Stellantis NV (STLA) 2009 Q4 法說會逐字稿

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.

And welcome to today's Fiat 2009 fourth quarter and full year results conference call.

For your information, today's conference is being recorded.

At this time, I would like to hand the conference over to Marco Auriemma, head of Fiat's Investor Relations.

Mr.

Auriemma, please go ahead, sir.

Thank you, Marian.

Good afternoon to you all or good morning as the case may be.

And welcome to Fiat's 2009 fourth quarter and full year results webcasting conference call.

Mr.

Sergio Marchionne, the Chief Executive, and Mr.

Maurizio Francescatti, our Group Treasurer, will host today's call as usual.

They will use the material which you have downloaded from our website.

And after introductory remarks, we will be available to answer all the questions you may have.

Before moving ahead, let me just remind you that any forward-looking statements we might be making during today's call are subject to the risks and uncertainties mentioned in the safe harbor statement included in the presentation materials.

So now I will turn the call over to Mr.

Sergio Marchionne.

Thank you and welcome to the 2009 financial results conference.

I've had an opportunity to read some of the remarks that have been made after the issuance of the press release this morning, I have to compliment some of you on the quality of the analysis that has been done after what has been an incredibly difficult year for every I think market participant in the automotive sector.

I'm hoping that as a result of all this we're going to remove some of the skepticism that I've noticed in some of your remarks about '09 performance, certainly in terms of 2010 over 2010 outlook.

If we could start on page two and just deal with the 2009 results, we have spoken -- now this is the fourth time that we've spoken about 2009.

And as we predicted, the second half of 2009 has seen an improvement in the rate of decline of our top line.

This is a combination of a couple of things.

The first one is that the automotive sector, the car business, has done phenomenally better than 2008 and, secondly, because the fourth quarter of 2008 in and by itself was the beginning of a series of market adjustments, which I think have probably completed in the fourth quarter of this year.

The automobile sector has had the fourth highest quarter in its history.

And effectively, on a unit sales basis, we were almost identical to 2008 combined by -- and as a result of the combination of a strong performance in the second half in Europe and a consistent strong performance at our Latin American operations for the whole year.

CNH is the one that has gone through probably the most uneven set of trading conditions for 2009.

I'll spend more time talking about this, especially as it relates to the construction equipment sector.

Iveco, as all truck manufacturers, has had -- has seen a draconian cut in demand, especially at the heavy end of the product offering, although I think we're beginning to see light at the end of the tunnel, certainly in the light and in the medium sector of the offering.

The more important thing to us is that from a trading profit standpoint, we delivered in excess of what we promised to about EUR1.1 billion in trading profit.

Margins were 2.1%.

There were sequential improvements quarter over quarter throughout 2009 in terms of operating margin performance.

The auto sector, including the luxury brands, delivered about EUR719 million worth of earnings.

Roughly two-thirds of that number came out of the car side.

EUR479 million came out of FGA.

And we had a good contribution out of both Ferrari and Maserati, which just by the nature of the offering would've been the businesses on the car side that would've been more severely impacted by the downturn.

CNH came in at EUR337 million, which is a long way away from over the -- the over EUR1 billion mark that was achieved in 2008.

That was the highest trading performance of CNH since the merger of Case and New Holland back in 1999.

And Iveco managed to eke out the trading profit of EUR105 million, which was a combination of a variety of things, which in addition to the sort of rigorous cost containment efforts that we carried out throughout the group, Iveco also benefited from the involvement of special vehicles and from a strong performance in Latin America.

We also booked a number of unusual charges, roughly EUR700 million, which we'll deal with in a later slide.

On a net, after-tax basis, that number is about EUR600 million.

And so that counts for the majority of the net loss that we booked for the year.

The more significant piece of the performance from '09 was the amount of cash generation that came out of the business.

We produced over EUR1.5 billion of cash for the year.

That levels at about EUR4.4 billion at the end of 2009.

And as a result of that, in a number of capital market activities that we carried out in the second half of 2009, we're now sitting on EUR12.4 billion of cash.

And I mean, this was intentional.

It was not an effect.

We intentionally created a large liquidity buffer in the system to try and deal with whatever may be coming across us in the future and, secondly, to give us the highest level of flexibility from an industrial standpoint in terms of managing our businesses going forward.

Moving on to page three, as I mentioned, we've got three times as much liquidity as we had at the end of 2008.

Some of you were voicing concerns on the certainly conference call that we had in January of 2009 as it related to 2008 performance about the fact that the group may have been needing capital.

I mentioned to you at the time that any capital raising efforts had to be directed toward the debt side of the balance sheet, that we did not need equity, that we were effectively dealing with a working capital reversal associated with the downturn in volumes.

And that's effectively what happened.

I mean, we were able to manage through the crisis.

I think we waited for the appropriate time in which the capital markets came back.

And we accessed it with a number of transactions that gave rise to almost EUR5 billion in liquidity.

We continue to work on the internationalization of this group.

We've signed -- I don't want to belabor the point -- but I think the issue about Chrysler and the integration of Chrysler is well on its way.

We presented our plan to the markets on November the 4th.

We confirmed those targets effective by 2014.

Chrysler is expected to generate roughly $5 billion worth of trading profit.

And so all the initiatives that we have announced on that date are proceeding as planned.

And I think we expect to see an improvement in the performance of this business as we approach the launches of the significant product rejuvenation efforts that have been put in place in the last two quarters of 2009.

Just to remove any doubts, we have higher liquidity than we had on November the 4th.

The number is less than EUR6 billion.

But it's more than what we had when we talked to you on November the 4th.

So Chrysler is doing well.

I think we just need to navigate through 2010 to allow us to get to a new product portfolio by the end of 2010.

We have finally found what I consider to be a permanent sustainable, defensible choice in terms of a partner in China.

We signed an agreement with Guangzhou Automotive.

And that process is fully underway.

Hopefully, we'll be in market by 2011 with certainly the beginning of a product portfolio in China.

Our expectation is that we need to be able to interlink that joint venture with our Chrysler activity and bring Chrysler to China within the context of the general framework that we signed in the summer of 2009.

We also signed an agreement with Kamaz in Russia for the production of agricultural equipment or production and marketing of agricultural equipment in Russia.

This is absolutely required in order to allow us to continue to be competitive in that marketplace.

And I think we found the right partner to get that done.

I think it's the beginning of a long-lasting and probably deeper relationship with Kamaz than we've had so far.

Now in terms of the 2010 outlook, which has been interpreted by some of you with a degree of caution, I think there -- it is -- I mean, I've been running this business now for a number of years.

I doubt very much that you will find any automotive house that has been able to call a trading profit performance for the year.

We called this number by the way in the fourth quarter of 2009.

They gave us the opportunity to target a number like EUR1.5 billion for the whole year.

We also expect the net debt levels will be below EUR5 billion.

We're going to register an increase of anywhere between 30% and 35% in capital expenditure during that period of time as a result of the slowdown that we applied to our capital expenditure programs in 2009 due to the restricted availability of capital markets and funding.

All those things make us relatively comfortable that we'll have a positive net income number for the year and that we'll improve performance by 50% over current levels.

Now some of you may think that there may not be enough.

50% is a huge improvement, especially when you consider the level of uncertainty that still surrounds some of our activities on a global scale.

But I think we have reviewed the underlying operating mechanisms of our sector.

And we feel relatively comfortable that based on what we know as of today that those numbers are in fact achievable.

If you move on to slide number four, obviously, all of the sectors have had a decrease in turnover compared to 2008.

The important thing is that, as has been the case for most of 2009, the auto sector continues to be the biggest profit generator for the group.

It accounts for 70% of the combined trading profit of the group today.

CNH, as you well know, has had an uneven trading year.

It's coming at EUR337 million, which is a long way away from the EUR1.650 billion that it posted in 2008.

But all of it is demand driven, especially on the construction equipment side.

And I think that Iveco has posted respectable results, given the fact that market demand, especially on the heavy side, was drastically cut in 2009 compared to 2008.

I mean, just in rough numbers so we understand the magnitude of the shrink, 2009 -- for every three trucks sold in 2008, one was sold in 2009 at the heavy end.

It's been a phenomenal cutback in performance.

And I think that the fact that we survived the event and we ended up posting positive earnings reflects a significant achievement for that management team.

FPT obviously was impacted by the drop in demand, especially on the industrial side, which is the single largest component of its earnings generation.

The car side performed well.

But the transfer pricing mechanism does not allow FPT to make a large amount of money, even if volumes are up.

But obviously, the shortfall in industrial engines was felt by FPT.

And it posted a loss for the year of about EUR25 million.

If we could move on to slide number five, which deals with the P&L, there's really nothing unusual on the P&L.

We'll discuss the unusual items in detail in a moment.

And the composition of the interest charges that make up the interest line.

We ended up delivering a net loss of EUR848 million, EUR600 million of which on a net, after-tax basis relate to unusual items, which are now outlined on slide six.

You can see that most of them relate to restructuring.

That restructuring was pretty well distributed across -- was effectively distributed across all of the business.

We also ended up taking a write down on some fixed assets associated with the shortened legs of some of the platforms and architectures that we have within Fiat Group Automobiles.

And this has been trigged by the relationship with Chrysler, which is going to provide substitute and more efficient platforms for usage by FGA going forward.

Then there are a number of other provisions, which total EUR252 million.

The biggest portion of that number relates to the adjustment of stocks and used values for Iveco, for our truck business, and for dealing with some of its Eastern European activities, which were really impacted in a very negative way as a result of the downturn.

So we've had to take back some inventory, rework it.

And the charges associated with those are reflected in the others column for Iveco.

More importantly, we have already spent EUR276 million of the whole charge that was taken last year.

The remainder will be taken for the most part in 2010.

And a very small residual will be taken off in 2011.

Slide number seven deals with the composition of the financing charges.

There really nothing -- there's nothing unusual other than the reversal of the equity swap, which was negative in 2008 by EUR263 million and ended up being positive to the tune of EUR117 million in 2009.

The desire that we have to maintain this liquidity buffer has got a substantial cost to us.

As you can see, the cost of carry in 2009 amounted to EUR207 million.

And this is based on an average cash flow of roughly EUR6 billion and 350 basis points in spreads between borrowing costs and the interest that's associated with maintaining the cash.

This is going to continue going forward.

As long as our emphasis is maintained -- our focus remains on maintaining a large liquidity buffer, we will be encountering the same type of expense going forward.

But it has not been a bad year, given what's gone on here -- interest charges below the EUR800 million mark.

And we're targeting a similar number for 2010.

Cash flow analysis on page eight -- you can see that most of the improvements came out of two things.

One was obviously the amount of cash that was released by a reduction of working capital levels and, secondly, the substantial reduction in capital expenditures.

It was nearly EUR5 billion in 2008.

It went down to about EUR3.4 billion in 2009; so EUR1.5 billion worth of cash production and debt levels down to EUR4.4 billion.

Now if we can just deal on slide number ten with industry outlook and sales volumes, I'm not going to spend much time dealing with the numbers that we've posted for 2009.

I'll just give you my views on what I think will happen in 2010.

For one, on the car side, the German government has already announced that it will not renew the incentive scheme that it had in place for 2009.

And that will reduce demand on the European side by roughly 1 million cars.

And so what we have done now is that we have targeted effectively two numbers, one that assumes that the eco incentive or the scrappage schemes will be extended in Europe in some modified form for 2010.

And that will give a reduction of roughly 12% in volumes in 2010.

If they were not to be renewed, I think we're going to see a market down 16% for us, a 16% reduction in volumes compared to 2009.

Positive things that Brazil will continue to perform well -- we're expecting an uptick of anywhere between 2% to 3% on both the light commercial vehicle side and the passenger car side.

And therefore, our expectations are that we will sell between 1.9 million and 2.1 million cars in 2010.

For those of you who are old enough to remember what I suggested was the breakeven point for this business, I think I said there was about 1.84 million cars.

And therefore, we can confirm that we'll still be positive in earnings in 2010, regardless of whether the scrappage schemes are renewed or not.

Obviously, we would prefer that they were extended and renewed in whatever form.

I think eventually the system needs to go back to a normalized environment.

My view is that 2010 is probably the wrong year to abandon the scrappage scheme.

I think that it will have a pretty drastic impact on demand on the Western European side, which may ultimately have a beneficial impact in terms of people rationalizing capacity on a permanent basis, as we've begun to do.

But I think the level of uncertainty associated with that position will also make trading conditions very, very difficult in Europe.

The light commercial vehicle side has had -- unfortunately has not had a great performance in 2010.

We were down 27%.

And you'll see similar numbers coming out of the light commercial side out of Iveco.

They were down 27% in 2009.

And we do not -- we don't expect to see a recovery in the Western European market in 2010.

So this is an important consideration because that, as you will see -- and I don't know whether it's in the slide here -- but the real issue for us is that one light commercial vehicle is not the equivalent of a passenger car in terms of contribution.

And so the change in mix is the single largest driver of the earnings performance of the car business in 2009.

So on a 2010-to-2009 comparison, the impact will not be large.

But the loss of in excess of 100,000 light commercial vehicles in Europe in 2009 has had a significant impact on our trading results.

Rough calculations will suggest that if we had maintained volumes on the light commercial vehicle side, we would've probably had earnings that were as reported plus 300 million.

But it's been a significant difference.

I think it's going to take awhile before we start seeing volumes that we saw in 2008 come back.

The indication, certainly in terms of what we've seen in December and January, are encouraging.

And so we may be overly negative in terms of the assessment of the market for 2010.

But if we are, it would make a significant difference in the earnings performance of the business.

Brazil is expected to continue to grow, as I mentioned earlier.

If you go onto slide number 11, I think that we have done -- regardless of the sarcastic remarks that were made by one of you in connection with our desire to produce the lowest -- the fleet with the lowest CO2 emissions of any European car producer, I think this continues to be our objective.

It's something that we've worked at -- we have worked very hard at over the last four or five years.

And it's an objective that we intend to continue to focus on.

As you can see on the right-hand side of the slide, we have done significant product introductions in 2009.

We've introduced the second version of MultiJet for our diesel engines.

We've introduced the MultiAir, which is also going to be used by Chrysler in the Fiat 500 which will be available on the American market in December of this year.

And the engine will be produced in the United States with this technology.

And we continue to work on alternative fuels.

So CNG and LPG continue to be -- continue to represent a significant portion of the sales that we've had in 2009.

And we expect that to continue in 2010.

Obviously the amount of work that has gone on here, I think there's a chart that deals with all this going forward in terms of the streamlining of the operations.

The fact that we have removed a substantial amount of SG&A cost across the sector is even more relevant for the car side, which I think has delivered in excess of what was asked in terms of contributions in an effort.

And that is something that is now -- I think it's a permanent achievement of the businesses and something that will continue to impact positively on the earnings performance of the group going forward.

Inventory is in perfect shape on the car side.

We have a very strong portfolio coming out of 2009 working into 2010.

I think the first quarter of this year from an invoicing standpoint is pretty well covered, certainly for January and February and a big chunk of March.

I think a lot of people are just waiting and hesitating now to see what the government will do in connection with the renewal of the incentive scheme.

And this is true especially in Europe.

But we've got very tight inventories in the system.

We will continue to manage demand in production to ensure that we do not clog up our distribution channels.

Slide number 13, which deals with CNH -- certainly on the agricultural side, it has been a relatively decent year.

And we have performed relatively well.

We have performed relatively well, given what's happened in particular parts of the market.

The international side, which includes the Eastern Bloc countries, Russia, the Ukraine, and so on, has gone through a severe period of contraction because of the lack of access to credit.

And so that's negatively impacted on our performance in a significant way in 2009.

We have performed well in other parts of the country, in other parts of the world, with the exception of the US, where I think that although we have had great success in positioning the higher horsepower combines in the marketplace, we've allowed some competitors to occupy space in the midrange sector.

That's something that's being addressed, certainly in 2010.

And it was already -- I mean, evidence of that correction was already visible in the fourth quarter of 2009.

We expect that this market in 2010 on the ag side will decline.

I think we'll have strong performance out of Latin America.

But I think we'll see an acceleration of the decline in Western Europe.

And the US will continue to perform well, although not at levels that we have seen in 2009.

The construction equipment side is the one that's truly been devastated by the crisis in 2009.

I mean, we talked about this throughout the year.

And we made reference to this also on the 2008 earnings call.

The market has continued to try to find its bottom.

I think we probably hit it in this last quarter of this year.

We're beginning to see a slight uptick in demand.

And it's effectively forecast in our assessment of what the industry will do in 2010.

We're expecting it to be up, both on the light and the heavy end of the spectrum with Latin America being the largest contributor to that recovery.

The US market will probably do better than it's done in 2009.

But it's not [great shakes], given the fact that volumes that we've experienced in 2009 are probably the lowest that we've ever seen in any time series that's available for comparison.

I'm going to skip through slide number 15, which talks about what we've done operationally.

We've won a number of awards with these tractors.

I think that the quality of our product offering continues to be improved.

The real issue for us has been to manage the destocking of the construction equipment distribution channels that had started in a very effective way at the beginning of '09.

We have done huge progress in that direction.

I think we continue to work on this, certainly for the first semester of 2010.

And I don't think that we will be turning on the industrial machine on the construction equipment side until the second half of this year.

Inventory trend -- as you can see, the benefit of the destockings are clearly visible, both at company inventory levels and at dealer levels.

And we're going to continue to focus on this as being the biggest place from which we expect cash generation.

CNH, of all the businesses, has been the largest contributor to the cash flow of the fourth quarter.

It was certainly in line with the expectations that we've had.

And it reflects the seasonal trend associated with running that business.

We move on to slide number 17, which deals with our truck side.

We do expect a recovery in the truck business -- first half probably flat compared to '09 and some visible, tangible, sizable recovery in the second half of this year.

It has been a very difficult year for all of us.

I think that, as you can see from the slide, the heavy side has seen a decrease of 44% in volumes.

Eastern Europe has been down by 55%.

And these are significant decreases.

I mean, it's very, very difficult to try and find a parallel in history that shows this kind of draconian impact on demand.

I think the important thing is that we've managed the industrial machine to match the declining demand curve.

And I think to the extent that we see any uptick in demand, I think that we will be turning on the industrial side of this.

And I think that we will be -- there will be additional unexpected benefits when they're running on the industrial machine, obviously associated with the absorption factor of the fixed costs.

One of the things that's fundamentally underestimated about Iveco and some of the concerns that you have about the lack of critical size or critical mass of Iveco is that it totally ignores the work that was started by this sector about four years ago as we signed the joint venture with SAIC and we entered the Chinese market in a very significant way.

As you can see from the chart, we are now producing more vehicles out of China than we are out of Western Europe.

Actually, we're selling more vehicles in China than we're selling in Western Europe.

This is not insignificant.

And it doesn't even reflect the fact that the whole effort won't materialize until the latter part of 2010 as we begin to bring to market the wide array of products that have been worked on since the inception of the joint venture.

Our objective when we started this was to effectively create a larger Iveco in Asia.

We will deliver this on a joint venture basis with our partner out of Asia.

And I think we'll talk more about this on Investor Day when we meet on April the 21st.

But it was -- we wanted to be the largest truck manufacturer in China as a result of all this.

And we will be.

So I think this should allay any fears about this being -- this business being subcritical in the medium to long term.

Slide 19 deals with inventory reduction -- 40% roughly across both -- across the dealer network in company stocks.

Slide 20 deals with our group purchasing activities.

We're beginning to see the benefit associated with a combination of all our purchasing activities.

We were down 3% across the year with a significant improvement in purchasing achieved in the fourth quarter of this year -- of last year.

I think slide 21 probably tells the whole story about what happened in 2009.

I think that we went through a severe process of restructuring and right sizing of the organization.

And we lost about 8,300 people in the process.

A lot of reductions happened on the white collar side, especially of CNH and especially in North America.

We had a very keen interest in balancing demand and supply.

We want to maintain a tight reign on working capital levels with this house that obviously impacted on the trading profit performance of these businesses as we left unabsorbed fixed costs unattended throughout the period.

But I think it was important for us to finish the year in a way in which we would effectively reenter the market in 2010 in association with pickup in demand without having to drag inventory overhangs to the system.

And this has been accomplished across all business sectors with no exceptions.

As important as that accomplishment was, we were also able to reduce SG&A costs across the group.

We had targeted a 15% reduction compared to 2008.

We achieved a number in excess of 15% across all sectors.

I think the important thing for us now is to maintain that cost savings and permanent cost reduction across the system.

And all of these were designed to allow us to get ready for 2010, maintaining the same rigor, the same discipline on both production and on expenditures through the SG&A side.

All the efforts on the world-class manufacturing front continue.

We've achieved a reduction of 7.4% in terms of conversion cost in 2009.

We've targeted 6% reductions across all businesses within 2010.

So that work continues unabated.

Two important positions were taken in 2009.

One was in connection with the termination of car-making activities out of our Sicilian plant, which are now scheduled to stop making cars by the end of 2011.

And the other one is the reabsorption of the production from our Imola plant into the other two Italian plants, one in Lecce and the other one in San Mauro.

So that process is underway.

And both of these decisions hopefully will bring some level of sanity to the production capability of the house.

2010 outlook on page 22 -- some people ridiculed the reference to a year of transition and stabilization.

I invite those people who ridiculed the statement to come over and manage this.

I think it would be very beneficial for people who stood back as critics of this process.

I don't think people really understand the amount of devastation that's gone on onto this collection of businesses throughout 2009.

I'd like to remind those people on the call that two of the large car companies filed for bankruptcy in the United States in 2009.

This is unprecedented.

And I think that a number of European automotive players have had to resort to government fundings in order to bridge their financing requirements.

And it has been by far the most difficult year that anybody could've possibly expected, even at the beginning of last year.

I don't think anybody could've foreseen the amount of devastation that happened on the demand side of these businesses.

So Fiat has come out of this process, as I said, wiser.

I think it's come out much stronger.

It has proved clearly that it can manage these downturns effectively.

It has done everything that was asked in terms of objectives.

It has delivered in excess of the trading profit expectations that we made of the group.

And it has built up a sufficient liquidity buffer to try and navigate to whatever may be coming forward in 2010 and later years.

So our assessment of 2010 remains cautious, although I think we feel comfortable with reaffirming our commitment to produce EUR1.5 billion in trading profit.

We are going to resume in a more vigorous way the amount of capital expenditures that we have on the table.

I think that as you well know, all of us have cut back on those programs, given the uncertainty in the market and given the lack of liquidity that was available on the capital markets.

We're going to resume this.

And we're expecting a 30% to 35% increase in expenditures over 2009.

If the eco incentive systems that are in place in Italy and in the other countries in Europe were not to be renewed in 2010, we expect that the trading profit of the car side will be negatively impacted to the tune of EUR350 million to EUR400 million.

This includes the consequential impact on both Fiat power train technologies on the engine side and transmissions and on the components piece of the businesses.

So revenues will drop by as a minimum EUR2.5 billion.

We'll lose between EUR350 million to EUR400 million in trading profit.

So we will make between EUR1,150 million and EUR1,100 million in trading profit for the year.

This lack of profit obviously would have absolutely no tax relief because they would be happening in Italy, where we don't book debits in association with these reductions.

And therefore, they will fall straight to the bottom line.

The important thing is that if we do have a reversal of volumes of that caliber, in all likelihood, we will have -- we will also have a reversal of the negative working capital position associated with current production levels, which will negatively impact on the debt levels for the group.

And therefore, in all likelihood, we will push levels above the EUR5 billion mark for 2010.

The last slide I think deals with the announcement of the fact -- the announcement of the Fiat Investor Day, which is going to be held in Turin on April 21, 2010.

It will be held the same day that we release first quarter earnings.

And so you're all cordially invited to attend.

I have nothing to say on slide 24 about the calendar.

And I guess we're ready to take questions.

Thank you, Mr.

Marchionne.

Now we are ready to start the Q&A session.

Marian, please retrieve the first question.

(Operator Instructions).

Brian Johnson from Barclays Capital.

Good afternoon.

Could you give us a sense -- you talked about the cash generation at CNH -- but the cash generation in 2009 across the other units and then looking forward to 2010, how that working capital would play out?

I'm going to pass it on to Maurizio so I can drink a coffee.

Go ahead.

I mean, we have some major generators in terms of cash as being FGA, of course, and to some extent also Iveco through the destocking has produced cash.

So the combinations of, say, some productions levels have made -- have brought the production of working capital positively from all our major sectors for 2010.

If I can just stop Maurizio now, to the extent that we effectively destocked distribution channels, everybody across the scheme had positive cash generation because most of the negative impact of the working capital reversal was felt probably within Q4 of 2008 and at least in part in the first four months of 2009.

On a net basis, they're all cash flow positive on a trading basis.

For 2010, if we're right on the assumption that volumes will increase, even if they increase between 3% and 6%, this will accomplish two things.

One, it will get the industrial machine up and running again.

And to the extent that we've got negative working capital positions across these sectors, we will produce cash as a result.

And therefore, we expect to have an additional contribution of working capital coming through the system.

And that's what makes us comfortable to commit to a net debt level of below EUR5 billion, even though we're increasing capital expenditures between 30% and 35%.

And that's the reason why we feel comfortable.

If it doesn't happen -- if the volume increase doesn't happen, you cannot get a deterioration in working capital positions from where you are today because the industrial machine will not be turned on.

If it doesn't get turned on, we will not be generating -- we won't be aggravating our working capital position at all, although obviously it will have a very negative impact on trading profit as a result of all the fixed costs associated with the industrial machine not being absorbed.

Okay.

And one last -- one just other question -- what are you assuming about pricing in the Western European markets?

And how would it differ with and without eco incentives?

I think if the trading -- if the eco incentive schemes are not renewed, given the tenuous nature of the industrial setup of most of our competitors, I think the pricing game is going to become a lot tougher.

And I think margins will be eroded because I think people will be chasing whatever remaining volume there is in the marketplace.

And it'll become tough.

That's just going to force us to get a lot more selective in terms of what we do.

And I think what's built into our forecast in terms of the loss of trading profit assumes a margin erosion associated with what I consider to be excessively competitive trading practices.

If they do get renewed, I think we'll see trading margins at or around the same levels that we've seen in 2009.

I don't think you're going to see an improvement.

I remain convinced that the only solution to this problem on a European basis is that there is a very planned take out of production capacity across all Western European countries.

If that doesn't happen, these businesses will continue to be marginal producers.

They may not destroy value.

But I don't think they're going to create any.

All right?

We started a clean-up --

Thank you.

We started a clean-up process here at Fiat.

We're going to continue with that clean-up process.

I think we need to make sure there are assets.

In this business are the most competitive assets that you can find in the European context.

Thank you.

Massimo Vecchio from Mediobanca.

Good afternoon to everybody.

I would like to have your view on market share gains in 2010 in the car sector.

Do you think that new model launches are still a way to gain shares and above all increase profit in 2010?

Or probably given the current macroeconomic scenario, it will still be low emission engines the key driver of market share?

And it's probably better to save the new model launches in 2011.

Thanks.

I mean, I'll start off with the last assertion.

I wholeheartedly agree that launches in 2010 are wasted.

This is still a very uncertain market.

I think that -- and that's the reason why I think we intelligently postponed a number of our programs to make sure that it coincided with what I consider to be a structural recovery in demand in 2011 and later years.

I still don't think we're going to see phenomenal growth in this market going forward, but certainly much better and much more natural in 2011 than we've seen so far.

The other point that you make, which I think I wouldn't necessarily agree with is that the focus on emissions and efficiency of engines appears to be something which is transient in nature.

That's only going to apply for 2009 and 2010.

And it's associated with the eco incentive schemes that have been put in place by governments.

The procedures that have been put in place and the requirements that have been imposed on the industry by Brussels in connection with emissions are going to make it mandatory for everybody to be in that sandbox by -- between now and 2015.

These issues are no longer optional.

I think the level of taxation associated with noncompliance with those standards is going to make the whole portfolio of offerings in the marketplace substantially different by 2015 than they are today.

And therefore, the question about efficiency and who plays in that marketplace going forward is going to become really crucial.

The efforts that we've made here in terms of all the world-class manufacturing efforts to try and make these plants best-in-class plants are all designed to ensure that we end up being the lowest cost producers on the European context.

And so the emphasis on CO2 -- on the reduction of CO2 emissions, the improvement in mileage, the emphasis that we've placed on CNG and LPG as alternative fuels, the association with Chrysler in terms of coming up with both electric and hybrids will make the composition of the product offering by Fiat as competitive as you can possibly make it in the European place -- European marketplace.

I would not discount that as being sort of a transient fashion.

I think that this thing is permanent.

And it's going to be negatively impacting on demand for people who don't comply with those requirements way into the future.

Thank you very much.

Martino De Ambroggi from Equita.

Yes, thank you.

Good morning, good afternoon, everybody.

First question because you talked about heavy cost cutting across all the sectors.

But you also mentioned the breakeven point for Fiat Auto is always at 1.85 million cars, which is the same level you presented in 2006.

So my first question is -- why is it happening?

So I thought it was already quite below this level.

And the second part of the question is -- what will be your target at the end of the process, including Chrysler synergies and including also (inaudible).

Thank you.

The second question, you're going to have to wait until April the 21st.

The answer to your first question is relatively simple.

I mean, as we rebuild volumes or we build brand equity in this process, our commitment to two things -- one, network rebuild.

And the second one, which had to do with the marketing and advertising expenses with the launching of these brands, was phenomenal.

So the 1.840 million represented a breakeven point on the assumption that all the associated costs would maintain those volumes and the marketplace would be resized to match that demand.

What we have done in 2009 in terms of managing this process is that we've actually taken a hatchet to those costs and reduced them substantially against 2008 levels, purely to reflect the level of the ability of those programs to be effective in a marketplace which was so biased by the eco incentives that no amount of marketing or positioning or advertising could've possibly changed.

The numbers 1.840 million, it doesn't -- the more important question that I think you wanted to ask and maybe I'll ask on your behalf is -- what is the impact of world-class manufacturing and the cost take outs they are carrying on?

I mean, 6% reductions year over year in conversion cost is a big number.

And what's happened as a result of the competitiveness of the European market is all those savings have been chewed up by a reduction in margin performance, all of them, which means that in the absence of those initiatives, probably we would've been in much worse shape than we are today, which forces me to go back to my original assertion that the only way in which you can fix this business is to deal with the structural overcapacity of the system to allow people to earn an adequate return on capital.

In the absence of this, this is going to be a marginal business.

And it needs a permanent fix, which I think is going to require everybody's effort to accomplish.

Okay.

Thank you.

And if I may, one more question on Brazil -- you're presenting a growth between 2% and 3%.

It seems to be quite conservative.

I don't know if you have more indication on this subject.

Thank you.

I have a more optimistic view, which is not built into the forecast.

Okay.

Thank you.

Monica Bosio from Banca IMI.

Yes, good afternoon.

I would ask one question is regarding further restructuring costs on 2010, if you can give us an indication.

And I was wondering if Fiat is planning further write offs related to automobiles investments made before the Chrysler deal.

And that's the first question.

And I don't remember the second one.

So just a minute.

So why don't I answer your first question while you remember the second part.

Okay.

Is that okay?

Okay.

All right, based on what I know today, the restructuring -- there may be some additional restructuring in 2010.

But they're very specific to particular joint ventures that we have that may require interventions.

I have no better knowledge today about where they could be.

But they have not been built into the forecast.

And I have neither the certainty nor the knowledge to tell you what that number is.

I think we'll continue to look for ways in which we can improve operations.

But I do not know today of anything that will suggest that we're taking any, although there are a number of plans that are on the table to do additional stuff within the group that may trigger them.

Okay.

The second one --

By the way, I don't know.

And I think that the best thing we can do -- we're working on this right now.

The best thing to do is to wait until April 21st and I can give you a better update.

Okay.

The second part of your first question, which had to do with the write offs of additional architecture, the answer is no.

There are no additional write downs.

I think we've addressed all the holes that we have and all the potential redundancies.

I mean, the write downs are a reflection of the shortened lives of these assets.

It's that simple.

And I think based on the product development cycle out of Chrysler, there are no more coming.

Okay.

Thank you.

And as for the second question, I was wondering -- press reports the transfer of production from Poland to Italy and additional costs that could be estimated in the region of EUR400 million.

I was wondering if you can elaborate on this and if you can give us an indication from what date are you going to account this extra cost?

Well, I think that the answer to that -- EUR400 million of additional cost is exaggerated.

We produced 320,000 Pandas in 2009.

If you divide EUR400 million by 320,000, it gives you about EUR1,100, about EUR1,200 a car, maybe EUR1,250.

I haven't got a calculator here.

I think that that number is way out of range.

I think that it is our expectation -- and it is the issue that we have tabled very clearly with the unions here on the Italian side -- is that our willingness to commit to the production of Pandas for [Milano] is subject to the availability of conditions that will allow that plant to be as effective and as competitive as any European plant on the car side.

Now taking into account the wage rate differentials as an aside, the rest of the machine in [Po] Milano needs to function as efficiently if not more efficiently than the equivalent benchmark that we have within the group.

And that's a commitment that I want the unions to share with Fiat in terms of bringing that vehicle into Po Milano, in the absence of which we will be forced to rethink the choice.

It's not meant as a threat.

But the Panda is a large contributor to the earnings performance of Fiat group automobiles.

It cannot be undermined or minimized by the transfer.

Okay.

Thank you very much.

Thierry Huon from BNP Paribas.

Thierry Huon speaking from BNP Paribas.

A quick question on your view on the European market for 2010 -- minus 12 seems to be a really cautious view compared to what your main competitor says and especially since the main uncertainties regarding the eco incentives seems to be in Italy.

In France, we know that they're going to remain in place.

It's the case at least until April in the UK and in Spain.

So I hardly understand why you are so bearish.

We are thinking about 600,000 units if the market is on 12%.

So I would like to understand why you are so cautious.

The number is more than 600,000, 12%.

Just --

Sorry.

Yes, certainly, the 600,000 was the difference between the 12% and the 16% if the eco tax were not in place.

Even that's exaggerated.

It's a bit less than that.

But anyway, let's just -- let's not get involved in arithmetic here.

I think the level of optimism or pessimism is a reflection of what you smoke.

I can always get myself to a level of emotional inducement that will allow me to dream numbers better than this one.

I've seen what's happened in demand in January on the Italian market side in the absence of a commitment by the Italian government to confirm incentives.

And I'll tell you if it were not for the strong product portfolio with which we walked into 2010 and which has effectively guaranteed us the first quarter performance, I will be very, very bearish on the remainder of the year.

I think there is tangible proof that in the absence of the support mechanism, European volumes will drastically be cut.

So whoever's giving you numbers other than that, I wish them the best of luck.

I much prefer to manage these numbers and be pleasantly surprised on the upside than to believe it the other way around.

Okay.

That's fair.

That's fair.

And a second question about the SG&A reduction -- so you achieved a really good result there.

But it seems that -- it seems impossible because you took some extraordinary measures which are not necessarily sustainable going forward.

So could we expect you to keep 100% of what was achieved in 2009 in this regard?

You're talking about working capital?

No, no, SG&A.

On SG&A, no, I -- look, the only uptick that you will ever see in SG&A out of this group today going forward is an additional commitment to the marketing, including advertising positions of the SG&A business, which is totally going to be dependent on demand and the objective of growing share.

So it will be self funding.

Everything else that's been done here is permanent.

Okay.

That's why, I mean, the headline -- the title page of this presentation is older, wiser, and ready to re-engage.

I didn't get older for any reason.

I mean, I made the comment awhile back that senseless suffering is of no use to anybody.

We've learned a lot in the last 12 months.

It is my sincere hope that this organization has not forgotten whatever we've learned in the last 12 months.

These need to be sort of permanent fixtures now in the way in which we run this business.

And I think it's woken up everybody.

I think everybody understands now that there's a new rhythm to all this.

And I think it's going to be a long, long time -- and probably you're going to have to change leadership in these sectors to the detriment of Fiat to see a result that's other than this.

I think that these are permanent.

And I don't -- I would be incredibly surprised if these numbers moved drastically in the other direction in the absence of a commitment to reinvest in brand equities and start pushing the marketing effort forward.

Okay.

And a very last question about the truck and your JV in China -- could we consider that the trucks that you are selling and producing in China through the JV are roughly the same or are using the same components as the one you are selling in Europe?

Because I'm a bit amazed that you could get a significant scale effect with these JVs, given the fact that the Chinese market seems to be quite different.

I think there were two objectives that were set in our presence in China.

The first one, obviously, was to get access to what I considered to be lower [comped in] volumes to provide alternative to the high-end offerings that Iveco would have in the Western European market and therefore would be able to deal with that production on an international basis to allow it to expand beyond its current boundaries of trading.

The second one was to introduce its lineup of products into China and to sell them at the upper end of the product offering.

And so that possibility which has just started eventually will have positive repercussions on a component comp of whatever else we make here.

And so there are benefits and substantial benefits associated with getting the Chinese operation to start manufacturing similar products in China and therefore increasing scale.

But that is not going to be visible until 2011.

Okay.

That's clear.

Thank you very much.

John Buckland from MF Global.

Good afternoon.

Thanks for taking my question.

Just going on page -- on slide 21, it talks about the actions you've made.

And it says effectively managed temporary increase in demand in Brazil and Poland through utilization of overtime.

I just wondered if you could elaborate on this word temporary.

Are you talking about temporary overtime?

Or do you think there is some effects in demand which aren't going to be there?

And this is talking outside of the Western European incentive picture.

And then on Iveco --

If I can just answer that question, I'll give you time on the second.

I think the reason why we made reference to the temporary nature of that fix is to make sure that you understood that we were not institutionalizing the cost structure associated with dealing with big demand, that it wouldn't end up being continuing ongoing structural cost of the business.

They were done in order to retain the flexibility of managing a downturn.

That's what it means.

It doesn't mean that we're not ready to do it again.

It just means that we did not institutionalize those costs on a permanent basis.

Right.

But you're currently using overtime now effectively or the end of 2009 to deliver the cars that you had in your order book.

Yes.

And so -- and what it says, we have used overtime out of Poland.

And we have used it out of Brazil.

And there's nothing in that overtime commitment that has made those costs permanent.

All right, sure.

Sure.

That's all we said, all right, because the problem that you've got with these things is that people -- once you institutionalize the cost, it's incredibly difficult to get rid of it.

But you expect in Brazil to go up more.

So in --

We do.

-- deal with that?

Well, we're going to deal with it the same way we dealt with it in 2009 is by retaining the maximum amount of industrial flexibility that we can.

I think it's incredibly dangerous in this environment to try and institutionalize costs in the expectation of a permanent stable recovery in volumes.

Right.

Right.

I think we need to go through 2010.

And I need to see the light at the end of the tunnel.

Okay.

It's either a real light.

Or it's a train coming in the opposite direction, and if it is --

Right.

Okay.

Just on Iveco, I mean, the performance has been extremely good, given the massive drop in volumes.

I wonder if there's any sort of special one-time factors there and also whether -- you talked about a very good performance in Brazil, special vehicles.

And clearly for the truck business, services and maintenance is also an important part.

And we can see that in how the revenue developed in the year.

And I just wondered if you could sort of break up the performance in terms of profitability between these things and to give us some confidence that this performance can be improved upon in 2010 if markets do recover as you expect.

Well, I mean, let's agree on one thing.

If markets don't recover, the result can be replicated, which is my only objective right now, right?

Right.

I mean, if there's no -- I mean, we forecast a recovery in volumes in 2010, a slight one, but not -- enough to be able to provide guidance which is in excess of current trading performance.

There's nothing unusual in the results that we've booked on the trading profit line that will suggest that next year's results or the ones there after are going to be negatively impacted by the nonrecurrence of the event.

What is much more important to me is the stuff that I talked earlier in one of the slides, which dealt with the restructuring efforts of the sector.

The single largest other column relates to Iveco, the EUR173 million that you see on the chart.

And that number deals with the adjustment of used equipment values, the adjustment of stock levels, the realignment of the distribution channels in Eastern Europe, all things which were associated with a growth strategy, which had to be abruptly stopped as a result of credit market tightening and demand effectively disappearing.

That has cleaned up the past.

And hopefully we will not incur this type of exposure going forward because it was built on the assumption that we will not see this draconian drop in demand.

You see from the chart the level of collapse of Eastern European markets in truck demand.

It's been huge, much more than it's been in Western Europe.

And that has been an incredibly costly experience to Iveco.

And I think some of the things that we reversed in 2009 were effectively profit that we booked in 2008 as part of normal trading operations.

We have to go back the year after and effectively correct that performance simply based on the fact that the market disappeared.

And so if you take those issues off the table and they're dealt with and they're out of the way, what's left over in Iveco, the EUR105 million in trading profit, is a sustainable number going forward.

There's no one off in it.

Okay.

And I appreciate your effort of trying to get the composition of that number.

But we don't do that.

Right.

But you also -- and I think in the third quarter, there's various questions about the truck business and about the behavior of truck makers and et cetera.

And you used the word that the truck industry was in deep do-do.

I just wondered whether you're any more optimistic about that industry, given what you've seen in the last months or weeks.

I mean, it appears as though order intakes and visibility is still pretty poor.

It's foggy at best.

And I think that I reiterate the point about being -- people being in do-do.

There's a couple of things that have happened here.

I think there's going to be a realignment of the ownership position on the truck side.

We've seen rules being made, people leaving, people coming in.

I think at the end of the day, the truck business is going to look different by the end of 2010 than it looks today.

I still think that this whole notion of discipline in terms of matching demand with production needs to be maintained until we see any visible sign -- permanent visible signs -- of recovery.

And based on what I know as of today -- and I spoke to Paolo Monferino as late as last night.

I mean, there are no visible signs of recovery in the heavy.

And we do see a pickup on demand on the light side and the medium sector of the business, but nothing to write home to mom about and certainly nothing that would suggest that 2010 is going to be a spectacular year.

I think we're going to see a significant improvement in performance for Iveco in 2010.

But it's based off of the trading performance of EUR105 million in 2009.

So the improvement is all relative, right?

I mean, so we'll do better.

But we're not even going to get close to what we posted in 2008.

Sure.

Sure.

Okay.

Thank you.

Stephen Reitman from MainFirst.

Yes, good afternoon.

Stephen Reitman from MainFirst in London.

Your sales in Brazil on the car group were up by 11%.

Obviously, we know that Brazil is a very important contributor to all FGA profitability, over EUR1 billion locally accounted in 2008.

What can you tell us the trend?

What happened to profitability in Brazil in 2009 on locally accounted basis at least?

Well, I made no comment on your number on 2008.

I think I'll blame it on Latin American exuberance.

And we'll leave it at that.

But it's been better than 2008.

Okay.

Corrected for exuberance.

Okay.

Thank you.

Adam Jonas from Morgan Stanley.

Hi.

It's Adam Jonas.

Just a couple of brief questions, please -- first, within your 3% to 6%, say, extended incentive outlook at the top line for 2010, are you able to tell us what the auto division can do within that?

Or another way to ask it, if in your down 12% Western European, assuming you mean sellout or registration environment, how close to flat could your auto sales in that same market environment be in terms of a sell-in or wholesale business, the first question?

And the second is related to the $179 million investment by Chrysler into the Dundee plant for the 1.4-liter engine, which I believe goes into production at the very end of this year.

How will that affect -- and forgive me -- and if you want to tell me I've got to wait until April 21st, go ahead and stop me now.

But conceptually, is this going to be counted as revenue by Fiat Power Train?

Is it purely a sharing of cost?

Or is it a little bit of both in terms of how that can affect Fiat accounts?

Thanks.

Well, let me deal with the second question.

It's probably easier than the first.

The first one is -- I'm not sure the company get it answered.

But it's convoluted at least.

On the second issue, this is purely a Chrysler investment.

$179 million is being spent by Chrysler.

And then they -- the only reference it has back into Fiat is the fact that there's a royalty stream which is going to be paid on that engine to Chrysler.

This is to Fiat, not of Chrysler.

This is not a big number.

I wouldn't change my forecast as a result of the royalty.

What it does do for me, though, is that it localizes the 1.4-liter engine in the US It makes it available for application into the car that's going to be produced in Toluca for consumption, both in the US and in Latin America, because Mexico will benefit from the free trade agreement with Latin America.

And it will make that engine and any car which wears that engine distributable in especially in Brazil without duties.

And so it was a big accomplishment to us in terms of bringing that engine and that know how over.

The application of MultiAir to that technology is the first introduction of that technology across a potentially much wider array of products, all of which have to do with the world engine, which is being manufactured by Chrysler.

So technically, it's a huge step forward in terms of the integration of Chrysler and the transfer of technology from Fiat into Chrysler.

But financially, certainly within 2010 and 2011, it's to the benefit of Chrysler with very little feedback into Fiat.

The first question -- I think I tried to be as detailed as I could be.

In the absence of the renewal of eco incentives, our forecast was the loss of about EUR2.5 billion in revenues.

That's what we would've expected to lose.

And so it is a significant deterioration in top line.

And if we end up getting that reduction, we may not grow the top line across the whole group.

I mean, the number is big enough.

It's a 5% reduction in top line compared to 2009.

So we may just go flush with 2009 into 2010 in the absence of the renewals.

And the impact of profitability, I've indicated.

I mean, it's going to be --

Yes.

-- straight across the sectors.

But the lion's share of that deterioration is going to happen in FGA.

I may have asked the question wrong.

I apologize.

In the extended scenario, in the scenario where you do grow revenues 3% to 6%, does auto grow -- does the auto division grow revenues?

Yes, it does.

Okay.

And even in Western Europe --?

And I'll tell you why.

It grows revenues because it was built into the analysis is a pretty reasonable substitution of passenger cars for light commercial vehicles.

Even though you do not expect any recovery --

But there's not a -- no, but I mean, we've come in off volumes here.

So the volume may not move substantially.

But in our analysis, just in terms of the distribution itself, we do see an increase in volumes for our car business in Europe, in our light commercial vehicles in Europe.

Okay.

Thanks very much.

Thanks.

Max Warburton from Bernstein.

Yes.

Max, before you ask the question, I just wanted to let you know that the next analyst call is going to be held in Orwellian doublespeak.

Sergio, I was wondering whether you wanted an explanation or an apology of what I wrote before asking the questions.

I don't know if that's a good use of this time.

Shall I just go straight to the questions?

Or do you want me to explain?

I would just -- I would go straight to the question.

I've made my point.

Okay.

Thank you.

The first one's just on Fiat Auto revenues.

I mean, it was something else in the note we put out.

As an analyst trying to understand operating leverage, I think once you helped us with a slide that was called the idiot's guide to operating leverage.

And in Q4, we had this very significant improvement in revenues but very, very modest improvement in EBIT.

And you've talked a little bit about Q4 drivers, like cost, et cetera.

I mean, can I just clarify that what we see in Q4 in auto is pretty clean, that there's no special provisioning or charges being taken to depress that number because it's -- it is as an outsider quite hard to understand why you didn't make more money in Q4.

That's the first question.

Well, God, you're greedy.

And then the second one is just on Chrysler.

Can you remind us how you're going to report Chrysler?

And you've talked about this before.

But you give us this net income guidance for 2010.

Are you going to split Chrysler out?

Or are you going to give us a quarterly number?

Is there some other way you're going to communicate the financial performance?

Thanks.

All right, just two things -- one, when I gave you the idiot's proof version of a breakeven analysis, it assumed at the time that I gave it to you an equal distribution of light commercial vehicles versus passenger cars across the whole range.

And that analysis has actually gone sideways because if you change the mix to light commercial vehicles in that analysis, the breakeven curve changes.

And so when we get together on April 21st, I'm going to give you some sensitivity analysis of what happens if I move -- if I shift a portion of light commercial vehicles into passenger cars and otherwise so you'll be slightly more accurate in your forecast.

The second part of it is that I think that we have shown a tremendous amount of prudence in reporting the numbers for the car side.

I think it's reflective of our position in the way in which we report.

And so I think you should feel absolutely comfortable that those numbers are ironclad numbers and there are no nasty surprises coming out of nowhere going forward.

The second question that you've asked about the Chrysler numbers -- what's included in the EUR699 million was the write-offs -- is it EUR699 million -- is a EUR41 million write-off of all the costs associated with the acquisition of the equity position in Chrysler.

So that position is now being carried at zero.

And the EUR41 million before anybody finds out what -- starts asking what that is, there are fundamentally professional fees associated with the acquisition.

So we paid lawyers and bankers and some from institutions that are on the call today that received a fee for having concluded the transaction.

That EUR41 million has now brought our carrying cost of Chrysler to zero.

We will not be booking any income or any loss associated with Chrysler for the foreseeable future until there is a requirement that we have an equity pickup out of that investment.

It will be treated at the relevant time as an equity pickup.

Right now, given the uncertainty associated with that position, we're going to continue to carry it at cost.

So you should not be seeing anything coming through.

And you will not see anything coming through in the 2010 to 2014 forecast on the analyst day presentation on the 21st because we -- I can give you the numbers, right?

I mean, I can tell you what -- I can give you a one liner that would tell you what the impact on the consolidated earnings would be if we made the 2014 plan for Chrysler.

And that's as far as it will go because the numbers that we're going to use for April, for the April presentation, are the same ones that we presented to the market on November the 4th.

In terms of your getting better knowledge of what's happening in Chrysler, Chrysler has made a public commitment to publish its financial statements on a quarterly basis.

So our commitment is now to issue consolidated statements for the year ended December 31st, 2009, by April 30th, 2010.

And we will be reporting numbers on a quarterly basis at the end of each quarter.

I think it's probably within 90 days after the end of the quarter in the United States.

So you'll be able to see them.

They will be out of sync with the disclosures of numbers out of Fiat.

But at least you'll have something to talk about as we get onto the conference calls.

Thanks.

Perfect.

That will conclude the question and answer session.

I would now like to turn the call back over to Marco Auriemma for any additional closing remarks.

Thank you, Marian.

We would like to thank everyone for attending the call with us.

If you have any further questions, please don't hesitate to give us a call.

Have a good evening.

Bye.

Thank you.

That will conclude today's conference call.

Thank you for participation, ladies and gentlemen.

You may now disconnect.