Burford Capital Ltd (BUR) 2026 Q1 法說會逐字稿

Hello, and welcome to Burford Capital first quarter 2026 financial results conference call and audio webcast. Please note that this call is being recorded. (Operator Instructions)

各位好，歡迎參加 Burford Capital 2026 年第一季財務業績電話會議暨音訊網路直播。請注意，本次通話將被錄音。(接線員指示)

I'd now like to hand the call over to Josh Wood, Head of Investor Relations. Please go ahead.

現在我想把電話交給投資人關係主管 Josh Wood。請開始。

Thank you, Ali, and good morning, everyone. Thank you for joining us to discuss Burford's first quarter 2026 results. On the call, we have our Chief Executive Officer, Chris Bogart; our Chief Investment Officer, John Molot; and our Chief Financial Officer, Jordan Licht. Earlier this morning, we posted a detailed earnings presentation, which we'll refer to during the call, and we also filed our Form 10 Q. If you've not already, you can find these materials on our Investor Relations website at investors.burfordcapital.com.

謝謝你，Ali，各位早安。感謝各位加入我們，一同討論 Burford 2026 年第一季業績。今天的電話會議上，出席者包括我們的執行長 Chris Bogart、投資長 John Molot，以及財務長 Jordan Licht。今天稍早，我們已發布一份詳細的財報簡報，通話中將會引用；我們也已提交 Form 10-Q。若您尚未取得，可至我們的投資人關係網站 investors.burfordcapital.com 查閱相關資料。

Before we get started, just a reminder that today's call may contain forward-looking statements that involve certain risks, uncertainties, and other factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from those discussed during the call. For information regarding these risk factors, please refer to our earnings materials relating to this call posted on our website and our filings with the SEC.

在開始之前提醒各位，今天的通話可能包含前瞻性陳述，涉及若干風險、不確定性及其他因素，可能導致實際結果與通話中討論內容存在重大差異。關於這些風險因素的資訊，請參閱我們網站上發布、與本次通話相關的財報資料，以及我們向美國證券交易委員會（SEC）提交的文件。

We will also be referring to certain non GAAP financial measures during the call. Please refer to today's earnings materials and our filings with the SEC for additional information, including reconciliations of these non GAAP financial measures to the most directly comparable GAAP measures.

我們在通話中也將提及若干非 GAAP 財務衡量指標。更多資訊（包括將這些非 GAAP 指標與最直接可比的 GAAP 指標進行調節的對照表），請參閱今日的財報資料以及我們向 SEC 提交的文件。

With that, I'll turn the call over to Chris.

接下來我把電話交給 Chris。

Thanks very much, Josh, and thanks to all of you for joining us today. We're going to do things a little bit differently than our usual quarterly earnings calls today. And I'm starting on slide 8. First of all, we're going to talk about YPF, give you a full update there. And then I'm going to take you through an update on the core business.

非常感謝你，Josh，也感謝各位今天加入我們。今天我們會以與以往季度財報電話會議稍有不同的方式進行。我將從第 8 頁投影片開始。首先，我們會談 YPF，向各位提供完整更新。接著我會帶各位了解核心業務的最新進展。

We're going to talk about liquidity and debt and give you some thoughts about what lies ahead. John and Jordan will then go on and talk about the quarter a bit. We may go a little longer than usual in our remarks, but we can reserve lots of time for questions, and we're able to go beyond an hour if people would like us to do that.

我們也會談流動性與債務，並分享一些對未來走向的看法。之後 John 與 Jordan 會接續談談本季表現。我們的說明可能會比平常稍長一些，但我們會保留充足時間回答問題；若各位希望，我們也可以把會議時間延長到一小時以上。

Let me start, though, by framing just the key message that I think it's important that everyone take away from today and this presentation and this set of results. Burford is the clear acknowledged market leader in a growing, high-return, uncorrelated industry.

不過我先以我認為各位今天以及從這份簡報與本次業績中最應帶走的關鍵訊息作為開場。Burford 是一個正在成長、具高報酬且與其他市場相關性低的產業中，公認且明確的市場領導者。

We have a very large portfolio that is generating meaningful cash. The YPF loss is disappointing and it's something that we expect to turn around, but it is an entirely non-cash event. And in fact, we have made a nice cash profit from it.

我們擁有非常龐大的投資組合，正在產生可觀的現金。YPF 的損失令人失望，我們預期會扭轉局面，但那完全是非現金事件。事實上，我們已從中取得不錯的現金獲利。

So let's start by talking about YPF on slide 9. So as I said, YPF was obviously disappointing, and it was very frustrating to us. Judge Preska, the trial judge in the Southern District of New York, who wrote the judgment a couple of years ago, is a very fine judge and has a 4% reversal rate at the Court of Appeals. And we should have been in that 4%. Unfortunately, we had a divided panel, the three judges split 2:1 against us with what we believe is quite a weak decision with poor reasoning.

那麼我們先從第 9 頁投影片談 YPF。如我所說，YPF 的結果顯然令人失望，也讓我們非常挫折。紐約南區聯邦地方法院的 Preska 法官是本案的一審法官，幾年前撰寫了判決；她是一位非常優秀的法官，在上訴法院的撤銷率僅 4%。而我們本應該落在那 4% 之內。不幸的是，合議庭意見分歧，三位法官以 2:1 對我們不利；我們認為該決定相當薄弱，論理欠佳。

Later today, we're going to be filing our en banc petition, which asks the entire court to take a look at the case again. And in our briefing later today, which will be public when it's filed, we go on what we call that decision egregiously wrong and indefensible. But the reality is that that's litigation.

今天稍晚，我們將提交全院審理（en banc）聲請，請求全體法官重新審視本案。在我們今天稍晚提交的書狀中（提交後將公開），我們將該決定稱為「嚴重錯誤且站不住腳」。但現實是，這就是訴訟。

Every case, every lawyer has one case that he or she should have lost. And every lawyer has lost cases that he or she should have won. And frankly, it's that idiosyncratic risk of litigation that lets us generate high returns, and that creates barriers to entry against potential entrants who don't have tolerance for that kind of risk. And look, our process does a very good job of screening in bad cases, but that doesn't mean that we can forever forgo that level of unpredictable risk. That's simply the way that litigation works.

每一個案件、每一位律師，都有一個他或她本來應該輸卻贏了的案子。也每一位律師都輸過他或她本來應該贏的案子。坦白說，正是訴訟這種特有的風險，讓我們能夠創造高報酬，也對那些無法承受此類風險的潛在競爭者形成進入障礙。而且，我們的流程在篩選不良案件方面做得非常好，但這並不代表我們能永遠避免那種不可預測的風險。這就是訴訟運作的方式。

And while we will try hard to get a different result in the US courts, statistically, that's something that is realistically difficult to obtain. So that takes us to arbitration. Arbitration here is a process that will let us advance essentially the same claims for the same damages.

雖然我們會努力在美國法院爭取不同結果，但從統計上看，要達成這點在現實上相當困難。因此就引出了仲裁。此處的仲裁程序，將使我們得以就基本相同的主張、請求相同的損害賠償繼續推進。

And the case is very well set up for arbitration. We are experts in doing this. We believe that we're the largest provider of finance to international arbitration in the world. We have, in fact, arbitrated successfully against Argentina before in a case involving the expropriation of two of Argentina's flag carrier airlines. Argentina loses very regularly when it goes to arbitration.

而且本案非常適合走仲裁。我們在這方面是專家。我們相信自己是全球最大的國際仲裁融資提供者。事實上，我們過去曾在一宗涉及阿根廷徵收其兩家國家航空公司資產的案件中，成功對阿根廷進行仲裁。阿根廷在仲裁中非常常敗。

86% of the more than 50 cases brought against it have been -- have resulted in a pro investor outcome. And once there is an arbitration award, the vast, vast majority of arbitration awards are satisfied. So this is not something that is pie in the sky. This is a very real alternative. And for those of you who have been following this case since its beginning, we will always go back to 2015 when we first started this litigation.

在針對阿根廷提起的 50 多件案件中，有 86%——最終得到有利於投資人的結果。而一旦作出仲裁裁決，絕大多數仲裁裁決都會獲得履行。因此這並非空中樓閣。這是一個非常真實的替代途徑。對於自本案一開始就一路關注的各位，我們一直會回到 2015 年——也就是我們首次啟動這起訴訟的時點。

We said at the time that keeping the case in the US courts is a significant risk and that if we were unsuccessful in doing that, then we had this arbitration avenue available to us. It's just disappointing that we had to go all the way through this US court process before turning and going to arbitration because this is also going to be a process that will take some amount of time. We've had a fair number of questions about the process here.

當時我們就說過，將案件留在美國法院是一項重大風險；若我們未能成功做到這點，便仍有仲裁這條路可走。令人失望的是，我們必須走完整個美國法院程序後才轉向仲裁，而這同樣也會是一個需要一定時間的流程。我們也收到不少關於此流程的問題。

And so in addition to this one slide that you see on the screen, there are several slides in the appendix that have more granular detail about the process and how this works. And the other question we get a fair bit is around cost. A bunch of the costs that you have seen us invest in the YPF case were structural, in other words, costs to obtain the interest in the first place. It wasn't litigation cost. Those structural costs don't need to be repeated.

因此，除了各位在螢幕上看到的這一頁投影片外，附錄中還有數頁投影片，提供更細緻的流程細節與運作方式。我們另外經常被問到的是成本問題。各位看到我們在 YPF 案件上投入的一部分成本屬於結構性成本，換言之，是為了最初取得該權益所需的成本。那不是訴訟成本。這些結構性成本不需要再重複發生。

And so going forward, the cost of this case will be consistent with any other complex arbitration case. There's nothing close to $100 million to spend here. Historically, we've spent in the $10 million to $20 million range on arbitration matters. But that's really where we sit with respect to the next steps on YPF and its litigation. And they're going to be kind of quiet because arbitration is an inherently confidential process, and there's not a lot of updating that goes on during it.

因此往後，本案的成本將與其他複雜仲裁案件一致。這裡不會有接近 1 億美元的支出。歷史上，我們在仲裁事項上的支出大多落在 1,000 萬至 2,000 萬美元區間。以上就是我們就 YPF 及其訴訟後續步驟的現況。而接下來的進展可能會相對安靜，因為仲裁本質上是保密程序，過程中不會有太多更新。

So let's turn to slide 10 and talk a little bit about YPF and money. So as you've all seen, and as you were expecting, given the guidance that we gave right after the decision came out, we have applied our valuation policy, and we've taken a very substantial write down of the YPF asset value. But I really would continue to emphasize that that's entirely a non-cash matter. If you look purely at the cash side of YPF, this has been a very successful investment. We've made a cash profit on it of more than $100 million.

那麼我們來看第10頁，稍微談談YPF與資金。如各位所見，也如各位所預期，基於我們在該決定出爐後立即提供的指引，我們已採用我們的估值政策，並對YPF資產價值進行了非常大幅度的減記。但我仍要強調，這完全是非現金事項。如果純粹從YPF的現金面來看，這是一項非常成功的投資。我們在這項投資上已實現超過1億美元的現金利潤。

But as you can see from our comments here about how going forward this affects our financial statements, there aren't many milestones in arbitration. And so you're not likely to see for the next several years much financial statement activity in the case. Let me give some details here that you can read for yourself, and Jordan will be happy to take questions on it. But that's sort of where we are. We're at the -- we have a high level of confidence that some time from now in the future, we're going to be coming back to you with good news from an arbitration award, good news from an arbitration tribunal.

但如你們從我們在此對未來如何影響財務報表的評論所見，仲裁程序中並沒有太多里程碑。因此，在接下來幾年內，你們不太可能在此案上看到太多財務報表層面的活動。我在此提供一些細節供各位自行閱讀，Jordan也很樂意就此回答問題。大致上我們目前就是這樣的狀態。我們處於——我們對於未來某個時間點，將帶著仲裁裁決的好消息、仲裁庭的好消息回來向各位報告，抱持高度信心。

But it's something that's going to take a little bit of time and require some amount of patience. And so what that really does for us, while we're obviously unhappy about the YPF result, is it changes the narrative around Burford. For the last few years, YPF has really dominated the Burford story. Many of my meetings with investors would open with YPF, and lots of those meetings never really made it past the discussion of the case. And that was understandable.

但這需要一些時間，也需要一定程度的耐心。因此，這對我們真正造成的影響是：雖然我們顯然對YPF的結果不滿意，但它改變了市場對Burford的敘事。過去幾年，YPF確實主導了Burford的故事。我與投資人的許多會議都會從YPF開始，而且很多會議其實從未真正超越對該案件的討論。這是可以理解的。

It was very public. It was very large. It was complicated, and it required a fair bit of effort to properly understand. But now, while we believe the case will resolve in our favor, as I said, it's going to take a number of years, and there's nothing really to discuss in the interim. So that lets us, I mean, close that chapter, to turn the page and start thinking more about Burford and its core business.

它非常公開。規模非常大。它很複雜，且需要相當的努力才能正確理解。但現在，雖然我們相信案件將以對我們有利的方式解決，如我所說，這將需要數年時間，而在此期間其實沒有什麼可討論的。因此，這讓我們——我是說——可以把那一章先告一段落、翻過頁，開始更多思考Burford及其核心業務。

And let's start doing that on slide 11. So we're happy now to be able to focus you on the core business because we've got an amazing core business and it, quite frankly, has been neglected by the market for some time.

我們就從第11頁開始這麼做。我們很高興現在能把各位的注意力放回核心業務，因為我們擁有一個令人驚豔的核心業務，而坦白說，它一段時間以來一直被市場忽視。

So before we turn to quarterly results, I want to spend a little bit of time refocusing on that core business and trying to get you to understand and share our excitement about it. One of our largest shareholders wrote to us recently and they said the business ex YPF is performing really well, and we see the stock as wildly undervalued. And that's a sentiment that the management team agrees with.

在我們轉入季度業績之前，我想花一點時間重新聚焦於核心業務，並試著讓各位理解並分享我們對它的興奮。我們最近有一位最大股東之一寫信給我們，他們表示：扣除YPF後的業務表現非常好，而他們認為股價被嚴重低估。管理團隊也同意這種看法。

The core business that we have is a gigantic portfolio of litigation matters globally, hundreds and hundreds of them. They move along the litigation comparable to maturity fairly rapidly, and they generate substantial cash flow and strong returns. And because we have the market leading global origination engine, we add materially to that portfolio every year.

我們的核心業務是一個龐大的全球訴訟事項投資組合，數以百計、數以百計的案件。它們在訴訟進程中相對快速地走向成熟，並產生可觀的現金流與強勁的回報。而且由於我們擁有市場領先的全球案源開發引擎，我們每年都會對該投資組合做出實質性的新增。

So let's turn to slide 12 and take a look inside it. We say that we have 237 active assets, but many of those are multicase arrangements. In actual fact, we have somewhere around 900 cases. And a case for us means a substantial complex piece of high value litigation.

那麼我們翻到第12頁，深入看一下。我們說我們有237項活躍資產，但其中許多是多案件安排。實際上，我們大約有900件案件。而對我們而言，一件案件意味著一個高價值、重大且複雜的訴訟項目。

We're not counting plaintiffs. If we did, because some cases have many clients, we would be in the many thousands. So in short, this is an enormous collection of high value litigation, by far the largest in the world, we believe. And we expect that it's going to produce billions of dollars of cash over time. The cases are widely diversified across any metric you'd care to use, as you can see from the graphic here.

我們不是在計算原告人數。如果我們計算，因為有些案件有許多客戶，我們的數量將達到數千件。總之，這是一個龐大的高價值訴訟集合，我們相信它是全球最大。而我們預期，隨著時間推移，它將產生數十億美元的現金。如各位從此處圖表所見，這些案件在任何你想用的衡量指標上都高度分散。

I'd make a couple of important points on this slide. First of all, looking at the bar on the right, 35% of that portfolio is from 2015 to 2019. Those are old cases. But for the pandemic, we believe many of them would have resolved by now. But they will resolve over the next bit of time, and they will be a desired source of cash as they do.

我想就這張投影片提出幾個重要重點。首先，看右側的長條，該投資組合中有35%來自2015年至2019年。那些是較早期的案件。若非疫情，我們相信其中許多案件現在本應已經解決。但它們會在接下來一段時間內陸續解決，並在解決時成為我們理想的現金來源。

And let's also look on the left at those undrawn definitive commitments, more than $1 billion now. That's basically something approaching another $2 billion of future cash proceeds as that capital flows out in the cases and then returns at our historical rates of return. And we already have those cases. We don't need to do any work to find them. So it's a very interesting portfolio from a financial perspective.

另外也請看左側那些尚未動用的確定承諾，現在已超過10億美元。基本上，當這些資金在案件中逐步投入，並以我們歷史回報率回收時，這相當於接近另外20億美元的未來現金收益。而且我們已經擁有這些案件。我們不需要再做任何工作去尋找它們。因此，從財務角度來看，這是一個非常有意思的投資組合。

Speaking of returns, let's have a look at slide 13. And let's just remind ourselves of what Burford has already been able to achieve. $3.8 billion of cash for the balance sheet, and in fact, more than $6 billion group wide, at high returns. So in short, we know how to do this. And we have been brought.

談到回報，我們來看第13頁。讓我們提醒自己Burford迄今已經能夠達成什麼：為資產負債表帶來38億美元的現金，事實上以集團整體計算超過60億美元，且回報率很高。總之，我們知道如何做到這件事。而我們已經被帶來。

We have a large portfolio, as shown on the right, and that translates into accelerating realizations, as shown on the left-hand graphic. So the all important question here is around cash. And let's have a look at slide 14. So this year is going nicely. We have sight of $280 million of cash already this year.

如右側所示，我們有一個龐大的投資組合，而這轉化為如左側圖表所示的加速實現。因此，這裡最重要的問題在於現金。我們來看第14頁。今年進展良好。我們今年已經看得到2.8億美元的現金。

But let's step back from short term quarterly numbers, and let's look at the basic model. Most of you have heard me describe litigation before as a conveyor belt. What I mean by that is that it is a rules based process that doesn't permit cases simply to sit and gather dust. Once the case is filed, the system moves it forward through a set of consistent activities and ultimately gets it to a resolution. Every litigation case comes to an end.

但讓我們先從短期季度數字退一步，看看基本模型。你們大多數人都聽過我把訴訟形容為一條輸送帶。我的意思是，這是一個以規則為基礎的流程，不允許案件只是擱置積灰。一旦案件立案，系統就會透過一系列一致的活動推動其向前，最終使其達成解決。每一件訴訟案件都會走到終點。

Unless they're abandoned, and we have never had a client abandon a case, they're simply too large, these cases that we do. The conveyor belt takes each case to trial unless the case settles along the way. Now of course, one of the possible outcomes in litigation is that you can lose. But our full business is designed to help us minimize losses and pick good cases. That is literally the thing we spend the most time on.

除非被放棄，而我們從未有客戶放棄案件——我們所做的這些案件規模都太大了。除非案件在過程中和解，否則這條輸送帶會把每個案件帶到審判。當然，訴訟可能的結果之一是你可能會輸。但我們整個業務的設計就是為了幫助我們把損失降到最低並挑選好案件。這確實是我們花最多時間在做的事情。

And we do that with scores of experienced lawyers around the world, with a substantial data science and quantitative analytics function, with proprietary data, and applying our very considerable judgment and experience. And as you can see on the right hand graphic here, it works. Our loss rate, that blue line, is low and stable. So if you don't lose, you're going to make money from a case. There are just two how much and when.

我們透過全球數十位經驗豐富的律師、強大的資料科學與量化分析職能、專有數據，並運用我們相當可觀的判斷力與經驗來做到這一點。如你們從右側圖表所見，這是有效的。我們的損失率——那條藍線——低且穩定。因此，如果你不輸，你就會從案件中賺錢。只剩下兩個問題：賺多少，以及何時賺到。

The how much question depends on whether you settle or whether you win at trial. When you settle, you make somewhat less money for obvious reasons because you're not taking trial risk anymore and a defendant expects a discount for derisking the case. So there is a direct correlation between settlement rates and returns, as you can see on the graphic in the middle of the page. As we've said before, we're not sure if the increase in our settlement rate is pandemic driven, with courts pushing cases to settle to try to reduce the pandemic backlog, or if it is more permanent because the cases we are doing are ever larger and thus present more trial risk for defendants. We'll see as time passes.

「多少」這個問題取決於你是和解，還是你在審判中勝訴。當你選擇和解時，出於顯而易見的原因，你賺到的錢會少一些，因為你不再承擔審判風險，而被告也會因為案件去風險化而要求折扣。因此，和解率與回報之間存在直接的相關性，正如你在頁面中間的圖表所看到的。如同我們之前所說，我們不確定我們和解率的上升是否由疫情所驅動——法院推動案件和解以試圖減少疫情積壓——或者是否更為長期，因為我們正在處理的案件規模愈來愈大，因而對被告而言帶來更高的審判風險。我們會隨著時間推移再觀察。

But we're not complaining about that because settlements happen faster than trials and they derisk our positions. In short, this is a very good business, but it is not an easy business. We spent a lot of time building a high quality, unique moat, and we are now seeing the benefit of it. Turning to the when question, this is the vexing part to public investors who like predictable quarterly results and forecast models. And this business just can't provide them the way that we would like to.

但我們並不為此抱怨，因為和解比審判更快，而且能讓我們的部位去風險化。簡言之，這是一門非常好的生意，但並不容易。我們花了很多時間建立高品質、獨特的護城河，而我們現在正看到其帶來的效益。轉到「何時」這個問題，這是偏好可預測季度結果與預測模型的公開市場投資人最感到棘手的部分。而這門生意就是無法以我們希望的方式提供那種可預測性。

We can provide a lot of predictability around outcomes. But as to when the conveyor belt will do its thing, there are a number of variables at work, including today the question of how clogged up the road in front of us is. But our concluded weighted average lives, as you can see, have been pretty consistent and pretty short. And the weighted average life of our active capital is longer, as you can see in the bullet on the slide, over three years instead of in the middle of the two year range, but it, too, has been relatively stable.

我們可以在結果方面提供很高的可預測性。但至於這條「輸送帶」何時會開始運作，會受到多個變數影響，其中包括當下我們前方道路有多壅塞的問題。但如你所見，我們已結案投資的加權平均存續期一直相當一致且相當短。而我們在投資中的資金（active capital）的加權平均存續期更長——如投影片上的重點所示，超過三年，而不是落在兩年區間的中段——但它同樣相對穩定。

So there isn't really any question that a lot of cash is going to show up, and it's going to show up in a reasonably short period of time, but precisely when is harder to say. It would be easier for you and easier for us if that were different, but then commercial banks could do this business as well.

因此，幾乎可以確定會有大量現金進來，而且會在相當短的時間內進來，但精確的時間點較難判斷。如果情況不同，對你們與對我們都會更容易，但那樣一來，商業銀行也能做這門生意了。

Slide 15, you've seen before, and it tries to give you some insight into that important how much question. How much cash are we going to be able to generate? And our modeling says the answer to that question is more than $5 billion. And again, this is not including YPF.

第15頁投影片你們以前看過，它試圖讓你對那個重要的「多少」問題有些洞見。我們能產生多少現金？而我們的模型顯示，這個問題的答案是超過50億美元。再次強調，這不包含YPF。

Now the obvious question is why we are modeling 110% ROIC when our historical ROIC is 82%. And the answer is in two parts. First, the mix of the current book is different than the mix of the historical book. We have learned some lessons along the way and we are better investors today than we used to be. As one example, we have learned not to do small cases.

現在顯而易見的問題是：為什麼我們在模型中使用110%的ROIC，而我們的歷史ROIC是82%。答案分成兩部分。第一，當前投資組合的結構與歷史投資組合的結構不同。我們一路走來學到了一些教訓，如今我們比過去是更好的投資人。舉例來說，我們學會了不要做小案子。

Our ROIC across a significant number of small cases turned out to be pretty weak and certainly dragged down our overall returns. And second, we don't yet know if the settlement rate changes we have seen in the last few years are permanent or transitory. But whatever the precise number will end up being, it still represents a massive amount of incoming cash in a world where we have only $1.7 billion in net debt. There really isn't any plausible scenario in which the portfolio's output isn't meaningfully greater than the debt. And if you then not only look at the freeze frame portfolio, the existing portfolio, which is what slide 15 tells you, and we turn to slide 16, this shows you the next level of this story because the portfolio isn't static.

我們在相當多的小案子上的ROIC結果相當疲弱，且確實拖累了我們的整體回報。第二，我們仍不確定過去幾年所見到的和解率變化是永久性的還是暫時性的。但無論最終精確數字是多少，在我們淨負債僅17億美元的情況下，這仍代表一筆龐大的現金流入。幾乎不存在任何合理情境會使投資組合的產出不顯著高於債務。而如果你不僅看第15頁所呈現的「凍結時點」投資組合（也就是既有投資組合），再轉到第16頁，這會顯示這個故事的下一個層次，因為投資組合並非靜態。

We've been growing the business significantly, as you can see on the left, a 17% five-year CAGR. And new business generates yet more cash. So what we've done here on the right-hand side of the slide, it was a quick and dirty calculation to illustrate the point. If we have sort of an $800 million of new commitments a year, and that's perfectly within range for us, ultimately, we'll deploy somewhere around 80% of that commitment. And if you apply a ROIC to that, which is consistent with history or our modeling, you can see the outcome.

我們一直在顯著擴張業務，如你在左側所見，五年複合年成長率（CAGR）為17%。而新業務會帶來更多現金。因此我們在投影片右側所做的是一個快速且粗略的計算，用來說明重點。如果我們每年大約有8億美元的新承諾額（new commitments），這完全在我們的合理範圍內，最終我們會部署其中約80%的承諾額。若對此套用一個與歷史或我們模型一致的ROIC，你就能看到結果。

In other words, every year, we're adding well over $1 billion of future cash flow to the mix. So we have the big static portfolio and then every single year, we're growing the incremental cash that we expect to get out of this. I will talk about leverage in a little bit, but the simple answer is that growth delevers this business pretty darn quickly.

換言之，每一年我們都在組合中新增遠超過10億美元的未來現金流。因此，我們有一個龐大的靜態投資組合，然後每一年我們都在增加我們預期可從中取得的增量現金。我稍後會談槓桿，但簡單的答案是：成長會讓這門生意相當快速地去槓桿。

So turning to slide 17. Everything that I have been talking about until now is cash. I run the business, and I'd like to talk to investors on a cash basis, not an accounting basis. And many of you have heard me say that for years, with, frankly, a somewhat critical view of accounting terminology at the same time. There are two reasons for my critical eye. One of them is, I suppose, that I've been in and around complex litigation for 35 years now. And that has taught me that accounting numbers are often disconnected from reality.

接著看第17頁投影片。到目前為止我談的所有內容都是現金。我經營這門生意，我希望以現金基礎而非會計基礎與投資人溝通。坦白說，你們很多人多年來都聽我這麼說，同時我也對會計用語抱持某種批判性的看法。我之所以批判，有兩個原因。其中之一是，我想，是因為我在複雜訴訟領域從事或接觸已35年。這讓我明白，會計數字往往與現實脫節。

But the second is more specific to Burford. There aren't yet comprehensive accounting standards for this asset class. And a number of the current accounting choices seem to me to be not very sensible or not very helpful to investors. So I focus on cash and not accounting. But here's an accounting slide for those of you who want to look at the accounting numbers.

但第二個原因更具體地與Burford有關。這個資產類別目前仍沒有完整的會計準則。而現行的一些會計選擇在我看來並不太合理，或對投資人並不太有幫助。因此我聚焦在現金，而不是會計。不過，這裡有一張會計投影片，提供給想看會計數字的各位。

And this slide makes a very important point. Our balance sheet is only carrying our assets at a 22% return. That is 60 points less than our historical returns, almost 90 points less than our modeled future returns. So on an accounting basis, there is an enormous amount of runway here to generate P&L income that will grow shareholders' equity. So that's the portfolio.

而這張投影片提出一個非常重要的觀點。我們的資產負債表目前僅以22%的回報來承載我們的資產。這比我們的歷史回報低了60個百分點，幾乎比我們模型推估的未來回報低了90個百分點。因此，從會計角度看，這裡有非常大的空間可產生損益表（P&L）收益，進而增加股東權益。以上就是投資組合。

Let's turn to slide 18 and touch very briefly on the origination engine. We have the leading origination platform in the industry. And we've just laid out a bunch of the data points here. I'm not going to go through them in detail. You've heard them from us before.

我們轉到第18頁投影片，簡要談一下案源開發引擎（origination engine）。我們擁有業界領先的案源開發平台。而我們在這裡列出了一系列數據點。我不會逐一詳細說明。你們之前已經聽我們談過。

We have lots of people. We have data. We have strong relationships. We have global presence, marketing and business development. And what all that translates into is the kind of growth that you see in the graphic on the right.

我們有人才。我們有數據。我們有強大的關係網。我們具備全球布局、行銷與業務開發能力。而這一切所轉化出的，就是你在右側圖表中看到的那種成長。

Turning to slide 19. It's not just that we have been successful doing this and that we're good at doing that. It's also that there is a structural dynamic going on with corporations that drives the acceleration of their adoption of our products. And so this data might be interesting to you. This is from The American Lawyer.

轉到第19頁投影片。不僅是我們做這件事很成功、也很擅長。同時，企業端也存在一種結構性的動態，推動它們加速採用我們的產品。因此，這些數據可能會讓你感興趣。這些資料來自《The American Lawyer》。

So these are statistics about the very largest of the law firms, the Am Law 10, so the 10 largest law firms by revenue, and then the Am Law 25. And what you can see there is basically an explosion of revenue and profits. The chart on the right, just a lever on that. That is the millions of dollars per partner in law firm profit. So these big law firms have gone from sort of $3 million and $4 million of profit per partner to $6 million, $7 million of profit per partner. That's an average of every partner in the firm.

所以，這些是關於規模最大的律師事務所的統計數據，也就是 Am Law 10（按營收計算的前 10 大律所），以及 Am Law 25。你可以看到，基本上營收與利潤都出現了爆發式成長。右邊的圖表只是對此做了槓桿式的呈現。那是以「每位合夥人」計算的律所利潤（以百萬美元計）。因此，這些大型律所的每位合夥人利潤，已從大約 300 萬、400 萬美元，提升到 600 萬、700 萬美元。這是指事務所內每一位合夥人的平均值。

And how have they been doing that? They've been doing that by being able to push through double digit increases in their billing rates to their corporate clients. Now that's great for the law firms, but what does it do for the corporate clients? Well, it has an extraordinary consequence because it means that corporate clients who want to use those law firms are having to divert more and more capital from their operating businesses, which generates for them a return and a multiple, to a collateral activity like litigation, which does neither of those things.

那他們是怎麼做到的？他們之所以能做到，是因為他們能夠對企業客戶推動帳單費率的兩位數百分比調漲。這對律所當然很好，但對企業客戶會造成什麼影響？結果非常重大，因為這意味著想使用這些律所的企業客戶，必須把越來越多的資本，從其能產生報酬與估值倍數的營運業務中挪出，轉而投入像訴訟這類附帶活動，而後者兩者都無法帶來。

It's, in fact, injurious to their business to do it. So they do it because they need to, but not because they particularly want to. We are the solution to that problem. And that is why our business has grown the way that it has over time. And this trend shows no signs of abating.

事實上，這樣做對他們的業務是有害的。所以他們之所以這麼做，是因為不得不做，而不是因為特別想做。我們就是這個問題的解決方案。這也就是為什麼我們的業務能隨時間以這樣的方式成長。而且這個趨勢沒有任何減弱的跡象。

And that is why every single year, we have more frustrated corporate clients come to us and use our capital for this very reason. Now let's turn to liquidity and leverage. I'm going to start on slide 20. We've had lots of questions about the topics, and I want to lay out our position very clearly to dispel any market uncertainty. Our liquidity position is very strong.

因此，每一年都有更多感到挫折的企業客戶來找我們，基於這個原因使用我們的資本。現在我們來談流動性與槓桿。我將從第 20 張投影片開始。我們收到很多關於這些主題的問題，我想非常清楚地闡述我們的立場，以消除市場上的任何不確定性。我們的流動性狀況非常強勁。

We consciously raised $500 million in January to buttress our position, and we sit today with more than $700 million of cash in the bank. We have historically brought in much more each year in cash than we need to cover our cash costs, including OpEx and interest. Moreover, as I've laid out in earlier slides, we believe our cash realizations are likely to increase over our historical levels.

我們在 1 月有意識地籌集了 5 億美元，以強化我們的部位；而截至今天，我們銀行帳上現金超過 7 億美元。歷來我們每年帶入的現金都遠高於覆蓋現金成本所需，包括營運費用（OpEx）與利息。此外，正如我在前面的投影片所說，我們認為我們的現金回收（cash realizations）很可能會高於歷史水準。

And by the way, not to keep beating the accounting dead horse, but our reported GAAP operating expenses are generally a good deal higher than our actual cash operating expenses. For example, compensation is our largest expense, and a significant portion of our compensation is through share based or carry based long term incentive programs.

順帶一提，不想一直重複談會計這匹死馬，但我們申報的 GAAP 營運費用通常明顯高於我們實際的現金營運費用。例如，薪酬是我們最大的費用，而我們薪酬中有相當一部分是透過以股份為基礎或以 carry（業績分成）為基礎的長期激勵計畫支付。

Those produce current levels of GAAP OpEx, but are largely non-cash. Jordan will detail some other items on the P&L that don't have any cash impact on us in a few minutes. I would also underline that we have not been reliant on cash from the YPF case, nor was YPF included in any of our forward looking cash flow modeling. There was simply too much uncertainty around it. As you can see from the graphic in the center, the last time YPF produced any cash for us at all was in 2019, seven years ago.

這些會形成目前的 GAAP OpEx 水準，但大多屬於非現金項目。Jordan 會在幾分鐘後詳細說明損益表（P&L）上其他一些對我們沒有任何現金影響的項目。我也要強調，我們並未依賴 YPF 案件帶來的現金，而且在我們任何前瞻性的現金流模型中也沒有納入 YPF。因為圍繞它的不確定性實在太大。如你從中間的圖示所見，YPF 上一次為我們帶來任何現金是在 2019 年，也就是七年前。

We have, in the past, tapped the debt markets to fund gaps between new business opportunities and organically generated cash flow. But as we reported previously, we had already concluded before the YPF outcome that the business no longer needed to do that going forward. And the team has been operating on the basis that we need to fund new business organically. That does present the occasional risk to our ability to do as much new business as we would like, as if we are short on organic cash flow, there is a world in which we would have to constrain new business. But that is only a risk to our future growth rate.

過去，我們曾進入債務市場，以填補新業務機會與內生現金流之間的資金缺口。但如我們先前所披露的，在 YPF 結果出來之前，我們就已經得出結論：未來業務不再需要這麼做。而團隊一直以「我們必須以內生方式為新業務提供資金」為前提在運作。這確實偶爾會對我們想做多少新業務的能力帶來風險；因為如果我們的內生現金流不足，在某些情況下我們就必須限制新業務。但那只會影響我們未來的成長率。

It is not a challenge to our liquidity, as the solution is simply not to do the new business if we don't have capital available to do it. To be sure, we would like not to face that issue, and we believe our accelerating cash generation will permit us to avoid it, but it is not a liquidity risk.

這並不是對我們流動性的挑戰，因為解決方式很簡單：如果沒有可用資本，我們就不做新的業務。當然，我們希望不要面臨這個問題，而且我們相信加速的現金生成將使我們能夠避免它，但這不是流動性風險。

Slide 21. In a few minutes, Jordan will spend some time on the nuts and bolts of our debt arrangements. But let me speak about leverage strategically. We believe strongly that balance sheet investing, including the use of debt, is the right way to engage in this business and that it is substantially preferable to the use of third party investment fund capital. We've described in detail in the past the reasons for that view.

第 21 張投影片。幾分鐘後，Jordan 會花一些時間說明我們債務安排的細節。但我想從策略層面談談槓桿。我們堅信，以資產負債表進行投資（包括使用債務）是從事這項業務的正確方式，而且相較於使用第三方投資基金資本，明顯更可取。我們過去已詳細說明支持這一觀點的原因。

The exception to that view is our strategic relationship with our sovereign wealth fund partner, which has a different economic structure. And that is a relationship we expect to continue. With the sharp decline in the balance sheet carrying value of YPF, again, notwithstanding our long term confidence in the ability of the YPF case to produce a very substantial cash return, we now have a higher debt equity ratio than we would like, and we are going to work over time to address that.

這一觀點的例外，是我們與主權財富基金合作夥伴的策略關係，因為其經濟結構不同。而這段關係我們預期會持續下去。隨著 YPF 的資產負債表帳面攤提價值大幅下降——再次強調，儘管我們對 YPF 案件長期仍有信心，認為其能帶來非常可觀的現金回報——我們目前的負債對股權比率高於我們希望的水準，我們將隨時間推進來加以改善。

When we have spoken before about leverage, we have made the point that the management team are the largest shareholders of this business, and we are very conscious of the ability of some debt funds to behave badly if they obtain the ability to do so. We have always been very alive to trying to ensure that our--and thus your--equity value was not at risk that way through sensible levels of debt, laddered maturities, long dated issuances, and through the design and structure of the debt instruments themselves, all of which are unsecured and all of which are free of any meaningful maintenance covenants.

我們過去談到槓桿時曾指出，管理團隊是本公司最大的股東，我們非常清楚某些債務基金一旦取得作惡的能力，可能會有不當行為。我們一直高度重視，透過合理的負債水準、階梯式到期結構、長天期發行，以及債務工具本身的設計與結構，來確保我們——也就是你們——的股權價值不會以這種方式承受風險；而我們所有債務皆為無擔保，且不含任何具實質意義的維持性財務契約（maintenance covenants）。

We've previously spoken of having a comfort level of a debt equity ratio around 1.25 times. However, that was in the context of more than 40% of our assets being in a single matter. With the effective elimination of that concentration, our asset base is now widely diversified, as I demonstrated earlier, and is capable of supporting a higher level of leverage.

我們先前提過，對負債對股權比率約 1.25 倍有一個舒適區間。不過，那是在我們超過 40% 的資產集中於單一案件的背景下提出的。隨著這種集中度實質上被消除，我們的資產基礎如今已如我先前所示變得高度分散，並能支撐更高水準的槓桿。

We have not yet settled on a precise leverage target, as we would today be above whatever that might be, but the fact that our incurrence covenant is at 2.0 times is certainly a relevant criteria. But the bottom line message here is the following. We intend to delever over time, but we are not alarmed by the current posture of the business. And we'd remind investors that the rating agencies agree. Moody's did not alter our debt rating after the YPF event, keeping us at Ba1, and S&P lowered us in March to BB with a stable outlook.

我們尚未確定精確的槓桿目標，因為以今天的狀況來看，無論那個目標是多少，我們都會高於它；但我們的新增負債契約（incurrence covenant）設定在 2.0 倍，當然是一項相關的判準。但這裡的核心訊息如下。我們打算隨時間降低槓桿，但我們並未對目前公司的姿態感到驚慌。同時也提醒投資人，信評機構也同意。穆迪在 YPF 事件後並未調整我們的債務評級，仍維持 Ba1；而標普在 3 月將我們下調至 BB，展望穩定。

So how are we going to do that? Slide 22. The core answer is that we are going to continue to grow the business, and we're going to be even more focused on harvesting cash from the existing portfolio. I spent quite some time earlier demonstrating the cash generative power of the current portfolio. And while equity investors may find our quarterly volatility frustrating, any reasonable view of the timing of cash flows from the portfolio would be considerably faster than our debt maturities.

那我們要怎麼做到？第 22 張投影片。核心答案是：我們將持續擴大業務，並且更專注於從既有投資組合中收割現金。我先前花了不少時間展示目前投資組合的現金創造能力。雖然股權投資人可能會覺得我們的季度波動令人沮喪，但對投資組合現金流時點的任何合理判斷，都會顯示其速度遠快於我們的債務到期時間。

And I also showed how significant the cash generative impact of even routine levels of new business can be. We will also look hard at cash conserving actions. We've been in discussions with shareholders for several years about the dividend. And while no decision needs to be taken today, there is a genuine market question about its benefit. We don't trade on its yield, and many investors do not particularly value us and do not run their portfolios for income.

我也展示了，即使是例行水準的新業務，也能帶來多麼顯著的現金創造影響。我們也將嚴格檢視各項保留現金的措施。我們多年來一直就股利與股東進行討論。雖然今天不必做出任何決定，但市場確實在質疑其效益。我們的交易並非基於其殖利率，且許多投資人並不特別看重我們，也不以收益為目的來配置其投資組合。

So while we appreciate that some investors do attach significance to a dividend, we would also note, as the slide shows, the delevering impact of not paying it. We also reiterate our longstanding position that share repurchases are not appropriate at this point. We also have in mind a number of ways to manage operating expenses. We have announced this morning the departure of Craig Arnott, our CIO International. That was his choice, not ours, as he seeks out an unrelated final chapter, but it nevertheless reduces our compensation expense.

因此，雖然我們理解部分投資人確實認為股利具有重要性，但我們也要指出，如投影片所示，不支付股利對去槓桿具有正面影響。我們也重申我們長期以來的立場：在此時點進行庫藏股回購並不適當。我們也考量了多種管理營運費用的方法。我們今早已宣布國際投資長（CIO International）Craig Arnott將離任。這是他的選擇而非我們的決定，他希望尋找與本業無關的最後篇章，但這仍將降低我們的薪酬費用。

We have some other streamlining in mind as part of both a more streamlined structure and a demonstration of our deep bench. Travis Lenkner is going to become the Chief Operating Officer and work hand in hand with Jordan on those initiatives.

作為更精簡架構的一部分，以及展現我們深厚人才梯隊的一部分，我們也規劃了其他精簡措施。Travis Lenkner將出任營運長（Chief Operating Officer），並與Jordan密切合作推動這些計畫。

Slide 23 talks about growth. As I've indicated, the best way to delever this business and to enhance its equity value is to continue to grow it. We have the people, we have the market position, we have the know how, and we have real demand for our offering. And we believe that we can make the financial construct work. So as we say internally, onwards.

第23頁投影片談的是成長。如我所指出，讓這項業務去槓桿並提升其股權價值的最佳方式，就是持續成長。我們有人才、有市場地位、有專業能力，也確實有對我們產品的需求。我們相信我們能讓財務架構運作起來。因此，如同我們內部所說，繼續前進。

And while I've gone on for quite a long time, I will now turn it over to Jon and Jordan for some brief remarks about the quarter, after which we'd be happy to take your questions and happy to stay on past the hour if there's a desire for us to do so.

雖然我講了相當久，接下來我將交給Jon與Jordan，就本季做一些簡短說明；之後我們很樂意回答各位的問題，若各位希望，我們也樂意在整點之後繼續在線。

Thanks, Chris, and thanks to you all for joining. I'm going to talk about three things that were in Chris' presentation, but I just want to focus a little more on them. One is new business, which is proceeding at a steady pace, as Chris said, and is the driver of growth and replaces the matters that come off and generate revenue. Second is the portfolio matters that are positioned to deliver the higher levels of realizations Chris referred to. And third, a word about just a reminder of how strong the portfolio is, as demonstrated by the track record we've experienced over time.

謝謝你，Chris，也謝謝各位參與。我將談三件在Chris簡報中提到的事情，但我想更聚焦地補充一下。第一是新業務，如Chris所說，正以穩定步調推進，是成長的驅動力，也用來替代結束的案件並產生營收。第二是投資組合中的案件，這些案件已具備條件，可望帶來Chris所提到的較高實現水準。第三，提醒大家投資組合有多強健，這點可由我們長期累積的績效紀錄所證明。

So first, new business. The new business reflects a steady pace. The business development team is humming. We did $133 million of new business commitments, which is a solid start to the year and consistent with the recent first quarter average. The $100 million of deployments are likewise consistent with the recent pace.

先談新業務。新業務反映出穩定的節奏。業務開發團隊運作順暢。我們取得了1.33億美元的新業務承諾，這是今年良好的開局，並與近期第一季的平均水準一致。1億美元的資金投放同樣與近期節奏一致。

And as Jordan noted, if you look at the average over the last eight quarters, you'll get a sense that that's right on target. We have, as Chris mentioned before, $1.3 billion of unfunded definitive commitments, which continue to drive deployment. And because Chris said, we don't have to go out and find the matters, we found those matters, we've underwritten them, we're in them, and the money will go out to generate returns going forward. And that balance, that number is up by more than 40% if you compare it to five quarters ago, at the end of 2024.

如Jordan所提，如果你看過去八個季度的平均值，就會感覺這正好符合目標。如Chris先前提到，我們有13億美元尚未出資的具約束力承諾，持續推動資金投放。而且如Chris所說，我們不需要再出去尋找案件；我們已找到這些案件、完成承作評估、已經參與其中，資金將陸續投入並在未來創造報酬。若與五個季度前、也就是2024年底相比，該餘額已增加超過40%。

So we have grown the portfolio, and that's a significant amount of capital that's going out to deliver returns for us. And while we tend to focus on deployments, it's important not to forget about discretionary commitments.

因此我們已擴大投資組合，這是一筆相當可觀、將投入以為我們帶來報酬的資本。雖然我們往往聚焦於資金投放，但也重要的是不要忘記自由裁量承諾。

We have $600 million around of unfunded discretionary commitments.Well, what are those? We don't have to put that money out. We still underwrite additional matters, but they reflect strong relationships we've built with counterparties, corporates, but particularly law firms, and the opportunity to grow through adding new cases, new matters to portfolios. And you find it is much more efficient. We end up with much better matters, closing more easily when you have an existing relationship and a portfolio set up. And when we see something good, we work together with our counterparty to bring it in.

我們目前約有6億美元尚未出資的自由裁量承諾。那是什麼？我們不一定要把那筆錢投出去。我們仍會承作評估更多案件，但這些承諾反映了我們與交易對手、企業，尤其是律師事務所所建立的強健關係，以及透過將新案件、新事項加入投資組合來成長的機會。你會發現這樣效率高得多。當你已有既有關係且投資組合架構已建立時，我們最終能取得更好的案件，也更容易完成交易。當我們看到好的機會時，我們會與交易對手合作把它納入。

And we continue to expand our business development globally. We've added people on the ground in Spain and Korea. So I'm very excited about how the new business machine is turning basically on all fronts in each of our pipelines in each of our geographic locales.

我們也持續在全球擴展業務開發。我們已在西班牙與韓國增聘當地人員。因此我對新業務引擎在各個面向、在我們各條管線以及各個地理區域的運轉情況感到非常振奮。

So the second question then is what about the portfolio, what is delivering, what is poised to deliver? We had $97 million in realizations in the first quarter. It's not a big quarter, but it still exhibits to the diversification of our business. There were 25 assets contributing into that quarter.

那麼第二個問題是投資組合如何：哪些在交付成果，哪些已蓄勢待發？第一季我們有9,700萬美元的實現收入。這不是一個很大的季度，但仍展現了我們業務的多元分散。共有25項資產對該季度有所貢獻。

We said that 6 of those 25 generated $5 million or more. Two of the six generated $20 million or more. Nine of them are from pre COVID vintages. Remember, Chris talked about the slide of the pre 2020 stuff, demonstrating the older book is moving. Even if it's taken longer and COVID slowed it down, it is happening.

我們提到，這25項之中有6項產生了500萬美元或以上。其中6項裡有2項產生了2,000萬美元或以上。其中有9項來自COVID之前的批次（vintages）。請記得，Chris談到COVID前（2020年前）的投影片，顯示較舊的案源正在推進。即使耗時更久且COVID拖慢進度，事情仍在發生。

One thing that's noteworthy is the number of trials and hearings that are projected to take place or are in a position to take place this year because those are significant catalysts for settlements or resolutions. We have - when we look at the book, 36 trials and merit hearings scheduled during 2026 across those various portfolios. And that's up significantly.

值得注意的一點是，今年預計將進行或已具備條件進行的審判與聽證數量，因為這些往往是促成和解或解決的重要催化劑。當我們檢視整體投資組合時，2026年在各投資組合中已排定36場審判與實體爭點聽證（merit hearings）。這個數字顯著增加。

If you look back same time last year, there were 23 scheduled for the remainder of the year versus 36. It doesn't mean that's all going to happen, things get pushed, but it's a positive indicator.

如果回看去年同一時間，當時剩餘年度排定的是23場，而現在是36場。這不代表全部都會如期進行，事情可能延後，但這是一個正向指標。

And slicing it a different way and stepping back, like we look at our portfolio, we see 23 different assets that have the potential to generate double digit millions or more in realizations in '26. And for comparison, in 2025, there were 14 assets that generated $10 million or more, and in 2024, there were 16. And again, I'm not saying that all 23 will deliver. We find sometimes things that could deliver don't, and sometimes things that we weren't expecting to deliver end up resolving earlier than expected. But there's a lot going on.

換個角度切分並拉遠來看，我們檢視投資組合時，看到有23項不同資產在2026年具備產生「數千萬美元等級」或以上實現收入的潛力。作為比較，2025年有14項資產產生了1,000萬美元或以上，而2024年有16項。同樣地，我不是說這23項都會交付成果。我們發現有時候本來可能交付的並未交付，而有時候原本不預期會交付的，反而比預期更早解決。但目前確實有很多事情在推進。

As Chris said, we have a mature portfolio with a lot of great stuff in it. Stepping back to the track record over time because, as Chris said, there may be quarterly volatility in this business, but the portfolio over time has delivered on a consistent basis. You've had $3.8 billion plus of cumulative realizations. I think that's more than doubled since 2020. Over that time period, the realized loss rate cumulatively has remained remarkably consistent in that 10% range.

如Chris所說，我們擁有一個成熟的投資組合，裡面有很多優質資產。再回到長期績效紀錄：如Chris所說，這個業務可能存在季度波動，但投資組合長期以來一直穩定交付成果。累計實現收入已超過38億美元。我認為自2020年以來已增加一倍以上。在這段期間，累計已實現損失率一直維持得相當一致，約在10%的區間。

We've noted how the interplay of ROIC and settlement rate in recent years is how those two are related to each other, and time will tell if that's temporary or is a more structural feature. But the takeaway is we continue to add new matters fueling our growth and the potential for the future. We continue to see the portfolio turning, and we have lots of matters that are mature enough to be delivering results in the near term. And the overall portfolio is very strong, and I'm very excited about it.

我們已注意到，近年來 ROIC 與和解率之間的相互作用，顯示這兩者彼此相關；而這究竟只是暫時現象，或是更具結構性的特徵，仍有待時間驗證。但重點是，我們持續新增新案源以推動成長，並為未來帶來潛力。我們持續看到投資組合在輪動，而且我們有許多案件已成熟到足以在短期內帶來成果。整體投資組合非常強勁，我對此感到非常振奮。

So with that, I will turn it over to Jordan.

那麼，接下來我把時間交給 Jordan。

Thank you, Chris and Jon, and thank you to everyone for joining us this morning. I want to reiterate, but without repeating, I see many of the same strengths in the Burford origination platform and portfolio that Chris and Jon just spoke about. We spent a good portion this morning discussing our disappointment with the recent activity in our YPF related assets, and as you would expect, the judgment reversal had a significant non-cash impact on our financial results. Those numbers understandably overshadow much of the first quarter activity.

謝謝你，Chris 和 Jon，也謝謝各位今天早上加入我們。我想再次強調（但不重複贅述），我在 Burford 的案源開發平台與投資組合中，看到了許多與 Chris 和 Jon 剛才提到的相同優勢。今天早上我們花了相當多時間討論我們對近期 YPF 相關資產動態的失望；如各位所預期，判決被推翻對我們的財務結果造成了重大的非現金影響。這些數字可以理解地掩蓋了第一季許多活動的表現。

Rather than walking through each page of our two segments, the Principal Finance and Asset Management segment, I'm going to focus on the key highlights and themes associated with the quarter on page 25. I'll also call out several non-cash items that affected the income statement on some different lines, and I'll make sure to note what those impacts were as we go through it. And then at the end, we'll open up for Q&A.

與其逐頁帶各位看我們兩個部門（主體融資與資產管理部門），我將聚焦於第 25 頁本季的關鍵亮點與主題。我也會點出幾項影響損益表、且分別反映在不同科目的非現金項目，並在說明過程中清楚指出其影響。最後，我們將開放問答。

Jon just spoke about his excitement around the global origination franchise, and let me add some perspective by walking through some of the related figures. New definitive commitments were $133 million, which is 25% higher than the first quarter average of '24 and '25. That's a strong start to the year, and we expect healthy demand and a strong pipeline as we move throughout 2026.

Jon 剛才談到他對全球案源開發特許經營（franchise）的興奮之情；我補充一些觀點，帶各位看幾個相關數字。新增確定性承諾（new definitive commitments）為 1.33 億美元，較 2024 與 2025 年第一季平均水準高出 25%。這是今年強勁的開局；隨著我們進入 2026 年，我們預期需求將保持健康、案源管線也將維持強勁。

Definitive commitments naturally translate into deployments. We deployed $108 million in the first quarter, broadly in line with our quarterly average. Realizations were $97 million in the first quarter. That's lower than last year's start, which benefited from a nearly $100 million single asset realization, but it's still an encouraging beginning to the year, reflecting, as Jon mentioned, the diverse set of cash generating assets, including two that produced $20 million or more realizations.

確定性承諾自然會轉化為資金投放。我們第一季投放 1.08 億美元，整體與我們的季度平均水準大致一致。第一季實現（realizations）為 9,700 萬美元。這低於去年年初（當時受惠於接近 1 億美元的單一資產實現），但仍是令人鼓舞的年度開端；正如 Jon 所提到，這反映出多元的現金創造資產組合，其中包含兩項資產各自帶來 2,000 萬美元或以上的實現。

Realizations become receivables. Receivables ultimately convert to cash. As Chris noted at the start of the call, we believe we have visibility to more than $280 million in cash receipts so far this year. And as Jon mentioned, there's a significant amount of anticipated court activity still to come over the balance of 2026. Capital provision income had a few headwinds through this period. First, discount rates used to net present value of our assets increased by nearly 50 basis points, accounting for about half of the negative impact.

實現會形成應收款。應收款最終會轉為現金。如 Chris 在電話會議一開始所提到，我們相信截至今年目前為止，我們對超過 2.8 億美元的現金收款具有可視性。而如 Jon 所說，2026 年剩餘期間仍預期會有大量法院活動。資本提供收入（capital provision income）在此期間面臨幾項逆風。首先，用於將資產折現至淨現值的折現率上升了將近 50 個基點，約占負面影響的一半。

As I mentioned before, under our fair value accounting, changes in rates in the broader rate environment affect our assets in a way that can resemble a bond portfolio. In addition, capital provision income was negatively impacted by changes in duration and certain observable milestones.

如我先前提到，在我們的公允價值會計下，整體利率環境中的利率變動會以某種方式影響我們的資產，其表現可能類似債券投資組合。此外，資本提供收入也受到存續期間（duration）變動以及若干可觀察里程碑變化的負面影響。

Turning to operating expenses. There are a couple of items to highlight. You'll see movement in the long term incentive line, or what we call carry, that naturally tracks changes in the fair value of assets. In addition, our deferred share based compensation was impacted by the decline in our share price during the period.

接著談營運費用。有幾點值得強調。各位會看到長期激勵（long term incentive）科目，也就是我們所稱的 carry，出現變動；這會自然地隨資產公允價值的變化而變動。此外，我們的遞延股份基礎薪酬也受到期間股價下跌的影響。

But I want to spend a few moments explaining the $19 million charge related to case related expenditures. These expenditures relate to previously deployed costs that have been capitalized into the fair value of our assets. Given our ownership position, these costs should have been expensed. Going forward, we'll continue to track the cumulative amount of expenses associated with these assets and provide continued visibility into whether they relate to active assets or concluded cases. These are all active cases when looking at the $19 million of costs. And these costs will also be treated as deployed costs when we look at our ROIC and IRR metrics.

但我想花幾分鐘說明與案件相關支出（case related expenditures）所產生的 1,900 萬美元費用。這些支出與先前已投放、且已資本化並計入我們資產公允價值的成本有關。基於我們的持有權益立場，這些成本本應費用化。未來，我們將持續追蹤與這些資產相關的累計費用金額，並持續提供透明度，說明其是與進行中資產相關，或與已結案案件相關。就這 1,900 萬美元成本而言，全部都是進行中的案件。而在我們檢視 ROIC 與 IRR 指標時，這些成本也將被視為已投放成本（deployed costs）。

We raised $500 million of incremental debt in January and redeemed the remaining outstanding UK issuance. Before I say more about the capital structure, it's worth noting that the redemption did impact the income statement. More than $12 million of the $60 million of foreign exchange impact recorded in the income statement related to this redemption.

我們在 1 月新增舉借 5 億美元的增量債務，並贖回剩餘未償的英國發行債券。在我進一步談資本結構之前，值得注意的是，這次贖回確實影響了損益表。損益表中記錄的 6,000 萬美元外匯影響之中，有超過 1,200 萬美元與此次贖回相關。

Overall, GBP rates have increased mostly since when we first issued these bonds in 2017. And historically, that rate impact was recognized below the line in other comprehensive income, or OCI. This period, with the redemption, it was crystallized in the first quarter, but it's been recorded over time in OCI in the prior periods. And it's also important to note that over the life of these bonds, with rate movement, our GBP denominated assets in the portfolio, as well as some of our marketable securities, have also benefited on the positive side with pound depreciation. Overall, liquidity remains strong with $740 million of cash and marketable securities at quarter end.

整體而言，自我們於 2017 年首次發行這些債券以來，英鎊利率大多呈上升。而過去，該利率影響是列在損益表下方的其他綜合損益（OCI）中認列。本期因贖回而在第一季一次性實現（crystallized），但在先前期間已隨時間在 OCI 中累積入帳。同時也必須指出，在這些債券存續期間內，隨著匯率變動，我們投資組合中的英鎊計價資產，以及部分可交易證券，也在英鎊貶值時於正面方向受益。整體而言，流動性仍然強勁，季末現金與可交易證券合計為 7.4 億美元。

Let us switch to Page 43 and wrap up with a few comments on our capital structure and then turn to Q&A. A few key points to highlight. We have an unsecured laddered maturity schedule that's been deliberately constructed to support our portfolio. As discussed, we've had no maturities due until 2028 following the proactive redemption of our 2026 maturity earlier this year. Weighted average life of our debt capital is 5.5 years compared to the weighted average life of concluded assets and asset deployments of 2.6 and 3.4 years, respectively.

接著請翻到第 43 頁，我們用幾點對資本結構的評論作結，然後進入問答。有幾個重點要強調。我們擁有無擔保、梯次到期（laddered maturity）的到期結構，這是為了支撐我們的投資組合而刻意建構的。如前所述，因我們今年稍早主動贖回 2026 年到期債券，接下來直到 2028 年前都沒有到期項目。我們債務資本的加權平均存續期間為 5.5 年，相較之下，已結案資產與資產投放的加權平均存續期間分別為 2.6 年與 3.4 年。

The redemption of the 2026 bonds also eliminated our remaining maintenance covenants. Our outstanding debt now consists entirely of 144A notes with incurrence covenants only. In practical terms, that means we're limited to how much additional debt we can incur at certain debt to equity levels, but we retain flexibility to refinance existing issuances and a variety of other flexibility under various baskets created under the debt indentures. All of that is public and available on our IR website. The incurrence test is 2.0 times debt to equity compared to our current level of [3.5] times.

贖回 2026 年到期債券也同時消除了我們剩餘的維持性財務契約（maintenance covenants）。我們目前未償債務完全由 144A 票據構成，且僅包含新增負債型契約（incurrence covenants）。就實務而言，這表示在特定的負債對股權比率水準下，我們可新增舉債的額度會受到限制；但我們仍保有再融資既有發行，以及在債券契約（indentures）中各項「籃子」（baskets）所提供的多種彈性。上述內容皆已公開，並可在我們的投資人關係（IR）網站查閱。新增負債測試（incurrence test）為負債對股權 2.0 倍，相較於我們目前約為 [3.5] 倍。

And while, as Chris mentioned, we intend to delever over time, we remain comfortable that a balance sheet model supported by leverage is appropriate for this asset class. We believe our current leverage is manageable, given our mature and diversified portfolio.

此外，正如 Chris 所提到，雖然我們打算隨時間降低槓桿，但我們仍認為，以槓桿支撐的資產負債表模式對此一資產類別是合適的。鑑於我們成熟且多元化的投資組合，我們相信目前的槓桿水準是可控的。

With that, I would like to turn it back to Chris for any closing remarks, and then we can open up for Q&A.

那麼，我想把時間交回給 Chris 做結語，接著我們就可以開放問答。

I think we've gone on for more than 45 minutes. And so rather than me prattle on for longer, I think it would be better for us just to go ahead and take your questions. We are -- as you can tell from all three of us, we are excited about what lies ahead and the ability to showcase the strength of the core business to you, and that's really where we're going to be focusing on in the years to come.

我想我們已經講了超過 45 分鐘。因此與其我再繼續嘮叨更久，我想我們不如直接開始回答各位的問題。我們——從我們三位的表現各位也看得出來——對未來充滿期待，也期待向各位展現核心業務的強勁實力；而這也正是我們未來幾年將聚焦的重點。

(Operator Instructions) Timothy D'Agostino, B. Riley Securities.

（操作員指示）Timothy D'Agostino，B. Riley Securities。

I guess thinking forward, when you all think about approaching larger cases or unicorn cases such as YPF. Given the process of YPF, how does that change your approach to those larger cases especially ones that again are kind of in -- I guess, that [uniform bracket] that are way larger than what you quantify as large cases? I know it's usually around $100 million.

我想往前看，當你們思考要接觸更大型的案件或像 YPF 這樣的獨角獸案件時。鑑於 YPF 的流程，這會如何改變你們對那些更大型案件的做法，尤其是那些同樣屬於——我想，是那個[統一區間]、規模遠大於你們所量化為大型案件的案件？我知道通常大約是 1 億美元。

Sure. I guess I would divide the world into two pieces a little bit because YPF was large in the sense of its potential outcome. But it wasn't especially large in terms of what it cost us to acquire the ability to provide financing and then the financing itself.

當然。我想我會把這個世界稍微分成兩個部分，因為 YPF 的「大」在於其潛在結果。但就我們為了取得提供融資的能力以及融資本身所付出的成本而言，它並不特別大。

And so yeah, we've got, round numbers, $100 million invested in YPF, but that's over an 11-year period of hard-fought litigation. So I don't think that I would regard another EUR15 million investment, which was our original disbursement. I don't think I would necessarily regard that as a unicorn-type case, even if it came with the potential of a very high asymmetric return. And we are certainly open to doing cases like that from time to time when they present themselves.

所以是的，我們在 YPF 上投入了約 1 億美元，但那是在 11 年期間、經過艱苦訴訟累積而來。因此我不認為我會把另一筆 1,500 萬歐元的投資——也就是我們最初的墊付款——必然視為獨角獸型案件，即使它可能帶來非常高的非對稱回報。而且當這類案件不時出現時，我們當然也願意去做。

The reality is, as you can see, because YPF was effectively the largest judgment in American history, there aren't that many of those cases. The other side of the bucket is when we have clients who want us to put very substantial amounts of capital to work in their cases. We've done transactions for clients that have exceeded $300 million in size. But those cases don't necessarily have the same kind of asymmetric returns, they may simply be strong cases that clients want to monetize and our approach has always been the same.

現實是，如你所見，因為 YPF 實際上是美國史上最大的判決金額，所以這類案件並不多。另一個面向是，當我們有客戶希望我們在其案件中投入非常可觀的資本。我們曾為客戶做過規模超過 3 億美元的交易。但那些案件不一定具有同樣的非對稱回報；它們可能只是很強的案件，客戶希望變現，而我們的做法一向相同。

We set whatever our balance sheet risk tolerance is for the case or for the category of cases that we're pursuing. And to the extent that there is client demand for more capital than that, we have tended to meet that extra client demand using sidecar vehicles, most recently with our sovereign wealth fund partner and previously with some other private investors as well. And I think that's how we would continue to look at that slice of the market.

我們會為該案件或我們所追求的案件類別，設定資產負債表可承受的風險容忍度。而在客戶對資本的需求超過該水準時，我們往往會透過 sidecar 工具來滿足額外需求；最近是與我們的主權財富基金夥伴合作，先前也曾與其他私人投資人合作。我想我們會持續以這種方式看待那一塊市場。

Okay. Great. That's super helpful color. And then just a second one, if I can ask. Over the past couple of quarters, obviously, it's been talked about the backlog to recover from COVID cases.

好的。很好。這些補充說明非常有幫助。然後如果可以的話，我再問第二個。過去幾個季度，顯然一直在談因 COVID 案件造成的積壓待處理量。

I guess as we think about going forward, could you just remind us of, I guess, the change in case realizations from the pre-COVID time to where you stand now? Like how much longer is it taking on average for cases to either settle, adjudicate to win, or be lost compared to the cases that were maybe back in 2017? Just to get a better understanding.

我想在往前看時，你能否提醒我們一下，我想，是從 COVID 之前到你們現在的案件實現（realizations）變化？例如，相較於可能在 2017 年的案件，現在案件平均要花多久才會和解、裁決勝訴或敗訴？只是想更好地理解。

Yeah. It's -- so the actual number is -- you see it on slide 14. And what that shows is that the concluded weighted average life has gone up a little bit. It's now sitting at 2.6 years, up from 2.3 years before COVID. But if you look at the bullet that I pointed to earlier, the weighted average life of the active deployed capital is now 3.4 years.

是的。實際數字是——你可以在第 14 張投影片看到。那裡顯示已結案的加權平均存續期間（weighted average life）略有上升。目前是 2.6 年，高於 COVID 之前的 2.3 年。但如果你看我先前提到的那個重點，已部署的在案資本（active deployed capital）的加權平均存續期間現在是 3.4 年。

And presumably, that will continue to go up a little bit as we -- because we haven't, of course, resolved all of those cases. So even though it feels anecdotally like things are slower and taking longer, and I think there are certainly anecdotal examples about, as I pointed out earlier, we've still got a decent percentage of the portfolio in pre-pandemic cases, when you actually look at the hard numbers, we've added a year or so right now to weighted average life.

而且推測，隨著我們——因為我們當然還沒有解決所有那些案件——它還會再略微上升。所以即使從軼事角度感覺事情變慢、耗時更久，而且我認為確實有一些軼事例子；正如我先前指出的，我們的投資組合中仍有相當比例是疫情前的案件，但當你實際看硬數據時，目前加權平均存續期間大約增加了一年左右。

Mark DeVries, Deutsche Bank.

Mark DeVries，德意志銀行。

First one of the questions are around the $5.2 billion of kind of modeled realizations. I think you just referenced it for February, I'm assuming the expectations are still there? And could you just confirm that? And also, could you discuss what kind of the assumed weighted [outlook] is for that?

第一個問題是關於約 52 億美元那種「模型化的實現」金額。我想你剛提到是 2 月的，我假設預期仍然存在？你能否確認一下？另外，你能否談談對此所假設的加權[展望]是什麼？

I'm going to defer to Jon and Jordan on this. I am not certain that I know the weighted average life -- and if I do, I'm not sure that it's something that we've said publicly. But Jon or Jordan, do you have any comments on that?

這題我先交給 Jon 和 Jordan。我不確定我是否知道那個加權平均存續期間——即便我知道，我也不確定那是不是我們曾公開說過的內容。不過 Jon 或 Jordan，你們有什麼看法嗎？

Yeah. We don't -- as you know, we don't actually disclose a duration estimate associated with our cash flows.

是的。如你所知，我們其實不會揭露與我們現金流相關的存續期間（duration）估計。

It sort of goes back to what I said earlier, how much versus when in the business. We're comfortable talking about how much, and we're pretty good at it. We're less able to do a good job on the when part.

這有點回到我先前說的，在這個業務裡「多少」與「何時」的問題。我們很願意談「多少」，而且我們在這方面做得相當好。至於「何時」那一部分，我們比較難把它做得同樣好。

Yeah. No, understood. But is there a reason to think it's meaningfully different than, I guess, the 3.6 years you assume in the fair value of the capital provision asset?

是的。了解。但有理由認為它會與你們在資本提供資產（capital provision asset）公允價值中所假設的 3.6 年有顯著差異嗎？

Well, what we do when we model that stuff is we model a very wide range of outcomes. And so in every case, you're going to have outcomes that include early settlement, later settlement, trial, appeal, and so on. And so what that does is it gives you actually quite a wide range of sort of scenario outputs that we then weight by probability.

嗯，我們在建模那些東西時，會模擬非常廣泛的結果範圍。因此在每個案件中，你都會有包含提早和解、較晚和解、審判、上訴等等的結果。這樣做會產生其實相當寬的情境輸出範圍，然後我們再按機率加權。

And so the reason I don't have that number to hand, and the reason that Jordan doesn't either is because there's such variability in case type and in throughput of where you're headed. Like obviously, if you have a case that files and then goes through class certification, which is going to take less than a year, loses class certification and then settles, that's a very different dynamic than the case that you think is going to go -- well, let's take arbitration.

所以我手邊沒有那個數字、Jordan 也沒有的原因，是因為案件類型以及你所處理流程的進度差異非常大。例如很明顯，如果你有一個案件提起後進入集體訴訟認證（class certification），這可能不到一年就完成，然後集體認證失敗再和解，這種動態就和你認為會一路走——嗯，我們拿仲裁來說——的案件非常不同。

I think the ICSID process has got a 4.4-year average followed by two to six months of enforcement if you want to go for nominal. And so if you're modeling an exit case, if the case doesn't settle rapidly, then you've got obviously a considerably longer duration. So it doesn't really work to say, I don't think it's that helpful to say, yeah, portfolio-wide here is the number because of the degree of idiosyncratic variability.

我認為 ICSID 流程平均是 4.4 年，之後若要走名目（nominal）執行，還要再加上 2 到 6 個月的執行程序。因此如果你在建模一個退出案件，而案件沒有快速和解，那麼顯然存續期間會長得多。所以我不認為說「整體投資組合的數字是這個」真的可行或有多大幫助，因為存在高度的個別差異變動。

Okay. Understood. Just changing tack here. You mentioned in the presentation both the ability to aggressively manage operating expenses and also to harvest cash. Could you talk about the different levers that you have in line?

好的。了解。我換個話題。你在簡報中提到既有能力積極管理營運費用，也有能力收割現金（harvest cash）。你能談談你們有哪些不同的槓桿可以運用嗎？

Yeah. Look, ultimately, with respect to managing the operating expenses, it's something that we've been doing continuously as we monitor the cash that goes out the door, whether that's with respect to day-to-day operating expenses and our long-term growth aspirations. I think that overall, though, our focus, obviously, given that those numbers are not as large when you think about the potential of revenue and realizations, the focus really is on continuing to see the portfolio perform.

是的。你看，最終在管理營運費用方面，這是我們一直持續在做的事：我們會監控現金流出，不論是日常營運費用，或是我們長期成長願景相關的支出。不過整體而言，我們的重點顯然是——考量到相較於潛在的營收與實現金額，那些數字並沒有那麼大——重點其實是在持續讓投資組合表現良好。

And then how we harvest cash from the existing portfolio, we don't necessarily control the cases, but that doesn't mean that we are extremely active partners to our clients, whether that's corporates or law firms, in thinking through opportunities in which to manage resolution. Case management is something that we have done historically and we'll continue to do as we go forward.

接著談到我們如何從既有投資組合中回收現金，我們不一定能掌控個案，但這不代表我們不會作為客戶（無論是企業或律師事務所）非常積極的合作夥伴，一起思考有哪些機會可以管理和解決爭議。案件管理是我們過去一直在做的事情，未來也會持續進行。

And I think we've talked in the past about, but even in cases where we obviously don't control settlement, the counterparties or lawyers will come to us to model the potential outcomes, whether it's granularity on particular matters, and they confirm that quite helpful and useful in figuring out what's an acceptable strategy towards settlement and to get to yes sooner.

而且我想我們過去也談過，即便在我們顯然無法主導和解的案件中，交易對手或律師也會來找我們，請我們對可能的結果進行建模，不論是針對特定事項的更細緻拆解；他們也確認這對於判斷什麼樣的和解策略可被接受、以及更快達成共識（get to yes）非常有幫助、很有用。

Got it. And then just one more if I could slip it in. Sounds like cutting the dividend is at least on the table here. I think when it was raised in the last earnings call, you kind of mentioned that you've got a class of investors that kind of need some yield to hold your shares. Have you looked into how meaningful of your shareholder base that is and what pressure you would have on the stock if you did cut the dividend?

了解。那我再插問最後一個問題。聽起來至少有在考慮削減股利。我記得上次財報電話會議提到這點時，你有說你們有一類投資人需要一些殖利率才會持有你們的股票。你們有沒有研究過這在股東結構中占比有多重要？如果真的削減股利，對股價會造成多大壓力？

Yeah. The consultations that we've had, including with our advisers, suggest that that's not a particularly dramatic portion of our shareholder base at this point. We've seen quite a lot of rotation in the last five years since we added the New York Stock Exchange listing. And so if you look now at liquidity and trading volume in the shares, it's very heavily US-weighted today. And the consistent feedback we've had from US investors is a relatively low level of focus on the dividend.

是的。我們做過的諮詢（也包括與顧問的討論）顯示，目前這並不是我們股東基礎中特別顯著的一部分。自從我們新增紐約證交所上市以來的五年裡，我們看到相當多的持股輪動。因此如果你現在看股票的流動性與成交量，今天是非常偏向美國市場。而我們從美國投資人那裡得到的一致回饋是，他們對股利的關注度相對不高。

James Allen, Berenberg.

James Allen，Berenberg。

Just in terms of a couple of questions from me. So first one, I think earlier on the call, you mentioned -- forgive me if this is wrong -- around your 86% of cases against Argentina saw them pay out historically. Does that include international arbitration? And if it does, what would that be?

我這邊有兩個問題。第一個，我想你在電話會議前面提到——如果我記錯請見諒——大約你們針對阿根廷的案件有86%在歷史上看到對方有支付（賠付）。這個數字包含國際仲裁嗎？如果包含，那具體是指什麼？

And then secondly, just with regards to the debt-to-equity ratio, it sounds like you're quite comfortable on that, but you obviously will have to pay it down over time through kind of aggressively managing your OpEx, et cetera. But would you also consider a sale of a bundle of cases if there was a buyer out there?

第二個，關於負債對股權比（debt-to-equity ratio），聽起來你們對目前水準相當放心，但你們顯然仍需要隨時間推進去償還，透過更積極地管理營運費用（OpEx）等等。不過，如果市場上有買家，你們也會考慮出售一籃子案件嗎？

So sure. So taking them in order, the 86% number in fact is international arbitrations. So that represents -- and you can get decent public data on this -- there have been, if memory serves, the numbers on the slide, there have been 51 international arbitrations brought against Argentina.

好的。依序回答，86%這個數字其實就是國際仲裁。這代表——而且你可以取得相當不錯的公開資料——如果我沒記錯，投影片上有數字，針對阿根廷提起的國際仲裁一共有51件。

And just so that we're clear about what we're talking about, because a lot of people think about arbitration as being simply an alternative to litigation. So you might have an arbitration clause in your employment arrangements, or you might have an arbitration clause when you sit down in an Uber, you can't see it but you've agreed to go to arbitration. Those are commercial arbitrations. Those are simply an alternative to litigation where you've got a dispute between two private parties and you're choosing an alternative resolution mechanism. That's not what we're talking about here.

為了釐清我們在談什麼，因為很多人把仲裁想成只是訴訟的替代方案。例如你的雇用安排裡可能有仲裁條款，或你坐上Uber時也可能有仲裁條款，你看不到但你已同意進行仲裁。那些是商業仲裁。那只是當兩個私人當事人之間有爭議時，選擇一種替代訴訟的解決機制。但我們這裡談的不是那種。

What we're talking about here are arbitrations that are brought under what are called bilateral investment treaties. So these are treaties between two sovereigns. In our case, one between Argentina and Spain, because Petersen is a Spanish entity, and one between Argentina and the United States because of Eton Park. And those treaties permit claims under what is called a public international law regime administered by the World Bank or by the UN and so on.

我們談的是依據所謂「雙邊投資協定」（bilateral investment treaties）提起的仲裁。這些是兩個主權國家之間的條約。以我們的案件而言，一個是阿根廷與西班牙之間的條約，因為Petersen是西班牙實體；另一個是阿根廷與美國之間的條約，因為Eton Park的關係。而這些條約允許在由世界銀行或聯合國等機構管理的所謂公法國際法（public international law）體系下提出主張。

So we're talking about a special kind of arbitration that yields an award against a country that, as you heard me say, is generally satisfied. So that's the denominator, the 51 bilateral investment treaty arbitrations brought against Argentina, and 86% of those, as reported, have had resolutions in favor of the investor.

所以我們談的是一種特殊的仲裁，會產生對一個國家的裁決（award），而如同你剛才聽我說的，通常會被履行。因此分母是：針對阿根廷提起的51件雙邊投資協定仲裁；其中有86%如報導所示，最終的解決結果是對投資人有利。

On the debt-to-equity question and sale of cases, we're fans -- and I've talked about this for years -- we're fans of creating, building and being able to make use of a vibrant secondary market in litigation risk. And that's how you saw us take profit off the table in YPF. That still remains, I think, one of the largest secondary transactions that was done in the space. So we're totally open to it.

至於負債對股權以及出售案件的問題，我們一直是——而且我多年來都在談——建立並能夠運用一個活絡的訴訟風險次級市場（secondary market）的支持者。這也是你看到我們在YPF案上把部分利潤先落袋的方式。我認為那至今仍是這個領域最大規模的次級交易之一。所以我們完全願意這麼做。

The challenge is whether the market is there and pricing, because we haven't seen the secondary market move to the kind of efficiency that you see in, let's say, private equity secondaries, where investors are still, in my view, regularly trying to overprice secondary capital for those transactions. So we're certainly open to it, but it's not as fluid as one might wish, and it's an area that we continue to devote time and effort to.

挑戰在於市場是否存在以及定價，因為我們尚未看到次級市場達到你在例如私募股權次級市場所看到的那種效率；在我看來，投資人仍經常試圖對這類交易的次級資本開出過高價格。因此我們當然願意，但它不像大家希望的那麼流動；而這也是我們持續投入時間與精力的領域。

Hal Potter, Bank of America.

Hal Potter，美國銀行。

Just two for me. So on your managing of operating expenses, you called out potentially some early retirements. My question really is about to what extent are you concerned about key person risk and the potential knock-on impact on the rest of the business going forward?

我有兩個問題。關於你們管理營運費用，你提到可能會有一些提早退休。我真正想問的是：你們在多大程度上擔心關鍵人物風險（key person risk），以及這對未來其餘業務可能造成的連鎖影響？

And then my other question is just about the shape in terms of doubling of the portfolio aspiration and then specifics on timing. If we're thinking that there's no more leverage to fund it, at least in the short term, is there a kind of kink upwards that you're expecting on that multiyear view?

另外一個問題是關於你們希望投資組合規模倍增的目標，以及時間點的具體安排。如果我們認為至少短期內不會再用更多槓桿來資助，那在這個多年期展望中，你們是否預期會出現某種向上加速的「拐點」（kink upwards）？

Sure. So on the people point, no, and quite contrary actually. We've talked for a while about the bench that we've been able to build at Burford. We're really, really, really thrilled with the quality of the team and with the next generation of people coming along.

好的。先談人員的部分，不會，事實上恰恰相反。我們談了一段時間，Burford已經建立起我們的後備梯隊（bench）。我們對團隊的品質，以及正在成長的下一代人才，感到非常、非常、非常滿意。

And so while it's always sad to say goodbye to people that you've worked with for a long time, Craig Arnott had been at Burford for a decade. But he and I actually started working together all the way back at Latham when we practiced law together. So it's sad when that happens, but at the same time, it opens the door to our next generation really coming along and moving up. And so I'm actually quite excited by that.

所以，雖然和共事很久的人道別總是令人難過，Craig Arnott在Burford待了十年。但其實我和他早在Latham時就開始一起工作，當時我們一起執業。所以這樣的離開確實令人感傷，但同時也為我們的下一代人才真正接棒、往上晉升打開了大門。因此我其實對此相當期待。

And in terms of doubling the portfolio, I think if you look at the new business numbers that we highlighted today, it's -- to be honest, while it sounds like a lofty goal to double the portfolio, to double the size of the business, it's actually not that difficult to do over the course of five or six years. And we have been running CAGRs that are well in excess of what we would need to produce to just be able to meet that goal. So I think that is frankly largely a business-as-usual undertaking, while obviously continuing to pay attention to the market dynamics.

至於投資組合倍增，我想如果你看我們今天強調的新業務數字——老實說，雖然倍增投資組合、把業務規模翻倍聽起來是個很高的目標，但在五到六年的時間裡其實並不難做到。而且我們一直以來的複合年成長率（CAGR）遠高於達成該目標所需的水準。所以我認為，坦白說，這在很大程度上就是按部就班的日常經營，只是我們當然會持續關注市場動態。

Ryan Shelley, Bank of America.

Ryan Shelley，美國銀行。

My first question is around kind of the cadence of commitments. Are you able to provide any color on how you can time those commitments when you need to fund them? And just as we think about operating expense going forward here, given where the covenants sit today?

我的第一個問題是關於承諾的節奏。你們能否提供一些說明，關於你們如何安排這些承諾的時間點，以及在需要出資時如何配合？另外，考量到目前契約條款（covenants）的位置，往後在營運費用方面我們應該如何看待？

Yeah. So I think let's break that into two pieces. My suspicion is that you're probably talking about the definitive commitments that we've identified. So those are commitments to existing cases that we expect to finance over time. And those have been pretty consistent.

好的。我想把這個拆成兩個部分。我猜你的問題可能是在談我們已經辨識出的具約束力承諾（definitive commitments）。也就是對既有案件的承諾，我們預期會隨時間推進而提供融資。而這些一直都相當一致。

Again, back to the conveyor belt, you have a pretty good sense when you start the case of the rhythm that it's going to follow and when the spend is going to go out. Litigation spend comes in peaks and valleys depending on what's going on in the case, but there is certainly a relatively large component of the spend that comes towards the end as you prepare for and go to trial.

再回到「輸送帶」的比喻，一旦你開始一個案件，你對它將遵循的節奏，以及支出會在何時發生，通常就有相當好的掌握。訴訟支出會因案件進展而有高峰與低谷，但確實有相當大一部分支出會集中在後期，當你準備並進入審判時。

And if you look across history, and we published those numbers for years, you don't see a massive percentage of that number going out in any given year. I want to say numbers in the 20%s percent, give or take, so that's sort of what it looks like.

如果你回顧歷史數據——而且我們多年來都有公布這些數字——你不會看到在任何單一年份有非常高比例的金額支出。我想大概是20%上下，視情況而定，所以大致就是這樣的樣貌。

Now the other piece of commitments is, of course, new business that we do. And that new business, as Jon pointed out earlier, is entirely within our control. So we can do lots of it, we can do none of it, depending on what we think at any point, our risk tolerance and our cash position and liquidity.

當然，承諾的另一部分是我們做的新業務。而如Jon先前指出，新業務完全在我們的控制之內。所以我們可以做很多，也可以完全不做，取決於我們在任何時點對風險承受度、現金部位與流動性的判斷。

I would only add to that, we have relationships with some firms where the pace at which the dollars go out is actually built into it. Firms instead of billing by the hour will bill us by the month or by stage of case, and if the stage gets delayed, then they'll postpone the monthly billing. Or for those who are billing by the hour, there will still be caps on stages to make sure that you don't use up the budget too quickly.

我只想補充一點：我們與一些事務所有合作關係，資金支出的節奏其實是寫進安排裡的。有些事務所不是按小時計費，而是按月或按案件階段向我們請款；如果某個階段延後，他們就會延後每月請款。而對於按小時計費的，也會在各階段設上限，確保不會太快把預算用完。

And conversely, we will -- when it comes to our returns -- have a component built into those returns that is IRR-based or multiple-based, so that to the extent you're putting out money, your potential returns go up as well.

相對地，談到我們的報酬——我們會在報酬中設計一個以IRR或倍數為基礎的組成，因此在你投入資金的同時，你的潛在回報也會相應提高。

Got it. Very helpful. And one more quick, if I could. In the presentation, you mentioned the possibility around repurchasing some of the bonds in the open market. Can you talk about what you would need to be able to do that? Is that something you'd be considering today? Or are there any hurdles before you consider doing that?

了解。非常有幫助。如果可以的話我再快速問一個。在簡報中，你提到可能在公開市場回購部分債券。你能談談要具備哪些條件才能這麼做嗎？這是你們今天就會考慮的事嗎？或者在考慮這麼做之前，是否有任何障礙？

Sure. Look, we've always been active in managing our maturities and purchasing bonds in the open market. If you look at the last two UK issuances, we spent some of our cash in advance of redeeming these bonds when we saw attractive pricing. I think that it's something that we are constantly looking at relative to the pricing that we see, the cash on balance sheet, the forward look of our cash and expenditures, and then how the maturities are playing out.

當然。你看，我們一直都很積極管理到期結構，並在公開市場買回債券。如果你看最近兩次英國發行，我們在看到有吸引力的價格時，會在正式贖回這些債券之前先動用部分現金買回。我認為這是我們持續在看的事情：相對於我們看到的價格、資產負債表上的現金、對未來現金與支出的展望，以及到期結構的演變。

So I guess it's a dynamic view that we continually have compared to our growth, et cetera. So I don't think there's a hard and fast rule, but it's a tool that we've used over the last several years that I've been here.

所以我想這是一個我們會持續動態評估的觀點，也會與我們的成長等因素一起比較。因此我不認為有什麼硬性規則，但這確實是我在這裡過去幾年我們一直使用的工具。

This is Josh. I'm going to jump in really quick. I think we have just a few minutes to take a few questions from the webcast. The first one is, given the current YPF outcome, what would you do differently in terms of valuing such a large potential outcome? Is there a case for a more conservative valuation or a cap on potential value to reduce the impact on share price volatility from unfavorable outcomes?

我是Josh。我快速插一句。我想我們還有幾分鐘可以回答幾個網路直播的提問。第一個是：鑑於目前YPF的結果，對於這種潛在結果非常大的案件，在估值上你會做哪些不同的處理？是否有理由採取更保守的估值，或對潛在價值設上限，以降低不利結果對股價波動的影響？

Well, what I would do is look at the cash and not the accounting, but given that people want to look at the accounting, there's not much you can do. We fair value our assets. We engaged in a market transaction with the YPF assets that set a clear market valuation mark, but it was very high. And so the accounting rules leave you no choice but to take the asset on your books at that point at a value that's implied by the market transaction.

嗯，我會看現金而不是會計數字；但既然大家想看會計，那其實你也做不了太多。我們以公允價值衡量資產。我們針對YPF資產進行了一筆市場交易，該交易設定了一個明確的市場估值基準，但那個估值非常高。因此會計準則讓你別無選擇，只能在那個時間點，按市場交易所隱含的價值把資產入帳。

And then the other valuation rules, including writing assets up over time based on the passage of time and so on, come in and do their own work. So no, I don't think there's anything you can do differently about that. And I do think that if you examine the value of the YPF asset at various points in time, I think it did accurately reflect what the fair value, what the market value of the asset was. The simple fact is that if you were going to do a probabilistic analysis walking into the Second Circuit, you would have said that your odds of reversal were in the single digits. Preska's reversal rate was 4%, the whole Southern District reversal rate was 6%.

接著其他估值規則——包括隨時間推移而將資產逐步調升等——就會各自發揮作用。所以不，我不認為在這方面你能做出不同的處理。而且我確實認為，如果你檢視YPF資產在不同時間點的價值，它確實準確反映了該資產的公允價值、也就是市場價值。事實很簡單：如果你在進入第二巡迴法院（Second Circuit）前做機率分析，你會說被推翻的機率是個位數。Preska法官的判決被推翻率是4%，整個紐約南區（Southern District）的推翻率是6%。

So the market wasn't irrational in how it was valuing the asset -- it was just a low-probability, high-impact outcome.

所以市場在如何為該資產定價上並非不理性——只是這是一個低機率、高影響的結果。

Okay. Second webcast question. Your slide 19 shows accelerating legal costs, which you say drives companies towards litigation finance, but we're paying these increased costs, so unless we're increasing pricing, does this reduce margins?

好的。第二個網路直播問題。你們的第19頁投影片顯示法律成本加速上升，你們說這會驅使公司轉向訴訟融資，但我們也在支付這些增加的成本，所以除非我們提高定價，否則這會不會壓縮利潤率？

Yeah, yeah, yeah, I'm happy to take that. I sort of alluded to it in answering your prior question, and maybe Jon sort of started to answer this, which is we virtually always have a component in our pricing that is a multiple on or an IRR on the money we put out.

是的、是的、是的，我很樂意回答。我在回答你前一個問題時有稍微提到，Jon可能也開始回答了：我們幾乎總是在定價中包含一個組成部分，按我們投入資金的倍數或IRR來計算。

There will be a component as well where it's a percentage of the net beyond that. But we're very mindful of it. And in particular, with high-priced, big-ticket litigation where we are concerned about the spend, we not only work very hard with the lawyers and clients to come up with budgets that we can predict and that we can hold the lawyers to, but we also build it in so that the more the lawyers spend, the larger our profit, which means that we and the clients have a strong incentive to monitor the cost and make sure that the lawyers aren't overstating.

另外也會有一個組成部分，是在此之外對淨收益再抽取一定比例。但我們對此非常謹慎。尤其是在高單價、重大型訴訟中，當我們擔心支出時，我們不僅會與律師和客戶非常努力地制定可預測、且能要求律師遵守的預算；我們也會把機制設計成：律師花得越多，我們的利潤就越高，這表示我們與客戶都有強烈誘因去監控成本，並確保律師不會虛報。

So I'd say that basically, the litigation does get more expensive as billing rates go up, and that is the reason why there is greater demand for our capital. But we are able to deal with that additional cost by making our capital more expensive, as the question says, it does become inherently more expensive. Every dollar of spend is going to need a profit to us as well as the lawyers' built-in profit.

所以我會說，基本上，隨著計費費率上升，訴訟確實變得更昂貴，而這也是市場對我們資本需求更高的原因。但我們能透過讓我們的資本更昂貴來因應這些額外成本——如問題所說，它確實會在本質上變得更昂貴。每一美元的支出都需要同時包含我們的利潤，以及律師內含的利潤。

Okay. And we'll do one last webcast question. Will deleveraging activities hurt your long-term growth? If YPF had not been written down, could you have taken on more cases than you now will?

好的。我們再做最後一個網路直播提問。去槓桿活動會傷害你們的長期成長嗎？如果YPF沒有被減記，你們是否能承接比現在更多的案件？

So I think and hope the answer to that is no. And as I said earlier, we had decided some months ago that we were not going to continue to close new business funding gaps with leverage. We made that decision long before the YPF decision, and we put that in a release a while ago, in fact.

所以我認為並希望答案是否定的。而且如我先前所說，我們在幾個月前就已決定，不再用槓桿去持續填補新業務的資金缺口。我們在YPF決策之前很久就做了這個決定，而且事實上我們也在一段時間前的公告中提到過。

And so the reason for that is basically that we thought that the portfolio is large enough and the cash generation ability of the portfolio was substantial enough that we didn't need to give people the out anymore of just saying, oh, well, let's just go and take out more debt because we've got this BA1.

因此，原因基本上是我們認為投資組合已經夠大，而且投資組合的現金創造能力也足夠可觀，所以我們不需要再讓大家有那種退路——也就是說，喔，那我們就再多借點債吧，因為我們有這個BA1。

So we believe that we're at the size and stage where we don't need to do that, where we should be able organically to fund the growth that we want to do. Now, as I noted, there's always the risk of some timing mismatch there because the incoming cash is not the most predictable thing in the world. And so that's really the only area of risk that we hit there, I think. But otherwise, I think that the plan should work itself out.

所以我們相信，我們已經到了這樣的規模與階段，不需要那麼做；我們應該能夠以內生成長的方式，為我們想做的成長提供資金。現在，如我所提到的，那裡總是存在一些時間錯配的風險，因為流入的現金並不是世界上最可預測的事情。所以我認為，那確實是我們面臨的唯一風險領域。但除此之外，我認為這個計畫應該能夠順利推進。

I might add to that just an observation. In the same way that we said before that the high price of litigation is what creates demand structurally for our capital from the clients who would otherwise pay those costs and who end up not only having to pay them, but pay our returns on them in the end, but out of recoveries.

我可能再補充一點觀察。就像我們之前說過的，高昂的訴訟成本，結構性地創造了客戶對我們資本的需求——那些原本會自行支付這些成本的客戶，最後不僅要支付這些成本，還要在最終以回收款中支付我們的報酬。

But also, the structure that the question implies, that basically in Chris' response, there is a lag time between putting the money out and getting it in, although a relatively predictable lag time across the whole book, meaning our weighted average life hasn't changed dramatically even if COVID slowed things down. That sort of explains the moat that we've historically described around our business.

此外，問題所暗示的結構——也就是在Chris的回應中——基本上存在一段把資金投出去與把資金收回來之間的時間落差；不過就整個投資組合而言，這個落差相對可預測，意思是即便COVID讓進度放慢，我們的加權平均存續期間也沒有出現劇烈變化。這也某種程度上解釋了我們過去所描述、圍繞我們業務的護城河。

It is very hard to start up a business like the one we've built because to start it up, you have to raise capital, you have to deploy capital, and have the relationships and the underwriting team to be able to do it. And generally, to keep the machine going, you have to raise more capital before the money comes back. And that's why over the years, we've seen entrants raise initial capital, and when they go to raise the second fund, they've had a hard time keeping up because they don't yet have the performance or the cash back for investors to reinvest.

要創建像我們打造的這種業務非常困難，因為要啟動它，你必須募資、必須部署資本，並且要有關係網與承保團隊才能做到。而且一般而言，為了讓這台機器持續運轉，你必須在資金回流之前就再募集更多資本。這也是為什麼多年來，我們看到一些新進者募到第一筆資金後，當他們要募第二支基金時會很難跟上，因為他們尚未累積足夠的績效或現金回流，讓投資人再投入。

And as Chris said, we've gotten to a size and scale where we can use the money coming in from prior cases to fund the new commitments. And that's really a pretty privileged position to be in. That has nothing to do with YPF, and so in fact, it highlights the competitive advantage we have.

而如Chris所說，我們已經達到一個規模與量級，可以用先前案件回流的資金來支持新的承諾。而那確實是一個相當有利的位置。這與YPF無關，因此事實上，它凸顯了我們所擁有的競爭優勢。

Thank you so much. I'd now like to hand the call back to Christopher Bogart for closing remarks.

非常感謝。我現在想把電話交回給Christopher Bogart做結語。

Thanks very much. We really appreciate your time. We ran well over time, I know. To the extent that we did not get to your question, we have a call coming up for retail shareholders where we're happy to take a whole lot more of your questions, and details about that will be forthcoming. And there are also lots of opportunities to engage with us, both at investor conferences that are coming up and in one-on-one format.

非常感謝。我們真的很感謝各位撥冗。我知道我們超時很多。如果我們沒有來得及回答你的問題，我們接下來會有一場面向零售股東的電話會議，我們很樂意在那裡回答更多問題，相關細節將會另行公布。此外，也有很多與我們互動的機會，包括即將到來的投資人會議，以及一對一的交流形式。

So we know this has been a shocking and disappointing time for the last few months, but it's time for us to turn the corner and to really now not have my investor meetings start with YPF and instead for us to be able to show you just how potent the core business is and how much cash we think that is capable of generating from the portfolio that we have been building a little bit out of sight, out of mind of the market for the last half dozen years. So we're very excited about what that has to offer, and we're excited to be sharing it with you as we go forward down the road here. Thanks to you all.

所以我們知道，過去幾個月是一段令人震驚且失望的時期，但現在是我們扭轉局面的時候了；接下來，我的投資人會議不必再以YPF作為開場，而是讓我們能向各位展示核心業務有多強勁，以及我們認為在過去六年左右、在市場較少關注之下逐步建立的投資組合，具備多大的現金創造能力。因此，我們對這些所能帶來的機會感到非常興奮，也很期待在未來的路上持續與各位分享。謝謝大家。

Thank you for attending today's session. You may now disconnect. Goodbye.

感謝您參加今天的會議。您現在可以中斷連線。再見。