Doordash, Inc. (DASH) 2020 Q4 法說會逐字稿

Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for standing by, and welcome to the DoorDash Q4 2020 Earnings Call. (Operator Instructions) Please be advised that today's conference is being recorded. (Operator Instructions) I would now like to hand the conference over to your speaker today, Mr. Andy Hargreaves. Please go ahead, sir.

各位女士、先生，感謝您稍候，歡迎參加 DoorDash 2020 年第四季財報電話會議。（接線員指示）請注意，今天的會議將被錄音。（接線員指示）現在我想把會議交給今天的發言人 Andy Hargreaves 先生。先生，請開始。

Thanks, Elaine. Hello, everyone, and welcome to our fourth quarter 2020 earnings call. I'm Andy Hargreaves, the VP of Investor Relations. It's a pleasure to be joined today by DoorDash CEO and Co-Founder Tony Xu; and CFO, Prabir Adarkar.

謝謝你，Elaine。各位好，歡迎參加我們 2020 年第四季財報電話會議。我是 Andy Hargreaves，投資人關係副總裁。今天很高興與 DoorDash 執行長暨共同創辦人 Tony Xu，以及財務長 Prabir Adarkar 一同出席。

We'd like to remind everyone that we'll be making forward-looking statements during this call, including statements related to the expected performance of our business, future financial results and guidance, strategy, long-term growth and overall future prospects as well as statements regarding litigation and regulatory matters. Forward-looking statements depend on assumptions, data or methods that may be incorrect or imprecise and are subject to risks and uncertainties. Events that could cause our actual results and future actions of the company to differ materially from those described in forward-looking statements are set forth under the captions Forward-looking Statements in today's investor letter and are described in our risk factors, including in our SEC filings, including our final prospectus for our initial public offering filed with the SEC on December 8, 2020. You should not rely on our forward-looking statements as predictions of future events. Also note that the forward-looking statements we make on this call are based on information available to us and assumptions and beliefs as of today's date. We disclaim any obligation to update any forward-looking statements except as required by law.

我們想提醒各位，本次電話會議中將會發表前瞻性陳述，包括與我們業務預期表現、未來財務結果與指引、策略、長期成長與整體未來展望相關的陳述，以及關於訴訟與監管事項的陳述。前瞻性陳述依賴的假設、數據或方法可能不正確或不精確，並且受到風險與不確定性影響。可能導致我們實際結果及公司未來行動與前瞻性陳述所描述內容出現重大差異的事件，已載於今日投資人信函中「前瞻性陳述」標題下，並在我們的風險因素中加以說明，包括我們向 SEC 提交的文件，其中包括我們於 2020 年 12 月 8 日向 SEC 提交的首次公開發行最終招股說明書。您不應將我們的前瞻性陳述視為對未來事件的預測。另請注意，我們在本次電話會議中所作的前瞻性陳述，係基於截至今日我們可得之資訊，以及截至今日的假設與信念。除法律要求外，我們不承擔更新任何前瞻性陳述之義務。

During this call, we will be discussing certain non-GAAP financial measures. Information regarding our non-GAAP financial results, including a reconciliation of such non-GAAP results to the most directly comparable GAAP financial measures, may be found in our investor letter, which was furnished with our Form 8-K filed today with the SEC and on our Investor Relations website. These non-GAAP measures should be considered in addition to our GAAP results and are not intended to be a substitute for our GAAP results.

在本次電話會議中，我們將討論若干非 GAAP 財務衡量指標。有關我們非 GAAP 財務結果的資訊（包括將該等非 GAAP 結果與最直接可比的 GAAP 財務衡量指標進行調節之對照表），可於我們的投資人信函中查閱；該信函已隨同我們今日向 SEC 提交的 Form 8-K 一併提供，並刊載於我們的投資人關係網站。這些非 GAAP 指標應與我們的 GAAP 結果一併考量，並非用以取代我們的 GAAP 結果。

Finally, this call in its entirety is being audio webcast on our Investor Relations website, and an audio replay of the call will be available on our website shortly after the call's end.

最後，本次電話會議全程將於我們的投資人關係網站進行音訊網路直播，且在會議結束後不久，網站上將提供音訊重播。

With that out of the way, I'd like to turn it over to Tony.

在說明完上述事項後，我想把時間交給 Tony。

Thanks, Andy, and thanks, everyone, for joining our very first earnings call. 2020 really put into focus the mission of our company and why we started this journey 7.5 years ago. We exist to grow and to empower local economies.

謝謝你，Andy，也謝謝各位參加我們的第一場財報電話會議。2020 年確實讓我們公司的使命以及我們在 7 年半前為何踏上這段旅程變得更加清晰。我們的存在，是為了成長並賦能在地經濟。

As this is our first earnings call, I thought I'd give you a snapshot into how our team has executed this mission during the most critical times, and I'll follow by sharing a few thoughts on where we are going as we hopefully soon emerge out of this pandemic.

由於這是我們的第一場財報電話會議，我想先讓各位快速了解，在最關鍵的時刻我們的團隊如何執行這項使命；接著我也會分享一些想法，談談當我們希望不久後能走出這場疫情時，我們將前往何處。

2020 was a difficult year for all of our audiences, and our operations met great challenges and faced enormous uncertainty. While exhausting at times, I'm proud that our team chose optimism, built plans, prepared for all scenarios and executed 24/7 to ensure that we did our part in seeing the best of our local communities. While much of the work began in March 2020, a lot of the impact was carried into Q4. We prioritized safety by shipping no contact delivery, distributed more than 10 million units of PPE in the form of hand sanitizers, gloves and masks to Dashers, and we collaborated with merchants on tamper-proof packaging. We prioritized Dashers' health by offering affordable telehealth visits with doctors, ensured financial assistance for those impacted by COVID-19, and just last week, hosted our first webinar to provide Dashers with information about the vaccine. Equally important, we became a lifeline to millions of people who saw flexible earnings opportunities, especially after furloughs and other forms of job loss.

2020 年對我們所有的受眾而言都是艱難的一年，我們的營運面臨巨大挑戰與高度不確定性。雖然有時令人筋疲力盡，但我很自豪我們的團隊選擇保持樂觀、制定計畫、為各種情境做好準備，並以 24/7 的方式執行，確保我們盡一己之力，讓在地社區展現最好的一面。雖然許多工作始於 2020 年 3 月，但其影響延續至第四季。我們以寄送「無接觸配送」為優先以確保安全，向 Dasher 發放超過 1,000 萬件個人防護裝備（PPE），包括乾洗手、手套與口罩，並與商家合作採用防拆封包裝。我們也將 Dasher 的健康列為優先事項，提供可負擔的遠距醫療看診服務，為受 COVID-19 影響者提供財務援助，並在上週首次舉辦線上研討會，向 Dasher 提供疫苗相關資訊。同樣重要的是，我們成為數百萬人的生命線，為他們提供彈性收入機會，特別是在被迫休假與其他形式失業之後。

In Q4 alone, over 1 million Dashers earned over $2 billion in supplemental income on our platform. We reduced our commissions by half to local merchants, an investment totaling over $100 million, while funding national marketing campaigns to drive growth and add instant liquidity. We provided grants to more than nearly 2,000 local restaurants to help them adapt to the COVID winter. And by the end of Q4 2020, our analysis showed that the odds of surviving during the pandemic were 8x better for merchants on DoorDash versus all U.S. restaurants.

僅在第四季，就有超過 100 萬名 Dasher 在我們的平台上賺取超過 20 億美元的補充收入。我們將對在地商家的抽成費率減半，這項投資總額超過 1 億美元，同時資助全國性行銷活動以帶動成長並提供即時流動性。我們向近 2,000 家在地餐廳提供補助金，協助其因應 COVID 的冬季。並且截至 2020 年第四季末，我們的分析顯示：在疫情期間，DoorDash 平台上的商家存活機率是全美所有餐廳的 8 倍。

For consumers, we accelerated our entry into the convenience and grocery categories. From September to December last year, we observed 95% growth in consumers who ordered from these new categories on the DoorDash marketplace.

對消費者而言，我們加速進軍便利商店與雜貨品類。從去年 9 月到 12 月，我們觀察到在 DoorDash 市集上從這些新類別下單的消費者人數成長了 95%。

Finally, we supported our community by donating free DashPass subscriptions to health care workers across the country and partnered with organizations like the New York City Department of Public Schools, United Way and Feeding America to deliver food, groceries and supplies to those most in need, powering the delivery of 6.5 million meals to those in need during 2020.

最後，我們也透過向全國醫護人員捐贈免費的 DashPass 訂閱來支持社區，並與紐約市教育局（New York City Department of Public Schools）、United Way 以及 Feeding America 等組織合作，向最需要的人運送餐食、雜貨與物資，推動在 2020 年為有需要者送達 650 萬份餐點。

I want to thank all of our teams worldwide and the millions of consumers, Dashers and merchants who each stepped up in their own ways to navigate this pandemic. As we progress out of the pandemic, I thought I'd remind everyone of our long-term vision, which will take decades to build. In order to grow and empower local economies, we plan to build a marketplace and platform to enable every brick-and-mortar business to compete in today's convenience economy. The job of our marketplace is to grow in merchant sales, and we aspire to bring all of your city to you in minutes, not hours or days. Today, most of our business is in the restaurants category where we still see massive runway. We are investing to extend our category-leading position in the U.S. while doubling down on the momentum we are seeing overseas in Canada and in Australia.

我要感謝我們全球所有團隊，以及數以百萬計的消費者、Dasher 與商家；大家都以各自的方式挺身而出，共同度過這場疫情。隨著我們逐步走出疫情，我想提醒各位我們需要數十年才能打造完成的長期願景。為了成長並賦能在地經濟，我們計畫建立一個市集與平台，使每一家實體商家都能在今日的便利經濟中競爭。我們市集的任務，是推動商家銷售成長；我們的願景是讓整座城市在幾分鐘內送到你面前，而不是幾小時或幾天。今天，我們的大部分業務仍在餐廳品類，而我們仍看到巨大的成長空間。我們正投資以延伸我們在美國的品類領先地位，同時加倍投入我們在海外（加拿大與澳洲）所看到的動能。

Outside of restaurants, we're excited about the early progress we're making after launching into the convenience and grocery categories. According to third-party data, DoorDash became the largest online convenience delivery platform in the U.S. in less than a year, demonstrating the extensibility of our platform. And this is just the beginning as we have a long way to go in building our marketplace to serve these and many other categories in the future.

在餐廳之外，我們對於進軍便利商店與雜貨品類後所取得的早期進展感到振奮。根據第三方數據，DoorDash 在不到一年的時間內成為美國最大的線上便利配送平台，展現了我們平台的延展性。而這只是開始，因為我們在打造市集以服務這些以及未來更多品類方面，仍有很長的路要走。

The job of our platform is to empower a brick-and-mortar merchant to build their own digital channel, a task necessary to have adapted to evolving consumer preferences before the pandemic and a task certainly necessary to have survived COVID-19. This business is even more critical as we come out of the pandemic as consumers have only become more habituated to a convenience economy, aided by a possible longer-term trend towards working from home. Today, merchants can use DoorDash Drive to offer on demand and same-day delivery from their own digital channels. In cases where merchants don't have an online ordering solution, they can use DoorDash Storefront, which enables them to participate in e-commerce and gives them a product that's seamlessly tied to their back-of-house systems. Over time, we will have to build even more products and services to enable merchants to run their digital business as effectively as we operate our marketplace.

我們平台的任務，是賦能實體商家建立自己的數位通路；這項工作在疫情前就已是因應消費者偏好演變所必需，而在 COVID-19 期間更是生存所必需。隨著我們走出疫情，這項業務變得更加關鍵，因為在可能更長期的居家工作趨勢助推下，消費者對便利經濟的習慣只會更加根深蒂固。如今，商家可以使用 DoorDash Drive，從其自有的數位通路提供即時與當日送達服務。若商家沒有線上點餐解決方案，則可使用 DoorDash Storefront，使其能參與電子商務，並獲得可與其後台系統無縫串接的產品。隨著時間推進，我們還必須打造更多產品與服務，讓商家能像我們營運市集一樣有效地經營其數位業務。

Underpinning our marketplace and platform is our maniacal focus on operating efficiency where we believe best-in-class execution will result in an improving cost structure that unlocks further investment capital as we grow our skin.

支撐我們市集與平台的，是我們對營運效率近乎偏執的專注；我們相信，一流的執行將帶來持續改善的成本結構，並在我們擴大規模的同時釋放更多可再投資的資本。

With that, let me hand it over to Prabir.

接下來，我把時間交給 Prabir。

Thanks, Tony, and good afternoon, everyone. Throughout our history, we've been laser-focused on our 4 core constituents: merchants, consumers, Dashers and our employees. And today, we are excited to welcome our fifth constituent, our shareholders.

謝謝你，Tony，各位下午好。在我們的歷史中，我們一直高度聚焦於四個核心利害關係人：商家、消費者、Dasher 以及我們的員工。而今天，我們很高興迎來第五個利害關係人——我們的股東。

I want to take this opportunity to share how we manage the business and allocate capital. We are still early in our life cycle and believe we have substantial growth opportunities ahead of us. We intend to invest aggressively to pursue these opportunities. When navigating capital, we start small and experiment until we find product market fit. If we see strong demand with a path to unit economics that meet our thresholds, we invest incremental capital. Each project we invest in must continuously earn capital on its own merits. To date, the bulk of our investments have been made through our income statement rather than through our balance sheet, and we expect this to remain the case for the foreseeable future.

我想藉此機會分享我們如何經營業務並配置資本。我們仍處於生命週期的早期階段，並相信未來仍有可觀的成長機會。我們打算積極投資以把握這些機會。在資本配置上，我們會先從小規模開始並進行試驗，直到找到產品市場契合（product-market fit）。若我們看到強勁需求，且具備達到符合我們門檻之單位經濟（unit economics）的路徑，我們就會投入增量資本。我們投資的每個專案都必須持續憑其自身價值來「賺取」資本。迄今為止，我們的大部分投資是透過損益表而非資產負債表進行，我們預期在可預見的未來仍將如此。

We are the category leader in the U.S., but despite our scale, we see significant room for growth. Consequently, we are managing the business to maximize scale and long-term profit dollars rather than take rate or margin percentages. Impact is this means we intend to invest aggressively into the business in order to further our growth initiatives and expand our competitive advantages.

我們是美國的類別領導者，但儘管已有規模，我們仍看到顯著的成長空間。因此，我們經營業務的目標是最大化規模與長期的利潤金額，而非抽成率（take rate）或毛利率百分比。這意味著我們打算積極投資於業務，以推進成長計畫並擴大我們的競爭優勢。

As you likely saw, we intend to provide guidance for Marketplace GOV and adjusted EBITDA going forward. We do not plan on guiding to revenue as we do not directly manage the business to this metric. In our model, revenues and output, reflecting in part dynamic decisions we make around consumer pricing, the ideal mix of advertising to promotions, our relative success with DashPass and the mix of Drive volume. We focus intently on inputs in each of these areas but will manage the business to Marketplace GOV and adjusted EBITDA dollars.

如各位可能已看到的，我們未來打算提供 Marketplace GOV 與調整後 EBITDA 的指引。我們不打算提供營收指引，因為我們並非直接以此指標來管理業務。在我們的模型中，營收是結果（output），部分反映我們在消費者定價、廣告與促銷的理想組合、DashPass 的相對成功程度，以及 Drive 交易量組合等方面所做的動態決策。我們會在上述各領域高度聚焦於投入（inputs），但將以 Marketplace GOV 與調整後 EBITDA 金額來管理業務。

We've provided our guidance for Q1 and 2021 in our investor letter, but I'd like to provide a little more detail behind that. Underlying our 2021 guidance is an assumption of accelerated market reopenings and a return to in-store dining. While we have seen many positive signals from consumers and markets that have temporarily reopened during the pandemic, we acknowledge that vaccination and full reopenings could drive sharper changes in consumer behavior than current data would predict. Consequently, our 2021 full year guidance reflects this uncertainty. We are deeply hopeful that markets will reopen soon and we'll manage our business to provide exceptional experiences to merchants, consumers and Dashers in any scenario.

我們已在投資人信中提供了第一季與 2021 年的指引，但我想再補充一些背後的細節。我們 2021 年指引的基礎假設之一，是市場將加速重新開放，並回到店內用餐。雖然在疫情期間，我們已從消費者以及曾短暫重啟的市場看到許多正面訊號，但我們也承認，疫苗接種與全面重啟可能會使消費者行為出現比現有數據所預測更劇烈的變化。因此，我們 2021 年全年指引反映了這種不確定性。我們非常希望市場能盡快重啟，並將在任何情境下管理業務，為商家、消費者與 Dashers 提供卓越體驗。

With that, I'll open it up to questions.

接下來我開放提問。

(Operator Instructions) And your first question comes from the line of Doug Anmuth from JPMorgan.

（接線員指示）第一個問題來自摩根大通（JPMorgan）的 Doug Anmuth。

I have 2. First, just on trends a little bit in 1Q. We've seen some signs of accelerating growth in the quarter from some of your peers. Can you just talk about kind of what you're seeing in the first quarter and how that ties into your guidance for 1Q in terms of GOV? And then secondly, can you just talk more broadly about how you're thinking about the marketing in competition in the category in the U.S. now that we've seen a degree of consolidation over the last year and reopening happening and how you view kind of rationality in the space going forward?

我有兩個問題。第一，關於第一季（1Q）的趨勢。我們看到你們一些同業在本季出現成長加速的跡象。你能否談談你們在第一季看到的情況，以及這如何與你們對 1Q 的 GOV 指引相呼應？第二，更廣泛地談談，在過去一年出現一定程度的整併、且市場正在重啟的背景下，你們如何看待目前美國此類別中的行銷與競爭？以及你們如何看待未來市場競爭的理性程度？

Doug, maybe I'll take that question. So first, in terms of the first quarter, we are seeing acceleration in January relative to our order growth in December as well as in Q4. So that answers that question. So our findings are consistent with what others have communicated.

Doug，這題我來回答。首先，就第一季而言，我們看到 1 月相較於 12 月以及第四季（Q4）的訂單成長有所加速。這就回答了你的第一個問題。我們的觀察與其他公司所傳達的訊息一致。

With respect to marketing and competition around that, we continue to acquire more of the new customers joining the industry in any given period. And part of what's driving that is the consistent gains we drive in our unit economics and the retention and engagement of our consumer base, which then allows us to pay higher and higher amounts in terms of CPAs to acquire customers. And so we believe it's a competitive advantage where our increasing unit economics help drive an LTV increase that then translates into an ability to acquire more customers and others.

至於行銷與競爭，我們持續在任何特定期間內，取得加入此產業的新客戶中更高的占比。推動這點的部分原因，是我們在單位經濟上的持續改善，以及消費者基礎的留存與參與度提升，這使我們能以更高的 CPA（每次獲客成本）來獲取客戶。因此我們相信這是一項競爭優勢：我們不斷改善的單位經濟推動 LTV（客戶終身價值）提升，進而轉化為我們能獲取更多客戶的能力，相較其他業者更具優勢。

And your next question comes from the line of Ross Sandler from Barclays.

下一個問題來自巴克萊（Barclays）的 Ross Sandler。

Thanks for the chart in the letter about the marketplace versus the Drive partner store growth rate. A question about the latter. So on Drive, I think order growth was growing around 700% in mid-2020. And looking at the take rate in the fourth quarter, might have slowed down a little bit. So just -- is that true? And what percent of orders are coming from Drive at this point? And just any thoughts on the long-term outlook for that business? That's it.

感謝你們在信中提供關於 marketplace 與 Drive 合作商店成長率的圖表。我想問後者。就 Drive 而言，我記得 2020 年年中訂單成長大約在 700% 左右。從第四季的抽成率（take rate）來看，似乎可能稍微放緩了一點。所以——這是真的嗎？另外，目前有多少百分比的訂單來自 Drive？以及對這項業務的長期展望有何看法？以上。

Ross, so let me take the second part of the question first, which is I think you were talking about take rate changes going from the third quarter into the fourth quarter. Third quarter take rate was 12.1%, which reduced to 11.9% in the fourth quarter. And really the 2 things driving that was incremental Prop 22 cost. Remember Prop 22 passed in November, and so we have a portion of the quarter during which we had incurred those costs as well as the impact of commission caps or price controls in certain jurisdictions in Q4.

Ross，我先回答你問題的第二部分，也就是你提到抽成率從第三季到第四季的變化。第三季抽成率是 12.1%，第四季降至 11.9%。主要有兩個因素：其一是 Prop 22 的新增成本。請記得 Prop 22 在 11 月通過，因此第四季中有一段期間我們已開始承擔這些成本；其二是第四季在某些司法管轄區實施的佣金上限或價格管制所帶來的影響。

So those price controls, I believe we disclosed in the letter. The net impact of revenue from the price controls was $36 million or 44 basis points. So if you add that back, you get a cleaner picture of what the actual underlying increase in the take rate was inclusive of the Prop 22 cost.

關於這些價格管制，我相信我們已在信中揭露。價格管制對營收的淨影響為 3,600 萬美元，或 44 個基點。因此若把這部分加回去，就能更清楚看出在納入 Prop 22 成本後，抽成率實際的底層變動情況。

On Drive, we continue to be excited by that business. Drive continues to grow strongly, faster than the core marketplace, and Drive orders grew both quarter-on-quarter as well as on a year-on-year basis. The thing that's interesting about Drive is about a year ago, we were largely concentrated in the restaurant vertical. But since then, we've diversified beyond restaurants and have now brought onto the Drive platform merchants and local businesses in other verticals, such as retail. We signed Michael's and Macy's. In pet supplies, we signed PetSmart and Petco. We're in pharma delivery for Sam's Club as well as flowers.

至於 Drive，我們仍對這項業務感到振奮。Drive 持續強勁成長，速度快於核心 marketplace；Drive 訂單不僅季對季成長，也年對年成長。Drive 有趣之處在於，大約一年前我們主要集中在餐廳垂直領域。但此後我們已從餐廳擴展並多元化，將其他垂直領域（例如零售）的商家與在地企業導入 Drive 平台。我們簽下了 Michael's 與 Macy's。在寵物用品方面，我們簽下 PetSmart 與 Petco。我們也為 Sam's Club 提供藥品配送，以及花卉配送。

So we continue to be excited about the growth here. We haven't disclosed exactly what percentage of Drive orders took place in this past quarter, but suffice to say, Drive continues to grow strongly both quarter-on-quarter and year-on-year and faster than the core business.

因此我們仍對此處的成長感到興奮。我們尚未揭露上一季 Drive 訂單占比的確切百分比，但可以說的是，Drive 仍持續強勁成長，無論季對季或年對年，且成長速度快於核心業務。

Your next question comes from the line of Ron Josey from JMP.

下一個問題來自 JMP 的 Ron Josey。

I wanted to ask a little bit more about usage. In the letter, I think you talked about improved retention from DashPass subs. And DashPass subs grew, I think, a bigger, larger part of the mix of orders. So can you talk about retention a little bit more, particularly as we think about January and trends going forward in terms of consumer behavior trends? And then any sort of insights on DashPass usage and just frequency of use would be helpful.

我想再多問一些關於使用情況。在信中，我記得你們提到 DashPass 訂閱者帶來更好的留存。而 DashPass 訂閱者的訂單占比也提高，成為更大的一部分。你們能否更深入談談留存，特別是當我們思考 1 月以及未來消費者行為趨勢時？另外，若能分享任何關於 DashPass 使用情況與使用頻率的洞見也會很有幫助。

Ron, yes, in terms of DashPass, we haven't disclosed the number of subs, but I will say that they have grown sequentially since our disclosure in the S-1. We continue to invest behind this because as we had explained in our S-1, DashPass Drive increased engagement amongst its subscribers due to the 0 delivery season. So certainly an avenue for growth that's exciting to us.

Ron，是的，關於 DashPass，我們尚未揭露訂閱者數量，但我可以說，自我們在 S-1 中揭露以來，訂閱者已連續成長。我們持續加大投入，因為如同我們在 S-1 所解釋的，DashPass 由於 0 外送費（0 delivery）而提升了訂閱者的參與度。因此這確實是我們感到興奮的一條成長途徑。

In terms of retention as well as engagement, we continue to see retention and engagement remain at COVID highs. In fact, engagement continues to improve, both within the DashPass product as well as amongst non-DashPass users of the platform. So we're seeing positive trends there.

就留存與參與度而言，我們持續看到留存與參與度維持在 COVID 期間的高點。事實上，參與度仍在改善，無論是在 DashPass 產品內，或是在平台上非 DashPass 使用者之間。我們在這方面看到正向趨勢。

In terms of the long term, in our experience, consumer behavior tends to be sticky. So once the consumer discovered DoorDash and they've ordered from their favorite restaurants and enjoyed the benefits of on demand convenience, new habits get formed, and we believe this habituation will persist over the long run. And so even when you look at markets like Texas and Georgia and Florida that reopened, that was sort of partially open, even through the pandemic in the U.S., against that backdrop, we continue to see our weekly order volumes in these markets continue to grow. So that's a promising sign.

就長期而言，依我們的經驗，消費者行為往往具有黏著性。因此，一旦消費者發現 DoorDash、從他們喜愛的餐廳下單，並享受到即時便利的好處，就會形成新的習慣，我們相信這種習慣化將在長期持續。即使你看像德州、喬治亞州與佛羅里達州這些在美國疫情期間也曾重新開放（部分開放）的市場，在那樣的背景下，我們仍看到這些市場的每週訂單量持續成長。這是一個令人鼓舞的訊號。

I suspect your question is sort of heading into a guidance question. So maybe I'll address that right now, which is embedded in our guidance, we're assuming that as the vaccine gets fully rolled out and -- consumer behavior will start reverting back to pre-COVID levels. And so that's what's embedded in the guidance, along with standard Q2, Q3 summer seasonality when people generally tend to go out versus order in. And so you're seeing that embedded in our guidance. There's a certain amount of uncertainty with respect to what consumer behavior does post-pandemic, and we're trying to reflect that in the guidance we've provided.

我懷疑你的問題某種程度上是在朝向指引（guidance）相關的問題。所以也許我現在就先回應這一點；這其實已經包含在我們的指引之中。我們的假設是，隨著疫苗全面推廣，以及——消費者行為將開始回到 COVID 之前的水準。因此，這些都已反映在指引裡，同時也包含第二季、第三季一般的夏季季節性因素：人們通常更傾向外出用餐，而不是叫外送。所以你會看到這些都已內嵌在我們的指引中。至於疫情後消費者行為會如何變化，仍存在一定程度的不確定性，而我們也試圖在所提供的指引中反映這點。

And your next question comes from Heath Terry from Goldman Sachs.

下一個問題來自高盛（Goldman Sachs）的 Heath Terry。

Great. I was wondering if you could give us a bit of an update on your experiments. It's probably more than an experiment, but your -- the work that you're doing in general merchandise, the relationship with Macy's, Bloomingdale's and others, what kind of progress you're seeing so far. And to the extent that we just came out of a holiday season where companies like Nike were being told by third-party delivery network that they couldn't ship through them, how you see the size of that opportunity and the pace that you're going to, to try and address it.

很好。我想請問你們能否就你們的實驗提供一些最新進展。這可能已經不只是實驗了，但你們——你們在一般商品（general merchandise）方面所做的工作、與 Macy's、Bloomingdale's 以及其他夥伴的合作關係，到目前為止看到什麼樣的進展？另外，考量到我們剛經歷一個假期旺季，像 Nike 這類公司曾被第三方配送網路告知無法透過他們出貨，你們如何看待這個機會的規模，以及你們將以多快的速度去嘗試解決並切入？

Heath, it's Tony. I'll take that question. If you can think of any silver linings of this pandemic, I think it is that every brick-and-mortar store, whether they are a restaurant or a retailer, is participating in e-commerce, sometimes exclusively in e-commerce given some of the restrictions that we saw during the past year. And for us, we really were seeing that on both sides of our business as a marketplace as well as a platform.

Heath，我是 Tony。我來回答這個問題。如果要說這場疫情有任何一線曙光，我想就是每一家實體店，不論是餐廳或零售商，都在參與電子商務；在過去一年我們看到的一些限制之下，有時甚至是只做電商。對我們而言，我們確實在業務的兩端都看到了這點：一方面作為市集（marketplace），另一方面作為平台（platform）。

On the marketplace front, we launched our second category of convenience item deliveries about a year ago when we announced partnerships with 7-Eleven, CVS, Walgreens and many others. And already, that has picked up quite a lot of momentum in the early progress. Again, very early, but according to third-party estimates, DoorDash already is the largest delivery platform for convenience goods in the U.S. And I think you're seeing some of the extensibility of starting with the highest frequency category of restaurants, building the biggest audience there and covering the most number of stores there, just given the nature of how many restaurants there are relative to how many other types of stores there are that have made us be able to accelerate very, very quickly into some of these other categories.

在市集端，我們大約一年前推出了第二個品類——便利商品配送，當時我們宣布與 7-Eleven、CVS、Walgreens 以及許多其他夥伴建立合作。而且到目前為止，這在早期進展中已經累積了相當多的動能。再次強調，仍然非常早期，但根據第三方估計，DoorDash 已經是美國便利商品最大的配送平台。我認為你也看到，從最高頻的餐廳品類起步、在那裡建立最大受眾、覆蓋最多店家——考量到餐廳數量相對於其他類型店家更多——這種特性讓我們能夠非常、非常快速地加速進入其他一些品類。

On the platform front, we've actually been delivering from a lot of these partners for a while. DoorDash Drive launched in 2017 Q1. So it's about 4 years old now. And Prabir mentioned some of the categories that really came into fruition in the past year, whether that be in retail as we partnered with the likes of Macy's and Michael's, pet supplies, PetSmart and Petco, or pharmacy with Sam's Club. And so I think what you're seeing is every business recognizes that omnichannel is a great thing. Every business is trying to figure out how to redo their supply chains to really meet a post-pandemic omnichannel presence, which they expect to grow. And we'll be there with them, both with our marketplace as well as our platform.

在平台端，其實我們為許多這類合作夥伴提供配送已經有一段時間了。DoorDash Drive 在 2017 年第一季推出，所以現在大約 4 年了。Prabir 也提到一些在過去一年真正開花結果的品類，不論是零售（我們與 Macy's、Michael's 等合作）、寵物用品（PetSmart、Petco），或是藥局/藥品相關（與 Sam's Club）。因此我認為你看到的是，每一家企業都認知到全通路（omnichannel）是一件很棒的事。每一家企業都在思考如何重塑其供應鏈，以真正符合疫情後、且預期會成長的全通路布局。我們會與他們並肩前行，無論是在我們的市集端或平台端。

And your next question is from Eric Sheridan from UBS.

下一個問題來自瑞銀（UBS）的 Eric Sheridan。

I want to come back to the [counter] investments against the longer-term opportunities. You've talked before about geographic expansion. Can you just give us a bigger sense of the way you're thinking now post the IPO about the process of either building businesses globally or acquiring businesses globally and sort of puts and takes of both organic and inorganic growth outside your core markets?

我想回到「針對長期機會的投資」這個主題。你們之前談過地理擴張。IPO 之後，你們現在如何看待在全球建立業務或在全球收購業務的流程？以及在核心市場之外，採取有機成長與非有機成長（併購）各自的利弊取捨？能否給我們更完整的脈絡？

Yes, Eric, I'll take that one. Look, the goal on -- if you think about our portfolio of investments today, we are growing in our core category of restaurants, which we have -- we believe, has massive runway ahead. We're adding categories to becoming a multi-marketplace -- multicategory marketplace. We're adding products on our platform in addition to Drive and Storefront. And the fourth area is international.

好的，Eric，我來回答。你看我們目前的投資組合，目標是——如果你把它拆開來看：我們在核心品類餐廳持續成長，我們相信這仍有非常大的成長跑道。我們也在新增品類，朝向多市集——多品類市集發展。我們在平台端也在 Drive 和 Storefront 之外新增產品。第四個領域則是國際市場。

So our perspective on international opportunities is really taking a very long-term view and becoming a global company over the long run. And given what we've seen, even with our current footprint in Australia and Canada where we believe we gained share in 2020 and saw improvements in our unit economics, we're really liking what we've seen with our playbook. And we also like what we see in terms of some of the geographic opportunities outside of the ones we operate in, in terms of just how underpenetrated and how large some of these opportunities are, especially as we bring a multiproduct portfolio into those geographies.

因此，我們對國際機會的看法，是真正採取非常長期的視角，長期而言要成為一家全球性公司。就我們目前在澳洲與加拿大的布局來看，我們相信在 2020 年我們提升了市占，且單位經濟（unit economics）也有所改善；我們非常喜歡我們所看到的這套打法（playbook）的成果。我們也喜歡我們在其他尚未營運的地理市場中所看到的機會——就其滲透率仍偏低、且機會規模很大而言——尤其當我們把多產品組合帶進那些地區時。

With respect to how we enter, obviously, we'll look at any opportunities and weigh them against our own organic efforts. So far, we like our playbook, and we'll always seek to enter markets in a differentiated way for all of the audiences.

至於如何進入市場，顯然我們會評估任何機會，並與我們自身的有機拓展努力做權衡。到目前為止，我們喜歡我們的打法，而我們也會一如既往，尋求以差異化的方式進入市場，服務所有受眾。

And just to add to Tony's point, I mean, I want to make sure we don't lose sight that even within the core food delivery business, the runway for growth is massive. If you compare just our GOV compared to the overall restaurant spend, we're a tiny fraction of that. So there's a lot of runway for growth just in food delivery alone.

另外補充 Tony 的觀點：我想確保我們不要忽略一點，即使是在核心的外送業務之內，成長跑道也非常巨大。若把我們的 GOV 與整體餐廳支出相比，我們只占其中非常小的一部分。所以光是外送本身，就還有很大的成長空間。

Now you tack onto that new verticals such as convenience and grocery and that further adds to our addressable market we're a tiny, tiny fraction of that. So international is definitely an important priority and is an area where we certainly aspire to grow into, but even the core U.S. business has many avenues for growth, and we're relatively early in those opportunities.

再加上便利商店與雜貨等新垂直領域，這會進一步擴大我們的可服務市場（addressable market），而我們在其中也只占非常、非常小的一部分。因此國際市場確實是重要優先事項，也是我們確實希望成長的領域；但即便是美國核心業務也有許多成長途徑，而我們在這些機會上仍相對早期。

And your next question is from Alex Potter from Piper Sandler.

下一個問題來自 Piper Sandler 的 Alex Potter。

Just a question, maybe follow on the previous discussion we were just having there. But if you were to maybe, I guess, divide management bandwidth, like the amount of brain power you're spending on these different growth opportunities right now, the various different verticals within Drive, international, I know it's easy to just say they're all important, but you go to bed at night, what are the things that you're thinking about most versus less?

我有個問題，可能是延續我們剛才的討論。如果要把管理層的精力分配——也就是你們在不同成長機會上投入的腦力——例如 Drive 內的各種垂直領域、國際市場等，我知道很容易說它們都很重要，但你們晚上睡覺前，最常在想的是哪些事情？相對比較少想的是哪些？

Yes. I'll take that. Look, certainly, we have a full plate, and it's a broad surface area. And the goal was always, over many decades, to build both a marketplace and a platform in which we can transform every brick-and-mortar business. So that aperture is -- was wide even 7.5 years ago when we started the company.

好的。我來回答。你看，我們確實事情很多，而且覆蓋面很廣。我們的目標一直都是在很多個十年的時間尺度上，同時打造一個市集與一個平台，藉此改造每一家實體商家。因此這個視野——即便在我們 7.5 年前創立公司時——就已經很寬。

The way I tend to think about this is less about which thing comes up, I guess, most often in my dreams. It's more -- do we have the right leader and are we setting up that leader with the right cross-functional team for success. And as Prabir mentioned in some of the opening remarks, a lot of these projects that we're talking about, they're in very different stages of progression. And we tend to invest commensurate to what we see, both in terms of achieving product market fit as well as just where we are in the maturation and development of that market opportunity.

我思考這件事的方式，與其說是哪一件事最常出現在我的夢裡，不如說——我們是否有合適的領導者？我們是否為那位領導者配置了合適的跨職能團隊，讓他/她能成功？正如 Prabir 在開場的一些談話中提到的，我們正在談的許多專案，所處的進展階段其實差異很大。而我們通常會依據我們所看到的情況來投入相稱的資源，包含是否達到產品市場契合（product-market fit），以及我們在該市場機會的成熟度與發展階段所處的位置。

So it's not like -- I guess it's making sure that we always have that portfolio of investments and making sure that so long as we have the right team and the right single-threaded focus on that area that the focus is really just on that execution and nothing else.

所以並不是——我想重點是確保我們始終維持那個投資組合，並確保只要我們有合適的團隊，以及在該領域有正確、單線聚焦（single-threaded focus），那麼焦點就真的只在執行上，而不是其他事情。

Okay. And then maybe another question kind of on, I guess, on the regulatory front. There's been some rumors, I guess, in the press of potentially talking to unions nationally in order to prevent sort of a state-by-state Prop 22 type fight -- legal fight. If you deal with unions onetime nationally, then maybe you can come to some sort of labor agreement, and it's kind of a one-and-done setup. Is that accurate? Are you guys having discussions like that? What are the odds something like that actually happens?

好的。那我再問一個可能偏監管面的問題。媒體上有一些傳聞，說你們可能會在全國層級與工會對話，以避免逐州發生類似 Prop 22 那種——法律攻防。如果一次在全國層級與工會協商，或許就能達成某種勞動協議，變成一種一次到位（one-and-done）的安排。這說法正確嗎？你們有在進行這類討論嗎？這種事情真的發生的機率有多大？

Well, I think it's important to start with what it is that we want to achieve with respect to anything policy when it comes to Dashers. And for us, that always starts with what it is that Dashers want. And I think what you saw in Proposition 22 was that both politics and policies sided with the Dasher. Both sides of the aisle in California came together to support Dashers' desire to keep the flexibility that, frankly, doesn't exist in any other type of work opportunity and then paired that flexibility with greater security. And wherever there are opportunities to have discussions about how can we maintain this flexibility and really create a set of standards around it that gives portable and proportional benefits tied to this flexibility, we're happy to have those conversations.

嗯，我認為重要的是，先從我們在涉及外送員（Dasher）的任何政策上，想要達成什麼目標談起。對我們而言，這一切永遠都從外送員想要什麼開始。我認為你在第 22 號提案（Proposition 22）中看到的是，政治與政策都站在外送員這一邊。加州兩黨攜手支持外送員希望保有的彈性——坦白說，這種彈性在其他任何類型的工作機會中都不存在——並且把這種彈性與更高的保障結合起來。只要有機會討論如何維持這種彈性，並真正建立一套圍繞此彈性的標準，提供與此彈性相連結、可攜且按比例的福利，我們都很樂意參與這些對話。

I mean if you just look at some of the outcomes that have been achieved with Prop 22, I mean, you see a 50% increase in Net Promoter Scores for Dashers post Prop 22 in the State of California. So I think this is an instance where business and policy actually achieve the outcomes -- or the outcomes actually achieved the objectives that it set out to accomplish.

我的意思是，如果你只看第 22 號提案帶來的一些成果，你會看到在加州，第 22 號提案通過後，外送員的淨推薦值（Net Promoter Score, NPS）提升了 50%。所以我認為這是一個案例：企業與政策確實達成了結果——或者說，結果確實達成了它原本設定要完成的目標。

And your next question comes from Lloyd Walmsley from Deutsche Bank.

下一個問題來自德意志銀行（Deutsche Bank）的 Lloyd Walmsley。

Two questions, if I can. First, can you just give us an update on how you're approaching the incremental Prop 22 costs? How are they coming in versus your estimates? How are you passing along or not passing those along to consumers? And what are you seeing in the competitive environment that may inform what you do?

如果可以的話，我有兩個問題。第一，能否請你更新一下你們如何因應第 22 號提案帶來的增量成本？實際發生的成本與你們的估計相比如何？你們是否、以及在多大程度上把這些成本轉嫁給消費者？另外，你們在競爭環境中看到了什麼，可能會影響你們的作法？

And then I guess the second would just be on kind of active efficiency. You talked about in the letter continuing to improve. Is there an opportunity, do you feel like there's multiple years left? Or are there regions where you have strong density or other factors that might serve as a leading indicator where you could give us a sense of more mature contribution margins or regional EBITDA margins? Anything you could share there would be great.

第二個問題我想是關於所謂的「活躍效率」（active efficiency）。你們在信中提到會持續改善。你覺得這方面還有多年的提升空間嗎？或者是否有一些地區因為密度高或其他因素，可能作為領先指標，讓你們能分享更成熟的貢獻毛利率（contribution margins）或區域 EBITDA 利潤率？任何你能分享的資訊都會很有幫助。

Lloyd, maybe I'll take that. So first, in terms of the Prop 22 costs, we're absorbing the vast majority of the Prop 22 costs. We are passing them along in certain instances. But for the vast majority of the cost in California, we're absorbing it in our P&L. And if you think about why we're doing it, it's first and foremost in order to benefit merchants because if we keep prices low to consumers, consumers tend to order more. Those orders ultimately benefit our merchants. And so to the extent we can continue doing so, we will. It also is consistent with our overall philosophy to manage the business to maximize scale and top line growth while maintaining discipline in EBITDA. So what's embedded in our guidance for Q1 and 2021 as a whole is an assumption that we're going to continue absorbing Prop 22 costs to the degree that we currently have.

Lloyd，也許我來回答。首先，關於第 22 號提案的成本，我們吸收了其中絕大多數。我們在某些情況下會把部分成本轉嫁出去，但就加州的大部分成本而言，我們是在損益表（P&L）中自行吸收。至於我們為什麼這麼做，首要原因是為了讓商家受益，因為如果我們把消費者價格維持在較低水準，消費者往往會下更多訂單，而這些訂單最終會讓我們的商家受益。因此，只要我們能持續這麼做，我們就會這麼做。這也符合我們整體的理念：在維持 EBITDA 紀律的同時，管理業務以最大化規模與營收成長。也就是說，我們對 2021 年第一季以及 2021 全年的指引中，已內含一項假設：我們將在目前的程度上持續吸收第 22 號提案的成本。

On your second question around active efficiency, I remember we had this discussion even at the time of the IPO. Our active efficiencies continue to grow obviously year-on-year, but also on a quarter-on-quarter basis. And the reason for that is because active efficiency is not simply a product of the traffic that's on the streets or the waiting time at restaurants. There's a ton of product work that goes into dispatching a Dasher appropriately, ensuring batches are prepared well, ensuring wasted time at the restaurant is eliminated and so on. So we've not found the ceiling yet. And I feel good about the fact that there's continued improvements in active efficiency are possible, but we don't have at least a view in terms of where it will saturate at this point.

至於你第二個關於活躍效率的問題，我記得我們在 IPO 當時就討論過。我們的活躍效率顯然持續逐年成長，也在逐季成長。原因在於，活躍效率不只是街上的交通狀況或餐廳等待時間的產物；我們在產品上投入了大量工作，包括更適當地派單給外送員、確保批次（batches）準備得更好、確保消除在餐廳的無效等待時間等等。因此我們還沒有看到天花板。我對於活躍效率仍有持續改善的空間感到樂觀，但至少目前我們還沒有一個明確的看法，知道它會在何處飽和。

And your next question comes from Jason Helfstein from Oppenheimer.

下一個問題來自 Oppenheimer 的 Jason Helfstein。

I'll ask two. Just maybe how are you thinking about driving more docks in the storefront? Obviously, there's a lot of suites out there for SMBs, but yours integrate into your whole back end. And so maybe just talk about how you drive that adoption. Is there certain pricing mechanisms you're using or other ways to get that out there? And then secondly, just maybe talk a bit more about kind of the caps and some of the pushback.

我問兩個問題。第一，你們如何思考推動更多商家採用 Storefront？顯然市面上有很多提供給中小企業（SMB）的套件，但你們的產品能整合到你們整個後端系統。所以也許談談你們如何推動採用：是否有特定的定價機制，或其他方式讓更多人使用？第二，也請多談談關於費率上限（caps）以及一些反彈（pushback）的情況。

I mean number one, any information you could share about how nonchain restaurants are kind of increasing prices -- online prices to offset fees and, just in general, that behavior and the awareness that that's kind of a pretty healthy way to kind of manage? And then can you see any way that permanent jurisdictional price caps are legal?

我的意思是，第一，你能否分享一些資訊：非連鎖餐廳是否在提高價格——例如提高線上價格——以抵消費用？以及更一般而言，這種行為與大家對此作法其實是相當健康的管理方式的認知。第二，你是否認為永久性的、按司法管轄區設定的價格上限在法律上可行？

Yes. So Jason, maybe I'll take the first part of the question. So I think the first question was on Storefront. Look, Storefront is very early. It's a little over 6 months old as a product, and it has grown extremely, extremely quickly since launch. And you're right, in some sense for merchants, it's a bit of a no-brainer because it already integrates with all of their back-of-house systems that we've had to do on our marketplace.

好的。Jason，也許我先回答第一部分。你第一個問題是關於 Storefront。你看，Storefront 還非常早期。作為一個產品，它推出至今才剛超過 6 個月，但自上線以來成長非常、非常快。你說得對，從某種意義上對商家而言，這幾乎是不需要多想的選擇，因為它已經能與我們在平台上為他們整合的所有後台系統相連。

On the flip side, there's a lot of work to be done, making sure that it works with a wide variety of merchants. We serve -- we're very privileged and proud to serve hundreds of thousands of businesses, but that also comes with lots of complexity in terms of their operations, their protocols, their reporting requirements and things -- and so on and so forth. And so that's really where we are. We're back to how we think about investment horizons and how we manage capital allocation.

另一方面，我們還有很多工作要做，以確保它能適用於各式各樣的商家。我們很榮幸也很自豪能服務數十萬家企業，但這也意味著在他們的營運、流程、報表需求等方面存在大量複雜性——諸如此類。因此這就是我們目前所處的位置。這也回到我們如何看待投資期間，以及我們如何管理資本配置。

Right now, Storefront is really in the product market fit phase. And so we're just trying to create more and more features such that it can deliver more and more of the benefits that we see in our own marketplace to a merchant's own digital channel.

目前，Storefront 真正處於產品市場契合（product-market fit）階段。因此我們正努力打造越來越多的功能，讓它能把我們在自家平台上看到的更多好處，帶到商家自己的數位渠道上。

And Jason, just on your question regarding price caps. As of the end of Q4, we were subject to price controls in 73 jurisdictions, which is up from 32 at the end of the third quarter. Now based on all the conversations we've had with city officials, these price caps are temporary in nature, and they're all tied to emergency orders that are related to in-store dining. So it's our expectation that when in-store dining resumes, these price caps will fall away.

Jason，關於你提到的價格上限問題。截至第四季末，我們在 73 個司法管轄區受到價格管制，較第三季末的 32 個有所增加。根據我們與各城市官員的所有對話，這些價格上限本質上是暫時性的，且都與和店內用餐相關的緊急命令掛鉤。因此我們預期，當店內用餐恢復後，這些價格上限將會取消。

In the interim, we've begun implementing incremental consumer fees in order to recoup some of the costs related to price controls. Remember, in the long term, our [mantra is to] continue reducing consumer fees. And so we'll do this as long as price caps are temporary, and the fee increases will go away once the price caps drop away. But in Q4, those price caps had an impact of $36 million in terms of revenue, about 44 basis points on our take rate. And we -- we're planning to manage to that similar dollar impact over time.

在此期間，我們已開始實施額外的消費者費用，以回收部分與價格管制相關的成本。請記得，長期而言，我們的[口號是]持續降低消費者費用。因此，只要價格上限是暫時性的，我們就會這麼做；而一旦價格上限取消，這些費用上調也會隨之取消。但在第四季，這些價格上限對營收的影響為 3,600 萬美元，約使我們的抽成率（take rate）下降 44 個基點。我們——我們計畫隨時間推移，以類似的美元影響幅度來進行管理。

In terms of the legality of permanent price caps, I don't want to comment on a hypothetical, but because based on all the conversations of that so far, city officials insist that these are temporary in nature.

至於永久性價格上限的合法性，我不想對假設情境發表評論，因為就目前為止我們所有的對話來看，城市官員都堅稱這些措施是暫時性的。

And just if there's anything you want to share about maybe proportion of restaurants that are using separate pricing for online versus in-store to try to recoup fees?

另外，你是否願意分享一些資訊：例如有多少比例的餐廳為了回收費用，而採用線上與店內不同的定價？

Yes. Some restaurants are using menu inflation and e-price inflation in order to recoup fees. So far, again, this may be a function of the fact that in-store dining is shut down and consumer price elasticity, the impact on price [loss] is relatively minimal. But we're hopeful that as in-store dining resumes, merchants will recognize that keeping prices consistent with their in-store is actually the right path forward because it boosts the amount of demand that's possible to their delivery channel.

是的。有些餐廳會透過提高菜單價格以及提高線上價格（e-price inflation）來回收費用。到目前為止，再次強調，這可能與店內用餐關閉以及消費者價格彈性有關，價格[流失]的影響相對較小。但我們希望，隨著店內用餐恢復，商家會認知到讓價格與店內一致其實才是正確的前進方向，因為這能提升其外送渠道所能承接的需求量。

And your next question comes from Ralph Schackart from William Blair.

下一個問題來自 William Blair 的 Ralph Schackart。

First, just on the annual EBITDA guidance, Prabir, that contemplates a fairly wide range between 0 and $200 million or so. I know you talked about price controls as well as Prop 22, but just can you give us a sense what would drive either outcome on the low end or the high end, especially after coming off, obviously, some strong tailwinds with COVID, but off a strong 2020?

首先，關於全年 EBITDA 指引，Prabir，這個指引涵蓋的區間相當寬，大約在 0 到 2 億美元之間。我知道你談到了價格管制以及第 22 號提案（Prop 22），但你能否讓我們了解一下，哪些因素會驅動結果落在區間低端或高端？尤其是在顯然受惠於 COVID 的一些強勁順風、且 2020 年表現強勁之後？

And then just maybe a follow-up on the competitive side. You talked about CAC being a little bit more expensive but within your normal range. Maybe just give a sense of how the supply side looks for drivers and your ability to continue to add merchants, particularly on the restaurant side.

接著可能再追問一下競爭面。你提到 CAC 稍微變貴，但仍在你們的正常範圍內。能否談談供給端（司機）目前的狀況，以及你們持續新增商家的能力，特別是在餐廳端？

Sure. Ralph, so on your first question regarding the guidance, really, the objective there in the guidance is to ensure some level of discipline on the EBITDA line. To the extent that we're outperforming on the top line, either due to the core food business or outperformance in products such as Drive or new verticals, such as convenience, we would be towards the high end. On the other hand, we've got some interesting opportunities ahead of us, particularly as it pertains to convenience. As you likely saw, third-party data shows us as being the leader in the online convenience space, and this is after having launched that particular vertical about a year or maybe less than a year ago.

當然。Ralph，針對你第一個關於指引的問題，這份指引的目標主要是確保在 EBITDA 這條線上維持一定程度的紀律。如果我們在營收端（top line）表現優於預期，不論是核心外送餐飲業務，或是像 Drive 這類產品的超預期表現，或是像便利商店（convenience）這類新垂直領域的超預期表現，我們就會更接近區間高端。另一方面，我們前方也有一些很有意思的機會，特別是便利商店這塊。你可能也看到，第三方數據顯示我們在線上便利商店領域是領導者，而我們推出這個垂直領域大約才一年、甚至不到一年。

And so if we start seeing incremental progress and positive signals from some of these new projects, including Storefront and Drive and other things, we're inclined to invest as long as it meets our return thresholds, in which case, we will -- we'll likely end up towards the low end of that range.

因此，如果我們開始看到這些新專案（包括 Storefront、Drive 以及其他項目）帶來更多進展與正向訊號，只要符合我們的報酬門檻，我們就傾向加大投資；在那種情況下，我們——我們很可能會落在該區間的低端。

Again, we're managing the business, just as a reminder, to maximize scale and top line growth, with an intent to try to land inside the range in EBITDA as opposed to try to beat EBITDA.

再次提醒，我們經營這門生意的方式，是以最大化規模與營收成長為目標，並且意圖讓 EBITDA 落在指引區間內，而不是以「打敗 EBITDA」為目標。

And then on your second question with respect to the supply side, let me talk about merchants first. And with COVID and the recent pandemic, it became clear to merchants that they need a delivery channel. So merchants that weren't participating in delivery prior to the pandemic needed to get that -- deliver that quickly. And so we saw a massive influx in terms of merchants, which led to selection growth. And you can see that in the chart that we included in the shareholder letter where the selections available on the platform has continued to grow.

至於你第二個關於供給端的問題，我先談商家。COVID 與近期疫情讓商家清楚意識到，他們需要一個外送通路。因此，那些在疫情前未參與外送的商家，需要快速把外送能力建起來。於是我們看到商家大量湧入，帶動了品項/選擇（selection）的成長。你也可以在我們股東信中附上的圖表看到，平台上可供選擇的品項持續增加。

In terms of our cost to acquire merchants has been relatively stable, the same goes on the Dasher side where you've had sort of a tale of 2 cities. On the one hand, you would have expected large influxes of Dashers as a result of heightened unemployment, but that was offset to some degree by stimulus checks.

就我們取得商家的成本而言，整體相對穩定。Dasher（外送員）端也是如此，呈現某種「兩個城市的故事」。一方面，你可能會預期因失業率上升而帶來大量 Dashers 湧入，但在某種程度上又被紓困支票（stimulus checks）所抵銷。

Regardless of all of that, our cost to acquire Dashers have been sort of stable in terms of within the realm of what we were expecting.

不論上述因素如何，我們取得 Dashers 的成本大致維持穩定，落在我們原先預期的範圍內。

And your next question comes from the line of James Lee from Mizuho.

下一題來自瑞穗（Mizuho）的 James Lee。

Great. On the shareholder letter, you guys mentioned that consumer acquisition costs increased in 4Q. So is that the trend we are expecting or you're expecting going forward? And second thing, how should we think about maybe contract revenue going forward into FY '21? Is that a rising trend as well? And specifically, on advertising, can you talk about maybe what channel is working well -- very well for you, what channel that you like to improve? Any particular regions that you want to go after a little bit more aggressive?

很好。在股東信中，你們提到第四季（4Q）的消費者獲客成本上升。所以這會是我們——或你們——預期未來的趨勢嗎？第二個問題，我們應該如何看待 2021 財年（FY '21）未來的合約收入（contract revenue）？這也會是上升趨勢嗎？另外，特別就廣告而言，你能否談談哪些渠道對你們效果很好——非常好，哪些渠道你們希望改善？有沒有特定區域你們想更積極加碼？

Maybe I'll start with your first question on customer acquisition cost. To be clear, we manage our business to pay back thresholds. And so the customer acquisition cost, the CPA that we pay in order to acquire customers is simply an output resulting from a payback period that we're trying to hit. And so to the extent that we continue increasing the LTV of our customer base through improved profitability, through improved engagement, through levers such as DashPass, it gives us more flexibility to increase our CPA. So I view our increasing CAC as a feature where we're able to fund higher and higher amounts of customer acquisition in order to acquire a larger and larger share of new customers joining the industry, which then when you couple that with our industry-leading retention, leads to continued market share gains in the future. So the increase in customer acquisition costs are a choice that we're making to reinvest the profitability in our business.

我先回答你第一個關於獲客成本的問題。先說清楚，我們是以回收期（payback）門檻來管理業務。因此，我們為了獲取客戶所支付的獲客成本、也就是 CPA，本質上只是我們想達成的回收期所導出的結果。也就是說，當我們透過提升獲利能力、提升互動/黏著度，以及透過像 DashPass 這樣的槓桿來持續提高客戶基礎的 LTV（終身價值）時，我們就有更大的彈性去提高 CPA。所以我把 CAC 的上升視為一項特性：代表我們能夠投入越來越高的獲客金額，以取得產業中新加入客戶更大、更多的份額；再結合我們業界領先的留存率，將在未來帶來持續的市占提升。因此，獲客成本的上升是我們做出的選擇，是把業務中的獲利再投資回去。

On the question around counter revenue, just looking at 2020 versus 2021, the -- again, we don't guide to revenue, but I would point to the fact that we have an incremental cost resulting from Prop 22 that didn't exist in 2020 for the most part. And so you will see a decrement to our take rate in 2021 as a result of that incremental Prop 22 cost, the vast majority of which we're choosing to absorb.

關於抽成收入（take rate）這個問題，如果只看 2020 對比 2021——再次強調，我們不提供營收指引——但我會指出一點：我們因第 22 號提案（Prop 22）而產生了 2020 年大多數時間並不存在的新增成本。因此，2021 年你會看到我們的抽成率因這項 Prop 22 的新增成本而下滑，而其中絕大部分成本我們選擇自行吸收。

And lastly, on the advertising front, again, we don't reference one channel over another necessarily. We're managing the business to payback periods. And so we will -- we'll flexibly deploy capital across regions, across channels as long as it hits our payback thresholds.

最後，關於廣告方面，同樣地，我們不會特別偏重某一個渠道。我們是以回收期來管理業務。因此，只要符合我們的回收期門檻，我們就會在不同地區、不同渠道之間彈性配置資本。

And your next question comes from the line of Michael McGovern from Bank of America.

下一題來自美國銀行（Bank of America）的 Michael McGovern。

I was just wondering if you could provide a little bit more color on maybe the trajectory of AOV versus total orders for the 2021 guidance. With AOV down 5 points in the fourth quarter, do you kind of expect AOV to stay in the negative territory throughout 2021? And maybe if you could also talk a little bit about the cadence for -- on a quarterly basis, do you kind of just expect seasonality to return to maybe, like, a pre-COVID level in 2021 with a normal bump in Q4?

我想請你們多提供一些關於 2021 指引中，AOV（平均訂單金額）相對於總訂單量的走勢的說明。第四季 AOV 下滑了 5 個百分點，你們是否預期 2021 年 AOV 會持續處於負成長區間？另外也想請你談談季度節奏——以季度來看，你們是否預期 2021 年季節性會回到類似疫情前（pre-COVID）的水準，例如第四季出現正常的上揚？

Sure. So on the first question with respect to AOV, the first thing I should clarify is if you take our GOV and divide it by total orders, remember that AOV compression in part is driven by the fact that our total orders includes Drive orders, but the value associated with the Drive order is not contained in our GOV. And so when you see deceleration in AOV, some portion of that deceleration is being caused by an increasing mix of Drive orders. So I want to make sure I clarify that.

好的。先回答關於 AOV 的第一個問題。我首先要澄清的是，如果你用我們的 GOV 除以總訂單數，請記得 AOV 的壓縮部分是因為：我們的總訂單數包含 Drive 訂單，但 Drive 訂單所對應的金額並未包含在我們的 GOV 中。因此，當你看到 AOV 放緩時，其中一部分放緩是由於 Drive 訂單占比提高所造成。我想先把這點說清楚。

Second, having said that, if I just look at our marketplace orders alone, AOVs remain above pre-COVID levels, but not massively above pre-COVID levels, that continued sort of normalizing over the course of the -- of 2020. They were at a high in Q2 and so has continued normalizing since then, but it's still modestly above pre-COVID levels. And we expect continued moderation over the course of 2021.

第二，話雖如此，如果我只看我們的 marketplace（平台）訂單，AOV 仍高於疫情前水準，但並沒有大幅高於疫情前水準；在 2020 年期間持續呈現某種正常化（normalizing）。AOV 在第二季（Q2）達到高點，之後就持續正常化，但仍略高於疫情前水準。我們預期 2021 年期間會持續溫和回落。

On your question on seasonality, what I'd say is what was embedded into our guidance is an assumption that the vaccine will be broadly available soon and that in-store dining will resume relatively soon. And as a result, starting from Q2 onwards, we're going to see a reversion towards pre-COVID behavior within the customer base. That includes a reversion in terms of AOVs as well as order frequency, and that's compounded by the traditional seasonality you see around the summertime where order frequencies are impacted as consumers can get out more and go to restaurants a lot more. To the extent the consumer behavior remains propped up as a result of a delay in the vaccine or other factors, obviously, we'll perform to the upside.

至於你問的季節性，我想說的是：我們的指引中所內含的假設是疫苗將很快廣泛可得，且內用（in-store dining）將相對很快恢復。因此，從第二季（Q2）開始，我們會看到客戶群的行為回歸到疫情前。這包括 AOV 與下單頻率的回歸；此外還會疊加你在夏季通常會看到的傳統季節性——因為消費者更能外出、也更常去餐廳，所以下單頻率會受到影響。若因疫苗延遲或其他因素導致消費者行為仍被撐住，那麼我們顯然會有上行表現。

And your next question is from Youssef Squali from Truist.

下一題來自 Truist 的 Youssef Squali。

Two quick questions from me, please. Starting with just your -- I know you're not guiding to revenues per se. But since you are guiding to GOVs, I was wondering, as you look out, not just for 2021, but beyond, say, the next 5-plus years, how do you see your take rate over time evolving? Is there a point at which you kind of prefer not to have it go above certain thresholds because then it just creates so much friction with clients, with consumers, with restaurants and potentially even bring some jurisdictions even harder -- to pay a harder look at the unit economics of the business?

我這邊兩個簡短問題。先從你們的——我知道你們不特別提供營收指引。但既然你們提供 GOV 指引，我想請教：展望未來，不只是 2021 年，而是更長期、例如未來 5 年以上，你們如何看待抽成率（take rate）隨時間的演變？是否存在某個點，你們會傾向不讓抽成率高於某些門檻，因為那會在客戶、消費者、餐廳之間造成很大的摩擦，甚至可能讓某些司法管轄區更嚴格——更仔細地檢視這門生意的單位經濟（unit economics）？

And then maybe just look at the business internationally. As you -- I know the focus is primarily on the U.S., Australia, Canada. But as you look beyond, and there were some press articles about your interest in Japan, et cetera, can you just flesh out what you look at in terms of an attractiveness of a market? I think your main competitor talks about wanting to be #1, #2, and otherwise, they're not in that market. I'm not seeing that many markets where people can still be #1, #2. So maybe if you can just flesh that out for us a little bit, your strategy around international expansion beyond the 3 -- the other 2 markets you're in, that would be great.

然後也許再從國際角度來看你們的業務。正如你——我知道目前重點主要在美國、澳洲、加拿大。但當你們把視野放到更廣的市場，而且也有一些新聞報導提到你們對日本等市場的興趣，你能否更具體說明一下，你們在評估一個市場吸引力時會看哪些因素？我想你們的主要競爭對手談到他們希望在市場做到第 1 或第 2，否則就不進入那個市場。我看不出還有那麼多市場能讓人做到第 1、第 2。所以也許你可以再多跟我們說一點，你們在國際擴張方面的策略——除了你們目前所在的 3 個市場之外、也就是你們已經進入的另外 2 個市場以外——那就太好了。

Great. Youssef, so let me take the question on take rate first, and then Tony can talk about international. Actually, when you think -- when we call our strategy long term, the idea is to lower commissions and fees on merchants, to lower fees on consumers and to increase Dash earnings. That's the simple sort of equation that we're trying to solve for. And the way we do that is by -- on the merchant side, as we unlock greater efficiency in the P&L, whether it's through active efficiency or through eliminating wastage or through reducing defect rates that then help our customer support costs and so on, we'll invest that both in -- on the merchant side as well as the consumer side.

很好。Youssef，那我先回答關於抽成率（take rate）的問題，然後 Tony 可以談國際市場。其實，當你想到——當我們說我們的策略是長期的，核心想法就是：降低對商家的佣金與費用、降低對消費者的費用，並提高 Dashers 的收入。這就是我們要解的簡單方程式。而我們做到這點的方式是——在商家端，當我們在損益表（P&L）上解鎖更高的效率，不論是透過提升主動效率（active efficiency）、消除浪費、或降低缺陷率，進而降低客服成本等等，我們會把這些成果再投資到——商家端以及消費者端。

As an example, on the consumer side, as we keep increasing the adoption of DashPass, that has a natural deflationary impact on take rate. And although our unit take rates decline, they are more than made up for by the increase in engagement amongst DashPass consumers. And so if you look at total revenue per MAU for a DashPass user versus somebody that doesn't use DashPass, the total dollars of revenue or total dollars of gross profit for a DashPass consumer tend to be higher than they do for non-DashPass consumers. So we're actively choosing to make that trade-off.

舉例來說，在消費者端，隨著我們持續提高 DashPass 的採用率，這會對抽成率帶來自然的通縮效應。雖然我們的單位抽成率下降，但會被 DashPass 消費者更高的互動與使用所帶來的提升所抵銷，甚至超過。若你比較 DashPass 用戶與非 DashPass 用戶的每 MAU 總收入，DashPass 消費者帶來的總收入金額或總毛利金額，往往高於非 DashPass 消費者。因此我們是有意識地做出這樣的取捨。

And so over time, as we unlock these efficiencies in the P&L, and as we provide merchants with additional products and services, the idea is to continuously reinvest those dollars into reducing merchant commissions, reducing consumer fees and increasing Dasher earnings because it's our belief that as we continue doing so, it will enable more adoption and we'll have access to more of the TAM that will ultimately translate into growth over the long run. Not only growth but sustained growth.

因此，隨著時間推進，當我們在損益表中解鎖這些效率，並且為商家提供更多產品與服務，我們的想法是持續把這些資金再投入，用於降低商家佣金、降低消費者費用並提高 Dasher 的收入。因為我們相信，只要我們持續這麼做，就能帶來更高的採用率，並讓我們觸及更大的 TAM（總可服務市場），最終在長期轉化為成長——不只是成長，而是可持續的成長。

Youssef, on your second question around international, I touched upon this a little bit earlier. But for us, it's really taking a really long-term view. And otherwise, candidly, we would not have launched in the United States either as we were not the first player in 2013 when we founded the company. And so I think for us, it's really looking for areas of opportunity where we can bring something of unique difference and taking a pretty long-term view on what it is that we can do for all of the audiences, consumers, merchants and Dashers.

Youssef，關於你第二個國際市場的問題，我稍早有稍微提到。對我們而言，關鍵是採取非常長期的視角。否則，坦白說，我們當初也不會在美國推出，因為我們在 2013 年創立公司時並不是第一個進入者。所以我想，對我們來說，就是尋找我們能帶來獨特差異的機會領域，並以相當長期的視角來看我們能為所有受眾——消費者、商家與 Dashers——做些什麼。

And I mean if you look at some of the markets, well, frankly, even in the U.S., it's still pretty early days. The penetration levels are quite low in these very large geographies, including those that have players already existing there. So for us, it's always just obsessing over the consumer, merchant and Dasher. And I think if we do that, our products will speak for themselves.

而且如果你看一些市場，坦白說，即使在美國，現在也仍然算是早期階段。在這些非常大的地理區域中，滲透率仍然相當低，包括那些已經有既有玩家存在的地區。對我們而言，始終就是專注到近乎偏執地服務消費者、商家與 Dasher。我認為只要我們做到這點，我們的產品自然會自己說話。

And our last question comes from the line of Samuel Lourensz from Arete.

我們的最後一個問題來自 Arete 的 Samuel Lourensz。

So firstly, could you maybe talk a little bit about your testing in DashMart, how you're thinking about the business model here, and if it can bring attractive returns to -- in excess of your thresholds? And then secondly, could you talk a little bit about your progression with order batching? And as you add new verticals, how do you envision this becoming more material in the longer term?

首先，你能否談談你們在 DashMart 的測試情況、你們如何思考這裡的商業模式，以及它是否能帶來具吸引力、且高於你們門檻的回報？其次，你能否談談你們在訂單合併（order batching）方面的進展？以及當你們新增更多垂直品類時，你們如何看待它在更長期變得更具實質性？

Yes. I'll take the first question on DashPass. And I think since Prabir talked earlier about active efficiency, I'll let him take the second question on batching. With respect to DashMart, we're super excited about the DashMart business. It's, again, very early days. What turned into an experiment at the end of 2019 has been something that we've invested into 2020. And so we're certainly seeing the right input metrics to cross our investment thresholds and stage this for further capital allocation.

好的。我先回答第一個關於 DashPass 的問題。我想 Prabir 先前談到主動效率，所以第二個關於合併（batching）問題我讓他來回答。就 DashMart 而言，我們對 DashMart 業務非常興奮。這同樣還在非常早期的階段。2019 年底的一個實驗，在 2020 年成為我們投入資源的項目。因此我們確實看到正確的投入指標（input metrics），足以跨過我們的投資門檻，並將其納入下一階段以配置更多資本。

And really, if you think about the thesis behind DashMart, it's really bringing selection to where it has not existed before. Whether that means giving merchants -- it's really a win-win for merchants and consumers. For merchants, it gives them the opportunity to bridge into certain geographies that they may want to be in but aren't currently in in the depth or magnitude that they wish. For consumers, it's getting selection that they've never had before.

而且如果你思考 DashMart 背後的論點，核心就是把「選擇」帶到過去不存在的地方。不論是讓商家——這對商家與消費者而言其實是雙贏。對商家來說，這讓他們有機會進入某些他們想進去、但目前在深度或規模上尚未達到理想程度的地理區域。對消費者來說，則是獲得他們以前從未擁有過的選擇。

I mean for example, I mean, if you think about restaurateurs, they also sell a lot of retail items, as an example, where in places like Chicago, we carry the sauces of chefs like Stephanie Izard and many others in which we're serving the restaurants on DoorDash and Caviar. We're also now serving some of their other products through DashMart. Equivalently, that's also happening in other categories as well where, again, for merchants, this is an extension to bring them beyond their 4 walls wherever they are. And for consumers, it's giving them selection that they've never had access to before.

例如，如果你想到餐廳業者，他們也會販售許多零售商品。以芝加哥為例，我們上架了像 Stephanie Izard 等主廚以及其他許多人的醬料；我們一方面透過 DoorDash 與 Caviar 服務他們的餐廳，現在也透過 DashMart 供應他們的其他產品。同樣地，其他品類也在發生類似的情況；對商家而言，這是一種延伸，讓他們能突破原本的四面牆、把觸角延伸到他們所在位置以外的地方；對消費者而言，則是提供他們以前從未能取得的選擇。

Yes. Samuel, on your question on batching, batch rates have been relatively consistent for the last -- since Q2. And so I want to make sure that we don't assume that batch rates are the only driver of active efficiency, efficiency of the logistics network. There are several other sources from a product perspective that we make progress on, which is what led to the consistent and sequential increases of -- in active efficiency over the course of the past year.

好的，Samuel，關於你對合併（batching）的問題，自從第二季（Q2）以來，合併率（batch rates）一直相對一致。因此我想確保我們不要假設合併率是主動效率、也就是物流網路效率的唯一驅動因素。從產品角度來看，我們還在其他多個來源上持續取得進展，這也是過去一年主動效率能夠持續且逐季提升的原因。

It's things like eliminating wasted time that a Dasher spends in a restaurant. It's better predictions of kitchen prep time to ensure the Dasher doesn't show up at the restaurant earlier than the food might be ready and so on. So batch rates are obviously an important source for the -- beyond resource.

例如，減少 Dasher 在餐廳耗費的無效等待時間；更準確地預測廚房備餐時間，以確保 Dasher 不會比餐點準備完成的時間更早到店等等。所以合併率顯然是一個重要來源——也是提升資源利用的來源之一。

And there are no further questions in queue.

目前佇列中沒有其他問題。

Great. Thanks, everyone.

很好。謝謝各位。

Ladies and gentlemen, this concludes today's conference call. Thank you for participating. You may now disconnect.

各位女士先生，今天的電話會議到此結束。感謝各位參與。您現在可以掛線。