本發出警告一樣，也就是說，除非遊戲規則發生變化，或發生外部事件導致我們這樣做，否則我們目前不打算發出警告。

Thanks very much. In your answer, you touched upon an important topic for Deutsche Bank and that's the FBO issue. Structurally, you've got a lower leverage ratio in your US operations than you do elsewhere. I was just wondering if you had any thoughts about how you might address that in your overall strategy? That would necessitate reallocation of capital from other parts to the US or maybe designating businesses as non-US, say to the UK or Mexico.

非常感謝。在您的回答中，您談到了德意志銀行的一個重要話題，那就是FBO問題。從結構上看，你們在美國的業務的槓桿率比其他地方要低。我只是想知道您是否考慮過如何在整體策略中解決這個問題？這將需要將資本從其他地區重新分配到美國，或將企業指定為非美國企業，例如英國或墨西哥。

Yes. And part of the Strategy 2020, one of the underlying factors that we're building into it were the FBO rules and the need to capitalize our IHC and have it up and running, initially by 2017 and then fully fledged by 2018. We would expect to meet the capitalization requirements of the IHC, which on a leverage basis could actually -- I think we'd expect would be marginally higher than the group net/net to meet that through internal allocation of capital.

是的。作為 2020 策略的一部分，我們正在建立的一個基本因素是 FBO 規則以及利用我們的 IHC 並使其初步在 2017 年啟動並運行，然後在 2018 年全面成熟。我們預計將滿足 IHC 的資本化要求，從槓桿率來看，這實際上可以 — — 我認為我們預計會略高於集團淨值/淨值，透過內部資本分配來滿足這一要求。

Although the leverage targets actually only kick in, in 2018.

儘管槓桿目標實際上要到 2018 年才會真正生效。

In 2018. That's correct.

在2018年。沒錯。

In the FBO. And we try to basically create all that through internal funding.

在 FBO。我們嘗試透過內部融資來實現這一切。

Yes. But bear in mind we have not been through the CCAR process yet for the IHC. So the outcome of that is uncertain.

是的。但請記住，我們尚未完成 IHC 的 CCAR 流程。因此其結果尚不確定。

Right. Thank you very much for that.

正確的。非常感謝。

Fiona Swaffield, RBC.

菲奧娜·斯瓦菲爾德（Fiona Swaffield），RBC。

Hi. Most questions have been answered, but I just wondered if you could comment on the compensation ratio, particularly in CB&S, which historically has gone up over the quarters -- starts very low, then creeps up. Do you think there's any prospect of changing the way that you accrue for variable compensation potentially so that it looks a bit less backend loaded? Thanks.

你好。大多數問題都已得到解答，但我只是想知道您是否可以評論一下薪酬比率，特別是 CB&S 的薪酬比率，該比率歷來在各個季度內呈上升趨勢 - 開始時很低，然後逐漸上升。您是否認為可以改變浮動薪酬的累積方式，使其看起來後端負擔較小？謝謝。

Fiona, I think the compensation accruals are driven just by the accounting. And there are no plans to make fundamental changes to the way that compensation is structured. And, as you know, compensation is now relatively heavily regulated. So the latitude we have to change our compensation basis is relatively low.

菲奧娜，我認為薪資應計只是由會計驅動的。目前還沒有計劃對薪酬結構做出根本性的改變。而且，如你所知，現在對薪酬的監管相對較嚴格。因此，我們改變薪酬基礎的自由度相對較低。

Okay. Thanks.

好的。謝謝。

Since we are running out of time, this was our last question. We apologize to those who do not get to ask. I would now like to hand back to John Andrews.

由於時間不多了，這是我們的最後一個問題。對於那些無法提問的人，我們深表歉意。現在我想把發言權交還給約翰安德魯斯。

Operator, thank you. And, again, let me extend my apologies to the small handful of you left in the queue. We have some tight internal scheduling, and Marcus and John have to move on to another event. Obviously, I and the IR team will be available for all of you with any of your follow-up questions. Otherwise, thank you very much for attending, and have a good day and evening.

接線員，謝謝。再次，請允許我向排隊中剩下的少數人表示歉意。我們內部的日程安排很緊湊，馬庫斯和約翰必須去參加另一個活動。顯然，我和 IR 團隊將隨時為大家解答任何後續問題。非常感謝您的出席，祝您有個愉快的一天和夜晚。

Ladies and gentlemen, the conference is now concluded and you may disconnect the telephone. Thank you for joining and have a pleasant day. Goodbye.

女士們、先生們，會議現已結束，您可以掛斷電話了。感謝您的加入並祝您有個愉快的一天。再見。