Realty Income Corp (O) 2008 Q3 法說會逐字稿

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, and thank you for standing by. Welcome to the Realty Income Third Quarter 2008 Earnings Conference Call. (OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS)

下午好，女士們先生們，感謝你們的支持。歡迎參加房地產收入 2008 年第三季度收益電話會議。 （操作員說明）

At this time, I would like to turn the Conference over to the Chief Executive Officer of Realty Income, Tom Lewis. Please go ahead, sir.

現在，我想將會議交給 Realty Income 首席執行官湯姆·劉易斯 (Tom Lewis)。請繼續，先生。

Thank you, Andrew. Good afternoon, everybody, and welcome to our Conference Call, where we'll run through the third quarter and nine months, and then see if we can give some color or additional information on the balance of the year.

謝謝你，安德魯。大家下午好，歡迎參加我們的電話會議，我們將在會上討論第三季度和九個月的情況，然後看看我們是否可以提供有關今年剩餘時間的一些信息或其他信息。

In the room with me today is Gary Malino, our President and Chief Operating Officer; Paul Meurer, our Executive Vice President, CFO; Mike Pfeiffer, our Executive Vice President, General Counsel; and Tere Miller, as always, our Vice President, Corporate Communications.

今天和我一起在會議室的是我們的總裁兼首席運營官加里·馬利諾 (Gary Malino)； Paul Meurer，我們的執行副總裁兼首席財務官； Mike Pfeiffer，我們的執行副總裁兼總法律顧問；和一如既往的我們企業傳播副總裁 Tere Miller。

And as I am oriented to do on all of these is to say during this Conference Call, we will make certain statements that may be considered to be forward-looking statements under Federal Securities law. The Company's actual future results may differ significantly from the matters disclosed in any forward-looking statements, and we will disclose in greater detail on the Company's quarterly 10-Q the factors that may cause such differences.

正如我在本次電話會議期間準備就所有這些問題所做的那樣，我們將做出某些根據聯邦證券法可能被視為前瞻性聲明的聲明。公司未來的實際業績可能與任何前瞻性陳述中披露的事項存在重大差異，我們將在公司季度 10-Q 中更詳細地披露可能導致此類差異的因素。

And Paul, if you want to start up by going through the numbers, that'll be great.

保羅，如果你想從查看數字開始，那就太好了。

Thanks, Tom.

謝謝，湯姆。

As usual, I'm going to comment on our financial statements -- provide a few highlights of our financial results for the third quarter, starting with the income statement.

像往常一樣，我將對我們的財務報表發表評論——從損益表開始，提供我們第三季度財務業績的一些亮點。

Total revenue increased 12.2% for the third quarter as compared to the third quarter of 2007. Rental revenue increased to approximately $82.2 million in the quarter as a result of new property acquisitions. Same-store rental revenue increased 1.1% for the quarterly period, and other income was $322,000 for the quarter.

與 2007 年第三季度相比，第三季度的總收入增長了 12.2%。由於新房產收購，本季度的租金收入增至約 8,220 萬美元。本季度同店租金收入增長 1.1%，本季度其他收入為 322,000 美元。

On the expense side -- interest expense increased by about $7.8 million during the third quarter as compared to the third quarter of last year. And this increase is due to more bonds outstanding as compared to a year ago -- specifically, the $550 million of 2019 notes that we issued in September of 2007.

在費用方面——第三季度利息費用比去年第三季度增加了約780萬美元。這一增長是由於未償還債券比一年前有所增加——具體來說，是我們於 2007 年 9 月發行的 2019 年 5.5 億美元票據。

We had zero borrowings on our credit facility throughout the third quarter. On a related note, our interest coverage ratio continues to be strong, at 3.2 times, while our fixed-charge coverage ratio was 2.5 times.

整個第三季度我們的信貸安排借款為零。與此相關的是，我們的利息保障倍數繼續保持強勁，達到 3.2 倍，而固定費用保障倍數為 2.5 倍。

Depreciation and amortization expense increased by about $3.4 million in the comparative quarterly period, as depreciation expense has increased as our portfolio continues to grow. General and administrative expenses, or G&A expenses, for the third quarter were about $5.1 million, a reduction of almost $1.2 million from last year. G&A represents only 6.2% of total revenues for the quarter. We expect G&A expenses in 2008 to remain below 2007 levels.

折舊和攤銷費用在上一季度增加了約 340 萬美元，因為折舊費用隨著我們的投資組合的持續增長而增加。第三季度的一般及行政費用（G&A 費用）約為 510 萬美元，比去年減少近 120 萬美元。 G&A 僅佔本季度總收入的 6.2%。我們預計 2008 年的一般管理費用將繼續低於 2007 年的水平。

Property expenses increased by $963,000 for the quarter. And these are the expenses primarily associated with the taxes, maintenance and insurance expenses which we are responsible for on properties that are available for lease or sale. Income taxes consists of income taxes paid to various states by the Company, and these taxes totaled $308,000 for the quarterly period.

本季度物業費用增加了 963,000 美元。這些費用主要與我們負責出租或出售的房產的稅收、維護和保險費用相關。所得稅包括公司向各州繳納的所得稅，本季度這些稅款總計 308,000 美元。

Income from discontinued operations for the quarter was $6.1 million. Real estate acquired for resale refers to the operations of Crest Net Lease, our subsidiary that acquires and resells properties. Crest sold three properties for $4.6 million for the quarter, for a gain on sale of $199,000. And overall for the quarter, Crest contributed income of $238,000.

該季度來自已終止業務的收入為 610 萬美元。為轉售而收購的房地產是指我們收購和轉售房地產的子公司 Crest Net Lease 的業務。 Crest 在本季度以 460 萬美元的價格出售了三處房產，銷售收益為 199,000 美元。整個季度，Crest 貢獻了 238,000 美元的收入。

Real estate held for investment refers to property sales by Realty Income from our existing core portfolio. We sold 13 properties during the third quarter, resulting overall in income of $5.9 million. These properties' sales gains are not included in our funds from operations.

投資性房地產是指我們現有核心投資組合中的房地產收入所銷售的房地產。第三季度我們出售了 13 處房產，總體收入為 590 萬美元。這些房產的銷售收益不包括在我們的運營資金中。

Preferred stock cash dividends remained at $6.1 million for the quarter, and net income available to common stockholders was $28.6 million for the quarter. Funds from operations, or FFO, was approximately $45.7 million for the quarter. FFO per share was $0.46 for the quarter versus $0.47 per share for the same quarter a year ago. However, our FFO before Crest contribution, or the FFO from our core portfolio, remained at $0.45 per share for the comparative quarterly period.

本季度優先股現金股息保持在 610 萬美元，普通股股東可獲得的淨利潤為 2860 萬美元。本季度運營資金 (FFO) 約為 4570 萬美元。本季度 FFO 每股為 0.46 美元，而去年同期為每股 0.47 美元。然而，在比較季度期間，我們在 Crest 貢獻之前的 FFO，或者我們核心投資組合中的 FFO，仍保持在每股 0.45 美元。

For the nine-month period year-to-date, our FFO before Crest contribution increased to $1.37 per share, versus $1.34 per share a year ago, or an increase of 2.2% in earnings year-to-date from our core portfolio.

今年迄今為止的 9 個月期間，我們在 Crest 之前的 FFO 貢獻增加至每股 1.37 美元，而去年同期為每股 1.34 美元，或者說我們的核心投資組合今年迄今的收益增長了 2.2%。

When we file our 10-Q, we will again provide information you need to compute our adjusted funds from operations, or AFFO, or our cash available for distribution as dividends. Our AFFO, or CAD, is typically higher than our FFO, as our capital expenditures are generally relatively low, and we don't have a great deal of straight-line rent in the portfolio.

當我們提交 10-Q 時，我們將再次提供您計算調整後的運營資金或 AFFO 或可作為股息分配的現金所需的信息。我們的 AFFO（或 CAD）通常高於 FFO，因為我們的資本支出通常相對較低，而且我們的投資組合中沒有大量的直線租金。

Our continued growth in core earnings allowed us to increase our monthly dividend twice this quarter. We have increased the dividend 44 consecutive quarters and 51 times overall since we went public over 14 years ago. Our current monthly dividend is now $0.141125 per share, which equates to a current annualized amount of $1.6935 per share.

我們核心收益的持續增長使我們能夠在本季度將每月股息增加兩倍。自 14 年前上市以來，我們已連續 44 個季度提高股息，總共提高了 51 倍股息。我們當前的每月股息為每股 0.141125 美元，相當於當前的年化金額為每股 1.6935 美元。

Now let's turn to the balance sheet for a moment. We've continued to enhance our conservative and safe capital structure. Our debt-to-total market capitalization is 33%, and our preferred stock outstanding represents just 8% of our capital structure. And all of these liabilities are fixed-rate obligations.

現在讓我們看一下資產負債表。我們繼續加強保守且安全的資本結構。我們的債務佔總市值的比例為 33%，而我們的已發行優先股僅占我們資本結構的 8%。所有這些負債都是固定利率債務。

We continue to have zero borrowings on our new $355 million credit facility. This facility also has $100 million accordion expansion feature. The initial term of this facility runs until May 2011, plus two one-year extension options thereafter.

我們新的 3.55 億美元信貸額度繼續保持零借款。該設施還擁有價值 1 億美元的手風琴擴展設施。該設施的初始期限截至 2011 年 5 月，此後還有兩次為期一年的延期選項。

In September, we were very pleased to raise $75 million in a common equity offering. As noted on the balance sheet, we now have $113 million of cash on hand. We will use this cash and other cash being generated by our portfolio to repay our $100 million of bonds maturing next month and the $20 million of bonds maturing in January 2009. And thereafter, our next debt maturity isn't until 2013.

9 月份，我們非常高興通過普通股發行籌集了 7500 萬美元。正如資產負債表所示，我們現在手頭有 1.13 億美元現金。我們將使用這筆現金和我們投資組合產生的其他現金來償還下個月到期的1 億美元債券和2009 年1 月到期的2000 萬美元債券。此後，我們的下一次債務到期要到2013 年。

In summary, we currently have excellent liquidity, and our overall balance sheet remains healthy and safe. We have no exposure to variable-rate debt, and we have no need to raise capital for any balance sheet maturities for almost five years.

綜上所述，我們目前流動性良好，整體資產負債表保持健康安全。我們沒有浮動利率債務，而且在近五年內我們不需要為任何資產負債表到期籌集資金。

Now let me turn the call back over to Tom, who will give you more background on these results.

現在讓我將電話轉回湯姆，他將為您提供有關這些結果的更多背景信息。

Thank you, Paul. And as is our custom, I'll just run through the various areas of the Business. And I'll start with the portfolio.

謝謝你，保羅。按照我們的慣例，我將簡單介紹一下業務的各個領域。我將從作品集開始。

We ended the third quarter with 96.9% occupancy in 73 properties available for lease. That's out of the 2,355 we own. That's up 10 BIPS from last quarter. And I'll tell you, I never thought I would get excited about occupancy going up 10 BIPS, but I am, given this environment, and we'll certainly take that.

截至第三季度末，我們有 73 處可供出租的物業，出租率為 96.9%。這是我們擁有的 2,355 台中的一個。比上季度增長了 10 BIPS。我會告訴你，我從來沒有想過我會對入住率上升 10 BIPS 感到興奮，但鑑於目前的環境，我會感到興奮，而且我們一定會接受。

We had 14 new vacancies for the quarter. We re-leased 12 of those, and we sold [four] property which gets us to the increase in occupancy. Only four of the 14 new vacancies came from credit default, from a couple of smaller tenants this quarter. That's obviously not a large number, given the 2,300 properties. And the other 10, the balance, really came through the normal lease rollover that's going on in the portfolio at all times, which ebbs and flows, so pretty good there.

本季度我們有 14 個新職位空缺。我們重新租賃了其中 12 處房產，並出售了[四處]房產，這使我們的入住率有所增加。本季度 14 個新職位空缺中，只有 4 個來自信用違約，來自幾個較小的租戶。考慮到 2,300 個屬性，這顯然不是一個大數字。另外 10 個，即餘額，實際上是通過投資組合中始終發生的正常租賃展期來實現的，它會起起落落，所以非常好。

Our sense, looking forward for the fourth quarter as of right now, is occupancy should remain strong. We're not seeing a lot of default reflected in the portfolio at the moment. But obviously, the retail environment is very tough, and things could change.

展望第四季度，我們的感覺是入住率應該保持強勁。目前，我們沒有看到投資組合中反映出大量違約情況。但顯然，零售環境非常艱難，情況可能會發生變化。

I think we have a good handle on the lease rollover, and we're making decent progress on the leasing that comes up. So our expectations as of right now would be once again very high -- 96% to 97% occupancy at the end of the fourth quarter, so fairly stable.

我認為我們在租賃展期方面處理得很好，並且我們在即將到來的租賃方面取得了不錯的進展。因此，我們目前的預期將再次非常高——第四季度末入住率達到 96% 至 97%，相當穩定。

Same-store rents, as you saw in the release, on the core portfolio, increased 1.1% during the third quarter, 1.3% for the year. Most of you know we have 30 retail industries in the portfolio. Two had declining same-store rents, three were flat, and then 25 -- or most of the portfolio, different industries -- had some type of increasing rent, with about half the overall increases coming from three industries, which is childcare, interestingly enough, restaurant; and convenience stores.

正如您在新聞稿中看到的那樣，核心投資組合的同店租金第三季度增長了 1.1%，全年增長了 1.3%。大多數人都知道我們的投資組合中有 30 個零售行業。兩家的同店租金下降，三家持平，然後25 家（或大部分投資組合、不同行業）的租金出現某種形式的上漲，其中大約一半的租金增長來自三個行業，有趣的是，這三個行業是兒童保育夠了，餐廳；和便利店。

I think we continue to be very well-diversified with the portfolio. Relative to the total number of properties, we had a decrease of 12 properties in the portfolio during the quarter -- from 2,367 to 2,355. And that really was generated by the sale of a few restaurant properties out of the portfolio, where we pruned some units to reduce concentration. And we are keeping that money in cash and have not invested it through a 1031 back into property.

我認為我們的投資組合仍然非常多元化。相對於房產總數，本季度我們的投資組合中減少了 12 處房產，從 2,367 處減少到 2,355 處。這實際上是通過出售投資組合中的一些餐廳物業而產生的，我們修剪了一些單位以減少集中度。我們將這筆錢保留為現金，並沒有通過 1031 將其投資回房地產。

As I mentioned, there are 30 retail industries in the portfolio -- 118 chains in 49 states. And I think the industry exposure remains fairly well diversified. Restaurants are our largest industry, at 21.4% for the quarter. That's down from 21.7% last quarter and 23.7% in the second quarter, and -- excuse me, in the first quarter -- and then 24.2% at the end of the fourth quarter last year. So we continue to make a little progress in terms of reducing the concentration. We've said in previous calls that we're full in that sector and want to reduce that back down under 20%, and we're doing that.

正如我提到的，投資組合中有 30 個零售行業——49 個州的 118 個連鎖店。我認為行業風險仍然相當多元化。餐飲業是我們最大的行業，本季度佔 21.4%。這低於上季度的 21.7%、第二季度的 23.7%，以及——對不起，第一季度——以及去年第四季度末的 24.2%。所以我們在降低濃度方面繼續取得一點進展。我們在之前的電話會議中說過，我們在該領域已經飽和，並希望將其減少到 20% 以下，我們正在這樣做。

Convenience stores are the second-largest industry at 16.3%. It then goes to theaters at 9.1%. Childcare's down to about 7.7%, which was once our largest. So we continue to be mindful of diversification.

便利店是第二大行業，佔 16.3%。然後它以 9.1% 的價格進入影院。兒童保育率下降至 7.7% 左右，這曾經是我們最大的數字。因此，我們繼續關注多元化。

On a tenant basis -- our largest tenant is 5.9% of rents, next one's 5.4%. Everybody else in the portfolio is below 5% of rents. And if you put the top 15 tenants together, they comprise about 53.7% of our revenue, which is down a bit from last quarter.

以租戶為基礎——我們最大的租戶佔租金的 5.9%，其次是 5.4%。投資組合中的其他所有人的租金均低於 5%。如果把前 15 位租戶加在一起，他們約占我們收入的 53.7%，比上季度略有下降。

By the way, when you get to the 15th-largest tenant, that's only about 2.2% of revenue. And when you get to the 21st, you're down to 1%. So the vast majority of all of the tenants in the portfolio, even the larger ones, are a fairly small percentage of revenue. And we're pretty well diversified.

順便說一句，當你找到第 15 大租戶時，這大約只佔收入的 2.2%。到了 21 日，比例就下降到了 1%。因此，投資組合中的絕大多數租戶，即使是規模較大的租戶，也僅佔收入的一小部分。我們的業務相當多元化。

The average lease length in the portfolio remains long, at 12.1 years. And relative to the overall health of the portfolio, again, our 15 largest tenants are about 53.7%. Our best metric that we watch for credit in our portfolio is the cash flow coverage at the store level for the rent that's being paid. That's the individual store's cash flow to the retailer EBITDA divided by the rent. And that shows us how much we're really covering rent on a store and unit basis, which is our best method of credit and profitability.

投資組合中的平均租賃期限仍然較長，為 12.1 年。相對於投資組合的整體健康狀況，我們的 15 個最大租戶的比例約為 53.7%。我們在投資組合中關注信用的最佳指標是商店層面對所支付租金的現金流覆蓋率。這是單個商店流向零售商的 EBITDA 除以租金。這向我們展示了我們實際上在商店和單位的基礎上支付了多少租金，這是我們最好的信貸和盈利方法。

The average cash flow coverage for our largest 15 tenants for the quarter was 2.79 times. That ranged from a low on a tenant basis of 1.7 times to 4.55 times, which is very, very healthy. That compares last quarter to 2.7 times, so actually up a bit, and a range of 1.77 to 4.55. And we continue to believe that'll give us a really good margin of safety and is really the primary thing that are going to allow the tenants to pay in this environment.

本季度我們最大的 15 個租戶的平均現金流覆蓋率為 2.79 倍。以租戶計算，這一數字從 1.7 倍到 4.55 倍不等，這是非常非常健康的。與上季度相比為 2.7 倍，因此實際上有所上升，範圍為 1.77 至 4.55。我們仍然相信，這將為我們帶來非常好的安全邊際，並且確實是讓租戶在這種環境下付款的首要因素。

I do want to make a couple comments on those numbers. As always, they're not real-time. We get the reports from our larger tenants -- quarterly on some, annually on others, so they do tend to lag. And we like to make sure everybody knows that. And I think the number probably would have dropped a little bit this quarter if it had been real-time, obviously, because of the slowdown that we saw in retail going back to September, where I think retail sales were up about 1.2% throughout the country. And I think you would have seen it in our portfolio, too.

我確實想對這些數字發表一些評論。一如既往，它們不是實時的。我們從較大的租戶那裡得到報告——有些是季度報告，有些是每年報告，所以它們確實往往會滯後。我們希望確保每個人都知道這一點。我認為，如果是實時的，這個數字可能會在本季度略有下降，顯然，因為我們看到零售業的放緩可以追溯到 9 月份，我認為整個 9 月份的零售額增長了約 1.2%國家。我想您也會在我們的產品組合中看到它。

The other thing in there is that the rent concessions that we gave to Buffets at the end of the fourth quarter really reset their cash flows up to -- cash flow coverages up to higher numbers, higher coverage. And that obviously helped the number. But I would also note that generally, we like our cash flow coverage numbers to increase through the store's EBITDA going up, and not through the rent going down. So while we're pleased that it's high coverage generally, it's preferable if it happens through the tenants doing a little better.

另一件事是，我們在第四季度末給予巴菲特的租金優惠確實將他們的現金流重置為——現金流覆蓋範圍達到更高的數字，更高的覆蓋範圍。這顯然對這個數字有所幫助。但我還要指出的是，一般來說，我們希望我們的現金流覆蓋率數字通過商店 EBITDA 的上升而增加，而不是通過租金的下降。因此，雖然我們很高興總體覆蓋率很高，但如果租戶做得更好一點，那就更好了。

However, the cash flow coverage do remain very high, and we think that's what gives us our best margin of safety. And that's important to us in this environment, and I think continues to be why the portfolio does very well.

然而，現金流覆蓋率仍然非常高，我們認為這給了我們最好的安全邊際。在這種環境下，這對我們很重要，我認為這仍然是該投資組合表現出色的原因。

I'll move on to property acquisitions. During the third quarter, we invested a whopping $400,000 in one property at a [10/1] cap. That was a convenience store. It was another $3.9 million completing a couple of development properties. The development properties were all transactions started late last year or at the end of the first quarter, and that pretty much complete any development that we have in the portfolio. Those are all now paying rent. And we won't have a lot of funds going out for development, as we've just moved away from that in this market environment.

我將繼續進行財產收購。在第三季度，我們以 [10/1] 的上限投資了一處房產高達 400,000 美元。那是一家便利店。完成幾處開發地產還需要 390 萬美元。開發物業都是去年年底或第一季度末開始的所有交易，幾乎完成了我們投資組合中的所有開發項目。這些現在都在付租金。我們不會有很多資金用於開發，因為我們剛剛在這種市場環境下擺脫了這種狀態。

We've been using for acquisitions $250 million for the year. For the nine months, we're at $188 million. And we're now assuming that we do not buy really anything else in the fourth quarter, and that that $188 million is our estimate for guidance. That obviously could change if we saw some motivated sellers willing to go with higher cap rates. But for now, we're going to assume no acquisitions in the quarter, which is what we've been doing for the last couple of quarters.

今年我們用於收購的資金達 2.5 億美元。這九個月的收入為 1.88 億美元。我們現在假設我們在第四季度不會購買任何其他東西，並且 1.88 億美元是我們對指導的估計。如果我們看到一些積極的賣家願意接受更高的資本化率，那麼這種情況顯然可能會改變。但目前，我們假設本季度沒有收購，這正是我們過去幾個季度一直在做的事情。

It's been an act of volition, really intentional, for us not to be out buying properties. We thought prices would decline and cap rates rise. And generally, anything that we would have bought in the last few quarters we could have bought at a better, higher cap rate today or in future quarters. And we continue to believe that's the case. So I think that's served us pretty well.

我們不出去買房是一種自願行為，真的是有意為之。我們認為價格會下降，資本化率會上升。一般來說，我們在過去幾個季度購買的任何東西都可以在今天或未來幾個季度以更好、更高的資本化率購買。我們仍然相信情況就是如此。所以我認為這對我們很有幫助。

I will say, though, that I think cap rates are definitely rising, while transaction volume's gone down quite a bit. We're starting to see a fair number of people, or a good number, coming to market, trying to use their real estate to raise some capital. And in most cases, I think they've adjusted cap rates upwards, but in our view not enough. So I think the transactions we're seeing -- a number of them won't get done until cap rates rise enough to interest some of the buyers like ourselves sitting out there. But we are seeing that movement.

不過，我要說的是，我認為資本化率肯定會上升，而交易量卻大幅下降。我們開始看到相當多的人，或者說相當多的人，進入市場，試圖利用他們的房地產來籌集一些資金。在大多數情況下，我認為他們已經向上調整了資本化率，但我們認為還不夠。因此，我認為我們所看到的交易——直到資本化率上升到足以引起像我們這樣的一些買家的興趣之前，其中一些交易不會完成。但我們正在看到這種趨勢。

We continue to believe that there are a lot of people out there that have real estate on their books that don't have great access to other forms of capital, and that they're really going to have some capital needs that are coming up on them -- and have thought that probably next year, if the capital markets don't come back, they're going to need to bring those to market. And that likely will be the impetus to move cap rates and probably close the bid-ask spread that you see there out in the market, that has really caused declining number of acquisitions.

我們仍然相信，有很多人賬上有房地產，但無法很好地獲得其他形式的資本，而且他們確實會有一些即將出現的資本需求他們認為，也許明年，如果資本市場沒有恢復，他們將需要將這些產品推向市場。這可能會推動上限利率的變化，並可能縮小市場上看到的買賣價差，這確實導致了收購數量的下降。

As I mentioned, we're starting to see that. I think caps are going to have to move up into the 10% range to really start things moving. I can tell you that 10 caps have creeped into the discussions that we've had with several tenants over the last month or so. And while they're not there yet, I do believe that they're moving in that direction. And it wouldn't surprise me at all to see a few acquisitions go off at above that price for people who need the capital.

正如我提到的，我們開始看到這一點。我認為上限必須提高到 10% 的範圍才能真正開始發展。我可以告訴你，在過去一個月左右的時間裡，我們與幾位租戶的討論中已經涉及到了 10 個上限。雖然他們還沒有做到這一點，但我確實相信他們正在朝這個方向前進。對於需要資金的人來說，看到一些收購以高於這個價格進行，我一點也不感到驚訝。

It's interesting, when we talk about 10 caps to people, that it seems very high to them. But on a historical basis, it really isn't. Obviously, we've been in this business for 39 years. And I went back and looked at the cap rates that we did in each of the years that we've been in business. And the last three years, kind of 2005 through 2008, our cap rates have run from 8.42% as a low up to the 8.7% that we're doing this year. And we've done about $1.5 billion in acquisitions at that price.

有趣的是，當我們與人們談論 10 次上限時，這對他們來說似乎非常高。但從歷史的角度來看，事實並非如此。顯然，我們從事這個行業已有 39 年了。我回顧了我們經營的每一年的資本化率。過去三年，即 2005 年到 2008 年，我們的資本化率從最低的 8.42% 上升到今年的 8.7%。我們以這個價格完成了大約 15 億美元的收購。

And then look back at 2003 and 2004, and cap rates were over 9%, really closer to a mid-9% range, in those years. 1994 to 2003, which is really when we came public, up until just a few years ago, cap rates ranged from 10.35% to 11.3%. And previous to 1994, as I went back, cap rates were right around 11% in each year that I looked back, going back into the early '70s.

然後回顧 2003 年和 2004 年，那些年的上限利率都超過 9%，實際上更接近 9% 的中間範圍。 1994 年到 2003 年，也就是我們上市的時候，直到幾年前，資本化率在 10.35% 到 11.3% 之間。在 1994 年之前，當我回顧過去時，每年資本化率都在 11% 左右，可以追溯到 70 年代初。

So I think the 7% and 8% caps that we've seen out in the 1031 market in the last few years, like a lot of pricing at other asset classes, are really a function of what was some historically cheap financing. And moving up over 10% probably seems appropriate and really not that surprising, particularly if we look at what we've compared things against in the last few years, which were credit spreads, which have obviously gapped out in the debt markets. And so it's probably appropriate that it happen in net leases, too.

因此，我認為過去幾年我們在 1031 市場上看到的 7% 和 8% 的上限，就像其他資產類別的許多定價一樣，實際上是一些歷史上廉價融資的函數。上漲超過 10% 似乎是合適的，而且確實並不令人驚訝，特別是如果我們看看過去幾年的比較情況，即信用利差，在債務市場上，信用利差明顯出現缺口。因此，這種情況也發生在淨租賃中可能是合適的。

I think we'll wait a bit to go higher. I think we will make some acquisitions next year. And it really doesn't bother us to be patient right now. Obviously in this environment, a little liquidity is not a bad idea, either. So it's -- we really don't mind having some cash on hand and no balance on the line.

我想我們會稍等一下，然後再走高。我認為明年我們會進行一些收購。現在我們保持耐心真的不會打擾我們。顯然，在這種環境下，一點流動性也不是一個壞主意。所以，我們真的不介意手頭有一些現金，但沒有餘額。

I'll move on to Crest for a moment. That's obviously our subsidiary that acquires and then sells properties. We've been in that business about eight years. And it's a business where we booked FFO. But obviously, unlike our core revenue from long-term leases, its contribution is based primarily on property sales. And because of that, its cash flow is very volatile.

我將暫時轉到克雷斯特。這顯然是我們收購然後出售房產的子公司。我們從事這項業務已有大約八年了。這是我們預訂 FFO 的業務。但顯然，與我們來自長期租賃的核心收入不同，它的貢獻主要基於房地產銷售。因此，其現金流非常不穩定。

We started that business in 2002. And going through kind of 2002 through 2006, it made anywhere from $0.02 to $0.10 in FFO per year. Last year, in '07, it was $0.11. And this year, we're looking at a penny. And that last year's $0.11 was obviously a function of starting the year with a lot of inventory and a high level of sales.

我們於 2002 年開始這項業務。從 2002 年到 2006 年，每年 FFO 的收入為 0.02 美元到 0.10 美元。去年，07 年，價格為 0.11 美元。今年，我們關注的是一分錢。去年的 0.11 美元顯然是由於年初庫存量大、銷量高。

That inventory peaked at $140 million last year. And since the beginning of last year, we've been pairing inventory through sales, really for about 20 months now. We bought nothing in Crest six of the last seven quarters, and nothing for the last four quarters. And we plan no acquisitions in Crest as of right now.

去年，該庫存達到 1.4 億美元的峰值。自去年年初以來，我們一直通過銷售來匹配庫存，實際上已經持續了大約 20 個月。過去七個季度中，我們有六個季度沒有購買任何佳洁士商品，最後四個季度也沒有購買任何商品。目前我們還沒有計劃收購 Crest。

Inventory held for sale there is down to five properties for $6 million. So effectively, we are out of that business, really until market conditions change substantially, or we feel we need to use Crest and market conditions change for acquisitions.

待售房產庫存減少至五處，售價 600 萬美元。因此，實際上，我們會退出該業務，直到市場條件發生重大變化，或者我們覺得我們需要使用 Crest 且市場條件發生變化才能進行收購。

We've thought for some time that cap rates would be moving up and prices down, and really thought holding inventory for sale would really give us some risk to the operation because of the mark-to-mark component of that business for pricing, if your cap rate that you bought at moves through the cap rate that you're selling at. And so, while it's cost us about $0.10 a share in FFO -- that we've had less FFO this year versus last year to get out of that business -- we think it has been prudent, and that's where we're going to stay.

一段時間以來，我們一直認為資本化率會上升，價格會下降，並且確實認為持有待售庫存確實會給我們的運營帶來一些風險，因為該業務的定價部分是逐價計算的，如果您購買的上限利率會超過您出售的上限利率。因此，雖然我們在 FFO 上的成本約為每股 0.10 美元——今年我們退出該業務的 FFO 比去年減少了——但我們認為這是謹慎的做法，這就是我們要做的停留。

Moving on to dividends -- as Paul said, we've been increasing the dividends. I would anticipate we'd look for dividend growth to continue in 2009. I think it'll likely be at a moderate pace that will match probably our FFO growth over the next year or so.

轉向股息——正如保羅所說，我們一直在增加股息。我預計 2009 年股息將繼續增長。我認為股息增長的速度可能會適中，與我們未來一年左右的 FFO 增長相匹配。

I wanted to just cover one more time, as Paul did, the balance sheet, which is in great shape. And obviously with the retained earnings, a few property sales and the capital from the equity offering we did, we'll have cash on hand to pay off the $100 million at 8.25% 10-year paper that we had, and the other $20 million coming due in January.

我想像保羅那樣再討論一次資產負債表，該資產負債表狀況良好。顯然，有了留存收益、一些房產銷售以及我們進行的股票發行的資金，我們手頭將有現金來償還我們擁有的 1 億美元、利率為 8.25% 的 10 年期票據，以及另外 2000 萬美元一月份到期。

And post that, given that we just recast the $355 million credit line, we'll have no maturities, as Paul said, to 2013 and no balance on the line. So sitting here with no mortgages on any of the properties, and no need for capital and a strong balance sheet, feels very good right now for the Business.

考慮到我們剛剛重新設定了 3.55 億美元的信貸額度，正如保羅所說，到 2013 年我們將沒有到期日，並且該額度上沒有餘額。因此，坐在這裡，沒有任何房產抵押，也不需要資本和強大的資產負債表，現在對企業來說感覺非常好。

As to guidance -- we revised our estimates for 2008 to $1.82 to $1.84. And that revision really reflects having the additional number of common shares outstanding after the recent equity offering. Also, the assumption in there that there were a couple of remaining Crest properties that we thought might sell at the end of the year, and we now think those will move into next year, and also that we're not going to acquire additional acquisitions for the balance of this year. And while it's minor, I think it'll show up that since we have sold some properties out of the portfolio, and we're keeping the cash from those properties rather than reinvesting, that's pretty much how we get to that number.

至於指導——我們將 2008 年的預測修正為 1.82 至 1.84 美元。這一修訂確實反映了最近股票發行後已發行普通股數量的增加。此外，其中的假設是，我們認為還有一些剩餘的 Crest 房產可能會在今年年底出售，我們現在認為這些房產將移至明年，而且我們不會進行額外的收購今年的餘額。雖然它很小，但我認為它會表明，由於我們已經出售了投資組合中的一些房產，並且我們保留了這些房產的現金而不是再投資，這幾乎就是我們達到這個數字的方式。

For next year -- by the way, I think that means that our FFO for the year will be down a bit. Our core FFO before Crest will be up a bit for the year.

對於明年——順便說一句，我認為這意味著我們今年的 FFO 將會有所下降。我們在 Crest 之前的核心 FFO 今年將會有所上漲。

For 2009, we really talked at length about guidance internally and posted $1.86 to $1.96, which would be 1.1% to 7.7% FFO growth. For next year, we will have lost Crest out of the numbers, so really looking at $0.00 probably to a penny at best in Crest, so almost everything in the guidance coming from the core portfolio.

對於 2009 年，我們確實在內部詳細討論了指導，並公佈了 1.86 至 1.96 美元，即 FFO 增長 1.1% 至 7.7%。明年，我們將把 Crest 排除在外，所以實際上 Crest 的價格可能是 0.00 美元，最多可能是一美分，所以指導中的幾乎所有內容都來自核心投資組合。

It's obviously one of the more interesting times that we've had trying to think about guidance for 2009, with everything going on in the economy. And while we're in grape shape from a balance sheet standpoint, trying to estimate, I think, first acquisition to this point or the movement of the portfolio is difficult.

顯然，這是我們在考慮 2009 年指導方針時最有趣的時刻之一，因為經濟中的一切都在發生。雖然從資產負債表的角度來看，我們處於葡萄狀態，但我認為，試圖估計目前的首次收購或投資組合的變動是很困難的。

So as we put the guidance together, the $1.86 in 2009 estimates no acquisitions in the portfolio whatsoever. I think we'll do some, but I think it's good to put that down as a market -- the $1.96, about $500 million or so in acquisitions.

因此，當我們將指導意見放在一起時，2009 年的 1.86 美元估計投資組合中沒有任何收購。我認為我們會做一些，但我認為最好將其視為一個市場 - 1.96 美元，大約 5 億美元左右的收購。

And to put that in perspective, in the last five years, I think we've bought obviously $188 million this year, but as high as $770 million. So we thought that was a pretty good range.

從長遠來看，在過去五年中，我認為我們今年顯然購買了 1.88 億美元，但高達 7.7 億美元。所以我們認為這是一個相當不錯的範圍。

It, I think, also assumes a conservative re-lease schedule on the 3.1% of the assets that are not leased right now. Also on lease rollover is only about 3% of the portfolios rolling over next year. However, two thirds of those rolls are a second-time roll, where the existing tenant, at a very profitable store, stayed in the first time the lease rolled. And typically those tend to be pretty easy. So we don't foresee a significant problem there.

我認為，它還假設對目前未租賃的 3.1% 資產採取保守的重新租賃時間表。此外，明年滾動租賃的投資組合中，只有約 3% 會進行租賃滾動。然而，其中三分之二的租約是第二次租約，即利潤豐厚的商店的現有租戶在第一次租約租約期間留下來的。通常這些往往非常簡單。所以我們預計那裡不會出現重大問題。

Anyway, that's our best estimate, I think, for the moment, which I hope is helpful for everybody's modeling. We'll obviously see what unfolds in 2009 and watch the portfolio.

不管怎樣，我認為這是我們目前最好的估計，我希望這對每個人的建模都有幫助。我們顯然會看到 2009 年會發生什麼並關注投資組合。

To summarize, then -- portfolio's in relatively decent shape. We think that'll continue through the fourth quarter. We're being patient with acquisitions. We have the balance sheet to buy, and obviously nothing to deal with on that front. And our core FFO continues to grow, albeit slowly. And we anticipate that that will be the case into the future, although it is certainly a very challenging market out there in retail, and we're well aware of that.

總而言之，投資組合的狀況相對不錯。我們認為這種情況將持續到第四季度。我們對收購保持耐心。我們有資產負債表要購買，顯然在這方面沒有什麼可處理的。我們的核心 FFO 繼續增長，儘管速度緩慢。我們預計未來情況也會如此，儘管零售業無疑是一個非常具有挑戰性的市場，而且我們很清楚這一點。

So with those comments, we will open it up to questions at this time. And if anybody would like to ask us something, we'd be happy to do that. Andrew, if you can handle that for us?

因此，對於這些意見，我們現在將開放接受提問。如果有人想問我們一些問題，我們很樂意這樣做。安德魯，你能幫我們處理一下嗎？

(OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS) Michael Bilerman, Citigroup.

（操作員說明）Michael Bilerman，花旗集團。

Hi, it's [Greg Schwartz]. I'm here with Michael.

嗨，我是[格雷格·施瓦茨]。我和邁克爾在一起。

This one's probably for Paul. What occupancy expectation for the full year are you baking into the '09 guidance range?

這可能是給保羅的。您對 09 年指導範圍的全年入住率預期是多少？

We do take into consideration that there might be some additional stress, if you will, in the portfolio. As kind of a general comment, I'd say about 1% occupancy down is something that's already in those numbers and those assumptions.

如果您願意的話，我們確實考慮到投資組合中可能存在一些額外的壓力。作為一般性評論，我想說大約 1% 的入住率下降已經包含在這些數字和假設中。

How would that compare to when you were at this point last year, [deciding] on '08 occupancy, when you made the '08 plan? Were you sort of also baking in sort of a decline there?

與去年您制定 08 年計劃時[決定] 08 年入住情況相比，情況如何？你是否也在經歷某種程度的衰退？

Something similar, maybe a little bit less. Maybe half of a percentage point, or that sort of thing, at that point. But there's always something like that baked in just as a -- more of a conservative view in the model. And at this point in time, it seems prudent certainly to have something in there as part of the viewpoint for how the portfolio might perform. And that would mean, what, 96% occupancy, or what have you, instead of 97%.

類似的東西，也許少一點。那時可能是半個百分點，或者類似的事情。但模型中總有類似的東西——更多的是保守的觀點。在這個時候，將一些東西作為投資組合可能表現的觀點的一部分似乎是明智的。這意味著，96% 的入住率，或者你有什麼，而不是 97%。

Right.

正確的。

It may not be as conservative as it has been in previous year, given the market we're --

考慮到我們的市場，它可能不像去年那麼保守——

No. And then, if we -- then of course, if it's a little bit more than that, but yet we do some acquisitions, then obviously, we're still in that range in terms of earnings performance.

不。然後，如果我們——當然，如果比這個多一點，但我們進行了一些收購，那麼顯然，我們的盈利表現仍然處於這個範圍內。

Okay.

好的。

And then Tom, just touching on Buffets -- get your thoughts. Had disappointing September sales (inaudible) the default on the loan. How should we -- how should we think about the situation?

然後湯姆，剛剛談到自助餐——聽聽你的想法。九月銷售令人失望（聽不清），貸款違約。我們應該如何——我們應該如何思考這種情況？

Yes. It's an interesting one. I'm not overly concerned. I'll mention we're on the Creditors Committee and subject to confidentiality agreements. And the reorganization is likely not to be completed till early next year. So I'll give you some color on it, but relative to parsing that while it's still going on and we're in committee is something we can't do.

是的。這是一件有趣的事。我並不太擔心。我要提到的是，我們是債權人委員會的成員，並遵守保密協議。而重組很可能要到明年初才能完成。所以我會給你一些關於它的顏色，但相對於解析它仍在進行並且我們在委員會中是我們無法做的事情。

They filed last January. We had 116 properties; we got 12 back. They were about 7.6% of rents in our largest tenant. And we took the 12 back and went off on those, and really started focusing on the 104 properties that we own.

他們於去年一月提交了申請。我們擁有 116 處房產；我們回來了12個。它們大約占我們最大租戶租金的 7.6%。我們收回了 12 處房產並開始著手處理這些房產，並真正開始關注我們擁有的 104 處房產。

And as we mentioned three months ago now or so, or four months, the agreement we put together with Buffets is to lease all of the 104 properties and adjust the rent from a little over $22 million to a little over $19 million, or about 87% of previous rent. That agreement was signed by all parties, it was approved by the court. And we're operating under that in the fourth quarter. And I think it was pretty consistent with what we thought. And it's also what we had in the guidance, so that really didn't change guidance.

正如我們三個月前提到的，現在大約是四個月，我們與巴菲特達成的協議是租賃所有104 處房產，並將租金從2200 萬美元多一點調整到1900 萬美元多一點，即大約87 美元。之前租金的%。該協議已由各方簽署，並得到法院批准。我們第四季度的運營也是如此。我認為這與我們的想法非常一致。這也是我們在指南中的內容，所以這確實沒有改變指南。

Our thought on Buffets, as we worked through it, is -- even though their EBITDA declined substantially post their merger, there was still a lot of EBITDA in the chain, and it was going to be a reorganization. And while we had some properties that had been, I think, substantially weakened in their operations, we had mostly profitable properties. And we knew that they would want those profitable properties. And we felt, given the level of EBITDA, that they would go forward, and we continue to think that today.

正如我們所經歷的那樣，我們對巴菲特的想法是——儘管他們的 EBITDA 在合併後大幅下降，但鏈條中仍然有很多 EBITDA，而且這將是一次重組。我認為，雖然我們的一些資產的運營大幅削弱，但我們大部分資產都是盈利的。我們知道他們會想要那些有利可圖的房產。我們認為，考慮到 EBITDA 的水平，他們會繼續前進，而且我們今天仍然這麼認為。

It's interesting, as we looked at it. One of the goals we had, as we look at a case like this -- and it changes from market conditions, and certainly we have interesting market conditions today -- is that what's going to cause us to continue to get paid rent, like we're getting paid the majority of it today, is that they have high EBITDA cash flow coverage of the rent. And we also focused, in working on this, that we wanted to keep the vast majority of the properties occupied. We don't always do that. But given what we were seeing coming through the year with market conditions, we thought that was a good idea.

正如我們所看到的，這很有趣。當我們看到這樣的案例時，我們的目標之一——它會隨著市場條件的變化而變化，當然我們今天有有趣的市場條件——就是讓我們繼續獲得租金，就像我們一樣今天他們得到的大部分報酬是他們擁有高額的EBITDA 現金流覆蓋租金。在這方面的工作中，我們還重點關注的是，我們希望保留絕大多數房產。我們並不總是這樣做。但考慮到我們今年所看到的市場狀況，我們認為這是一個好主意。

And so we broke the portfolio down for us into the current profitability, and then tried to adjust the rents on the weaker units. And we did that in return for shortening some lease lengths on it. And basically, what it did for us -- it got the cash flow coverages on the units we owned back up into a very comfortable level that we normally like to underwrite at, and left them in a situation where the properties we had were profitable.

因此，我們將投資組合分解為當前的盈利能力，然後嘗試調整較弱單位的租金。我們這樣做是為了換取縮短一些租賃期限的回報。基本上，它為我們做了什麼——它使我們擁有的單位的現金流覆蓋率恢復到我們通常喜歡承保的非常舒適的水平，並使它們處於我們擁有的房產有利可圖的狀態。

So I think there's some things they have to go through here in completing the reorganization. Our belief is they'll come out. Our belief is there's enough EBITDA where the Company will be out and operating. And I think now, if you look at our properties all the way up and down the portfolio, we have good operations in them.

所以我認為為了完成重組，他們必須經歷一些事情。我們相信他們會出來的。我們相信，公司將有足夠的 EBITDA 進行運營。我認為現在，如果你從投資組合的上下各個角度審視我們的房產，就會發現我們的運營狀況良好。

So I -- my sense is obviously, we prefer not to go through one of these, particularly since it was our largest tenant. And it was a rather large integration of M&A that didn't work.

所以我——我的感覺顯然是，我們不想經歷其中之一，特別是因為它是我們最大的租戶。這是一次相當大的併購整合，但沒有成功。

I'll also tell you that I think their customer was kind of a poster child for what's been going on in the economy, and they were [also -- the] middle line was hit with some increasing costs.

我還要告訴你，我認為他們的客戶是經濟中正在發生的事情的典型代表，他們[也——]中間線受到了一些增加的成本的打擊。

But if we can go through that and maintain over the vast majority, 80%-plus of the rent we had in, and then end up back with cash flow coverages -- for those of you that follow us -- in very attractive levels, and come out of it with the stores occupied, we're pretty pleased with that. And my sense is we'll move forward with that and that we won't have a lot of issues in the future.

但如果我們能夠經歷這個過程並維持我們所擁有的絕大多數租金，80%以上，然後最終以非常有吸引力的水平獲得現金流覆蓋——對於那些關注我們的人來說，並在商店被佔領的情況下走出去，我們對此非常滿意。我的感覺是，我們將繼續推進這一點，並且將來不會出現很多問題。

How much would sales -- how much could sales come down for the cash flow coverage range to be at the point where you start to get concerned, on the properties in the portfolio?

當您開始擔心投資組合中的房產時，銷售額會下降多少——現金流覆蓋範圍的銷售額會下降多少？

In the confidentiality agreements, the only thing I could speak to was rent levels and terms. But saying that we want the cash flow coverages in levels we're comfortable with -- for those of you that watched the underwriting in recent years, I think you know where those levels are. And obviously that would take a substantial decrease.

在保密協議中，我唯一能說的就是租金水平和條款。但說我們希望現金流覆蓋範圍達到我們滿意的水平——對於那些近年來關注承保情況的人來說，我想你們知道這些水平在哪裡。顯然這需要大幅減少。

Okay.

好的。

And then just finally, are you able to provide some color on the revised lease lengths?

最後，您能否提供有關修訂後的租賃期限的一些信息？

Yes, sure. The revised lease lengths are -- they vary. We cut the portfolio up into pieces with them. And on that -- see, I've got it here -- give it to you exactly -- here we go.

是的，當然。修改後的租賃期限各不相同。我們和他們一起把投資組合分成幾部分。關於這一點——看，我已經拿到了——準確地給你——開始吧。

And by the way, before he answers, Greg, just so you know, the expiration schedule that's currently in our press release now and will be in our 10-Q, and of course on a go-forward basis, does reflect all of these changes that were made to the Buffets lease plan.

順便說一句，在他回答之前，格雷格，讓你知道，目前我們新聞稿中的到期時間表以及將在我們的 10-Q 中，當然在未來的基礎上，確實反映了所有這些對巴菲特租賃計劃進行的更改。

And Paul -- it's Michael Bilerman -- that takes effect as of October 1? Or at what point in the fourth quarter?

保羅——邁克爾·比勒曼——從 10 月 1 日起生效？或者第四季度的什麼時候？

It's September 15th.

現在是 9 月 15 日。

September --

九月 -

We reflected that in the numbers at the end of the quarter relative to cash flow coverages, and also the lease rollover.

我們在季度末的現金流覆蓋率以及租賃展期的數據中反映了這一點。

Okay.

好的。

Anyway, of the 104, we had 15 of them where we cut the rents pretty substantially and went to a three-year lease. But again, putting the cash flow coverages up into a very comfortable range didn't bother us that much. We had 11 that we did at five-year, we had 34 at seven-year, we had 10 we did 10-year leases, and we had 34 where we did 13-year leases. And again, the focus for us is, if you get the cash flow coverage very high, then lease length is not your issue.

無論如何，在這 104 間公寓中，我們有 15 間，我們大幅削減了租金，並簽訂了為期三年的租約。但同樣，將現金流覆蓋範圍提高到一個非常舒適的範圍並沒有讓我們感到太大的困擾。我們有 11 個是五年期租賃，有 34 個是七年期租賃，有 10 個是 10 年期租賃，還有 34 個是 13 年期租賃。再說一次，我們關注的焦點是，如果您的現金流覆蓋率非常高，那麼租賃期限就不是您的問題。

Right, thank you.

對了，謝謝。

[Todd Lucalsic], Morningstar.

[托德·盧卡爾西克]，晨星公司。

Hi. Thanks for taking my questions.

你好。感謝您回答我的問題。

Hey, Todd.

嘿，托德。

Hey, Todd.

嘿，托德。

Hi.

你好。

Just seems like you guys have some dry powder to potentially take advantage of some good deals in the acquisition space. Can you just speak a little bit about what metrics you all will use to know when cap rates have gone high enough?

看來你們有一些乾粉可以利用收購領域的一些好交易。您能否簡單談談你們將使用哪些指標來了解資本化率何時達到足夠高的水平？

That's a great question. And like most decisions, rather than rely on one thing, there are a number of things. But I think, given what I talked about in historical cap rates, I think we're really going to need them up over 10, so that's one.

這是一個很好的問題。與大多數決策一樣，決策不是依賴於一件事，而是考慮到很多因素。但我認為，考慮到我談到的歷史資本化率，我認為我們確實需要將其提高 10 以上，所以這就是其中之一。

Second, at the same time that they need to be up over 10, I think that it'd be smart for us to be a little more stringent with our cash flow coverages. So if you're raising the rent a bit, the properties have to be more profitable to be up at 2.5 to three times cash flow coverage. So I think it's really a mix of cap, and as well as a price adjustment in a seller's mind, relative to where prices have to be. But my sense is 10-plus.

其次，在它們需要增長超過 10 的同時，我認為我們對現金流覆蓋範圍更加嚴格一點是明智的。因此，如果你稍微提高租金，這些房產的盈利能力必須更高，才能達到現金流覆蓋率的 2.5 到三倍。因此，我認為這實際上是上限以及賣家心中相對於價格必須進行的價格調整的結合。但我的感覺是10+。

The other part of this is in net lease, we -- while our leases do grow, we have to make a good spread right up front. So I think if you look at your cap rate, and then you start looking at cost of capital, I think it shows you that cap rates do need to be high before it makes sense to make accretive acquisitions.

另一部分是淨租賃，雖然我們的租賃量確實增長，但我們必須預先實現良好的利差。因此，我認為，如果你看看你的資本化率，然後你開始考慮資本成本，我認為這表明你的資本化率確實需要很高，然後才有意義進行增值收購。

If you look at debt costs for us today, BBB spreads have gapped out. In the REIT world, I think you're over 10%. If you look at preferred, obviously that market's been beaten up pretty bad, so you're looking at 12%.

如果你看看我們今天的債務成本，就會發現 BBB 利差已經出現缺口。在 REIT 領域，我認為你的比例超過 10%。如果你看一下首選，顯然這個市場已經遭受了相當嚴重的打擊，所以你看到的是 12%。

So you kind of look for permanent financing in the common equity area. And I think if you take the guidance we have for 2008 as an example, and you did $1.82 to $1.84, and you divided that by the price of the stock at $21, a price of the equity around there on a nominal basis, if you then mark it up for underwriting costs -- you're going to be looking at 9% or so as a cost of equity.

因此，您會在普通股領域尋找永久融資。我認為，如果你以我們 2008 年的指導為例，你做了 1.82 美元到 1.84 美元，然後你將其除以 21 美元的股票價格，即名義上的股票價格，如果你然後將其標記為承保成本——您將看到9% 左右的股本成本。

And so I think you really have to be looking at a spread of 100 basis points before it makes sense to add accretive acquisitions. So it's -- one, the market relative to cap, which I think has to be 10-plus. I think it's then secondarily making sure that in this environment -- which will be volatile for a few years and a tough financing market for people for a few years -- we make sure that cash flow coverages are even higher than they were before. And then it'll be a look just personally at our company, and I think for anybody else in the business, at what point is it accretive enough on a nominal basis over your cost of capital where it makes sense.

因此，我認為您確實必須考慮 100 個基點的利差，然後才有意義增加增值收購。所以，第一，相對於上限的市場，我認為必須是 10 以上。我認為其次要確保在這種環境下——這將是未來幾年的波動，以及未來幾年人們融資市場的艱難——我們確保現金流覆蓋率甚至比以前更高。然後，這將是我們公司的個人觀察，我認為對於業內的其他任何人來說，在名義上，它在什麼時候可以比你的資本成本有足夠的增值，這是有意義的。

Okay.

好的。

And can you talk a little bit about the process that you go through internally? Do you guys proactively go out and look for attractive property portfolios and approach the current owners? Or is it mainly reactive, where people are coming to you with opportunities?

您能談談您內部經歷的流程嗎？你們是否主動出去尋找有吸引力的房產組合併接觸當前業主？或者主要是被動的，人們會帶著機會來找你？

It's a mix of the two. But if it's reactive, it's because we have a list of close to 1,000 retailers, and a lot of owners. And our people are out really acting like investment bankers and calling on those people, and talking to them about their portfolio, first of all, but also talking to them about their business plans and their balance sheets and their sources of capital. And the majority of the transactions really come from those discussions, either through, gee, that's interesting, let's take a look at it; or, after having talked to the guy for five years, he wakes up and says, gee, the debt market's no good, I'm going to need to use my real estate to get some capital, and we get that call.

這是兩者的混合。但如果它是被動的，那是因為我們有近 1,000 家零售商和很多業主的名單。我們的員工真的像投資銀行家一樣，拜訪這些人，首先與他們談論他們的投資組合，同時也與他們談論他們的商業計劃、資產負債表和資本來源。大多數交易確實來自這些討論，或者通過，哎呀，這很有趣，讓我們看一下；或者，在與這個人談了五年之後，他醒來說，哎呀，債務市場不好，我需要用我的房地產來獲得一些資本，然後我們就接到了這個電話。

So I would say it's almost all a function of being fairly proactive, calling on people. And we've tried to be knowledgeable in terms of who's asset-rich and who has portfolios. We've also tried to be proactive relative to understanding people's debt maturities that are coming up.

所以我想說，這幾乎都是相當積極主動、號召人們的作用。我們試圖了解誰擁有豐富的資產以及誰擁有投資組合。我們還嘗試積極主動地了解人們即將到期的債務。

In our industry, there was a lot of net lease financing that was done in the CMBS market over the last five to seven years. And a lot of those were five-year floaters. So they're going to be coming up in '09, '10 and '11. And I think, unless the capital markets change dramatically relative to access -- and even if they do, they probably won't get back to the pricing of a few years ago -- that sale leaseback may end up being more attractive to them than the spreads they're going to experience as they see in the CMBS market.

在我們的行業中，過去五到七年，CMBS 市場上進行了大量的淨租賃融資。其中很多都是五年期流動資金。所以他們將在 09 年、10 年和 11 年推出。我認為，除非資本市場相對於准入發生巨大變化——即使發生了，他們也可能不會回到幾年前的定價——售後回租最終可能對他們更具吸引力。他們將在CMBS 市場中看到的價差。

So we've been proactive calling on people. That's where it comes from. But I think a lot of it'll come from refinance in the next few years, versus M&A, where it came the last few years.

因此，我們一直在積極呼籲人們。這就是它的來源。但我認為，其中很大一部分將來自未來幾年的再融資，而不是過去幾年的併購。

Okay. And it sounds like you may even expect more opportunities than sort of the $0.5 billion that you've said might be available next year. Do you have a sense, from your own balance sheet, what other funding opportunities might be available to you all to take advantage of even more potential acquisitions?

好的。聽起來您甚至可能期望比您所說的明年可能提供的 5 億美元更多的機會。從您自己的資產負債表來看，您是否知道還有哪些其他融資機會可供您利用更多潛在的收購？

There've been a lot of things used in the last few years in the REIT business to fund capital for growth. And I think one of the things that has served us better than anything is keeping a very uncomplicated balance sheet. And so I think it's primarily going to be through some asset recycling. And it would be through issuance of additional securities, where it's accretive to do so.

過去幾年，房地產投資信託基金業務使用了很多東西來為增長提供資金。我認為對我們最有利的事情之一就是保持一個非常簡單的資產負債表。所以我認為這主要是通過一些資產回收來實現的。這將通過發行額外的證券來實現，這樣做可以增加收益。

The credit facility, the $355 million, has no balance on it, and we don't anticipate it's going to have a balance on it in the near future. So that's available to buy properties. But I think before you put a lot on a credit line today, it would be very wise to know what your takeout's going to be. And I think that's going to be asset recycling and issuance of new securities, if they're profitable.

3.55 億美元的信貸額度沒有餘額，我們預計在不久的將來也不會出現餘額。這樣就可以購買房產了。但我認為，在你今天投入大量信用額度之前，最好先知道你的外賣會是什麼。我認為這將是資產回收和新證券的發行，如果它們能夠盈利的話。

And Todd, just to be clear, in terms of opportunity -- our historic track record has been more in the 10% to 15% range, in terms of what we purchase, of opportunities, not only that we hear about but really look at and underwrite, so that those are opportunities that are looked at internally through our Investment Committee, where we do the real estate work, the credit work, the cash flow coverage work.

托德，要明確的是，就機會而言，我們的歷史記錄更多地在10% 到15% 的範圍內，就我們購買的東西而言，機會不僅是我們聽到的，而且是我們真正看到的並承保，因此這些機會是通過我們的投資委員會進行內部審查的，我們負責房地產工作、信貸工作和現金流覆蓋工作。

So when we say $500 million next year -- to do that, we'd end up having to look at a whole lot more than that. Because we continue to be pretty stringent on opportunities we close on and make the final decision on relative to purchase.

因此，當我們說明年要投入 5 億美元時，我們最終不得不考慮的因素遠不止於此。因為我們仍然對我們關閉的機會非常嚴格，並做出與購買相關的最終決定。

Activity levels and opportunities, I would say, has slowed down a bit. But it is still strong, and we are still looking at lots of opportunities. We clearly have seen cap rate movement. But we don't think the volume, as Tom mentioned, will really tick back up again until people kind of get over the sticker shock, if you will, and realize that the alternatives available to them, from a refinancing or recapitalization perspective, are quite limited.

我想說，活動水平和機會有所放緩。但它仍然很強勁，我們仍在尋找很多機會。我們顯然已經看到資本化率的變動。但正如湯姆提到的那樣，我們認為交易量不會真正再次回升，直到人們克服了價格衝擊（如果你願意的話），並意識到從再融資或資本重組的角度來看，他們可用的替代方案是相當有限。

And while the debt product historically was our big competitor -- whether that be CMBS, high-yield debt, leveraged loan or bank credit facilities -- that competitor has largely completely disappeared for the BB retailer. Or if it's there, it's very, very expensive. So equity sale leaseback capital will be attractive to them and make a lot of sense. And when you start talking 10%, 11% equity sale leaseback capital to a BB retailer who doesn't have a lot of other alternatives relative to their balance sheet, it's still a very attractive alternative to them.

雖然債務產品歷來是我們的主要競爭對手——無論是 CMBS、高收益債務、槓桿貸款還是銀行信貸便利——但對於 BB 零售商來說，這個競爭對手基本上已經完全消失了。或者即使有，它也非常非常昂貴。因此，股權出售回租資本對他們來說很有吸引力並且很有意義。當你開始向一家BB 零售商談論10%、11% 的股權出售回租資本時，該零售商相對於其資產負債表沒有很多其他選擇，這對他們來說仍然是一個非常有吸引力的選擇。

Once they get over that hump, start realizing that, they're not quite there yet. But once they do, we think we'll have a lot of activity to look at.

一旦他們克服了這個困難，就會開始意識到，他們還沒有完全成功。但一旦他們這樣做了，我們認為我們將有很多活動值得關注。

I -- and I'll just make one more comment. I would assume on the low side of the range, until we see that movement. And then, we'll guide up in future quarters if it should be. So if I was doing what you're doing, I'd assume right in the midline, and understand it could be lower than that.

我——我將再發表一條評論。我會假設該範圍處於較低水平，直到我們看到這種走勢。然後，如果需要的話，我們將在未來幾個季度提供指導。因此，如果我正在做你正在做的事情，我會假設就在中線，並且理解它可能會低於這個值。

Right, okay, that's very helpful. Thanks again for taking my questions.

好的，好的，非常有幫助。再次感謝您回答我的問題。

Samit Harik, Banc of America Securities.

薩米特·哈里克 (Samit Harik)，美國銀行證券公司。

Hi. I'm here with Dustin as well.

你好。我也和達斯汀一起在這裡。

Question -- given that you're partially in the business of helping to extract real estate value from retailers then, there's been some talk in the market about trying to do that with one large public big-box retailer in particular. Could you provide maybe your thoughts on this type of strategy to create liquidity for a retailer in an environment when underlying real estate values are so much in question?

問題 - 考慮到您的部分業務是幫助從零售商那裡獲取房地產價值，市場上有一些關於嘗試與一家大型公共大型零售商合作的討論。您能否提供一下您對這種在房地產基礎價值受到嚴重質疑的環境下為零售商創造流動性的策略的看法？

That's a great question, and I'll speak generically. I'm aware of the one you're thinking of. But my sense is, is the move to extract value out of the retailer to give further value to the equity holders. And to do so by forming a REIT today is something that I think was talked about a lot a few years ago, and done, and a piece of financial engineering in a very well-capitalized market that might make sense.

這是一個很好的問題，我將泛泛而談。我知道你正在想的那個人。但我的感覺是，此舉是為了從零售商那裡提取價值，為股東提供更多價值。我認為，今天通過組建房地產投資信託基金來實現這一目標，幾年前就已經被討論過很多次，並且已經完成了，並且在資本充足的市場中，這也是一項可能有意義的金融工程。

In this market, I think for people -- if you're going to extract "value" out of the real estate portfolio in this environment, if I was running a retailer, it would be to make sure I'm solving a problem relative to my balance sheet, and stay as liquid and with the biggest margins I can. Because it's certainly a tough market out there.

在這個市場上，我認為對於人們來說——如果你要在這種環境下從房地產投資組合中提取“價值”，如果我經營一家零售商，那就要確保我正在解決一個相對的問題我的資產負債表，並保持流動性和最大的利潤。因為這確實是一個艱難的市場。

And then the second part is how that would be valued in the market, obviously, as it was discussed in the press, would be a decent structure. But it would be only one tenant. And even if you look at REITs today -- and you're doing this every day, and look at the valuations they're getting -- perhaps the value extraction might not be as high as somebody thinks. But for a retailer who's got a financing problem, I think that's where you step up to it today, or you want to build cash, unless you've got something compelling to do with the business.

然後第二部分是如何在市場上估值，顯然，正如媒體所討論的那樣，這將是一個不錯的結構。但只有一名租戶。即使你看看今天的房地產投資信託基金——你每天都這樣做，看看它們所獲得的估值——也許價值提取可能並不像人們想像的那麼高。但對於遇到融資問題的零售商來說，我認為這就是你今天要採取的行動，或者你想積累現金，除非你有一些令人信服的業務要做。

But I think in most businesses, it's probably not a period when huge CapEx investments are going to generate a lot of incremental revenue. It's a better time to take care of your balance sheet.

但我認為，在大多數企業中，巨額資本支出投資可能不會產生大量增量收入。現在是處理資產負債表的更好時機。

Sure.

當然。

And then, I guess, then just as a follow-up on that -- where do you think, I guess, a ground lease for a well-capitalized big-box retailer would trade right now?

然後，我想，然後作為後續行動 - 我想，您認為一家資本充足的大型零售商的地面租賃現在會在哪裡交易？

You know, I could have probably given you a really good answer six months ago or 12 months ago, and I think it would have been down in the sixes. But today, it could be substantially higher. And I think if you just take a look at our yield and look at the balance sheet, and kind of run through the implied cap rate there, you'd maybe take 100 basis points off for it. And then understand your standard deviation on that guess may be 200 basis points. I apologize for not being that helpful in this market.

你知道，我本可以在 6 個月前或 12 個月前給你一個非常好的答案，但我認為答案會是 6 分。但今天，它可能會高得多。我認為，如果你只看一下我們的收益率和資產負債表，並瀏覽一下那裡的隱含上限利率，你可能會因此降低 100 個基點。然後了解您的猜測標準差可能是 200 個基點。我很抱歉在這個市場上沒有那麼有幫助。

No, that's fine.

不，沒關係。

And I guess, lastly, your -- I guess your troubled-tenant watch list -- has there been any changes? Has your watch list maybe increased? And I'm sure you look at rent coverage ratios for your troubled tenants. How's that been going? Have they gone down?

我想，最後，你的——我想你的問題租戶觀察名單——有什麼變化嗎？您的觀察名單可能增加了嗎？我確信您會查看陷入困境的租戶的租金覆蓋率。進展如何？他們下去了嗎？

It's interesting, the watch list today has a couple of retailers on it. They're fairly -- they're not huge positions for us; they're small. And there's nothing imminent. And like all of you, I know it's a difficult market out there, and it's difficult for the retailers, particularly those that have a lot of debt. And I think for those, their primary problem is their debt; it's not their real estate. And so some of them may well have to deal with that.

有趣的是，今天的觀察名單上有幾家零售商。它們是公平的——對我們來說，它們並不是重要的職位；它們很小。而且沒有什麼迫在眉睫的事情。和大家一樣，我知道這是一個困難的市場，對於零售商來說也很困難，尤其是那些負債累累的零售商。我認為對於這些人來說，他們的首要問題是債務；這不是他們的房地產。因此，他們中的一些人很可能不得不面對這個問題。

But it's not expanded as fast as I thought it would. It's not large. And if I go back six or eight months ago, it looks about the same as it did then.

但它的擴張速度並沒有我想像的那麼快。它不大。如果我回到六、八個月前，情況看起來和那時差不多。

And I think cash flow coverages again in the portfolio are like 2.7, and they range from 1.7 to 4.55. So you can assume that if we have somebody that's on the watch list, my sense is they'd probably be at the 1.7 to 2.1 -- at the lower end of that range -- as a guess.

我認為投資組合中的現金流覆蓋率約為 2.7，範圍從 1.7 到 4.55。所以你可以假設，如果我們有人在觀察名單上，我的感覺是他們可能會在 1.7 到 2.1 之間——在這個範圍的下限——作為猜測。

And we try to make some pretty affirmative statements on these calls every quarter, as a good form of disclosure, relative to our tenant base. Because we recognize that we don't disclose specific tenant names for competitive business reasons.

我們每個季度都會嘗試對這些電話做出一些相當肯定的聲明，作為相對於我們的租戶群的一種良好的披露形式。因為我們認識到，出於競爭性商業原因，我們不會披露具體租戶名稱。

So let me just say a couple more things beyond what Tom said in his call remarks at the beginning. That is, in our top 20, we don't have any other retailers in bankruptcy. So when you get down beyond our top 20 tenants, now you're getting down to about 1% of rent. So that's just kind of an affirmative statement that might be helpful to a lot of folks out there wondering about our portfolio.

除了湯姆在開頭的電話講話中所說的內容之外，讓我再多說幾句話。也就是說，在我們的前 20 名零售商中，沒有任何其他零售商破產。因此，當您超出我們的前 20 名租戶時，現在您的租金將降至 1% 左右。所以這只是一個肯定的聲明，可能對很多想了解我們的投資組合的人有所幫助。

I'll also just want to say, so people know we know -- look, it's -- obviously, economic position is not positive out there. There's a lack of credit available, you've got an over-levered, worried consumer, who's worrying about his house and equity portfolio declines. Consumer debt's high, credit cards are tough; while gas price and food inflation has come off at bit, which is certainly helpful. That's really offset by a low consumer confidence level.

我還想說，所以人們知道我們知道——看，很明顯，那裡的經濟狀況並不樂觀。可用信貸不足，槓桿率過高，消費者憂心忡忡，擔心自己的房屋和股票投資組合下跌。消費者債務高，信用卡困難；而汽油價格和食品通脹有所回落，這當然是有幫助的。這確實被消費者信心水平低所抵消。

And so I think for a lot of retailers, you need to dig in your heels and operate well, and watch your CapEx and your balance sheet. And retail sales were up about 1.2% September. I think it'll be worse in October, and then we'll have to see.

因此，我認為對於很多零售商來說，您需要堅定不移並良好運營，並註意您的資本支出和資產負債表。 9 月份零售額增長約 1.2%。我認為十月份情況會更糟，然後我們就得看看。

So with that said, though, with high cash flow coverages, we hear noise and complaints from tenants. But there's nothing that I can say today, gee, I think in the second quarter, X is going to happen, or Y. But it's a market also where we know that things can change. But for right now, not bad.

話雖如此，儘管現金流覆蓋率很高，我們還是聽到了租戶的噪音和投訴。但今天我無話可說，哎呀，我認為在第二季度，X 將會發生，或者 Y。但我們也知道，在這個市場上，事情可能會發生變化。但就目前而言，還不錯。

All right. That's it for me, thanks.

好的。對我來說就是這樣，謝謝。

Craig Kucera, BB&T Capital Markets.

Craig Kucera，BB&T 資本市場。

Yes, hi, good afternoon. This is actually --

是的，嗨，下午好。這實際上是——

Hey, Craig.

嘿，克雷格。

-- this is [Steve Redonavit], for Craig.

——這是[史蒂夫·雷多納維特]，代表克雷格。

On the C-store acquisition -- albeit it was a small one -- is that pricing, the 10/1 -- is that indicative of what you're seeing now? Or was this a -- more or less a distress situation?

關於便利店的收購——儘管規模很小——定價是10/1——這是否表明了你現在所看到的情況？或者這或多或少是一種困境？

That's what we're -- that's what we're telling them it's going to take. And so this was a situation, actually, with an existing tenant, who had another property they wanted to get done. And we had done business with them. And we said, look, that's the new rate. And it's just a poster child. We just say, look at the spread on our 10-year, and look at how much it's moved. And so the fact that we're moving you up 130 basis points is really still pretty much of a bargain. And if you don't need to do it, and you think things will get better, then hang out and wait. But our advice is that cap rates will go up before they go down. And again, it's really anecdotal, because it was a one-off. But they felt that was the easiest thing to do for the one property.

這就是我們——這就是我們告訴他們將會採取的做法。實際上，這是一個現有租戶的情況，他有另一處想要完成的房產。我們已經和他們做了生意。我們說，看，這就是新的匯率。這只是一個典型的孩子。我們只是說，看看我們 10 年期國債的利差，看看它變動了多少。因此，我們將利率上調 130 個基點這一事實仍然非常划算。如果你不需要這樣做，並且你認為事情會變得更好，那就出去等待。但我們的建議是資本化率在下降之前會上升。再說一次，這確實是一件軼事，因為它是一次性的。但他們認為這是對一處房產來說最簡單的事情。

We've had a couple other three people come in the door. And the discussions have been up in that range, or maybe even higher. But I think it has been to date some challenged credits, where even at a higher rate, it didn't meet some of the other pieces of the puzzle. But that's where we're quoting.

我們還有另外三個人進門。討論已經在這個範圍內進行，甚至可能更高。但我認為迄今為止已經有一些受到挑戰的學分，即使在更高的速度下，它也沒有滿足其他一些難題。但這就是我們引用的地方。

Okay.

好的。

And then on the sales, the 13 sales in the quarter -- do you have kind of a blended cap rate on those?

然後在銷售方面，本季度的 13 筆銷售——您對這些銷售有某種混合上限嗎？

Yes. It was 7.9%.

是的。是7.9%。

7.9%.

7.9%。

That's much -- obviously lower than you've seen on sales in the past. But it was lightening up on what were some attractive properties, smaller price point, in good markets, which -- I think over the last quarter, there was still a pretty good market in that. And I think I would look for higher cap rates on sale and not put that in your model.

這明顯低於你過去看到的銷售額。但在良好的市場中，一些有吸引力的、價格較低的房產正在減倉，我認為在上個季度，市場仍然相當不錯。我想我會尋找更高的銷售上限率，而不是把它放在你的模型中。

Okay.

好的。

And then just broadly, what industries are you seeing the best risk-adjusted returns right now? Are you still taking a look at any banks, sale leasebacks there? And if you can just talk sort of through your major -- your industries there?

那麼，從廣義上講，您目前認為哪些行業的風險調整回報率最高？您還在考慮那裡的銀行、售後回租嗎？如果你能談談你的專業——你在那裡的行業嗎？

You could send us a list of which banks you think are perfectly safe, [and get] a look at that sector.

您可以向我們發送您認為完全安全的銀行列表，[並了解]該部門的情況。

[laughter]

[笑聲]

As Tom's grabbing his notes here, let me just make a comment on this, which is that banks -- or not banks, but it's really going to be balance sheet-driven as opposed to industry-driven, relative to where the opportunities are. So we're kind of seeing a mix, if you will, come in the door.

當湯姆在這裡抓筆記時，讓我對此發表評論，即銀行——或者不是銀行，但相對於機會所在，它實際上將是資產負債表驅動的，而不是行業驅動的。所以我們看到了一種混合體，如果你願意的話，進來吧。

I -- let me echo -- what Paul's saying is I don't think there's an industry theme that we're going to see. I think it's going to be looking at each of our industries and having a view of how we feel about their business and their future, and how much they're impacted right now by the consumer; i.e., are they are a low-price point basic human need or value that seems to be holding up? Or are they a consumer discretionary that's not holding up, or anything home-related that's not holding up? And we'll start with kind of that view of whether we like them or not. But I think, to get to the cap rates we want in this environment, when these guys really aren't trying to grow, it's going to be balance sheet-related, and them really doing some liquidity.

我——讓我重複一下——保羅所說的是，我認為我們不會看到一個行業主題。我認為我們將審視我們的每個行業，了解我們對他們的業務和未來的看法，以及他們現在受到消費者的影響有多大；即，它們是否是一種低價格點的人類基本需求或似乎持續存在的價值？或者它們是非必需消費品，或者是任何與家居相關的東西，沒有持續下去？我們將從我們是否喜歡它們的角度開始。但我認為，為了在這種環境下達到我們想要的資本化率，當這些人真的不試圖增長時，這將與資產負債表相關，而且他們確實會做一些流動性。

We've looked at banks. Banks are something we'll continue to look at. About three years ago, we took one of our people and had him spend a year on banks -- talk to everybody in the business, underwrite the industry, go through it. And what we found out is there wasn't a bank in America that needed any money that we could find, that was a bank in America, not the Bank of America.

我們研究過銀行。銀行是我們將繼續關注的對象。大約三年前，我們聘請了一名員工，讓他在銀行工作了一年——與業內的每個人交談，為該行業提供承保，並進行審查。我們發現美國沒有一家銀行需要我們能找到的任何資金，那是美國的銀行，而不是美國銀行。

And as such, we spent a year and didn't do any business, but put the files away thinking there are points, albeit far between, where banks need capital. And now that we're in that, we're starting to see portfolios come across in banks. And it's a very careful underwriting process. So I'm not particularly optimistic relative to doing large volumes there.

因此，我們花了一年的時間，沒有做任何業務，而是把文件收了起來，認為銀行在某些地方需要資本，儘管兩者之間相距甚遠。現在我們已經進入了這個階段，我們開始看到投資組合出現在銀行中。這是一個非常仔細的承保過程。因此，相對於在那裡進行大量生產，我並不是特別樂觀。

The other challenge is if cash flow coverage at the unit level is our best metric for credit, that's something that's a lot more difficult to do in a bank branch than it is in other type of retail, and just from the standpoint of identifying what those are. And then more importantly, can they migrate down the street if a bank has two branches? And we believe it can migrate. So it really has to fall so heavily on the overall credit of the bank -- that's a difficult one today -- and then secondarily, the real estate and secondary use, which is a little better in the newer de novo type branches.

另一個挑戰是，如果單位層面的現金流覆蓋率是我們衡量信貸的最佳指標，那麼在銀行分行中做到這一點比在其他類型的零售中要困難得多，並且僅從確定這些指標的角度來看是。更重要的是，如果銀行有兩個分行，他們可以沿著街道遷移嗎？我們相信它可以遷移。因此，它確實必須嚴重影響銀行的整體信用——這在今天是一個困難的問題——其次是房地產和二次利用，這在較新的從頭類型分支機構中要好一些。

But it may be a challenge to do a lot there. But we're seeing them, and we're looking at them.

但在那裡做很多事情可能是一個挑戰。但我們正在看到它們，我們正在看著它們。

Great, thanks.

萬分感謝。

Jeff Donnelly, Wachovia Securities.

傑夫唐納利，美聯證券。

Good afternoon.

下午好。

Paul, in light of the fact that I think two thirds of the people on the call work for a bank (inaudible) -- there's a witty retort in here somewhere, but frankly it alludes me.

保羅，鑑於我認為接到電話的人中有三分之二在銀行工作（聽不清）——這裡有一個詼諧的反駁，但坦率地說，它暗示了我。

Hey, I did not mean it in that light (inaudible).

嘿，我不是這個意思（聽不清）。

[laughter]

[笑聲]

Don't write bad things about the Company now because of it, please.

請不要因此而寫公司的壞話。

Of course not.

當然不是。

Actually, a question -- historically, you guys have used an internal credit-scoring system -- I guess it's the [darth] score, I believe you call it -- to score deals and determine somewhat of a baseline, I think, for an appropriate cap rate. However, with the debt markets blown out, I guess, how valuable are the conclusions there from a pricing standpoint? And I guess as a follow-up, where does your portfolio-wide darth score fall today on the S&P credit scale? And what sort of yield would that imply for your portfolio?

實際上，一個問題——從歷史上看，你們使用了內部信用評分系統——我想這是[達斯]評分，我相信你們稱之為——來獲得交易並確定某種基線，我認為，適當的上限利率。然而，我想，隨著債務市場的崩潰，從定價的角度來看，這些結論有多大價值？我想作為一個後續行動，您今天的投資組合達斯評分在標準普爾信用等級上處於什麼位置？這對您的投資組合意味著什麼樣的收益率？

Yes. The last part of that I'm not quite sure I can answer, Jeff. It's our darf score that gets us to where we really [think in it]. I think their darth scores generally have held up to date. They're higher than they were a few years ago. However, I anticipate they're going to decline. And I will tell you, of the three credit metrics we use -- which is an unsecured underwriting, which is what you're talking about -- versus the real estate and cash flow coverage at a unit level, it's the one we assign the less, I think, credence to relative to underwriting.

是的。我不太確定我能回答最後一部分，傑夫。正是我們的 darf 分數讓我們到達了我們真正[思考]的地方。我認為他們的達斯分數總體上是最新的。他們的水平比幾年前要高。然而，我預計他們會下降。我會告訴你，在我們使用的三個信用指標中——這是無擔保承保，這就是你所說的——與單位層面的房地產和現金流覆蓋率相比，這是我們指定的指標我認為，相對於承保而言，可信度較低。

Where that goes with yield -- if you're trying to take a cap rate to their debt spreads, obviously it'd be significantly higher. So I'm kind of struggling with a good answer here for you.

這與收益率相關——如果你試圖對他們的債務利差採取上限利率，顯然它會高得多。所以我正在努力為您提供一個好的答案。

Well, let me just say this, Jeff. Similar to what you guys are doing to the REIT space, and really, I think, most investors or analysts are trying to do to any companies out there -- our credit analysis has adapted to the current environment. And when we're looking at credit, what's the first thing we do? The balance sheet. What do the debt maturities look like for the next two to three years, and are we comfortable with that? If the use of proceeds for the sale leaseback we're talking about solve some of that problem, great. But are there additional problems beyond that in the balance sheet?

好吧，讓我這麼說，傑夫。與你們對房地產投資信託基金領域所做的事情類似，實際上，我認為大多數投資者或分析師都在嘗試對任何公司做——我們的信用分析已經適應了當前的環境。當我們考慮信用時，我們首先要做的是什麼？資產負債表。未來兩到三年的債務到期日如何，我們對此感到滿意嗎？如果我們所說的售後回租收益的使用能夠解決部分問題，那就太好了。但除了資產負債表中的問題之外，還有其他問題嗎？

And then we look at cash flow metrics. In our case, in our industry, it's going to be payout ratio, if you will. But say, in a general corporate underwriting, might be a fixed-charge coverage ratio type calculation.

然後我們看看現金流量指標。就我們的情況而言，在我們的行業中，如果你願意的話，這將是支付率。但是，在一般企業承保中，可能是固定費用覆蓋率類型的計算。

So we're -- it's reordered, if you will, in terms of what the priority is of what we look at, whereas in the past, we might have been less concerned, if you will, about a debt maturity coming up in their balance sheet a year from now. Like sure, they'll have access to the capital to repay that. Well, guess what? As we know, that's not always the case. And so -- and certainly not the case today, and certainly not the case for a BB retailer.

因此，如果你願意的話，我們會根據我們所關注的優先事項進行重新排序，而在過去，如果你願意的話，我們可能不太擔心他們的債務到期日。一年後的資產負債表。當然，他們將有機會獲得資金來償還債務。嗯，你猜怎麼著？據我們所知，情況並非總是如此。所以，今天的情況肯定不是這樣，對於 BB 零售商來說也肯定不是這樣。

So I'd say that the analysis and approach we go through has naturally adapted to the current times. But in terms of the actual scoring system, it hasn't really changed. They're hanging in there. As Tom said, they'll probably go down, I would guess. But in terms of our approach to credit underwriting, it's certainly adapted to the current times.

所以我想說，我們所經歷的分析和方法自然適應了當前時代。但就實際的評分系統而言，並沒有真正改變。他們就掛在那裡。正如湯姆所說，我猜他們可能會倒下。但就我們的信貸承銷方法而言，它無疑適應了當前時代。

Yes, I'd throw in BB minus as kind of the unsecured debt scoring -- obviously we own the real estate and don't own their equity debt [converts] credit default swaps, or whatever securities out there.

是的，我會把 BB 減去作為無擔保債務評分——顯然我們擁有房地產，但不擁有他們的股權債務[轉換]信用違約掉期或任何證券。

And then, I'm curious -- I guess it's a follow-up to an earlier question on banks. Twelve to 24 months ago, banks were sort of maybe the hot tenant, if you will. The margin that -- they were paying top-dollar rents, and there's top-dollar pricing for their assets. I'm curious where that has gone. Because you said a year or two ago, none of the banks really wanted or needed money. Could you argue that now, in this environment, they definitely want capital? And has TARP effectively provided some degree of a government backstop or cushion that you could argue that this is an industry that's sort of back on its heels, or a group of creditors that are back on their heels a little bit? But at the end of the day, their credit's actually better than it appears?

然後，我很好奇——我想這是之前關於銀行的問題的後續。如果你願意的話，十二到二十四個月前，銀行可能是熱門租戶。他們支付的租金是最高的，而且他們的資產也有最高的定價。我很好奇那去了哪裡。因為你在一兩年前說過，沒有一家銀行真正想要或需要錢。你能說現在在這種環境下，他們肯定需要資本嗎？問題資產救助計劃是否有效地提供了某種程度的政府支持或緩衝，你可以說這是一個有點落後的行業，或者是一群有點落後的債權人？但歸根結底，他們的信用實際上比表面上看起來要好？

Maybe. With the regional banks -- or the ones that have been coming in the door are the local banks. And I'll tell you, we've looked at a number of them. And a part of our underwriting requires that we get into their portfolio, and we get into the portfolio, and we start looking at the real estate and the real estate development loans, and backing residential homebuilders. And the rest of us -- quite frankly, in a number of them, we just threw up our hands in the middle of the underwriting and said we're not smart enough to do this at this juncture.

或許。區域銀行——或者說已經進來的銀行是當地銀行。我會告訴你，我們已經研究了其中的一些。我們承保的一部分要求我們進入他們的投資組合，我們進入投資組合，我們開始關注房地產和房地產開發貸款，並支持住宅建築商。而我們其他人——坦率地說，在其中一些人中，我們只是在承保過程中舉手錶示，我們還不夠聰明，無法在這個節骨眼上這樣做。

And the people that are not in that situation and are really backed by TARP and the bigger banks -- it just would have to be a decision to build liquidity. But I don't think the cap rate's going to be in a range where we would do it right now.

而那些不處於這種情況並且真正得到問題資產救助計劃和大銀行支持的人——這只是一個建立流動性的決定。但我認為上限利率不會在我們現在要做的範圍內。

Okay. And I guess, just last question -- point of clarification -- the low end of your $1.86 guidance next year -- that includes the $0.05 of investment sale gains, correct?

好的。我想，最後一個問題 - 澄清一點 - 明年 1.86 美元指導的低端 - 包括 0.05 美元的投資銷售收益，對嗎？

No. We've never included property gains -- sales gains in our --

不。我們從未將財產收益——銷售收益——計入我們的——

No.

不。

-- numbers.

——數字。

Okay. I wasn't sure. Just, when I was reading through your --

好的。我不確定。只是，當我讀到你的——

No, just Crest. And Crest essentially is estimated, to be honest, at 0 next year.

不，只有佳洁士。老實說，明年的 Crest 基本上估計為 0。

Okay.

好的。

We say 0 to 1, just put something in there, but it's 0.

我們說0到1，只要往裡面放一些東西，但它就是0。

Okay. Okay.

好的。好的。

And then, I'm curious -- how plausible is it that you could actually face a year-over-year decline in FFO? Or maybe, what sort of magnitude of occupancy decline would you need to make that a reality?

然後，我很好奇——FFO 同比下降的可能性有多大？或者，入住率需要下降到什麼程度才能實現這一目標？

Well, there's a lot of moving parts to it, and no acquisitions. And we have 1% growth in the portfolio. I'm just doing the math in my head. Then it would take a -- and we've built about 100 BIPS decline in occupancy into the model.

嗯，其中有很多變動的部分，而且沒有收購。我們的投資組合增長了 1%。我只是在心裡算算。然後，這將需要 - 我們已將入住率下降約 100 BIPS 納入模型中。

Already.

已經。

So I would say, why don't you start at a couple hundred BIPS, 300, to see some decline. But --

所以我想說，為什麼不從幾百個 BIPS、300 個 BIPS 開始，看看有所下降。但 -

I think at that point, Jeff -- if I could say this -- and I don't mean it cavalierly -- Realty Income might not be the company you're going to be worried about under that scenario. It's going to be a pretty significant issue in the economy. And I tend to think, on a relative basis, we'll still be hanging in there pretty well.

我認為在這一點上，傑夫 - 如果我可以這麼說 - 我並不是漫不經心地這麼說 - 房地產收入公司可能不會是你在這種情況下擔心的公司。這將成為經濟中一個非常重要的問題。我傾向於認為，相對而言，我們仍然會堅持得很好。

Yes. But I think you just take -- you take the bottom end of the range and understand we got a 100-BIP decline in there, and you see the number [it] gets it. And it's all core; there's no Crest. So it's easy to do. And then you can start working some numbers.

是的。但我認為你只要採取——你採取該範圍的底端，就會明白我們在那裡下降了 100 BIP，你會看到[它]得到的數字。這都是核心；沒有克雷斯特。所以這很容易做到。然後你就可以開始計算一些數字了。

Okay, and thanks. Oh, sorry, before I meant one penny, not $0.05. Thanks, guys.

好的，謝謝。哦，抱歉，之前我指的是一便士，而不是 0.05 美元。多謝你們。

Thank you.

謝謝。

[laughter]

[笑聲]

[Ryan Levinson], [Previtt Fund].

[瑞安·萊文森]，[普雷維特基金]。

Thanks for taking my question.

感謝您提出我的問題。

My first one is -- I think you just said these numbers, but I was busy talking to somebody and missed them. The -- kind of the portfolio leverage numbers that you use, that range of EBITDA to lease coverage?

我的第一個是——我想你剛剛說了這些數字，但我正忙著和某人交談而錯過了它們。您使用的投資組合槓桿數字是多少，租賃覆蓋範圍的 EBITDA 範圍是多少？

Yes --

是的 -

Just repeat that?

只是重複一遍嗎？

Yes, sure, I will.

是的，當然，我會的。

When we're in the portfolio for the quarter, the top 15 tenants -- and this is EBITDAR, the R being rent -- to rent was 2.79 times on average on the stores we own in our top tenants, top 15 tenants. The lowest tenant was a 1.7, the highest, 4.55. And typically, I think if you look back over the last five, six, seven years, we're a company that has liked a 2.5 times coverage. And it really vary industry to industry. But when you get down to 1.5, we're getting uncomfortable. So it's really like a two-plus is what we're looking for.

當我們在本季度的投資組合中時，前 15 個租戶（這是 EBITDAR，R 為租金）的平均租金是我們在前 15 個租戶中擁有的商店的 2.79 倍。最低租戶為 1.7，最高租戶為 4.55。一般來說，我認為如果你回顧過去五年、六年、七年，我們是一家喜歡 2.5 倍覆蓋率的公司。不同行業的情況確實有所不同。但當降到 1.5 時，我們就會感到不舒服。所以我們正在尋找的確實是兩個以上。

And then obviously, the higher the coverage, better. And that goes up as, hopefully, EBITDAR goes up over time. So we're really looking at about 2.5, and when we go [and do an] acquire. And in the past, I would say there were a few transactions where there'd be a couple properties that might get down to a 1.6, 1.7. I would say in something we're doing today, we'd be a lot less patient with having a cash flow coverage under two at all. And we'd want the transaction overall to be 2.5 to three times, I would think.

顯然，覆蓋率越高越好。希望 EBITDAR 會隨著時間的推移而上升。所以我們真正關注的是 2.5 左右，當我們去[並進行]收購時。在過去，我想說有一些交易，其中有幾個屬性可能會降到 1.6、1.7。我想說的是，在我們今天所做的事情中，我們對現金流覆蓋率低於兩點的耐心要少得多。我認為，我們希望整體交易量能夠達到 2.5 到 3 倍。

Okay. And so that's a -- just EBITDA to rent -- or, excuse me, EBITDAR to rent.

好的。所以這只是 EBITDA 出租，或者，對不起，是 EBITDA 出租。

Right.

正確的。

What is -- given that you're dealing with all less-than-investment-grade credits, they're all leveraged -- what is it -- what it EBITDAR to rent plus interest?

什麼是——考慮到你正在處理所有低於投資級的信貸，它們都是槓桿的——它是什麼——租金加利息的 EBITDAR 是多少？

The EBITDAR to rent is what we look at at a unit basis. When we do our underwriting for the tenant, we do a full unsecured underwriting. And there are many, many metrics, of which that's one. And primarily, what we're looking for somebody is that we think -- we just start by saying that we've got a business that is a low-price point basic human needs, and it's something that their product's going to be used over a long period of time, that there's a lot of EBITDA. So if they ever had a problem by overleveraging the balance sheet -- that it'll be a Chapter 11, and not a 7. And then we really go and focus on cash flow coverage at the unit level to survive that type of event, and real estate prices, so if we ever get a unit back, that we have a decent chance of leasing it.

租金的 EBITDAR 是我們以單位為單位計算的。當我們為租戶進行承保時，我們會進行完全無擔保的承保。有很多很多指標，這只是其中之一。首先，我們要找的人是我們認為的——我們首先說我們有一個低價格點的業務，可以滿足人類的基本需求，而且他們的產品將被廣泛使用在很長一段時間內，有很多EBITDA 。因此，如果他們因資產負債表過度槓桿化而遇到問題，那麼這將是第11 章，而不是第7 章。然後我們真的會專注於單位層面的現金流覆蓋率，以在此類事件中生存下來，和房地產價格，所以如果我們拿回一個單位，我們就有很大的機會出租它。

But then it ranges all over the board, and I'll give you an example. In 2000, when all the theater companies were having a significant problem, we walked into one that we knew was going to do a Chapter 11 in about three months, and really structured a transaction where we looked at a group of their movie theaters that were very profitable, and then we bought the land under them at very high cash flow coverages. And so we were happy, knowing we had a tenant who might do an 11, to go in and underwrite that.

但它的範圍很廣，我會給你一個例子。 2000 年，當所有影院公司都遇到了重大問題時，我們走進一家我們知道將在大約三個月內完成第11 章的影院公司，並真正構建了一項交易，我們考察了他們的一組電影院，這些影院非常有利可圖，然後我們以非常高的現金流覆蓋率購買了他們下面的土地。所以我們很高興，因為知道我們有一個租戶可能會做 11，進去並承保。

Conversely, we've been in situations with a tenant that we think has a business that's a little more volatile. And we've required that just their balance sheet would be in better shape.

相反，我們也遇到過這樣的情況：我們認為某個租戶的業務波動較大。我們要求他們的資產負債表狀況更好。

But I'll give you our lessons of 39 years. And that is we own properties for 10 to 20 years. We don't own securities. And during that 10 to 20 years, it has been our experience the balance sheet will change, management will change, that industry will go through a downturn, it will go through an upturn. And while we do all of that work, it's really centered around that it's a business that we think has a large amount of sustainable EBITDA over a long period of time. But we are not underwriting to a corporate credit to make sure we get paid. It's more centered on the individual units we own, the real estate price, and then the assumption if they ever have a problem, it's an 11.

但我會告訴你我們 39 年的教訓。那就是我們擁有房產10到20年。我們不擁有證券。在那10到20年裡，我們的經驗是資產負債表會發生變化，管理層會發生變化，行業會經歷低迷，也會經歷好轉。雖然我們做了所有這些工作，但我們認為這是一家在很長一段時間內擁有大量可持續 EBITDA 的企業。但我們不會向企業信貸提供擔保以確保我們得到報酬。它更集中於我們擁有的單個單元、房地產價格，然後假設如果他們遇到問題，那就是 11。

The other caveat I'll put on that on EBITDA is it various dramatically, from tenant to tenant, to industry and industry. Because obviously, different tenants have different margins. And different industries have very different fixed costs. So if you're taking a look at a movie theater, and you have a two-times coverage, it would take close to a 40% decline in revenue to take it to a one-to-one coverage. If you were looking at a department store when we underwrote a Boscov's or a Gottschalks but didn't do anything, our sense was a 2.0 coverage only took about a 9.8% drop in revenue to get to a one-to-one coverage.

我要對 EBITDA 提出的另一個警告是，從租戶到租戶、從行業到行業，它的差異很大。因為顯然，不同的租戶有不同的利潤。而且不同行業的固定成本差異很大。因此，如果您正在看一家電影院，並且有兩次覆蓋，則收入需要下降近 40% 才能達到一對一覆蓋。如果您正在查看一家百貨商店，當我們承保 Boscov's 或 Gottschalks 但沒有採取任何行動時，我們的感覺是 2.0 承保只需要收入下降約 9.8% 即可達到一對一承保。

So it varies dramatically from industry to industry and tenant to tenant.

因此，不同行業、不同租戶的情況差異很大。

And I understand that. I guess what I'm just trying to understand is -- across the portfolio, and this is the EBITDAR-to-rent number, I think, tells only part of the picture. And I'm just interested --

我明白這一點。我想我只是想了解的是——在整個投資組合中，這是 EBITDAR 與租金的數字，我認為，只說明了情況的一部分。我只是感興趣——

We stand in front of the interest expense in a bankruptcy scenario. So we're in front of the debt-holders, if you will. If we have a positive cash flow EBITDAR-to-rent property that's cash flow-positive, they need to accept the leases to keep those properties, to generate cash flow to pay the debt-holders. So we stand in front of that.

我們面臨破產情況下的利息支出。所以如果你願意的話，我們是站在債權人面前的。如果我們有正現金流 EBITDAR 來出租現金流量為正的房產，他們需要接受租賃來保留這些房產，以產生現金流來支付債務持有人。所以我們站在前面。

So we, on some level, really don't care, meaning yes, we look at how leveraged a credit might be, and don't want them, in a best-case scenario, to go into bankruptcy. But, if you will, at the same time, you should assume most of the BB retailers we do business with are generally going to be leveraged. I mean, they've been leveraged for 39 years. They're hitting a pretty bad cycle right now, over the past couple years, combined with some operating metric downturns. But in terms of the leverage element, that's nothing new.

因此，在某種程度上，我們真的不在乎，是的，我們會考慮信貸的槓桿程度，並且不希望它們在最好的情況下破產。但是，如果您願意的話，您同時應該假設大多數與我們有業務往來的 BB 零售商通常都會利用槓桿。我的意思是，它們已經被槓桿化了 39 年。在過去的幾年裡，他們現在正處於一個相當糟糕的周期，加上一些運營指標的下滑。但就槓桿因素而言，這並不是什麼新鮮事。

And so that's why we don't kind of add that into our calculation. Now we do -- as Tom said, when we do credit underwriting, to make sure, from a fixed-charge coverage ratio, that they're cash flow-positive. We certainly don't want them to be not being able to pay their interest expense and make money as an entity. But we also assume that over the course of a 10-, 15-, 20-year lease, they'll probably take on more leverage than even what we're looking at up front in our underwriting.

這就是為什麼我們不將其添加到我們的計算中。現在我們這樣做——正如湯姆所說，當我們進行信貸承保時，以確保從固定費用覆蓋率來看，它們的現金流為正。我們當然不希望他們作為一個實體無法支付利息費用和賺錢。但我們還假設，在 10 年、15 年、20 年的租賃過程中，他們可能會承擔比我們在承保中預先考慮的更多的槓桿。

I'm just a little perplexed by something. How do your leases -- is there a provision written that some sort of document that works with the -- with your creditors, with your tenants' creditors as well, that puts the leases ahead? Are you just saying, kind of notionally, that if they want to stay in the building that they have to accept the terms of your lease? I don't -- because I think the mechanics of it --

我只是對某事有點困惑。您的租約如何與您的債權人以及租戶的債權人合作，以確保租約提前？您只是在理論上說，如果他們想留在大樓裡，就必須接受您的租約條款嗎？我不——因為我認為它的機制——

(inaudible) your latter comment. Your latter comment.

（聽不清）你的後一條評論。你的後一條評論。

Okay.

好的。

That is --

那是 -

Chapter 11, Chapter 11.

第11章，第11章。

What happens -- in an 11, obviously the equity-holders typically get wiped out. The debt-holders have their position markedly changed. And very often, they end up the equity-holders primarily. And that happens in a Chapter 11. You then go to what happens to the real estate -- and it's pretty simple -- is they either want to keep the unit, or they don't want to keep the unit. And that is going to be based on their profitability.

會發生什麼——在 11 中，顯然股東通常都會被消滅。債務持有人的立場發生了顯著變化。通常，他們最終主要是股東。這發生在第 11 章中。然後你會看到房地產會發生什麼——這很簡單——他們要么想保留該單位，要么不想保留該單位。這將基於他們的盈利能力。

And the way we measure that is EBITDAR divided by rent. So if it's 2.5 times, that means for every buck of rent, they're making $2.50 EBITDAR, and their choice is pretty clear. They can -- A, reject the lease, in which case we get the building back. We have our asset and our risk as what we can rent to somebody else versus them -- or they can accept it. If they accept it, then we have had no credit event. So if you have a substantially cash flow-positive property, that is what happens to it. Because they have to have the stores to sell their goods to generate their EBITDA. And they can't have it without paying rent.

我們衡量的方法是 EBITDAR 除以租金。因此，如果是 2.5 倍，則意味著每一塊租金，他們都能賺取 2.50 美元的 EBITDAR，而且他們的選擇非常明確。他們可以—— A，拒絕租約，在這種情況下我們可以收回建築物。我們擁有我們的資產和風險，因為我們可以租給其他人而不是他們——或者他們可以接受它。如果他們接受，那麼我們就沒有信用事件。因此，如果您擁有大量現金流量為正的房產，那麼它就會發生這種情況。因為他們必須有商店來銷售他們的商品才能產生 EBITDA。他們不付租金就無法擁有它。

And I think if you look at Buffets, that was a very good example. Here's a tenant that had an M&A that they struggled through their top line, really got hit, their middle line really got hit; all of those three things happened at once. It was our largest tenant. We had 116 properties. We got 12 back immediately that were out re-renting.

我認為如果你看看自助餐，就會發現這是一個很好的例子。這是一個進行併購的租戶，他們在頂線中苦苦掙扎，確實受到了打擊，他們的中線也確實受到了打擊；所有這三件事同時發生。這是我們最大的租戶。我們擁有 116 處房產。我們立即收回了 12 間正在重新出租的房間。

And then on the balance, the majority of them had no rent change whatsoever. And overall, we maintained 87% of the rent on that portfolio. So that's kind of how it works.

總的來說，他們中的大多數人的租金沒有任何變化。總體而言，我們維持了該投資組合 87% 的租金。這就是它的工作原理。

Okay.

好的。

Let me just switch gears, if I could. I'm just curious. On the guidance, the $1.86 to $1.96, there's nothing for Crest. But where does the growth come from? I know you have some modest escalations built into some of these -- some of the leases. But if you have 100 BIPS of a decline in occupancy, what's more than offsetting that?

如果可以的話，讓我換個方向。我只是好奇。根據指引，1.86 美元到 1.96 美元之間，佳洁士沒有什麼。但增長從何而來？我知道你們在其中一些租約中進行了一些適度的升級。但如果入住率下降了 100 BIPS，還有什麼比抵消這一點更好呢？

Well, we have lower G&A, which you saw in this quarter and we anticipate will continue. That's primarily a function of compensation of the lower level of activity. And outside of that, and maybe [something else] --

嗯，我們的一般費用較低，您在本季度看到了這一點，我們預計這種情況將會持續下去。這主要是較低活動水平的補償功能。除此之外，也許還有[其他的東西]——

We had same-store rent growth, we had free cash flow.

我們有同店租金增長，我們有自由現金流。

If you're 40% levered, which I guess if you add debt and preferred, and you have one --

如果你的槓桿率為 40%，我猜如果你加上債務和優先股，你就有了——

Our interest expense is going to go down pretty significantly --

我們的利息支出將會大幅下降——

-- 1.1% to 1.3% growth, then that gets up around 2%.

-- 增長 1.1% 至 1.3%，然後增長 2% 左右。

Our interest expense is going to go down pretty significantly after we pay off the bonds.

還清債券後，我們的利息支出將大幅下降。

And the balance is acquisitions.

餘額是收購。

Okay. So -- pardon me -- and so acquisitions gets you to the $1.96; no acquisitions gets you the $1.86?

好的。所以——請原諒我——所以收購可以讓你的價格達到 1.96 美元；沒有收購可以讓您獲得 1.86 美元？

Correct.

正確的。

Correct.

正確的。

Okay. All right, thanks a lot.

好的。好的，非常感謝。

Thanks, Ryan.

謝謝，瑞安。

You bet.

你打賭。

Philip Martin, Cantor Fitzgerald.

菲利普·馬丁，康托·菲茨杰拉德。

Good afternoon.

下午好。

Hey, Philip.

嘿，菲利普。

I guess my only question -- a lot of them have been answered -- but how will Crest impact your ability to go after and take advantage of opportunities, I guess, along the risk curve in 2009? For example, an opportunity may present itself that may combine a higher-risk, less desirable -- or that may contain higher-risk or less desirable assets. But this might occur before Crest's business really comes back. So, I guess, how do you manage that and balance that?

我想我唯一的問題——其中很多問題已經得到解答——但我想，佳洁士將如何影響你沿著 2009 年風險曲線追尋和利用機會的能力？例如，一個機會可能會結合較高風險、較不理想的資產，或者可能包含較高風險或較不理想的資產。但這可能發生在佳洁士的業務真正恢復之前。那麼，我想，你如何管理並平衡這一點？

I can answer that, Philip.

我可以回答這個問題，菲利普。

If you go back two years ago, when we were -- last eight years, when we were using Crest a lot, I'll make a blanket comment that cash was a commodity, and property was valuable. And as such, the person selling the property to a number of people who had cash in a competitive environment was able to put into a number of properties that may not have [hit] where you wanted to underwrite to. Or secondarily, it may be a large enough portfolio where you needed out of diversification by selling off.

如果你回到兩年前，當我們——過去八年，當我們大量使用佳洁士時，我會概括地說現金是一種商品，而財產是有價值的。因此，在競爭環境中將房產出售給許多擁有現金的人的人能夠投入許多可能沒有[達到]你想要承保的房產。其次，它可能是一個足夠大的投資組合，您需要通過拋售來實現多元化。

Today, that has completely flip-flopped, where I think properties are a bit of a commodity and cash is what's valuable. So somebody looking for cash, it's a very different market.

如今，情況完全顛倒了，我認為房產有點像商品，而現金才是有價值的。所以對於尋找現金的人來說，這是一個非常不同的市場。

We competed primarily with a 1031 tax-deferred exchange market that really bought the bulk of all net lease properties out there. And that market has just shut down; it's just really declining extraordinarily fast, as the people in that market, A, either don't need a 1031, because they're not selling properties at profit; or B, can't get their financing.

我們主要與 1031 遞延稅款交易市場競爭，該市場確實購買了那裡所有淨租賃房產的大部分。而那個市場剛剛關閉；它的下降速度確實非常快，因為 A 市場的人們要么不需要 1031，因為他們不出售房產以獲取利潤；要么不需要 1031。或B，無法獲得融資。

And then secondarily, because other forms of financing have been dramatically impacted because the spread expansion in the debt markets, or the shutdown of the CMBS -- I think we're in a situation today where there's a darth of buyers who have cash. And there are a number of sellers out there. And I think next year that there's going to be a dramatic number of sellers and not a lot of buyers.

其次，因為債務市場利差擴大或 CMBS 關閉，其他形式的融資受到了巨大影響——我認為我們今天所處的情況是，有大量擁有現金的買家。那裡有很多賣家。我認為明年將會有大量的賣家，而不是很多買家。

So the answer is, if we had to use Crest, it'd be no. If they want to put in some properties we don't want to buy, we'd take them out. And it's just a very different market.

所以答案是，如果我們必須使用 Crest，那就不行。如果他們想買一些我們不想買的房產，我們就會把它們撤掉。這是一個非常不同的市場。

Then you just have the negotiating leverage, obviously, to do that in this market with -- okay. Okay.

那麼顯然，你就擁有了談判籌碼，可以在這個市場上做到這一點——好吧。好的。

And that's what I -- and that's what it is. And I anticipate, but don't know for sure, that we're going to kind of sit back here in the fourth quarter. We're looking at transactions. And if we find the right one, we'll do it. But my sense is it's going to be coming in the next year, when the reality for a lot of folks -- who are just hoping with all their might that the credit markets come back -- capital markets come back -- that reality will impede, and there'll be a lot of properties out there.

這就是我——這就是它的本質。我預計，但不確定，我們將在第四季度坐穩。我們正在關注交易。如果我們找到合適的人，我們就會這麼做。但我的感覺是，這種情況將在明年到來，屆時對於很多人來說，現實將是——他們只是竭盡全力希望信貸市場回歸——資本市場回歸——但現實將阻礙這一點，並且那裡會有很多屬性。

If -- look, if credit comes running back in, and the world's just great, and interest rates go low, and equities go high, then you're back into a situation where you could probably use Crest again, and I guess we would. But I'd be amazed if that happens.

如果——看，如果信貸回來了，世界變得很好，利率走低，股市走高，那麼你就會回到一種可能再次使用 Crest 的情況，我想我們會。但如果發生這種情況我會感到驚訝。

If that happens, okay.

如果發生這種情況，好吧。

Okay. Thank you.

好的。謝謝。

Thank you, sir.

謝謝你，先生。

Management, at this time, I'd like to turn the Conference to you for any closing remarks.

管理層，此時，我想請您在會議上發表閉幕詞。

Thank you. Thank you very much, everybody. As always, it's a busy earnings season, and there's a lot of complicated things going on. And we appreciate the coverage and the support and appreciate your attention.

謝謝。非常感謝大家。一如既往，這是一個繁忙的財報季節，並且發生了很多複雜的事情。我們感謝您的報導和支持，並感謝您的關注。

Thank you very much.

非常感謝。

Thank you.

謝謝。

Ladies and gentlemen, at this time, we will conclude today's Teleconference. We do thank you for your participation and for using ACT Teleconferencing. You may now disconnect, and please have a pleasant afternoon.

女士們、先生們，今天的電話會議到此結束。我們非常感謝您的參與和使用 ACT 電話會議。您現在可以斷開連接，祝您度過一個愉快的下午。