摩根大通 (JPM) 2026 Q2 法說會逐字稿

The JPMorgan Chase earnings call will begin shortly.

摩根大通（JPMorgan Chase）財報電話會議即將開始。

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to JPMorgan Chase's second quarter 2026 earnings call. This call is being recorded. (Operator Instructions). We will now go live to the presentation.

各位女士、先生，早安。歡迎參加摩根大通2026年第二季財報電話會議。本次會議將被錄音。（接線員指示）。我們現在將切換至簡報現場。

Information concerning forward-looking statements and non-GAAP financial measures Included in this presentation can be found in JPMorgan Chase's earnings press release and investor presentation posted on the Investor Relations website. Please stand by.

本簡報所包含之有關前瞻性陳述與非GAAP財務衡量指標的資訊，可於摩根大通發布的財報新聞稿及投資人簡報中查閱，相關文件已張貼於投資人關係網站。請稍候。

At this time, I would like to turn the call over to JPMorgan Chase's Chairman and CEO, Jamie Dimon; and Chief Financial Officer, Jeremy Burnham. Mr. Barnum, please go ahead.

此刻，我想將電話會議交給摩根大通董事長兼執行長 Jamie Dimon，以及財務長 Jeremy Burnham。Barnum 先生，請開始。

Thanks, Amanda, and good morning, everyone. Including the significant items noted on the page, the firm delivered net income of $16.9 billion, EPS of $6.14, and an ROTCE of 23%.

謝謝你，Amanda，各位早安。包含本頁所註明的重要項目在內，本公司淨利為169億美元，每股盈餘（EPS）為6.14美元，ROTCE為23%。

Excluding the significant items, revenue was up 15% year on year, predominantly driven by markets revenue, higher asset management fees in AWM and CCB, higher investment banking revenue and higher deposit and loan balances, partially offset by the impact of lower rates. Expenses of $27.3 billion were up 15% year on year, largely driven by volume and revenue-related expense as well as growth in front office hiring and labor inflation. And credit costs were $2.5 billion with net charge-offs of $2.4 billion and a net reserve build of $149 million.

排除重要項目後，營收年增15%，主要由市場業務營收帶動，並受益於AWM與CCB較高的資產管理費、較高的投資銀行營收，以及較高的存款與放款餘額；但部分被較低利率的影響所抵銷。費用為273億美元，年增15%，主要由量能與營收相關費用增加所致，並包含前台人員招募成長及勞動成本通膨。信用成本為25億美元，其中淨沖銷為24億美元，淨提存準備金增加1.49億美元。

And in terms of the balance sheet, we ended the quarter with a standardized CET1 ratio of 14.1%, down 20 basis points versus the prior quarter as net income was more than offset by higher RWA and capital distributions. This quarter's standardized RWA increase of approximately $103 billion is largely driven by increases in financing across our markets business as well as growth in traditional lending. As you saw in our CCAR press release in June, the Board intends to increase the quarterly dividend to $1.65 per share effective in the third quarter.

就資產負債表而言，本季末標準化CET1比率為14.1%，較前一季下降20個基點，因淨利增加被較高的RWA與資本分配所抵銷。本季標準化RWA約增加1,030億美元，主要來自我們市場業務融資增加，以及傳統放款成長。如同我們6月的CCAR新聞稿所示，董事會擬自第三季起將季度股利提高至每股1.65美元。

Now moving to our businesses. CCB reported net income of $5.3 billion. Revenue of $20.3 million was up 8% year on year, predominantly driven by higher card NII largely on higher revolving balances as well as higher operating lease income in auto and asset management fees and wealth management. A few points to highlight.

接著談各項業務。CCB淨利為53億美元。營收為2,030萬美元，年增8%，主要由卡片淨利息收入（NII）增加所帶動，主要來自較高的循環餘額；此外，汽車業務的較高營運租賃收入，以及資產管理費與財富管理收入亦有貢獻。以下幾點重點說明。

Consumers and small businesses continue to show resilience despite elevated gas prices and inflation with higher tax refunds and a solid labor market contributing to strong spend growth. In Banking and Wealth Management, average deposits were up 3% year on year and 2% quarter on quarter, driven by strong net new checking account growth of over 500,000 accounts this quarter. Client investment assets were up 21% year on year, driven by market performance along with strong flows.

儘管油價與通膨仍處高檔，消費者與小型企業仍展現韌性；較高的退稅以及穩健的勞動市場，推動支出成長強勁。在銀行與財富管理方面，平均存款年增3%、季增2%，主要由本季超過50萬個支票帳戶的強勁淨新增所帶動。客戶投資資產年增21%，受惠於市場表現以及強勁資金流入。

In Card Services, we refreshed the Sapphire Preferred card in June following the successful refresh of several other products over the last 12 months. Next, the CIB reported net income of $9.7 million. Revenue of $24.9 billion was up 27% year on year driven by strong performance across the businesses.

在卡片服務方面，我們於6月更新了Sapphire Preferred卡，延續過去12個月成功更新多項其他產品的成果。接著，CIB淨利為970萬美元。營收為249億美元，年增27%，主要由各業務線的強勁表現所帶動。

IB fees were up 30% year on year, reflecting double-digit growth across all products with particularly strong performance in equity underwrite. This quarter's performance was supported by both some large ECM deals and the acceleration of the closure of some M&A transactions, the pipeline remains quite robust, and the current activity levels seem to be encouraging more activity. As a result, while conversion will obviously be dependent on market conditions, we expect activity levels to remain healthy.

投資銀行（IB）費用年增30%，反映所有產品皆呈雙位數成長，其中以股票承銷表現尤為強勁。本季表現同時受部分大型ECM交易，以及部分併購（M&A）交易加速結案所支撐；目前案源（pipeline）仍相當強勁，而當前活動水準似乎也在鼓勵更多交易活動。因此，雖然轉換率顯然取決於市場狀況，我們預期活動水準將維持健康。

In markets, fixed income was up 6% year on year with solid performance in credit currencies in emerging markets and rates, partially offset by lower revenue in commodities. The equities business delivered an exceptionally strong quarter with revenue up 86% year on year, reflecting the highly dynamic market conditions. We saw strength across products and regions. Flows were strong and trading was favorable in both derivatives and cash and prime benefited from higher client activity and balances.

在市場業務方面，固定收益年增6%，新興市場的信用、外匯與利率業務表現穩健，但部分被大宗商品營收較低所抵銷。股票業務本季表現極為強勁，營收年增86%，反映市場狀況高度動態。我們在各產品與各地區皆見到強勁動能。資金流入強勁，衍生品與現貨交易皆有利；而Prime業務亦受惠於較高的客戶活動與餘額。

Turning to Asset & Wealth Management. AWM reported net income of $2 billion with pretax margin of 38%. Revenue of $6.9 billion was up 19% year on year driven by growth in management fees on higher average market levels and strong net inflows as well as investment valuation gains, higher loan balances, and higher brokerage activity. Long-term net inflows were $50 billion with continued strength across fixed income and equity. AUM of $5.1 trillion was up 18% year on year, and client assets of $7.7 trillion were up 19% year on year, driven by higher market levels and continued net inflows.

接著談資產與財富管理（Asset & Wealth Management）。AWM淨利為20億美元，稅前利潤率為38%。營收為69億美元，年增19%，主要由較高平均市場水準帶動的管理費成長與強勁淨流入所驅動，並包含投資估值收益、較高的放款餘額，以及較高的經紀業務活動。長期淨流入為500億美元，固定收益與股票皆持續強勁。資產管理規模（AUM）為5.1兆美元，年增18%；客戶資產為7.7兆美元，年增19%，主要由較高市場水準與持續淨流入所帶動。

And before turning to the outlook, Corporate reported net income of $4.2 billion on revenue of $6 billion, which includes the significant items noted in the presentation. In terms of the full year 2026 outlook, we now expect NII X markets to be about $96.5 billion and total NII to be approximately $105.5 billion as a function of market's NII increasing to about $9 million. The new adjusted expense outlook is about $107.5 billion, with the increase primarily due to higher volume and revenue-related expenses driven by the activity levels and associated revenue outperformance.

在談展望之前，企業部門（Corporate）淨利為42億美元，營收為60億美元，其中包含簡報中所註明的重要項目。就2026年全年展望而言，我們目前預期「NII（不含市場業務）」約為965億美元，總NII約為1,055億美元，主要因市場業務的NII提高至約900萬美元。新的調整後費用展望約為1,075億美元，增加主要來自較高的量能與營收相關費用，係由活動水準及其帶動的營收優於預期所致。

Finally, we now expect card net charge-off rate to be approximately 3.2% and reflecting better-than-expected consumer credit performance. With that, we're now happy to take your questions, so let's open the line for Q&A.

最後，我們目前預期信用卡淨沖銷率約為3.2%，反映消費者信用表現優於預期。接下來我們很樂意回答各位問題，現在開放問答。

(Operator Instructions) Ken Usdin, Autonomous Research.

（接線員指示）Autonomous Research 的 Ken Usdin。

Jamie, I was just wondering if you could start by just evaluating on the recent management changes and elevation of Doug and Troy to co-Presidents. And -- just anything we should be thinking about in terms of the ongoing development of the leadership team and anything it may mean in terms of your tenure as a CEO from the Board's perspective.

Jamie，我想先請你評估一下近期的管理層變動，以及Doug與Troy升任共同總裁一事。另外——從董事會的角度來看，在領導團隊持續發展方面，有沒有什麼我們應該留意的，以及這對你擔任執行長的任期可能意味著什麼。

No, it's exactly -- I think we try to be totally clear in the press release, which is what Marianne is an exceptional individual is a human being as a leader and is obviously an executive and but the Board made a decision to go ahead with making two co-presidents, which we'll be preparing them to do far more at the company to be prepared hasn't changed the timetable or anything, and obviously wish Marianne the best. As a result, she decided, when she knew about the plans, that she'd rather retire than stay here. That's it. No mystery.

沒有，這正是——我想我們在新聞稿裡已盡量說得非常清楚：Marianne是一位非常傑出的人，不論作為一個人、作為領導者，當然也是一位高階主管；但董事會做出決定，推動設立兩位共同總裁，我們將讓他們在公司承擔更多工作、為未來做好準備；這並未改變時間表或任何事情，當然也祝Marianne一切順利。因此，當她得知這些計畫後，她決定寧可退休也不願繼續留在這裡。就這樣。沒有什麼神祕之處。

Okay. Very good. And then just on the Jeremy, on your follow-up to the strength that you're seeing across investment banking and markets. Just I know it depends on conversion opportunities and just the environment, but this is clearly far higher level of activity than anyone would have expected. How do you judge the sustainability and how do you judge just how risk on are we across the various businesses?

好的。非常好。接著想請教Jeremy，關於你提到投資銀行與市場業務所見到的強勁動能。我知道這取決於轉換機會以及整體環境，但這顯然是遠高於任何人原先預期的活動水準。你如何判斷其可持續性？以及你如何評估我們在各項業務上的「risk-on」程度？

Yes. Good question, Ken. So I would actually bifurcate that a little bit between investment banking and markets. And then by historical standards, investment banking fees were fine, but they weren't at super peak levels. So they had some room to come off a little bit.

是的。好問題，Ken。因此我會把這個問題稍微分成投資銀行與市場兩部分來看。以歷史標準而言，投資銀行費用表現不錯，但並未處於超級高峰水準。所以仍有一些下滑的空間。

And so one of the things we looked at is like, okay, how much like cannibalization of the future pipeline might have happened for the acceleration this quarter, and/or to what extent would this quarter's results like particularly elevated as a result of some of the large high-profile IPOs and other capital raisings in particular.

因此我們觀察的一件事是：好吧，本季的加速是否在某種程度上「透支」了未來的案源管線，亦或本季的結果在多大程度上是因為一些大型、備受矚目的IPO以及其他募資活動而特別偏高。

And I think clearly, there was some pull forward. And clearly, the large deals contributed meaningfully to this quarter results. But at the same time, the pipeline is actually quite robust. And to some degree, it feels a little bit. I mean we're guessing here, obviously, but it feels a little bit as if the high-profile nature of the activity this quarter and just a generally robust environment is itself be getting more activity.

我認為很明顯確實有一些提前發生（pull forward）。而且很明顯，大型交易對本季業績有實質貢獻。但同時，案源管線其實相當強勁。而且在某種程度上，感覺有點……我的意思是我們當然是在猜測，但感覺本季活動的高能見度，以及整體強勁的環境，本身正在帶動更多活動。

So I obviously don't want to get into like guiding you. And in any case, we're just guessing. But that's maybe just a little bit of context about how we're thinking about the trade-off between the robustness of the pipeline and the fact that there was some pull forward and some kind of exceptional events this quarter.

所以我當然不想在這裡對你做任何指引。而且無論如何，我們也只是在猜。但這或許能提供一點背景，說明我們如何在「管線的強勁」與「本季確實有一些提前發生及一些例外事件」之間做權衡。

On the market side, I would probably separate between fixed income and equities. I mean all the normal caveats like we don't know, anything can happen. And clearly, markets revenues in general, have been quite elevated and strong for some time, although as we pointed out, that also is associated with much more financial resource deployment and support of our clients.

在市場業務方面，我大概會把固定收益與股票分開來看。我想還是要加上所有常見的但書：我們不知道，任何事都可能發生。而且很明顯，整體市場收入在一段時間以來都相當高且強勁；不過如我們所指出的，這也伴隨著投入更多金融資源來部署並支援客戶。

But I think the particular set of things that happened in equities this quarter, so a little bit hard to imagine that being repeated. But the background environment is quite supportive. So we'll see what happens. But in the end, we're just trying to serve the clients and manage the risk and get our pressure of the business. And overall, obviously, the environment feels pretty good.

但我認為，本季股票業務發生的那一組特定事件，要再重演有點難以想像。不過大環境仍相當有利。所以我們就看看會怎麼發展。但歸根結底，我們只是努力服務客戶、管理風險，並把業務的壓力測試做好。而整體而言，很明顯環境感覺相當不錯。

I guess you did say something about risk on, and you said how risk on are we? And not to be pedantic, but I think the question, the we matters, right? So the market is clearly extremely risk on and we're kind of takers of that. And we're trying to strike the right balance between supporting all our clients and being appropriately cautious in an environment that has some complicated dynamics on that.

我想你確實提到了一些關於「risk on」的事，你問我們有多「risk on」。我不是要咬文嚼字，但我認為問題在於「我們」指的是誰，對吧？市場顯然是極度偏好風險（risk on），而我們某種程度上是接受那樣的環境。我們正試著在支援所有客戶與在具有一些複雜動態的環境中保持適度謹慎之間，取得正確的平衡。

Chris McGrathy, KBW.

Chris McGrathy，KBW。

On deposits, what stuck out was slide 4 to me, the growth in CCB in the quarter. Interested in kind of the progression towards that 15% retail market share that you've talked about in the past and really how higher for longer may impact the pace of market share gains over time.

關於存款，我注意到第4頁投影片，本季CCB的成長很突出。我想了解你們過去談到的零售市占率達到15%的進展情況，以及「高利率維持更久」可能如何影響市占率隨時間提升的速度。

Sure. So let me just do near-term deposits for the company quickly. So -- and let me actually start with the wholesale. So wholesale deposit growth was quite strong this quarter actually and has been for the first half of the year. If you recall, last year was particularly strong.

當然。我先快速談一下公司短期的存款狀況。我先從批發端開始。本季批發存款成長其實相當強勁，而且今年上半年一直如此。如果你還記得，去年特別強。

I think this year, we were expecting it to be sort of fine but slightly less strong. And so far, the first half of the year has outperformed our expectations. Obviously, a lot of that is the strength of the franchise and winning deals and taking share, but some of it is also the kind of lending environment, particularly the sort of BFI space and a lot of the data center stuff, like however you look at it, you have a little bit of the dynamic of loans creating deposits, and that's going to disproportionately show up in wholesale. So that's probably a little bit of a tailwind for wholesale.

我想今年我們原本預期會還不錯，但會稍微沒那麼強。而到目前為止，今年上半年的表現超出我們的預期。很明顯，其中很大一部分來自特許經營體系（franchise）的實力、贏得交易並取得市占；但也有一部分與放款環境有關，特別是在BFI領域以及許多資料中心相關的案子——不管你怎麼看，都有一點「放款創造存款」的動態，而這會在批發端更不成比例地反映出來。所以這大概對批發端是些許順風。

On consumer, we talked about expecting low single-digit growth this year. And I think that expectation is still in effect. It's unchanged, which is good because I think there were some different moving pieces there, and they could have played out differently in some sense. But if you look at what those pieces were, it was fundamentally the balance between ongoing very robust net new checking account growth and the question of yields on flows and the impact that, that was having or not having on average balances per account.

在消費者端，我們談到今年預期是低個位數成長。我認為這個預期仍然成立。它沒有改變，這是好事，因為我認為那裡有一些不同的變動因素，某種意義上它們也可能以不同方式發展。但如果你看那些因素，本質上是「持續非常強勁的新開支票帳戶淨增」與「資金流向追逐收益（yields on flows）以及其對每戶平均餘額是否造成影響」之間的平衡。

And you saw obviously very strong net new checking account this quarter. And in light of the fact that the rate environment is a little bit more hawkish, yield taking flows are still a factor and probably a little bit of a risk. But on balance, the picture is in line with our expectations for this year, which is good.

而你也看到本季新開支票帳戶淨增非常強勁。鑑於利率環境稍微更偏鷹派，追逐收益的資金外流仍是一個因素，可能也帶來一些風險。但整體而言，情況與我們對今年的預期一致，這是好事。

And so then the question is, how does that all feed into the 15%? And what I would say about that is we feel great about the franchise, and we feel great about how everything is going. And there's no change to that sort of cope for aspiration. But I would think about that as a kind of natural long-term consequence of executing the strategy that we believe in across all the various components of it, our focus on primary bank relationships, branch expansion, deepening, product value proposition, et cetera. And so the view is that the 15% will be an outcome of that, and we still feel good about that.

那麼問題是，這一切如何導向15%？我對此想說的是，我們對這個franchise非常有信心，也對目前各方面的進展感到很滿意。而對那個目標性的願景並沒有改變。但我會把它視為一個自然的長期結果：也就是我們在各個組成面向上，持續執行我們所相信的策略——聚焦主要往來銀行關係、擴張分行、深化經營、強化產品價值主張等等。因此我們的看法是，15%會是上述策略執行的結果，而我們仍然對此感到樂觀。

That's great. And for my follow-up, a bigger picture question on the expenses. Really, the returns that you're getting from the branch build-out, the investments, the hire of the bankers. Ultimately, I guess the question is, where are we in the investment cycle? And really, how does it play into the operating leverage outlook over the medium term?

很好。那我的追問是關於費用的較宏觀問題。也就是你們從分行擴建、各項投資、以及聘用銀行家所獲得的回報。最終我想問的是：我們目前處於投資週期的哪個階段？以及它在中期的營運槓桿展望上會如何體現？

I would just say it's a complete continuation we've been doing for years. You shouldn't really expect any change.

我只想說，這完全是我們多年來一直在做的事情的延續。你不應該預期會有任何改變。

Yes. I mean, that's what I was going to say, too. I mean, obviously, there are other expense dynamics this quarter, which maybe I'll save for another question. But in the end, we're investing. We're always going to invest. It's been working and obviously, the returns so far speak for themselves.

是的。我的意思是，我本來也想這麼說。當然，本季還有其他費用面的動態，這部分我可能留到另一個問題再談。但歸根結底，我們在投資。我們永遠都會投資。而且這一直有效，顯然到目前為止的回報已經不言自明。

And I think that we've been saying for a long time is that the power of this franchise is such that we are able to aggressively invest for the future for the sake of generating future returns and to solidify the competitive position of the franchise, while still delivering exceptional current returns. And I think that would be true if we were delivering 15%, 16%, 17% returns. Obviously, when we're delivering these types of returns, it really is firing on all cylinders.

而且我認為我們長期以來一直在說，這個franchise的力量在於：我們能夠為了創造未來回報、鞏固franchise的競爭地位，而積極投資未來，同時仍能交出卓越的當期回報。我認為即便我們交出15%、16%、17%的回報，也會是如此。很明顯，當我們交出這種水準的回報時，確實是各方面都火力全開。

John McDonald, Truist Securities.

John McDonald，Truist Securities。

Jeremy, I was wondering if you could talk a little bit about the drivers of the upward revision to the ex-Markets NII, perhaps the cadence to in third quarter, fourth quarter as we think about the exit rate heading into next year.

Jeremy，我想請你談談非 Markets 的 NII 上修的驅動因素，或許也談談我們在思考明年進入時的退出水準（exit rate）時，第三季、第四季的節奏會是如何。

Yes. Sure, John. So yes, revising up from $95 billion to $96.5 billion for the full year, and you see our first half actual, so you can infer the second half. And as Jamie always likes to say, what matters is the run rates and the exit. And if you sort of do that math, it does suggest a higher exit run rate, which in the central case, assuming the yield curve plays out as the forwards currently forecast and deposit and other drivers are in line with our current expectations. That's what we would expect.

是的。當然可以，John。所以，是的，我們把全年預期從 950 億美元上修到 965 億美元，你也看到我們上半年實際數字，因此你可以推算下半年。而且如 Jamie 一向喜歡說的，重要的是運行率（run rate）以及退出水準（exit）。如果你做一下那個計算，確實顯示退出運行率會更高；在中性情境下，假設殖利率曲線如目前遠期所預測的那樣演進，且存款與其他驅動因素符合我們目前的預期。這就是我們所預期的。

Just mechanically, in terms of the drivers of the upward revision, the biggest single factor is deposit balances, I would say, across both wholesale and consumer both sort of the overall quantum of it, but also like mix shift inside of that in favor of slightly higher margin overall. And then rates are like a little bit higher than when we previously guided, both in the short end and in the back end.

就機械性地看，上修的驅動因素中，最大單一因素我會說是存款餘額，涵蓋批發與消費兩端：不只是總量（quantum），也包括其中的組合轉移（mix shift），整體上略偏向較高利差。另外，利率也比我們先前指引時略高，短端與長端都是。

And as you know, we've got sensitivity to both. And probably our actual sensitivity is a little bit more than the EAR suggests right now because of the outturn of the consumer betas relative to the model, and that difference is probably disproportionately in the front end. So when you assemble all that together, you have a little bit of the increase as a function of higher rates, but most of it is balances overall.

如你所知，我們對兩端都有敏感度。而且我們的實際敏感度可能比 EAR 目前所顯示的略高，原因在於消費端 beta 的實際結果相對於模型；而這個差異可能在前端（短端）占比更大。所以把這些合在一起，你會看到一小部分增幅來自利率較高，但大部分仍是整體餘額所帶動。

Okay. And then just to finish up on the NII. The market's NII has guided a bit higher, even though the outlook for rates is also a little bit higher. So I guess what are some of the drivers there? Is it balance sheet mix and some other factors?

好的。那最後再把 NII 談完。Markets 的 NII 指引也略為上調，儘管利率展望也稍微更高。所以我想問，背後有哪些驅動因素？是資產負債表組合以及其他因素嗎？

Yes, it's a great question, John. So yes, you correctly alluded to the fact that we've said previously that the market in number is actually liability sensitive, all else equal, also, obviously, in the context of what we always say, which is that in general, changes in the markets NII, especially when they are driven by rates are almost always fully offset on the bottom line through NIR.

是的，這是個很好的問題，John。所以，是的，你正確提到我們先前說過，Markets 這個數字在其他條件不變下其實是負債敏感（liability sensitive）；當然也要放在我們一貫強調的脈絡下：一般而言，Markets NII 的變動，特別是由利率驅動時，幾乎總會透過 NIR 在最終損益（bottom line）上被完全抵銷。

And so yes, you're right. This quarter, all else equal, based on the higher rates, you would have expected markets NII to be down. And instead, the forecast is up. And the difference is changes in balance sheet composition essentially expecting lower amounts of finance noninterest-bearing assets on the balance sheet in the second half of the year and at this level of rates, one balance sheet unit of that stuff drives the number, like quite a bit if you think about it and can overwhelm sort of the rate effect. So that's what's going on there.

所以，是的，你說得對。本季在其他條件不變下，基於利率更高，你原本會預期 Markets NII 會下降。但相反地，我們的預測是上升。差異在於資產負債表組成的變化：我們預期下半年資產負債表上以融資方式持有的無息資產（finance noninterest-bearing assets）金額會更低；在目前這個利率水準下，這類資產每減少一個資產負債表單位，對該數字的影響其實相當大，足以壓過利率效果。所以這就是那邊發生的事情。

If you -- to just indulge myself for 30 seconds. There's also another interesting nuance, which as you will have noted that we actually increased the equity allocation to the CIB this quarter for reasons that I think are pretty obvious in light of the amount of growth of supporting clients that we've done and the way that's playing through RWA.

如果你允許我多講 30 秒。還有另一個有趣的細節：你可能也注意到，我們本季提高了對 CIB 的股權配置（equity allocation），原因我想在我們支持客戶成長的幅度，以及這如何反映在 RWA 上，都相當明顯。

And the consequence of that is to move some equity essentially out of corporate into the CIB and a lot of those markets that obviously comes with a little bit of NII. And so that NII is moving out of NII ex into markets NII.

其結果是把部分股權基本上從公司（corporate）移到 CIB，而其中有不少是在 Markets；這當然會帶來一點 NII。因此，這部分 NII 會從非 Markets 的 NII 轉移到 Markets NII。

And so it's sort of a rare exception to the rule that changes in markets NII are offset in the bottom line. This piece, which betas quite small, it's probably like $150 million is part of the increase that we would not expect to be offset on the bottom line all those equals. And so obviously, it's left pocket, right pocket at the level of the company.

所以這算是「Markets NII 的變動會在最終損益被抵銷」這個規則的一個少見例外。這一塊 beta 很小，可能大約 1.5 億美元，是增幅的一部分；在其他條件不變下，我們不預期它會在最終損益被抵銷。當然，在公司層級看就是左口袋、右口袋。

Erika Najarian, UBS.

Erika Najarian，UBS。

I just had one question. I do want to revisit the succession line of questioning because it is so critical for a lot of your current investor base. And so Jamie, I guess, maybe re-asking the question in a different way. What characteristics are you and the Board looking for in terms of the new leader of JPMorgan. What do you think makes an exceptional CEO in the future as you pass the baton on?

我只有一個問題。我確實想回到接班這條提問，因為這對你們目前許多投資人基礎來說非常關鍵。所以 Jamie，我想也許用不同方式再問一次。你和董事會在尋找摩根大通新領導人時，會看重哪些特質？當你把接力棒交出去時，你認為未來什麼樣的人才算是卓越的 CEO？

And additionally, I think that some of your investors may have read the announcement, particularly Marianne's departure as sort of an extension of your tenure. And I'm wondering if we should think about your remaining tenure is more fixed or if investors are still thinking about a more rolling type of retirement date and a longer stay as executive chair?

另外，我想有些投資人可能讀了那則公告，特別是 Marianne 的離任，並把它視為你任期延長的一部分。我想請問，我們是否應把你剩餘任期視為較固定，或投資人仍應以較「滾動式」的退休時間點來看待，以及你以執行董事長身分更長時間留任的可能性？

And so the question to that is, though, the timing is essentially the same. Obviously, completely up to the Board, but it hasn't changed. It's just a natural change that we have to go to about how we go about this. And -- but the -- look, that question is obviously critical, but I've always said it's -- you want to be good at management, you want to be good at people, you want to be analytical, you want to be detailed, you want to be a culture carrier, you want to be curious, you want to have heart, you want to grit, you want to have soul, you want to have work ethic, you want to be able to travel, you want to be able to walk in operating centers and be with CEOs and Prime Ministers. It's all of that.

所以對那個問題的回答是：時間點基本上是一樣的。當然，完全取決於董事會，但並沒有改變。這只是我們在推進這件事的方式上，一個自然的變化。而且——但——你看，那個問題顯然很關鍵，但我一直說，你要擅長管理、擅長帶人、要有分析能力、要注重細節、要能承載並傳遞文化、要有好奇心、要有熱忱、要有韌性、要有靈魂、要有工作倫理、要能出差、要能走進營運中心，也要能和 CEO 以及總理會面。就是所有這些。

I mean I could give you a long list of stuff, but it's all of that. At the end of the day, we're blessed with a lot of people who are great culture carriers across a broad spectrum. No one has all those things in a perfect way. And some of the things you learn and some of those things you get better at.

我的意思是，我可以給你一長串清單，但就是所有這些。歸根結底，我們很幸運，在廣泛的範圍內有很多人都是很好的文化承載者。沒有人能把所有這些都做到完美。有些是你在過程中學到的，有些你也會變得更擅長。

And -- but you know when you see and we have two exceptional co-presidents, we have other people at the company who are great culture carriers, but that's what you want. And you want it across the whole company, not weighted to investment banking or trading or just big CEOs, but also weighted to the fact that we've got 300,000 employees around the world. In our branches, we have 50,000 top-notch people. In our operating centers and our call centers, we have 150,000 people. You have to be a flexible mind to deal with this new growing complex world.

而且——但你知道，當你看到時就會知道；我們有兩位傑出的共同總裁，我們公司也有其他很好的文化承載者，這就是你想要的。而且你希望這種能力覆蓋整個公司，而不是偏重投資銀行、交易或只偏重大型企業 CEO；同時也要考量我們在全球有 30 萬名員工。在我們的分行，我們有 5 萬名一流的人才。在我們的營運中心與客服中心，我們有 15 萬人。你必須有彈性的思維，才能應對這個正在成長且日益複雜的新世界。

And we have teams of people. And as you know, I think it's important we pointed out that we're blessed to have Jen Piepszak, the Chief Operating Officer; and Mary Erdoes continuing to run Asset and Wealth Management. So it's a great team of people, which I am fully confident if I was hit by a truck, which is not my preference, we would be fine.

而且我們有一整套團隊。如你所知，我認為重要的是我們也指出，我們很幸運擁有營運長 Jen Piepszak；以及 Mary Erdoes 持續領導資產與財富管理。所以這是一個很棒的團隊；我完全有信心，如果我被卡車撞了——這不是我的偏好——我們也會沒問題。

Just wanted to unpack -- sorry, I am going to ask a follow-up question. What do you mean by no change in timing?

我只是想釐清一下——抱歉，我要再追問一個問題。你所說的時點沒有改變，是什麼意思？

Exactly what we said last time. whatever I said last time is that time fails essentially the same. Several years, you can use a few years, you can use plus or minus or obviously, it's totally up to the Board, not up to me.

就跟我們上次說的一模一樣。我上次說的意思是，時點基本上不變。幾年，你可以用幾年，也可以用正負幾年——當然，完全取決於董事會，不取決於我。

Jim Mitchell, Seaport Global Securities.

Jim Mitchell，Seaport Global Securities。

Okay. Just Jeremy, maybe a follow-up on the expense question and operating leverage question earlier. I understand completely longer term can generate perpetual operating leverage. But if we look at year-to-date results, it's been a strong revenue environment, but I think operating leverage on an adjusted basis was negative. You alluded to some expense one-offs potentially. No question you're investing heavily and should be.

好的。Jeremy，我想就先前的費用問題與營運槓桿問題再追問一下。我完全理解，長期而言可以帶來持續性的營運槓桿。但如果看年初至今的結果，營收環境很強，但我認為在調整後口徑下，營運槓桿是負的。你提到可能有一些一次性的費用因素。毫無疑問，你們正在大力投資，而且也應該如此。

So I get all that. But I just want to think about the benefits of AI and technology generally. Is there a time over the intermediate term where you think expense growth could slow a little and operating leverage kind of becomes more likely in a period of time over the next few years?

所以這些我都理解。但我想從 AI 與科技的一般效益來思考。在中期的某個時間點，你是否認為費用成長可能會稍微放緩一些，並且在未來幾年內，營運槓桿在某段時間變得更有可能出現？

I'm just going to answer that by saying when you have great returns and very good margins, which actually went up this quarter, not down, the notion that somehow you can further increase your operating leverage is a crazy notion. We don't have that.

我就這樣回答：當你已經有很好的報酬與非常好的利潤率——而且其實本季利潤率是上升不是下降——還認為能進一步提高營運槓桿，這種想法很瘋狂。我們不會那樣做。

I think it's part of the reason why banks failed if you go back 20 years ago, we're never going to have that point of view. And AI will have its gives and takes. So we can't project. I do think you might actually see a slowdown in growth, maybe a slowdown in '27 or '28, but the teams are looking at all of our opportunities and we pointed out over and over again when we have an opportunity to spend more money in marketing with a positive ROI, we're going to do it.

我認為這也是為什麼如果你回頭看 20 年前，銀行會倒閉的一部分原因——我們永遠不會抱持那種觀點。而 AI 也會有利有弊。所以我們無法預測。我確實認為你可能會看到成長放緩，或許在 2027 或 2028 年會放緩；但團隊正在檢視我們所有的機會，而且我們一再指出，只要我們有機會在行銷上多花錢且 ROI 為正，我們就會去做。

We're not going to have false god. We have to pray that we can't do something really smart. I've also pointed out over and continuously some expenses, if you accounted for those investments that they have very good returns, but they're expense in the short run.

我們不會去崇拜虛假的神。我們不會祈禱說自己做不出真正聰明的事。我也一再、持續指出，有些費用如果你把那些投資納入考量，它們的報酬非常好，但短期內會以費用形式呈現。

And so AI still remains to be seen because the other thing I think about AI, which is a little bit different than everybody else, is you don't uniquely benefit from AI. The ultimate beneficiary of AI will be our customers. And in a competitive capitalist world, we always use AI to do a better job for the customers, and we can't just say, oh, it's going to increase our margins and we're going to keep that. If that were true, our margins would be 80% today because of computerization over the last 20 years.

因此 AI 仍有待觀察；因為我對 AI 的另一個看法——跟大家有點不同——是你不會因 AI 而獨享好處。AI 的最終受益者會是我們的客戶。在競爭的資本主義世界裡，我們總是用 AI 把客戶服務做得更好；我們不能只是說，喔，它會提高我們的利潤率，然後我們把好處都留著。如果那是真的，因為過去 20 年的電腦化，我們今天的利潤率早就會是 80% 了。

Yeah. Well, all fair. Appreciate it. Just maybe a quick one on regulation. Is there any update on the thoughts on potential for adjustments to the regulatory proposals? Since I know you and your peers have been particularly vocal around the G-SIB surcharge, and some elements of Basel III. Just curious if there's been any developments there.

是的。好，這些都很合理。謝謝。再快速問一個監管方面的問題。對於監管提案可能進行調整的想法，有沒有任何最新進展？因為我知道你和同業對 G-SIB 附加費以及巴塞爾協議 III 的一些要素特別直言不諱。只是想了解那邊是否有任何發展。

There are four obvious changes they should make. And I think it's unfair when I hear them say, they should do the numbers the right way. And you guys should demand it, do the numbers the right way and they think they want to be more conservative, they should add conservatism. They should not do the numbers in a false way to make the number higher. I just think that's intellectual clarity and honesty and stuff like that.

他們有四個很明顯應該做的改變。而且我覺得不公平的是，我聽到他們說：他們應該把數字算對。你們也應該要求他們把數字算對；如果他們想更保守，就應該加入保守性。他們不應該用不實的方式去算數字，讓數字變得更高。我認為那只是智識上的清晰與誠實之類的基本要求。

They have -- they should get rid of the double accounted operating risk capital. They should get rid of double count in market risk capital.

他們——他們應該取消重複計入的作業風險資本。他們也應該取消市場風險資本的重複計算。

We have $80 billion or more now of market risk capital and the biggest quarterly loss we ever had was $1.4 billion. Even the CCAR market loss, I think, is like $14 billion or $15 billion. And so they should adjust the G-SIB, the way they're supposed to going back to 2015 and they should change the way to doing short-term wholesale funding to be fair to everybody.

我們現在有 800 億美元或更多的市場風險資本，而我們史上最大的單季虧損也只有 14 億美元。甚至 CCAR 的市場損失，我記得也就大概 140 億或 150 億美元。所以他們應該調整 G-SIB，按照他們本來就應該做的方式，回到 2015 年的做法；而且他們應該改變短期批發融資的計算方式，對所有人都公平。

Those are the things they should do the numbers should be the number. If they think we sold more capital, they should ask us it's all 10% more, and I'd be happy to do that. But I'm not happy to have these numbers falsely done.

這些就是他們應該做的事——數字就應該是數字本身。如果他們認為我們應該持有更多資本，他們可以要求我們多 10%，我也很樂意照做。但我不樂意看到這些數字被用不實的方式算出來。

Yes. And just to briefly add on short-term wholesale funding. I think there's an important point there in terms of the competitive dynamics that we were really quite explicit about in our comment letter, which I would encourage our own to read because it's a nuanced thing, but I think if you go through it, it makes the point very clearly.

是的。再簡短補充一下短期批發融資。我認為那裡有一個很重要的點，關於競爭動態；我們在意見函中其實講得非常清楚——我會鼓勵大家去讀，因為這是個細緻的議題——但我認為你若仔細看，會發現它把重點講得很清楚。

And what they wound up doing with this change to the short-term wholesale funding is essentially increase the burden on banks like us and Bank of America that have both markets and banking businesses as well as traditional consumer businesses, disproportionately relative to our former investment bank competitors who have different business mix.

而他們最後對短期批發融資所做的這項變更，本質上是提高了像我們和美國銀行這種同時擁有市場業務與銀行業務、以及傳統消費金融業務的銀行的負擔；相較之下，對我們過去的投資銀行競爭對手——因為其業務組合不同——造成的影響不成比例地更小。

And I guess, conceivably, someone could want that as a policy outcome. I don't understand why you would want that as a policy outcome because is disproportionately damaging the ability of banks to serve mainstream.

我想，理論上，可能有人會希望這成為一種政策結果。但我不理解為什麼你會希望這成為政策結果，因為這會不成比例地損害銀行服務主流客群的能力。

But if that's what someone wants, they should say it. And if that's not what they want, then they shouldn't let it happen by accident as a result of like a seemingly very technical thing like removing RWA from the denominator of the short-term wholesale funding contribution to the GSIB score. I mean this is a little bit of what Jamie talks about when he's saying like, do the numbers right and just be clear about your policy objectives.

但如果這就是某些人想要的，他們就應該明說。如果那不是他們想要的，那他們就不應該讓它因為一個看似非常技術性的事情而「意外」發生，例如把 RWA 從短期批發融資對 GSIB 分數貢獻的分母中移除。我的意思是，這有點呼應 Jamie 所說的：把數字算對，並且清楚說明你的政策目標。

Matt O'Connor, Deutsche Bank.

Matt O'Connor，德意志銀行。

It seems like everything is firing on most or all cylinders, trading, investment banking, lending, credit. Is this as good as it gets? Or -- and I know you've kind of flagged some of the risks out there. But is there also an argument you made that were earlier cycle given AI and what seems likely to be a big increase in global defense spending, global supply chain management? As we put all that together, what are your thoughts?

看起來幾乎所有或大多數業務都火力全開：交易、投資銀行、放款、信用。這是否已經是最好的狀態了？或者——我知道你們也提到了一些外部風險——但是否也可以主張，考量 AI，以及看起來很可能會大幅增加的全球國防支出、全球供應鏈管理，我們其實還在週期的早期？把這些都放在一起，你的看法是什麼？

It's getting close to as good as it gets. We just don't know how long it's going to last.

已經接近最好的狀態了。我們只是不知道這能持續多久。

Okay. And then the rate expectations continue to move all over the place out there and you show that your kind of well positioned for higher rates and you make more money. But is there a tipping point where the deposit behavior changes both from a volume perspective and then betas, which you alluded to earlier, better than expected so far. But if we go up a certain amount, do you think there could be a meaningful change in that?

好的。另外，市場對利率的預期仍在大幅波動；你們也顯示自己在較高利率環境下的配置相當有利，能賺更多錢。但是否存在一個臨界點，到了那裡存款行為會改變——不論是量的角度，或是你先前提到、目前為止優於預期的 beta（存款利率傳導係數）？如果利率上升到某個幅度，你認為那可能會出現顯著變化嗎？

Yes. That's a good question actually, Matt. And I think the short answer is like we don't really know. And if you'd asked me that question a couple of years ago, I would have said that, that you're essentially asking a question about the complexity of the rate paid dynamic, especially for consumer deposits, the negative contract to be specific. And if you'd asked me that at the beginning of this rate cycle, I would have said that we would be experiencing that effect right now, and we're not.

是的。這其實是個好問題，Matt。我想簡短的答案是：我們其實也不太確定。如果你在幾年前問我這個問題，我會說，你本質上是在問「支付利率」動態的複雜性，特別是針對消費者存款，具體來說是負向合約（negative contract）。如果你在這一輪利率循環一開始問我，我會說我們現在就會感受到那個效應，但事實上我們並沒有。

But just from a common sense perspective, like you have to believe that at some point, that kicks in. So when we do our stress testing and when we think about not just like a slightly more elevated inflation environment and a slightly more aggressive response from the Fed, but something that's like meaningfully different. It's a true stress test with an actual change in regime. One of the things that we look at and stress is like, okay, at what point do you have that kind of like acceleration in rate paid as a result of that type of environment.

但從常識角度來看，你必須相信在某個時間點，那個效應會開始發生。所以當我們做壓力測試、思考的不只是略高的通膨環境與聯準會稍微更強硬的反應，而是那種「顯著不同」的情境時，那會是一個真正的壓力測試，伴隨實際的體制轉變。我們會觀察並施壓的一件事是：在那種環境下，支付利率會在什麼點位開始出現那種加速上升。

And that's one of the reasons why it's important not to be naive about higher rates because if you simply take our current EAR, even recognizing that locally, the empirical EAR is probably higher than our reported EAR and you ignore the convexity dynamics, you could convince yourself that 7% rate environment is great. And obviously, that wouldn't be true if you had to do a massive reprice deposit franchise in order to protect it essentially.

這也是為什麼面對更高利率時，不能天真看待；因為如果你只是拿我們目前的EAR（有效年利率），即便承認在本地層面、經驗觀察到的EAR可能高於我們揭露的EAR，然後又忽略凸性（convexity）動態，你可能會說服自己：7%的利率環境很棒。但顯然，如果你必須大幅重新定價整個存款特許經營（deposit franchise）來本質上保護它，那就不會是真的很棒。

We do assume some of that.

我們確實會假設其中一部分。

It's something that we think about. It's in the models. It's very much like part of the discipline. But the question is when and -- and obviously, there's the larger question of the competitive dynamics and the full value proposition of the deposit franchise, especially in consumer.

這是我們會思考的事情。它在模型裡。這非常是我們紀律的一部分。但問題在於何時會發生——而且顯然，還有更大的問題是競爭動態，以及存款特許經營的完整價值主張，尤其是在消費者端。

Mike Mayo, Wells Fargo.

Mike Mayo，富國銀行。

In response to the earlier question, you were asked about operating negative is negative, and you gave the reasons for that. But is operating negative the way you look at things? I mean, when you grow revenues 15% core year over year, percentage-wise, it's negative, but dollar wise, I think it's positive when I look at slide 2. And I don't know why -- I'm not going to create the narrative for you, but even if you take out those numbers, if you --

回應先前的問題，你被問到營運槓桿為負是否就是負的，你也說明了原因。但你們看事情的方式就是用「營運槓桿為負」來看嗎？我的意思是，當你們核心營收年增15%時，從百分比來看是負的，但從金額來看，我看第2頁投影片覺得是正的。而且我不知道為什麼——我不打算替你們編故事，但即使把那些數字拿掉，如果你--

It definitely was positive. Let me -- can I just point out another thing, it was positive, but when revenues go up 10%, like our -- if your general -- if your overhead -- if your margin overall is 25%, when revenues go up 10%, the marginal return on that, so not an now the overhead is going to be a lot more than 25%, people trying to forget -- but obviously, a rapid increase in revenue drives a big increase in operating leverage.

確實是正的。我先——我可以再指出另一件事嗎？它是正的，但當營收增加10%時——像我們——如果你的整體——如果你的管理費用——如果你的整體利潤率是25%，當營收增加10%時，那部分的邊際回報，所以不是——現在管理費用會遠高於25%，大家常常忘了——但顯然，營收快速上升會帶來營運槓桿的大幅提升。

Yes. So I agree with what Jamie just said and maybe just since we've tried a couple of questions about this. And obviously, we did revise up this year's expense guidance by $2.5 billion, which is not a trivial number. So maybe I can piece all this together to add a little clarity here.

是的。所以我同意Jamie剛才說的，而且也許因為我們已經被問了幾個相關問題。而且很明顯，我們把今年的費用指引上修了25億美元，這不是個小數字。所以也許我可以把這些拼在一起，讓這裡更清楚一些。

So first of all, if you remember, the guidance that we gave in the fourth quarter last year are for the full year for the company. And if you made some kind of like reasonable assumptions about what type of market environment and NIR ex-markets for the rest of the company at the time and you build out your models or whatever. I don't remember exactly what you had, Mike, but I'm sure that the consensus was for meaningful negative operating leverage in this year's numbers, however, defined.

首先，如果你還記得，我們去年第四季給的指引是針對公司全年的。而如果你當時對公司其他業務的市場環境、以及NIR（不含市場業務）做一些合理假設，然後建立你的模型之類的。我不記得你當時的數字是什麼，Mike，但我確定市場共識是：今年的數字會出現顯著的負向營運槓桿，不管你怎麼定義。

And that's why a company update, I gave the long speech about sort of what Jamie always says about why operating leverage in the long term for the cycle is not a thing. Now for a company like us anyway producing the types of returns that we're producing.

這也是為什麼在公司更新時，我做了那段長篇說明，談到Jamie常說的：從長期、以整個循環來看，營運槓桿並不是一個重點。至少對像我們這樣、能產出我們目前這種報酬的公司而言。

Now -- and the root cause of that was essentially that as Jamie just said, like there's a fixed expense base and there's a variable expense base, the variable expense base is disproportionally associated with the kind of capital markets complex, broadly defined. And we were in a moment where coming out of the back of the rate hiking cycle and relatively modest deposit growth, et cetera, the NII was still working its way out of the headwinds.

而其根本原因基本上是，正如Jamie剛才說的：費用基礎有固定費用與變動費用；變動費用與資本市場綜合業務（廣義定義）有不成比例的關聯。而當時我們正處在一個時點：在升息循環後段、存款成長相對溫和等等情況下，淨利息收入（NII）仍在逐步走出逆風。

In the meantime, we had inflation and investment and the usual stuff driving the expense base. So that sort of was the operating leverage picture for the year. To Jamie's point, since then, in the first half of this year, the capital markets complex has outperformed our then expectations by $6.5 billion. And we have booked in the first half of the year, $1.5 billion of additional expenses associated with that. So that says a lot about that kind of like marginal operating leverage point. And then -- so therefore, of the 2.5% that we increased guidance, 1.5% is essentially already booked and a direct sort of happy consequence of the exceptionally strong performance.

同時，我們有通膨、投資以及一貫的因素推升費用基礎。所以那就是今年的營運槓桿圖像。依Jamie的觀點，自那之後，在今年上半年，資本市場綜合業務的表現比我們當時的預期高出65億美元。而我們在上半年也認列了15億美元與此相關的額外費用。這對那種邊際營運槓桿的觀點很能說明問題。因此，在我們上修指引的2.5%之中，1.5%基本上已經認列，且是極為強勁表現帶來的直接、令人高興的結果。

And then yes, we've implicitly added $1 billion for the second half of the year. And there are some nuances. I wouldn't draw too many conclusions from that in terms of our expectations about the revenue environment because there are some other factors and there's some timing or whatever. But at a high level, that gives you the picture of the second half of the year will be whether it will be. And I think when you look at returns, overhead ratio, any metric that your updated model actually for this year, it's obviously exceptional performance principally through the lines of like returns, which is what actually matters.

然後是的，我們也在下半年隱含增加了10億美元。其中有一些細節。我不會因此就對我們對營收環境的預期下太多結論，因為還有其他因素，也有一些時點差異之類的。但從高層次來看，這讓你看到下半年大概會是什麼樣子。而我認為，當你看報酬、費用率（overhead ratio）、以及你更新後模型裡今年的任何指標時，顯然都是卓越表現，主要體現在報酬這些線上，而那才是真正重要的。

There's a little bit of that in Asset & Wealth Management, a little bit of that in credit card spend, a little bit of that other parts of the business --

在資產與財富管理（Asset & Wealth Management）有一點，在信用卡消費（spend）有一點，在業務的其他部分也有一點--

Yes. And that's why I say the capital market is complex. It's really the whole competition as well.

是的。所以我才說是資本市場「綜合體」。其實也包含整體競爭。

Yes, exactly.

是的，沒錯。

So your marginal margin based on the number you just gave is on that? And so how is -- why is that as good as it gets? Are you referring to the revenue environment, maybe as good as it gets, Jamie? Or are you just being conservative or what?

所以依你剛才給的數字，你們的邊際利潤率是在那上面？那麼——為什麼那就是最好的狀況了？Jamie，你指的是營收環境可能已經是最好了？還是你只是比較保守，或是怎樣？

No, I just think we're in a very healthy active exuberant market with very high prices and very high volumes, and we benefit from that. We just don't know how long it will continue. Could it get a lot better than this, it can get better. But how much better, I don't know.

不，我只是覺得我們正處在一個非常健康、活躍、甚至有些亢奮的市場，價格很高、量也很大，而我們從中受益。只是我們不知道這會持續多久。它能不能比現在更好？可以更好。但能好多少，我不知道。

And then the second question does relate to the management changes and Troy taking over the consumer bank and we don't know Troy as well as we did Marianne, and you have a lot more information internally. But to oversimplify and exaggerate, and we have FX trader now selling mortgages, credit cards and deposits. And I'm being simplistic for a reason, but what gives you confidence that Troy is the right person to run the consumer business when he doesn't have that experience in the past?

第二個問題與管理層變動有關：Troy接手消費金融銀行，而我們不像認識Marianne那樣認識Troy，你們內部掌握的資訊更多。但如果我過度簡化並誇張一點：我們現在讓一位外匯交易員去賣房貸、信用卡和存款。我刻意用簡化的說法是有原因的，但當Troy過去沒有那方面經驗時，你們憑什麼有信心他是經營消費者業務的合適人選？

Yes. Mike, it's a great question. First of all, like I mentioned how you evaluate people, if they're analytics, is the brain power EQ, it's their heart, they're sold, the culture carrier. Can they walk into operating -- so he's exhibited that in markets in investment banking, they remember even the IP is an extensive operations function and our back office function technology function where he's exhibited great expertise. We're completely comfortable with that.

是的。Mike，這是個很好的問題。首先，如同我提到你如何評估人才，如果他們偏分析型，是腦力、情商（EQ），還是他們的熱忱；他們是否買單、是否是文化的傳承者。他能否走進營運——他在市場與投資銀行領域已展現過；你要記得，即使是 IP 也包含龐大的營運職能，以及我們的後台職能、科技職能，而他在這些方面都展現了很強的專業能力。我們對此完全放心。

I do think it's very important that people have experience across the company. And when I've seen investment banks, big banks taken over by someone only from the investment bank who only cares about the investment bank, believe me, the rest of the franchise can suffer. You need to respect for the rest of the franchise.

我確實認為，人們在公司內部擁有跨部門經驗非常重要。而當我看到投資銀行、大型銀行由一位只來自投資銀行、只在乎投資銀行的人接掌時，相信我，其他業務版圖可能會受苦。你需要尊重公司其他業務版圖。

So I think it's great for him. It's great for the company. He's already excited. He's always been to branches and out and about. And he'll take it hopefully upward on and upward.

所以我認為這對他很棒。對公司也很棒。他已經很興奮。他一直都會去分行、到處走動。而他會把它帶向更高的層次，希望能一路向上。

And Mike, just a minor correction, Troy, with no offense intended to my old good friends who are foreign exchange spot traders, but Troy was actually an options trader, which is also where I started. So I think you would want me to correct the record on that.

另外 Mike，小小更正一下，Troy——無意冒犯我那些做外匯即期交易的老朋友——但 Troy 其實是做選擇權交易的，而那也是我起步的地方。所以我想你會希望我把這點更正一下。

Saul Martinez, HSBC.

Saul Martinez，匯豐（HSBC）。

I have a broader question on AI. And it is -- is there an argument that we're vastly underestimating the potential benefits to efficiency and its impacts on how companies can run their businesses. I know Block is a really different animal than you are on a lot of levels, but they argue they cut 40% of their workforce at given the advancement in AI tools, it look at their organizational structure with a blank sheet of paper they can be much leaner and not sacrifice on product velocity and commercial outcomes.

我有一個關於 AI 的更廣泛問題。也就是——是否有一種可能：我們大幅低估了 AI 對效率提升的潛在好處，以及它對企業如何營運其業務的影響。我知道 Block 在很多層面上跟你們很不一樣，但他們主張，隨著 AI 工具的進步，他們裁減了 40% 的人力；如果用一張白紙重新檢視組織架構，他們可以更精簡，同時不犧牲產品迭代速度與商業成果。

And I guess I'm asking if you think there could be a parallel with banks where you can operate with a different structure, be much more agile, be more efficient over time? I know it's a sensitive topic, but curious how you think about these questions and how you're positioning yourself for this world.

我想問的是，你是否認為銀行也可能有類似情況：可以用不同的架構來運作，變得更敏捷、並隨時間推進更有效率？我知道這是敏感議題，但我很好奇你如何看待這些問題，以及你們如何為這樣的世界做定位與準備。

So it's not a sensitive topic at all. We are going to use AI to do a better job for our clients. That's our job. We fully expect it will have huge efficiency in certain parts of the company. And we analyze it all the time. I think we've mentioned in the past, we spent quite a bit of money on it.

所以這完全不是敏感議題。我們會使用 AI，為客戶做得更好。這就是我們的工作。我們完全預期它會在公司某些部分帶來巨大的效率提升。而我們一直在分析這件事。我想我們過去也提過，我們在這上面投入了不少資金。

We have a lot of NPVs that we know we have the whole company is working at this at this point, and there are -- I think there's almost 1,000 use cases today, though, we say that really important ones are 50 across risk, fraud, marketing, hedging, prospecting, note-taking, idea generation, document reading, and it's kind of just starting.

我們有很多我們已知的 NPV（淨現值）專案；此刻全公司都在做這件事，而且——我想目前幾乎有 1,000 個使用案例；不過我們會說真正重要的大概是 50 個，涵蓋風險、詐欺、行銷、避險、客戶開發、筆記整理、點子生成、文件閱讀等等，而這才剛開始。

So we do expect that. I think you have to put in the back of your mind that there are areas where we may just accelerate what we do that we want to get done anyway. Think of a certain applications and customer-facing things and stuff like that. We are preparing to make sure we can retrain our people. And we have had discrete areas where we did reduce jobs by 30% or 40%. And most of those people offer jobs elsewhere.

所以我們確實預期會如此。我認為你也要在心裡記著，有些領域我們可能只是加速推進那些本來就想完成的事情。想想某些應用、面向客戶的功能之類。我們正在準備，確保能重新訓練我們的員工。而我們也曾在一些特定領域把職位減少 30% 或 40%。其中大多數人我們都提供了公司內其他職位。

So we do expect that. I also think that over time, remember, this will be offered to smaller competitors to through Fiserv and FIS and other fintech kind companies. And over time, we've been doing this nonstop for 25 years with just large computers and mainframes and APIs and various tools and tricks for us have always been trying to create more efficient and stuff like this. This will be faster.

所以我們確實預期會如此。我也認為，隨著時間推進，這些能力也會透過 Fiserv、FIS 以及其他金融科技公司提供給較小的競爭者。而長期來看，我們 25 年來一直不間斷地做這件事——用大型電腦、主機、API，以及各種工具與方法——我們一直在努力提升效率、做出類似的改進。而這次會更快。

This would be dramatic. The whole company is involved in when we have our upside in July, you can imagine this is a big topic everywhere from front office to mid-office to back office to marketing to risk, you name the subject and more to come, but we're kind of in the midst of this mini revolution, and we'll report to you.

這會是劇烈的變化。全公司都投入其中；當我們在 7 月做年度策略會（upside）時，你可以想像這會是個大議題，從前台到中台到後台，從行銷到風險，你說得出來的主題都有，而且後續還會更多；我們正處於這場小型革命的進行中，我們也會向各位回報。

But I do also want to point out maybe you could be ahead of other people kind of, but what always happens is the benefit accrues to the customer, not to the JPMorgan in this case. Because other people are doing the same thing and presuming at least to lower cost and lower error rates and a bunch of things. You can't just say, well, you're always going to go to 50% stay there. if we had a 50% ROE growing at 10% a year, you probably have 50 or 60 years, you'd probably be 100% of the GDP of the United States of America.

但我也想指出，也許你可能會在某種程度上領先其他人，但通常發生的情況是：效益會歸於客戶，而不是在這個案例中的摩根大通。因為其他人也在做同樣的事，至少會帶來更低成本、更低錯誤率，以及一堆其他改善。你不能只說，好吧，你永遠都會維持 50% 並停在那裡。若我們有 50% 的 ROE（股東權益報酬率）且每年成長 10%，大概 50 或 60 年後，你可能就會變成美國 GDP 的 100%。

Yes. Okay. A follow-up on equities. And I think, Jeremy, you said, if I recall correctly, that the particular set of things that happened this quarter are difficult to see repeated.

是的。好的。接著追問一下股票業務。我想 Jeremy，你說過——如果我沒記錯——本季發生的這一組特定因素，很難再度重演。

Can you just maybe elaborate on what was most exceptional this quarter. I think some of your peers have talked about Asia, prime brokerage there. And I think you mentioned derivatives and cash being strong, but is there any areas or products or geographies that were particularly noteworthy in terms of the strength this quarter that may be difficult to sustain going forward?

你能否再多說明一下，本季最不尋常的是什麼？我想你的一些同業談到亞洲、那邊的主經紀業務（prime brokerage）。我也記得你提到衍生品與現貨表現強勁；但是否有任何領域、產品或地區，本季的強度特別值得注意，而未來可能難以維持？

Yes. I mean there's really not a lot like behind my comment. It's essentially what you would get from asking any of the commercial AI models, this question and the two-year-old -- two stages, old version of the model. In other words, it's all the obvious stuff that's been heavily reported, like -- we had some major IPOs. We had some major index rebalancing.

是的。我的評論背後其實沒有太多玄機。基本上，你問任何商用 AI 模型這個問題——甚至是兩年前、較早兩代的模型——你得到的也會是類似答案。換句話說，就是那些已被大量報導的顯而易見的事情，例如——我們有一些大型 IPO。我們有一些大型指數再平衡。

We had some very complicated dynamics in Korean equity market. There's been a lot of activity in Asia. The overall environment has been dynamic and interesting across a whole variety of dimensions. The clients have been extremely active.

我們在韓國股票市場看到一些非常複雜的動態。亞洲有很多活動。整體環境在各種面向都很動態、也很有意思。客戶非常活躍。

So it's like -- it's all the headlines basically that have driven the market. And of course, that could obviously repeat, but I just think like statistically, it seems improbable that particular combination of effect to repeat itself.

所以——基本上就是所有推動市場的新聞標題。當然，那些事情顯然可能再度發生，但我只是覺得，從統計上看，那種特定的組合效應再次出現的機率不高。

And you guys -- those who pay attention, you can see most of this on a daily basis from volumes in the New York Stock Exchange, the CME buying through hedge funds, Hikari's not a secret, margin loans, you can see a lot of it taking place during the course of the quarter.

而你們——那些有在關注的人——其實每天都能從紐約證券交易所的成交量、CME 的交易、透過避險基金的買盤、Hikari（這不是秘密）、融資融券貸款等看到其中大部分；你可以看到很多事情在本季期間發生。

Ebrahim Poonawal, Bank of America.

Ebrahim Poonawal，美國銀行（Bank of America）。

I guess maybe a lot of discussion on the strong Wall Street backdrop. Maybe, Jeremy, just talk about the main street part of the US economy. There is a sense that there's a fragility when you look at housing, real estate rates potentially could go higher. Give us a sense around what you're seeing from on the consumer side, the ability to sort of pull forward and resiliency if rates go up?

我想目前很多討論都聚焦在華爾街強勁的背景。也許 Jeremy，你談談美國經濟的「主街」（Main Street）那一部分。有一種感覺是，當你看住房、房地產時，存在某種脆弱性，而且利率可能還會更高。請你談談你在消費者端看到的情況：如果利率上升，消費者提前消費的能力，以及其韌性如何？

And are you seeing any broadening in CapEx beyond AI? Or is it very AI-centric in terms of what you're seeing on even commercial lending activity.

您是否看到除 AI 之外的資本支出（CapEx）有任何擴大？還是就您在商業放款活動上所看到的而言，仍然非常以 AI 為中心？

Okay. Let me do those in reverse order, actually, because I'll just address your AI CapEx question quickly. We do see some decent kind of CapEx and associated loan growth across the franchise. And at least on the surface, some of that does not appear to be AI related.

好的。我其實先倒過來回答，因為我可以先快速回應您關於 AI 資本支出的問題。我們確實看到在整個版圖（franchise）中，有一些不錯的資本支出以及相關的貸款成長。而且至少表面上看，其中一部分似乎與 AI 無關。

However, I was a little reluctant to draw that conclusion too strongly just because the AI team has started to proliferate in so many different parts of the economy, right? It's like the comments about data centers wind up creating a lot of demand for plumbers and electricians, right?

不過，我有點不太願意把這個結論下得太重，因為 AI 團隊已經開始在經濟的許多不同領域擴散，對吧？就像大家談到資料中心，最後會帶來對水電工、管線工和電工的大量需求，對吧？

So you wind up seeing it in sort of slightly non-obvious places. And so any given bit of loan growth or CapEx that you see that doesn't superficially look like it's AI-related might still be. But on the other hand, it might not.

所以你會在一些不那麼顯而易見的地方看到它。因此，你看到的某一段貸款成長或資本支出，表面上看起來不像與 AI 有關，但其實仍可能是。但另一方面，也可能不是。

To give you a big number, I think CapEx is about $4 trillion a year and AI went from $400 billion last year to $700 billion this year, people project, which so do our people, it will be like a little over $1 trillion next year and maybe a little reduction in the non-AI CapEx -- but that's hard to figure out because the same people -- some of the same people doing the same.

給您一個大數字：我認為資本支出大約每年 4 兆美元，而 AI 從去年的 4,000 億美元增加到今年人們預估的 7,000 億美元；我們的人也同樣預期，明年可能會到略高於 1 兆美元，非 AI 的資本支出可能會略有下降——但這很難判斷，因為同一批人——其中一些同樣的人在做同樣的事。

Yes. I now starting to draw our comments the other day about like the CapEx impact of chipset and some of that's going to roll off and it's getting replaced by more direct AI stuff. So it's a little bit hard to untangle the whole thing. Going to the consumer for a second. So a few things, I guess, I've kind of already covered.

是的。我現在開始把我們前幾天的評論串起來，例如晶片組（chipset）的資本支出影響，其中一些將會逐步消退，並被更直接的 AI 相關支出所取代。所以要把整件事拆解清楚有點困難。再談一下消費者。有幾點我想我其實已經大致提過了。

But so number one, spend is kind of fine robust and across income segments, seems like a bit of a tailwind there from tax refunds. Delinquencies are a little lower than we expected. And again, that's a better performance. You see pretty much across the board by kind of FICO score. There's some of that economic heterogeneity data came out from the Fed recently which also, I think, doesn't give a lot of support to the K-shaped narrative essentially.

第一，支出表現算是穩健，而且跨各收入族群；看起來退稅帶來了一些順風。逾期率比我們預期的略低。而且這確實是更好的表現。你幾乎可以在各個 FICO 分數區間都看到。聯準會最近也發布了一些關於經濟異質性的資料，我認為基本上也不太支持所謂 K 型復甦的敘事。

So again, we think about this, we worry about this. We look at it. But from our perspective, from all the various dimensions, there's not like that much there in terms to support the narrative. Now to your point about fragility in rates and housing and stuff like that, it is, of course, we are in a slightly higher than normal inflationary environment. I think Marianne had made some comments at some point about a cohort of consumers who are experiencing negative real wage growth and not potentially creating some distress for those folks.

所以我們會思考這件事、也會擔心、也會觀察。我們會去看。但從我們的角度、從各種不同面向來看，並沒有太多證據支持那個敘事。至於您提到利率、房市等方面的脆弱性，當然，我們確實處在一個略高於常態的通膨環境。我記得 Marianne 曾在某個時點評論過，有一群消費者正經歷實質薪資成長為負，這可能會讓這些人承受一些壓力。

Now some of that statistically is kind of always going to be true at any moment in time in any cohort, but that's probably a watch area. And I think generally, obviously, it's been a long expansion that's gone on for a long time. I think the economy is surprised on the upside on some more strength, a surprise on the upside. And that inevitably everyone worry about fragility and about the thing that could change it.

其中一部分從統計上來說，在任何時間點、任何族群裡多少都會存在，但這可能是一個需要關注的領域。而且我想整體而言，很明顯這是一段已經持續很久的長期擴張。我認為經濟在某些更強的力道上出乎意料地向上。而這也不可避免地讓每個人都擔心脆弱性，以及可能改變局勢的那個因素。

But as I always say, when it comes to consumer credit performance, it's just about the labor market. And so you're not going to hear anything from me that's new or differentiated about the labor market, like we all see the same numbers and it's been surprisingly resilient. So for now, that's the narrative.

但我一向說，談到消費者信貸表現，關鍵就是勞動市場。所以你不會從我這裡聽到任何關於勞動市場新的或特別不同的看法——我們看到的數字都一樣，而且它一直出乎意料地有韌性。所以目前就是這樣的敘事。

Got it. And I guess just a follow up. On the capital front, you have excess capital, strong ROEs. But I guess the question would be why buy back stock here at 3 times tangible book when things are so good, bad things could happen. Why not just have some even more excess capital for a rainy day if things go south?

了解。我想再追問一下。在資本面，你們有超額資本、ROE 也很強。但問題是：在一切看起來都很好、但壞事也可能發生的情況下，為什麼要在股價達到有形帳面價值（tangible book）的 3 倍時回購股票？如果情勢轉差，為什麼不乾脆保留更多超額資本以備不時之需？

Just talk to us in terms of how you're thinking about buybacks at these levels? And I know Jamie talked about potential M&A at some point, maybe asset management, fintechs, but would love to revisit that.

能否談談你們如何看待在這些水準進行回購？我也知道 Jamie 曾提到某個時點可能會做併購（M&A），也許是在資產管理、金融科技等領域，但也希望能再回顧一下。

So before I answer that, I want to tell you I always enjoy reading your weekend notes. They're insightful and sometimes quite funny. So thank you for that.

在我回答之前，我想先說我一直很喜歡讀你週末的筆記。很有洞見，有時也相當有趣。所以謝謝你。

Look, you're absolutely correct. I mean we've always said we want to buy back less stock as the price goes up and more stock as the price goes down. We had a lot of excess capital. And so we were struggling with that. If you talk about two years ago, we still think the number used just approximately $40 billion. And I think we now think we actually deployed it over time. The world has gotten bigger. It's got more complex.

你說得完全正確。我們一直都說，股價上升時我們希望回購更少，股價下跌時回購更多。我們有很多超額資本。所以我們一直在為此苦惱。如果你回到兩年前，我們仍認為那個數字大概是 400 億美元。而我想我們現在認為，我們其實是隨時間逐步把它部署出去了。世界變得更大了。也變得更複雜。

I just got back from a tour of Europe. Our security resilience initiative, the hyperscalers, the needs are just big, and it's not just AI, our global infrastructure, the remiliatrization of the world, the reduction of trade is taking place, the enormous need of our governments. You have global deficits are almost 4.5% or 5%, which is a very big number competing for the same capital. So we do think we'll deploy and that has consequences. And we're not going to tell the market we're going to do, but I -- we agree with you, generally.

我剛從歐洲巡訪回來。我們的安全韌性倡議（security resilience initiative）、超大規模雲端業者（hyperscalers）的需求都非常龐大，而且不只是 AI；我們的全球基礎建設、全球再軍事化（remilitarization）、貿易縮減正在發生、各國政府的龐大需求。全球財政赤字接近 4.5% 或 5%，這是非常大的數字，正在與同一筆資本競爭。所以我們確實認為我們會去部署資本，而這會帶來後果。我們不會告訴市場我們要做什麼，但我——我們大體上同意你的看法。

And if we think we can deploy, it's very different than buying back stock. I've also never thought that by -- I actually want to get rid of that number money returned to shareholders. I just don't even like seeing it because buying back stock is not returning money to shareholders. And you're making an investment decision, you're not making a return money to shareholder decisions. I actually went out of all our reports. And so you can see changes taking place. We're just not going to tell you what they are.

而且如果我們認為可以去部署資本，那就和回購股票非常不同。我也從來不認為——我其實想把「回饋股東的資金」這個數字拿掉。我甚至不喜歡看到它，因為回購股票並不是把錢回饋給股東。你是在做投資決策，而不是在做「把錢還給股東」的決策。我其實已經把它從我們所有報告中拿掉了。所以你可以看到一些變化正在發生。我們只是不會告訴你那些變化是什麼。

And I made a mistake last time mentioning at $20 billion. We could obviously do far more than that or nothing at all. What I was trying to point out is we have huge opportunities for organic growth in every single business we're in. Organic growth is hard. Its technology is people, it's systems, it's branches, it's bankers, it's hiring, it's training and recruiting.

而且我上次提到 200 億美元是個錯誤。我們顯然可以做得遠超過那個數字，或是完全不做。我想指出的是，我們在所涉足的每一個業務中，都有巨大的內生成長（organic growth）機會。內生成長很難。它涉及科技、人員、系統、分行、銀行家、招募、訓練與徵才。

But I was surprised to find out in parts of Europe that when we doubled our share in certain areas, they think that we could do a lot more there. And country by country, including countries that they aren't doing particularly well.

但我在歐洲某些地區發現一件讓我驚訝的事：當我們在某些領域把市占翻倍時，他們認為我們在那裡還能做得更多。而且是逐國來看，包括一些他們表現並不是特別好的國家。

And I think the true here, we have our branches in the United States. We've got a credit card business. We've got the app arsenal, the Apple business at one point, which we have pretty high hopes for, if we come up with better products and better services. And so yes. So the goal is to deploy our capital at a 17% return. That is the goal and which we think we can do over time.

而且我認為真正的情況是，我們在美國有分行。我們有信用卡業務。我們有 App 的武器庫、曾經的 Apple 業務，我們對它抱有相當高的期望，前提是我們能推出更好的產品與更好的服務。所以是的。因此目標是以 17% 的報酬率來部署我們的資本。這就是目標，而且我們認為隨著時間推移我們可以做到。

We should always be looking at inorganic. What we don't want to do is look at inorganic as a sign of weakness of organic in which I think companies do some time the busied about M&A when they should be focusing on why they're not doing particularly well in the area or something like that. And we have a lot of competition, by the way, and we had pointed that out before.

我們應該一直在尋找非有機成長的機會。我們不想做的是，把非有機成長當成有機成長疲弱的訊號；我認為有些公司有時候忙著做併購（M&A），但其實應該把重點放在為什麼自己在某個領域表現不佳之類的問題上。順帶一提，我們面臨很多競爭，而且我們之前也指出過。

Very good competition, not just Goldman Sachs who's doing a great job if you didn't read their numbers this morning because I did. But you got Stripe and PayPal and Cash and Block and Chime and SoFi and Revolut, and they're good. And we have to make certain investments to keep up with them or to hopefully do a better job so of them. And so we're doing all of that.

競爭非常激烈，不只是高盛——如果你今天早上沒看他們的數字，他們做得很棒，我看了。但還有 Stripe、PayPal、Cash、Block、Chime、SoFi、Revolut，他們都很強。我們必須做出某些投資，才能跟上他們，或希望做得比他們更好。所以我們正在做所有這些事。

But you should always be looking at things that could be good for your company inorganically. And so -- and we've done a bunch of deals this year. Most were goods, a couple weren't particularly good. And we're going to be looking and we're open-minded. It wasn't any particular thing or any particular place.

但你應該一直在尋找那些可能以非有機方式對公司有利的事情。所以——而且我們今年做了不少交易。大多數是好的，有幾筆並不是特別好。我們會持續觀察，也會保持開放的心態。並沒有任何特定的事情或任何特定的地點。

It might be adjacencies. It might be data-related, it might be a whole bunch of areas. We have a bunch of skunk works going on we hope, Chase UK, that we continue to build that in a way that becomes a great European digital bank over time. It could take a lot of time and effort to do that. So you raise a good point.

可能是相鄰領域。可能與數據相關，也可能是很多不同的領域。我們有一堆「秘密研發」（skunk works）在進行中；我們希望 Chase UK 能持續建設，並隨著時間推移成為一家很棒的歐洲數位銀行。要做到這點可能需要很多時間與努力。所以你提得很好。

Glenn Schorr, Evercore.

Glenn Schorr，Evercore。

Just two quick follow ups. One, in the last couple of times you talked publicly, you had a couple of comments on the Smart Cash tool that you're working on. I know you said it's nascent and early, but sometimes technology moves fast. So curious status of the tool, when you might roll it out into who and maybe a little more on your comments on you're going to have to pay more for money over time. Just curious.

兩個很快的追問。第一，最近幾次你公開談話時，你對正在開發的 Smart Cash 工具有一些評論。我知道你說它還很初期、剛起步，但有時候科技發展很快。所以想請教這個工具目前的進度、你可能何時推出、會先給哪些對象使用；另外也想多了解你提到「隨著時間推移，你們將不得不為資金付出更高成本」的評論。只是好奇。

Yes. So this kind of relates to Jeremy was talking about before about the velocity of money and how it's going to move in a new world. So we are kind of prepared for that. So this is still a test case. Banks, people are in a different position.

是的。所以這某種程度上呼應 Jeremy 先前談到的貨幣流通速度，以及在新世界裡它將如何移動。所以我們算是為此做好準備。這仍然是一個測試案例。銀行、以及人們所處的位置都不一樣。

And if you actually look at accounts, these tons don't like every account, they relate to a narrow segment accounts and where you're competing for their investment business and their deposit business. So what you're going to see is certain tests coming out and then you'll find out about what we can do, what we can't do. And we're going to learn a lot by doing some of that.

而且如果你實際去看帳戶，這些並不是針對每一個帳戶；它們只對應到一個較窄的帳戶族群——也就是你在那裡競爭他們的投資業務與存款業務。所以你會看到一些特定測試推出，然後你會知道我們能做什麼、不能做什麼。而且我們會透過做其中一些事情學到很多。

And we think it could be good for customers and good for us. We're not just buying way to waste money.

我們認為這對客戶有利，對我們也有利。我們不是只是花錢買一種浪費錢的方法。

Okay. So of this year thing, I take it?

好的。所以是今年內的事情，我理解對嗎？

Yes, you'll see something this year.

是的，你今年會看到一些東西。

Cool. One other follow-up on -- you just touched briefly on it. I'm just curious of how you'd state your European consumer banking aspirations, you mentioned opportunities. You do plenty of business there, but you mentioned opportunities in each country by country, but maybe you could just sum it up in aggregate of what are you trying to be as a consumer bank across the major markets in Europe?

很酷。另外一個追問——你剛剛稍微提到。我想了解你會如何描述你們在歐洲的消費金融（零售銀行）抱負；你提到機會，你們在那裡也做很多業務，但你提到各國逐一都有機會；不過也許你可以用整體角度總結一下：在歐洲主要市場中，作為一家消費銀行，你們想成為什麼樣的角色？

Yes. So we didn't -- when we were talking about just bricks and mortar, we were going to try to compete because we couldn't have with local banks, their brands and capabilities. And unlike the United States, over there, we have to add all the overhead in different languages and different regulatory regimes, et cetera. And we have no real reason to when digital may have changed that.

是的。所以我們當時——如果只是談實體據點（bricks and mortar），我們不會嘗試去競爭，因為我們無法與當地銀行的品牌與能力競爭。而且不同於美國，在那邊我們必須承擔不同語言、不同監管制度等帶來的所有管理費用與間接成本。而且我們沒有真正的理由這麼做，直到數位化可能改變了這一點。

So we started Chase UK, I've got like five years ago it was a complete start-up. And we made a little bit of fits and starts, but we have, I think, almost 3 million or 2.5 million customers and in the UK. We have -- we've opened up in Berlin. We've actually done much better in Germany than we thought we're going to do, though it's not quite profitably yet.

所以我們大概在五年前成立了 Chase UK，當時是完全從零開始的新創。我們走過一些反覆與摸索，但我認為我們在英國已經有將近 300 萬或 250 萬名客戶。我們——我們已經在柏林開業。我們在德國的表現其實比我們原先預期的要好得多，雖然目前還沒有完全獲利。

So what you got to look at there is you have a platform, the platform costs money as you can distribute of course, more and more clients and more and more countries, you can get to the point where you're breakeven and then hopefully profitable.

所以你在那邊要看的重點是：你有一個平台，而平台是要花錢的；當然，隨著你把它分攤到越來越多客戶、越來越多國家，你可以到達損益兩平，然後希望進一步獲利。

And so we've added the investment products in the UK, you can assume we're going to try to add them elsewhere and probably credit card. And hopefully, the dream would be there would be a pan-European successful digital bank, building off of JPMorgan Chase's strengths.

因此我們已在英國加入投資產品；你可以假設我們會嘗試在其他地方也加入，可能還會加入信用卡。而且希望、理想狀況是，能建立一家泛歐洲、成功的數位銀行，並以摩根大通（JPMorgan Chase）的優勢為基礎來打造。

We are a private bank. We do have an upscale, a huge business here. We've got a lot of clients that go across border. We've got a lot of training capability and underlying capability and research capabilities. So but it's still adjusting over time.

我們有私人銀行業務。我們在這裡確實有高端客群，以及非常龐大的業務。我們有很多跨境往來的客戶。我們有很多培訓能力、底層能力與研究能力。所以——但這仍需要隨著時間推移去調整。

We always call this like this is -- it's not income. It's not a brand-new thing, but it's developing over time. I have high hopes for. And we -- the management team is doing great. We tell them constantly come in and tell us what you want to do when you want it differently what we've learned, and we're kind of patient kind of.

我們總是把這稱作——這不是收入。這不是一個全新的東西，但它會隨著時間推移而發展。我對此抱有很高的期望。而且——管理團隊做得很棒。我們不斷告訴他們：進來告訴我們你們想做什麼、你們想在什麼時候做、有哪些地方想做得不一樣、你們學到了什麼；而我們也算是有耐心的。

Gerard Cassidy, RBC.

Gerard Cassidy，RBC。

Jamie and Jeremy, you guys have talked about you've seen some excesses in underwriting and credit late last year. I think it was Jamie. Jeremy, you talked about risk on in the capital markets. What are you guys seeing in credit underwriting from your competitors. Is it getting crazier or no, it's still pretty good? And what's the outlook there, please?

Jamie 和 Jeremy，你們談到去年年底在承銷與信貸方面看到一些過度現象。我想是 Jamie 提到的。Jeremy，你談到資本市場的風險偏好（risk on）。你們從競爭對手那邊看到的信貸承銷狀況如何？是變得更瘋狂了，還是仍然相當不錯？另外那邊的展望如何，謝謝？

I mean crazy is a strong word, but I spent some time looking into this issue like a week ago. And we did hear some examples. I mean I don't know for whatever reason, I think the data center underwriting space is one that resonates with me as a kind of bellwether for what people are doing. And we passed on some deals that obviously when you look at the data center stuff, the key question is like what happens with power supply, what happens with tenants, what happens -- it's a well-discussed thing.

我的意思是，「瘋狂」是個很強烈的詞，但我大概在一週前花了一些時間深入研究這個議題。我們確實聽到一些例子。我不知道為什麼，但我覺得資料中心的承銷領域對我來說很有代表性，像是一個觀察大家在做什麼的風向球。我們放棄了一些交易；顯然當你看資料中心相關案子時，關鍵問題是：電力供應會怎樣、租戶會怎樣、還有會怎樣——這是一個被廣泛討論的議題。

And we have a pretty precise framework to govern what we're willing to do and what we're not willing to do in that space across those types of risks. And we saw some deals come through where we were just like, yes, we're not doing that. So it's normal, I guess, it's competitive, and people are eager to be involved. And in some cases, there's ironically some element of like relationship lending that's happening through the data center space, when it's kind of a start-up entity that's building the data center.

而且我們有一套相當精確的框架，用來規範在該領域、針對這些類型風險，我們願意做什麼、不願意做什麼。我們也看到有些案子送進來時，我們就覺得：是的，我們不做那個。所以我想這很正常，市場競爭激烈，大家都很渴望參與。而在某些情況下，諷刺的是，在資料中心領域發生了一些類似「關係型放款」的情況，因為那其實是個正在建資料中心的新創實體。

So that's part of the story a little bit, too. But I don't think we're screaming from the rooftops that underwriting center is such a class, but I think you see normal pressures, and we're navigating those in the way that we do, which is we do flex in some moments for particularly important clients in situations where we feel like it's the right thing to do. But in general, we try to be the one that holds the line and make sure that we're guided by our own risk appetite on kind of appropriately skeptical view of the environment.

所以這也是故事的一部分。但我不認為我們會大肆宣揚說資料中心承作是一個多麼了不起的資產類別；不過你確實會看到一般性的壓力，而我們正以我們一貫的方式在應對：在某些時刻，對於特別重要的客戶、在我們認為做法正確的情境下，我們會做一些彈性調整。但總體而言，我們努力成為那個守住底線的人，確保我們是以自身的風險偏好為指引，並對環境保持適度的懷疑態度。

We didn't talk about a huge deterioration in credit underwriting standards. I think we talked about it as a very mild one, but it's across several spectrum, which is people assumptions on revenue growth or add back of expenses, more PIK, and this is not across the board, by the way. It's more some players than others. Some weaker covenants, some people taking more rollover risk. And by that, I mean, if rates go up, how much interest rate exposure you're taking as opposed to underwriting exposure and it's just things like that. But it is across the spectrum.

我們並沒有談到信貸承作標準出現大幅惡化。我想我們談的是非常輕微的惡化，但它涵蓋好幾個面向：例如對營收成長的假設、費用回加（add back）、更多的 PIK（實物支付利息），而且順帶一提，這並不是全面性的。比較像是某些參與者比其他人更明顯。一些較弱的契約條款（covenants），有些人承擔更多的展期／再融資風險（rollover risk）。我指的是：如果利率上升，你承擔了多少利率曝險，而不是承作曝險——諸如此類。但它確實是跨多個面向出現的。

You've seen a little bit of weakness. And the only point we're always trying to make is when there's a credit cycle and there will be a credit cycle, how will everybody perform? And I don't think it's going to be like a bell curve of performance. I think there'd be some pretty -- there'll be some outliers out there just like the by the way, in the great financial crisis.

你已經看到一點點的疲弱。而我們一直想強調的唯一重點是：當信貸循環來臨——而且一定會來——每個人的表現會如何？我不認為表現會呈現鐘形曲線那樣平均分布。我認為會出現一些相當——會有一些離群值，就像順帶一提，在全球金融危機時一樣。

I totally agree with you, Jamie, on that. I don't want to sound pollyannish, but on a question regarding the regulatory outlook. Obviously, we've got Basel III endgame, hopefully, it'll be codified maybe by the end of the year. I know you guys have put out your remarks on it. And next year, hopefully, we get tailoring.

Jamie，我完全同意你這點。我不想聽起來太過樂觀，但我想問一個關於監管前景的問題。顯然，我們有巴塞爾協定 III 的最終方案（Basel III endgame），希望能在年底前完成成文化。我知道你們已經對此發表過看法。而明年，希望我們能看到「量身訂做」（tailoring）。

Could you envision a period where and again, I don't want to sound pollyannish, but a period where the regulators are just set, where do you go? Because the last 20 years, there's been constant change with the regulators affecting the banking industry. Could we enter a period where we have a stability in the regulatory environment, which could enhance valuations possibly for bank stocks?

你能否想像一段時期——再次強調，我不想聽起來太過樂觀——監管機關就此定案、接下來要往哪裡走？因為過去 20 年，監管機關對銀行業的影響一直在持續變動。我們是否可能進入一段監管環境穩定的時期，從而可能提升銀行股的估值？

Well, I would break the question down into two parts, like could we envision stability and impact on valuations. On the question of stability, I mean I don't think it's pollyannaish to say that regulatory stability is a desirable thing. And I actually think it's a relatively nonpartisan idea, like I think it's understandable and correct that there would have been a big reaction to the crisis and then maybe a reaction to the reaction and the sort of amplitude of those oscillations might be decreasing, and we get to a place where we've got about right.

我會把這個問題拆成兩部分：我們是否能想像穩定，以及它對估值的影響。就穩定性而言，我不認為說監管穩定是件可取的事會顯得過度樂觀。而且我其實認為這相對是個不分黨派的想法：危機之後出現強烈反應是可以理解且合理的，之後也可能會出現對該反應的反作用；而這些擺盪的振幅可能正在縮小，最終我們會到達一個大致恰當的位置。

And frankly, we get to a point where banks are primarily focused not on complying with regulatory constraints of various types, which should probably in general, operate as backstops or rather thinking about what their own standards are and what their own risk appetite is and have that be kind of the true north of any given type of decisions. And I think we're getting closer to that stage, which will be good.

坦白說，我們會走到一個階段：銀行主要關注的不再是遵循各式各樣的監管限制——這些限制一般而言應該作為最後防線——而是更多思考自身的標準是什麼、自己的風險偏好是什麼，並讓這些成為各類決策的真正北極星。我認為我們正逐步接近那個階段，這會是好事。

Whether achieving that state would be particularly supportive of bank stock valuations. I'll leave that question to you. But at least, I think, for banks like us, I'm not convinced that's a major drag right now, to be honest, that it has been in the recent past.

至於達到那種狀態是否會特別有利於銀行股估值，我把這個問題留給你。但至少我認為，對像我們這樣的銀行而言，老實說，我不確定這在當下是一個很大的拖累；在不久之前它確實曾是。

Yes. And I would just add, there's one legislator at Supreme Court decision that makes it less likely that we wouldn't have flip-flopping, which is a present to remove a lot of people more easily. But I'm hoping -- I mean what really should happen now is when they write legislation, they could be more clear about their intent and what they want because they could have written it and said, we want this independent or you can only replace so many or we don't want to flip flop in regulations.

是的。我再補充一點：最高法院的一項裁決，使得監管不太可能出現來回翻轉，因為它讓總統更容易撤換很多人。但我希望——我的意思是，現在真正應該發生的是：立法時可以更清楚地表達其意圖與想要的結果，因為他們本可以在法條中寫明：我們希望這是獨立的，或你只能更換多少人，或我們不希望監管規則來回翻轉。

But I really like the fact that Mickey Bowman and Kevin Warsh are taking a step back and looking at the broad range of changes, which have been extensive over 20 years and never ended. And often with no ultimate intended consequence where they want in an system and outside and system makes it safer. So I actually believe it would make the system much safer, much safer.

但我很欣賞 Mickey Bowman 和 Kevin Warsh 願意退一步，檢視過去 20 年來範圍廣泛、且一直沒有停止的各項變革。而且這些變革往往沒有明確的最終目標或預期後果——他們想要的是一個更安全的體系，而體系內外的安排讓它更安全。所以我其實相信，這會讓體系更安全、更安全。

And that should be their real goal, not just adding layer upon layer bureaucratic reporting -- the -- some of the regulators said that from now on, they're going to focus on safety and soundness, they do that. We would have no MRAs because none of them related to our safety insentive related to other issues.

而那才應該是他們真正的目標，而不是一層又一層地增加官僚式的申報——有些監管者說，從現在起他們會聚焦在安全與健全（safety and soundness），他們就該這麼做。那樣的話，我們就不會有任何 MRA（監管關注事項），因為那些都與我們的安全與健全無關，而是與其他議題有關。

And I think have you related to safety and soundness, Silicon Valley Bank and First Republic wouldn't have happened simply upon they were taking to much is rate risk, which was disclosed. But one thing -- and so I just think the goal should be to take a step back, look at these things in the open light, be very honest about what worked and what didn't work like resolution did not work. Resolution recovery does not work. People should we should look at the discount window differently.

而且我認為，如果你把重點放在安全與健全，矽谷銀行和第一共和銀行的事件就不會發生，因為他們承擔了過多的利率風險，而那是已揭露的。但有一件事——所以我只是認為目標應該是退一步，在公開的光線下檢視這些事情，對哪些有效、哪些無效要非常誠實，例如處置機制（resolution）並沒有奏效。處置／復原（resolution recovery）並不起作用。大家應該用不同的方式看待貼現窗口（discount window）。

And anyway, if those things are done, I think we have a safer banking system where we don't have to be breathless every time a bank fails. You guys are the guys who know so much about this, they should be making some of these recommendations to regulators. It's in all of our interest is just to be better. not any one of us, all of us.

總之，如果這些事情都能做到，我認為我們會有一個更安全的銀行體系，這樣每次有銀行倒閉時，我們就不必那麼緊張兮兮。你們才是對這些最了解的人，你們應該向監管機關提出其中一些建議。這符合我們所有人的利益：就是要變得更好——不是我們其中任何一家，而是所有人。

Manan Gosalia, Morgan Stanley.

Manan Gosalia，摩根士丹利。

Jeremy, as we think about the various expense buckets you called out at the start of the year, the volume-related expenses, bankers, tech, marketing. I know the majority of the increase in the expense guide is coming in the revenue-related line. But are you also bringing up some of the other categories, maybe pulling forward any tech or marketing spend given the environment?

Jeremy，當我們回顧你在年初提到的各項費用類別：與業務量相關的費用、銀行家人力、科技、行銷。我知道費用指引上調的大部分增量來自與營收相關的那一項。但在目前環境下，你們是否也在上調其他一些類別，例如把部分科技或行銷支出提前？

Yes. There's some of that stuff going on. So I'm trying to sort of keep it simple and disproportionately focus on the big driver, which is obviously volume and revenue-related expense. But -- as is always the case, there are some ups and downs, which -- some of which relates to things like our marketing strategy, which I probably don't particularly want to disclose.

是的。確實有一些那樣的情況。所以我試著把事情講得簡單一點，並把重點不成比例地放在最大的驅動因素上，也就是顯然與業務量和營收相關的費用。但是——一如往常，還是會有一些起起落落，其中一部分與我們的行銷策略之類的事情有關，而這些我可能不太想特別揭露。

But I think one topic which is not financially meaningful this year, but which I think is interesting and maybe come in the future is the question of token expense, because that is something that we're spending a bunch of time on. I think as probably pretty much everyone in corporate America is.

但我認為有一個今年在財務上並不具重大意義、但我覺得很有趣且未來可能會出現的議題，是代幣費用（token expense）這個問題，因為這是我們正在投入大量時間處理的事情。我想大概美國企業界幾乎所有人都是如此。

So just for the avoidance of doubt, it is a trivial number for the first half of the year. We are forecasting some meaningful acceleration of that number for the second half of the year. But still nonetheless, the full year contribution of that is still trivial. And obviously, we had budgeted some of that. So it's not in any way a meaningful driver of the current outlook or the revision on the outlook.

所以為了避免任何疑義，上半年這個數字微不足道。我們預期下半年這個數字會有顯著加速。但即便如此，全年貢獻仍然很小。而且很明顯，我們也已經為其中一部分編列了預算。所以它絕不是目前展望或展望修正的任何重要驅動因素。

But obviously, when you listen to the Frontier Labs talk, they talk about the exponential and the acceleration of usage, which is obviously driving their revenues and someone's paying those bills. And we're in a sense, like a representation of the economy as a whole that we're probably lagging a little bit some of the cutting-edge adoption and usage as we should, given who we are as a company.

但很明顯，當你聽 Frontier Labs 的談話時，他們談到使用量的指數型成長與加速，這顯然正在推動他們的營收，而這些帳單總得有人買單。而我們某種程度上就像整體經濟的一個縮影；考量到我們作為一家公司的定位，我們在一些最前沿的採用與使用上可能會稍微落後一點，這也是合理的。

But it is an important question for us as we go into next year and the subsequent years. And I think the good news is that we've done a lot of really high-quality thinking on this and a lot of the infrastructure that we've built over the last couple of years is going to position us to be quite sophisticated about using the right models for the right purpose.

但當我們進入明年以及之後的年度，這對我們而言是一個重要問題。我認為好消息是，我們已經就此做了大量高品質的思考，而我們過去幾年建立的許多基礎設施，將使我們能夠相當成熟地針對不同目的使用合適的模型。

I mean just to use one sort of topical example and no events intended to those of you who tend to write slightly long reports. But as you can imagine, sometimes people like to summarize those reports, using AI tools. And as you know, the tools are quite good at doing that. And you really don't need the latest cutting-edge incredibly expensive model to summarize analyst report.

我用一個貼近時事的例子來說，並非要冒犯那些傾向寫比較長報告的各位。但如你所想，有時候人們會用 AI 工具來摘要那些報告。而如你所知，這些工具在這方面相當不錯。而要摘要分析師報告，你其實不需要最新、最前沿、而且極其昂貴的模型。

So the idea is use the right model for the right purpose, be smart about open source where appropriate and ensure that you're getting value out of it, ultimately, in the end, either we're going to have a lot more capacity or we're going to have a lot more efficiency or both or we're going to have better revenue outcomes or we're going to compete more effectively, and we just need to be disciplined about how we handle that. So that's a body of work that's happening right now.

所以核心概念是：針對不同目的使用合適的模型；在適當之處聰明地採用開源方案；並確保最終能從中獲得價值——到最後，不是我們會有更大的產能，就是會有更高的效率，或兩者兼具；或者我們會有更好的營收成果，或更有效地競爭。我們只需要在處理這件事時保持紀律。所以這是一項正在進行中的工作。

Got it. Very helpful. And then maybe on CIB and the increased capital allocation there. I guess, how nimble do you expect to be there? Do you think we're at peak allocation here? Are there any internal limits that you might be ramping up against? Or is there room to keep allocating more balance sheet to the business if the environment remains where it is?

了解。非常有幫助。接著可能談一下 CIB 以及那邊資本配置的增加。我想問，你預期在那方面能有多靈活？你覺得目前已經是配置高峰了嗎？是否有任何內部限制你們可能正在逼近？或者如果環境維持現狀，資產負債表是否還有空間繼續對該業務配置更多資源？

I mean, I'm definitely not going to get into discussions with you about like internal limit management. I guess it was on the press call, so maybe you didn't hear this, but I did get a question about this. And I think the right -- and I think you said this correctly, but I just want to err on the side of being precise here. Sometimes people think about capital allocation almost as if it's a hedge fund where you're like giving a pot of people, some capital and telling them to go use it, that's not the way it works. It's the opposite of that.

我的意思是，我肯定不會跟你討論像是內部限制管理這類話題。我想這在新聞電話會議上有提到，所以你可能沒聽到，但我確實被問過這個問題。我認為正確的——而且我覺得你剛才說得沒錯，但我想在這裡寧可更精確一些。有時候人們談資本配置，幾乎把它想成對沖基金：好像你給一群人一筆資金，叫他們去運用；但實際上不是這樣運作的。恰恰相反。

In other words, we have demand from clients to support them in various ways. And to be clear, we also have some, what you might describe as passive effects, like obviously, when volatility is higher, market risk capital goes up passively, and simply the appreciation of global equity markets increases the RWA associated with things like the prime business. So you've got active and passive effects, but the active effects are us responding to client needs. And obviously, we've got a ton of access as a company. And as Jamie said, our primary goal is to deploy that organically.

換句話說，我們是因應客戶需求，以各種方式支持他們。而且要說清楚，我們也有一些你可以稱之為被動效應的因素：例如當波動性較高時，市場風險資本會被動上升；而全球股市上漲也會提高與主經紀（prime）等業務相關的風險加權資產（RWA）。所以你同時有主動與被動效應，但主動效應是我們回應客戶需求。而且很明顯，作為一家公司，我們有非常廣泛的觸及與管道。正如 Jamie 所說，我們的首要目標是以有機方式部署這些資源。

So when our CIB clients want us to serve them, and we can do that in ways that make sense for us from a risk appetite and from a returns perspective, we've got plenty of capital to do that, and so we do that. Sometimes there are other financial resource constraints, and that's part of what we do for a living is try to manage that stuff.

所以當我們的 CIB 客戶希望我們為他們提供服務，而我們也能以符合我們風險偏好與報酬角度的方式來做時，我們有充足的資本可以這麼做，因此我們就會這麼做。有時候也會有其他金融資源方面的限制，而我們的工作之一就是設法管理這些事情。

And I talked a little bit at the Company Update, if you recall about the system and the fact that the system is currently quite flush with capital, but at the margin, less flush with liquidity. And that's obviously an area of advocacy, especially in light of the stated goal to reduce the size of the Fed balance sheet, you really need to reduce bank demand for reserves to get that done. And so that in turn probably requires some adjustment to liquidity regulation.

如果你還記得，我在公司更新（Company Update）時也稍微談到這個系統，以及目前系統的資本相當充裕，但在邊際上流動性較不充裕。而這顯然是一個我們倡議的重點領域，特別是在既定目標要縮減聯準會資產負債表規模的背景下；要做到這點，你確實需要降低銀行對準備金的需求。因此，這反過來可能需要對流動性監管做一些調整。

So that's the next thing on the agenda.

所以這就是接下來議程上的下一件事。

Right. But our risk standards haven't changed. It's possible some of these things change because people self-select and pick somebody else, and that would be fine with us.

對。但我們的風險標準並沒有改變。有可能其中一些事情會改變，因為有人會自我篩選、轉而選擇別人，而我們也完全可以接受。

Thank you. We have no further -- Thank you all for participating in today's conference. You may disconnect at this time, and have a great rest of your day.

謝謝。我們沒有其他——感謝各位參與今天的電話會議。您現在可以斷線，祝您今天剩餘時間一切順利。