Coupang, Inc. (CPNG) 2026 Q2 法說會逐字稿

Hello, everyone. My name is Emily, and I will be your conference operator today. At this time, I would like to welcome everyone to the Coupang 2026 second-quarter earnings conference call. (Operator Instructions)

大家好。我叫 Emily，今天將擔任各位的電話會議接線員。此刻，我想歡迎各位參加 Coupang 2026 年第二季財報電話會議。(接線員指示)

Now I'd like to turn the call over to Mike Parker, Vice President of Investor Relations. You may begin your conference.

現在我想把電話會議交給投資人關係副總裁 Mike Parker。您可以開始您的會議。

Thanks, operator. Welcome, everyone, to Coupang's second-quarter 2026 earnings conference call. I'm pleased to be joined on the call today by our Founder and CEO, Bom Kim; and our CFO, Gaurav Anand. The following discussion, including responses to your questions, reflects management's views as of today's date only. We do not undertake any obligation to update or revise this information except as required by law.

謝謝，接線員。歡迎各位參加 Coupang 2026 年第二季財報電話會議。今天很高興與我們的創辦人暨執行長 Bom Kim，以及財務長 Gaurav Anand 一同出席。以下討論（包括對各位提問的回覆）僅反映管理層截至今日的觀點。除法律要求外，我們不承擔更新或修訂此資訊的任何義務。

Certain statements made on today's call may include forward-looking statements including statements regarding future financial and operational results. Actual results may differ materially. Additional information about factors that could potentially impact our financial results is included in today's press release and in our filings with the SEC, including our most recent annual report on Form 10-K and subsequent filings.

今天電話會議中的某些陳述可能包含前瞻性陳述，包括關於未來財務與營運結果的陳述。實際結果可能存在重大差異。可能影響我們財務結果之因素的更多資訊，已載於今日新聞稿以及我們向美國證券交易委員會（SEC）提交的文件中，包括我們最近一期 Form 10-K 年報及其後續申報文件。

As we share our second-quarter 2026 results on today's call, the comparisons we make to prior periods will be on a year-over-year basis, unless otherwise noted. We may also present both GAAP and non-GAAP financial measures. Additional disclosures regarding these non-GAAP measures, including reconciliations of these measures to the most comparable GAAP measures are included in our earnings release, our slides accompanying this webcast and our SEC filings, which are posted on the company's Investor Relations website.

在今天分享 2026 年第二季業績時，除非另有說明，我們與前期的比較將以年對年為基礎。我們也可能同時呈現 GAAP 與非 GAAP 財務衡量指標。關於這些非 GAAP 指標的額外揭露（包括與最可比 GAAP 指標之調節表）已載於我們的財報新聞稿、隨本次網路直播提供的簡報，以及我們的 SEC 申報文件中，並已張貼於公司投資人關係網站。

And now I'll turn the call over to Bom.

現在我把電話會議交給 Bom。

Thanks, everyone, for joining us today. Consolidated revenue grew 10% year over year in constant currency, that's a step up from the growth in Q1 and in line with the guidance we provided. Adjusted EBITDA margin also came in within the range of guidance.

謝謝各位今天加入我們。以固定匯率計算，合併營收年增 10%，較第一季的成長有所加速，並符合我們先前提供的指引。調整後 EBITDA 利潤率也落在指引區間內。

First, Product Commerce saw its revenue growth increase to 8% year over year in constant currency. Let me spend a moment on the customer behavior behind that number because the reported rate blends groups moving in different directions.

首先，產品電商（Product Commerce）的營收成長率以固定匯率計算提升至年增 8%。我想花點時間說明支撐這個數字的客戶行為，因為報告的成長率混合了走向不同的客群。

The vast majority of our customer spend never moved. That group is spending at the highest levels in our history and compounding similarly to before last year's data incident. The spend that did leave was a minority of the total and most of it has already returned. Some of these customers were away for months, long enough to settle in somewhere else. These customers not only came back, they returned to their full prior spend levels and have since gone beyond it, compounding their spend at similar high rates as before.

我們絕大多數客戶的消費支出從未改變。這一群的支出處於我們歷史最高水準，且其累積成長（compounding）與去年資料事件發生前相近。確實流失的支出僅占總額的一小部分，而且其中大多數已經回流。其中一些客戶離開了數個月，時間長到足以在其他地方安頓下來。這些客戶不僅回來了，還回到先前完整的支出水準，且此後已超越原本水準，支出以與過去相近的高成長率持續累積成長。

And because the customers who returned were, on average, higher spenders than those who haven't, the picture in spend terms is even clearer than in customer counts. The vast majority of the spend, the incident disrupted is back and growing the way it did before. On top of that, new customers keep arriving.

而且，由於回流的客戶平均而言是比尚未回流者更高的消費者，因此以支出金額來看，情況比以客戶數來看更為清楚。事件所擾動的絕大多數支出已回來，並以事件前的方式持續成長。此外，新客戶仍持續加入。

Total WOW membership, for example, now exceeds its levels before the incident. New members begin at the early stage of the spend curve where new members always begin, so record membership shows up in revenue on a lag. Every cohort before them has climbed that curve, and we expect these to do the same.

例如，WOW 會員總數目前已超過事件發生前的水準。新會員一開始都處於支出曲線的早期階段，因此會員數創新高對營收的反映會有時間落後。在他們之前的每一個同批（cohort）都沿著那條曲線向上攀升，我們預期這些新同批也會如此。

The spend of all customers, excluding just those that left during the incident and haven't returned, is growing around 16% year over year, which is closer to the spend growth Product Commerce delivered in Q2 last year before the incident. Spend growth does outpace revenue growth, but the gap between the 16% and the reported 8% revenue growth is driven mostly by the missing spend of the cohort that hasn't returned.

所有客戶的支出（僅排除在事件期間流失且尚未回流者）約年增 16%，這更接近產品電商在去年第二季、事件發生前所達成的支出成長。支出成長確實快於營收成長，但 16% 與報告的 8% 營收成長之間的差距，主要是由尚未回流那一同批的缺口支出所造成。

We'll keep chipping away at earning them back. And after we lap the affected periods, we expect the spend growth for all of Product Commerce to reflect the growth rate of this underlying customer base because the cohort that has not returned will no longer be in our year-over-year comparison.

我們會持續努力把他們爭取回來。而在我們跨越受影響期間的年對年比較後，我們預期整體產品電商的支出成長將反映這個底層客戶基礎的成長率，因為尚未回流的那一同批將不再納入我們的年對年比較。

On margins, we're continuing to work through the disruption. We plan capacity and fixed costs against the predicted demand curve, and much of that capacity has long lead times. With revenue temporarily below that plan, those costs represent a larger share of revenue today. We could cut them significantly, but we've chosen not to because the right long-term decision is to grow into the capacity and support our customer experience that has always been our North Star.

在利潤率方面，我們仍在持續消化這次擾動的影響。我們會依據預測的需求曲線來規劃產能與固定成本，而其中相當一部分產能具有較長的建置前置期。由於營收暫時低於該規劃水準，這些成本在目前占營收的比重更高。我們可以大幅削減這些成本，但我們選擇不這麼做，因為從長期來看，正確的決策是讓營收成長去消化既有產能，並支撐我們的客戶體驗——這一直是我們的北極星。

There are also meaningful volume-based savings in our supply chain that we're missing this year that we expect to recover next year. We've also deliberately increased marketing spend to reacquire customers but we plan to reduce it next year after we've lapped the period.

此外，我們供應鏈中也存在顯著的「隨量而來」的節省（volume-based savings），今年因量不足而未能取得，我們預期明年可恢復。我們也刻意提高行銷支出以重新獲取客戶，但在跨越該期間後，我們計畫明年降低這部分支出。

We run this business with precision on capacity utilization and volume economics. That's what allows us to deliver double-digit growth along with expanding margins in normal times. And it's also why a sudden shock is more visible in our numbers than it might be somewhere else. And the same discipline that makes the disruption more visible is what will enable us to reverse it.

我們以精準的方式管理這門業務的產能利用率與規模經濟。這使我們在正常情況下能在維持兩位數成長的同時擴大利潤率。也因此，突如其來的衝擊在我們的數字上會比在其他地方更為明顯。而讓擾動更顯眼的同一套紀律，也將使我們得以扭轉它。

We've seen elements of this before, coming out of COVID, a sudden shift in the demand curve pressured margins and we return to normal levels. The shape of the recovery this year won't move in a straight line. Holiday timing and seasonal cost patterns will affect the reported improvement quarter to quarter. Gaurav will walk through how that shapes the back half. The [arc] we're managing to runs through next year. After we lap the effective period next year, we expect to work our way back to the growth and margin structure that Product Commerce ran at before.

我們以前也見過類似情況：在 COVID 之後，需求曲線的突然變化曾壓縮利潤率，而我們也回到正常水準。今年復甦的走勢不會是一條直線。假期時點與季節性成本型態將影響各季之間所呈現的改善幅度。Gaurav 將說明這如何形塑下半年表現。我們正在管理的這條[弧線]會延伸到明年。在明年跨越受影響期間後，我們預期將逐步回到產品電商在事件前的成長與利潤率結構。

I want to also note a few trends that we track closely and the broader opportunity we see before us. Our cohorts have continued to increase their spend with us year after year, including through this past year. Our oldest cohorts, the customers we acquired about 1.5 decades ago are still increasing their spend today. They now spend nearly 10 times what they spent in their first year and climbing.

我也想補充幾個我們密切追蹤的趨勢，以及我們所看到的更廣泛機會。我們的各同批客戶年復一年持續提高在我們平台上的支出，包括在過去這一年也是如此。我們最早期的同批——約在 15 年前獲取的客戶——至今仍在增加支出。他們目前的支出幾乎是第一年時的 10 倍，且仍在攀升。

Our newest courts are growing fastest of all at the beginning of the same curve. Each year adds a new cohort at the start of the curve, while every earlier cohort keeps climbing it. All three trends, our oldest cohorts continuing to grow spend, the spend of our subsequent cohorts climbing the curve to convert to higher levels and new cohorts joining power our growth. The past year tested us and all three trends held.

我們最新的同批在同一條曲線的起點成長速度最快。每一年都會新增一個位於曲線起點的新同批，而更早的每一個同批都持續沿著曲線向上攀升。這三個趨勢——最早期同批持續增加支出、後續同批沿曲線攀升並轉換至更高支出水準，以及新同批加入——共同驅動我們的成長。過去一年對我們是一項考驗，而這三個趨勢都維持不變。

And the spend of our cohorts climbs because spend growth is wallet share growth. As we expand selection, customers find more and more of the things they buy for which we've broken the trade-off between price, selection and speed. We're saving customers more money and more time with every item we add on Rocket Delivery.

而我們各期客群的支出之所以攀升，是因為支出成長就是錢包份額的成長。隨著我們擴大選品，客戶能找到越來越多他們原本就會購買、而我們已打破價格、選擇與速度之間取捨的商品。我們在 Rocket Delivery 每新增一個品項，就為客戶省下更多金錢與時間。

Our wallet share, or penetration of the overall retail spend in Korea, remains below the levels of penetration we see from global peers in markets like the US. And we don't view these levels as our ceiling because penetration follows the strength of the offering. Every trade-off we break brings purchases online that were never in reach before. As the offering improves, the addressable share of retail expands with it.

我們的錢包份額，或在韓國整體零售支出中的滲透率，仍低於我們在美國等市場的全球同業所見的滲透水準。而我們不把這些水準視為上限，因為滲透率取決於產品與服務供給的強度。我們每打破一個取捨，就把過去無法觸及的購買行為帶到線上。隨著供給改善，可觸及的零售份額也會隨之擴大。

And the same logic applies to margins. The long-term margin drivers keep compounding. Automation continues to improve productivity across our fulfillment [And] logistics network, and margin-accretive offerings like advertising and FLC are still early in their scale.

同樣的邏輯也適用於利潤率。長期的利潤率驅動因素持續複利累積。自動化持續提升我們履約與物流網路的生產力，而像廣告與 FLC 這類具利潤增厚效果的服務仍處於規模化的早期階段。

And AI raises the ceiling on both. We think of AI as a multiplier and what it multiplies is a set of assets we've been building for 15 years, the physical network; operating data from billions of orders picked, packed and delivered; and direct relationships with tens of millions of customers. Applied to the customer experience, AI improves discovery, personalization and service. Applied to operations, it compounds productivity and lowers the cost to serve. And apply to margin-accretive offerings, it raises the returns for the merchants and brands who are using them, which expands the addressable opportunity itself.

而 AI 也提高了兩者的上限。我們把 AI 視為一個乘數；它所放大的，是我們 15 年來打造的一組資產：實體網路；來自數十億筆訂單揀貨、包裝與配送的營運數據；以及與數千萬名客戶的直接關係。應用在客戶體驗上，AI 能改善探索、個人化與服務。應用在營運上，它能讓生產力複利提升並降低服務成本。而應用在具利潤增厚效果的服務上，它能提高使用這些服務的商家與品牌的回報，進而擴大可觸及的機會本身。

Turning now to Developing Offerings where we're running the playbook I just described in new markets and categories.

接下來談「開發中服務（Developing Offerings）」：我們正把我剛才描述的作法，運用到新的市場與品類。

In Taiwan, we've built out and continue to expand our own end-to-end fulfillment and logistics network that now delivers the vast majority of our shipments, next day, seven days a week, the only service in Taiwan to our knowledge that does. We also began rolling out our Dawn Delivery experience, which became a defining part of the customer experience in Korea to our first neighborhood in Taiwan. And we're building it faster than the first time because Taiwan didn't start from scratch.

在台灣，我們已建置並持續擴張自有的端到端履約與物流網路，如今可在每週七天提供隔日送達，並承擔我們絕大多數的出貨；據我們所知，這是台灣唯一能做到的服務。我們也開始把「晨間配送（Dawn Delivery）」體驗推廣到台灣的第一個社區；這項體驗在韓國已成為客戶體驗的關鍵特色。而且我們建置得比第一次更快，因為台灣並非從零開始。

Taiwan inherits over a decade of technology and process innovation from our Korean operations, the design, the systems, the operational playbook refined shipment by shipment. It took us four years into our logistics journey in Korea before we were able to launch Dawn Delivery. Taiwan reached it in just one year.

台灣承襲了我們韓國營運超過十年的技術與流程創新：設計、系統，以及一票一票出貨所淬鍊出的營運作戰手冊。在韓國的物流旅程中，我們花了四年才得以推出晨間配送。台灣只用了一年就達成。

With the network in place, the work shifts to the input we know best, selection. Our selection in Taiwan today is a fraction of rocket deliveries in Korea. Every item we add is another purchase where our customer saves both money and time. And each of those purchases earns more of their wallet.

在網路到位後，工作重心就轉向我們最熟悉的投入：選品。台灣目前的選品規模，仍只是韓國 Rocket Delivery 的一小部分。我們每新增一個品項，就多一筆讓客戶同時省錢又省時的購買。而每一筆購買都能為我們贏得更多客戶的錢包份額。

That's the same dynamic that as our Korean cohorts still climbing 15 years in, and we can already see it taking hold. Our early cohorts in Taiwan are retaining and growing their spend tracing the curve Korea's cohorts produced at the same age. Taiwan is on the same compounding curve as Korea, just earlier on it.

這正是同樣的動態：我們在韓國的各期客群即使 15 年後仍在攀升，而我們已經能看到它在台灣開始發生。台灣的早期客群正在留存並提高支出，其走勢與韓國在相同「年齡」時的客群曲線一致。台灣正走在與韓國相同的複利曲線上，只是處於更早的階段。

Two things to keep in mind as this scales, First, the path won't be linear quarter to quarter. Sometimes building selection at the right cost structure means stepping back in a category to rebuild it. Second, today's economics reflects the stage of our build-out, not the destination. As we work out the inefficiencies of an early supply chain and our volumes grow into the network, volume economics engage, and we expect Taiwan's P&L to follow the path that Korea paved.

隨著規模擴大，有兩點需要記住：第一，季度之間的路徑不會是線性的。有時要以正確的成本結構打造選品，意味著必須在某個品類先退一步、重新建構。第二，今天的經濟性反映的是我們建置期的階段，而非終點。隨著我們排除早期供應鏈的低效率、且量能在網路中成長到位，規模經濟將開始發揮作用；我們預期台灣的損益表（P&L）將沿著韓國所鋪陳的路徑前進。

Let me turn to our on-demand delivery service, which includes both Eats in Korea and Rocket Now in Japan. We've shared in the past our approach to Developing Offerings. We make disciplined initial investments where we see the potential for meaningful long-term cash flows. We look for early proof points in customer behavior, and we scale investments only as a result to validate the opportunity.

接著談我們的即時配送服務，包含韓國的 Eats 與日本的 Rocket Now。我們過去曾分享過我們對「開發中服務」的做法。在我們看見具意義的長期現金流潛力之處，我們會進行有紀律的初期投資。我們會尋找客戶行為的早期驗證點，並僅在此基礎上擴大投資，以驗證機會。

This cycle is complete when an offering stops drawing on the portfolio and starts funding it. Eats has traveled that entire arc. We entered a category most considered settled with a modest investment and a simple thesis: that the same propositions that customers valued in commerce, price, selection and service would matter just as much in food delivery. Customers responded at every stage, and we invested behind that response.

當一項服務不再消耗投資組合資源、而是開始為投資組合提供資金時，這個循環就完成了。Eats 已走完這整段歷程。我們以適度投資進入一個多數人認為已尘埃落定的品類，並提出一個簡單論點：客戶在電商中重視的同樣主張——價格、選擇與服務——在外送上也同樣重要。客戶在每個階段都給出回應，而我們也依據這些回應加碼投資。

Today, Eats has grown to serve millions of customers and the category itself has grown with us. Food delivery in Korea has more than quadrupled in size since we launched Eats, now reaching a meaningfully higher share of total restaurant spend than when we entered. And we've been a significant driver of that expansion.

如今，Eats 已成長到服務數百萬名客戶，而該品類本身也隨著我們一起成長。自我們推出 Eats 以來，韓國的外送市場規模已成長超過四倍；其在餐廳總支出中的占比，也已顯著高於我們進入時的水準。而我們一直是這波擴張的重要推動者。

And the capital story has come full circle. Rocket Now, our on-demand delivery offering in Japan, is in its early investment stage. Eats and Rocket Now are today sustainable on a combined basis. That is the model working end-to-end, disciplined entry, validation, scale and then an offering that carries its successors.

而資本的故事也走完一個完整循環。Rocket Now——我們在日本的即時配送服務——仍處於早期投資階段。以合併基礎來看，Eats 與 Rocket Now 目前已可永續運作。這就是該模型端到端運作的結果：有紀律地進入、驗證、擴張，然後由成熟的服務去承載後續的服務。

We're also extending what Eats built. We've begun rolling out non-food on-demand delivery, the same network and speed customers already trust apply to new use cases, offering customers even more opportunities to save time and money.

我們也在延伸 Eats 所建立的能力。我們已開始推出非食品的即時配送；客戶已信任的同一套網路與速度，將被應用到新的使用情境，為客戶提供更多省時省錢的機會。

What I've covered today is one model running at three different stages. Product Commerce is furthest ahead with years of investment in infrastructure and selection, customer cohorts still compounding 15 years in and the margin expansion that follows scale. Eats has now run that same cycle in a second category. And Taiwan is midway through it, building the network, filling in the selection, moving through the same stages that Korea moved through. They represent the same playbook at three different points on the same curve.

我今天所涵蓋的是同一個模型在三個不同階段的運行。商品電商（Product Commerce）走得最前面：多年來在基礎設施與選品上的投資、各期客群在 15 年後仍持續複利成長，以及隨規模而來的利潤率擴張。Eats 也已在第二個品類跑完同樣的循環。而台灣正處於中段：建置網路、補齊選品，並經歷韓國曾走過的相同階段。它們代表同一套作戰手冊在同一條曲線上的三個不同位置。

I'm proud of our teams for continuing to build for our customers at every stage. Our ambition from the very beginning has been to build an experience that wows customers so much that they ask themselves, how did I ever live without Coupang? Every item we add, every offering we build and every market we enter is another chance to build to that standard.

我為我們的團隊感到自豪，因為他們在每個階段都持續為客戶打造更好的體驗。從一開始，我們的企圖心就是打造一個讓客戶驚艷到會問自己：「沒有 Coupang 我以前是怎麼生活的？」的體驗。我們每新增一個品項、每打造一項服務、每進入一個市場，都是一次朝這個標準前進的機會。

With that, I'll turn the call over to Gaurav.

接下來，我把電話會議交給 Gaurav。

Thanks, Bom. Our Q2 results demonstrate a continuation of the momentum we started to see last quarter. Before I walk through the numbers, I should highlight two items that shape the reported numbers this quarter.

謝謝，Bom。我們第二季（Q2）的結果顯示，我們延續了上季開始看到的動能。在我帶大家看數字之前，我要先強調兩個會影響本季揭露數字的項目。

First, the Korean won weakened significantly versus the US dollar during the quarter, reaching its weakest level in more than 15 years. As a result, our reported growth rates in US dollars understate the underlying growth of our business and we believe it is especially important to evaluate our results on a constant currency basis this quarter.

第一，韓元在本季相對美元顯著走弱，跌至超過 15 年來的最低水準。因此，以美元呈現的我們報告成長率低估了業務的內生成長；我們認為本季特別重要的是以固定匯率（constant currency）基礎來評估我們的表現。

Second, our Product Commerce results this quarter include $410 million in administrative fines recently imposed by Korean regulatory authorities. While these fines are still subject to judicial review and we plan to appeal them through the courts, we recorded the expense this quarter within OG&A in the P&L. Where relevant, I'll explain our results both with and without the fines.

第二，本季我們的產品商務（Product Commerce）業績包含韓國監管機關近期裁處的4.10億美元行政罰鍰。雖然這些罰鍰仍須接受司法審查，且我們計畫透過法院提出上訴，但我們已於本季在損益表（P&L）的OG&A中認列該項費用。在適用之處，我將同時說明包含與不包含該罰鍰的業績表現。

Let me now walk through the segment results and then cover our consolidated performance.

接下來我將先說明各事業部門的業績，然後再談合併層級的表現。

Product Commerce segment net revenues were $7.4 billion for the quarter, growing 1% on a reported basis and 8% in constant currency. This represents a sequential improvement from the 5% constant currency growth rate we reported last quarter.

本季產品商務部門淨營收為74億美元，按報告基礎年增1%，按固定匯率年增8%。相較於我們上季所報告的固定匯率5%成長率，這代表連續季度表現有所改善。

Product Commerce active customers for the quarter were 24.7 million, growing 3% year over year and up from 23.9 million last quarter. As we noted, the sequential decline last quarter reflected the lag effect of the data incident on our trailing three-month active customer definition. This quarter, we saw the dynamic reverse driven by the number of returning customers and new customer additions. And as Bom noted, WOW memberships now exceeds the level we saw prior to the data incident and returning members are spending today at higher levels than they did before the incident and increasing their spend at similar high rates as prior to the incident.

本季產品商務活躍客戶數為2,470萬，年增3%，亦較上季的2,390萬增加。如我們先前所提，上季的連續季度下滑反映了資料事件對我們「過去三個月活躍客戶」定義的滯後影響。本季在回流客戶數與新增客戶帶動下，我們看到此一動態出現反轉。此外，如Bom所提，WOW會員數現已超過資料事件發生前的水準，且回流會員目前的消費金額高於事件前，並以與事件前相近的高成長率持續提升其消費。

Product Commerce gross profit for the quarter was $2.3 billion with a gross profit margin of 30.5%. This represents a contraction of approximately 210 basis points year over year but an improvement of 25 basis points quarter over quarter. The year-over-year contraction is driven primarily by supply chain headwinds and temporarily elevated levels of promotional activities to accelerate customer re-acquisition.

本季產品商務毛利為23億美元，毛利率為30.5%。這較去年同期約收縮210個基點，但較上季改善25個基點。年對年收縮主要由供應鏈逆風，以及為加速客戶重新獲取而短期提高促銷活動水準所致。

Segment adjusted EBITDA for Product Commerce was $382 million for the quarter, which excludes the fines I mentioned earlier, resulting in an adjusted EBITDA margin of 5.1%. This represents a contraction of approximately 390 basis points year over year, resulting from the gross profit margins impact I just described as well as the headwinds from our current capacity and fixed cost structure built against a pre-incident demand curve.

本季產品商務部門調整後EBITDA為3.82億美元（不含我先前提及的罰鍰），調整後EBITDA利潤率為5.1%。這較去年同期約收縮390個基點，原因在於我剛才所述的毛利率影響，以及我們目前的產能與固定成本結構係依資料事件前的需求曲線所建置，因而帶來的逆風。

We believe the margin pressure we are experiencing to be relatively short term in nature and not representative of a structural change. Our conviction of the drivers of our long-term margin expansion potential, operational efficiencies, supply chain optimization, continued investment in automation and technology and the scaling of our margin-accretive categories and offerings remains firmly in place.

我們認為目前所承受的利潤率壓力屬相對短期性質，並不代表結構性改變。我們對長期利潤率擴張潛力的驅動因素仍具高度信心，包括營運效率、供應鏈最佳化、持續投資自動化與科技，以及擴大具提升利潤率效益的品類與服務規模。

Within Developing Offerings, we reported segment net revenue of $1.4 billion growing 20% on a reported basis and 24% in constant currency. Growth continues to be led by Taiwan, Eats and Farfetch driven by increasing levels of customer adoption of these emerging initiatives. Developing Offerings generated $226 million in gross profit for the quarter with a gross profit margin of 15.8%, expanding both year over year and quarter over quarter as these offerings continue to demonstrate the path to sustainable economics.

在「發展中業務（Developing Offerings）」方面，我們本季部門淨營收為14億美元，按報告基礎年增20%，按固定匯率年增24%。成長持續由台灣、Eats與Farfetch帶動，主要受惠於客戶對這些新興計畫的採用程度提升。發展中業務本季毛利為2.26億美元，毛利率為15.8%，年對年與季對季皆擴張，顯示這些業務持續展現通往可持續經濟效益的路徑。

Segment adjusted EBITDA losses were $219 million, an improvement of $110 million versus last quarter and over 440 basis points of margin improvement over last year. At the consolidated level, we reported total net revenues of $8.9 billion for the quarter, growing 4% on a reported basis and 10% in constant currency. This is in line with the constant currency growth range we guided to last quarter.

部門調整後EBITDA虧損為2.19億美元，較上季改善1.10億美元，且較去年同期利潤率改善超過440個基點。在合併層級，本季總淨營收為89億美元，按報告基礎年增4%，按固定匯率年增10%。此與我們上季所提供的固定匯率成長指引區間一致。

Consolidated gross profit was $2.5 billion with a gross profit margin of 28.2%. This represents a contraction of 188 basis points year over year, but an expansion of 115 basis points quarter over quarter. As with Product Commerce, the year-over-year margin compression continues to reflect the near-term headwinds we have discussed.

合併毛利為25億美元，毛利率為28.2%。這較去年同期收縮188個基點，但較上季擴張115個基點。與產品商務相同，年對年毛利率壓縮仍反映我們先前討論的短期逆風。

OG&A expense was $3.1 billion for the quarter or 34.4% of total net revenues, representing an increase of approximately 610 basis points year over year. Excluding the $410 million in fines, OG&A expense was approximately $2.6 billion or 29.8% of total net revenues, an increase of approximately 150 basis points year over year and down slightly quarter over quarter.

本季OG&A費用為31億美元，占總淨營收34.4%，年對年增加約610個基點。若排除4.10億美元罰鍰，OG&A費用約為26億美元，占總淨營收29.8%，年對年增加約150個基點，且較上季略為下降。

This underlying year-over-year increase primarily reflects temporarily elevated marketing spend, our continued investments in Developing Offerings and a cost-based position against an expected demand curve from prior to the data incident. We view the elevated marketing and promotional spend as a deliberate near-term investment to accelerate growth, not a structural change in our cost base.

此一基礎性的年對年增加，主要反映短期提高的行銷支出、我們對發展中業務的持續投資，以及相對於資料事件前預期需求曲線所形成的成本結構定位。我們將較高的行銷與促銷支出視為加速成長的刻意短期投資，而非成本基礎的結構性改變。

Operating loss for the quarter was $556 million. Excluding the fines, the adjusted operating loss was approximately $146 million, representing a quarter-over-quarter improvement and an operating loss margin of approximately 120 basis points. Loss before income taxes was $533 million or $123 million, excluding the fines.

本季營業損失為5.56億美元。若排除罰鍰，調整後營業損失約為1.46億美元，較上季改善，營業損失率約為120個基點。所得稅前損失為5.33億美元；若排除罰鍰則為1.23億美元。

We incurred income tax expense of $37 million this quarter. Our tax dynamics continue to reflect the fact that losses in early stage operations in Taiwan and Japan do not generate an offsetting tax benefits at the consolidated level. In addition, the fines recorded this quarter are not deductible for tax purposes in Korea, which further impacted our reported effective tax rate this quarter.

本季我們認列所得稅費用3,700萬美元。我們的稅務動態仍反映一項事實：台灣與日本早期階段營運的虧損，在合併層級無法產生相對應的稅務利益抵減。此外，本季認列的罰鍰在韓國不得作為稅前扣除，亦進一步影響本季所報告的有效稅率。

Net loss attributable to Coupang's stockholders was $570 million or approximately $160 million, excluding the fines. This resulted in a diluted loss per share of $0.32 or approximately $0.09, excluding the fines. We generated $163 million in consolidated adjusted EBITDA this quarter, which excludes the $410 million in fines recorded this quarter resulting in an adjusted EBITDA margin of 1.8%. This represents a contraction of approximately 320 basis points year over year at the low end of the guidance range we provided.

歸屬於Coupang股東的淨損為5.70億美元；若排除罰鍰則約為1.60億美元。因此，稀釋後每股虧損為0.32美元；若排除罰鍰則約為0.09美元。本季我們產生合併調整後EBITDA為1.63億美元（不含本季認列的4.10億美元罰鍰），調整後EBITDA利潤率為1.8%。這較去年同期約收縮320個基點，位於我們所提供指引區間的低端。

The vast majority of this year-over-year contraction is attributable to three temporary items: supply chain dislocation, elevated levels of marketing investments, our primary fixed cost base size to a pre-incident demand curve each of which we expect to work through over the next few quarters.

這項年對年收縮的絕大部分可歸因於三個暫時性因素：供應鏈失序、較高水準的行銷投資，以及我們主要固定成本基礎係依資料事件前的需求曲線所設定；我們預期這些因素將在未來幾季逐步消化。

On cash flow, on a trailing 12-month basis, we generated operating cash flow of $1.4 billion and free cash flow of $105 million. The decreases versus prior periods reflect the lower profitability resulting from the data incident, increased level of investment in Developing Offerings and elevated levels of capital expenditures.

就現金流而言，以過去12個月計算，我們產生營運現金流14億美元，自由現金流1.05億美元。相較於先前期間的下降，反映資料事件導致獲利能力降低、對發展中業務的投資水準提高，以及資本支出增加。

During the quarter, we repurchased an additional 23 million shares of our Class A common stock for approximately $459 million. We continue to be opportunistic in our capital allocation as we identify opportunities to generate long-term returns for our shareholders.

本季期間內，我們額外回購2,300萬股A類普通股，金額約4.59億美元。在資本配置方面，我們將持續把握機會，於辨識到可為股東創造長期報酬的機會時採取行動。

Now a few comments on our outlook. We expect Q3 consolidated constant currency revenue growth to be 8% to 9%. With the year-over-year comparison pressured by the timing of the Chuseok holiday season in Korea, which negatively impacts Q3 of this year compared to Q3 of the prior year. As Bom indicated, excluding the portion of customers that left during the data incident period and not yet returned, we are seeing growth in customer spend at 16% year over year.

接著就我們的展望補充幾點。我們預期第三季合併固定匯率營收成長為8%至9%。年對年比較將受到韓國中秋（Chuseok）連假時點影響，使今年第三季相較去年第三季呈現不利影響。如Bom所指出，若排除在資料事件期間流失且尚未回流的那部分客戶，我們觀察到客戶消費金額年增16%。

After we fully lap the affected periods in Q2 next year, the cohort that has not returned will no longer be in our year-over-year comparison. And we expect the spend growth rates of Product Commerce to reflect the spend growth rates of the underlying customer base.

在明年第二季我們完全跨過受影響的期間後，尚未回流的那一批客群將不再納入我們的年對年比較。而我們預期，產品商務（Product Commerce）的支出成長率將反映其底層客戶基礎的支出成長率。

On margins, we expect underlying improvements in Product Commerce to continue their progress in Q3. However, we expect these to be offset by higher weather-related seasonality and the timing of Chuseok holiday that is different from last year. As a result, despite our expectation of making meaningful improvements in the underlying drivers we noted this quarter, we anticipate consolidated year-over-year adjusted EBITDA margin contraction in Q3 of 300 to 400 basis points, similar to the contraction we guided to for Q2.

在利潤率方面，我們預期產品商務的基本面改善將在第三季持續推進。然而，我們預期這些改善將被較高的天候相關季節性因素，以及中秋（Chuseok）假期時點與去年不同所抵銷。因此，儘管我們預期本季所提到的基本面驅動因素將有顯著改善，我們仍預估第三季合併口徑的年對年調整後 EBITDA 利潤率將收縮 300 至 400 個基點，與我們對第二季所給出的收縮指引相近。

Looking beyond Q3, we expect the improvements to become increasingly more evident with Product Commerce adjusted EBITDA margins by mid-2027 returning to margin levels approximating those we generated prior to the data incident. We plan to provide more detailed guidance on the 2027 margin expectations towards the end of this year.

展望第三季之後，我們預期改善將愈發明顯，並且產品商務的調整後 EBITDA 利潤率將在 2027 年年中回到接近資料事件發生前我們所創造的利潤率水準。我們計畫在今年年底前後，提供更詳細的 2027 年利潤率展望指引。

We continue to estimate full-year Developing Offerings adjusted EBITDA losses of between $950 million and $1 billion. The largest contributor of the Developing Offering losses this year remains the long-term investments we are making into building our retail offering in Taiwan. As always, our investment in Developing Offerings is anchored by our commitment to rigorous analysis, operational excellence and disciplined capital allocation.

我們仍估計全年「開發中業務」（Developing Offerings）的調整後 EBITDA 虧損介於 9.5 億至 10 億美元之間。今年開發中業務虧損的最大來源，仍是我們為在台灣打造零售業務所進行的長期投資。一如既往，我們對開發中業務的投資以嚴謹分析、卓越營運與紀律性的資本配置承諾為依歸。

Operator, we are now ready to begin the Q&A.

接線員，我們現在準備開始問答環節。

(Operator Instructions) Stanley Yang, JPMorgan.

(接線員指示) JPMorgan 的 Stanley Yang。

I have two questions. First, on the margin guidance, I couldn't hear very clearly about this new point. But did you guide your EBITDA margin of the Product Commerce will recover to 2025 level in 2027? Can you confirm that? And if that is the case, what will be the major margin expansion drivers? And related to this margin outlook, have you seen a more competitive environment, post-data accidents that caused cost pressure? That was my first question.

我有兩個問題。第一個，關於利潤率指引，我沒有聽得很清楚這個新重點。但你們是否指引產品商務的 EBITDA 利潤率將在 2027 年回到 2025 年的水準？可以確認一下嗎？如果是的話，主要的利潤率擴張驅動因素會是什麼？以及與這個利潤率展望相關，你們是否看到在資料事故之後競爭環境更激烈、導致成本壓力？這是我的第一個問題。

And my second question is about this Taiwan. So do you have any visibility into a potential structural decline in [developed offering] in Taiwan over time? If so what will be the major drivers?

第二個問題是關於台灣。你們是否能看見台灣的[開發中業務]隨時間出現結構性下滑的可能性？如果有，主要驅動因素會是什麼？

Yeah. Thanks for your question, Stanley. Yeah, we did guide that we'll recover our margins by middle of 2027. Specifically in Q3, we guided that the underlying drivers of our margin are improving. Some of the drivers haven't fully recovered yet and won't require until next year because of the scale, but we are on trend to benefit from high utilization as the volume grows.

是的。謝謝你的問題，Stanley。是的，我們確實指引將在 2027 年年中恢復我們的利潤率。具體到第三季，我們指引利潤率的基本面驅動因素正在改善。其中一些驅動因素尚未完全恢復，且因規模因素要到明年才會恢復，但隨著量能成長，我們正朝著受益於高利用率的趨勢前進。

Second, in the projected numbers for Q2, this progress is for Q3. This progress is masked by holidays, timing and seasonal cost patterns which is why we guided 300 to 400 basis points of year-over-year contraction similar to Q2. (multiple speakers)

第二點，在第二季的預測數字中，這個進展是針對第三季的。這個進展被假期時點與季節性成本型態所掩蓋，因此我們指引年對年收縮 300 至 400 個基點，與第二季相近。(多位講者)

Go ahead.

請繼續。

Beyond Q3, the improvement will become increasingly evident in the reported numbers as we expect this Product Commerce margin to return to approximately pre-incident levels by mid-'27. And we'll provide a retail guidance towards the end of the year.

第三季之後，隨著我們預期產品商務利潤率在 2027 年年中回到約略事件前水準，改善將在已揭露的數字中愈發明顯。我們會在年底前後提供零售方面的指引。

The reason for our confidence is that nothing has structurally changed. The pressure is from some temporary items that we chose to carry rather than cut and trade away the customer experience. We have also seen this play out before. Coming out of COVID, a sudden shift in demand pressured margins the same way and the same discipline brought them back.

我們之所以有信心，是因為結構上沒有任何改變。壓力來自一些我們選擇承擔、而非削減並以犧牲客戶體驗作為交換的暫時性項目。我們也曾見過這種情況。在 COVID 之後，需求突然轉變以同樣方式壓縮了利潤率，而同樣的紀律也讓利潤率回升。

Yeah. So just to quickly touch on that a little bit. Yes, Stanley, we have guided margins to recover fully in 2027. The drivers of that margin expansion are the opposite of what led to the compression.

是的。我快速補充一下。是的，Stanley，我們已指引利潤率將在 2027 年完全恢復。利潤率擴張的驅動因素，正好與導致壓縮的因素相反。

The compression -- the large majority of the compression traces back to volume coming in softer than our demand trajectory. As Gaurav mentioned, we run a business with very tight execution. And so when demand deviates meaningfully below that trajectory, we get capacity stranded -- being stranded and we miss out on some of the volume-based savings that affect our economics. All of that is reversible and it's not structural, but the bulk of it is mechanical, and we expect to recover it in 2027.

利潤率壓縮——絕大多數的壓縮可追溯至量能表現低於我們的需求軌跡。如 Gaurav 所提，我們的業務執行非常精準。因此，當需求明顯偏離並低於該軌跡時，我們會出現產能閒置——產能被閒置，且我們無法取得一些基於量能的節省，進而影響我們的經濟性。這些都是可逆的，並非結構性問題；但其中大部分是機械性的，我們預期在 2027 年恢復。

We have seen more elevated competitive activities. But the -- we think the past year has given us an unusually direct test. Customers who paused during the incident had a lot of time to try alternatives, months trial alternatives. And when they came back, and most of them did, they came back, not splitting their prior spend with us. They're back, as Gaurav mentioned, spending at the highest levels ever and growing that spend now as fast as they did before.

我們確實看到競爭活動更為升溫。但我們認為，過去一年給了我們一次異常直接的測試。在事件期間暫停使用的客戶有很多時間去嘗試替代方案，試用替代方案長達數月。而當他們回來時——而且大多數人都回來了——他們回來後並沒有把先前在我們這裡的支出拆分給其他平台。他們回來了，如 Gaurav 所說，支出達到史上最高水準，且目前支出成長速度與之前一樣快。

We also have membership now, an all-time high. And as customers who never left are also spending at record levels growing as fast as they did before. So we feel very confident about the position that our service -- the value proposition that we're providing for our customers. And we'll keep focusing on widening the experience gap with broader selection, lower prices and faster service.

我們的會員數也創下歷史新高。而從未離開的客戶同樣以創紀錄的水準消費，成長速度也與之前一樣快。因此，我們對自身服務的定位——也就是我們為客戶提供的價值主張——非常有信心。我們將持續透過更廣的選擇、更低的價格與更快的服務，專注於擴大體驗差距。

On Developing Offerings, the economics of our -- I think we've typically talked about Developing Offerings as a whole. Taiwan is a big part of it. As I mentioned earlier, Eats has really come full circle and completed the cycle. We're talking about Taiwan, which is in the middle of that cycle. It's on the same curve that Korea is on just earlier. And the economics there reflects the stage of the build out that it's at. And its priority right now is building that foundation for durable growth and economics at scale.

關於開發中業務，其經濟性——我想我們通常是把開發中業務作為整體來談。台灣是其中很大的一部分。如我先前提到，Eats 已經走完一整個循環並完成該週期。我們談到的台灣，正處於該週期的中段。它走在與韓國相同的曲線上，只是處於更早期。當地的經濟性反映了其目前建置（build out）所處的階段。而它目前的優先事項，是建立可支撐長期成長與規模化經濟性的基礎。

And we're encouraged by the signals we look for and customer behavior and response that we invest behind. And our guidance for Developing Offerings, we typically provide at the end of the year. So we look forward to sharing that with you later this year.

我們也受到我們所關注的訊號所鼓舞，包括客戶行為與回應，而我們也會據此加大投資。至於開發中業務的指引，我們通常在年底提供。因此，我們期待在今年稍晚與你分享。

Eric Cha, Goldman Sachs.

Goldman Sachs 的 Eric Cha。

I have two questions also related to the guidance you provided today. So first, the first question is on -- actually your commentary around the Product Commerce revenue growth. I think you mentioned that without the WOW members that have left the spending growth was about 16%, which compares to the 8% growth on a reported basis as a whole. Just wanted to understand the gap between these two numbers.

我也有兩個問題，與你們今天提供的指引相關。第一個問題是——其實是關於你們對產品商務營收成長的評論。我想你們提到，若不計已離開的 WOW 會員，支出成長約為 16%，而整體在已揭露口徑下的成長為 8%。我想了解這兩個數字之間的差距原因。

I think you mentioned that the people that have left are minority. So it does seem like this minority seems to have a bit of an outsized impact. So I just wanted to just get a sense why the gap seems a bit large.

我想你提到離開的人是少數。所以看起來這個少數族群似乎產生了有點不成比例的影響。因此我只是想了解一下，為什麼這個落差看起來會有點大。

And also, when we head into the fourth quarter, obviously, we'll be lapping a quarter where it's post the incident. So given that you mentioned that the existing WOW members are growing at 16% level, can we expect a meaningful step-up in growth by the time we reach fourth quarter this year? So that's my first question.

另外，當我們進入第四季時，很明顯我們將會與一個事件發生後的季度進行同比比較（lap）。所以鑑於你提到現有 WOW 會員以 16% 的水準成長，等到今年第四季時，我們是否可以期待成長出現有意義的上升？這是我的第一個問題。

The second question relates to the margin. And I think as Stanley mentioned, you commented that the margin will be down 300 to 400 bps year over year. Does that include your sort of expectation around a material impact or some impact from the fire incident as I believe it does cause a bit of efficiencies around logistics. So I was just wondering how much of that was baked into the guidance?

第二個問題與毛利率有關。我想如 Stanley 所提到的，你評論毛利率將年減 300 到 400 個基點。這是否包含你對火災事件帶來重大影響或某種影響的預期？因為我相信它確實會在物流方面造成一些效率影響。所以我想知道，這當中有多少已經反映在指引裡？

And also, you mentioned the margin will be fully recovered by midpoint next year. Just wanted to understand the cadence of that improvement, I'm not sure how you will answer the first question, but if by fourth quarter, we do have a bit of an improvement in the year over year for the top line, can we expect a bit of a step-up in the fourth quarter, seeing the evidence of that sort of reversal kicking in?

另外，你提到毛利率將在明年年中前完全恢復。我想了解改善的節奏；我不確定你會如何回答第一個問題，但如果到第四季，我們的營收同比在頂線上確實有些改善，我們是否可以期待第四季毛利率也會有些上升，看到那種反轉開始發生的證據？

So largely sort of a linear fashion, I know you mentioned linear is not the way you see. But moving from 5% margin to probably around 8% margin for PC, Product Commerce margin, should we expect a step-up in fourth quarter and then continuously move up to the 8% level? Or do we expect rather compressed level and then step up in the midpoint next year to around 8% level? Just wanted to get color around that.

所以大致上以線性的方式——我知道你提到你不認為會是線性。但若 PC（Product Commerce）毛利率從 5% 走到大約 8%，我們是否應該預期第四季會先上升一步，然後持續往 8% 水準走？或者我們會先維持在較受壓縮的水準，然後在明年年中再跳升到約 8%？只是想請你提供一些看法。

Eric, thanks for your question. For clarification, the data incident was closer to the end of Q4 which began in the end of Q4, and the affected period extended into part of Q1, actually most of Q1. So I think that's one point of clarification.

Eric，謝謝你的提問。先澄清一下，資料事件更接近第四季末發生，實際上是在第四季末開始，而受影響期間延伸到第一季的一部分，實際上是第一季的大部分。所以我想這是第一點澄清。

The cleanest way to understand the picture is, as I mentioned, to set aside that small group that's still missing. The customers who left during that period and haven't yet come back, everyone else is growing at about 16% year over year. As I mentioned, that's close to the right Product Commerce was compounding before the incident. And there are three groups that make up that 16%, all of whom are healthy.

理解整體情況最清楚的方式是，如我所提到的，先把那一小群仍然缺席的人先放一邊。在那段期間離開且尚未回來的客戶之外，其他所有客戶的年增率約為 16%。如我所說，這接近事件發生前 Product Commerce 的複合成長水準。而這 16% 由三個族群構成，三者都很健康。

The largest is customers who never left, they're spending more with us than at any point in our history, compounding at their old pace. Second group is a group that left came back. As I mentioned, they came back, are spending now at record levels. And they represent an even larger share of spend that left because the returnees skewed towards the higher spenders. And now spending at record levels growing faster than they did -- as fast as they did before the incident.

最大的一群是從未離開的客戶，他們在我們這裡的消費高於我們歷史上任何時點，並以原本的速度持續複合成長。第二群是離開後又回來的客戶。如我所提到的，他們回來後，目前的消費也達到創紀錄水準。而且他們在離開的消費占比中代表更大的份額，因為回流者偏向高消費客群。而且現在以創紀錄水準消費，成長速度比他們——與事件發生前一樣快。

And the third is new customers who are joining us actually even faster than they did before the incident. So the gap, as you point out, is between -- the 16% and the reported 8% is primarily driven by that small group of lower spending customers who haven't returned yet. There is, of course, this factor of spend growth outpacing revenue growth as well. But really, the vast -- the majority of that gap is really driven by that small group that is in the [base] of the year-over-year comp and is really distorting or obscuring the growth rate of the underlying customer base, the customers who are with us.

第三群是新客戶，他們加入我們的速度其實比事件發生前更快。所以如你所指出的，16% 與報告的 8% 之間的落差，主要是由那一小群尚未回來、且消費較低的客戶所造成。當然，也有消費成長快於營收成長的因素。但實際上，這個落差的絕大部分，確實是由那一小群在同比比較（year-over-year comp）基期中的客戶所驅動，並且真的扭曲或遮蔽了我們底層客戶群——也就是仍與我們往來的客戶——的成長率。

As I mentioned, next year, the mechanics work as such -- as we outpace -- as we lap the period, the group that still haven't returned to us hasn't -- won't have returned to us by that point, will drop out of our year-over-year comp base. And so this Product Commerce spend growth naturally converges to the spend growth of the customers who are with us, our customer base at that point, which will be then compared against a comp base that no longer includes that missing cohort. So hopefully, that mechanics -- the mechanics of that are clear.

如我所提到的，明年的運作機制是這樣——當我們進行同比比較並跨過（lap）那段期間時，那群仍未回來的客戶在那個時間點也不會回來，將會從我們的同比比較基期中剔除。因此，Product Commerce 的消費成長會自然收斂到當時仍與我們往來的客戶（也就是我們的客戶基礎）的消費成長率，並且是相對於一個不再包含那個缺席族群的比較基期。希望這個機制——其運作方式——是清楚的。

And as to your point -- to your question of how that reflects in our growth rate, as you might imagine, we had varying levels of disruption that began at the end of Q4 that extended into Q1 after we fully lap that effective period. Or as we lap that period, you might see some of the [apps] and customers drop out of the base, but you'll see the full effect of that after we fully lapped the effective period.

至於你提到——你問到這如何反映在我們的成長率上，如你所想像的，我們在第四季末開始出現不同程度的干擾，並延伸到第一季；在我們完全跨過那段受影響期間之後。或者當我們跨過那段期間時，你可能會看到部分 [apps] 與客戶從基期中退出，但在我們完全跨過受影響期間後，你會看到其完整效果。

Yeah, Eric, let me take your question on the margins. We highlighted that the margin contraction were primarily driven by the supply chain headwinds, alleviated levels of marketing activities to reaccelerate -- or accelerate the customer acquisition and the headwinds from our current capacity and fixed cost structure built against the pre-incident demand curve. So we expect to make meaningful progress in mitigating these impacts over the next several quarters, including in Q3. But Q3 has this specific timing issue of holidays and seasonal cost patterns.

是的，Eric，我來回答你關於毛利率的問題。我們強調毛利率收縮主要由供應鏈逆風所驅動、為了重新加速——或加快——客戶獲取而提高的行銷活動水準，以及我們目前的產能與固定成本結構是依事件前的需求曲線所建置而帶來的逆風。因此，我們預期在接下來幾個季度（包括第三季）在緩解這些影響方面會取得有意義的進展。但第三季有一個與假期及季節性成本型態相關的特定時間點問題。

The whole margin stepdown and recovery is driven by our volumes that came in softer than our planned trajectory since the incident. The mechanics going forward are clear. As the demand rebuilds capacity and fixed cost utilization come back into balance and the volume-based supply chain savings that we are missing this year come back and the incremental marketing we have deliberately deployed this year begins to normalize.

整體毛利率下滑與恢復，都是由於事件發生後，我們的量（volumes）比原先規劃的軌跡更疲弱所致。往後的運作機制很清楚。隨著需求回升，產能與固定成本的使用率會回到平衡；而我們今年缺少的、以量為基礎的供應鏈節省將會回來；以及我們今年刻意投入的額外行銷也會開始正常化。

So as you also pointed out, it may not be linear or at least we're not forecasting or giving any guidance on that, but we are confident that we'll -- we should be able to make the whole recovery.

所以如你也指出的，這可能不會是線性的，至少我們不會對此做預測或提供任何指引，但我們有信心我們——應該能夠完成整體的恢復。

Seyon Park, Morgan Stanley.

Seyon Park，Morgan Stanley。

I'll ask a question on Developing Offering. I think there was many questions asked on Product Commerce margins already, so I'll skip that.

我想問一個關於 Developing Offering 的問題。我想關於 Product Commerce 毛利率已經有很多問題了，所以我就略過。

But just on -- first of all, on the Developing Offerings, you did see the losses narrow meaningfully in the second quarter. Can you maybe provide us a little bit of context as to what part of the business saw lowered losses? And how we should think about the losses for the third quarter and the fourth quarter? That's my first question.

不過先談 Developing Offerings，你們確實看到第二季虧損明顯收斂。你能否提供一些背景，說明是哪一部分業務的虧損降低了？以及我們應該如何看待第三季與第四季的虧損？這是我的第一個問題。

Second question, I guess, is a little bit going beyond the core. A lot of talk about agentic AI and how AI could change how we purchase items online? And I know Coupang is already using a lot of AI especially for demand forecasting, delivery and the like. Does the company have plans to maybe utilize AI like from an agentic side of things, is that something that's kind of in one of the research pieces that we can kind of expect going forward? That's my second question.

第二個問題，我想是稍微超出核心業務。市場上有很多關於 agentic AI 的討論，以及 AI 可能如何改變我們在線上購買商品的方式？我知道 Coupang 已經大量使用 AI，特別是在需求預測、配送等方面。公司是否有計畫從 agentic 的角度來運用 AI？這是否是你們某個研究方向的一部分，讓我們未來可以期待？這是我的第二個問題。

Seyon, thanks for your question. On Developing Offering losses, as I mentioned, Taiwan is in the middle of that cycle. It is where we're primarily investing. I think I wouldn't read too much into investment levels quarter to quarter. We provide guidance on an annual basis. And as I mentioned, we currently remain in line with the full-year guidance we're providing for Developing Offerings. And we're still at a very exciting phase of building that foundation for both durable growth and economics.

Seyon，感謝你的提問。關於「開發中業務（Developing Offerings）」的虧損，如我先前提到的，台灣正處於該週期的中段。這也是我們主要投入資本的地方。我認為不需要過度解讀每一季之間投資水位的變化。我們是以年度為基礎提供指引。而如我所說，我們目前仍符合我們對開發中業務所提供的全年指引。我們仍處於一個非常令人振奮的階段，正在為可持續的成長與經濟效益奠定基礎。

In Korea, we saw the power of building that underlying infrastructure that really powers the quality of customer experience that leads to both compounding growth and attractive economics in the long term. We saw the benefits of that of building the network, the last-mile capability, the full supply chain, these things take time to build, but they compound for a very long time afterwards, as you've seen.

在韓國，我們看到了打造底層基礎設施的力量；這些基礎設施真正驅動了客戶體驗的品質，並在長期帶來複利式成長與具吸引力的經濟效益。我們看到了建置網路、最後一哩能力、完整供應鏈的好處；這些事情需要時間打造，但之後會在很長一段時間內持續累積效益，如你所見。

And the economics of Taiwan and the growth of Taiwan actually reflects the stage that we're at in the build-out. And again, I wouldn't -- the buildout is still under progress, and we don't manage to a quarter to quarter. We provided annual guidance. But we see that the build-out is happening in some ways, even faster in Taiwan than in Korea.

台灣的經濟效益與成長其實反映了我們目前在擴建（build-out）所處的階段。再說一次，我不會——擴建仍在進行中，我們不以季度到季度來管理。我們提供的是年度指引。但我們看到，在某些方面，台灣的擴建甚至比韓國更快。

As I mentioned, it took Korea four years of logistics build-out to reach Dawn Delivery. Taiwan has reached it in just one. We still have a lot of work to reach the quality of experience we're striving for. But Taiwan does benefit from over a decade of systems and operating processes that it's inheriting. And we invest -- we scale our investment as customers validate it, and we're especially encouraged by the cohort response that we're tracking.

如我提到的，韓國花了四年的物流擴建才達到「Dawn Delivery（清晨配送）」。台灣只用了一年就達成。我們仍有大量工作要做，才能達到我們追求的體驗品質。但台灣確實受益於其承接了超過十年的系統與營運流程。而我們會——在客戶驗證之後擴大投資規模，我們特別受到我們正在追蹤的同批次（cohort）回應所鼓舞。

The customer behavior we see in Taiwan at this stage looks very much like Product Commerce did in its early years. And that's the signal we invest behind. So we look forward to updating our guidance with you at the end of the year around Developing Offerings.

我們在台灣此階段看到的客戶行為，看起來非常像「產品電商（Product Commerce）」早期的樣貌。這就是我們加碼投資的訊號。因此，我們期待在年底就開發中業務與你更新我們的指引。

On AI, as you point out, we are already have already deployed AI in many parts of our business. It's already contributing across operations, fulfillment, logistics, supply chain, pricing, advertising, customer service. It's providing meaningful improvements in service levels and cost to serve where it's been deployed.

關於 AI，如你所指出的，我們已經在業務的許多環節部署了 AI。它已在營運、履約、物流、供應鏈、定價、廣告、客服等方面做出貢獻。在已部署的領域，它正為服務水準與單位服務成本帶來顯著改善。

We have customer-facing -- active investments on the customer-facing side as well, for example, in certain discovery where the industry's direction, we think is clear. And AI has the potential, as we've mentioned earlier, to really multiply the asset base that we have underneath it, the physical network, our operating assets or customer experience.

我們在面向客戶的一端也有——積極的投資，例如在某些探索/發現（discovery）場景上，我們認為產業方向很明確。而如我們先前提到的，AI 具有潛力去大幅放大我們底層的資產基礎——實體網路、營運資產或客戶體驗。

And we've already seen and will expect it to improve customer engagement and compound productivity and lower cost to serve and all the benefits that we've mentioned earlier, on margin-accretive offerings, we think it actually has the potential to expand the addressable market itself, the opportunity itself because we've seen signs of it being able to -- and we see the potential for it to raise the return of the merchant brand customers who use them.

我們已經看到，並且預期它將提升客戶互動、帶來複利式的生產力提升、降低單位服務成本，以及我們先前提到的所有好處；在具備提升毛利（margin-accretive）的產品/服務上，我們認為它甚至有潛力擴大可服務市場（addressable market）本身、也就是機會本身，因為我們已看到一些跡象顯示它能夠——並且我們也看到它有潛力提高使用這些工具的商家品牌客戶的投資報酬。

On the agentic AI part that you've brought up specifically, we think this is still a work in progress. We think the industry's direction or the -- it's not clear that the winning experience has emerged. But we're investing. We are investing in teams and the research, as you mentioned, to explore it while being thoughtful about it and investing with the same discipline that we do and all the other initiatives that we have on the exploration front.

至於你特別提到的「代理式 AI（agentic AI）」部分，我們認為這仍在進展中。我們認為產業方向或——目前尚不清楚最終勝出的體驗是否已經出現。但我們正在投資。如你所說，我們正在投資團隊與研究來探索，同時也會審慎評估，並以我們在其他所有計畫上同樣的紀律來投入探索性投資。

Whatever form agentic shopping takes, we believe we'll be in the best position to provide the winning experience, which we believe will combine AI with all the other aspects of customer experience to provide a complete and seamless buying experience that customers trust. And to build a complete and seamless buying experience, you need more than AI. AI is one input, but there are many other assets that will be part of it. And we believe we should be in a position to provide the best of all worlds on that front.

無論代理式購物最終以何種形式呈現，我們相信我們將處於最佳位置來提供勝出的體驗；我們認為那將把 AI 與客戶體驗的其他各個面向結合，提供客戶信任的完整且無縫的購買體驗。而要打造完整且無縫的購買體驗，你需要的不只是 AI。AI 只是其中一個投入要素，但還有許多其他資產也會是其中的一部分。我們相信在這方面，我們應該能夠提供各方面兼具的最佳組合。

So we'll continue to invest in exploring this opportunity thoughtfully. And when a winning approach emerges we'll be positioned to execute with the same operational excellence and capital discipline we apply everywhere else.

因此，我們會持續以審慎的方式投資探索這個機會。當勝出的做法浮現時，我們將能以同樣的營運卓越與資本紀律來執行，就像我們在其他所有領域所採用的一樣。

Yeah. Let me jump in. I had missed the question regarding fire impact in Q3 guidance. Let me address that -- from Eric, let me just address that.

好的。我插一句。我剛剛漏掉了關於第三季指引中火災影響的問題。我來回應——這是 Eric 的問題，我先回應一下。

Regarding the recent fire at one of our fulfillment centers in Korea in July, this fire has not had a significant impact on revenue generation or our ability to meet the customer demand, and nor do we expect significant disruption to our ability to meet the future customer demand. So while we experienced disruption at the affected facility, we have been leveraging the flexibility of our broader logistics network to continue serving customers.

關於 7 月韓國其中一座履約中心近期發生的火災，這起火災並未對營收產生重大影響，也未影響我們滿足客戶需求的能力；我們也不預期會對未來滿足客戶需求的能力造成重大干擾。因此，雖然受影響的設施出現中斷，我們一直在運用更廣泛物流網路的彈性來持續服務客戶。

It's still far too early for us to assess any financial impact that may result from the fire but we are working very closely with the relevant stakeholders to assess the level of damage to our assets. We currently estimate the total carrying value of our owned inventory and fixed assets at the facility prior to the fire, as well as our obligation to sellers relating to their inventory sold in the facility to be approximately $246 million.

目前要評估火災可能造成的任何財務影響仍為時過早，但我們正與相關利害關係人密切合作，以評估我們資產的受損程度。我們目前估計，火災發生前該設施內我們自有存貨與固定資產的總帳面價值，以及我們對賣家就其在該設施內所售存貨所承擔的義務，合計約為 2.46 億美元。

We maintain insurance coverage for fire and intend to pursue the available claims. So any losses associated with FLC fire and the corresponding insurance recoveries would be recognized in future quarters beginning in Q3.

我們有投保火災保險，並打算提出可用的理賠申請。因此，與 FLC 火災相關的任何損失及相對應的保險理賠回收，將自第三季起在未來季度認列。

And while we're on the note of addressing questions that we missed. I think I missed a question from Stanley about how competition has affected our marketing spend. And I want to quickly touch on that question.

另外，趁著我們在補答先前漏掉的問題。我想我漏掉了 Stanley 關於競爭如何影響我們行銷支出的問題。我想快速回應一下。

The step-up in marketing so far this year isn't a response to any competitive activity. It's primarily a onetime investment to accelerate reacquisition of customers after the exceptional event of the incident. It's deliberate, we plan to bring it back down next year. Nothing about our long-term approach around marketing has changed. We've always been disciplined on that front and focused on generating attractive returns on investment.

今年迄今行銷費用的增加並不是對任何競爭活動的回應。這主要是一筆一次性投資，用於在該事件這種特殊情況之後加速重新獲取客戶。這是刻意為之，我們計畫明年把它降回來。我們在行銷方面的長期做法沒有任何改變。我們一直在這方面保持紀律，並專注於產生具吸引力的投資報酬。

Jiong Shao, Barclays.

Jiong Shao，巴克萊（Barclays）。

Just so in the spirit of not making you miss another question, I'm going to ask one at a time, if that's okay.

為了避免讓你再漏掉問題，我會一次問一個，如果可以的話。

So the first question is on your Q3 revenue guidance. I mean, for Q2, your group revenue was up 10% year over year and PC revenue growth was up 8%. So there's a 2-point gap. So if [you] take your Q3 rev guide of 8% to 9% and the PC, the implied PC may be 6% to 7%, let's say. That's a deceleration of Q2.

第一個問題是關於你們第三季的營收指引。我的意思是，第二季你們集團營收年增 10%，而 PC 營收成長為 8%。所以中間有 2 個百分點的差距。因此如果按照你們第三季營收指引 8% 到 9%，以及 PC 的話，推算 PC 可能是 6% 到 7%，例如。這相較第二季是放緩的。

I know you talked about holiday cutting the shift. So I was wondering if you can [guesstimate] or give us some help on how to estimate the impact from that cutting the shift. Is there any estimate you can give us apple-to-apple comparison basis in terms of the Product Commerce growth? That's the first question.

我知道你提到假期導致班次調整。所以我想請問你們是否可以[粗略估算]，或給我們一些協助，說明該班次調整的影響該如何估算。就產品商務（Product Commerce）的成長而言，你們是否能提供任何在同口徑（apple-to-apple）基礎上的估計？這是第一個問題。

Thanks, Jiong, for the question. At this time, we are not giving estimates by a reason. But at a high level, there are a couple of factors impacting it. Our cohort strength exiting the quarter remains a growth strength for Product Commerce exiting the quarter remains really strong. So this is primarily a temporary calendarization impact and weather seasonal related impact, which we expect in Q3.

謝謝你，Jiong，提問。目前我們基於某些原因不提供相關估計。但從較高層次來看，有幾個因素正在影響。我們在季度末的客群（cohort）強度仍然是成長動能；季度末產品商務的成長動能依然非常強。因此這主要是暫時性的日曆因素影響，以及與天氣季節性相關的影響，我們預期會在第三季出現。

But getting into Q4 and Q1, we expect to see stronger growth as our customers who have left us as Bom was talking earlier, as we are starting to overlap those customers.

但進入第四季與第一季時，我們預期會看到更強的成長，因為如同Bom先前提到的，隨著我們開始與那些曾離開的客戶形成重疊（overlap），成長會轉強。

Yeah, I think the point to come to communicate clearly is that the underlying base we see continuing to grow very fast. As I mentioned, the underlying base grew 16% year over year. The customers are with us. We expect that trend to stay strong in Q3.

是的，我認為需要清楚傳達的一點是：我們看到的底層基本面仍在持續非常快速地成長。如我提到的，底層基本面年增16%。客戶仍然和我們在一起。我們預期這個趨勢在第三季仍會維持強勁。

And Q3 carries this added calendar effect that Gaurav mentioned, which is that the Chuseok holidays timing this year creates a headwind against last year's Q3. But underlying the trend of the headwind of the Q3 holidays timing, the seasonal timing as well as the absent cohort that creates that year over base -- year-over-year comp distortion, we think the -- we believe the underlying customer base will continue to compound at very strong rates in Q3 similar to what we saw this quarter.

而第三季還會承受Gaurav提到的額外日曆效應，也就是今年中秋（Chuseok）假期的時間點，相較去年第三季形成逆風。但在第三季假期時點的逆風之下，加上季節性時點以及缺失的客群所造成的年對年比較基期扭曲，我們認為——我們相信第三季底層客戶基礎仍將以非常強勁的速度持續複利成長，類似於本季所見。

And as I mentioned, also, the record while membership numbers -- the new members are really a leading indicator, they don't quite show up in the revenues, they show up on a lagging basis. And so you'll see that in future quarters and years to come. So the Q3 guidance isn't a reflection of the underlying growth. It's really a residual math of that one missing cohort and a holiday period shift this year.

另外如我提到的，會員數創新高——新會員其實是非常領先的指標，但不會立刻反映在營收上，而是會以落後的方式呈現。因此你們會在未來幾季與未來幾年看到它的反映。所以第三季的指引並不代表底層成長。它其實是那一個缺失客群與今年假期期間移轉所造成的剩餘數學結果。

Okay. Thank you for your comments. My second question is, I just want to confirm your margin guidance because all the drivers you talked about are reversing after the data leak. So I would imagine, when you talk about the margins in mid-'27 going back to the data leak incident applies to Product Commerce, not just to the group. I just want to confirm that point.

好的。謝謝你的說明。我的第二個問題是，我想確認你們的毛利率/利潤率指引，因為你們提到的所有驅動因素在資料外洩事件之後都在反轉。所以我想像，當你們談到到2027年年中利潤率回到資料外洩事件之前的水準時，這是適用於產品商務，而不只是集團層級。我想確認這一點。

That's correct. We're talking about margin recovery for Product Commerce next year.

沒錯。我們談的是明年產品商務的利潤率回升。

Okay. Perfect. Great. And my last question is also a follow-up to what you mentioned about that missing cohort.

好的。完美。很好。我最後一個問題也是針對你提到的那個缺失客群的追問。

So I was just wondering what may be some of the reasons you feel that this missing cohort may not come back to Coupang, given the obvious value we're providing to these consumers. Maybe tie into what's going on with the competitors are doing. Our competitors are adding more value to not only attract these cohorts appear to be keeping them for a bit longer than what we hope.

所以我想請問，你們認為這個缺失客群可能不會回到Coupang的一些原因是什麼？畢竟我們為這些消費者提供的價值很明顯。也許可以連結到競爭對手正在做什麼。我們的競爭對手正在增加更多價值，不僅是為了吸引這些客群，似乎也能把他們留住更久一些，超過我們所希望的時間。

Yeah, Jiong. It's difficult to say with absolute certainty why some customers haven't returned. But we think the data lets us rule some things out. And I don't think it's a change in the value proposition or a structural shift in the market. And I say that because when customers from this group come back even after months away, they return to their full prior spend levels and have grown from there.

是的，Jiong。很難以絕對確定的方式說明為什麼有些客戶尚未回來。但我們認為數據讓我們可以排除一些可能性。我不認為這是價值主張的改變，或市場出現結構性轉變。我這麼說是因為，當這一群客戶即使離開數個月後回來，他們會回到先前完整的消費水準，並在此基礎上繼續成長。

These returning customers, as I've mentioned, are now spending at record levels, growing as fast as they did before the incident. If the value proposition or the relative value proposition had weakened for them, that's not the behavior you'd see. We understand that there may be some leftover sentiment and trust factors in play for customers who have still not returned. And our plan is to keep earning their trust every day, keep winning them back over time.

如我提到的，這些回流客戶目前的支出已達到創紀錄水準，成長速度也和事件發生前一樣快。如果價值主張或相對價值主張對他們而言變弱了，你不會看到這樣的行為。我們理解，對於仍未回來的客戶，可能還存在一些殘留的情緒與信任因素在影響。我們的計畫是每天持續贏得他們的信任，並隨時間推移把他們逐步贏回來。

Wei Fang, Mizuho.

魏芳，瑞穗（Mizuho）。

I have one regarding your supply expansion in Taiwan. So we've seen some of the local Taiwan brands onboarding recently and particularly in those high-volume categories like pet supply, personal care, et cetera. I believe the success is part of your -- part of the drivers for your gross margin expansion in the quarter.

我有一個關於你們在台灣擴大供給的問題。我們最近看到一些台灣在地品牌上架，特別是在寵物用品、個人護理等高銷量品類。我相信這些成功是你們——是你們本季毛利率擴張的部分驅動因素。

I was wondering if management can comment on the pace of local brand onboarding, like, compared to your home country, Korea, at a similar stage of development. If possible, can you also help provide any like example so far in terms of Taiwan local brands onboarded?

我想請問管理層能否評論在地品牌上架的速度，例如與你們母國韓國在相似發展階段相比如何。如果可以的話，也請協助提供一些目前為止台灣在地品牌上架的例子。

Wei, we're such an early stage right now. The supplier adoption is following a trajectory similar to what we experienced during the early years in Korea. And that's been an encouraging sign. And expanding local selection is one of our top priorities, but we're very early in that journey.

Wei，我們目前仍處於非常早期的階段。供應商採用（supplier adoption）的軌跡與我們在韓國早期幾年的經驗相似。這是一個令人鼓舞的跡象。擴大在地選品是我們的首要任務之一，但我們在這段旅程上仍非常初期。

We're still at a fraction of the overall selection that we plan to get to that we will have at a later stage. And so while it's exciting, and we're making progress, we're still -- we're just getting started in building that out right now.

我們目前的選品規模仍只達到我們計畫在後期階段所要達到的整體選品的一小部分。因此雖然令人興奮、我們也在取得進展，但我們仍然——我們現在才剛開始把這件事建構起來。

This concludes today's conference call. Thank you, and you may now disconnect.

今天的電話會議到此結束。謝謝各位，現在可以掛線。