New York Mortgage Trust Inc (NYMT) 2022 Q3 法說會逐字稿

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen, and thank you for standing by. Welcome to the New York Mortgage Trust Third Quarter 2022 Results Conference Call. (Operator Instructions) This conference is being recorded on Thursday, November 3, 2022. A press release and supplemental financial presentation with New York Mortgage Trust's third quarter 2022 results was released yesterday. Both the press release and supplemental financial presentation are available on the company's website at www.nymtrust.com. Additionally, we are hosting a live webcast of today's call, which you can access in the Events and Presentations section of the company's website.

早上好，女士們，先生們，謝謝你們的支持。歡迎參加紐約抵押貸款信託基金 2022 年第三季度業績電話會議。 （操作員說明）本次會議將於 2022 年 11 月 3 日星期四錄製。昨天發布了紐約抵押信託基金 2022 年第三季度業績的新聞稿和補充財務報告。新聞稿和補充財務報告均可在公司網站 www.nymtrust.com 上查閱。此外，我們正在主持今天電話會議的現場網絡直播，您可以在公司網站的活動和演示部分訪問。

At this time, management would like me to inform you that certain statements made during the conference call, which are not historical, may be deemed forward-looking statements within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Although New York Morgan Trust believes the expectations reflected in any forward-looking statements are based on reasonable assumptions, it can give no assurance that its expectations will be attained.

此時，管理層希望我通知您，電話會議期間做出的某些非歷史性陳述可能被視為 1995 年《私人證券訴訟改革法案》含義內的前瞻性陳述。儘管紐約摩根信託相信任何前瞻性陳述中反映的預期均基於合理的假設，因此無法保證其預期將會實現。

Factors and risks that could cause actual results to differ materially from expectations are detailed in yesterday's press release and from time to time in the company's filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

昨天的新聞稿以及公司不時向美國證券交易委員會提交的文件中詳細說明了可能導致實際結果與預期產生重大差異的因素和風險。

Now at this time, I would like to introduce Jason Serrano, CEO and President. Jason, please go ahead.

現在，我想介紹一下首席執行官兼總裁 Jason Serrano。傑森，請繼續。

Thank you very much. Good morning. Welcome to New York Mortgage Trust 2020 Third Quarter Earnings Call. I'm joined this morning by our CFO, Kristine Nario. I'll be referring to the supplemental which is posted on our website for additional details.

非常感謝。早上好。歡迎參加紐約抵押貸款信託基金 2020 年第三季度財報電話會議。今天早上，我們的首席財務官 Kristine Nario 加入了我的行列。我將參考我們網站上發布的補充文件以獲取更多詳細信息。

The U.S. economy activity was pressured in the third quarter by rising interest rates, concerns over tightening monetary policy, near double-digit inflation and geopolitical instability. Thus far, in 2022, equity markets have been challenged with the Fed's decision to raise interest rates by 75 basis points in 4 consecutive meetings, taking the federal funds rate to its highest point since 2008 with expected additional rate hikes in the upcoming months, alongside of a growth -- growing concerns of a potential near-term recession.

美國經濟活動在第三季度受到利率上升、貨幣政策收緊擔憂、接近兩位數的通脹和地緣政治不穩定的壓力。到目前為止，在 2022 年，美聯儲決定在連續 4 次會議上加息 75 個基點，使聯邦基金利率達到 2008 年以來的最高點，預計未來幾個月還會加息，同時增長——對潛在的近期衰退的擔憂日益增加。

Accordingly, fixed income markets have been impacted. The yield on the 2-year treasury increased to 4.22% at the end of the quarter, an increase of 349 basis points from last year. Rate hikes by the Fed contributed to the treasury curve and [burning]. At the end of September, the spread between the 2- and 10-year treasury yield closed at negative 39 basis points compared to 79 basis points positive at 2021 year-end.

因此，固定收益市場受到影響。 2 年期國債收益率在本季度末升至 4.22%，比去年增加 349 個基點。美聯儲加息助長了國債曲線和[燃燒]。截至 9 月底，2 年期和 10 年期國債收益率之間的利差收於負 39 個基點，而 2021 年底為正 79 個基點。

As was the case for credit-sensitive assets across markets, pricing for many assets within our investment portfolio during the third quarter declined, particularly so in the final weeks of the quarter. Due to these factors, we anticipate markets and the pricing will continue to experience volatility through year-end and into 2023. So the question is how do we navigate this risk while keeping a proactive stance to seek opportunities. I hope to demonstrate that our portfolio managed decisions and financing plans over the last 18 months were designed to stay short, nimble and liquid.

與跨市場的信用敏感資產的情況一樣，我們投資組合中的許多資產的定價在第三季度有所下降，尤其是在本季度的最後幾週。由於這些因素，我們預計市場和定價將在年底和 2023 年繼續經歷波動。所以問題是我們如何在保持積極主動尋求機會的同時應對這種風險。我希望證明我們過去 18 個月的投資組合管理決策和融資計劃旨在保持短期、靈活和流動性。

Before I dive into these points, I'll start with a brief review of the third quarter financial results and then pass over to Christine for further details.

在深入探討這些要點之前，我將首先簡要回顧第三季度的財務業績，然後轉交給克里斯汀了解更多細節。

Now speaking from Page 7. Due to the macro factors discussed, we incurred an undepreciated loss per share of $0.27 and undepreciated book value decline of 8.3%, ending the third quarter at $3.89. This decline was related to mark-to-market changes of our portfolio against higher rates, which we believe is recoverable over time. We saw a tremendous opportunity to buy back our shares in the quarter given a sharp selloff in the market. In all, we repurchased 5.5 million shares at an average price of $2.62 during the third quarter. We added 2.1 million shares to this amount in the first days of October at a price of $2.23. At these levels, we believe repurchases are highly accretive, particularly in light of our short duration portfolio and ability to generate cash. Thus, we expect to continue with share repurchase in Q4 should our common stock continue to trade at a significant discount to our undepreciated book value.

現在從第 7 頁開始。由於所討論的宏觀因素，我們的未折舊每股虧損為 0.27 美元，未折舊賬面價值下降 8.3%，第三季度末為 3.89 美元。這種下降與我們的投資組合針對更高利率的按市值計算的變化有關，我們認為隨著時間的推移可以恢復。鑑於市場大幅拋售，我們在本季度看到了回購股票的巨大機會。總的來說，我們在第三季度以平均 2.62 美元的價格回購了 550 萬股股票。我們在 10 月的頭幾天以 2.23 美元的價格向這一數量增加了 210 萬股。在這些水平上，我們認為回購是高度增值的，特別是考慮到我們的短期投資組合和產生現金的能力。因此，如果我們的普通股繼續以遠低於我們未折舊賬面價值的價格交易，我們預計將在第四季度繼續進行股票回購。

As we announced in late September, we are focused on monetizing the value created against our timely multifamily property acquisitions, mostly aggregated in 2021. We were able to recognize $14 million of realized gains from our first property sale ‐‐ more on that in a minute ‐‐ alongside of $18 million in other asset sales. Investment activity was significantly reduced in the quarter, primary or in the [origination market], coupons were frankly not repriced fast enough. Unfortunately, second market sellers refer to primary market activity for their pricing levels and a feedback loop that locked the market in the third quarter. In fact, we are still very much there today, and I will have further details about that.

正如我們在 9 月下旬宣布的那樣，我們專注於將我們及時的多戶住宅收購所創造的價值貨幣化，這些資產大部分在 2021 年匯總。我們能夠從我們的第一次房地產銷售中確認 1400 萬美元的已實現收益……更多關於在一分鐘內……以及 1800 萬美元的其他資產銷售。本季度的投資活動顯著減少，無論是初級市場還是[原始市場]，優惠券的重新定價速度都不夠快。不幸的是，二級市場賣家參考一級市場活動的定價水平和在第三季度鎖定市場的反饋循環。事實上，我們今天仍然非常活躍，我將提供更多細節。

Shortly after the Jackson Hole and Powell pivot (inaudible), if you will, we found an attractive entry point to a $242 million loan securitization. This allowed us to reduce our repo mark‐to‐market exposure and recourse leverage, which now stands at industry-leading low of 0.5x at the company and 0.4x at the portfolio level.

在傑克遜霍爾和鮑威爾轉向後不久（聽不清），如果你願意的話，我們發現了一個有吸引力的切入點，可以進行 2.42 億美元的貸款證券化。這使我們能夠降低我們的回購標記——市場敞口和追索權槓桿，目前公司處於行業領先低點 0.5 倍，投資組合水平為 0.4 倍。

With that, I'll pass it over to Kristine for more details on our financial results. Kristine?

有了這個，我會把它交給克里斯汀，以了解更多關於我們財務業績的細節。克里斯汀？

Thank you, Jason. Good morning, everyone, and thank you again for being on the call. Our financials now showed on Slide 9 covers key portfolio metrics on a quarter-over-quarter comparison. As Jason mentioned earlier, undepreciated book value per share ended at $3.89, down 8.3% from June 30 and translated to a negative 5.9% economic return on undepreciated book value during the quarter.

謝謝你，傑森。大家早上好，再次感謝您的來電。我們現在在幻燈片 9 上顯示的財務數據涵蓋了季度比較的主要投資組合指標。正如 Jason 之前提到的，每股未折舊賬面價值為 3.89 美元，比 6 月 30 日下降 8.3%，並轉化為該季度未折舊賬面價值的 5.9% 負經濟回報。

The company had undepreciated loss per share of $0.27 in the third quarter. The fair value changes related to our investment portfolio continued to have a significant impact on our earnings and book value. We recognized $0.34 per share of unrealized losses, primarily due to an increase in interest rates and credit spread widening that resulted in a decline in the fair values of a majority of the assets in our investment portfolio. More on this point in a minute.

該公司第三季度每股未折舊虧損為 0.27 美元。與我們的投資組合相關的公允價值變動繼續對我們的盈利和賬面價值產生重大影響。我們確認每股 0.34 美元的未實現虧損，主要是由於利率上升和信用利差擴大導致我們投資組合中大部分資產的公允價值下降。稍後將詳細介紹這一點。

Consistent with our efforts to further strengthen our balance sheet, we completed a securitization of residential loans, as Jason mentioned. With the completion of this securitization as of September 30, the company's recourse leverage ratio and portfolio recourse leverage ratio decreased to 0.5x and 0.4x, respectively, from 0.7x and 0.6x, respectively, as of June 30.

正如傑森所說，與我們進一步加強資產負債表的努力相一致，我們完成了住宅貸款的證券化。隨著本次證券化截至9月30日完成，公司追索權槓桿率和投資組合追索權槓桿率分別從6月30日的0.7倍和0.6倍下降至0.5倍和0.4倍。

In addition, it is worth mentioning that only 23% of our total financing arrangements, including CDOs or securitization structures is subject to mark-to-market margin call risk, down from 33% at June 30.

此外，值得一提的是，在我們的全部融資安排中，包括 CDO 或證券化結構，只有 23% 存在按市值計價的追加保證金通知風險，低於 6 月 30 日的 33%。

We paid a $0.10 per common share dividend, which was unchanged from the prior quarter. While our financing costs were higher in the third quarter due to rising interest rates, the contribution of adjusted net interest income to EPS during the quarter was at the same level as a year ago at $0.08 per share as a result of our low utilization of leverage.

我們支付了每股 0.10 美元的普通股股息，與上一季度持平。雖然由於利率上升，我們在第三季度的融資成本較高，但由於我們對槓桿的利用率低，本季度調整後淨利息收入對每股收益的貢獻與去年同期持平，為每股 0.08 美元.

Moving on to Slide 10. I will focus my commentary on the main drivers of third quarter financial results. We had GAAP net interest income of $14.2 million or $0.04 per share for the quarter. Excluding the $16 million or $0.04 per share of interest expense on mortgages payable related to our consolidated real estate, our adjusted net interest income, as mentioned earlier, contributed $0.08 per share in earnings. During the quarter, we opportunistically disposed off investment securities in our portfolio, generating in total realized gains of $20.6 million or $0.05 per share.

轉到幻燈片 10。我將把我的評論重點放在第三季度財務業績的主要驅動因素上。我們本季度的 GAAP 淨利息收入為 1420 萬美元或每股 0.04 美元。不包括與我們的合併房地產相關的應付抵押貸款的 1600 萬美元或每股 0.04 美元的利息費用，如前所述，我們調整後的淨利息收入貢獻了每股 0.08 美元的收益。在本季度，我們機會性地出售了我們投資組合中的投資證券，實現的總收益為 2060 萬美元或每股 0.05 美元。

Also, as Jason mentioned, during the quarter, we successfully disposed off a property in one of our consolidated joint venture structures at a 2.18x multiple, earning NYMT a net gain of $14 million, which is included in net -- which has included net of losses incurred from other investments and other income of $4 million.

此外，正如 Jason 所提到的，在本季度，我們以 2.18 倍的倍數成功出售了我們合併的合資企業結構中的一處房產，為 NYMT 帶來了 1400 萬美元的淨收益，包括在淨收益中——其中包括淨收益。其他投資和其他收入造成的損失為 400 萬美元。

Also, as previously discussed, the [star-grade] volatility witnessed in the third quarter caused prices in a majority of the assets in our investment portfolio to significantly decline. This resulted in $128.1 million or $0.34 per share of unrealized losses incurred in the third quarter. Of the $128.1 million of unrealized losses, $67 million or $0.18 per share are attributed to residential loans held in securitization vehicles. Unlike some of our peers, we do not mark our liabilities to fair value. Therefore, there is no corresponding unrealized gain recognized on our securitization liabilities to offset and realize losses on the assets held in the securitization.

此外，如前所述，第三季度出現的 [星級] 波動導致我們投資組合中大部分資產的價格大幅下跌。這導致第三季度發生的未實現虧損為 1.281 億美元或每股 0.34 美元。在 1.281 億美元的未實現損失中，6700 萬美元或每股 0.18 美元歸因於證券化工具中持有的住宅貸款。與我們的一些同行不同，我們不會將我們的負債標記為公允價值。因此，我們的資產證券化負債並沒有相應的未實現收益來抵消和實現資產證券化中持有的資產的損失。

In correlation to our decision to significantly curtail our investment activity in the quarter in light of extreme volatility, our G&A and portfolio operating expenses were down $4.1 million in the quarter as compared to the second quarter.

鑑於極端波動性，我們決定在本季度大幅削減投資活動，與第二季度相比，本季度我們的 G&A 和投資組合運營費用減少了 410 萬美元。

The final point to highlight is our adjustments to add back depreciation expense and operating real estate and amortization of lease intangibles to calculate undepreciated earnings. As previously announced, we are actively considering opportunities to monetize the appreciated value of our consolidated JV investments, therefore, meeting the held-for-sale criteria for GAAP purposes. On a go-forward basis, we would expect depreciation and amortization to reduce significantly as the majority of these assets are held for sale and capital gains to be the main driver of earnings related to this portfolio.

最後要強調的一點是我們的調整，以增加折舊費用和經營房地產以及租賃無形資產的攤銷以計算未折舊收益。正如之前宣布的那樣，我們正在積極考慮將我們合併的合資企業投資的增值價值貨幣化的機會，因此，符合 GAAP 目的的持有待售標準。展望未來，我們預計折舊和攤銷將顯著減少，因為這些資產中的大部分都是待售資產，而資本收益將成為與該投資組合相關的收益的主要驅動力。

I will now turn it over to Jason to go over the market and strategy update. Jason?

我現在將把它交給 Jason 來審查市場和戰略更新。傑森？

Thank you, Kristine. Talking from Page 12. The U.S. housing market underpinned by a multi-decade low of U.S. units available for sale is now slowing. Units of new and existing homes trending below 2019 levels are now turning below 2019 levels due to an average monthly mortgage pay. That's 60% to 90% below previous year's payment, depending on the market. So the raising of interest rates have caused affordability levels today to actually experience the worst that the market has seen in over 2 decades with a 60% to 90% rise in multi payment.

謝謝你，克里斯汀。從第 12 頁開始。在美國可售單元數量處於數十年低點的支撐下，美國房地產市場現在正在放緩。由於平均每月抵押貸款支付，趨勢低於 2019 年水平的新房和現房單位現在正低於 2019 年水平。這比上一年的付款低 60% 到 90%，具體取決於市場。因此，利率的提高已經導致今天的支付能力水平實際上經歷了市場在 20 多年來所看到的最糟糕的情況，多重支付增長了 60% 到 90%。

Now what we highlighted here last quarter was a transmission mechanism for the market going from the first quarter of 2022 to 2023. So we've updated that. Everything pretty much is going as we outlayed last quarter, in that the first half of 2022, we saw a par plus efficient financing market. The securitization market was very robust and many deals could get done at really the tightest levels that we've seen in this market in quite some time.

現在我們上個季度在這裡強調的是從 2022 年第一季度到 2023 年市場的傳導機制。所以我們已經更新了它。正如我們上個季度的支出一樣，一切都在進行，在 2022 年上半年，我們看到了面值加有效的融資市場。證券化市場非常強勁，許多交易可以在相當長一段時間內我們在這個市場看到的最嚴格的水平上完成。

In the third quarter 2022, after the second quarter fall off of securitization activity, discount and inefficient financing became the norm. In that time period throughout the entirety of the third quarter, we have paused our pipelines where we had about $1 billion of pipeline that we could have invested into in the third quarter. And with that, we were able to forgo some mark-to-market and also lower coupon assets on our balance sheet that would be better off if we would have waited to invest in those assets today.

2022 年第三季度，在第二季度證券化活動下降後，貼現和低效融資成為常態。在整個第三季度的這段時間裡，我們暫停了我們的管道，我們有大約 10 億美元的管道可以在第三季度投資。這樣一來，我們就能夠放棄一些按市值計價的資產，並降低資產負債表上的息票資產，如果我們今天等著投資這些資產，情況會更好。

So the plan has worked. However, in the fourth quarter, as we discussed in last quarter's conversation, we're seeing a dislocated market with wide bid-ask spreads. That feedback loop I mentioned earlier where the primary market levels are not adjusting fast enough higher is causing the secondary market to reference those points and cause a larger bid-ask spread, which is locking the markets.

所以這個計劃奏效了。然而，正如我們在上一季度的談話中所討論的那樣，在第四季度，我們看到市場錯綜複雜，買賣價差很大。我之前提到的反饋循環，即一級市場水平調整得不夠快，導致二級市場參考這些點並導致更大的買賣差價，從而鎖定市場。

So what we expect to happen is capitulation in early 2023. With deep discount assets being available, where financing is not required given the underlying returns, meaning go-forward yield expectations. And at that time, we expect to be aggressive and liquid to invest into these markets. Now we're able to do that through, first, with our operations, where we didn't engage in high fixed cost entanglements which would have allowed us to -- would have forced us to continue buying assets into the market to support the cost that we have on our balance sheet.

因此，我們預計會在 2023 年初投降。由於可以使用大幅折扣資產，考慮到潛在回報，不需要融資，這意味著未來的收益率預期。屆時，我們預計將積極和流動性地投資這些市場。現在我們能夠做到這一點，首先，通過我們的運營，我們沒有參與高固定成本的糾纏，這將使我們能夠 - 會迫使我們繼續向市場購買資產以支持成本我們在資產負債表上的。

So with that and the flexibility and nimbleness that we've provided, our portfolio also was managed to preserve book value in higher rates or more volatility. In this case, we favored shorter term duration assets, which help minimize the mark-to-market loss and also reduce the requirement to use repo leverage, mark-to-market repo leverage, for our balance sheet.

因此，憑藉這一點以及我們提供的靈活性和敏捷性，我們的投資組合還設法在更高的利率或更大的波動性下保持賬面價值。在這種情況下，我們偏愛短期久期資產，這有助於最大限度地減少按市值計價的損失，並減少對我們的資產負債表使用回購槓桿、按市值計價回購槓桿的要求。

Now the timing is going to be everything here on when to start redeployment efforts in a significant manner. We need to exhibit patients, the bid-ask spreads, the market capitulation could take longer than initially discussed at the beginning of 2023, and we will wait until that happens. We are already seeing evidence of this where there's trades that are in the market that are failing based on too big of a discount being required by the market, in particular, in the SFR space, single-family residential -- single-family rental opportunity. We're seeing a 15% to 30% discount to current values being priced in some market and a very little trading.

現在時機將是一切關於何時以重要方式開始重新部署工作的一切。我們需要展示患者，買賣差價，市場投降可能需要比 2023 年初最初討論的時間更長的時間，我們將等到這種情況發生。我們已經看到了這方面的證據，因為市場要求的折扣太大，市場上的交易失敗了，特別是在 SFR 空間、單戶住宅 - 單戶出租機會.我們看到在某些市場上的定價比當前價值有 15% 到 30% 的折扣，而且交易很少。

It looks like sellers want to sell at 15% discount and buyers want to buy at a 30% discount to current values in the single-family rental markets. So that's just an example of some of the lack of trading that's happening because of a large bid-ask spread.

看起來賣家希望以 15% 的折扣出售，而買家希望以 30% 的折扣購買單戶租賃市場的當前價值。因此，這只是由於買賣價差較大而導致交易不足的一個例子。

Now the execution of this particular market environment is going to be key based on asset management and ability to roll up your sleeves and deal with the underlying discounts even purchasing and being able to unlock value through asset management plans. This is something we are very adept at doing and have various amounts of experience over 2 decades managing discounted assets to trust environments and look forward to optimizing our portfolio in that environment.

現在，基於資產管理和捲起袖子處理潛在折扣甚至購買並能夠通過資產管理計劃釋放價值的能力，這一特定市場環境的執行將成為關鍵。這是我們非常擅長做的事情，並且在 2 年中擁有豐富的經驗來管理貼現資產以信任環境，並期待在該環境中優化我們的投資組合。

Now going over to Page 13. The investment strategy. As I mentioned, $119 million was invested in the third quarter. Much of that was actually draws from previous loans that we funded. So when I mentioned we curtailed investment activity, it was significant. We were able to basically hold up over about $1 billion investment activity. And that was decided due to a portfolio management decision of waiting for a better opportunity given what we saw earlier in the third quarter.

現在轉到第 13 頁。投資策略。正如我提到的，第三季度投資了 1.19 億美元。其中大部分實際上是從我們之前資助的貸款中提取的。因此，當我提到我們減少投資活動時，這意義重大。我們基本上能夠維持超過 10 億美元的投資活動。鑑於我們在第三季度早些時候看到的情況，這是由於投資組合管理決定等待更好的機會而決定的。

The paradigm shift significantly curtailed our investment pipelines and all core strategies, both in single-family DPL, rental and fix-and-flip as well as within the multifamily sector.

範式轉變顯著縮減了我們的投資渠道和所有核心戰略，無論是在單戶住宅 DPL、租賃和固定和翻轉以及多戶部門。

Now again, our focus is acquiring assets on a levered basis. We believe that the market will come around to be able to do that and generate double-digit returns without the use of leverage. However, we also recognize that the market definition of liquidity at some point in 2023 will change to be really unrestricted cash. And for our purposes and how we've dealt with our debt management, we believe that the -- our definition of unrestricted cash, which is going to be truly unrestricted cash, we'll be able to put into higher-yielding opportunities to grow our earnings per share.

現在，我們的重點是在槓桿基礎上收購資產。我們相信市場將能夠做到這一點並在不使用槓桿的情況下產生兩位數的回報。但是，我們也認識到，到 2023 年某個時候，市場對流動性的定義將變為真正不受限制的現金。就我們的目的以及我們如何處理債務管理而言，我們相信 - 我們對無限制現金的定義，這將是真正的無限制現金，我們將能夠投入更高收益的增長機會我們的每股收益。

To discuss that point, turning to Page 14. Our portfolio financing strategy to optimize cash was more or less a de-risking mechanism from mark-to-market financing. Portfolio financing exposure for mark-to-market repo exposure equals 23% as of the third quarter. Mark-to-market repo percent of asset portfolio is only 14%. We currently carry, as Kristie mentioned, 0.4x portfolio recourse leverage.

要討論這一點，請轉到第 14 頁。我們優化現金的投資組合融資策略或多或少是一種從盯市融資中的去風險機制。截至第三季度，按市值回購的投資組合融資敞口為 23%。資產組合的盯市回購百分比僅為 14%。正如克里斯蒂所說，我們目前持有 0.4 倍的投資組合追索權槓桿。

But the story goes beyond just the portfolio financing. It goes also within our corporate borrowing strategy. We have 3 bonds that are standing on our balance sheet today. A $100 million secured fixed, which is due in 2026, and Jr. Subordinated debt deals that are due in 2035. Company recourse leverage of 0.5x is the result. I mentioned this because there are no maturity walls that we have to contend with and reserve cash back in case of dislocated markets for corporate activity.

但故事不僅僅局限於投資組合融資。它也屬於我們的企業借貸策略。我們今天的資產負債表上有 3 只債券。 1 億美元的擔保固定資產將於 2026 年到期，而 Jr. 次級債務交易將於 2035 年到期。公司追索權槓桿為 0.5 倍。我之所以提到這一點，是因為沒有我們必須應對的成熟期牆，並在公司活動市場錯位的情況下保留現金返還。

So when I -- when we mention that we have unrestricted cash, we truly believe that it is unrestricted and can be used in this market environment. Evidence of that, in the third quarter, we had margin calls about $50.2 million. Now this is very low relative to the $369 million cash we had on our balance sheet in the end of the second quarter, also low with respect to $4.3 billion of portfolio that we have in our balance sheet. So we're able to manage this margin call risk and we expect it to actually -- the exposure to repo leverage to decline in the fourth quarter with an additional securitization that is being priced.

所以當我 - 當我們提到我們有不受限制的現金時，我們真的相信它是不受限制的並且可以在這個市場環境中使用。這方面的證據是，在第三季度，我們收到了大約 5020 萬美元的追加保證金通知。現在，這與我們在第二季度末資產負債表上的 3.69 億美元現金相比非常低，與我們資產負債表中的 43 億美元投資組合相比也很低。因此，我們能夠管理這種追加保證金的風險，並且我們預計它實際上會 - 回購槓桿的敞口將在第四季度下降，並且正在定價的額外證券化。

Now going to Page 15, balance sheet summary. We left this page in there from last quarter. It puts it all together and it provides a nice summary of our portfolio assets and debt. On the left side, bridge loans was leading opportunity. Again, over 18 months ago, we decided to invest into this space as a trade, not a business in that we were focused on utilizing our cash for short-term opportunities that would have fast reinvestment criteria, enable us to invest into higher-yielding or more dislocated assets in the future.

現在轉到第 15 頁，資產負債表摘要。從上個季度開始，我們把這個頁面留在了那裡。它將所有內容放在一起，並為我們的投資組合資產和債務提供了一個很好的總結。在左側，過橋貸款是領先的機會。同樣，在 18 個月前，我們決定將這個領域作為一項交易進行投資，而不是一項業務，因為我們專注於利用我們的現金來獲得具有快速再投資標準的短期機會，使我們能夠投資於高收益或未來更多錯位資產。

And also on the multifamily side, we focused on both JV and Mezzanine lending, both are shorter dated opportunities, shorter duration opportunities for us to invest in. On the joint venture side, we saw an opportunity in 2001 to buy underlying properties. We thought that would be a shorter dated opportunity in that the environment wouldn't last forever to have double-digit rental rate increases per year. So we see an opportunity to monetize our portfolio today. On the Mezzanine lending, various debt that was issued below the senior debt, which we find incredibly accretive to our portfolio.

同樣在多戶家庭方面，我們專注於合資企業和夾層貸款，兩者都是我們投資的期限較短、期限較短的機會。在合資企業方面，我們在 2001 年看到了購買基礎物業的機會。我們認為這將是一個較短日期的機會，因為環境不會永遠保持每年兩位數的租金增長。因此，我們今天看到了將我們的投資組合貨幣化的機會。在夾層貸款中，在優先債務之下發行的各種債務，我們發現這些債務對我們的投資組合具有難以置信的增值作用。

On the right side, our securitization debt, as Kristine mentioned earlier, we do not mark-to-market our underlying securitization notes that would offset unrealized losses on our portfolio that are underlying those loans. In that case, the majority of our financing is through the securitization debt structure. And as I mentioned earlier, we have very little corporate debt on our balance sheet and no maturity to speak of.

在右側，我們的證券化債務，正如克里斯汀之前提到的那樣，我們不會按市值計價我們的基礎證券化票據，這將抵消我們作為這些貸款基礎的投資組合的未實現損失。在這種情況下，我們的大部分融資都是通過證券化債務結構進行的。正如我之前提到的，我們的資產負債表上的公司債務很少，而且沒有到期日可言。

Now turning to Page 16. Single-family portfolio overview. Our single-family portfolio is stable. Our highest credit risk category in the sector that we have here is within our RPL. As you can see, the FICO scores are quite low and also the fact that these borrowers had been somewhat delinquent in previous time. But to date, our portfolio of 60-plus delinquency ratio has declined by 3.15% since the beginning of 2021. When you're aligned with the borrower with a 62% LTV, plenty of equity, and able to work with the borrower on sustainable payment plans, you should expect this result. We have securitized 99.5% of this portfolio to date.

現在翻到第 16 頁。單戶家庭投資組合概覽。我們的單戶投資組合是穩定的。我們在這裡擁有的行業中最高的信用風險類別在我們的 RPL 範圍內。正如你所看到的，FICO 分數很低，而且這些借款人在以前的時間裡有些拖欠。但迄今為止，自 2021 年初以來，我們 60+ 拖欠率的投資組合已下降 3.15%。當您與擁有 62% 的 LTV、充足的股權並能夠與借款人合作實現可持續發展的借款人時付款計劃，您應該期待這個結果。迄今為止，我們已將該投資組合的 99.5% 證券化。

In bridge lending and rental and performing loan opportunities, these were the areas that were pretty robust. Allocations over the last couple of quarters in areas that we saw an opportunity to pause and reset for a dislocated opportunity.

在過橋貸款以及租賃和執行貸款機會中，這些領域非常強勁。在過去幾個季度中，我們看到有機會暫停並重新設置錯位機會的領域的分配。

Turning to multifamily. On the multifamily business, rental unit demand continues to be elevated in the short term, particularly in the South and Southeast. The demand for rental units is outpacing the supply due to the high migration, particularly in Florida and Texas. Nationally, rents continue to increase at a slower rate with the Southeast outperforming.

轉向多戶家庭。在多戶型業務方面，短期內出租單元需求繼續上升，特別是在南部和東南部。由於大量移民，尤其是在佛羅里達州和德克薩斯州，對出租單元的需求超過了供應。在全國范圍內，隨著東南部的表現出色，租金繼續以較慢的速度增長。

This opportunity here on our senior lending relating to our mezzanine loan opportunity, we've seen senior lending advance rates decline. In other words, banks are not advancing the same proceeds they did on senior loans as they had in the past. The difference is roughly a 10-point decline in advance rate. So it's taking a 75% LTV to a 65 LTV. As an example, -- and in this case, it provides a nice opportunity to fit a second lien or mezzanine financing behind that first lien with larger equity position for us today.

與我們的夾層貸款機會有關的高級貸款的這個機會，我們已經看到高級貸款預付利率下降。換句話說，銀行並沒有像過去那樣推進與優先貸款相同的收益。差異大約是提前率下降了10個百分點。所以它將 75% 的 LTV 提高到 65 LTV。舉個例子，在這種情況下，它提供了一個很好的機會，可以為我們今天提供更大的股權頭寸，在第一留置權之後進行第二留置權或夾層融資。

We see this opportunity as a core strategy. However, we are also recognizing that the underlying rates, which you could lend at aren't moving as fast as we'd like. We'd like to see this lending rate around anywhere north of 13%, closer to 15%. And we think it's a process that is happening to achieve those types of lending rates, but they're not quite there yet in the market. We think we'll be able to see that in 2023 or perhaps even in the later part of this quarter. On the joint venture side, as we discussed, we're in a monetization effort on the portfolio.

我們將此機會視為一項核心戰略。然而，我們也認識到，您可以藉出的基礎利率並沒有像我們希望的那樣快速變化。我們希望看到這個貸款利率在 13% 以上，接近 15%。我們認為這是實現這些類型的貸款利率的過程，但市場上還沒有完全實現。我們認為我們將能夠在 2023 年甚至本季度後期看到這一點。正如我們所討論的，在合資企業方面，我們正在對投資組合進行貨幣化。

On the multifamily and mezzanine lending, we have few loans that were prepaid and redeemed in the quarter. $19 million total, 17.66% lifetime IRR on these assets as well as a 1.42 multiple. Now this is exactly what we expected to see in our lending. Our coupons were around 11.9%, as you can see on average, but because of the minimum payoff multiples we do, we're able to achieve a higher return. This asset class and sector has been extremely stable. We have only one loan that is delinquent and we expect a full payoff at par. Again, we believe this sector has been highly accretive to our balance sheet, and we continue to add value over time.

在多戶家庭和夾層貸款方面，本季度預付和贖回的貸款很少。總計 1900 萬美元，這些資產的終生 IRR 為 17.66%，倍數為 1.42。現在，這正是我們期望在貸款中看到的。如您所見，我們的優惠券平均約為 11.9%，但由於我們所做的最低迴報倍數，我們能夠實現更高的回報。這個資產類別和行業一直非常穩定。我們只有一筆拖欠的貸款，我們期望按面值全額償還。同樣，我們相信這個行業對我們的資產負債表有很大的貢獻，我們會隨著時間的推移繼續增加價值。

Now on the multifamily joint venture side, we have listed out the 19 properties that remain in our portfolio. As we mentioned earlier, we had one sale of a Houston property last quarter, which achieved a 66.3% IRR or 2.8x multiple. Now these are assets that we underwrote to a 13% to 17% IRR. Obviously, the return here is well beyond our expectation. We had significant rental growth in our portfolio, as you can see, labeled on the top left corner here. In 2021, we had a 16% growth in our portfolio. In 2022, we had a 17% growth, and we are still seeing rental growth in our portfolio, again, looking at the cities, mostly in the South, Southeast part of the United States.

現在，在多戶型合資企業方面，我們列出了我們投資組合中剩餘的 19 處房產。正如我們之前提到的，我們在上個季度出售了一處休斯頓房產，實現了 66.3% 的內部收益率或 2.8 倍的倍數。現在，這些是我們以 13% 至 17% 的內部收益率承保的資產。顯然，這裡的回報遠遠超出我們的預期。如您所見，我們的投資組合中的租金顯著增長，標記在此處的左上角。 2021 年，我們的投資組合增長了 16%。到 2022 年，我們實現了 17% 的增長，我們的投資組合中的租金仍在增長，再次關注城市，主要位於美國南部和東南部。

So we feel we're fairly confident that we'll be able to produce further gains in this portfolio, and hence, the reason why we're looking to monetize these 19 assets.

因此，我們認為我們相當有信心能夠在這個投資組合中產生進一步的收益，這也是我們尋求將這 19 種資產貨幣化的原因。

Now I would like to wrap up my comments here with the following. The company is focused on opportunities in a market undergoing a landscape change and offering deep discount pricing due to the inefficiencies that we're seeing in the securitization market. And we believe the success in the new environment will be achieved through organic creation of liquidity, tactical asset management and prudent liability management for book value protection.

現在我想用以下內容來結束我的評論。由於我們在證券化市場上看到的低效率，該公司專注於市場正在發生變化並提供大幅折扣定價的機會。我們相信，在新環境下的成功將通過有機創造流動性、戰術性資產管理和審慎的負債管理來保護賬面價值來實現。

I thank you for your time. At this time, I'll pass it over to the operator to open up the call for Q&A. Thank you.

我感謝你的時間。這個時候，我會把它交給接線員打開問答電話。謝謝你。

(Operator Instructions) Our first question comes from Doug Harter with Credit Suisse.

（操作員說明）我們的第一個問題來自瑞士信貸的 Doug Harter。

This is John Kilichowski on for Doug. My first question, could you just give us an idea of the pacing of future JV equity transactions?

這是道格的約翰·基利喬夫斯基。我的第一個問題，您能否告訴我們未來合資股權交易的節奏？

Yes. So we are currently engaged on a couple of properties. We are looking at individual sales, we're looking at portfolio sales and looking at strategic opportunities. So the pace is really undetermined. The market, as I mentioned earlier, is in flux, and that includes even property transactions. In flux, meaning that there is more of a wait-and-see approach to 2023 than willing to put more capital to work in 2022. And I think that's across a lot of sectors, credit sectors in this market. But we do have a pipeline of sales that we're working on at the moment. The pace is really mediated by the market, really hard to make a firm comment on that.

是的。因此，我們目前正在處理幾處房產。我們正在關注個人銷售，我們正在關注投資組合銷售並尋找戰略機遇。所以速度真的是不確定的。正如我之前提到的，市場在不斷變化，甚至包括房地產交易。不斷變化，這意味著對 2023 年的觀望態度更多，而不是願意在 2022 年投入更多資金。我認為這涉及到這個市場的許多部門，包括信貸部門。但我們目前確實有銷售渠道。速度真的是由市場調節的，很難對此做出堅定的評論。

And I guess just the return opportunity on those, do you think they're similar to what you saw at the [Bridge Houston] property?

我猜只是那些回歸的機會，你認為它們與你在 [Bridge Houston] 房產中看到的相似嗎？

I think they are going to be some maybe more, some maybe less. It's hard to say. Again, this market is -- with the rate increases, one thing that is in our favor here, despite rate increases, the reason why cap rates is still quite low in this market is that the market is supported by agency financing on the senior debt side. So they have a budget to put to work for senior financing against properties just like this, which has allowed the cap rate to stay quite low relative to other markets. That has been a tailwind to this market for quite some time. And that stability and the financing is there, where you don't have that in residential credit.

我認為他們可能會更多，也可能會更少。很難說。再說一次，這個市場是——隨著利率的提高，我們在這裡有利的一件事，儘管利率上升，這個市場的上限利率仍然很低的原因是市場得到了優先債務機構融資的支持邊。因此，他們有預算用於針對此類房地產的高級融資，這使得上限利率相對於其他市場保持在相當低的水平。很長一段時間以來，這一直是這個市場的順風車。這種穩定性和融資就在那裡，而住宅信貸則沒有。

Yes, so from that perspective, it's hard to comment on exactly what the returns look like. We know that from GAAP perspective, we have these assets marked as depreciated and amortized, lower depreciation amortized costs as well. On a depreciated basis, we hold it at cost basis. And we feel like we, given the rental rate increases that we've experienced in these portfolios that they're more valuable today, and we hope to demonstrate that over the course of the year.

是的，所以從這個角度來看，很難準確地評論回報的樣子。我們知道，從公認會計原則的角度來看，我們將這些資產標記為折舊和攤銷，折舊攤銷成本也較低。在折舊的基礎上，我們以成本為基礎持有它。我們覺得，鑑於我們在這些投資組合中經歷的租金上漲，它們今天更有價值，我們希望在一年中證明這一點。

And do you have a book value update quarter-to-date?

你有一個季度至今的賬面價值更新嗎？

Yes, we're seeing basically less than 1% decline in our portfolio on a book value basis.

是的，按賬面價值計算，我們的投資組合下降幅度基本上不到 1%。

The next question comes from Christopher Nolan, Ladenburg Thalmann.

下一個問題來自克里斯托弗·諾蘭（Christopher Nolan）和拉登堡·塔爾曼（Ladenburg Thalmann）。

Quick question. For the JV exits, is the plan to remain exposed to multifamily through mezz lending?

快速提問。對於合資企業的退出，是否計劃通過夾層貸款繼續接觸多戶家庭？

Yes, that's right. We saw an opportunity in 2021 to add exposure in the equity space. We did so because of the migration that was experienced, that we were seeing. That was quite obvious. And the rental -- the lack of supply and demand that was there. Supply was obviously -- new construction was held off for quite a bit and is now catching up. So we saw an opportunity to put some money to work there. We felt like when we were underwriting the mezzanine loan opportunities, we saw better upside with same downside protection in the JV space, equity space. So hence, that's why we looked in that space.

是的，這是正確的。我們在 2021 年看到了增加股票領域曝光率的機會。我們這樣做是因為我們所經歷的、我們所看到的遷移。這很明顯。還有租金——那裡的供需不足。供應顯然是——新建築被推遲了相當長的一段時間，現在正在迎頭趕上。因此，我們看到了投入一些資金在那里工作的機會。我們覺得，當我們承銷夾層貸款機會時，我們看到了更好的上行空間，在合資空間和股權空間具有相同的下行保護。因此，這就是我們研究那個空間的原因。

Today, we see better opportunity in pref or in mezzanine lending. And because of that, with a larger equity cushion, given I just mentioned earlier that the senior lending has pulled back slightly, and therefore, we can fit in with higher equity exposure or equity cushion loss. So with a -- with our performance of -- in the history of underwriting this market for us, we've never experienced a loss in this asset class. It's been a fantastic strategy. We have great underwriting and sourcing capabilities. So we do expect to continue putting money work in the space.

今天，我們在 pref 或夾層貸款方面看到了更好的機會。正因為如此，在更大的股權緩衝下，鑑於我剛才提到的高級貸款略有回落，因此，我們可以適應更高的股權敞口或股權緩衝損失。因此，在為我們承銷這個市場的歷史上，憑藉我們的表現，我們從未在這一資產類別中經歷過虧損。這是一個很棒的策略。我們擁有強大的承保和採購能力。因此，我們確實希望繼續在該領域投入資金。

The timing of it is a little more up in the air depending on capitulation for a higher rate kind of lump, but that's something we're looking to continue doing.

它的時機有點懸而未決，具體取決於投降率更高的腫塊，但這是我們希望繼續做的事情。

And given where we are in the cycle, is this mezz lending sort of a form of hard money lending?

考慮到我們在周期中的位置，這種夾層貸款是一種硬通貨貸款嗎？

I wouldn't call it hard money lending. I mean this is traditional second lien mezz lending that has been a part of the multifamily market for quite some time. I would say hard money lending comes into play where you shorten the duration or the maturity of the loan to a year, and it could look more like a loan-to-own opportunity where you're providing the sponsor some bridge capital, and you're waiting to see if they can formulate whatever plan they need to pay you off at a 1-year maturity.

我不會稱之為硬通貨貸款。我的意思是這是傳統的第二留置權夾層貸款，它已經成為多戶家庭市場的一部分已經有一段時間了。我會說硬通貨貸款開始發揮作用，你將貸款的期限或期限縮短到一年，它看起來更像是一個貸款到擁有的機會，你為贊助商提供一些過渡資金，而你'正在等著看他們是否可以製定他們需要在 1 年到期時還清你的任何計劃。

The market is not there yet, and we don't pursue that in the near term. We do know that there is about $130 billion of bank loans, senior loans that will be coming due over the course of 2023. And that provides an opportunity given that bank loan senior funding was done at a higher LTV than it's available today. So there will be needs for a second component to finance these assets. And given the run-up in rental yields and some appraisal values, we see that the assets could support that additional debt, which is, quite frankly, equal to the same senior level debt they had from 2 years ago.

市場還沒有，我們在短期內不會追求。我們確實知道大約有 1300 億美元的銀行貸款，高級貸款將在 2023 年到期。鑑於銀行貸款高級融資的 LTV 比現在更高，這提供了一個機會。因此，將需要第二個組件來為這些資產提供資金。鑑於租金收益率和一些評估價值的上升，我們看到這些資產可以支持額外的債務，坦率地說，這相當於他們兩年前的高級債務。

And final question. Is it fair to say, given your comments in terms of preparing the market for an investment opportunity in coming quarters that we should see the recourse leverage levels decrease further?

最後一個問題。可以公平地說，鑑於您對市場為未來幾個季度的投資機會做準備方面的評論，我們應該看到追索權槓桿水平進一步下降嗎？

That's right. Yes. We're looking at moving a portfolio within our BPL rental strategy into securitization in the coming days. That will significantly reduce our mark-to-market exposure due to rebuild financing as well as focus on assets that do not require leverage. Now we do have a revolver -- 2 revolver securities within our short dated BPL loan strategy that we continue to utilize and we want to keep funded. So that we should expect to be active there. But for the most part, what we do see, some incremental leverage opportunities, our focus is going to be on the non-mark-to-market side of the equation for financing.

這是正確的。是的。我們正在考慮在未來幾天將 BPL 租賃策略中的投資組合轉變為證券化。由於重建融資以及專注於不需要槓桿的資產，這將顯著降低我們的市值風險敞口。現在我們確實有一個左輪手槍——在我們的短期 BPL 貸款策略中的 2 個左輪手槍證券，我們將繼續使用它們並且我們希望保持資金充足。所以我們應該期望在那里活躍。但在大多數情況下，我們所看到的一些增量槓桿機會，我們的重點將放在融資等式的非盯市方面。

The next question is from Bose George with KBW.

下一個問題來自 Bose George 和 KBW。

This is actually [Mike Smith] on for Bose. So it sounds like you're pretty cautious in terms of capital deployment. Can you just kind of talk through how you're thinking about the balancing act between buying back more stock versus maintaining a strong liquidity position? And then as a follow-up, can you just remind us how much remaining authorization you have left on the buyback?

這實際上是 Bose 的 [Mike Smith]。所以聽起來你在資本部署方面相當謹慎。您能否談談您如何考慮在回購更多股票與保持強勁流動性頭寸之間取得平衡？然後作為後續行動，您能否提醒我們您在回購中還剩下多少授權？

Yes. So I'll start with the liquidity situation. So the -- what we've done over 18 months is built over $1 billion of short duration BPL loans. The goal there was to be able to utilize that market, those assets into a higher-yielding market. So it was a great cash utilization strategy for us, given the high coupons, short duration aspect of those portfolios. And we see an opportunity to rotate that capital into -- we hope to see as a better buying opportunity in 2023.

是的。因此，我將從流動性情況開始。因此，我們在 18 個月內所做的是建立了超過 10 億美元的短期 BPL 貸款。目標是能夠利用該市場，將這些資產用於更高收益的市場。因此，考慮到這些投資組合的高票息和短期存續期，這對我們來說是一個很好的現金利用策略。我們看到了將這筆資金轉入的機會——我們希望在 2023 年看到一個更好的購買機會。

So today, we see a better opportunity as it relates to our share price and buybacks versus the investable market today, simply because of the discount we currently trade at. And we do have to weigh that with liquidity and expected capitalization efforts in 2023.

所以今天，我們看到了一個更好的機會，因為它與我們的股價和回購與今天的可投資市場相比，僅僅是因為我們目前交易的折扣。我們確實必須權衡流動性和 2023 年的預期資本化努力。

But as I said earlier, we do expect to continue engaging and buying back shares in the market if levels stay around lows that we've been purchasing at. And that is something that we're going to continually monitor and look at. In previous calls, we weren't as forthcoming simply because we were still debating the value proposition there versus assets that we saw in the market. But once the third quarter securitization market sort of being very much less liquid and efficient, the meter turned towards our buyback literally as a primary strategy in the third quarter. We spent more money there than we did in new investment activity, given the majority of what we invested in in the third quarter was related to a drawdown from previous loans that we actually funded.

但正如我之前所說，如果水平保持在我們一直購買的低點附近，我們確實希望繼續參與並回購市場股票。這是我們將持續監控和關注的事情。在之前的電話會議中，我們並沒有那麼坦率，因為我們仍在就那裡的價值主張與我們在市場上看到的資產進行辯論。但是，一旦第三季度證券化市場的流動性和效率大大降低，我們就將回購作為第三季度的主要策略。鑑於我們在第三季度投資的大部分資金與我們實際資助的先前貸款的提款有關，我們在那里花費的資金比我們在新投資活動上的花費更多。

So we will continue looking at our shares and our share price and discount to book value as an opportunity. We think it's highly accretive. And that could change depending on share price as well as the market opportunity offering from a large bid-ask spread to shortening up and becoming more of a buyers' market. So it's something we're balancing and we'll continue to follow.

因此，我們將繼續將我們的股票、股價和賬面價值折讓視為一個機會。我們認為它具有很高的增值性。這可能會根據股價以及提供的市場機會而改變，從大買賣價差到縮短並成為更多的買方市場。所以這是我們正在平衡的事情，我們將繼續遵循。

And to answer your question with how much is left over. So as of 9/30, that's about $178 million with the trades that we settle early in October, that will be taking you down to $176 million.

並用剩餘的數量來回答您的問題。因此，截至 9 月 30 日，我們在 10 月初結算的交易約為 1.78 億美元，這將使您降至 1.76 億美元。

And maybe just one on the dividend. Can you just talk through how you're thinking about the dividend? It looks like, especially given the context of the comments you made on remaining defensive, it looks like the ROE on the existing book implies like a breakeven ROE of 10% to 11%? Is that something you think you can generate just given your defensive posture? Or any other color on the dividend would be helpful.

也許只有一個股息。你能談談你對股息的看法嗎？看起來，尤其是考慮到您對保持防禦性的評論的背景下，現有書中的 ROE 似乎意味著盈虧平衡 ROE 為 10% 至 11%？這是你認為只要你的防守姿勢就能產生的東西嗎？或者股息上的任何其他顏色都會有所幫助。

Yes. So as we said earlier in previous calls, our dividend policy is kind of an 18-month forecast on not only our interest income but also some realized activity we see on our balance sheet. Today, we believe we can support the $0.10 based on, as Kristine mentioned earlier, our interest. Net interest income generated about $0.08 of EPS on top of potential liquidations in the future for additional realized gains. A component to our dividend policy for quite some time now has been the principal component on sales or realized activity to meet our dividend obligation. And that still continues today.

是的。因此，正如我們之前在之前的電話會議中所說，我們的股息政策是對我們的利息收入以及我們在資產負債表上看到的一些已實現活動的 18 個月預測。今天，正如克里斯汀之前提到的，我們相信我們可以根據我們的興趣支撐 0.10 美元。淨利息收入在未來可能清算的基礎上產生了約 0.08 美元的每股收益，以獲得額外的已實現收益。很長一段時間以來，我們股息政策的一個組成部分一直是銷售或已實現活動的主要組成部分，以履行我們的股息義務。這種情況今天仍在繼續。

We, over the past 5 years, really have not been a story of NIM. That is the full focus of what we are looking to -- and how to (inaudible) over a leverage play on assets with short-term liabilities to pay dividends. It's always been a component of looking at not only the interest income on assets we're generating, but also on principal activity through discounted purchases or realized activity.

在過去的 5 年裡，我們真的不是 NIM 的故事。這是我們所尋求的全部焦點——以及如何（聽不清）對具有短期負債的資產進行槓桿作用以支付股息。它不僅是查看我們產生的資產的利息收入的組成部分，而且還包括通過折扣購買或已實現活動的主要活動。

So the fact that we're -- we've already announced the $0.10 dividend and looking at the 18-month forecast, we feel that we can support that dividend over time. Now the market, obviously, the key component here is whether or not we can reinvest our BPL, short-term duration loans into the market. It's a higher-yielding opportunity. That's something we expect to do. And the goal there, just in today's market where coupons in that space are generally 150, 200 basis points higher than it was 1.5 months ago, 2 months ago. So at a minimum, we could reinvest and continue into the BPL space to earn a higher return than we had earlier. But we think there may be better opportunities in 2023.

因此，事實上，我們已經宣布了 0.10 美元的股息，看看 18 個月的預測，我們認為我們可以隨著時間的推移支持該股息。現在市場，顯然，這裡的關鍵部分是我們是否可以將我們的 BPL 短期貸款再投資到市場中。這是一個更高收益的機會。這是我們期望做的事情。而那裡的目標，就在今天的市場上，該領域的優惠券通常比 1.5 個月前、2 個月前高出 150、200 個基點。因此，至少，我們可以再投資並繼續進入 BPL 領域，以獲得比之前更高的回報。但我們認為 2023 年可能會有更好的機會。

So for us, we wanted to stay liquid. We wanted to be able to be active in a dislocated market and be able to put money to work at compelling risk-adjusted returns. So with that, we think that the bridge from the BPL book to the opportunity or just even higher coupon BPLs, will continue to allow us to support our dividend.

所以對我們來說，我們想保持流動性。我們希望能夠在混亂的市場中保持活躍，並能夠將資金投入到令人信服的風險調整回報中。因此，我們認為，從 BPL 賬簿到機會甚至更高息票 BPL 的橋樑，將繼續讓我們支持我們的股息。

The next question is from Jason Stewart at JonesTrading.

下一個問題來自 JonesTrading 的 Jason Stewart。

This is Matthew on for Jason. What is the quarterly operating expense run rate that you guys have for operating real estate going to look like after the next chunk of asset sales? And then how should we model that to get to 0 once the sales are complete?

這是傑森的馬修。在下一次資產銷售之後，你們經營房地產的季度運營費用運行率是多少？然後我們應該如何建模以在銷售完成後達到 0？

Well, in terms of operating expenses, there will still be operating expenses left in the property. But if you take a look at what's really driving that operating expense on real estate, it's depreciation and amortization with GAAP accounting being held for sale. Depreciation and amortization on a majority of those properties will be essentially 0. What's going to be left over is multifamily property on a consolidated JV structure that we have where we own less than 20% of common equity. There will still be depreciation, but to a lesser extent as it compares to prior quarters.

那麼，在營業費用方面，物業中仍然存在營業費用。但是，如果您看一下真正推動房地產運營費用的原因，那就是折舊和攤銷以及 GAAP 會計被持有待售。大多數這些房產的折舊和攤銷將基本上為0。剩下的是在我們擁有不到20%的普通股的綜合合資企業結構上的多戶住宅。仍然會有貶值，但與前幾個季度相比，貶值幅度較小。

And then with that cash, is the plan to pay off repo debt outstanding or continue to invest it?

然後用這筆現金，計劃償還未償還的回購債務還是繼續投資？

Yes. So the cash is going to be invest. The repo debt payoff will occur through a securitization that we're looking to complete. So if we're successful in that deal, which is out at the moment, we will be able to pay down debt through transparence of terms securitization leverage. And the cash will be utilized for investment opportunities.

是的。因此，現金將用於投資。回購債務的回報將通過我們希望完成的證券化來實現。因此，如果我們在這筆交易中取得成功（目前已經結束），我們將能夠通過條款證券化槓桿的透明度來償還債務。現金將用於投資機會。

Got you. And then one quick follow-up. What is the cap rate that you guys are looking to get or have got on some of these sales for the assets?

得到你。然後快速跟進。你們希望獲得或已經獲得的資產銷售的上限是多少？

Yes. I mean it cap rate, if you spend time in the multifamily space, there's probably 3 or 4 definitions of what cap rate means. Cap rate traditionally is obviously your rental income versus your cost basis and minus the expenses there. But because of rental rate increases that you're seeing across the market, there is catch-up that needs to be applied into some of the formula that you're looking to sell. So if you have leases that are rolling in the next 6 months that are up 10%, that's part of your cash flow. Therefore, the cap rate number really becomes very difficult to understand because it doesn't incorporate that, given current cash flow.

是的。我的意思是上限率，如果您花時間在多戶家庭空間中，那麼上限率的含義可能有 3 或 4 個定義。傳統上，上限率顯然是您的租金收入與您的成本基礎並減去那裡的費用。但是由於您在整個市場上看到的租金上漲，因此需要在您希望出售的某些公式中應用追趕。因此，如果您的租約在未來 6 個月內上漲 10%，這就是您現金流的一部分。因此，考慮到當前的現金流，上限利率數字確實變得非常難以理解，因為它沒有包含這一點。

If I simply answer your question, caveating those points, you're around 5.2%-5.5%. But the loss to lease is a significant component of your cash flow on a pro forma basis, that has to be modeled in as well. So that is our opportunity.

如果我只是簡單地回答你的問題，警告那些點，你大約是 5.2%-5.5%。但是，租賃損失是您在備考基礎上現金流量的重要組成部分，也必須對其進行建模。所以這是我們的機會。

The next question comes from Matthew Howlett with B. Riley.

下一個問題來自 Matthew Howlett 和 B. Riley。

My question is, you got the company as well positioned as really anyone out there with the leverage and the excess cash and potentially some more capital coming in the door. When you look at the pace of capital deployment in 2022, I know you don't have a crystal ball, but you could obviously deploy it overnight, given all the different asset classes you look at. I mean what are some of the things as asset prices decline? What we saw during the last recession was things went down, they went down further and further. What can you tell us in terms of when you feel like it's time to start really getting aggressive?

我的問題是，你讓公司和真正的任何人一樣處於有利地位，擁有槓桿和多餘的現金，並且可能會有更多的資本進入。當您查看 2022 年的資本部署速度時，我知道您沒有水晶球，但鑑於您看到的所有不同資產類別，您顯然可以在一夜之間部署它。我的意思是，隨著資產價格下跌，會發生哪些事情？我們在上一次經濟衰退中看到的是事情在下降，而且越來越低。你能告訴我們什麼時候你覺得是時候開始變得積極進取了？

Right. So the first point that you mentioned, if you found value in today's markets, particularly in BPL rental or fix-and-flip or short dated loans, you can really own the market today. There are various originators that would love somebody to show up with $250 million of cash to invest in this market. And the problem is that the loans that they're producing just aren't attractive relative to the term rates that we see in the market today. But there is much difference than a year ago. Anybody with capital can step in and take a big market share that exists in this market.

正確的。所以你提到的第一點，如果你在今天的市場中發現了價值，特別是在 BPL 租賃或固定翻轉或短期貸款中，你就可以真正擁有今天的市場。有各種各樣的發起人希望有人帶著 2.5 億美元的現金出現在這個市場上進行投資。問題在於，與我們今天在市場上看到的期限利率相比，他們提供的貸款並沒有吸引力。但與一年前相比有很大不同。任何有資本的人都可以介入，並在這個市場上佔有很大的市場份額。

We're also looking at the fact that we're quite possibly could call peak housing third quarter of 2022, and that's evident, obviously, in the affordability measures that are one of the worst levels in 20 years. So I think there's a lot -- there will be some significant buyer's remorse that it may experience from Q3 activity. And I think that is part of our opportunity for 2023 in that if you've not efficiently financed those assets in 2022, we believe that the 2023 financing environment could be even more difficult and even less efficient than it is today.

我們還在考慮這樣一個事實，即我們很可能會在 2022 年第三季度稱住房高峰期，這顯然在 20 年來最糟糕水平之一的負擔能力措施中很明顯。所以我認為有很多 - 會有一些重大的買家悔恨，它可能會從第三季度的活動中經歷。我認為這是我們 2023 年機會的一部分，因為如果你沒有在 2022 年有效地為這些資產融資，我們相信 2023 年的融資環境可能比現在更加困難，甚至效率更低。

So your question on timing, it's really a function of when we can generate our double-digit kind of equity type of returns without the use of leverage. That's -- in a much broader and much deeper stress scenario, that's what basically helped the housing market cure, is when rental yields became 13%, 14%. And and you could earn that just by buying a home and not utilizing any leverage. While similar kind of outcomes that we would expect in some of these loan products where financing is not available or very inefficient, where the -- there were maybe shopping of portfolios, not getting done in 2022 and 2023 is a capitulation on the sale.

所以你關於時機的問題，它實際上是我們何時可以在不使用槓桿的情況下產生我們的兩位數股票類型回報的函數。那是 - 在更廣泛和更深層次的壓力情景中，這基本上有助於房地產市場治愈，即租金收益率變為 13%、14%。而且你可以通過購買房屋而不利用任何槓桿來賺取。雖然我們在其中一些融資不可用或效率非常低的貸款產品中預期會出現類似的結果，但可能會購買投資組合，但在 2022 年和 2023 年沒有完成是對出售的投降。

What causes some of those capitulation is financing. And warehouse lines, they are typically structured 364 days. And the roles on that financing facilities for loans, we expect obviously could be pressured in that you have less financing dollars that will be provided, advance rates will be lower, likely if it's an aged portfolio. And if you're over levered there and do not have enough liquidity to take those assets off your warehouse line, that becomes a distressed opportunity. And that is something that we expect to see in some parts of this market, particularly within the origination channels in the market today.

導致其中一些投降的原因是融資。和倉庫線，它們通常是 364 天結構化的。我們預計，貸款融資設施的作用顯然會受到壓力，因為您將提供的融資資金較少，預付款利率會較低，如果它是一個老化的投資組合。如果你在那裡過度槓桿化並且沒有足夠的流動性將這些資產從你的倉庫線中取出，那將成為一個糟糕的機會。這是我們期望在這個市場的某些部分看到的東西，特別是在當今市場的原始渠道中。

So for those reasons, we're kind of at hold until where we see that capitulation. We see loans and houses being shopped and trades failing or not being consummated because the discount required by the market is larger than the pain points of the seller. But over time, we believe that some of those sellers will run out of time and will provide an opportunity for us to invest in this market.

因此，出於這些原因，在我們看到投降之前，我們會有所保留。我們看到貸款和房屋被購買，交易失敗或沒有完成，因為市場要求的折扣大於賣家的痛點。但隨著時間的推移，我們相信其中一些賣家將用完時間，並將為我們提供投資這個市場的機會。

So I think I hear what you're saying. You're going to buy this stuff unlevered double digits. Potentially maybe over time, watch them go up, maybe put financing them over time. But in the meantime, NYMT is going to operate with effectively very limited recourse leverage until you get the securitization closed.

所以我想我聽到了你在說什麼。你要買這個東西，沒有槓桿的兩位數。可能隨著時間的推移，看著它們上漲，也許隨著時間的推移為它們提供資金。但與此同時，NYMT 將以非常有限的追索權槓桿運作，直到您完成證券化。

That's right. We purposely designed -- I mean there were various opportunities to issue corporate debt in 2021 at pretty attractive levels. We weighed that on a 5-year time line, which comes pretty quickly, especially when you're investing in 3- to 5-year assets. We didn't want to have a maturity wall structure. We'd rather have the financing on a secured basis with respect to our assets and matched to our assets, which is why we utilize mark-to-market repo leverage, 1-year facilities on our BPL fix-and-flip loans because of the short duration.

這是正確的。我們特意設計——我的意思是，2021 年有各種機會以相當有吸引力的水平發行公司債券。我們在 5 年的時間線上權衡了這一點，這個時間線來得很快，尤其是當你投資 3 到 5 年的資產時。我們不想擁有成熟的牆結構。我們寧願在有擔保的基礎上就我們的資產進行融資並與我們的資產相匹配，這就是為什麼我們在 BPL 固定和翻轉貸款上使用盯市回購槓桿、1 年期便利，因為持續時間短。

We do -- again, as I mentioned earlier, we have 2 securitizations are outstanding there. We can recycle some of those assets, but we also have those assets on repo currently. And we think that is a good use of leverage there and ties well with the asset. But the goal is to stay very liquid, stay nimble and look for these opportunities. Now that's what we currently see today. However, various things will come into this market landscape and some of the discounted opportunities may not be realized. What we can do and we'll do in that time frame, if, for example, the expectation of the Fed pushing interest rates higher to curb inflation, which really the only way you do that is through higher unemployment rates. If that doesn't come to fruition, and we have a paragon of inflation, well, then some of our expectations on these dislocated opportunities will not come into play.

我們確實 - 再次，正如我之前提到的，我們有 2 種證券化表現出色。我們可以回收其中一些資產，但我們目前也有這些資產在回購。我們認為這是對槓桿的一種很好的利用，並且與資產有很好的聯繫。但目標是保持流動性，保持敏捷並尋找這些機會。這就是我們今天所看到的。然而，各種各樣的事情會進入這個市場格局，一些打折的機會可能無法實現。在那個時間範圍內，我們能做什麼以及我們會做什麼，例如，如果美聯儲提高利率以抑制通脹的預期，那麼你做到這一點的唯一方法就是提高失業率。如果這沒有實現，並且我們擁有通貨膨脹的典範，那麼我們對這些錯位機會的一些期望將不會發揮作用。

But as I said earlier, the market, given the liquidity situation of various market players, the market is for anybody's taking. You can come in and you can be one of the largest buyers of these markets today with the capital and with the understanding of on how asset manage these assets. So we can step into the market with the same type of asset classes that we're in today at higher rates or wait for this dislocation to occur, and we believe that our capital is better spent waiting for dislocation at this moment.

但是正如我之前所說的，市場，鑑於各種市場參與者的流動性情況，市場是任人宰割的。您可以進來，您可以成為當今這些市場的最大買家之一，擁有資金並了解資產如何管理這些資產。因此，我們可以以更高的利率進入與我們今天所處的相同類型的資產類別的市場，或者等待這種錯位發生，我們相信我們的資金最好在此時等待錯位。

I would agree, and you guys are in a really good position with all the expertise in the various business classes. Appreciate it.

我同意，你們在各種商業課程中的所有專業知識都處於非常好的位置。欣賞它。

The next question is from Eric Hagen of BTIG.

下一個問題來自 BTIG 的 Eric Hagen。

How are you guys thinking about the warehouse funding for whole loans, your ability to source additional warehousing going forward, just the fungibility of those assets in general? Do you also have a breakdown of the type of collateral, which is on warehouse right now? And if I can just tack on another question, just what's the unfunded commitment in the BPL portfolio right now?

你們如何看待整個貸款的倉庫資金、未來採購額外倉儲的能力，以及這些資產的一般可替代性？您是否也有抵押品類型的明細，目前在倉庫中？如果我可以回答另一個問題，那麼現在 BPL 投資組合中沒有資金的承諾是什麼？

Yes. So warehouse funding-wise, we have proposals in front of us to upsize our warehouse lines. I think it's not something that we're concerned with at all given the availability to take the upsized request for proposals. We have a significant amount of capacity in our current warehouse line today. So given the repo loans to securitizations and reducing our repo balances there, the commitments we have from our warehouse lenders were kept the same. We have not reduced those. So we can re-lever those warehouse lines up if we felt like that was an opportunity to do so.

是的。因此，在倉庫資金方面，我們面前有擴大倉庫生產線的建議。我認為這不是我們關心的問題，因為我們可以接受更大的提案請求。今天，我們現有的倉庫線擁有大量容量。因此，考慮到證券化的回購貸款和減少我們在那裡的回購餘額，我們從倉庫貸方獲得的承諾保持不變。我們沒有減少這些。因此，如果我們覺得這是一個這樣做的機會，我們可以重新調整這些倉庫隊列。

Again, our plan is not to do that. We see opportunity to do otherwise. But there's really no -- we don't see any issues on buying large portfolios and utilizing warehouse leverage for that.

同樣，我們的計劃不是那樣做。我們看到了做其他事情的機會。但實際上沒有——我們認為購買大型投資組合和利用倉庫槓桿沒有任何問題。

As it relates to our BPL activity, we are generally funding around, I think, about $73 million a quarter. We expect that to occur for the next few quarters. But obviously, we expect it to also taper off given the -- for purposes of BPL distress or BPL bridge loans, we have a seasoned portfolio in that a lot of our ramp, if you look at our investment activity, the ramping of our portfolio really occurred in the fourth quarter of 2021 into the first quarter of 2022. So these are 18-month loans on average.

由於它與我們的 BPL 活動有關，我們通常每季度資助大約 7300 萬美元。我們預計這將在未來幾個季度發生。但很明顯，我們預計它也會逐漸減少，因為 - 出於 BPL 困境或 BPL 過橋貸款的目的，我們有一個經驗豐富的投資組合，我們的大部分斜坡，如果你看看我們的投資活動，我們的投資組合的斜坡真正發生在 2021 年第四季度到 2022 年第一季度。所以這些平均是 18 個月的貸款。

We've already kind of moved forward in time about 6 months. And we also have focused on a strategy of buying loans that had low utilization or low construction requirements. And our goal was to buy loans that would have very easy concepts to move forward in the plan for the operator. We have a chart in our supplemental that shows that activity. We have many assets where there was no requirement for repairs. So we limited the kind of ground-up construction and high repair situations, which then correlates to low go-forward draws for our portfolio.

我們已經在時間上向前推進了大約 6 個月。我們還專注於購買利用率低或建設要求低的貸款的策略。我們的目標是購買具有非常簡單概念的貸款，以便在運營商的計劃中推進。我們的補充中有一張圖表顯示了該活動。我們有許多不需要維修的資產。因此，我們限制了地面建設和高維修情況的種類，這與我們的投資組合的低前進吸引力相關。

And to answer your question in terms of what's in the warehouse lines, it's predominantly our BPL bridge loans. There's some, obviously, rental loans that's in there. That's the DSCR. But we are looking to move them into a securitization that's being priced. There's also our performing loan book or scratch and dent that's there. Our RPL portfolio are predominantly all securitized. It's about 99.5% of that portfolio is in securitization structures.

為了回答您關於倉庫線中有什麼的問題，主要是我們的 BPL 過橋貸款。顯然，那裡有一些出租貸款。那是DSCR。但我們正在尋求將它們轉移到正在定價的證券化中。還有我們的表演貸款簿或划痕和凹痕在那裡。我們的 RPL 投資組合主要都是證券化的。該投資組合中約有 99.5% 屬於證券化結構。

At this time, I would like to turn it back to Mr. Serrano for closing remarks.

在這個時候，我想把它轉回到塞拉諾先生的閉幕詞上。

Well, thank you, everybody, for taking the time today to be on our earnings call -- 2023 for earnings call. Thank you very much, and have a great day.

好吧，謝謝大家今天抽出時間參加我們的財報電話會議——2023 年的財報電話會議。非常感謝，祝您有美好的一天。

Thank you for your participation in today's conference. This does conclude the program. You may now disconnect.

感謝您參加今天的會議。這確實結束了程序。您現在可以斷開連接。