DoorDash Inc (DASH) 2020 Q4 法說會逐字稿

Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for standing by, and welcome to the DoorDash Q4 2020 Earnings Call. (Operator Instructions) Please be advised that today's conference is being recorded. (Operator Instructions) I would now like to hand the conference over to your speaker today, Mr. Andy Hargreaves. Please go ahead, sir.

女士們，先生們，感謝您的支持，歡迎參加 DoorDash 2020 年第四季度財報電話會議。 （操作員說明）請注意，今天的會議正在錄製中。 （操作員說明）我現在想把今天的會議交給你的演講者，Andy Hargreaves 先生。請繼續，先生。

Thanks, Elaine. Hello, everyone, and welcome to our fourth quarter 2020 earnings call. I'm Andy Hargreaves, the VP of Investor Relations. It's a pleasure to be joined today by DoorDash CEO and Co-Founder Tony Xu; and CFO, Prabir Adarkar.

謝謝，伊萊恩。大家好，歡迎來到我們的 2020 年第四季度財報電話會議。我是投資者關係副總裁 Andy Hargreaves。很高興今天有 DoorDash 首席執行官兼聯合創始人 Tony Xu 加入；和首席財務官 Prabir Adarkar。

We'd like to remind everyone that we'll be making forward-looking statements during this call, including statements related to the expected performance of our business, future financial results and guidance, strategy, long-term growth and overall future prospects as well as statements regarding litigation and regulatory matters. Forward-looking statements depend on assumptions, data or methods that may be incorrect or imprecise and are subject to risks and uncertainties. Events that could cause our actual results and future actions of the company to differ materially from those described in forward-looking statements are set forth under the captions Forward-looking Statements in today's investor letter and are described in our risk factors, including in our SEC filings, including our final prospectus for our initial public offering filed with the SEC on December 8, 2020. You should not rely on our forward-looking statements as predictions of future events. Also note that the forward-looking statements we make on this call are based on information available to us and assumptions and beliefs as of today's date. We disclaim any obligation to update any forward-looking statements except as required by law.

我們想提醒大家，我們將在本次電話會議期間做出前瞻性陳述，包括與我們的業務預期業績、未來財務業績和指導、戰略、長期增長和整體未來前景相關的陳述作為有關訴訟和監管事項的聲明。前瞻性陳述取決於可能不正確或不精確的假設、數據或方法，並受到風險和不確定性的影響。可能導致我們的實際結果和公司未來行動與前瞻性陳述中描述的事件產生重大差異的事件在今天的投資者信函中的“前瞻性陳述”標題下進行了闡述，並在我們的風險因素中進行了描述，包括在我們的 SEC文件，包括我們於 2020 年 12 月 8 日向 SEC 提交的首次公開募股的最終招股說明書。您不應依賴我們的前瞻性陳述作為對未來事件的預測。另請注意，我們在本次電話會議上所做的前瞻性陳述是基於我們可獲得的信息以及截至今天的假設和信念。除法律要求外，我們不承擔任何更新任何前瞻性陳述的義務。

During this call, we will be discussing certain non-GAAP financial measures. Information regarding our non-GAAP financial results, including a reconciliation of such non-GAAP results to the most directly comparable GAAP financial measures, may be found in our investor letter, which was furnished with our Form 8-K filed today with the SEC and on our Investor Relations website. These non-GAAP measures should be considered in addition to our GAAP results and are not intended to be a substitute for our GAAP results.

在本次電話會議中，我們將討論某些非公認會計原則財務措施。有關我們的非 GAAP 財務業績的信息，包括此類非 GAAP 結果與最直接可比的 GAAP 財務指標的對賬，可以在我們今天向美國證券交易委員會提交的表格 8-K 和我們的投資者信函中找到。在我們的投資者關係網站上。除了我們的 GAAP 結果之外，還應考慮這些非 GAAP 措施，並且不能替代我們的 GAAP 結果。

Finally, this call in its entirety is being audio webcast on our Investor Relations website, and an audio replay of the call will be available on our website shortly after the call's end.

最後，本次電話會議的全部內容正在我們的投資者關係網站上進行音頻網絡直播，電話會議結束後不久將在我們的網站上提供電話會議的音頻重播。

With that out of the way, I'd like to turn it over to Tony.

有了這個，我想把它交給托尼。

Thanks, Andy, and thanks, everyone, for joining our very first earnings call. 2020 really put into focus the mission of our company and why we started this journey 7.5 years ago. We exist to grow and to empower local economies.

謝謝安迪，謝謝大家參加我們的第一次財報電話會議。 2020 年真正關注我們公司的使命以及我們在 7.5 年前開始這一旅程的原因。我們的存在是為了發展並賦予當地經濟權力。

As this is our first earnings call, I thought I'd give you a snapshot into how our team has executed this mission during the most critical times, and I'll follow by sharing a few thoughts on where we are going as we hopefully soon emerge out of this pandemic.

由於這是我們的第一次財報電話會議，我想我會向您簡要介紹一下我們的團隊在最關鍵的時期是如何執行這項任務的，然後我將分享一些關於我們希望盡快實現的目標的想法走出這場疫情。

2020 was a difficult year for all of our audiences, and our operations met great challenges and faced enormous uncertainty. While exhausting at times, I'm proud that our team chose optimism, built plans, prepared for all scenarios and executed 24/7 to ensure that we did our part in seeing the best of our local communities. While much of the work began in March 2020, a lot of the impact was carried into Q4. We prioritized safety by shipping no contact delivery, distributed more than 10 million units of PPE in the form of hand sanitizers, gloves and masks to Dashers, and we collaborated with merchants on tamper-proof packaging. We prioritized Dashers' health by offering affordable telehealth visits with doctors, ensured financial assistance for those impacted by COVID-19, and just last week, hosted our first webinar to provide Dashers with information about the vaccine. Equally important, we became a lifeline to millions of people who saw flexible earnings opportunities, especially after furloughs and other forms of job loss.

2020 年對我們所有的觀眾來說都是艱難的一年，我們的運營遇到了巨大的挑戰，面臨著巨大的不確定性。雖然有時很累，但我很自豪我們的團隊選擇了樂觀，制定了計劃，為所有情況做好了準備，並 24/7 全天候執行，以確保我們在看到當地社區的最佳情況方面盡了自己的一份力量。雖然大部分工作於 2020 年 3 月開始，但很多影響都延續到了第四季度。我們通過運送非接觸式交付將安全放在首位，以洗手液、手套和口罩的形式向 Dashers 分發了超過 1000 萬件 PPE，並與商家合作開發防篡改包裝。我們通過向醫生提供負擔得起的遠程醫療就診來優先考慮 Dashers 的健康，確保為受 COVID-19 影響的人提供經濟援助，並且就在上週，我們舉辦了第一次網絡研討會，為 Dashers 提供有關疫苗的信息。同樣重要的是，我們成為了數百萬看到靈活收入機會的人的生命線，尤其是在休假和其他形式的失業之後。

In Q4 alone, over 1 million Dashers earned over $2 billion in supplemental income on our platform. We reduced our commissions by half to local merchants, an investment totaling over $100 million, while funding national marketing campaigns to drive growth and add instant liquidity. We provided grants to more than nearly 2,000 local restaurants to help them adapt to the COVID winter. And by the end of Q4 2020, our analysis showed that the odds of surviving during the pandemic were 8x better for merchants on DoorDash versus all U.S. restaurants.

僅在第四季度，就有超過 100 萬的 Dashers 在我們的平台上賺取了超過 20 億美元的附加收入。我們將向當地商家收取的佣金減少了一半，投資總額超過 1 億美元，同時資助全國營銷活動以推動增長並增加即時流動性。我們向近 2,000 多家當地餐館提供了贈款，以幫助他們適應 COVID 冬季。到 2020 年第四季度末，我們的分析表明，DoorDash 上的商家在大流行期間的生存機率是所有美國餐館的 8 倍。

For consumers, we accelerated our entry into the convenience and grocery categories. From September to December last year, we observed 95% growth in consumers who ordered from these new categories on the DoorDash marketplace.

對於消費者，我們加快了進入便利和雜貨類別的步伐。從去年 9 月到 12 月，我們觀察到在 DoorDash 市場上從這些新類別訂購的消費者增長了 95%。

Finally, we supported our community by donating free DashPass subscriptions to health care workers across the country and partnered with organizations like the New York City Department of Public Schools, United Way and Feeding America to deliver food, groceries and supplies to those most in need, powering the delivery of 6.5 million meals to those in need during 2020.

最後，我們通過向全國各地的醫療保健工作者捐贈免費的 DashPass 訂閱來支持我們的社區，並與紐約市公立學校部、United Way 和 Feeding America 等組織合作，為最需要的人提供食物、雜貨和用品，在 2020 年為有需要的人提供 650 萬份餐食。

I want to thank all of our teams worldwide and the millions of consumers, Dashers and merchants who each stepped up in their own ways to navigate this pandemic. As we progress out of the pandemic, I thought I'd remind everyone of our long-term vision, which will take decades to build. In order to grow and empower local economies, we plan to build a marketplace and platform to enable every brick-and-mortar business to compete in today's convenience economy. The job of our marketplace is to grow in merchant sales, and we aspire to bring all of your city to you in minutes, not hours or days. Today, most of our business is in the restaurants category where we still see massive runway. We are investing to extend our category-leading position in the U.S. while doubling down on the momentum we are seeing overseas in Canada and in Australia.

我要感謝我們在全球範圍內的所有團隊以及數百萬消費者、Dashers 和商家，他們每個人都以自己的方式挺身而出，以應對這一流行病。隨著我們從大流行中取得進展，我想我會提醒大家我們的長期願景，這將需要幾十年的時間來建立。為了發展和賦能當地經濟，我們計劃建立一個市場和平台，讓每個實體企業都能在當今的便利經濟中競爭。我們市場的工作是增加商家的銷售量，我們渴望在幾分鐘內，而不是幾小時或幾天內，將你所有的城市帶給你。今天，我們的大部分業務都在我們仍然看到大型跑道的餐廳類別中。我們正在投資以擴大我們在美國的領先地位，同時將我們在加拿大和澳大利亞的海外發展勢頭加倍。

Outside of restaurants, we're excited about the early progress we're making after launching into the convenience and grocery categories. According to third-party data, DoorDash became the largest online convenience delivery platform in the U.S. in less than a year, demonstrating the extensibility of our platform. And this is just the beginning as we have a long way to go in building our marketplace to serve these and many other categories in the future.

在餐廳之外，我們對進入便利和雜貨類別後所取得的早期進展感到興奮。根據第三方數據，DoorDash 在不到一年的時間裡成為美國最大的在線便利配送平台，展示了我們平台的可擴展性。這只是一個開始，因為我們在建立我們的市場以在未來為這些和許多其他類別提供服務方面還有很長的路要走。

The job of our platform is to empower a brick-and-mortar merchant to build their own digital channel, a task necessary to have adapted to evolving consumer preferences before the pandemic and a task certainly necessary to have survived COVID-19. This business is even more critical as we come out of the pandemic as consumers have only become more habituated to a convenience economy, aided by a possible longer-term trend towards working from home. Today, merchants can use DoorDash Drive to offer on demand and same-day delivery from their own digital channels. In cases where merchants don't have an online ordering solution, they can use DoorDash Storefront, which enables them to participate in e-commerce and gives them a product that's seamlessly tied to their back-of-house systems. Over time, we will have to build even more products and services to enable merchants to run their digital business as effectively as we operate our marketplace.

我們平台的工作是授權實體商家建立自己的數字渠道，這是在大流行之前適應不斷變化的消費者偏好所必需的任務，也是在 COVID-19 中倖存下來的必然任務。隨著我們從大流行中走出來，這項業務變得更加重要，因為在可能的長期在家工作趨勢的幫助下，消費者只會更加習慣於便利經濟。如今，商家可以使用 DoorDash Drive 從他們自己的數字渠道提供按需和當日送達服務。如果商家沒有在線訂購解決方案，他們可以使用 DoorDash Storefront，這使他們能夠參與電子商務並為他們提供與他們的後台系統無縫連接的產品。隨著時間的推移，我們將不得不構建更多的產品和服務，以使商家能夠像我們運營我們的市場一樣有效地運營他們的數字業務。

Underpinning our marketplace and platform is our maniacal focus on operating efficiency where we believe best-in-class execution will result in an improving cost structure that unlocks further investment capital as we grow our skin.

支撐我們的市場和平台的是我們對運營效率的狂熱關注，我們相信一流的執行將導致成本結構的改善，從而隨著我們的皮膚成長而釋放更多的投資資本。

With that, let me hand it over to Prabir.

有了這個，讓我把它交給Prabir。

Thanks, Tony, and good afternoon, everyone. Throughout our history, we've been laser-focused on our 4 core constituents: merchants, consumers, Dashers and our employees. And today, we are excited to welcome our fifth constituent, our shareholders.

謝謝，托尼，大家下午好。縱觀我們的歷史，我們一直專注於我們的 4 個核心組成部分：商家、消費者、Dashers 和我們的員工。今天，我們很高興地歡迎我們的第五個成員，我們的股東。

I want to take this opportunity to share how we manage the business and allocate capital. We are still early in our life cycle and believe we have substantial growth opportunities ahead of us. We intend to invest aggressively to pursue these opportunities. When navigating capital, we start small and experiment until we find product market fit. If we see strong demand with a path to unit economics that meet our thresholds, we invest incremental capital. Each project we invest in must continuously earn capital on its own merits. To date, the bulk of our investments have been made through our income statement rather than through our balance sheet, and we expect this to remain the case for the foreseeable future.

我想藉此機會分享我們如何管理業務和分配資金。我們仍處於生命週期的早期階段，相信我們面前有大量的增長機會。我們打算積極投資以尋求這些機會。在引導資本時，我們從小處著手並進行試驗，直到找到適合市場的產品。如果我們看到強勁的需求以及滿足我們門檻的單位經濟路徑，我們就會投資增量資本。我們投資的每個項目都必鬚根據自身的優點不斷賺取資本。迄今為止，我們的大部分投資都是通過損益表而非資產負債表進行的，我們預計在可預見的未來仍將如此。

We are the category leader in the U.S., but despite our scale, we see significant room for growth. Consequently, we are managing the business to maximize scale and long-term profit dollars rather than take rate or margin percentages. Impact is this means we intend to invest aggressively into the business in order to further our growth initiatives and expand our competitive advantages.

我們是美國的類別領導者，但儘管我們的規模很大，但我們看到了巨大的增長空間。因此，我們正在管理業務以最大化規模和長期利潤，而不是採取利率或利潤率百分比。影響是這意味著我們打算積極投資於業務，以推進我們的增長計劃並擴大我們的競爭優勢。

As you likely saw, we intend to provide guidance for Marketplace GOV and adjusted EBITDA going forward. We do not plan on guiding to revenue as we do not directly manage the business to this metric. In our model, revenues and output, reflecting in part dynamic decisions we make around consumer pricing, the ideal mix of advertising to promotions, our relative success with DashPass and the mix of Drive volume. We focus intently on inputs in each of these areas but will manage the business to Marketplace GOV and adjusted EBITDA dollars.

正如您可能看到的，我們打算為 Marketplace GOV 和調整後的 EBITDA 提供指導。我們不打算指導收入，因為我們不直接管理該指標的業務。在我們的模型中，收入和產出部分反映了我們圍繞消費者定價做出的動態決策、廣告與促銷的理想組合、我們在 DashPass 方面的相對成功以及 Drive 銷量的組合。我們專注於每個領域的投入，但將根據 Marketplace GOV 和調整後的 EBITDA 美元管理業務。

We've provided our guidance for Q1 and 2021 in our investor letter, but I'd like to provide a little more detail behind that. Underlying our 2021 guidance is an assumption of accelerated market reopenings and a return to in-store dining. While we have seen many positive signals from consumers and markets that have temporarily reopened during the pandemic, we acknowledge that vaccination and full reopenings could drive sharper changes in consumer behavior than current data would predict. Consequently, our 2021 full year guidance reflects this uncertainty. We are deeply hopeful that markets will reopen soon and we'll manage our business to provide exceptional experiences to merchants, consumers and Dashers in any scenario.

我們在投資者信函中提供了第一季度和 2021 年的指導，但我想提供更多細節。我們 2021 年指導方針的基礎是加速市場重新開放和恢復店內用餐的假設。雖然我們從大流行期間暫時重新開放的消費者和市場中看到了許多積極信號，但我們承認，疫苗接種和全面重新開放可能會推動消費者行為發生比當前數據預測的更劇烈的變化。因此，我們的 2021 年全年指引反映了這種不確定性。我們非常希望市場能夠很快重新開放，我們將管理我們的業務，在任何情況下為商家、消費者和 Dashers 提供卓越的體驗。

With that, I'll open it up to questions.

有了這個，我會提出問題。

(Operator Instructions) And your first question comes from the line of Doug Anmuth from JPMorgan.

（操作員說明）您的第一個問題來自摩根大通的 Doug Anmuth。

I have 2. First, just on trends a little bit in 1Q. We've seen some signs of accelerating growth in the quarter from some of your peers. Can you just talk about kind of what you're seeing in the first quarter and how that ties into your guidance for 1Q in terms of GOV? And then secondly, can you just talk more broadly about how you're thinking about the marketing in competition in the category in the U.S. now that we've seen a degree of consolidation over the last year and reopening happening and how you view kind of rationality in the space going forward?

我有 2 個。首先，關於 1Q 的一些趨勢。我們已經從一些同行那裡看到了本季度加速增長的一些跡象。您能否談談您在第一季度看到的情況，以及這與您在 GOV 方面對 1Q 的指導有何联系？其次，您能否更廣泛地談談您如何看待美國該類別競爭中的營銷，因為我們在過去一年中看到了一定程度的整合和重新開放，以及您如何看待這種未來空間的合理性？

Doug, maybe I'll take that question. So first, in terms of the first quarter, we are seeing acceleration in January relative to our order growth in December as well as in Q4. So that answers that question. So our findings are consistent with what others have communicated.

道格，也許我會回答這個問題。因此，首先，就第一季度而言，我們看到 1 月份的訂單增長相對於 12 月份和第四季度的訂單增長有所加快。所以這回答了這個問題。因此，我們的發現與其他人所傳達的一致。

With respect to marketing and competition around that, we continue to acquire more of the new customers joining the industry in any given period. And part of what's driving that is the consistent gains we drive in our unit economics and the retention and engagement of our consumer base, which then allows us to pay higher and higher amounts in terms of CPAs to acquire customers. And so we believe it's a competitive advantage where our increasing unit economics help drive an LTV increase that then translates into an ability to acquire more customers and others.

在營銷和競爭方面，我們在任何特定時期都將繼續獲得更多加入該行業的新客戶。部分原因是我們在單位經濟方面的持續收益以及消費者群的保留和參與，這使我們能夠支付越來越高的註冊會計師費用來獲取客戶。因此，我們相信這是一種競爭優勢，我們不斷增長的單位經濟有助於推動 LTV 的增長，進而轉化為獲得更多客戶和其他人的能力。

And your next question comes from the line of Ross Sandler from Barclays.

你的下一個問題來自巴克萊銀行的羅斯桑德勒。

Thanks for the chart in the letter about the marketplace versus the Drive partner store growth rate. A question about the latter. So on Drive, I think order growth was growing around 700% in mid-2020. And looking at the take rate in the fourth quarter, might have slowed down a little bit. So just -- is that true? And what percent of orders are coming from Drive at this point? And just any thoughts on the long-term outlook for that business? That's it.

感謝信中關於市場與 Drive 合作夥伴商店增長率的圖表。關於後者的問題。所以在 Drive 上，我認為 2020 年年中的訂單增長約為 700%。看看第四季度的錄取率，可能已經放緩了一點。所以只是——這是真的嗎？目前有多少百分比的訂單來自云端硬盤？以及對該業務的長期前景有何想法？而已。

Ross, so let me take the second part of the question first, which is I think you were talking about take rate changes going from the third quarter into the fourth quarter. Third quarter take rate was 12.1%, which reduced to 11.9% in the fourth quarter. And really the 2 things driving that was incremental Prop 22 cost. Remember Prop 22 passed in November, and so we have a portion of the quarter during which we had incurred those costs as well as the impact of commission caps or price controls in certain jurisdictions in Q4.

羅斯，讓我先來回答問題的第二部分，我認為你說的是從第三季度到第四季度的利率變化。第三季度為 12.1%，第四季度降至 11.9%。真正推動 22 號提案增加成本的兩件事。請記住，第 22 號提案於 11 月通過，因此我們在本季度的一部分時間裡產生了這些成本，以及第四季度某些司法管轄區的佣金上限或價格控制的影響。

So those price controls, I believe we disclosed in the letter. The net impact of revenue from the price controls was $36 million or 44 basis points. So if you add that back, you get a cleaner picture of what the actual underlying increase in the take rate was inclusive of the Prop 22 cost.

所以那些價格控制，我相信我們在信中披露過。價格控制帶來的收入淨影響為 3600 萬美元或 44 個基點。因此，如果您將其添加回去，您就會更清楚地了解採取率的實際潛在增長包括 Prop 22 成本。

On Drive, we continue to be excited by that business. Drive continues to grow strongly, faster than the core marketplace, and Drive orders grew both quarter-on-quarter as well as on a year-on-year basis. The thing that's interesting about Drive is about a year ago, we were largely concentrated in the restaurant vertical. But since then, we've diversified beyond restaurants and have now brought onto the Drive platform merchants and local businesses in other verticals, such as retail. We signed Michael's and Macy's. In pet supplies, we signed PetSmart and Petco. We're in pharma delivery for Sam's Club as well as flowers.

在 Drive 上，我們繼續對這項業務感到興奮。 Drive 繼續強勁增長，增長速度快於核心市場，Drive 訂單環比和同比均增長。 Drive 有趣的是大約一年前，我們主要集中在垂直餐廳。但從那時起，我們已經超越了餐廳，現在已經在 Drive 平台上引入了其他垂直領域的商家和本地企業，例如零售。我們簽下了邁克爾和梅西百貨。在寵物用品方面，我們簽約了 PetSmart 和 Petco。我們正在為 Sam's Club 和鮮花提供藥品配送服務。

So we continue to be excited about the growth here. We haven't disclosed exactly what percentage of Drive orders took place in this past quarter, but suffice to say, Drive continues to grow strongly both quarter-on-quarter and year-on-year and faster than the core business.

因此，我們繼續對這裡的增長感到興奮。我們沒有確切披露上一季度 Drive 訂單的百分比，但可以說，Drive 繼續保持強勁的季度環比和同比增長，並且快於核心業務。

Your next question comes from the line of Ron Josey from JMP.

您的下一個問題來自 JMP 的 Ron Josey。

I wanted to ask a little bit more about usage. In the letter, I think you talked about improved retention from DashPass subs. And DashPass subs grew, I think, a bigger, larger part of the mix of orders. So can you talk about retention a little bit more, particularly as we think about January and trends going forward in terms of consumer behavior trends? And then any sort of insights on DashPass usage and just frequency of use would be helpful.

我想問更多關於使用的問題。在這封信中，我認為您談到了 DashPass 訂閱者的留存率提高。我認為，DashPass 訂閱量在訂單組合中的增長越來越大。那麼，您能否多談談留存率，尤其是當我們考慮到 1 月份和消費者行為趨勢方面的未來趨勢時？然後任何關於 DashPass 使用情況和使用頻率的見解都會有所幫助。

Ron, yes, in terms of DashPass, we haven't disclosed the number of subs, but I will say that they have grown sequentially since our disclosure in the S-1. We continue to invest behind this because as we had explained in our S-1, DashPass Drive increased engagement amongst its subscribers due to the 0 delivery season. So certainly an avenue for growth that's exciting to us.

羅恩，是的，就 DashPass 而言，我們還沒有披露訂閱者的數量，但我會說，自從我們在 S-1 中披露之後，訂閱者的數量一直在增長。我們繼續為此進行投資，因為正如我們在 S-1 中所解釋的那樣，由於 0 交付季節，DashPass Drive 增加了其訂戶的參與度。因此，這無疑是一條令我們興奮的增長途徑。

In terms of retention as well as engagement, we continue to see retention and engagement remain at COVID highs. In fact, engagement continues to improve, both within the DashPass product as well as amongst non-DashPass users of the platform. So we're seeing positive trends there.

在留存率和參與度方面，我們繼續看到留存率和參與度保持在 COVID 高位。事實上，無論是在 DashPass 產品內部還是在平台的非 DashPass 用戶中，參與度都在不斷提高。所以我們在那裡看到了積極的趨勢。

In terms of the long term, in our experience, consumer behavior tends to be sticky. So once the consumer discovered DoorDash and they've ordered from their favorite restaurants and enjoyed the benefits of on demand convenience, new habits get formed, and we believe this habituation will persist over the long run. And so even when you look at markets like Texas and Georgia and Florida that reopened, that was sort of partially open, even through the pandemic in the U.S., against that backdrop, we continue to see our weekly order volumes in these markets continue to grow. So that's a promising sign.

從長遠來看，根據我們的經驗，消費者行為往往具有粘性。因此，一旦消費者發現了 DoorDash，並從他們最喜歡的餐廳點菜並享受了按需便利帶來的好處，就會形成新的習慣，我們相信這種習慣會長期存在。因此，即使你看看德克薩斯州、喬治亞州和佛羅里達州等重新開放的市場，即使在美國大流行的情況下，這些市場也是部分開放的，在這種背景下，我們繼續看到我們在這些市場的每週訂單量繼續增長.所以這是一個有希望的跡象。

I suspect your question is sort of heading into a guidance question. So maybe I'll address that right now, which is embedded in our guidance, we're assuming that as the vaccine gets fully rolled out and -- consumer behavior will start reverting back to pre-COVID levels. And so that's what's embedded in the guidance, along with standard Q2, Q3 summer seasonality when people generally tend to go out versus order in. And so you're seeing that embedded in our guidance. There's a certain amount of uncertainty with respect to what consumer behavior does post-pandemic, and we're trying to reflect that in the guidance we've provided.

我懷疑你的問題有點像指導問題。因此，也許我現在會解決這個問題，這包含在我們的指導中，我們假設隨著疫苗的全面推出，消費者行為將開始恢復到 COVID 之前的水平。這就是指南中包含的內容，以及標準的第二季度、第三季度夏季季節性，當人們通常傾向於外出而不是訂購時。所以你在我們的指南中看到了這一點。大流行後消費者的行為存在一定的不確定性，我們正試圖在我們提供的指導中反映這一點。

And your next question comes from Heath Terry from Goldman Sachs.

您的下一個問題來自高盛的 Heath Terry。

Great. I was wondering if you could give us a bit of an update on your experiments. It's probably more than an experiment, but your -- the work that you're doing in general merchandise, the relationship with Macy's, Bloomingdale's and others, what kind of progress you're seeing so far. And to the extent that we just came out of a holiday season where companies like Nike were being told by third-party delivery network that they couldn't ship through them, how you see the size of that opportunity and the pace that you're going to, to try and address it.

偉大的。我想知道你是否可以給我們一些關於你的實驗的最新信息。這可能不僅僅是一個實驗，而是你的——你在一般商品中所做的工作，與梅西百貨、布魯明代爾百貨和其他公司的關係，到目前為止你看到了什麼樣的進步。就我們剛剛度過一個假日季節而言，像耐克這樣的公司被第三方交付網絡告知他們無法通過它們發貨，你如何看待這個機會的規模和你的速度去，試圖解決它。

Heath, it's Tony. I'll take that question. If you can think of any silver linings of this pandemic, I think it is that every brick-and-mortar store, whether they are a restaurant or a retailer, is participating in e-commerce, sometimes exclusively in e-commerce given some of the restrictions that we saw during the past year. And for us, we really were seeing that on both sides of our business as a marketplace as well as a platform.

希思，是托尼。我會回答這個問題。如果你能想到這次大流行的任何一線希望，我認為每家實體店，無論是餐館還是零售商，都在參與電子商務，有時只參與電子商務，因為我們在過去一年中看到的限制。對我們來說，我們確實在我們業務的雙方都看到了這一點，既是一個市場，也是一個平台。

On the marketplace front, we launched our second category of convenience item deliveries about a year ago when we announced partnerships with 7-Eleven, CVS, Walgreens and many others. And already, that has picked up quite a lot of momentum in the early progress. Again, very early, but according to third-party estimates, DoorDash already is the largest delivery platform for convenience goods in the U.S. And I think you're seeing some of the extensibility of starting with the highest frequency category of restaurants, building the biggest audience there and covering the most number of stores there, just given the nature of how many restaurants there are relative to how many other types of stores there are that have made us be able to accelerate very, very quickly into some of these other categories.

在市場方面，大約一年前，當我們宣布與 7-11、CVS、Walgreens 和許多其他公司建立合作夥伴關係時，我們推出了第二類便利商品交付。而且，這已經在早期進展中獲得了相當大的動力。同樣，很早，但根據第三方估計，DoorDash 已經是美國最大的便利商品交付平台。而且我認為你看到了從頻率最高的餐廳類別開始的一些可擴展性，建立最大的那裡的觀眾和覆蓋那裡最多的商店，只是考慮到有多少餐館相對於有多少其他類型的商店的性質，這使我們能夠非常、非常迅速地加速進入其他一些類別。

On the platform front, we've actually been delivering from a lot of these partners for a while. DoorDash Drive launched in 2017 Q1. So it's about 4 years old now. And Prabir mentioned some of the categories that really came into fruition in the past year, whether that be in retail as we partnered with the likes of Macy's and Michael's, pet supplies, PetSmart and Petco, or pharmacy with Sam's Club. And so I think what you're seeing is every business recognizes that omnichannel is a great thing. Every business is trying to figure out how to redo their supply chains to really meet a post-pandemic omnichannel presence, which they expect to grow. And we'll be there with them, both with our marketplace as well as our platform.

在平台方面，我們實際上已經從很多這些合作夥伴那裡交付了一段時間。 DoorDash Drive 於 2017 年第一季度推出。所以它現在大約4歲。 Prabir 提到了一些在過去一年中真正取得成果的品類，無論是零售，我們與梅西百貨和邁克爾百貨、寵物用品、PetSmart 和 Petco 合作，還是與山姆會員店合作的藥房。所以我認為你看到的是每個企業都認識到全渠道是一件很棒的事情。每個企業都在試圖弄清楚如何重做他們的供應鏈，以真正滿足他們期望增長的大流行後全渠道存在。我們將與他們同在，無論是我們的市場還是我們的平台。

And your next question is from Eric Sheridan from UBS.

您的下一個問題來自瑞銀的 Eric Sheridan。

I want to come back to the [counter] investments against the longer-term opportunities. You've talked before about geographic expansion. Can you just give us a bigger sense of the way you're thinking now post the IPO about the process of either building businesses globally or acquiring businesses globally and sort of puts and takes of both organic and inorganic growth outside your core markets?

我想回到針對長期機會的 [櫃檯] 投資。您之前談到過地域擴張。您能否讓我們更深入地了解您現在在 IPO 後的想法，即在全球範圍內建立業務或在全球範圍內收購業務的過程，以及在您的核心市場之外的有機和無機增長的某種看跌和取捨？

Yes, Eric, I'll take that one. Look, the goal on -- if you think about our portfolio of investments today, we are growing in our core category of restaurants, which we have -- we believe, has massive runway ahead. We're adding categories to becoming a multi-marketplace -- multicategory marketplace. We're adding products on our platform in addition to Drive and Storefront. And the fourth area is international.

是的，埃里克，我要那個。看，目標——如果你考慮一下我們今天的投資組合，我們的核心餐廳類別正在增長，我們擁有——我們相信，未來有很大的發展空間。我們正在添加類別以成為一個多市場 - 多類別市場。除了 Drive 和 Storefront，我們還在我們的平台上添加產品。第四個領域是國際化。

So our perspective on international opportunities is really taking a very long-term view and becoming a global company over the long run. And given what we've seen, even with our current footprint in Australia and Canada where we believe we gained share in 2020 and saw improvements in our unit economics, we're really liking what we've seen with our playbook. And we also like what we see in terms of some of the geographic opportunities outside of the ones we operate in, in terms of just how underpenetrated and how large some of these opportunities are, especially as we bring a multiproduct portfolio into those geographies.

因此，我們對國際機遇的看法確實是非常長遠的眼光，並從長遠來看成為一家全球性公司。鑑於我們所看到的，即使我們目前在澳大利亞和加拿大的足跡，我們相信我們在 2020 年獲得了份額並看到我們的單位經濟有所改善，我們真的很喜歡我們在劇本中看到的東西。而且我們也喜歡我們所看到的一些在我們經營的地區之外的地理機會，就這些機會的滲透程度和其中一些機會有多大，特別是當我們將多產品組合帶入這些地區時。

With respect to how we enter, obviously, we'll look at any opportunities and weigh them against our own organic efforts. So far, we like our playbook, and we'll always seek to enter markets in a differentiated way for all of the audiences.

關於我們如何進入，顯然，我們會考慮任何機會，並將它們與我們自己的有機努力進行權衡。到目前為止，我們喜歡我們的劇本，我們將始終尋求以差異化的方式為所有觀眾進入市場。

And just to add to Tony's point, I mean, I want to make sure we don't lose sight that even within the core food delivery business, the runway for growth is massive. If you compare just our GOV compared to the overall restaurant spend, we're a tiny fraction of that. So there's a lot of runway for growth just in food delivery alone.

為了補充托尼的觀點，我的意思是，我想確保我們不會忽視即使在核心食品配送業務中，增長的空間也是巨大的。如果您僅將我們的 GOV 與餐廳的整體支出進行比較，我們只是其中的一小部分。因此，僅在食品配送方面就有很多增長空間。

Now you tack onto that new verticals such as convenience and grocery and that further adds to our addressable market we're a tiny, tiny fraction of that. So international is definitely an important priority and is an area where we certainly aspire to grow into, but even the core U.S. business has many avenues for growth, and we're relatively early in those opportunities.

現在你涉足便利和雜貨等新的垂直領域，這進一步增加了我們的潛在市場，我們只是其中的一小部分。因此，國際化絕對是一個重要的優先事項，也是我們當然渴望成長的領域，但即使是美國的核心業務也有許多增長途徑，我們在這些機會方面相對較早。

And your next question is from Alex Potter from Piper Sandler.

您的下一個問題來自 Piper Sandler 的 Alex Potter。

Just a question, maybe follow on the previous discussion we were just having there. But if you were to maybe, I guess, divide management bandwidth, like the amount of brain power you're spending on these different growth opportunities right now, the various different verticals within Drive, international, I know it's easy to just say they're all important, but you go to bed at night, what are the things that you're thinking about most versus less?

只是一個問題，也許可以繼續我們剛才的討論。但是，如果您要劃分管理帶寬，例如您現在在這些不同的增長機會上花費的腦力，國際驅動器中的各種不同垂直領域，我知道很容易說出來都很重要，但是你晚上睡覺，你想的最多的事情是什麼？

Yes. I'll take that. Look, certainly, we have a full plate, and it's a broad surface area. And the goal was always, over many decades, to build both a marketplace and a platform in which we can transform every brick-and-mortar business. So that aperture is -- was wide even 7.5 years ago when we started the company.

是的。我會接受的。看，當然，我們有一個完整的盤子，而且它的表面積很大。幾十年來，我們的目標始終是建立一個市場和平台，我們可以在其中改變每一個實體業務。因此，即使在 7.5 年前我們創辦公司時，這個範圍也很寬。

The way I tend to think about this is less about which thing comes up, I guess, most often in my dreams. It's more -- do we have the right leader and are we setting up that leader with the right cross-functional team for success. And as Prabir mentioned in some of the opening remarks, a lot of these projects that we're talking about, they're in very different stages of progression. And we tend to invest commensurate to what we see, both in terms of achieving product market fit as well as just where we are in the maturation and development of that market opportunity.

我傾向於考慮這件事的方式，而不是關於發生什麼事情，我猜，最常見的是在我的夢中。更重要的是——我們是否有合適的領導者，我們是否為該領導者建立了正確的跨職能團隊以取得成功。正如 Prabir 在一些開場白中提到的那樣，我們正在談論的很多這些項目都處於非常不同的進展階段。我們傾向於根據我們所看到的情況進行投資，無論是在實現產品市場契合度方面，還是在市場機會的成熟和發展方面。

So it's not like -- I guess it's making sure that we always have that portfolio of investments and making sure that so long as we have the right team and the right single-threaded focus on that area that the focus is really just on that execution and nothing else.

所以這不是——我想這是確保我們始終擁有該投資組合，並確保只要我們擁有合適的團隊和正確的單線程專注於該領域，重點實際上只是在執行上沒有別的了。

Okay. And then maybe another question kind of on, I guess, on the regulatory front. There's been some rumors, I guess, in the press of potentially talking to unions nationally in order to prevent sort of a state-by-state Prop 22 type fight -- legal fight. If you deal with unions onetime nationally, then maybe you can come to some sort of labor agreement, and it's kind of a one-and-done setup. Is that accurate? Are you guys having discussions like that? What are the odds something like that actually happens?

好的。然後可能是另一個問題，我想，在監管方面。我猜，有一些謠言在媒體上可能會與全國工會交談，以防止發生州與州之間的 22 號提案類型的鬥爭——法律鬥爭。如果你曾經在全國范圍內與工會打交道，那麼也許你可以達成某種勞工協議，這是一種一勞永逸的安排。那準確嗎？你們有這樣的討論嗎？這樣的事情實際發生的機率有多大？

Well, I think it's important to start with what it is that we want to achieve with respect to anything policy when it comes to Dashers. And for us, that always starts with what it is that Dashers want. And I think what you saw in Proposition 22 was that both politics and policies sided with the Dasher. Both sides of the aisle in California came together to support Dashers' desire to keep the flexibility that, frankly, doesn't exist in any other type of work opportunity and then paired that flexibility with greater security. And wherever there are opportunities to have discussions about how can we maintain this flexibility and really create a set of standards around it that gives portable and proportional benefits tied to this flexibility, we're happy to have those conversations.

好吧，我認為重要的是從我們想要在涉及 Dashers 的任何政策方面實現的目標開始。對我們來說，這總是從 Dashers 想要的東西開始。我認為你在 22 號提案中看到的是，政治和政策都支持 Dasher。加利福尼亞過道的雙方齊心協力支持 Dashers 保持靈活性的願望，坦率地說，這種靈活性在任何其他類型的工作機會中都不存在，然後將這種靈活性與更高的安全性結合起來。只要有機會討論我們如何才能保持這種靈活性並真正圍繞它創建一套標準，以提供與這種靈活性相關的可移植和成比例的好處，我們很高興進行這些對話。

I mean if you just look at some of the outcomes that have been achieved with Prop 22, I mean, you see a 50% increase in Net Promoter Scores for Dashers post Prop 22 in the State of California. So I think this is an instance where business and policy actually achieve the outcomes -- or the outcomes actually achieved the objectives that it set out to accomplish.

我的意思是，如果您只看一下第 22 號提案所取得的一些成果，我的意思是，您會看到加利福尼亞州第 22 號提案後 Dashers 的淨推薦值增加了 50%。因此，我認為這是業務和政策實際實現結果的一個例子——或者結果實際上實現了它設定的目標。

And your next question comes from Lloyd Walmsley from Deutsche Bank.

您的下一個問題來自德意志銀行的 Lloyd Walmsley。

Two questions, if I can. First, can you just give us an update on how you're approaching the incremental Prop 22 costs? How are they coming in versus your estimates? How are you passing along or not passing those along to consumers? And what are you seeing in the competitive environment that may inform what you do?

兩個問題，如果可以的話。首先，您能否向我們介紹一下您如何處理第 22 號提案的增量成本？與您的估計相比，它們是如何進入的？你是如何傳遞或不傳遞給消費者的？您在競爭環境中看到的哪些信息可能會影響您的工作？

And then I guess the second would just be on kind of active efficiency. You talked about in the letter continuing to improve. Is there an opportunity, do you feel like there's multiple years left? Or are there regions where you have strong density or other factors that might serve as a leading indicator where you could give us a sense of more mature contribution margins or regional EBITDA margins? Anything you could share there would be great.

然後我想第二個只是關於主動效率。你在信中談到的不斷改進。有沒有機會，你覺得還有很多年嗎？還是在某些地區您的密度或其他因素可以作為領先指標，您可以讓我們了解更成熟的邊際貢獻或區域 EBITDA 利潤率？你可以在那里分享的任何東西都會很棒。

Lloyd, maybe I'll take that. So first, in terms of the Prop 22 costs, we're absorbing the vast majority of the Prop 22 costs. We are passing them along in certain instances. But for the vast majority of the cost in California, we're absorbing it in our P&L. And if you think about why we're doing it, it's first and foremost in order to benefit merchants because if we keep prices low to consumers, consumers tend to order more. Those orders ultimately benefit our merchants. And so to the extent we can continue doing so, we will. It also is consistent with our overall philosophy to manage the business to maximize scale and top line growth while maintaining discipline in EBITDA. So what's embedded in our guidance for Q1 and 2021 as a whole is an assumption that we're going to continue absorbing Prop 22 costs to the degree that we currently have.

勞埃德，也許我會接受。因此，首先，就 22 號提案的成本而言，我們正在吸收 22 號提案的絕大部分成本。在某些情況下，我們會傳遞它們。但是對於加利福尼亞州的大部分成本，我們將其吸收在我們的損益表中。如果你想想我們為什麼這樣做，首先是為了讓商家受益，因為如果我們對消費者保持低價，消費者往往會訂購更多。這些訂單最終使我們的商家受益。因此，在我們可以繼續這樣做的範圍內，我們會這樣做。這也符合我們管理業務以最大化規模和收入增長同時保持 EBITDA 紀律的整體理念。因此，我們對第一季度和整個 2021 年的指導中所包含的假設是，我們將繼續以目前的程度吸收第 22 號提案的成本。

On your second question around active efficiency, I remember we had this discussion even at the time of the IPO. Our active efficiencies continue to grow obviously year-on-year, but also on a quarter-on-quarter basis. And the reason for that is because active efficiency is not simply a product of the traffic that's on the streets or the waiting time at restaurants. There's a ton of product work that goes into dispatching a Dasher appropriately, ensuring batches are prepared well, ensuring wasted time at the restaurant is eliminated and so on. So we've not found the ceiling yet. And I feel good about the fact that there's continued improvements in active efficiency are possible, but we don't have at least a view in terms of where it will saturate at this point.

關於你關於主動效率的第二個問題，我記得我們甚至在 IPO 時也進行過討論。我們的主動效率同比繼續明顯增長，但環比也是如此。其原因是因為主動效率不僅僅是街道上的交通流量或餐廳等待時間的產物。有大量的產品工作涉及適當地調度 Dasher，確保批次準備好，確保消除餐廳浪費的時間等等。所以我們還沒有找到天花板。我對主動效率有可能持續改進這一事實感到滿意，但我們至少對此時它將在哪裡飽和尚無定論。

And your next question comes from Jason Helfstein from Oppenheimer.

您的下一個問題來自 Oppenheimer 的 Jason Helfstein。

I'll ask two. Just maybe how are you thinking about driving more docks in the storefront? Obviously, there's a lot of suites out there for SMBs, but yours integrate into your whole back end. And so maybe just talk about how you drive that adoption. Is there certain pricing mechanisms you're using or other ways to get that out there? And then secondly, just maybe talk a bit more about kind of the caps and some of the pushback.

我會問兩個。只是也許你是怎麼考慮在店面開更多的碼頭的？顯然，有很多適合 SMB 的套件，但您的套件集成到您的整個後端。所以也許只是談談你是如何推動這種採用的。您是否正在使用某些定價機製或其他方式來實現這一目標？其次，也許可以多談談上限和一些回擊。

I mean number one, any information you could share about how nonchain restaurants are kind of increasing prices -- online prices to offset fees and, just in general, that behavior and the awareness that that's kind of a pretty healthy way to kind of manage? And then can you see any way that permanent jurisdictional price caps are legal?

我的意思是第一，您可以分享關於非連鎖餐廳如何提高價格的任何信息——在線價格以抵消費用，以及一般來說，這種行為和意識是一種非常健康的管理方式？然後你能看到永久管轄價格上限是合法的嗎？

Yes. So Jason, maybe I'll take the first part of the question. So I think the first question was on Storefront. Look, Storefront is very early. It's a little over 6 months old as a product, and it has grown extremely, extremely quickly since launch. And you're right, in some sense for merchants, it's a bit of a no-brainer because it already integrates with all of their back-of-house systems that we've had to do on our marketplace.

是的。那麼傑森，也許我會回答問題的第一部分。所以我認為第一個問題是關於店面的。看，店面很早。作為一個產品，它已經有 6 個多月的歷史了，而且自推出以來，它的發展速度非常非常快。你是對的，從某種意義上說，對於商家來說，這有點簡單，因為它已經與我們必須在我們的市場上做的所有後台系統集成。

On the flip side, there's a lot of work to be done, making sure that it works with a wide variety of merchants. We serve -- we're very privileged and proud to serve hundreds of thousands of businesses, but that also comes with lots of complexity in terms of their operations, their protocols, their reporting requirements and things -- and so on and so forth. And so that's really where we are. We're back to how we think about investment horizons and how we manage capital allocation.

另一方面，還有很多工作要做，以確保它適用於各種各樣的商家。我們服務——我們非常榮幸和自豪地為數十萬家企業服務，但這也帶來了它們的運營、協議、報告要求和事物等方面的許多複雜性——等等。這就是我們真正的所在。我們回到了我們如何看待投資範圍和我們如何管理資本配置。

Right now, Storefront is really in the product market fit phase. And so we're just trying to create more and more features such that it can deliver more and more of the benefits that we see in our own marketplace to a merchant's own digital channel.

目前，Storefront 確實處於產品市場契合階段。因此，我們只是在嘗試創建越來越多的功能，以便將我們在自己的市場中看到的越來越多的好處提供給商家自己的數字渠道。

And Jason, just on your question regarding price caps. As of the end of Q4, we were subject to price controls in 73 jurisdictions, which is up from 32 at the end of the third quarter. Now based on all the conversations we've had with city officials, these price caps are temporary in nature, and they're all tied to emergency orders that are related to in-store dining. So it's our expectation that when in-store dining resumes, these price caps will fall away.

傑森，就你關於價格上限的問題。截至第四季度末，我們在 73 個司法管轄區受到價格管制，高於第三季度末的 32 個。現在，根據我們與市政府官員的所有對話，這些價格上限本質上是暫時的，並且都與與店內用餐有關的緊急訂單有關。因此，我們預計，當店內用餐恢復時，這些價格上限將消失。

In the interim, we've begun implementing incremental consumer fees in order to recoup some of the costs related to price controls. Remember, in the long term, our [mantra is to] continue reducing consumer fees. And so we'll do this as long as price caps are temporary, and the fee increases will go away once the price caps drop away. But in Q4, those price caps had an impact of $36 million in terms of revenue, about 44 basis points on our take rate. And we -- we're planning to manage to that similar dollar impact over time.

在此期間，我們已開始實施增加的消費者費用，以彌補與價格控制相關的部分成本。請記住，從長遠來看，我們的 [口頭禪] 將繼續降低消費者費用。因此，只要價格上限是暫時的，我們就會這樣做，一旦價格上限下降，費用增加就會消失。但在第四季度，這些價格上限對收入產生了 3600 萬美元的影響，比我們的利率高出約 44 個基點。而且我們 - 我們計劃隨著時間的推移管理類似的美元影響。

In terms of the legality of permanent price caps, I don't want to comment on a hypothetical, but because based on all the conversations of that so far, city officials insist that these are temporary in nature.

關於永久價格上限的合法性，我不想評論一個假設，但因為基於迄今為止的所有對話，市政府官員堅持認為這些都是暫時的。

And just if there's anything you want to share about maybe proportion of restaurants that are using separate pricing for online versus in-store to try to recoup fees?

如果您想分享一些關於使用在線和店內單獨定價以試圖收回費用的餐廳比例的信息？

Yes. Some restaurants are using menu inflation and e-price inflation in order to recoup fees. So far, again, this may be a function of the fact that in-store dining is shut down and consumer price elasticity, the impact on price [loss] is relatively minimal. But we're hopeful that as in-store dining resumes, merchants will recognize that keeping prices consistent with their in-store is actually the right path forward because it boosts the amount of demand that's possible to their delivery channel.

是的。一些餐館正在使用菜單通脹和電子價格通脹來收回費用。到目前為止，這可能是由於店內餐飲關閉和消費者價格彈性的原因，對價格[損失]的影響相對較小。但我們希望，隨著店內用餐的恢復，商家會認識到，保持價格與店內價格一致實際上是正確的前進道路，因為這會增加他們交付渠道的需求量。

And your next question comes from Ralph Schackart from William Blair.

您的下一個問題來自 William Blair 的 Ralph Schackart。

First, just on the annual EBITDA guidance, Prabir, that contemplates a fairly wide range between 0 and $200 million or so. I know you talked about price controls as well as Prop 22, but just can you give us a sense what would drive either outcome on the low end or the high end, especially after coming off, obviously, some strong tailwinds with COVID, but off a strong 2020?

首先，僅就年度 EBITDA 指導，Prabir 而言，該指導考慮了 0 到 2 億美元左右的相當大的範圍。我知道你談到了價格控制以及 22 號提案，但你能否讓我們了解一下，什麼會推動低端或高端的結果，尤其是在顯然，COVID 帶來了一些強勁的順風之後，但關閉了強勁的 2020 年？

And then just maybe a follow-up on the competitive side. You talked about CAC being a little bit more expensive but within your normal range. Maybe just give a sense of how the supply side looks for drivers and your ability to continue to add merchants, particularly on the restaurant side.

然後可能只是競爭方面的後續行動。你談到 CAC 有點貴，但在你的正常範圍內。也許只是讓您了解供應方如何尋找司機以及您繼續添加商家的能力，特別是在餐廳方面。

Sure. Ralph, so on your first question regarding the guidance, really, the objective there in the guidance is to ensure some level of discipline on the EBITDA line. To the extent that we're outperforming on the top line, either due to the core food business or outperformance in products such as Drive or new verticals, such as convenience, we would be towards the high end. On the other hand, we've got some interesting opportunities ahead of us, particularly as it pertains to convenience. As you likely saw, third-party data shows us as being the leader in the online convenience space, and this is after having launched that particular vertical about a year or maybe less than a year ago.

當然。拉爾夫，關於你關於指導的第一個問題，真的，指導中的目標是確保 EBITDA 線上的一定程度的紀律。如果我們在頂線上表現出色，無論是由於核心食品業務還是在 Drive 等產品或便利性等新垂直領域的表現，我們都將走向高端。另一方面，我們面前有一些有趣的機會，尤其是與便利有關的機會。正如您可能看到的那樣，第三方數據顯示我們是在線便利領域的領導者，這是在大約一年或不到一年前推出特定垂直市場之後。

And so if we start seeing incremental progress and positive signals from some of these new projects, including Storefront and Drive and other things, we're inclined to invest as long as it meets our return thresholds, in which case, we will -- we'll likely end up towards the low end of that range.

因此，如果我們開始看到其中一些新項目（包括 Storefront 和 Drive 等）的增量進展和積極信號，我們傾向於投資，只要它符合我們的回報門檻，在這種情況下，我們將 - 我們'很可能最終會接近該範圍的低端。

Again, we're managing the business, just as a reminder, to maximize scale and top line growth, with an intent to try to land inside the range in EBITDA as opposed to try to beat EBITDA.

再次提醒一下，我們正在管理業務，以最大限度地擴大規模和收入增長，並試圖將 EBITDA 控制在該範圍內，而不是試圖超過 EBITDA。

And then on your second question with respect to the supply side, let me talk about merchants first. And with COVID and the recent pandemic, it became clear to merchants that they need a delivery channel. So merchants that weren't participating in delivery prior to the pandemic needed to get that -- deliver that quickly. And so we saw a massive influx in terms of merchants, which led to selection growth. And you can see that in the chart that we included in the shareholder letter where the selections available on the platform has continued to grow.

第二個關於供給方面的問題，我先說商家。隨著 COVID 和最近的大流行，商家很清楚他們需要一個交付渠道。因此，在大流行之前沒有參與交付的商家需要得到它——快速交付。因此，我們看到商家大量湧入，這導致了選擇的增長。您可以在我們包含在股東信中的圖表中看到，平台上可用的選擇持續增長。

In terms of our cost to acquire merchants has been relatively stable, the same goes on the Dasher side where you've had sort of a tale of 2 cities. On the one hand, you would have expected large influxes of Dashers as a result of heightened unemployment, but that was offset to some degree by stimulus checks.

就我們獲得商人的成本而言，我們的成本相對穩定，在 Dasher 方面也是如此，你已經有了 2 個城市的故事。一方面，由於失業率上升，你會預計會有大量 Dashers 湧入，但這在一定程度上被刺激檢查所抵消。

Regardless of all of that, our cost to acquire Dashers have been sort of stable in terms of within the realm of what we were expecting.

儘管如此，我們收購 Dashers 的成本在我們預期的範圍內一直是穩定的。

And your next question comes from the line of James Lee from Mizuho.

您的下一個問題來自瑞穗的 James Lee。

Great. On the shareholder letter, you guys mentioned that consumer acquisition costs increased in 4Q. So is that the trend we are expecting or you're expecting going forward? And second thing, how should we think about maybe contract revenue going forward into FY '21? Is that a rising trend as well? And specifically, on advertising, can you talk about maybe what channel is working well -- very well for you, what channel that you like to improve? Any particular regions that you want to go after a little bit more aggressive?

偉大的。在股東信中，你們提到第四季度消費者獲取成本增加。那麼這是我們期待的趨勢還是您期待的趨勢？第二件事，我們應該如何考慮到 21 財年的合同收入？這也是上升趨勢嗎？具體來說，關於廣告，您能否談談哪個渠道運作良好——對您來說非常好，您喜歡改進哪個渠道？您想追求更具侵略性的任何特定區域？

Maybe I'll start with your first question on customer acquisition cost. To be clear, we manage our business to pay back thresholds. And so the customer acquisition cost, the CPA that we pay in order to acquire customers is simply an output resulting from a payback period that we're trying to hit. And so to the extent that we continue increasing the LTV of our customer base through improved profitability, through improved engagement, through levers such as DashPass, it gives us more flexibility to increase our CPA. So I view our increasing CAC as a feature where we're able to fund higher and higher amounts of customer acquisition in order to acquire a larger and larger share of new customers joining the industry, which then when you couple that with our industry-leading retention, leads to continued market share gains in the future. So the increase in customer acquisition costs are a choice that we're making to reinvest the profitability in our business.

也許我會從你關於客戶獲取成本的第一個問題開始。需要明確的是，我們管理我們的業務以償還門檻。因此，客戶獲取成本，我們為獲取客戶而支付的 CPA 只是我們試圖達到的投資回收期的結果。因此，就我們通過提高盈利能力、提高參與度、通過 DashPass 等槓桿繼續增加客戶群的 LTV 而言，它為我們提供了更大的靈活性來提高我們的 CPA。因此，我認為我們不斷增加的 CAC 是一項功能，我們能夠為越來越多的客戶獲取提供資金，以便獲得越來越多的新客戶加入該行業，然後當您將其與我們行業領先的留存率，導致未來市場份額的持續增長。因此，客戶獲取成本的增加是我們為將盈利能力再投資於我們業務而做出的選擇。

On the question around counter revenue, just looking at 2020 versus 2021, the -- again, we don't guide to revenue, but I would point to the fact that we have an incremental cost resulting from Prop 22 that didn't exist in 2020 for the most part. And so you will see a decrement to our take rate in 2021 as a result of that incremental Prop 22 cost, the vast majority of which we're choosing to absorb.

關於櫃檯收入的問題，只看 2020 年和 2021 年，我們不指導收入，但我要指出這樣一個事實，即我們有一個不存在於 22 號提案中的增量成本。 2020年大部分時間。因此，由於第 22 號提案的成本增加，我們將在 2021 年看到我們的採用率下降，其中絕大多數是我們選擇吸收的。

And lastly, on the advertising front, again, we don't reference one channel over another necessarily. We're managing the business to payback periods. And so we will -- we'll flexibly deploy capital across regions, across channels as long as it hits our payback thresholds.

最後，在廣告方面，我們並不一定要引用一個渠道而不是另一個渠道。我們將業務管理到投資回收期。因此，我們將——只要達到我們的回報門檻，我們就會跨地區、跨渠道靈活地部署資本。

And your next question comes from the line of Michael McGovern from Bank of America.

您的下一個問題來自美國銀行的 Michael McGovern。

I was just wondering if you could provide a little bit more color on maybe the trajectory of AOV versus total orders for the 2021 guidance. With AOV down 5 points in the fourth quarter, do you kind of expect AOV to stay in the negative territory throughout 2021? And maybe if you could also talk a little bit about the cadence for -- on a quarterly basis, do you kind of just expect seasonality to return to maybe, like, a pre-COVID level in 2021 with a normal bump in Q4?

我只是想知道您是否可以為 AOV 的軌跡與 2021 年指南的總訂單提供更多顏色。隨著第四季度 AOV 下降 5 分，您是否預計 AOV 會在整個 2021 年保持在負值區域？也許如果您還可以談談 - 每季度的節奏，您是否只是期望季節性可能會在 2021 年恢復到 COVID 之前的水平，並在第四季度出現正常增長？

Sure. So on the first question with respect to AOV, the first thing I should clarify is if you take our GOV and divide it by total orders, remember that AOV compression in part is driven by the fact that our total orders includes Drive orders, but the value associated with the Drive order is not contained in our GOV. And so when you see deceleration in AOV, some portion of that deceleration is being caused by an increasing mix of Drive orders. So I want to make sure I clarify that.

當然。因此，關於 AOV 的第一個問題，我首先要澄清的是，如果您將我們的 GOV 除以總訂單，請記住，AOV 壓縮部分是由我們的總訂單包括驅動訂單這一事實驅動的，但是與 Drive 訂單關聯的值不包含在我們的 GOV 中。因此，當您在 AOV 中看到減速時，減速的一部分是由不斷增加的 Drive 訂單組合引起的。所以我想確保我澄清這一點。

Second, having said that, if I just look at our marketplace orders alone, AOVs remain above pre-COVID levels, but not massively above pre-COVID levels, that continued sort of normalizing over the course of the -- of 2020. They were at a high in Q2 and so has continued normalizing since then, but it's still modestly above pre-COVID levels. And we expect continued moderation over the course of 2021.

其次，話雖如此，如果我只看我們的市場訂單，AOV 仍高於 COVID 之前的水平，但並未大幅高於 COVID 之前的水平，這在 2020 年期間繼續正常化。他們是在第二季度處於高位，因此自那時以來一直在正常化，但仍略高於 COVID 之前的水平。我們預計 2021 年將繼續放緩。

On your question on seasonality, what I'd say is what was embedded into our guidance is an assumption that the vaccine will be broadly available soon and that in-store dining will resume relatively soon. And as a result, starting from Q2 onwards, we're going to see a reversion towards pre-COVID behavior within the customer base. That includes a reversion in terms of AOVs as well as order frequency, and that's compounded by the traditional seasonality you see around the summertime where order frequencies are impacted as consumers can get out more and go to restaurants a lot more. To the extent the consumer behavior remains propped up as a result of a delay in the vaccine or other factors, obviously, we'll perform to the upside.

關於您關於季節性的問題，我想說的是，我們的指導中包含的假設是疫苗將很快廣泛使用，並且店內用餐將相對較快恢復。因此，從第二季度開始，我們將看到客戶群中的行為恢復到 COVID 之前的行為。這包括在 AOV 和訂單頻率方面的回歸，再加上您在夏季看到的傳統季節性，訂單頻率受到影響，因為消費者可以更多地外出並去更多餐館。如果由於疫苗延遲或其他因素而導致消費者行為仍然受到支持，顯然，我們將表現良好。

And your next question is from Youssef Squali from Truist.

您的下一個問題來自 Truist 的 Youssef Squali。

Two quick questions from me, please. Starting with just your -- I know you're not guiding to revenues per se. But since you are guiding to GOVs, I was wondering, as you look out, not just for 2021, but beyond, say, the next 5-plus years, how do you see your take rate over time evolving? Is there a point at which you kind of prefer not to have it go above certain thresholds because then it just creates so much friction with clients, with consumers, with restaurants and potentially even bring some jurisdictions even harder -- to pay a harder look at the unit economics of the business?

請給我兩個快速的問題。從你的開始——我知道你並沒有指導收入本身。但是，既然您正在指導 GOV，我想知道，當您放眼時，不僅是 2021 年，而且是未來 5 年多以後，您如何看待隨著時間的推移您的採用率？是否有一點你不希望它超過某些閾值，因為那樣只會與客戶、消費者、餐館產生如此多的摩擦，甚至可能使某些司法管轄區更加困難——更仔細地審視一下企業的單位經濟學？

And then maybe just look at the business internationally. As you -- I know the focus is primarily on the U.S., Australia, Canada. But as you look beyond, and there were some press articles about your interest in Japan, et cetera, can you just flesh out what you look at in terms of an attractiveness of a market? I think your main competitor talks about wanting to be #1, #2, and otherwise, they're not in that market. I'm not seeing that many markets where people can still be #1, #2. So maybe if you can just flesh that out for us a little bit, your strategy around international expansion beyond the 3 -- the other 2 markets you're in, that would be great.

然後也許只看國際業務。正如你一樣——我知道重點主要集中在美國、澳大利亞、加拿大。但是當你放眼望去，有一些關於你對日本的興趣的新聞文章等等，你能從市場吸引力的角度來充實你所看到的嗎？我認為您的主要競爭對手談論想要成為#1、#2，否則，他們不在那個市場。我沒有看到那麼多人們仍然可以成為#1、#2 的市場。因此，也許如果您可以為我們稍微充實一下，您圍繞國際擴張的戰略超越 3 - 您所在的其他 2 個市場，那就太好了。

Great. Youssef, so let me take the question on take rate first, and then Tony can talk about international. Actually, when you think -- when we call our strategy long term, the idea is to lower commissions and fees on merchants, to lower fees on consumers and to increase Dash earnings. That's the simple sort of equation that we're trying to solve for. And the way we do that is by -- on the merchant side, as we unlock greater efficiency in the P&L, whether it's through active efficiency or through eliminating wastage or through reducing defect rates that then help our customer support costs and so on, we'll invest that both in -- on the merchant side as well as the consumer side.

偉大的。 Youssef，所以讓我先回答關於錄取率的問題，然後托尼可以談談國際。實際上，當您考慮時——當我們將我們的戰略稱為長期戰略時，其想法是降低商家的佣金和費用，降低消費者的費用並增加 Dash 收入。這就是我們試圖求解的簡單方程。我們這樣做的方式是——在商家方面，當我們在損益表中釋放更高的效率時，無論是通過主動效率還是通過消除浪費或通過降低缺陷率來幫助我們的客戶支持成本等等，我們'將在商家和消費者方面進行投資。

As an example, on the consumer side, as we keep increasing the adoption of DashPass, that has a natural deflationary impact on take rate. And although our unit take rates decline, they are more than made up for by the increase in engagement amongst DashPass consumers. And so if you look at total revenue per MAU for a DashPass user versus somebody that doesn't use DashPass, the total dollars of revenue or total dollars of gross profit for a DashPass consumer tend to be higher than they do for non-DashPass consumers. So we're actively choosing to make that trade-off.

例如，在消費者方面，隨著我們不斷增加對 DashPass 的採用，這對使用率產生了自然的通縮影響。儘管我們的單位使用率有所下降，但 DashPass 消費者參與度的增加足以彌補這些不足。因此，如果您查看 DashPass 用戶與不使用 DashPass 用戶的每 MAU 總收入，DashPass 消費者的總收入或毛利潤總額往往高於非 DashPass 消費者.因此，我們正在積極選擇進行權衡。

And so over time, as we unlock these efficiencies in the P&L, and as we provide merchants with additional products and services, the idea is to continuously reinvest those dollars into reducing merchant commissions, reducing consumer fees and increasing Dasher earnings because it's our belief that as we continue doing so, it will enable more adoption and we'll have access to more of the TAM that will ultimately translate into growth over the long run. Not only growth but sustained growth.

因此，隨著時間的推移，隨著我們在損益表中釋放這些效率，並為商家提供額外的產品和服務，我們的想法是不斷將這些資金再投資於減少商家佣金、降低消費者費用和增加 Dasher 收入，因為我們相信隨著我們繼續這樣做，它將實現更多的採用，我們將獲得更多的 TAM，這最終將轉化為長期的增長。不僅增長，而且持續增長。

Youssef, on your second question around international, I touched upon this a little bit earlier. But for us, it's really taking a really long-term view. And otherwise, candidly, we would not have launched in the United States either as we were not the first player in 2013 when we founded the company. And so I think for us, it's really looking for areas of opportunity where we can bring something of unique difference and taking a pretty long-term view on what it is that we can do for all of the audiences, consumers, merchants and Dashers.

優素福，關於你關於國際的第二個問題，我早些時候談到了這一點。但對我們來說，這真的是從長遠來看。否則，坦率地說，我們也不會在美國推出，因為我們不是 2013 年成立公司時的第一個參與者。所以我認為對我們來說，它真的在尋找機會領域，我們可以帶來一些獨特的差異，並對我們可以為所有觀眾、消費者、商家和 Dashers 做些什麼有一個相當長期的看法。

And I mean if you look at some of the markets, well, frankly, even in the U.S., it's still pretty early days. The penetration levels are quite low in these very large geographies, including those that have players already existing there. So for us, it's always just obsessing over the consumer, merchant and Dasher. And I think if we do that, our products will speak for themselves.

我的意思是，如果你看看一些市場，坦率地說，即使在美國，現在還處於早期階段。在這些非常大的地區，包括那些已經有玩家的地區，滲透率非常低。所以對我們來說，它總是只關註消費者、商家和 Dasher。我認為，如果我們這樣做，我們的產品就會自己說話。

And our last question comes from the line of Samuel Lourensz from Arete.

我們的最後一個問題來自 Arete 的 Samuel Lourensz。

So firstly, could you maybe talk a little bit about your testing in DashMart, how you're thinking about the business model here, and if it can bring attractive returns to -- in excess of your thresholds? And then secondly, could you talk a little bit about your progression with order batching? And as you add new verticals, how do you envision this becoming more material in the longer term?

所以首先，你能否談談你在 DashMart 的測試，你如何看待這裡的商業模式，以及它是否可以帶來超過你的門檻的有吸引力的回報？其次，你能談談你在訂單批處理方面的進展嗎？當您添加新的垂直領域時，您如何設想從長遠來看這將變得更加重要？

Yes. I'll take the first question on DashPass. And I think since Prabir talked earlier about active efficiency, I'll let him take the second question on batching. With respect to DashMart, we're super excited about the DashMart business. It's, again, very early days. What turned into an experiment at the end of 2019 has been something that we've invested into 2020. And so we're certainly seeing the right input metrics to cross our investment thresholds and stage this for further capital allocation.

是的。我將回答關於 DashPass 的第一個問題。而且我認為由於 Prabir 早些時候談到了主動效率，我會讓他回答關於批處理的第二個問題。關於 DashMart，我們對 DashMart 業務感到非常興奮。這又是非常早期的日子。 2019 年底變成實驗的東西是我們在 2020 年投資的東西。因此，我們肯定會看到正確的輸入指標來跨越我們的投資門檻，並為進一步的資本配置進行階段性準備。

And really, if you think about the thesis behind DashMart, it's really bringing selection to where it has not existed before. Whether that means giving merchants -- it's really a win-win for merchants and consumers. For merchants, it gives them the opportunity to bridge into certain geographies that they may want to be in but aren't currently in in the depth or magnitude that they wish. For consumers, it's getting selection that they've never had before.

真的，如果你想想 DashMart 背後的論點，它確實將選擇帶到了以前不存在的地方。這是否意味著給商家——這對商家和消費者來說確實是雙贏的。對於商家來說，它讓他們有機會進入他們可能想要進入但目前還沒有達到他們希望的深度或規模的某些地區。對於消費者來說，他們獲得了前所未有的選擇。

I mean for example, I mean, if you think about restaurateurs, they also sell a lot of retail items, as an example, where in places like Chicago, we carry the sauces of chefs like Stephanie Izard and many others in which we're serving the restaurants on DoorDash and Caviar. We're also now serving some of their other products through DashMart. Equivalently, that's also happening in other categories as well where, again, for merchants, this is an extension to bring them beyond their 4 walls wherever they are. And for consumers, it's giving them selection that they've never had access to before.

我的意思是，例如，如果您考慮餐館老闆，他們也出售很多零售商品，例如，在芝加哥這樣的地方，我們提供斯蒂芬妮·伊扎德（Stephanie Izard）等廚師的醬汁以及我們所在的許多其他地方為 DoorDash 和 Caviar 上的餐廳提供服務。我們現在還通過 DashMart 為他們的一些其他產品提供服務。同樣，這也發生在其他類別中，同樣，對於商家來說，這是將他們帶到他們所在的 4 個牆之外的擴展。對於消費者來說，它為他們提供了他們以前從未接觸過的選擇。

Yes. Samuel, on your question on batching, batch rates have been relatively consistent for the last -- since Q2. And so I want to make sure that we don't assume that batch rates are the only driver of active efficiency, efficiency of the logistics network. There are several other sources from a product perspective that we make progress on, which is what led to the consistent and sequential increases of -- in active efficiency over the course of the past year.

是的。塞繆爾，關於你關於批處理的問題，自第二季度以來，批處理率一直相對一致。所以我想確保我們不要假設批處理率是主動效率的唯一驅動因素，物流網絡的效率。從產品的角度來看，我們在其他幾個方面取得了進展，這導致了過去一年中主動效率的持續和連續增長。

It's things like eliminating wasted time that a Dasher spends in a restaurant. It's better predictions of kitchen prep time to ensure the Dasher doesn't show up at the restaurant earlier than the food might be ready and so on. So batch rates are obviously an important source for the -- beyond resource.

這就像消除 Dasher 在餐廳花費的時間一樣。更好地預測廚房準備時間，以確保 Dasher 不會在食物準備好之前出現在餐廳等等。因此，批處理率顯然是超越資源的重要來源。

And there are no further questions in queue.

隊列中沒有其他問題。

Great. Thanks, everyone.

偉大的。感謝大家。

Ladies and gentlemen, this concludes today's conference call. Thank you for participating. You may now disconnect.

女士們，先生們，今天的電話會議到此結束。感謝您的參與。您現在可以斷開連接。