益華電腦 (CDNS) 2008 Q2 法說會逐字稿

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  • Operator

    Operator

  • Good afternoon. My name is Teresa, and I will be your conference operator today. At this time, I would like to welcome everyone to the 2008 Q2 earnings conference call. All lines have been placed on mute to prevent any background noise. After the speakers' remarks, there will be a question and answer session. ( OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS ) Thank you. Ms. Jordan, you may begin your conference.

    各位下午好。我叫 Teresa,今天將擔任本次會議的接線員。此刻,我謹代表公司歡迎各位參加 2008 年第二季(Q2)財報電話會議。為避免任何背景雜音,所有線路均已設為靜音。講者致詞結束後,將進行問答環節。( OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS )謝謝。Jordan 女士,您可以開始您的會議。

  • - IR

    - IR

  • Thank you, Teresa, and welcome to our earnings conference call for the second quarter of 2008. The webcast of this call can be accessed through our website, www.Cadence.com and will be archived for one week. With me today are Mike Fister, President and CEO; and Kevin Palatnik, Senior Vice President and CFO.

    謝謝你,Teresa,也歡迎各位參加我們 2008 年第二季財報電話會議。本次電話會議的網路直播可透過我們的網站 www.Cadence.com 收看,並將存檔一週。今天與我一同出席的有總裁暨執行長 Mike Fister,以及資深副總裁兼財務長 Kevin Palatnik。

  • Please note that today's discussion will contain forward-looking statements and that our actual results may differ materially from those expectations. For information on the factors that could cause a difference in our results, please refer to our 10-K for the period ended March 29, 2007, and our 10-Q for the period ended March 29, 2008 in the information set forth under the headings Cautionary Statement Regarding Forward-looking Statements and important information in the earnings press release issued today. In addition to financial results prepared in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, or GAAP, we will also present certain non-GAAP financial measures today. Cadence management believes in addition to using GAAP results in evaluating our business, it can also be useful to measure results using certain non-GAAP financial measures. Please refer to an earnings press release for discussion of non-GAAP measures, and both our earnings press release and our website for reconciliation of GAAP and non-GAAP financial measures used in today's discussion and with that I will turn the call over to Mike Fister.

    請注意,今天的討論將包含前瞻性陳述,而我們的實際結果可能與這些預期存在重大差異。關於可能導致我們結果出現差異的因素,請參閱截至 2007 年 3 月 29 日止期間的 10-K,以及截至 2008 年 3 月 29 日止期間的 10-Q,並參考其中「關於前瞻性陳述之警示聲明」等標題下所載資訊,以及今日發布之財報新聞稿中的重要資訊。除依據一般公認會計原則(GAAP)編製的財務結果外,我們今天也將提供若干非 GAAP 財務衡量指標。Cadence 管理層認為,除使用 GAAP 結果評估業務外,使用某些非 GAAP 財務衡量指標來衡量結果亦可能有其助益。關於非 GAAP 指標之討論,請參閱財報新聞稿;而今日討論中使用之 GAAP 與非 GAAP 財務衡量指標之調節表,請參閱我們的財報新聞稿及公司網站。接下來我將把電話交給 Mike Fister。

  • - President, CEO

    - President, CEO

  • Thanks, Jennifer. Good afternoon to everyone who joined us on today's call. I will begin today's call with some high level comments on the quarter. Our business has a whole and also provide a brief update on our proposal to acquire Mentor Graphics, and then I will turn the call over to Kevin, who will go into more detail in the numbers in our outlook.

    謝謝你,Jennifer。各位下午好,感謝大家參加今天的電話會議。我將先就本季做一些高層次的評論,概述我們整體業務情況,並簡要更新我們收購 Mentor Graphics 的提案進展,之後我會把電話交給 Kevin,由他更詳細說明數字與我們的展望。

  • Revenue for Q2 was $329 million, and non-GAAP earnings per share was $0.14. Key business highlights for the quarter include testimonials from several major customers, as well as the announcement of new technology for the systems software space. Matsushita is deploying Virtuoso 6.1 for both its advanced and legacy process nodes. Renesas publicly endorsed our solution for integrated statistical timing and optimization, and recently followed up with an announcement that they have adopted SoC encounter for their largest and most complex advanced chips. Broadcom recently increased its capacity using the latest Palladium 3 technology and told us that the Palladium end circuit emulation and ethernet speed bridge adapters have been key to the system validation efforts for their market leading ethernet switch products. This quarter we announced to you a silicon compiler which helps customers reduce iterations between system specification and design and implementation, and improve designer productivity for IP creation and reuse. Hitachi and Renesas both provided input into the technology, and are now using it successfully.

    第二季營收為 3.29 億美元,非 GAAP 每股盈餘為 0.14 美元。本季主要業務亮點包括多家重要客戶的肯定見證,以及我們在系統軟體領域宣布的新技術。Matsushita 正在其先進與既有製程節點上部署 Virtuoso 6.1。Renesas 公開背書我們的整合式統計時序與最佳化解決方案,並於近期進一步宣布已採用 SoC encounter 來設計其最大且最複雜的先進晶片。Broadcom 近期使用最新的 Palladium 3 技術提升其產能,並告訴我們,Palladium 端到端電路仿真與乙太網路速度橋接轉接器,對其市場領先的乙太網路交換器產品之系統驗證工作至關重要。本季我們向各位宣布一款矽編譯器,可協助客戶降低系統規格與設計、實作之間的反覆迭代,並提升設計人員在 IP 建立與重用方面的生產力。Hitachi 與 Renesas 皆對該技術提供了意見,且目前已成功使用。

  • Although we achieved our Q2 numbers and had a number of successes with our customers and new technology releases, it was challenging. The impact is slowing and price conscious economic environment exceeds what we originally anticipated. Customers are demanding even more flexibility in when, what, and how they purchase software and hardware. Many of our customers are facing uncertainty or outright slowdowns in their businesses. Others are choosing to amortize their current technology investments, staying with the same process nodes and methodologies longer. This means new design methodologies, using our advanced products are slower to migrate from high-end to gain broad proliferation in the main treatment. This invariably puts greater risk in our ability to do incremental business in the second half. Yet other customers are demanding greater flexibility in terms and access due to market conditions in order to close business.

    儘管我們達成第二季的數字,並在客戶與新技術發布方面取得多項成功,但整體環境仍具挑戰性。經濟環境放緩且對價格更為敏感的影響,超出我們原先的預期。客戶在購買軟體與硬體的時間、內容與方式上,要求更高的彈性。我們許多客戶的業務面臨不確定性,甚至出現明顯放緩。另一些客戶則選擇攤提其既有技術投資,在相同製程節點與方法學上停留更久。這意味著採用我們先進產品的新設計方法學,從高階市場向主流市場擴散的速度較慢,難以在主流市場廣泛普及。這不可避免地提高了我們在下半年進行增量業務的風險。還有一些客戶因市場狀況而在條款與存取方面要求更大的彈性,以促成交易。

  • As a result, we have made the difficult but necessary decision to lower our outlook and transition to an approximately 90% ratable license mix. We believe this transition will enable to us keep our focus on the value of our technology, and this decision is the right one for our business over the long-term and for building sustaining strong customer relationships in the future. Cadence fundamentals are intact. We have strong customer relationships around the world, and continue to maintain our share of customer spend. We continue to make investments in research and development, and have a robust pipeline of technology. Product rollouts are on track, we'll introduce some of these CDN Live in September. We have a talented talented team committed to the long-term success of our business.

    因此,我們做出了艱難但必要的決定:下調我們的展望,並轉型至約 90% 的可攤銷(ratable)授權組合。我們相信,這項轉型將使我們能持續聚焦於技術價值;從長期而言,這項決策對我們的業務以及未來建立並維繫強健的客戶關係都是正確的。Cadence 的基本面依然穩健。我們在全球擁有強大的客戶關係,並持續維持客戶支出中的市占。我們仍持續投資研發,並擁有強勁的技術產品管線。產品推出進度如期,我們將於九月的 CDN Live 介紹其中部分產品。我們擁有一支才華洋溢的團隊,致力於公司長期成功。

  • Now I would like to take a moment to update you regarding our proposal to acquire Mentor Graphics. As you know, on June 17th we publicly discussed our all cash proposal to acquire all the outstanding shares of Mentor Graphics for $16 per share. We continue to believe that our proposal is extremely compelling for the Mentor Graphics shareholders. Our proposal provides them with the unique opportunity to realize with certainty a significant cash premium value for their investment in Mentor Graphics. It remains our preference to work cooperatively with Mentor Graphics to complete the acquisition. Although we have not had discussions with Mentor Graphics concerning our acquisition proposal, we continue to communicate to them and their advisors both privately and publicly that we want to meet with them immediately to begin substantive discussions regarding our proposal. That said, we remain committed to the transaction and are moving this process forward on several fronts. We have commenced the regulatory process and have filed the require HSR notices with the US regulatory authorities. We remain confident that the proposed transaction will receive all necessary governmental approvals.

    現在我想花一點時間向各位更新我們收購 Mentor Graphics 的提案。如各位所知,6 月 17 日我們公開說明了以全現金方式收購 Mentor Graphics 全部流通在外股份的提案,收購價格為每股 16 美元。我們仍然相信,我們的提案對 Mentor Graphics 股東極具吸引力。我們的提案為其提供一個獨特機會,能以確定性實現其對 Mentor Graphics 投資的顯著現金溢價價值。我們仍偏好與 Mentor Graphics 以合作方式完成收購。儘管我們尚未就收購提案與 Mentor Graphics 進行討論,我們仍持續透過私下與公開方式向其及其顧問傳達:我們希望立即與其會面,開始就提案進行實質性討論。即便如此,我們仍致力於完成交易,並在多個面向推進此流程。我們已啟動監管程序,並已向美國監管機關提交所需的 HSR 通知。我們仍有信心,擬議交易將取得所有必要的政府核准。

  • Additionally, as of July 11th, Cadence acquired through open market transactions, approximately 4.3 million shares of Mentor Graphics. This represents approximately 4.7% of Mentor's outstanding common stock. We're confident that our HSR filing and ownership stake in Mentor Graphics demonstrate our commitment to this transaction. We're also in the process of working with our financial advisors to structure the permanent financing for the transaction on the most attractive terms available to us. Let me reiterate that our proposal is not subject to any financing conditions. We continue to believe strongly in this acquisition, and we will do what makes sense for us and our shareholders in making this combination a reality.

    此外,截至 7 月 11 日,Cadence 已透過公開市場交易收購約 430 萬股 Mentor Graphics 股票,約占 Mentor 流通在外普通股的 4.7%。我們相信,我們的 HSR 申報以及在 Mentor Graphics 的持股,展現了我們對此交易的承諾。我們也正與財務顧問合作,規劃本交易的永久性融資架構,以取得對我們最具吸引力的條件。我再次強調,我們的提案不以任何融資條件為前提。我們仍然堅信這項收購,並將在促成此一組合成真時,採取對我們及股東而言合理的作法。

  • I will now turn the call over to Kevin.

    接下來我把電話交給 Kevin。

  • - SVP, CFO

    - SVP, CFO

  • Thanks, Mike. Results for our key operating metrics for Q2 were total revenue of $329 million, non-GAAP operating margin of 15%, and operating cash flow of $77 million. GAAP earnings per share for Q2 was $0.02 compared to $0.20 for Q2 of 2007. Non-GAAP earnings per share for Q2 was $0.14 compared to $0.30 for Q2 of 2007. Total revenue for the second quarter was $329 million, compared to $391 million for Q2 of 2007, a decrease of 16%. Product revenue was $195 million, maintenance revenue was $100 million, and services revenue was $34 million. Revenue mix by geography in Q2 was 49% for the Americas, 21% for Europe, 18% for Japan, and 12% for Asia. Total cost and expenses on a non-GAAP basis for Q2 were $280 million, flat when compared to Q2 of 2007.

    謝謝你,Mike。第二季我們關鍵營運指標的結果為:總營收 3.29 億美元,非 GAAP 營業利益率 15%,以及營運現金流 7,700 萬美元。第二季 GAAP 每股盈餘為 0.02 美元,去年 2007 年第二季為 0.20 美元。第二季非 GAAP 每股盈餘為 0.14 美元,去年 2007 年第二季為 0.30 美元。第二季總營收為 3.29 億美元,較 2007 年第二季的 3.91 億美元下降 16%。產品營收為 1.95 億美元,維護營收為 1.00 億美元,服務營收為 3,400 萬美元。第二季按地區劃分的營收組合為:美洲 49%、歐洲 21%、日本 18%、亞洲 12%。第二季以非 GAAP 基礎計算的總成本與費用為 2.80 億美元,與 2007 年第二季相比持平。

  • Non-GAAP operating margin for Q2 was 15%. Quarter end headcount was approximately 5,100. Total DSOs for Q2 decreased to 139 days from 176 days in Q1, and quality of receivables remains high with less than 1% of receivables 90 days past due. Operating cash flow for Q2 was $77 million compared to $101 million for the second quarter of 2007. Capital expenditures for Q2 were $36 million. Cadence did not repurchase any common stock in Q2 and approximately $412 million remains under our current stock repurchase authorization. Cash and cash equivalents were $837 million at quarter end.

    第二季非 GAAP 營業利益率為 15%。季末員工人數約為 5,100 人。第二季總 DSOs 由第一季的 176 天降至 139 天,且應收帳款品質仍維持高水準,逾期 90 天以上的應收帳款不到 1%。第二季營運現金流為 7,700 萬美元,較 2007 年第二季的 1.01 億美元為低。第二季資本支出為 3,600 萬美元。Cadence 在第二季未回購任何普通股,且在目前的股票回購授權額度下仍剩約 4.12 億美元。季末現金及約當現金為 8.37 億美元。

  • Now I will turn to our outlook for Q3 and the year. The outlook reflects the shift to a 90% ratable mix and lower business levels for the remainder of the year. For Q3, we expect revenue to be in the range of 235 to $245 million. GAAP EPS should be in the range of a loss of $0.25 to $0.27, and non-GAAP EPS in the range of a loss of $0.09 to $0.11. For the year 2008, we expect revenue to be in the range of 1.12 to $1.14 billion. We expect year end backlog to be approximately $2 billion with order levels at approximately $1.1 billion. For 2008, we expect weighted average contract life to be in the range of three to four years. We expect to be break even for the non-GAAP operating margin on an annual basis for 2008. GAAP EPS should be in the range of a loss of $0.50 to $0.54, and non-GAAP EPS in the range of a positive $0.01 to $0.05. Other income for 2008 should be in the range of 12 to $16 million. For 2008, we expect to generate operating cash flow of approximately $175 million, down from our prior estimate of $300 million, due primarily to lower business levels and to a lesser extent, fewer receivable sales. We expect DSOs to be approximately 125 days at the close of 2008. Capital expenditures for 2008 should be in the range of $70 million with an additional $37 million for work to complete our new engineering building.

    現在我將談談我們對第三季及全年展望。此展望反映了轉向 90% 按期認列(ratable)組合,以及今年剩餘期間較低的業務水準。第三季方面,我們預期營收介於 2.35 億至 2.45 億美元。GAAP 每股盈餘(EPS)預計介於虧損 0.25 至 0.27 美元之間,非 GAAP EPS 預計介於虧損 0.09 至 0.11 美元之間。2008 全年方面,我們預期營收介於 11.2 億至 11.4 億美元。我們預期年末在手訂單(backlog)約為 20 億美元,訂單水準約為 11 億美元。2008 年我們預期加權平均合約年限介於三至四年。我們預期 2008 年全年非 GAAP 營業利益率約為損益兩平。GAAP EPS 預計介於虧損 0.50 至 0.54 美元之間,非 GAAP EPS 預計介於正 0.01 至 0.05 美元之間。2008 年其他收入預計介於 1,200 萬至 1,600 萬美元。2008 年我們預期產生約 1.75 億美元的營運現金流,低於先前估計的 3 億美元,主要因業務水準較低,且次要原因為應收帳款出售較少。我們預期 2008 年底 DSOs 約為 125 天。2008 年資本支出預計約為 7,000 萬美元,另加 3,700 萬美元用於完成我們新的工程大樓。

  • I know it is hard to analyze a software company when it goes through this kind of transition because of the impact the ratable mix has on revenue and operating margin. Although it is too early to provide specifics on 2009 guidance, I do want to provide some insight for operating cash flow. Our preliminary look at operating cash flow for 2009 suggests that it will be approximately $250 million with less than 10% coming from receivable sales. Looking forward, our strategy is to continue to leverage EDA cards, customers large and small continue to embrace our EDA cards as a preferable sale and delivery mechanism for our software. We expect to change to a high ratable mix to contain an increased proportion of platinum cards as well some ratable gold cards.

    我知道,當一家軟體公司經歷這類轉型時,由於按期認列(ratable)組合對營收與營業利益率的影響,分析起來會很困難。雖然現在要提供 2009 年指引的具體數字仍為時過早,但我確實想就營運現金流提供一些觀點。我們對 2009 年營運現金流的初步評估顯示,約為 2.5 億美元,其中來自應收帳款出售的比例低於 10%。展望未來,我們的策略是持續運用 EDA 卡;無論大型或小型客戶都持續將我們的 EDA 卡視為更理想的軟體銷售與交付機制而加以採用。我們預期在轉向高按期認列組合的同時,將納入更高比例的白金卡(platinum cards),以及部分按期認列的金卡(ratable gold cards)。

  • One final point. I believe the reduction in our outlook and the move to a higher ratable mix is the rate change for the business as we look to the environment and our customer base. Going forward, we'll have more flexibility to provide the right solution to customers when they need it and value it appropriately. Operator, we'll now take questions.

    最後一點。我認為我們下調展望並轉向更高的按期認列(ratable)組合,是因應我們在觀察環境與客戶基礎後,對業務節奏所做的調整。未來,我們將更有彈性在客戶需要時提供合適的解決方案,並以適當方式反映其價值。接線員,我們現在開始提問。

  • Operator

    Operator

  • (OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS). Our first question comes from Rich Valera.

    (接線員指示)。我們的第一個問題來自 Rich Valera。

  • - Analyst

    - Analyst

  • Hi. Good afternoon. I guess I will start off with just on the Mentor acquisition. When you proposed that deal, you talk about a leverage ratio of 2.5 X based on trailing cash flow of the combined companies. Obviously with your new forward projections, your cash flow in '08 and probably '09 are going to be significantly less than they were in '07, which gives you a very different leverage ratio, so I guess the question is do you still feel like you can support the 1.1 -- additional $1.1 billion of debt and at what kind of terms could you support that debt to make the offer?

    嗨,下午好。我想我先從 Mentor 併購案談起。當你們提出那筆交易時,你們談到以合併後公司過去的現金流為基礎,槓桿比率為 2.5 倍。顯然依照你們新的前瞻預測,你們在 2008 年以及可能 2009 年的現金流將顯著低於 2007 年,這會讓槓桿比率變得很不一樣。所以我的問題是,你們仍然覺得可以承擔額外 11 億美元的債務嗎?以及你們能以什麼樣的條件承擔該債務來提出這個收購要約?

  • - SVP, CFO

    - SVP, CFO

  • Hi, Rich. This is Kevin. With the model shift, the appropriate met trick going forward is operating cash flow, and the strong cash flow from the combined operation will allow the business to deleverage fairly quickly. The $250 million that I gave for guidance for 2009 is on a stand alone basis, and basically, if we went to the markets for $1.1 billion in debt, we would be able to pay that back in approximately four years even before any adjustments or synergies based on the combo.

    嗨,Rich。我是 Kevin。隨著模式轉換,未來適當的衡量指標是營運現金流,而合併後營運所帶來的強勁現金流將使公司能相當快速地去槓桿。至於我提供的 2009 年 2.5 億美元現金流指引,是以單獨公司(stand alone)為基礎;基本上,如果我們到市場上籌措 11 億美元的債務,即使在未考慮任何調整或合併綜效之前,我們也能在約四年內償還。

  • - Analyst

    - Analyst

  • In terms of a rate, I think you talked about a rate of LIBOR plus 150 to 200 points. Do you still think that is a doable rate?

    就利率而言,我想你們提過利率大約是 LIBOR 加 150 到 200 個基點。你們仍然認為這樣的利率可行嗎?

  • - SVP, CFO

    - SVP, CFO

  • Yes, Rich, so we're still working with our financial advisors to structure that financing in the most favorable terms for us, so probably won't get into specifics on LIBOR.

    是的,Rich,我們仍在與財務顧問合作,以對我們最有利的條件來規劃該融資結構,所以我可能不會就 LIBOR 的細節多談。

  • - Analyst

    - Analyst

  • Okay. And a question on -- as far as the model transition that seems to make sense for the long-term, I guess the real question is on bookings. Last year you guys had a modestly positive book-to-bill which would have suggested bookings were around the $1.6 billion level and if I heard you correctly, you're talking about $1.1 billion of bookings this year, so that's obviously something that's not affected by a model transition and is really a function of the strength of your current business. Can you just talk about and clearly a quarter ago, presumably, you were expecting to do something on the order of $1.5 billion or so of bookings, so did the environment deteriorate that quickly that your bookings outlook could have gone from $1.5 billion down to $1.1 billion in one quarter or any color around that would be helpful?

    好的。再問一個問題——就這個模式轉型而言,長期看起來是合理的;但我想真正的問題在於接單(bookings)。去年你們的 book-to-bill 略為正值,這表示接單大約在 16 億美元左右;如果我沒聽錯,你們今年談的是 11 億美元的接單,所以這顯然不是模式轉型造成的,而是你們目前業務強度的反映。你們能否談談這點?而且很明顯一季之前,你們大概還預期接單會在 15 億美元左右;所以環境是在一季之內惡化得那麼快,以致你們的接單展望可以從 15 億美元降到 11 億美元嗎?任何補充說明都會很有幫助。

  • - President, CEO

    - President, CEO

  • Certainly the environment has deteriorated. I have been around the world everywhere, almost everywhere in the last month, and even if you look at the spate of announcements from a variety of sources, not necessarily concentrated in the semiconductor industry, environment has gotten worse. I am struggling to find anybody who thinks that the second half is going to be strong, let alone hold up to where it was, and that's continuing to reach out into not just the first half of '09 but the second half of '09. Certainly we're choosing to be conservative about our forecast. The mix change gives us the opportunity to have longer conversations with customers about value and it is consistent with the comments that I made about the three types of customers. Those are in outright stress of one type or another financially, those are deciding that their waterfall rates are a little slower for proliferation, and those that are willing to do stuff but probably at terms that we're not that interested in doing because we're holding our line on what we think the perceived and real value of our technology is, and I don't know if that's in contrast with everybody else, but I know that's what we're going to do, so that's what led us to draw the conclusion that we did.

    環境確實已經惡化。我在過去一個月幾乎跑遍全球各地;而且即便你看看來自各種來源的一連串公告——不一定集中在半導體產業——環境都變得更糟。我很難找到任何人認為下半年會很強,甚至很難找到有人認為下半年能維持在原本的水準;而這種看法也持續延伸到不只是 2009 年上半年,甚至到 2009 年下半年。我們當然選擇對預測採取保守態度。組合改變讓我們有機會與客戶就價值進行更長時間的對話,這也與我先前對三類客戶的評論一致:一類是在財務上以某種形式承受明顯壓力;一類是認為其瀑布式(waterfall)進度/速率在擴散(proliferation)上稍微放慢;以及一類是願意做一些事情,但可能是在我們不太有興趣接受的條件下,因為我們會堅守我們認為技術的可感知價值與實際價值應該是多少。我不知道這是否與其他公司形成對比,但我知道我們會這麼做;因此這就是促使我們得出該結論的原因。

  • - Analyst

    - Analyst

  • That's helpful. Thank you.

    這很有幫助。謝謝。

  • - President, CEO

    - President, CEO

  • Sure.

    不客氣。

  • Operator

    Operator

  • Our next question comes from Mahesh Sanganeria.

    我們的下一個問題來自 Mahesh Sanganeria。

  • - Analyst

    - Analyst

  • Thank you. Mike, again, just to follow up on that, you were expecting earlier in the year a big ramp in the revenue in Q3 and Q4, and I just want to get some more color on what were your assumptions that went to -- that became different because I think we have been in this environment for awhile, but what degraded, and again I will say the same thing that, yes, things are bad, but I can't get from any semiconductor companies or any in other Companies that things are gotten so much worse what you're forecasting. Can you help us understand that a little bit more?

    謝謝你。Mike,再追問一下,年初你原本預期第三季與第四季營收會大幅拉升,我想更進一步了解,當時你有哪些假設——後來變得不同了?因為我認為我們在這種環境已經有一段時間了,但到底是什麼惡化了?我再重申一次:是的,情況很糟,但我從任何半導體公司或其他公司那裡都聽不到「情況變得比你們預測的還要糟很多」。你能不能幫我們更理解一下?

  • - President, CEO

    - President, CEO

  • I don't know if it is worse or better relative from the semiconductor companies. I can tell you that a relative time discretion spend for them, especially for waterfalling new technology and that's a conversion of bookings and bookings converted to revenue. I think that we could continue to go along and force some of the characteristics that we projected, but it is not going to be at the same value terms we're really interested in doing, and I have always believed, and I continue to believe that it is not in anybody's best interests, certainly ours but even our customers to jam them with technology, extend licenses forever, or extend contracts to infinity, to be able to drive that, any kind of reasonable bookings on a revenue dynamic, and certainly with the transparency of the model we had, we were making decisions about bookings to revenue conversion and this makes it a lot simpler that we don't have to -- that we don't have to force that as much if we don't want to, so that's a combination of things that drives this.

    我不確定相較於半導體公司而言是更糟還是更好。我可以告訴你的是,對他們來說在時間上的可支配支出(time discretion spend)是相對的,特別是用於瀑布式導入(waterfalling)新技術,而那會牽動訂單(bookings)的轉換,以及訂單轉為營收。我認為我們可以繼續推進並強行維持一些我們原先預測的特徵,但就我們真正有興趣做的「價值條件」而言,不會是同樣的水準。我一直相信、也仍然相信,這不符合任何人的最佳利益——當然包括我們,也包括客戶——去硬塞技術給他們、把授權無限期延長,或把合約延到無限長,以便在營收動態上推動任何合理的訂單量。尤其在我們模型透明度之下,我們一直在就「訂單到營收」的轉換做決策;而現在這樣做讓事情簡化許多,因為如果我們不想,我們就不必那麼用力去推動轉換。所以這是多種因素的組合,促成了這個結果。

  • The customers I think it is seminal that the customers are staying on old process nodes longer. Some may never move to 45 nanometers, and that's relatively recent and continuing to change, and even the one that is are doing it are sticking with older technologies that are not either more efficient, productive, or give the same kind of results, and just taking more risk in what they're doing. That's the second change in the industry that has been nontraditional, so some of these things continue to evolve. Some of them just continue to escalate at more rapid pace, but the pricing in the environment for the semiconductor manufacturers has only deteriorated and to some of them very drastically, the worst on the memory side, and some of our customers have seen radical drops in either their inventory condition, their ability to drive pricing for their product or even to deliver it, and that those things have an impact on what we do.

    我認為一個關鍵點是,客戶正在更長時間停留在舊的製程節點。有些可能永遠不會移轉到45奈米;這是相對近期的現象,而且仍在變化。即便有些正在移轉的客戶,也仍然採用較舊的技術——這些技術不是更有效率、更具生產力,或能帶來同樣的結果——而他們只是承擔更多風險來做事。這是產業中第二個非傳統的變化,因此其中一些事情仍在演進;有些則只是以更快的速度持續升級。但半導體製造商所處環境的定價只是在惡化,對其中一些甚至是非常劇烈地惡化;記憶體端最糟。而我們的一些客戶在庫存狀況、推動其產品定價的能力,甚至交付能力上都出現了劇烈下滑,這些都會影響我們的業務。

  • - Analyst

    - Analyst

  • Can you give us a little bit more color on what was the thought process in changing going back to the 90% ratable model? You just recently went from 70% plus to 50% kind of and now you're going back to 90. Can you walk us through some of your thought process in that?

    你能不能再多說一點,關於把模式改回90%按期認列(ratable)模型的思考過程?你們不久前才從70%多變到大約50%,現在又回到90%。可以帶我們走一遍你們的思考邏輯嗎?

  • - SVP, CFO

    - SVP, CFO

  • Mahesh, this is Kevin. As Mike said, the environment as we exited Q2, early Q3, proved much more challenging than we anticipated. Even though we successfully completed the quarter. With that as a back drop, it was our conclusion that moving to a more ratable mix will enable us to keep our focus on the value of our technology. We've talked about maintaining that value throughout the first half, and we believed that this further solidifies that.

    Mahesh,我是Kevin。正如Mike所說,我們在第二季結束、第三季初所面對的環境,比我們預期的要艱難得多。儘管我們成功完成了該季度。在這樣的背景下,我們的結論是:轉向更高比例的按期認列組合,將使我們能把重心放在我們技術的價值上。我們在上半年一直談到要維持這個價值,而我們相信這項調整會進一步鞏固這一點。

  • - President, CEO

    - President, CEO

  • Certainly you can see based on the book of business that we have and what we convert, some companies that want to do more up front and some that want to do more subscriptively, and it is largely a function of access to new technology and their own buying predisposition. I think we're in excellent shape to do that with the EDA card as an objective mechanism to talk about it. We're separated the access to new technology between gold and platinum, and that's a very nice farmable pool, so we already had that to as a way to exercise a ratability element for value, and rather than try to predict the absolute ratability dynamic even a quarter ago we started to obscure that. It is primarily ratable now, and that gives us maximum flexibility, something that some of the other customers are used to from Competitive Dynamic and that's what we'll do.

    當然,從我們現有的業務訂單(book of business)以及我們的轉換情況,你可以看到有些公司希望更多前置(up front),有些則希望更多以訂閱式(subscriptively)方式進行;這在很大程度上取決於他們取得新技術的需求,以及其自身的採購偏好。我認為我們在這方面狀態非常好,因為我們有EDA卡(EDA card)作為一個客觀機制來討論。我們把新技術的存取權在gold與platinum之間做了區隔,這形成了一個很好的、可耕作(farmable)的池子,因此我們本來就已經有這個作為運用「按期認列」元素以維持價值的方法。而不是像甚至一季前那樣去預測絕對的按期認列動態,我們開始把那個變得不那麼明確。現在主要是按期認列,這給了我們最大的彈性——一些其他客戶從競爭動態中也已經習慣這樣——我們就會這麼做。

  • - Analyst

    - Analyst

  • Maybe you can help in a slightly different way, comparing the bookings from last year to this year. Can you give us an idea of how did you -- the timing for top customers, was it heavily loaded last year, and much slower this year and how does that linearity work so that that's something we can use to reconcile this discrepancy in orders?

    也許你可以用另一種方式幫我們理解:把今年的訂單(bookings)和去年相比。你能否讓我們了解一下,你們——對於主要客戶的時點而言,去年是否高度集中在某些時段,而今年慢很多?這種線性度(linearity)是怎麼運作的,讓我們可以用來調和訂單上的這個落差?

  • - President, CEO

    - President, CEO

  • I am not going to give you a lot of detail. I will tell you in the last years we've had some very nice bookings from customers. You can imagine the consolidations are attractive to us, as well as to our customers because they operate more efficiently. What you have to do since we're not going to give a lot of detail on the bookings and the construction of the backlog is value the backlog and the average contract length and that gives us the pool that we go and farm, it has been relatively consistent, Kevin gave you some metrics on where it is going to be and I think that's a very nice pool to be able to go and at any time you can -- there is value in that and working these arrangements and the technology absorption with our customers longer gives us a better way to farm that pool.

    我不會提供太多細節。我可以告訴你的是,過去幾年我們從客戶那裡拿到一些非常不錯的訂單。你可以想像,整併(consolidations)對我們以及對客戶都很有吸引力,因為他們能更有效率地運作。由於我們不會提供太多關於訂單以及待履約訂單(backlog)構成的細節,你需要做的是評估待履約訂單的價值與平均合約期限,這就形成我們可以去「耕作」的池子;它一直相對一致。Kevin給了你一些指標,說明它將走向何處,我認為那是一個非常好的池子,讓我們可以隨時去運作——其中是有價值的。與客戶在更長時間內推動這些安排與技術吸收(technology absorption),也讓我們有更好的方式去耕作這個池子。

  • - Analyst

    - Analyst

  • Okay. Thank you.

    好的。謝謝。

  • Operator

    Operator

  • Our next question comes from Jay Vleeschhouwer.

    我們下一個問題來自Jay Vleeschhouwer。

  • - Analyst

    - Analyst

  • Mike, at your analyst meeting management said the following, which was quote, just doing consolidation in itself doesn't capture the value", and you went on to say that you have to be recognized as the causality of that value, end quote, so I guess a couple of questions which is why is it still proving to be so difficult, and granted you have the environment for the Company to be granted the recognition of what you believe to be the value of the software and if you just look at your forecast for bookings this year, I assume the 1.1 billion is total, so within the product only portion of that we're looking at something like a 30 to 40% decline of bookings versus '07, that's a pretty significant disconnect, particularly versus even conservative estimates for R&D spending growth this year. So I guess the question becomes how much is really the environment versus just a gap or some discontinuity in terms of your current competitiveness and ability to get recognized for the value.

    Mike,在你們的分析師會議上,管理層說了以下內容,我引用:「僅僅做整併本身並不能捕捉價值」,你接著說,你必須被認可為該價值的因果來源(causality of that value),引述完。所以我有幾個問題:為什麼這仍然如此困難?當然,你們所處的環境也影響公司能否獲得你們認為軟體價值應得的認可。再看你們今年對訂單(bookings)的預測,我假設11億美元是總額,那麼在其中僅產品(product only)部分,我們看到相較於2007年訂單可能下滑約30%到40%,這是相當顯著的落差,尤其是相對於今年即便保守的研發支出成長估計也是如此。因此問題變成:到底有多少是環境因素,多少是你們目前競爭力、以及讓市場認可你們價值能力上的缺口或不連續?

  • - President, CEO

    - President, CEO

  • It is time versus value. That's the equation. The consolidation in -- we have never lost a consolidation or decision has been made to consolidate to one person. I am pretty proud of that. I think that speaks reams for the technology. You still have a migration period from whatever their incumbent position is. One of our customers we have 160 some odd programs we helped them migrate over a year-and-a-half away from an incumbent digital position where they had to migrate those things and they were still valuing the technology investment they made with that competitor over that timeframe or migration, so it it isn't an instantaneous switch to do that.

    這是時間對價值的問題。這就是那個等式。就整併而言——我們從未在整併上輸過;也從未有決策是要整併到某一家(供應商)而我們落敗。我對此相當自豪,我認為這充分說明了技術的實力。但你仍然會有一段從他們既有(incumbent)狀態遷移的期間。我們有一位客戶,我們協助他們把大約160個程式在一年半內,從既有的數位(digital)供應商位置遷移過來;在那段遷移期間,他們仍然在衡量他們對那家競爭對手所做的技術投資價值,所以這不是一個可以瞬間切換的事情。

  • It takes time to do that and that's the business base we build on when we do that, and so when you win one of those consolidations, the confidence of a customer to consolidate builds an excellent platform to build on top of, and you have that time equation to be able to work through the technology pool, and so it is all pre-loading a business, and it also gives us a platform to expand into the system space, which is why we mentioned the silicon technology, down into the manufacturability spaces with the technologies that we have in lithography and mask that are just now really debuting themselves, even though we've been piloting for more than a year, and so you get some time delay when you do that, and in some respects, the momentum we're talking about now is predictive about other consolidations that are in the pipeline, and there are some, and they're back to Mahesh's question. Those are fruitful for us to go do.

    這需要時間,而這也是我們在此基礎上建立的業務根基。因此當你贏得其中一個整併案時,客戶願意整併的信心會建立起一個極佳的平台,讓你在其上繼續建構;你也就有那個「時間」的等式,去逐步消化(work through)技術池。因此這等於是在預先裝載(pre-loading)一門生意;同時也給我們一個平台,去擴展到系統領域,這也是為什麼我們提到矽技術(silicon technology),並往下延伸到可製造性(manufacturability)領域——我們在微影(lithography)與光罩(mask)方面的技術現在才真正開始亮相,儘管我們已經試點(piloting)超過一年。所以做這些事情會有一些時間延遲;而在某些方面,我們現在談的動能,是對管線中其他整併案的預測——確實有一些——回到Mahesh的問題,那些對我們而言是很有成果、值得去做的。

  • They're loose about how fast the technology will proliferate into the main stream. It is certainly going slower. It almost bifurcated into separating a smaller use of advanced technology only on the most complicated things, and trying to hang on as long as you can in the incumbent position, and in some respects it is good old-fashioned EDA 101 from ten years back, I don't know much more than that where people will go and try to play let's make a deal and we've been working on trying to show patience and value in that equation and that's not trying to be -- that's trying to be considerate with our customers, and I know that that's our modus operandi, so we'll see how it turns out, but that time equation is huge, especially when you know that business is back ended in the quarter and in a year, and we said going into the year that some of the little bit of the hockey stick that people categorize of the second half, if it pushed in and out of this year, would be big for us because Q4 is our biggest cyclical quarter of the year and we're worried about that, and we're trying to be proactive in projecting that, and at the maximum case, that amounts in a fair amount of conservatism, so that's how you get to the numbers that we got to.

    他們對於這項技術會以多快的速度擴散到主流市場的看法相當寬鬆。確實進展得更慢。它幾乎分岔成兩條路:一條是在最複雜的事情上才使用少量的先進技術;另一條則是盡可能久地維持既有的市場地位;而在某些方面,這就像是十年前那種老派的 EDA 101。我也不太清楚除此之外人們會怎麼走;大家會去玩「來談個交易」那一套,而我們一直努力在那個等式中展現耐心與價值,這並不是要——而是要對客戶更體貼;我知道這就是我們的運作方式(modus operandi)。所以我們會看看結果如何,但那個時間的變數非常巨大,尤其當你知道業務在季度與年度上都是後段集中。我們在年初就說過,有些人把下半年形容成「曲棍球棒」的那一小段,如果它在今年之內前後挪動,對我們會有很大影響,因為第四季是我們一年中循環性最大的季度,而我們對此感到擔心。我們也正試著主動把這點反映在預測中;在最極端的情況下,這會帶來相當程度的保守性,所以你才會得到我們現在給出的那些數字。

  • - Analyst

    - Analyst

  • A couple of questions about the model change. Are you suggesting that had the environment not deteriorated further from what you suggested earlier in the year that you would not have changed the model or you would have done it anyway, and secondly, what are the long-term advantages if any of anticipating longer durations? I mean, if you have an average of three to four years within the bookings that implies there are some deals that will be four to five years if not longer, so what are the long-term advantages or disadvantages of having some portion of the deals go out that long?

    關於模型變更我有兩個問題。第一,你是否在暗示:如果環境沒有比你年初所提到的情況進一步惡化,你就不會改模型?還是無論如何你都會改?第二,如果提前預期更長的合約期間,長期來看有什麼優勢(如果有的話)?我的意思是,如果你們的訂單(bookings)平均是三到四年,那就代表有些交易會是四到五年甚至更長;那麼讓部分交易拉到那麼長,長期的優點或缺點是什麼?

  • - President, CEO

    - President, CEO

  • Yes. We're not in the middle of a mild change. We obviously were confident that we can continue to sell through with our existing strategies and had a good pipeline to do that. The deterioration driving consideration of such a thing is a considered discussion with our customers, and I say it is realtime. We're going to do our best to try to hold the contract length because I think that that's coherent with the nominal development cycle of products, those tend to be two or three years. People are making those decisions intelligently. It is coherent with the length of technology projection that we do with the road maps. It is coherent with the development cycle for most of our product developments we do, so we understand the pipeline of what we do, and I think it is the best for value, and I can see other trends that are trending out well beyond that, where they don't have sophisticated mechanisms like EDA cards that allow objective conversation or whatever other reason they may be trying to drive technology and competency over a longer period and we're not going to do that. We're going to try to hold it.

    是的。我們不是處在一個溫和的變動之中。顯然,我們原本有信心可以用既有策略持續推進銷售,而且也有不錯的管線(pipeline)支撐。至於惡化到需要考慮這類事情,是我們與客戶之間經過審慎討論的結果;而且我說的是即時(realtime)的。我們會盡最大努力維持合約期限,因為我認為那與產品名目上的開發週期是一致的——通常是兩到三年。大家是在理性地做這些決策。這也與我們在路線圖(road maps)上所做的技術展望期間一致;也與我們大多數產品開發的開發週期一致,所以我們了解自己在做什麼的管線。我認為這對價值是最好的。我也看到其他趨勢正往更長的期間延伸;那些做法可能是因為他們沒有像 EDA 卡這樣成熟的機制,能夠進行客觀的對話,或是出於其他原因想在更長期間內推動技術與能力,但我們不會那樣做。我們會努力把期限守住。

  • With some customers it is a fact, some of our biggest customers are near the four-year kind of engagements, and when they have confidence in us and the road map and make big commitments, it is hard to say why not. Sure, we were doing it together, but that's why we're projecting average contract life every quarter, Kevin is reporting on it now just like Bill had reported on it, and we're going to continue to do that. We use it as an active management mechanism to monitor what we're doing, not only the customer's utility but the way we're driving the discussions with customers.

    對某些客戶而言這是事實;我們一些最大的客戶確實接近四年那種合作(engagement)。當他們對我們、對路線圖有信心並做出重大承諾時,很難說為什麼不這麼做。當然,我們是一起在做這件事;這也是為什麼我們每一季都在預測平均合約存續期(average contract life),Kevin 現在也像 Bill 以前一樣在報告這個指標,而我們會持續這麼做。我們把它當作一個主動的管理機制,用來監控我們在做什麼——不僅是客戶的效用(utility),也包括我們與客戶推進討論的方式。

  • - SVP, CFO

    - SVP, CFO

  • Jay, I would add, from a mix change or model change, it really boils down to environment. We're very happy with the numbers we publish for Q2, but in those last few weeks the discussions with customers were very, very challenging, and as they took another look at their businesses in the second half, we had those conversations, we had on our plate both selling I would say incremental technology as well as renewals in the second half, and when discussing the potentials with that for our customers, it was pretty obvious they wanted either more flexibility or I would say more challenging discussions around terms, so boiling it all down to an environmental change, that's really what caused us to move the model.

    Jay,我補充一下:從組合變化或模型變化的角度來看,核心其實就是環境。我們對外公布的第二季數字我們很滿意,但在最後那幾週,與客戶的討論非常、非常具有挑戰性。當他們重新檢視下半年的業務時,我們就進行了那些對話;而我們手上在下半年同時有我會說是增量技術(incremental technology)的銷售,以及續約(renewals)。在和客戶討論這些可能性時,很明顯他們要的不是更高的彈性,就是我會說在條款(terms)上有更具挑戰性的討論。所以把一切歸結起來,就是環境的變化——這才是真正促使我們調整模型的原因。

  • - Analyst

    - Analyst

  • Thank you.

    謝謝。

  • Operator

    Operator

  • (OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS). Our next question comes from Erik Kobayashi Salaam.

    (接線員指示)。我們的下一個問題來自 Erik Kobayashi Salaam。

  • - Analyst

    - Analyst

  • Thanks for taking my call. I think the points that I wanted to ask have been touched on already. One thing I spent a long time talking with your team about the EDA cards and the way the EDA card rollout was explained to me was that customers were actually using the technology faster and you had greater visibility into technology use by your customers, and so I guess I am just feeling a bit amazed that kind of the disconnect the rest of your guidance as well in light of what seemed to me a credible strategy.

    謝謝接我的電話。我想我原本要問的重點前面已經被提到了。有一件事我花了很長時間和你們團隊討論 EDA 卡,以及 EDA 卡推行(rollout)的方式;當時對我解釋的是,客戶其實更快地在使用這些技術,而你們也能更清楚掌握客戶的技術使用情況。所以我想我只是有點驚訝:在我看來那是一個可信的策略,但它和你們其餘的指引(guidance)之間似乎存在某種落差。

  • - President, CEO

    - President, CEO

  • All true, but do remember EDA cards did have a term life to those as well. Those are kind of three-year engagements, so some statistics for you, I think 43% of the customers in the current statistics use them faster than expected and 70% use them equally or faster than expected. That's great. Over that three-year period, and if you go back and track through our analyst day you will see that we showed how that stacks stacks over time and amount to say not only using the technology value of the card up sooner, but probably building on in a bigger way, but you still have to get near the end of the term to be able to do that, so if the card length was three years, and they use it up in two and three quarters years or two-and-a-half years, you still got to get to the two-and-a-half years. Second fact, we started doing the things about two years ago, and so the end of '08 is when we start to see some of the first renewals of those things and really stagger into the beginning of '09 if you look at the momentum of them, as we reported it, and so we've got good objective data looking at the utilization, and we're just beginning and really coming into the end of year, looking at the reupgrade of those things both in timing and value and we have a lot of confidence they're going to get used faster and hopefully be of equal value, and we have some confidence that in many cases they're going to get subscribed for more value the second time which is coherent with what we said at analyst day.

    都是真的,但請記得 EDA 卡本身也有期限(term life)。那大概是三年的合作期。我給你一些統計數字:我想目前的統計顯示有 43% 的客戶使用速度比預期更快,70% 的客戶使用速度與預期相同或更快。這很好——是在那三年期間內。而且如果你回去看我們的分析師日(analyst day),你會看到我們展示了它如何隨時間堆疊(stacks stacks),不只是更早用完卡片的技術價值,可能還會以更大的方式在其上加碼;但你仍然必須接近期限末端才能做到這點。所以如果卡片期限是三年,而他們在兩年九個月或兩年半就用完,你仍然得走到兩年半那個時間點。第二個事實是,我們大約兩年前開始做這些事情,所以到 2008 年底我們才開始看到第一批續約(renewals),如果你看我們所報告的動能(momentum),它會一路錯落延伸到 2009 年初。因此我們有很好的客觀數據來看使用率(utilization);而我們才剛開始、並且在年底前後真正進入對這些卡片的再升級(reupgrade)的觀察——包括時點與價值。我們很有信心它們會被更快使用,而且希望價值同樣不變;我們也有一些信心,在許多情況下第二次訂閱(subscribed)時會訂更高的價值,這也與我們在分析師日所說的一致。

  • We need to get through another six months or so, maybe nine, to really see to get two quarters worth of stuff to make a trend, but what I am confident in is that the conversations we have with customers are more objective and factual-based on information of utilization than conjecture and subjectivity which has been the history, and that's the thing that's most interesting about the EDA cards. I just came from where I can tell that you big customers and small all around lo these things because of the objectivity of it, and they buy the stuff at the rate they want to use it, and if they short call a shortfall, they don't mind paying a little more to be able to do that, so that's the -- the goodness of that mechanism and you're not -- it is not that you misunderstood, you just got to give a little bit more time to play out, but I am still very optimistic about it.

    我們還需要再過大約六個月左右,也許九個月,才能真正看到——至少要有兩個季度的資料才能形成趨勢。但我有信心的是:我們與客戶的對話,會更客觀、以使用率資訊為基礎,而不是像過去那樣依賴推測與主觀判斷;這正是 EDA 卡最有意思的地方。我剛從某個地方回來,我可以告訴你,大客戶小客戶都很喜歡這些東西,因為它的客觀性;他們會以自己想要使用的速度來購買,如果他們臨時發現有缺口(shortfall),也不介意多付一點來補足,所以這就是——這個機制的優點。你並不是誤解了;只是還需要多一點時間讓它發展出結果,但我對此仍然非常樂觀。

  • - SVP, CFO

    - SVP, CFO

  • Eric, one more point. In terms of Mike's point about customer's embracing the cards, we do approximately half our business on the cards, and when we talk about consumption, that's on cards already sold, so in terms of the second half outlook, those will be cards to be sold, and in terms of the reup rate that Mike also talked about, we did the cards in volume starting in 2006, so based on the three-year card we'll see some statistics at the second half of this year and end of this year, early next, so we'll understand what that reup will be, but again specific to consumption, it is all about cards that have already been sold.

    Eric,再補充一點。就 Mike 提到客戶擁抱卡片(cards)的部分而言,我們大約有一半的業務是透過卡片進行;而當我們談到消費(consumption)時,那是針對已經售出的卡片,所以就下半年展望而言,那會是將要售出的卡片。至於 Mike 也提到的續購率(reup rate),我們從 2006 年開始以量的方式推卡片,因此以三年期卡片來看,我們會在今年下半年、今年底以及明年初看到一些統計數據,屆時就能了解續購會是什麼樣子。但再次強調,就消費而言,全部都是針對已經售出的卡片。

  • - Analyst

    - Analyst

  • Okay. Thanks for those comments. I was also wondering kind of how much of the weakness would you characterize as a customer specific weakness or are there particular customers of yours that just simply aren't just ordering or would you say it is more broad based?

    好的。謝謝這些評論。我也想知道,這些疲弱你會如何界定:有多少是特定客戶的疲弱?或者是否有某些客戶就是單純不下單?還是你會說這是更廣泛性的現象?

  • - SVP, CFO

    - SVP, CFO

  • It is pretty broad based. There is not a lot of euphoria out there across the broad base of customers. When Kevin or I or Kevin Bushby or I are out with customers, the first question is not will you buy more tomorrow? It is how is the outlook for the second half, how does it look going into '09, what's the pricing look like, et cetera, et cetera, and that's not just with customers. That's with partners. Go look at fabless equipment manufacturers or equipment manufacturers look at the foundry infrastructure and that's why you see the thing on inventory, so it is across a broad base, certainly there are customer engagements that one of the earlier questions referred to that are natural renewals and the tradition of the customers is to engage nine months to a year ahead of when those contract lives come up, so we have a pipeline of those things, and we have as good a pipeline if not better than anybody else as far as I am concerned, and those cases, while these conversations may start, they're taking longer to complete, people are waiting longer to try to make those decisions, and even in some light of the information around our proposal for Mentor, it is another little bit of a twist to it because they're fascinated with the opportunity for a more efficient holistic solution across a broader base, and so it is the economic situation is the predominant piece of it.

    這是相當廣泛性的。整體客戶群並沒有太多亢奮情緒。當 Kevin 或我,或 Kevin Bushby 或我去拜訪客戶時,第一個問題不是「你明天會不會買更多?」而是「下半年展望如何?進入 2009 年看起來怎麼樣?定價看起來如何?」等等等等;而且不只是客戶,合作夥伴也是如此。你去看無晶圓(fabless)設備製造商或設備製造商,看看晶圓代工(foundry)的基礎設施,這也是為什麼你會看到庫存那件事。所以這是跨越廣泛基礎的情況。當然,也有一些客戶互動是先前某個問題提到的那種自然續約;客戶的慣例是在合約到期前九個月到一年就開始接洽,所以我們有這些案子的管線(pipeline),而且就我看來,我們的管線不比任何人差、甚至更好。在這些案子裡,即使對話開始了,完成所需時間也變長了;大家在做決策前等得更久。再加上我們對 Mentor 的提案相關資訊,也讓情況多了一點變化,因為他們對於在更廣泛基礎上提供更有效率、整體性的解決方案的機會很感興趣。因此,主導因素仍然是經濟情勢。

  • They are going to hold onto their cash longer, trying to stretch it across margin or something else, and use the time discretion to be able to hold those conversations longer, and to a smaller extent or another extent, the waterfalling of superior technology into wide base is really has been a tradition, and I think it will still be the tradition, but they're holding on longer to old methods and taking more risk in delivery or efficiency, and just telling the engineering team to work harder and that's why it affects the broad base, and you saw that Kevin gave you some of the geographic splits. We continue to do well across all parts of the world, so we're a little countercyclic that way, but Asia is evolving, pausing a little bit, Japan is concentrated in a few customers. We still have big base of concentration in some of the biggest customers around the world. That's a good first surrogate to go study if you want to look at their bravado or confidence and figure out how that waterfalls into their supplier base. We're one of their suppliers.

    他們會把現金留在手上更久,試著把它用在毛利或其他事情上,並利用時間彈性把這些對話拉長;另外在較小程度上,或從另一個角度來看,將更優越的技術逐步下放(waterfalling)到更廣泛基礎一直是傳統,我認為未來仍會如此,但他們更久地抱著舊方法不放,在交付或效率上承擔更多風險,只是告訴工程團隊更努力工作,這也是為什麼它影響到廣泛基礎。你也看到 Kevin 給了你一些地理區域的拆分。我們在全球各地仍持續表現不錯,所以在這方面我們有點逆週期(countercyclic);但亞洲正在演變、稍微暫停一下,日本則集中在少數幾個客戶。我們在全球一些最大的客戶身上仍有很大的集中度。若你想觀察他們的虛張聲勢(bravado)或信心,並判斷那如何逐層傳導到其供應商基礎,這是一個很好的第一個替代指標(surrogate)去研究。我們就是他們的供應商之一。

  • - Analyst

    - Analyst

  • Great. Thanks very much for your comments.

    很好。非常感謝你的評論。

  • - SVP, CFO

    - SVP, CFO

  • Sure.

    當然。

  • Operator

    Operator

  • Our next question comes from Terence Whalen.

    我們的下一個問題來自 Terence Whalen。

  • - Analyst

    - Analyst

  • Thanks for taking my question. I have a couple questions. The first one are first one or two are administrative regarding how you intend to report going forward. I think you alluded earlier to giving a time range three to four years of average contract duration. Would you actually consider giving that to the tenth point like 3.4 or 3.5 like your competitors do and I have a couple follow-ups.

    謝謝讓我提問。我有幾個問題。第一個、前一兩個是行政性問題,關於你們未來打算如何揭露。我想你們先前提到會給一個平均合約期間三到四年的時間範圍。你們會考慮像競爭對手那樣精確到小數點一位,例如 3.4 或 3.5 嗎?我還有幾個追問。

  • - SVP, CFO

    - SVP, CFO

  • Terence, no, we would stay with three to four years for our guidance. We wouldn't take it to the next decimal. That's preciseness we don't believe in.

    Terence,不會,我們的指引會維持三到四年。我們不會精確到下一個小數位。那種精確度我們不相信。

  • - Analyst

    - Analyst

  • Okay. The second question is in regard to making the model change, are you going to be giving the percentage of bookings that were ratable or up front on a go-forward basis so we can track the transition toward that 9010 model change?

    好的。第二個問題是關於模型變更:你們未來是否會提供訂單(bookings)中可攤提(ratable)與一次性認列(up front)的百分比,讓我們可以追蹤往 90/10 模型變更的轉換?

  • - SVP, CFO

    - SVP, CFO

  • Yes. Once again, from a ratability standpoint we're only going to report backlog once a year, so we're not going to get into the bookings ratability on a quarterly basis. We know that we manage it on an annual basis. It is lumpy within the quarters, and we don't want to confuse anyone with the quarterly numbers.

    會。不過再次說明,從可攤提的角度,我們一年只會揭露一次在手訂單(backlog),所以我們不會在季度層級去揭露訂單的可攤提性(bookings ratability)。我們知道我們是以年度基礎來管理的。季度之間會有不均勻(lumpy)的情況,我們不想用季度數字讓任何人困惑。

  • - Analyst

    - Analyst

  • Okay. And then I guess one other quick administrative question on CapEx. You think I think you said $70 million for '08. Do you have a CapEx number for '09 so we compare that to your 250 operating cash?

    好的。那另外一個很快的行政性問題是關於資本支出(CapEx)。我想你說 2008 年是 7,000 萬美元。你們有 2009 年的 CapEx 數字嗎?這樣我們可以拿來和你們 2.5 億的營運現金做比較。

  • - SVP, CFO

    - SVP, CFO

  • Yes. I don't think it will vary much from that 70. We haven't got into '09 in detail yet other than cash and, yes, plus or minus $70 million is probably a reasonable range.

    有。我不認為會和 7,000 萬差很多。我們還沒有把 2009 年的細節做得很深入,除了現金之外;是的,大約正負 7,000 萬美元應該是合理的範圍。

  • - Analyst

    - Analyst

  • Okay. And then I am just having a little trouble understanding the decline in orders this year. How can customers delay renewing contracts that would be expiring this year? In other words, as I look back three years, in '05, there were a number of 10% plus customers and larger deals. Do I have to assume those were four-year deals because otherwise they would be coming up for renewal and a customer would have to renew those deals or else they wouldn't have use of tools. Is that correct?

    好的。然後我對今年訂單下滑有點難以理解。客戶怎麼可能延後續約那些今年到期的合約?換句話說,回看三年前,2005 年有一些占比超過 10% 的客戶以及更大的交易。我是否必須假設那些是四年期合約?不然它們應該要到期續約,而客戶必須續約,否則就無法使用工具。這樣理解對嗎?

  • - President, CEO

    - President, CEO

  • If someone has a renewal that expires this year, then they'll have to do something about that. If someone had renewals that were on the cusp of the year, then they have flexibility to be in this year or outside of this year depending on what their natural cycle is, if they wait to the last minute or engage six months or a year ahead of time. Certainly not all of our business is on renewals, and I will tell you in my time we worked very hard to make it counter cyclical so these weren't feast or famine things aren't one big business arrangement that was cyclical every three years, and it is some of the things the cards do, allows us to layer some of the business, but we still do have some big companies who prefer to buy that way or some big geographic regions that prefer to would buy that way, and that's influenced in the timing that we both execute business and that we project the business if you were looking for the biggest rationale for cyclic shift, we said it going into the year, saying it again now, it matters to us if it is in this second half and if it is just a little out of the second half and into the first that is with the staggering business of the back end, that could be significant and is and people are choosing to wait longer and longer and longer to be able to exercise their option and make their decision and even in the consolidation discussion.

    如果有人有今年到期的續約,那他們就必須對此做些處理。如果有人續約剛好卡在年度交界,那他們就有彈性:依其自然週期而定,可能落在今年或今年之外,取決於他們是等到最後一刻,還是提前六個月或一年開始接洽。當然,我們的業務並非全部都是續約;而且我可以告訴你,在我任內我們非常努力讓它變得逆週期(counter cyclical),讓這些不會是大起大落、也不是每三年就循環一次的一個大型商業安排。卡片所做的一些事情,讓我們能把部分業務分層(layer)進來,但我們仍然有一些大公司偏好用那種方式購買,或某些大型地理區域也偏好那樣購買;這會影響我們執行業務的時點,以及如果你在預測業務時的時點。若你要找週期性位移(cyclic shift)最大的理由,我們在年初就說過,現在再說一次:對我們而言,差別在於它是在下半年,還是稍微落在下半年之外、進到上半年;在後端業務錯開(staggering business of the back end)的情況下,這可能很重要,而且確實如此。人們選擇等更久、更久、更久,才行使他們的選擇權並做出決定,甚至在整併(consolidation)討論中也是如此。

  • Like I say, I think our pipeline of customer and customer engagements is strong. Technology is excellent. We're getting super feedback. We've maintained our share of the customer spend as that's modulating, mostly modulating more conservatively or down, and I think it bodes nicely for us especially if we amortize this thing over a longer period.

    如我所說,我認為我們的客戶管線與客戶互動很強。技術非常出色,我們得到非常好的回饋。我們維持了客戶支出中的市占率;而客戶支出正在調整(modulating),多半是更保守地調整或下調。我認為這對我們是很好的徵兆,尤其如果我們把這件事攤到更長的期間來攤銷(amortize)。

  • - Analyst

    - Analyst

  • Last one. Mike, your commentary is appreciated and you do paint a positive picture of the company's health, but from a share price point of view and from a financial perspective, from an analyst perspective looking inward, it honestly looks like the organization has really deteriorated over the past several years, and is facing an uncertain transition period with the model and a large risky acquisition. So I guess my question is what are some of the business catalysts going forward and how will those flow through to financials and then lastly, Mike, I know some investors will be asking tomorrow, what the management plan going forward is post acquisition. Can you give us several reasons why you're the right person to continue to lead Cadence into the acquisition and after, and I ask that with all due respect. Thank you.

    最後一個問題。Mike,感謝你的評論,你確實描繪了公司健康狀況的正面圖像,但從股價角度以及財務面、從分析師由內而外的觀點來看,坦白說,這個組織在過去幾年似乎確實已大幅惡化,並且在商業模式轉換與一筆大型且具風險的併購之下,正面臨一段不確定的過渡期。所以我想問的是,未來有哪些業務催化劑?它們將如何反映到財務表現上?最後,Mike,我知道有些投資人明天會問,併購完成後管理層接下來的計畫是什麼。你能否提出幾個理由,說明為什麼你是帶領 Cadence 走進這次併購、以及併購之後繼續領導的合適人選?我非常尊重地提出這個問題。謝謝。

  • - President, CEO

    - President, CEO

  • I suppose you can have whatever opinion you want to have. The technology is strong, and it has been over the time, and that's a bias that you can impugn on us and customers have voted with their own confidence on that whether it be the consolidating ones or the ones you can't read about that have fueled the business growth over the last four years, and will continue to fuel it going forward. The confidence that we have in the combined, continued consolidation of the marketplace is both historically rooted in other industries and certainly concentrated in ours, and I am a technology guy. I will give you my rationale. Take it for what it's worth. Most of the customers engage in heterogeneous solution sets, that means they use technology from all different kinds of people, and when they do that they have to figure out how to glue it together. When they do that, they spend money to do that, experts, extra money, inefficiency in terms of building interface layers. A holistic solution supplied from Cadence makes that more efficient, makes it more predictable like lower power, when you use the low power flow. When you do that on a broader base including increasingly more and more some of the complementary components that are largely implicit in what Mentor Graphics has, we make that whole system more efficient for them and that's a beautiful thing as far as they're concerned and you can pulse them and ask them what they think.

    我想你可以持有任何你想持有的看法。技術很強,而且一直以來都是如此;你可以把那種偏見加諸在我們身上,但客戶已用他們自己的信心投票——不論是那些正在整併的客戶,或是那些你在新聞上看不到、卻在過去四年推動業務成長、並將在未來持續推動成長的客戶。對於市場持續整合、以及整合後的組合所帶來的信心,我們一方面有其他產業的歷史經驗作為根基,另一方面在我們這個產業更是高度集中;而我是一個技術人。我會給你我的理由,你就自行判斷其價值。多數客戶採用異質的解決方案組合,也就是他們使用來自各種不同供應商的技術;當他們這麼做時,就必須想辦法把它們黏合在一起。為此他們得花錢——請專家、額外支出、以及在建立介面層時的低效率。由 Cadence 提供的整體式解決方案能讓這件事更有效率、更可預測,例如在使用低功耗流程時能達到更低功耗。當你把這種做法擴展到更廣的基礎,並且納入越來越多在 Mentor Graphics 產品中很大程度上隱含的互補元件時,我們能讓整個系統對他們而言更有效率;就他們的角度來看,這是一件很美的事。你可以去問問他們、看看他們怎麼想。

  • You don't have to believe me. The business model as far as I am concerned has always been one of discipline, at least in my participation of it. That's to try to show the value we have if we do and some respects we can we would be rewarded with value. I say that very carefully, and the relationships that is we have not with just the customers but with the partners are as strong or stronger than anybody else's in the industry as far as I am concerned, so those are the things I think are interesting about it.

    你不必相信我。就我而言,商業模式一直都是以紀律為核心——至少在我參與的期間是如此。也就是盡力展現我們所提供的價值;如果我們做到了,在某些方面我們就會以價值獲得回報。我很謹慎地這麼說。而且我認為,我們不僅與客戶、也與合作夥伴之間的關係,和產業中任何人相比都是同樣強、甚至更強;所以這些是我覺得有意思的地方。

  • I don't know that it is a risky acquisition. You use those words. Those are your words, not mine. I think it is extremely complimentary technologies of technologies who love to do this because they love to see their solutions realized and the broader base gives them a better way to do that.

    我不認為這是一筆有風險的併購。你用了那些字眼——那是你的說法,不是我的。我認為這是高度互補的技術;做技術的人喜歡做這件事,因為他們喜歡看到自己的解決方案被實現,而更廣的基礎能讓他們有更好的方式去做到這一點。

  • The cultural integration of those things is something that we become very good at. In ten years of acquisitions, Cadence integrated something like 36 companies, and the ones that have been done in recent history have been the most successful acquisitions in terms of retaining technical talent and demonstrating business results of any parallel in the industry. We study that, and we continue to grow the organization to be able to show muscle and be able to do that efficiently and coherently with the integrating people, as well as the people exist in the Company, so that's the way we do it. We try hard to hit every projection that we do, and we try leaders lead and we try to be up front with why we think the environment continues to evolve and be predictive about it, and that's our MO, and that's the way we're going to continue to do it.

    這些事情的文化整合是我們已經非常擅長的。十年的併購經驗中,Cadence 整合了大約 36 家公司;而近年完成的那些併購,在留住技術人才以及展現業務成果方面,是業界同類案例中最成功的。我們會研究這些,並持續壯大組織,使其具備能力、能夠有效率且一致地完成整合——不僅是整合進來的人,也包括公司內既有的人員。我們就是這樣做的。我們努力達成每一個我們做出的預測;我們努力讓領導者去領導;我們也努力坦誠說明為何我們認為環境仍在演變,並對其做出前瞻性的判斷。這就是我們的做事方式(MO),而我們會繼續用同樣的方式做下去。

  • - SVP, CFO

    - SVP, CFO

  • Terence, beyond the technology combination and the strength in the combination for technology, of course there is a financial aspect to this as well, and I will focus on cash flow. As I mentioned earlier in my prepared remarks we'll generate $250 million of cash flow in 2009. That's standalone as the business comes together, and given the synergies that we talked about on the June 16th call, where net it is 50 million worth of income benefit, I think when we put the combination together, and it is our hope that we'll sit down with Mentor in a negotiated transaction, we'll do some due diligence, and maybe we can unlock even more synergies, we'll see, but as software companies come together, very strong cash flow generation. Huge positive.

    Terence,除了技術組合以及組合後的技術強度之外,當然這件事也有財務面向;我會聚焦在現金流。如我先前在準備好的發言中提到的,我們在 2009 年將產生 2.5 億美元的現金流。這是以單獨公司(standalone)在業務逐步到位的情況下所能達到的;再加上我們在 6 月 16 日電話會議中談到的綜效,淨額是 5,000 萬美元的獲利增益。我認為當我們把這個組合放在一起時——而我們也希望能與 Mentor 以協商交易的方式坐下來談,做一些盡職調查,也許還能解鎖更多綜效,我們再看看——但就軟體公司合併而言,現金流產生能力會非常強。這是非常大的正面因素。

  • - Analyst

    - Analyst

  • And I am sorry to chime in again, but the last facet of my question was with regard to management. Mike, what are you going to do over the next four or six, eight quarters to really rebuild confidence of the investor base in management and to really get the business reaccelerating again? Thank you.

    抱歉我再插一句,但我問題的最後一個面向是關於管理層。Mike,接下來四到六、八個季度,你打算做什麼來真正重建投資人對管理層的信心,並讓業務重新加速成長?謝謝。

  • - President, CEO

    - President, CEO

  • We generated hundreds of millions of dollars of positive cash in the last year, and as Kevin said, we'll measure the business on cash. The conservation of the technology to both work inside and outside the Company is landmark good. It is an industry dynamic. The industry dynamic in the semiconductor changed a lot. Take it from somebody been in it a long, long time, and we aim to be a leading player if not the leading player in this for a long time. We structure the business to win in the long-term. I think we have the best team of the peer group in the industry and we're rewarded with that confidence by many customers. That's good enough for me, and I hope as we demonstrate the financials that Kevin talked about that it will also be encouraging for people who want to invest with us in the Company.

    我們在去年產生了數億美元的正向現金;正如 Kevin 所說,我們會用現金來衡量這門生意。技術的延續性——無論在公司內部或外部都能運作——是里程碑式的優秀。這是產業動態所致。半導體產業的動態改變很大;相信一個在這個產業待了很久很久的人。我們的目標是在這個領域長期成為領先的玩家,甚至是最領先的玩家。我們以長期取勝來設計這門生意。我認為我們擁有同業群中最好的團隊,而許多客戶也以信任回報我們。對我來說這就夠了;我也希望,當我們展現 Kevin 所談到的財務表現時,對於想投資我們公司的人也會是一種鼓舞。

  • - Analyst

    - Analyst

  • I appreciate it and best of luck, guys.

    感謝你們,祝各位好運。

  • - President, CEO

    - President, CEO

  • Thank you. Next question, please.

    謝謝。請下一個問題。

  • Operator

    Operator

  • Our next question comes from Doug Rudisch.

    下一個問題來自 Doug Rudisch。

  • - Analyst

    - Analyst

  • Hey, guys, two parts to the questions. One is does the tougher environment make you rethink about how you manage the expense side of your business? I think you have some platforms where you earn very good returns and then others diverge in R&D efforts and other such things where the economics are less clear. Are you guys going to rethink how you're spending money and where you're spending it? That's question one, and I have a follow-up.

    嗨,各位,我有兩個部分的問題。第一個是:更艱難的環境是否會讓你們重新思考如何管理業務的費用端?我認為你們有一些平台能帶來非常好的報酬率,但也有其他平台在研發投入等方面出現分歧,經濟效益不那麼明確。你們是否會重新思考如何花錢、以及把錢花在哪裡?這是第一個問題,我還有一個追問。

  • - SVP, CFO

    - SVP, CFO

  • Yes, Doug, the expense management has always been a key focus of the management team, demonstrated by the improved operating margins over last few years. Obviously with the change in model, that tends to change things a bit, but in terms of expenses management going forward, we'll continue to maintain that key focus. The specifics at which at this point I am not going to get into, but clearly it is a key focus for this operating team.

    是的,Doug,費用管理一直是管理團隊的關鍵重點,這也反映在過去幾年營業利益率的改善上。顯然,隨著商業模式的改變,情況會有些不同;但就未來的費用管理而言,我們會持續維持這個關鍵重點。至於具體細節,我目前不打算深入說明,但很清楚,這是這個營運團隊的核心關注事項。

  • - President, CEO

    - President, CEO

  • Doug, on the peer strategy side, there are things that increasingly more cash cow oriented, and those are either slow growers or places where the technology, if we make a to ton of investment, if the customers aren't going to value that, we're going to slow it down, and the products that these men and women make with our stuff, are amazing, what's in a cell phone what they're carrying around in terms of complexity and stuff. All of that mixed signal content is enabled with our technology, bar none, and so I am as interested in the pacing of the investments outside of traditional EDA as anything, because the core of EDA is the thing that's kind of stagnating or getting slower growth. First surrogate for semi R&D spending, and it is decelerating, so we've been trying to track our net bigger investments up into the adjacencies in the manufacturability of the system space, the silicon technology is debuted into the broader industry, just had rave reviews on it, and I think that's a great first surrogate for what we're doing. Jim Miller talked about Sydney Technology at large in the analyst day, and we'll continue to vector spending into the place that is grow and expand to total universe for EDA as opposed to just concentration in the core of what it is, especially as that it is hard to find a customer who wants to pay the same amount for what he had, let alone doesn't want to pay less. We're very cognizant and studied on that. We have very tight management processes to measure those things.

    Doug,就同業策略那一端而言,有些事情會越來越偏向「現金牛」導向;那些要嘛是成長較慢的領域,要嘛是某些技術即使我們投入大量資金、但若客戶不會為此買單,我們就會放慢節奏。而這些男男女女用我們的工具所做出的產品非常驚人——看看手機裡面、他們隨身攜帶的東西,其複雜度之高。所有那些混合訊號(mixed-signal)內容,無一例外都是由我們的技術所促成。因此,對於傳統 EDA 之外投資節奏的拿捏,我和任何事情一樣關心,因為 EDA 的核心本身有點停滯或成長放緩。它是半導體研發支出的第一個替代指標(surrogate),而它正在減速,所以我們一直在嘗試把更大的淨投資導向周邊相鄰領域(adjacencies),例如系統空間的可製造性(manufacturability)。我們的矽技術(silicon technology)已在更廣泛的產業中亮相,並獲得極高評價;我認為那是我們正在做什麼的一個很好的第一個替代指標。Jim Miller 在分析師日談到了 Sydney Technology 的整體情況;我們也會持續把支出向能夠成長、並擴大 EDA 總體版圖的地方導引,而不是只集中在核心領域——尤其是在很難找到願意為既有內容支付同樣金額的客戶、更別說他們還想付更少的情況下。我們對此非常清楚且做過深入研究。我們有非常嚴謹的管理流程來衡量這些事情。

  • - Analyst

    - Analyst

  • Although sometimes accepting that business is slow growth is the key to optimizing the earnings power of the business. If I move to my second question, I think this industry has demonstrated some strange cyclicality and stranger cyclicality bookings than one would expect, both you guys now, Synopsis a couple years ago, and it is clear that sometimes for unusual reasons, bookings can tend to go above what might be a normalized level, and then post doing that they'll go below what is normalized level. The question is, if you look back at your bookings over the last couple of years, they're running in the 1.8 to $2.1 billion range, I think. Now you're guiding to 1.1. Clearly the 1.1 is below a normalized level. On the other hand, by implication some of the previous years' bookings probably got ahead of themselves. The question is what do you guys think is a normalized level of bookings? How do you quantify it? What is the normalized level of cash flow that should come off those numbers in a steady state?

    雖然有時候接受業務是低成長,反而是最佳化企業獲利能力的關鍵。如果我進到第二個問題,我認為這個產業展現出一些奇怪的循環性,以及比預期更奇怪的接單循環性;你們兩位現在、以及幾年前的 Synopsis 都是如此。很明顯地,有時候因為一些不尋常的原因,接單會高於可能的常態水準,之後又會低於常態水準。問題是,如果你回頭看過去幾年的接單,我想大概落在 18 億到 21 億美元的區間。現在你們指引到 11 億。顯然 11 億低於常態水準。另一方面,按推論,前幾年的接單可能也有點超前。問題是,你們認為接單的常態水準是多少?你們如何量化?在穩態下,從這些數字應該產生的常態現金流量水準又是多少?

  • - President, CEO

    - President, CEO

  • Yes. It is a good question, and your numbers are high, backing into them from the backlog. They're near 1.5, $1.6 billion, and it has a lot to do with market segment share shift in the end, and we clearly took by our analysis market segment share over the last years and our holding somewhat of a position this year as we say, and that's a tough thing to do because, you're trying to make guesses of whether the total universe is really growing or not, especially around the core which do I agree with you, you have to be objective about slow growth and where you stagger your investments, and that's why we try to be pragmatic about it. I don't think that they were crazy out of bounds before and they're biased a little bit by big things, either consolidations or if someone does things where they artificially extend the thing into big time you can artificially make a booking huge if you take it over five years or longer as opposed to hold in a three or four-year life and that's why we're reporting that and trying to use it as a management metric, so I think what I like to do is see how it plays because the customer psychology for buying and the amount of money they're going to spend has got a large amount to do to influence at least the core.

    是的。這是個好問題,而你的數字偏高;如果從積壓訂單(backlog)倒推,它們接近 15 億、16 億美元。最終這與市場區隔的市占率移轉有很大關係;依我們的分析,我們在過去幾年確實取得了市場區隔市占,而今年如我們所說也算維持住某種程度的地位。這很難,因為你必須猜測整體市場(total universe)到底是否真的在成長,尤其是在核心領域;我同意你,你必須客觀面對低成長,以及如何錯開投資節奏,這也是我們努力務實看待的原因。我不認為之前那些數字離譜到超出界線;它們有點受到大型事件的偏誤影響,像是整併,或是有人用某些方式把合約期間人為拉長到很久——如果你把它攤到五年或更久,而不是維持三到四年的合約壽命,你就可以人為把接單做得很大。這也是為什麼我們會揭露並嘗試把它當作管理指標。所以我喜歡觀察它如何演變,因為客戶的採購心理以及他們願意花多少錢,對至少核心業務的影響很大。

  • Turns out in a strange way their health or their relative optimism has a lot to do with expanding the the core because these guys are struggling with increasing their R&D spend in software resource developers and verification experts. At the same time, they don't really fire all the design guys, and so they compound their problem by trying to spend that money. I believe automation is the way out of that. On your sequency comment, I agree. One of my frustrations has been that we can't totally break whatever the cyclicality of the natural business was, which was probably somewhere in the three to four-year life cycle of average contract life, yet that doesn't mean we're not going to keep doing that, because I think inherently it is not healthy. It drives behaviors in buying or even some respects selling processes when that happens, and our hope is that as we take these objective measures like the EDA card, we have disciplined management practices to try to objectively decide what's going good and what isn't, be outspoken about it, and give the thing more time that we'll continue to do that. I think the consolidations bode well for people being first movers to try to change that -- those practices.

    結果以一種奇怪的方式,他們的健康狀況或相對的樂觀程度,與核心業務的擴張有很大關係,因為這些公司正苦於增加在軟體資源開發人員與驗證專家上的研發支出。同時,他們也不會真的把所有設計人員都裁掉,所以他們試圖花那筆錢,反而讓問題更複雜。我相信自動化是解方。關於你提到的循環性(sequency)評論,我同意。我其中一個挫折是,我們無法完全打破自然業務本來的循環性——那可能大約落在平均合約三到四年的生命週期;但這不代表我們不會持續努力,因為我認為那本質上並不健康。當那種情況發生時,它會驅動採購行為,甚至在某些方面也會影響銷售流程。我們的希望是,透過像 EDA card 這類客觀衡量,我們能以有紀律的管理作法,客觀判斷哪些做得好、哪些不好,直言不諱,並給事情更多時間,持續推進。我認為整併有利於那些先行者去嘗試改變那些——作法。

  • - Analyst

    - Analyst

  • Thanks for the thoughtful answer. I didn't mean to interrupt but if I just ask it a different way, isn't it -- you just walked through a complicated set of vectors, but isn't it simpler, there is some cyclicality, if you just assume the industry was very slow growth the last couple of years and will be very slow growth going forward, it is just a waterfall chart, you know how many five year deals you cut, you know how many three year deals you cut, and you can just stack out what a normalized revenue or bookings level should be and don't you need to do that for planning purposes and to manage the expense side of your business? It seems like it should be actually stack the mat and you know the customers and know the deal, and you guys should be able to form a pretty good estimate of what normal booking revenue and cash flow should be and don't you need to do it to budget expenses.

    謝謝你深思熟慮的回答。我不是要打斷,但如果我換個方式問:你剛剛講了一套很複雜的向量,但其實是不是更簡單——確實存在一些循環性;如果你只是假設這個產業過去幾年是非常低成長、未來也會非常低成長,那它就只是個瀑布圖(waterfall chart)。你知道你簽了多少五年期合約、多少三年期合約,你就可以把它們堆疊出常態化的營收或接單水準應該是多少。你們為了規劃與管理費用端,不需要這樣做嗎?看起來其實應該把矩陣堆起來,你們了解客戶、也了解交易,你們應該能對正常的接單、營收與現金流做出相當不錯的估計;而且為了編列費用預算,你們不需要做這件事嗎?

  • - President, CEO

    - President, CEO

  • We certainly have done that, and that set the foundation of what Kevin was talking about. The thing we've been able to do which I think has helped us in some of the last years of growth we may or may not get credit for is we built that broader base. We did that through an indirect touch on purpose. We did that with the broad Geo accounts and Bill was reporting some of that growth dynamic. Those are companies that aren't necessarily in anybody's top 100 but they represent large volumes of business and business potential. Lots of China is that way. These are companies $100 million and less that are going to spend a lot of money doing stuff. The fabless industries are rife with that. Also the amount, the quantization of market segment share shifting consolidation is the first protagonist that is difficult to call in time, but we use technology, leading technology engagements as a first barometer of that and like I say, I am optimistic about the results that we've been able to generate over the last years and look forward. It is just as that's where the buying -- where the waterfall down in the proliferation of that is in another secular change.

    我們當然做過,而那也奠定了 Kevin 剛才談到的基礎。我們能做到、而且我認為在過去幾年成長中幫助了我們(不一定有人會給我們這個功勞)的,是我們建立了更廣的基礎。我們是刻意透過間接觸達(indirect touch)來做到的;我們透過廣泛的 Geo 帳戶來做,而 Bill 也回報了其中一些成長動能。那些公司不一定在任何人的前 100 名名單裡,但它們代表了大量的業務量與業務潛力。中國很多就是這樣。這些是營收 1 億美元及以下、但會花很多錢做事情的公司。無晶圓(fabless)產業裡這種公司非常多。另外,市場區隔市占移轉與整併的量化,是第一個很難及時判斷的主角;但我們用技術、領先技術的合作(engagements)作為第一個衡量指標。就像我說的,我對我們過去幾年所能產生的成果、以及往前看都感到樂觀。只是,採購發生的地方——以及瀑布往下、其擴散的地方——也正處於另一個長期結構性變化之中。

  • Used to be that part of of the cyclicality of this industry was biased in the cyclicality of the semiconductor developers, I'm one of them, where every two years the process changed. Every two years you looked at a tool set difference or four and when you found the best stuff that was an excuse to change. People aren't necessarily doing that wholesale any more. They're doing it incrementally. They're separating it into the high-end and the low end. That's why we segmented the product four years ago. We'll see what happens. We have a very complex model that we built to forecast the business. I suppose that we can -- the critical will say your model must not be very good because you're struggling to forecast it now. My view is that the industry is going through cataclysmic change now, not just ours but the semiconductor industry and that's certainly impacting some of our historical and modeling characteristics, and we're fluid with it. We're going to be out there leading, trying to anticipate them, integrate them and learn from them.

    過去這個產業循環性的一部分,是受到半導體開發商循環性的偏誤影響——我也是其中一員——當時每兩年製程就會改變。每兩年你就會看到工具組(tool set)的差異,或是四年一次;當你找到最好的東西,那就成了更換的理由。現在人們不一定再以整套(wholesale)的方式這麼做了,而是以增量方式進行。他們把它分成高階與低階。這也是為什麼我們四年前做了產品分段。我們會看看會發生什麼。我們建立了一個非常複雜的模型來預測業務。我想批評者會說:你的模型一定不怎麼樣,因為你現在預測得很吃力。我的看法是,產業正經歷劇烈(cataclysmic)的變化,不只是我們的產業,而是整個半導體產業;這當然正在影響我們一些歷史特徵與建模特性,而我們也會隨之調整。我們會在市場上領先,嘗試預判、整合並從中學習。

  • Thanks for the question, though. Thanks for the observations. I think we have time for one more question.

    不過還是謝謝你的提問,也謝謝你的觀察。我想我們還有時間再問一個問題。

  • Operator

    Operator

  • Our next question comes from Matt Petkun.

    我們下一個問題來自 Matt Petkun。

  • - Analyst

    - Analyst

  • Hi. First, Mike, just on this Mentor transaction, with your shares likely down significantly tomorrow and as you discussed the questions on the FTC HSR side, which ultimately you suggested the deal would get done, but given all that uncertainty, I as a Mentor shareholder, would probably want to see a pretty significant breakup fee attached to that $16 bid and so far you guys haven't really articulated what you're willing to do to that front. Can you provide any color there and then I have one follow-up.

    嗨。首先,Mike,關於這筆 Mentor 交易,考量到你們的股價明天很可能會顯著下跌,以及你提到 FTC HSR 方面的問題——你最終表示交易會完成——但在所有這些不確定性之下,作為一名 Mentor 股東,我可能會希望在那個 16 美元的出價上附帶相當可觀的解約費(breakup fee);到目前為止你們還沒有真正說明你們願意在這方面做到什麼程度。你能否提供一些說明?然後我還有一個追問。

  • - President, CEO

    - President, CEO

  • Well, like I say, Matt, I think the transaction makes a lot of sense for the shareholders, certainty in a time where they may not have any. We don't have a financing -- we're not subject to any financing conditions so that isn't a problem. As I said, Kevin and I both said we're out there working on our finances now on the permanent financing. We're dying to discuss that with the Mentor management team and implicitly the board and the shareholders. When we do that, that will be a component of it, I am sure, and we're certainly well advised and thoughtful about that, so I don't lose a lot of sleep over that to tell you the truth.

    嗯,就像我說的,Matt,我認為這筆交易對股東非常有意義;在他們可能缺乏確定性的時候,提供了確定性。我們不需要融資——我們不受任何融資條件約束,所以這不是問題。正如我說的,Kevin 和我也都說過,我們現在正在推進永久性融資的財務安排。我們非常希望能與 Mentor 的管理團隊,並且隱含地與董事會和股東,討論這件事。當我們討論時,我相信那會成為其中的一個組成部分;我們在這方面也有很好的顧問支持並且審慎思考,所以老實說,我不會為此太過擔心、睡不著覺。

  • - Analyst

    - Analyst

  • And the other thing you were talking about earlier was the EDA cards. It sounds like you're still going to be offering both the gold and the platinum EDA cards and in the past you articulated that customers preferred the gold term cards versus the platinum cards. Had you are you going to be incentivising customers to move towards subscription-based rather than term based deals these EDA cards?

    另外一件你先前提到的是 EDA 卡。聽起來你們仍會同時提供金卡與白金 EDA 卡;而過去你們曾表示客戶更偏好金卡的定期(term)卡而不是白金卡。你們是否、或將會透過激勵方式,讓客戶從定期型交易轉向以訂閱為基礎、而非定期為基礎的 EDA 卡方案?

  • - SVP, CFO

    - SVP, CFO

  • Matt, with regards to gold card versus platinum cards, yes, we're still going to offer both. Those are we believe differentiating factor tore Cadence. Our competitors don't have those. Gold cards offer fixed price book and the platinum card offers technology access over time. As we look at the environment, as we have talked with our customers, they're looking for more flexibility. Flexibility when it comes to accessing future technology, especially in light of what we announced with Mentor, our pursuit of Mentor if you will. They're looking for more flexibility and access, and that's why we believe that there will be going forward a higher proportion of platinum cards.

    Matt,關於金卡與白金卡,是的,我們仍會同時提供兩者。我們相信這些是 Cadence 的差異化因素;競爭對手沒有。金卡提供固定價格的「本子」(book),而白金卡則提供隨時間推進的技術存取。當我們觀察環境、並與客戶交流時,他們正在尋求更高的彈性——尤其是在存取未來技術方面的彈性,特別是考量到我們與 Mentor 所宣布的內容、也就是我們對 Mentor 的追求(如果你願意這麼說)。他們想要更多彈性與存取,因此我們相信未來白金卡的占比會更高。

  • - Analyst

    - Analyst

  • Finally, do you expect your average deal size to increase? a year ago roughly Bill Porter was talking about the fact that you guys were moving towards smaller average deal sizes and this may move you towards larger deal sizes on average.

    最後,你是否預期你們的平均交易規模會增加?大約一年前 Bill Porter 曾談到你們正朝向較小的平均交易規模移動,而這可能會讓你們平均而言轉向較大的交易規模。

  • - SVP, CFO

    - SVP, CFO

  • Matt, in Q3 when I would say the EDA cards really to come off in significant volume, that did move the dial a little bit in terms of average contract length, and coming into the year we said with EDA cards being roughly half of our business, we would average out between three and four years, and we're not changing that guidance.

    Matt,在第三季(Q3),我會說 EDA 卡開始以顯著的量放量,這確實在平均合約期限方面稍微帶動了一些變化。進入今年時我們說過,若 EDA 卡約占我們業務的一半,我們的平均期限會落在三到四年之間,而我們不會改變這項指引。

  • - Analyst

    - Analyst

  • I am not talking about duration as much as much as let's talk about the number of seats per deal or products per deal.

    我談的與其說是期限,不如說我們來談談每筆交易的席位數(seats)或每筆交易的產品數。

  • - President, CEO

    - President, CEO

  • In a perfect world and equilibrium there will be more smaller ones. What people tend to do is buy them by project. You can imagine it is not a static environment in the customer, and they do project A, and about a quarter later, they do project B, and those things hang on for awhile and that's how they make access decisions about current technology or new technology, and in a nice way the model that we talked about here makes it easier to have that discussion because we had that discussion concurrently concurrently. Some of the accounting before we had to separate the discussions in time, that was cumbersome to the customers. They dent like to think that way. They're thinking about multiple projects over time, and the good thing about it and take this for what it is, with the momentum of the gold cards, that was most pragmatic because they were locked in a project, you kind of know what you need on project A, but when you get to project B you wanted a new one.

    在一個完美且均衡的世界裡,會有更多較小的案子。人們往往是按專案來購買。你可以想像,客戶端並不是一個靜態環境:他們做專案 A,大約一季之後又做專案 B,這些會持續一段時間;他們就是這樣在做關於存取現有技術或新技術的決策。從好的角度來看,我們在這裡談到的模式讓這種討論更容易,因為我們可以同時、同時地進行這個討論。過去因為某些會計處理,我們必須把討論在時間上分開,這對客戶很麻煩;他們不喜歡那樣思考。他們是在思考隨時間推進的多個專案。而這件事的好處——你就把它當作它本來的樣子——是:在金卡的動能之下,那是最務實的做法,因為他們被鎖定在某個專案裡,你大概知道專案 A 需要什麼;但當你進到專案 B 時,你又想要一張新的。

  • All of these things are no access to new technology and it's a farmable base for us. That's part of that pipeline that the previous questioner was asking about that's part of what makes it complex and part of what makes it intriguing for us, and so that's why Kevin says with some confidence that we're going to see, continued to see an increase in those platinum technology cards, and it is not going to be a digital switch, it happens. As time comes along we have to predict a rate for it and the technology is valuable to us and to the customers because it has productivity efficiency or quality of results built into it, those three things I said very carefully. Those are all valuable aspects of the technology aspect and the objectivity of the cards.

    所有這些事情都涉及到無法存取新技術,而這對我們而言是一個可耕耘的基礎(farmable base)。這也是前一位提問者所問的那個管線(pipeline)的一部分;這也是讓它變得複雜、同時也讓它對我們而言很有吸引力的一部分。因此 Kevin 才能相當有信心地說,我們將會看到、並持續看到那些白金技術卡的增加;這不會是一個數位開關式的瞬間切換,它會逐步發生。隨著時間推進,我們必須去預測其發生的速度(rate)。而技術對我們與客戶都很有價值,因為它內建了生產力、效率或結果品質——我非常謹慎地說了這三點。這些都是技術面向以及卡片客觀性(objectivity)的重要價值。

  • - Analyst

    - Analyst

  • Okay. Thank you for taking my question.

    好的。謝謝你回答我的問題。

  • - President, CEO

    - President, CEO

  • Sure. Thanks for the question. Okay, operator, with that we conclude and thank everybody for their attendance and we'll look forward to seeing you next time.

    當然。謝謝你的提問。好的,接線員(operator),那麼我們在此結束,並感謝各位的出席;我們期待下次再見。

  • Operator

    Operator

  • This concludes today's conference call. You may now disconnect.

    今天的電話會議到此結束。您現在可以掛線。