富蘭克林資源 (BEN) 2018 Q4 法說會逐字稿

Good morning, and welcome to Franklin Resources' earnings conference call for the quarter and fiscal year ended September 30, 2018. Please note that the financial results to be presented in this commentary are preliminary.

早安，歡迎參加富蘭克林資源公司（Franklin Resources）截至2018年9月30日之季度及會計年度盈餘電話會議。請注意，本次說明中將呈現的財務結果為初步數據。

Statements made in this conference call regarding Franklin Resources, Inc., which are not historical facts, are forward-looking statements within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. These forward-looking statements involve a number of known and unknown risks, uncertainties and other important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from any future results expressed or implied by such forward-looking statements.

本次電話會議中就富蘭克林資源公司（Franklin Resources, Inc.）所作、非屬歷史事實之陳述，均屬《1995年私人證券訴訟改革法》（Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995）所定義之「前瞻性陳述」。此等前瞻性陳述涉及多項已知與未知之風險、不確定性及其他重要因素，可能導致實際結果與該等前瞻性陳述所明示或暗示之任何未來結果存在重大差異。

These and other risks, uncertainties and other important factors are described in more detail in Franklin's recent filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission, including in the Risk Factors and MD&A sections of Franklin's most recent Form 10-K and 10-Q filings.

上述及其他風險、不確定性與其他重要因素，已在富蘭克林近期向美國證券交易委員會（SEC）提交之文件中更為詳盡地說明，包括富蘭克林最近一期Form 10-K與10-Q申報文件中的「風險因素」及「管理階層討論與分析（MD&A）」章節。

Good morning. My name is Donna, and I will be your conference operator today. (Operator Instructions) As a reminder, this conference is being recorded. At this time, I'd like to turn the call over to Franklin Resources' Chairman and CEO, Mr. Greg Johnson. Mr. Johnson, you may begin.

早安。我叫Donna，今天將擔任本次電話會議的接線員。（接線員指示）提醒各位，本次會議將被錄音。現在，我想將電話交給富蘭克林資源公司董事長兼執行長Greg Johnson先生。Johnson先生，請開始。

Well, good morning, and thank you for joining today's call to discuss fourth quarter and fiscal year results. This year marked a period of significant investment for the company as we reevaluated several facets of our business, continued to invest in ongoing strategic initiatives and expanded our capabilities.

各位早安，感謝各位參加今天的電話會議，一同討論第四季及會計年度的業績結果。今年對公司而言是大幅投資的一年，我們重新檢視了業務的多個面向，持續投入既有的策略性計畫，並擴充我們的能力。

These investments contributed to lower operating income this year, but we firmly believe we now have the appropriate organizational structures in place to meet evolving client needs. We also returned more than $3.5 billion to investors through dividends and buybacks in addition to that used for strategic acquisitions to enhance and expand our investment capabilities.

這些投資使得今年的營業利益下降，但我們堅信，我們如今已建立適當的組織架構，以因應客戶需求的演變。此外，除用於策略性併購以強化並擴大我們的投資能力之外，我們也透過股利與庫藏股回購向投資人返還超過35億美元。

Our heavy mix of value-style funds weighed on flows, but we're optimistic about our flagship product's performance moving forward as we've seen very strong performance in our key global macro and global equity funds into the quarter end and into October.

我們偏重價值型基金的產品組合對資金流向造成壓力，但我們對旗艦產品未來的表現仍持樂觀態度，因為我們看到在季末以及進入10月後，我們的主要全球總體（global macro）與全球股票基金表現非常強勁。

With me today is our CFO, Ken Lewis, and we also have some special guests here to discuss this morning's exciting acquisition announcement. I'd like to extend a warm welcome to Benefit Street Partners' Chief Executive Officer, Tom Gahan; and President, Rich Byrne. Tom is dialing in from BSP's offices in New York where he has been meeting with his team, and Rich is here with us in person in San Mateo.

今天與我一同出席的有我們的財務長Ken Lewis，另外也有幾位特別來賓，將就今早令人振奮的收購公告進行說明。我想熱烈歡迎Benefit Street Partners的執行長Tom Gahan，以及總裁Rich Byrne。Tom正在紐約BSP辦公室以電話連線，他一直在與團隊開會；Rich則親自來到加州聖馬刁（San Mateo）與我們同在現場。

Tom has been with BSP since the beginning and previously served as Chief Executive Officer of Deutsche Bank Securities and Head of Corporate and Investment Banking in the Americas. Rich also previously served as Deutsche Bank Securities -- at Deutsche Bank Securities in the capacity of Chief Executive Officer for a number of years. We're excited to welcome these talented people to our firm, and we hope you find their participation on today's call helpful.

Tom自BSP成立之初便加入，先前曾任德意志銀行證券（Deutsche Bank Securities）執行長，以及美洲地區企業與投資銀行業務主管。Rich先前也曾在德意志銀行證券任職——並以執行長身分服務多年。我們很高興歡迎這些優秀人才加入本公司，也希望各位覺得他們今天參與本次電話會議能帶來幫助。

I'd like to hand it over to Tom for some opening remarks.

接下來我想把時間交給Tom，請他先做一些開場說明。

Thanks, Greg. Rich and I are happy to join the call this morning to discuss the partnership we're building with Franklin Templeton. We both believe that Franklin will be the perfect long-term partner.

謝謝你，Greg。Rich和我很高興今天早上能加入電話會議，討論我們與富蘭克林坦伯頓（Franklin Templeton）正在建立的合作關係。我們都相信富蘭克林將會是最理想的長期合作夥伴。

I can tell you that on behalf of the entire BSP team, we're super excited to join this world-class global organization and combine our alternative credit products and investment capabilities with Franklin's tremendous investment platform.

我可以代表整個BSP團隊告訴各位，我們非常興奮能加入這個世界級的全球組織，並將我們的另類信貸產品與投資能力，與富蘭克林強大的投資平台結合。

We believe that this combination will serve to augment our investment capabilities, while accelerating our growth prospects. All 5 of our core strategies have significant and secular growth opportunities. We believe that the Franklin umbrella will improve our information flows, also expanding our origination capabilities.

我們相信，這項結合將有助於強化我們的投資能力，同時加速我們的成長前景。我們5項核心策略皆具備顯著且長期結構性的成長機會。我們也相信，在富蘭克林的體系之下，將改善我們的資訊流通，並擴大我們的案源開發（origination）能力。

In particular, we look forward to working with Franklin's global distribution platform to offer new products with extremely attractive risk-adjusted returns to their clients. In short, this is a win-win for our team, the combined platform and most importantly, our investors.

尤其是，我們期待與富蘭克林的全球銷售通路平台合作，向其客戶提供具備極具吸引力之風險調整後報酬的新產品。簡而言之，這對我們的團隊、合併後的平台，更重要的是對我們的投資人而言，都是雙贏。

In addition, Franklin's long history of successfully acquiring platforms, while maintaining the strength and independence of the investment processes, give us confidence that this will be a mutually beneficial endeavor. Our investment team and process will be unchanged, and the team has strong mutually aligned incentives to continue delivering best-in-class returns to our investor base. Our conservative investment style will mesh well with Franklin's focus on long-term value creation for investors.

此外，富蘭克林長期以來成功併購各類平台，同時維持投資流程的強度與獨立性，這讓我們有信心此舉將是互利的合作。我們的投資團隊與流程將維持不變，而團隊也具備高度一致的激勵機制，將持續為投資人提供同級最佳（best-in-class）的報酬。我們保守的投資風格，也將與富蘭克林著重為投資人創造長期價值的理念相契合。

In conclusion, we feel fortunate to be navigating the markets in future opportunities with Greg, Jenny and the entire Franklin team as our partner. Thank you.

最後，我們感到非常幸運，未來能與Greg、Jenny以及整個富蘭克林團隊作為夥伴，一同在市場中把握機會。謝謝。

Thanks, Tom. So with that, we'd like to open it up for your questions.

謝謝你，Tom。那麼接下來，我們想開放各位提問。

(Operator Instructions) Our first question is coming from Glenn Schorr of Evercore ISI.

（接線員指示）我們的第一個問題來自Evercore ISI的Glenn Schorr。

So I like Benefit Street and I like the space. There's -- never mind there's big concerns about too much growth in private credit. I think there's a big ramp if you do it right. So little more a question on what -- I get what Benefit Street brings to Franklin. Can we talk a little bit more about what Franklin brings to Benefit Street? Does it expand distribution and which parts of it? And this might be a stretch, but I know I've given you heat over the years of how you have this great retail fixed income platform but never really grew a big institutional platform. Could Benefit Street be a launching pad towards a bigger institutional public fixed income as well?

我喜歡Benefit Street，也喜歡這個領域。雖然——先不談市場對私募信貸成長過快的重大疑慮。我認為如果做得對，這裡有很大的加速成長空間。所以我想多問一點：我理解Benefit Street能為富蘭克林帶來什麼。我們能否多談談富蘭克林能為Benefit Street帶來什麼？是否能擴大銷售通路？會擴大哪些部分？另外這可能有點延伸，但我知道這些年我一直對你們提出質疑：你們有很棒的零售固定收益平台，但始終沒有真正做大機構平台。Benefit Street是否也可能成為邁向更大型機構端「公開市場」固定收益業務的跳板？

I'll take that. This is Greg. And I think the immediate opportunity for us, looking at our worldwide distribution network, the relationships we have with sovereign wealth funds around the globe, I would say that Benefit Street has been very successful growing with a relatively small distribution group and relied some on third-party distribution where we think this asset class, in this environment, with floating rate, first lien, more defensive characteristics is very attractive to institutions that are look -- concerned about rates, but need fixed income exposure. So we clearly see this as a growth opportunity where immediately, we can plug and play this with our institutional network and then explore the retail channel, whether it's a high net worth channel or looking at the type of interval funds or closed-end funds that could be attractive in the retail space. So we think there's immediate demand and opportunity for our distribution channels. And I'll turn it to Rich, if he has any additional comments.

我來回答。我是Greg。我認為對我們而言，最直接的機會在於我們的全球銷售網絡，以及我們與全球各地主權財富基金的關係。我會說，Benefit Street在相對精簡的銷售團隊下已非常成功地成長，並在一定程度上依賴第三方通路；而我們認為在目前這樣的環境下，這個資產類別具備浮動利率、第一順位擔保（first lien）以及更偏防禦性的特質，對於擔心利率變動但仍需要固定收益曝險的機構投資人而言非常具吸引力。因此我們清楚看到這是一個成長機會：我們可以立即把它與我們的機構通路網絡進行「即插即用」式的整合，接著再探索零售通路——不論是高淨值通路，或是評估在零售市場可能具吸引力的區間基金（interval funds）或封閉式基金（closed-end funds）等產品型態。所以我們認為，我們的通路在當下就有立即的需求與機會。我也把問題交給Rich，看看他是否有補充。

Sure, Greg. I think the way we think of it at Benefit Street is -- Franklin brings a lot of things. Tom mentioned some of them in his remarks, but it's pedigree, global reach, distribution, balance sheet and information flows. So if you think about it, we have a number of alternative strategies. We think they generate some really attractive risk-adjusted returns to the extent we can aid in our sourcing or information flow through the analysts at Franklin and all the other things that it brings -- that's great for our ability to deliver returns to our investors. But as far as delivering our products to a broader set of investors, our footprint on institutions, we've raised $26 billion over the 10 years that we've been around, but our footprint just isn't big enough and this deal comes at just the right time for us. And I would add, as you said, on the retail side, the only products that we have that really touch the retail market at all are our 2 permanent capital vehicles. We have a -- publicly filing but not listed BDC and mortgage REIT. And to the extent we can tap into the massive retail distribution here at Franklin, those are big growth areas as well.

好的，Greg。我想我們在Benefit Street的看法是——富蘭克林能帶來很多東西。Tom在他的發言中提到其中一些，包括品牌底蘊（pedigree）、全球觸及、通路、資產負債表以及資訊流。所以如果你這樣想，我們有多項另類策略。我們認為這些策略能產生相當具吸引力的風險調整後報酬；若我們能透過富蘭克林的分析師以及其所帶來的其他資源，提升我們的案源取得或資訊流通——這將非常有助於我們為投資人交付報酬的能力。但就把我們的產品提供給更廣泛的投資人而言、以及我們在機構端的覆蓋面，我們在成立的10年間募集了260億美元，但我們的觸及範圍仍不夠大，而這筆交易對我們而言正逢其時。另外我也補充，如你所說，在零售端，我們目前真正能觸及零售市場的產品，基本上只有兩個永久資本載體（permanent capital vehicles）。我們有一個——已公開申報但未上市的BDC（商業發展公司）以及一個房貸REIT。若我們能運用富蘭克林龐大的零售通路，這些也將是重要的成長領域。

And maybe Tom, you could expand on it. I think the institutional opportunity for us, we think this is the final piece, is having the full platform of credit available, and we're seeing more demand in the institutional space where you have mandates, where you can be tactical in moving between different categories?

或許 Tom，你可以再延伸說明一下。我認為我們在機構端的機會——我們覺得這是最後一塊拼圖——在於能提供完整的信貸平台；而我們也看到機構端的需求正在增加，因為你們有授權委託（mandates），可以在不同類別之間進行戰術性調整與配置？

Yes. No, I think, that's right. I mean, we're definitely seeing increased demand for the products that we manage. And we're seeing increased demand for effectively co-mingled structures that take combinations of what we do. Markets are always constantly changing and opportunities are constantly changing, and having that type of flexibility is becoming more and more important to our investor base.

是的。不，我想你說得沒錯。我的意思是，我們確實看到對我們所管理產品的需求增加。而且我們也看到對於實質上是「混合共管」（co-mingled）架構、把我們所做的不同策略組合在一起的需求上升。市場一直在變，機會也一直在變；具備那種彈性，對我們的投資人基礎而言正變得愈來愈重要。

Okay. And one final thing, anything you can tell us about performance? And it's going to sound ridiculous, but how do you know these guys are good? And what record are you looking at that you could show us over time?

好的。最後一點，你們能否談談績效表現？這聽起來可能很荒謬，但你怎麼知道這些人很厲害？你們在看的是什麼樣的歷史紀錄，能夠隨時間推移展示給我們？

Well, I think, we obviously did a lot of due diligence and looked at the records and also more importantly, we looked at the structures and downside protection. And I think that our first reaction like anybody is, "Hey, we're late in the credit cycle," and that was our first reaction in even my initial discussions. And the more we got to know the business that we think this is really in a great position to benefit from any dislocation. And we haven't talked about it, but it's not just private debt, it's distressed, it's long-short credit, it's high yield, it's other sectors that we think can do very well. And I think the important part of their business model is that the funds are more like private equity-type funds where you have -- you call on capital, there's dry powder there, you get market dislocations, you can have fresh powder to put into the market. That's different than the daily valuation, which has to sell as redemptions come in. So I think we looked at the defensive nature of how the assets are positioned and captive, and that was very attractive and also the lower leverage on the products versus the industry averages and the fact that this is one of the groups that has been doing it for a while since the global financial crisis. And you have a lot of new entrants kind of coming in now, and they've done it -- done very well through the entire cycle with less leverage than others.

嗯，我想我們顯然做了大量盡職調查，檢視了他們的紀錄；更重要的是，我們也看了架構設計與下行保護。我想我們的第一反應跟任何人一樣是：「嘿，我們已經處在信貸週期的後段了」，這也是我在最初討論時的第一反應。但我們愈了解這門業務，就愈覺得它其實處在一個很好的位置，能從任何市場錯位（dislocation）中受益。而且我們還沒談到的是，這不只是私募債；還包括困境投資（distressed）、多空信貸（long-short credit）、高收益（high yield）以及其他我們認為能表現很好的領域。我認為他們商業模式的重要部分在於，這些基金更像私募股權型基金：你會進行資本催繳（call on capital），有未動用資金（dry powder）；當市場出現錯位時，你就有新的火力可以投入市場。這不同於每日估值的產品，因為一旦有贖回進來就必須賣出資產。所以我想我們看重的是資產配置方式的防禦性、以及資產的鎖定性（captive），這非常有吸引力；另外，產品槓桿也低於產業平均，再加上這是一個自全球金融危機以來就一直在做這件事的團隊。現在有很多新進者才剛進來，而他們在整個週期中、以比別人更低的槓桿，做得——做得非常好。

Our next question is coming from Robert Lee of KBW.

下一個問題來自 KBW 的 Robert Lee。

Can you maybe like drill into the Benefit Street a  little bit more? If I'm reading it correctly, you're -- financially, you're only buying the management fee stream, you're not buying the incentive fee stream. And any color you have kind of around -- I'm assuming they're going to -- this would work as a kind of stand-alone entity even though you own 100%. Kind of any color you may have around kind of their current profitability in margins?

你能不能再更深入談一下 Benefit Street？如果我理解正確的話，你們——在財務上——只是在買管理費收入流（management fee stream），並不是在買績效激勵費（incentive fee stream）。另外你能否補充一些背景——我假設他們會——即使你們持有 100%，它仍會以某種獨立實體的方式運作。你能否談談他們目前的獲利能力與利潤率大概如何？

Yes. I mean, I'll take the first part and then maybe turn it to Ken on detail. I think the carry is the same carry percentages that existed before. So a percentage of the carry goes to the team, a percentage goes to Franklin and none of that's changed. And I think that -- and the majority of the carry goes to the team, 60%, and 40% to Franklin. So yes, performance fees are still very important in the equation of the value and accretion for this deal. And I'll have Ken talk about the numbers.

好的。我的意思是，我先回答第一部分，然後也許把細節交給 Ken。我認為 carry（業績分成）的比例仍然是原本就存在的那些比例。所以 carry 的一部分給團隊，一部分給 Franklin，而這些都沒有改變。而且我認為——大部分的 carry 是給團隊的，60%，40% 給 Franklin。所以是的，績效費（performance fees）在這筆交易的價值與增厚（accretion）計算中仍然非常重要。我讓 Ken 來談數字。

Sure. Thanks, Greg. So when we looked at this deal, and I know in the commentary, we talked about it being neutral next year, I think the first thing to point out is when we're talking about accretion, we're talking about GAAP accretion. And so while it's neutral next year under a GAAP basis, we do see it accreting over time in the 5% to 10% range going forward, and that's on a GAAP basis. If you were to back out noncash items, it would be a lot more accretive, which I know some of our peers do.

當然。謝謝你，Greg。所以當我們評估這筆交易時——我知道在說明稿裡我們提到明年是持平（neutral）——我想先指出的是：我們談的增厚，是指 GAAP 口徑下的增厚。因此，雖然在 GAAP 基礎下明年是持平，但我們確實看到隨時間推移，未來增厚可落在 5% 到 10% 的區間，而且這也是以 GAAP 為基礎。如果把非現金項目（noncash items）剔除，增厚會大得多——我知道我們一些同業會這麼做。

Is it possible to get some sense of that, I mean, in terms of as we model it and kind of think about the -- that cash generation? I mean, is it tax benefits -- or, oh will you see next quarter?

有可能讓我們對此有一些概念嗎？我的意思是，就我們建模、並思考——那個現金創造能力（cash generation）而言。我的意思是，這是稅務利益（tax benefits）——還是，喔，你們會在下個季度看到？

Yes, we don't think this will close, first of all, until like the second quarter. And then -- and that's why '19, we're saying it's neutral, but it should start to be accretive in the second year.

是的，我們認為這筆交易首先不會在第二季之前完成交割。然後——也因此我們才說 2019 年是持平，但它應該會在第二年開始增厚。

And is all of the $26 billion of assets fee generating? And kind of any color on how -- what is the size of the kind of uncalled capital that's not earning fees yet, as kind of the dry powder?

那 260 億美元的資產是否全部都在產生費用（fee generating）？另外能否補充一下——尚未被催繳、因此還沒開始收費的未動用資本（uncalled capital）規模有多大，也就是所謂的 dry powder？

Well, we can have -- we disclose run rate revenues. So that's one thing I'll point you to. And I think maybe Rich will talk about the dry powder.

嗯，我們可以——我們有揭露經常性（run rate）營收。所以這是我可以先請你參考的一點。至於 dry powder，也許 Rich 會談一下。

Yes. The capital that we have under management, $26 billion, is -- we have -- as we mentioned, most of that -- actually, over 85% is long-life capital, meaning that it's either in a drawdown structure or in our permanent capital vehicles, et cetera. We lever our funds. Our 2 most recent funds, our flagship private debt fund, our distressed funds. We have actually some other funds as well, have not finished drawing down all their capital yet, so we still have a fair amount of powder and that's runway.

好的。我們管理的資本 260 億美元——如我們提到的，其中大部分——其實超過 85%——是長久期資本（long-life capital），也就是它要嘛是在分期提取（drawdown）架構中，要嘛是在我們的永久資本載體（permanent capital vehicles）等等。我們會對基金加槓桿（lever）。我們最近兩檔基金——我們的旗艦私募債基金、以及我們的困境基金。另外我們其實還有一些其他基金，也都還沒有把所有資本完全提取完畢，所以我們仍有相當多的火力，而那就是跑道（runway）。

It's about $2 billion in dry, $2 billion to $3 billion.

大約有 20 億美元的 dry（未動用資金），大概 20 億到 30 億美元。

Great. And then if I could, I appreciate your patience, maybe back to the core business. Ken, I mean it's that, kind of, end of the year, kind of looking ahead, what are your latest thoughts about kind of what we should be thinking for expense rate, expense growth next year. I mean, previously, you wanted to hold it down to, I believe, less than 3% or is that still a good number? Where does that stand?

很好。然後如果可以的話，謝謝你們的耐心，我想回到核心業務。Ken，我的意思是，到了年底、往前看，你們對於明年的費用率（expense rate）與費用成長（expense growth）最新看法是什麼？我的意思是，之前你們希望把它壓在——我記得——低於 3%，這仍然是個合理的數字嗎？目前進展如何？

That's right, Rob. So we finished our budget process in kind of like August, September, and that process was consistent with the guidance that I provided last quarter that we were budgeting expenses to go up 2% to 3%. But as soon as the -- no sooner was the ink dry on that, than we started to look towards ways to get that expense gross down, and then with the recent market activity, we're accelerating that. So we do think that while the budgets, we're projecting to grow 2% to 3%, we do think that there are opportunities to reduce expenses more, and so even get it down to half that perhaps or even more than that. But just a word of caution there, some of these things, these levers that we have, and we do think there are several of them, they're a little bit -- take a little longer to pull and they take a little longer for the benefits to be seen through the P&L. Having said all that, because of the cyclical nature of the expenses, we do think next quarter, we should have flat expenses.

沒錯，Rob。所以我們在大概 8 月、9 月完成了預算流程，而該流程與我上季提供的指引一致：我們預算費用將增加 2% 到 3%。但就在——墨跡才剛乾——我們就開始尋找把費用成長率再壓低的方法；而隨著近期市場活動，我們正在加速推進。所以我們確實認為，雖然預算上我們預測成長 2% 到 3%，但也有機會進一步降低費用，甚至可能降到一半左右，或更低。不過提醒一下：我們手上有一些槓桿可以拉動——而且我們認為有好幾項——但它們需要更長時間才能啟動，也需要更長時間才能在損益表（P&L）上反映出效益。綜合以上，由於費用具有週期性，我們認為下個季度費用應該會持平。

Our next question is coming from Michael Carrier of Bank of America Merrill Lynch.

我們的下一個問題來自美國銀行美林的 Michael Carrier。

Maybe first one, just another question on the Benefit Street Partners. Just when I think about the $26 billion in maybe like the management fees, is that mostly on commitments or NAV and then any margin color? And maybe for the team, like Tom, just wanted to get your sense. It seems like there's more -- there's obviously structural growth, but there's a lot of competition coming into that market. So just how are you guys looking at deploying capital given where we are in this cycle and how the structure is -- of some of these products kind of protect the downside?

也許先問第一個，就是關於 Benefit Street Partners 的另一個問題。當我想到大約 260 億美元的（可能像是）管理費時，這主要是按承諾金額計費，還是按淨資產價值（NAV）計費？另外利潤率方面能否提供一些說明？另外也想請團隊（例如 Tom）談談你的看法。看起來那裡除了明顯的結構性成長之外，也有很多競爭者進入那個市場。所以在目前這個景氣循環的位置、以及某些產品結構如何保護下行風險的情況下，你們是如何看待資本部署的？

Maybe I'll have Rich address that. And Tom, you can jump in at the end if you have anything to add.

也許我請 Rich 來回答。Tom，如果你最後還有補充也可以加入。

Sure. Thanks, Greg. We have a number of products. The one that people seem to ask about the most is around private debt. There undoubtedly has been more competition there. Spreads have tightened. There's been some new players. But a couple of remarks. One is in everything we've read, it's probably the most unallocated asset class within alternatives certainly relative to PE or real estate, et cetera. So every projection we have seen shows that market considerably growing, almost doubling over the next 5 years. And despite tighter spreads and somewhat weaker documents, we still think, for the most part across the continuum that we run, remember, we're sort of a credit ecosystem always looking around relative value, it really is the best risk-adjusted returns for the most part that we see across the credit spectrum. So -- and the only other thing I would add, and maybe if Tom wants to chime in here, is size matters. So there may be more competitors in the market. Some stats we looked at recently is less than 20% of all the new funds formed are over $1 billion. Size really matters. Size matters because of the size of the teams. I mean, this is a very labor-intensive business, private debt, you don't just have research analysts doing a lot of work for you, you don't have liquid markets to sell to. Oftentimes, we're the only lender. So size matters as far as size of teams monitoring and all that, but it also manages commitment. So across our platform, almost half of our AUM, about $12 billion, is in private debt. Means that we can commit up to or -- and in some cases, even above $300 million per deal. Remember, the average size of deal we're doing on a middle market loan is a $30 million, $40 million, $50 million company. $50 million EBITDA companies don't need $25 million. They need commitments of multiple hundred millions. And believe it or not, there really aren't that many providers out there -- the banks aren't in that business for the most part -- that can do that. And that is -- and so I think what you'll see over time is consolidation. And for us, hopefully, with -- under the Franklin umbrella, just make us that much better at doing our job, and that's just private debt. Of course, we have a lot of other strategies which benefit from the same bank disintermediation and a lot of the same fundamental factors that (sic) [as] does private debt.

好的。謝謝，Greg。我們有多種產品。大家似乎問得最多的是私募債務相關。那裡確實出現了更多競爭。利差已經收窄。也有一些新進玩家。不過我有幾點想說。第一，根據我們讀到的所有資料，這可能是另類資產中配置最不足的資產類別，至少相對於私募股權（PE）或不動產等而言。因此我們看到的每一份預測都顯示該市場將大幅成長，未來 5 年幾乎會翻倍。儘管利差更緊、文件條款也稍微弱化，但我們仍認為，就我們所涵蓋的整個區間而言——請記得，我們是一個信用生態系統，持續從相對價值角度觀察——在信用光譜中，這仍是我們所見多數情況下最佳的風險調整後報酬。所以——另外我想補充的一點，也許 Tom 也可以在這裡插話，就是規模很重要。市場上可能有更多競爭者。我們最近看到的一些統計是，新成立的基金中，規模超過 10 億美元的不到 20%。規模真的很重要。規模重要在於團隊的規模。我的意思是，私募債務是一個非常勞力密集的業務，你不只是靠研究分析師替你做大量工作，你也沒有流動市場可以賣出。很多時候，我們是唯一的放款人。因此，規模在於團隊規模、監控等方面都很重要，但它也影響承諾能力。在我們的平台上，幾乎一半的資產管理規模（AUM），約 120 億美元，是在私募債務。這表示我們每筆交易可以承諾最高到——在某些情況下甚至超過——3 億美元。請記得，我們在中型市場貸款所做的平均交易規模，借款公司大約是 3,000 萬、4,000 萬、5,000 萬美元的公司。EBITDA 5,000 萬美元的公司不需要 2,500 萬美元。他們需要的是數億美元等級的承諾。而信不信由你，市場上能提供這種規模的供應者其實不多——銀行多數情況下並不做這門生意——能做到的更少。因此我認為，隨著時間推移你會看到整併。對我們而言，希望在 Franklin 的平台之下，能讓我們把工作做得更好，而這只是私募債務。當然，我們還有許多其他策略，同樣受惠於銀行去中介化，以及許多與私募債務相同的基本面因素（sic）[as]。

Tom, do you want to add anything or you...

Tom，你想補充什麼嗎？還是你……

Yes. I can add. Just quickly, I think one on more of a sort of technical question. I think you began with -- on our private equity style funds, fees are charged on drawn as opposed to committed capital. We think that actually places us in sort of a much better position with our investors. That's how they work. But I think just echoing Rich's comments, that scale matters and we have 50 people that are originating. We can write checks of multiple hundreds of millions of dollars. We can -- when we're talking to financial sponsors, owners of companies, management teams and we can say, "Look, we can underwrite your entire cap structure. We can underwrite acquisitions, et cetera." That direct transfer mechanism is becoming more and more important. And we think that the combination with Franklin is going to sort of further elevate us and continue to separate us from the smaller players who just can't do that.

是的。我可以補充。很快地，我想先回答一個比較技術性的問題。我想你一開始提到——就我們偏私募股權風格的基金而言，費用是按已提取（drawn）的資本收取，而不是按承諾資本收取。我們認為這其實讓我們在投資人面前處於更好的位置。他們就是這樣運作的。不過也呼應 Rich 的評論，規模很重要，而我們有 50 位人員在做案源開發（origination）。我們可以開出數億美元等級的支票。當我們與財務贊助方、公司所有者、管理團隊對談時，我們可以說：「你看，我們可以承作你整個資本結構（cap structure）。我們可以承作併購等。」這種直接轉移機制正變得越來越重要。我們認為與 Franklin 的結合將進一步提升我們，並持續讓我們與那些做不到的小型玩家拉開差距。

All right. And just a quick follow-up, maybe for Ken. Just on capital, I see guys were active on the buybacks, you did this transaction going forward. Just wanted to get a sense. I know you guys have a ton of cash and you generate a lot. But just from a priority standpoint, does this change anything in terms of the pace of buybacks that you guys have been kind of run-rating?

好的。再快速追問一下，也許問 Ken。就資本而言，我看到你們在庫藏股回購上很積極，而且你們也完成了這筆交易並將往前推進。我只是想了解一下。我知道你們手上現金很多，而且也產生大量現金。但就優先順序來看，這是否會改變你們一直在維持的回購速度（run-rate）？

Sure. I mean, I think we did see the buybacks slow down this quarter. I think that the trend, all things being equal, would have continued. Of course, that could be offset with the market right now, and so -- and as you know, we're pretty opportunistic. But we think that this acquisition and our buyback practices are consistent with our historical practices. If you look back, what we've done with the year, after tax reform, we've had almost 200% payout of our earnings this year, and this is consistent, this acquisition, so...

當然。我的意思是，我想我們確實看到本季回購放緩。我認為在其他條件相同的情況下，這個趨勢原本會持續。當然，這可能會被目前的市場狀況所抵銷，所以——而且如你所知，我們相當機會主義。但我們認為這次收購以及我們的回購作法，與我們過去的歷史作法是一致的。如果你回頭看，今年在稅改之後，我們今年的盈餘支付率（payout）接近 200%，而這次收購也與此一致，所以……

So I would just say, the answer, from our perspective, is this acquisition doesn't affect our capital management program, and I wouldn't relate if there's a little slowdown quarter-to-quarter, it doesn't -- it wasn't because of this. This deal was on cash. There's plenty of cash for buybacks.

所以我只想說，從我們的角度來看，這次收購不會影響我們的資本管理計畫；而且如果季度之間回購稍微放慢，也不——並不是因為這件事。這筆交易是用現金支付的。回購方面也有充足的現金。

Our next question is coming from Bill Katz of Citi.

我們的下一個問題來自花旗的 Bill Katz。

Congratulations on the transaction to both parties. Just sort of on that, I was wondering if we could just maybe peel back one more level here on the economics of it. It sounds like there's some money upfront, some money down the road. Just trying to tie back to your GAAP neutral and then some improvement on the other side of that. Maybe talk a little bit about how much is paid upfront? And what some of the milestones might be in terms of earn-outs and when that might be? What kind of margin are we talking about? And then can you quantify the intangible amortization?

恭喜雙方完成這筆交易。就此我想再往下追問一層，了解其經濟條件。聽起來有一部分是前期支付，另一部分是未來支付。我想把這與你們所說的 GAAP 中性（GAAP neutral）以及之後的改善連結起來。能否談談前期支付了多少？以及或有對價（earn-outs）的里程碑可能是什麼、可能在何時發生？我們談的是什麼樣的利潤率？另外你們能否量化無形資產攤銷？

Sure. I think the margins in this business are extremely attractive. And over the next few years, that will be largely offset by retention programs. Just a little bit about the deal itself. We have the 683 initial considerations. As we mentioned earlier, the key employees will still accrue the majority of the performance fees and they will also participate in retention programs. We stagger the vesting over the next 6 years with the more senior individuals having the longer vesting periods and the partners will invest, as we mentioned, 20% of the after-tax proceeds. So if you consider the commitment to invest in the future funds and the deferred programs, approximately half of the total consideration is back-end loaded, and we think that's aligned -- including the carry. And so we think that all of the interests are aligned there.

當然。我認為這項業務的利潤率極具吸引力。而在未來幾年，這將在很大程度上被留任計畫所抵銷。稍微談一下這筆交易本身。我們有 683 的初始對價。如我們先前提到的，關鍵員工仍將累積大部分的績效費用，並且也會參與留任計畫。我們把歸屬期分散在未來 6 年，資深人士的歸屬期更長，而合夥人將如我們所提到的，投入稅後收益的 20%。因此，如果你把對未來基金的投資承諾與遞延計畫一併考量，約有一半的總對價是後端加重的，我們認為這是對齊的——包括業績分成（carry）。因此我們認為各方利益在那裡都是一致的。

And I would just add. I think for us, that was a key point in the structure of this deal, that based on the ownership structure, allowed us to put much more of the consideration to employees and vesting over time. And I think like any deal you do, where it's one thing buying the company, it's another thing to be sure the key people are going to stick around. I think in this case, we would say that there's a higher probability of people staying because the incentives are better for them than the prior structure and nothing has been altered. It's just been more attractive with the vesting over 4 to 6 years.

我再補充一下。我認為對我們而言，這是這筆交易結構中的一個關鍵點：基於所有權結構，使我們能把更多對價分配給員工，並隨時間歸屬。而且我認為就像你做的任何交易一樣，買下公司是一回事，確保關鍵人才會留下來又是另一回事。我認為在這個案例中，我們會說人員留下來的機率更高，因為對他們而言，激勵比先前的結構更好，而且沒有任何內容被改變。只是透過 4 到 6 年的歸屬期變得更具吸引力。

And senior management will enter into non-compete and non-solicit agreements too, over a 6-year period.

而高階管理層也將在 6 年期間簽訂競業禁止與禁止招攬協議。

Okay. And then my follow-up question still stands on the core business as well. So if I look at the gross sales dynamics, they continue to weaken both quarter-to-quarter and year-on-year. However, could you give maybe a little bit more color around any kind of intra-quarter trends that you may have seen in terms of -- given the performance has improved as the quarter sort of unfolded a little bit. And then any sort of color, what you're sort of seeing just given the tumult that's continuing until October?

好的。那我對核心業務的追問也仍然成立。所以如果我看總銷售額的動態，它們在季對季與年對年都持續走弱。不過，你能否就你們在季度內看到的任何趨勢提供更多說明——鑑於隨著季度推進，表現似乎有所改善。另外，考量到動盪持續到 10 月，你們目前看到的情況也請提供一些說明？

Yes. I mean, I would start by -- for us, we've always felt that with a large base of value assets, you need some market setback and sell off and volatility to get the value back in favor and rising rates certainly, as we've said before, historically, in that kind of market, value tends to outperform growth. So if you look at September, October, it's probably the strongest overall performance we have had relative to our peer groups and the industry and even to me, the immediate, where I think we could turn flows fairly quickly, it's still our top-selling funds would be around the global macro, global bond where -- in this kind of environment, where you have the uncertainty, you have rising rates. And in the last probably 5 weeks, we picked up close to 600 basis points against our competitive universe here. So I think that -- and have a positive return in the last 12 months. So I think that's the one to me that, from a flow standpoint, that I think could turn fairly quickly. I think the others, we have better relative numbers with Templeton, with Mutual, as you'd expect in this kind of market. But I still think it would take a little bit more time to see that translate to sales. I think the immediate opportunity is still what has been our big driver. And if you look at the last time we had the global financial crisis and coming out of it and the lost decade in equities, that's where the global bonds did so well. So I think that, that story will be attractive.

是的。我的意思是，我會先從——對我們而言，我們一直覺得，當你有大量價值型資產的基礎時，你需要一些市場回檔、拋售與波動，才能讓價值風格重新受到青睞；而升息當然——如我們之前所說——在那種市場中，歷史上價值往往會優於成長。所以如果你看 9 月、10 月，這可能是我們相對於同業群組與整個產業、甚至就我而言在短期內的整體表現最強的一段；我認為我們可以相當快地扭轉資金流向，而我們最暢銷的基金仍會是全球總體、全球債券——在這種環境下，你有不確定性、你有升息。而在過去大概 5 週，我們相對於競爭同業範圍提升了接近 600 個基點。所以我認為——而且在過去 12 個月有正報酬。所以我認為就資金流的角度，這是我覺得可能相當快就會轉正的一塊。我認為其他產品方面，我們在 Templeton、Mutual 的相對表現數字更好，這也符合你對這種市場的預期。但我仍認為要再多一點時間，才會看到這轉化為銷售。我認為眼前的機會仍是一直以來帶動我們的主要驅動因素。而如果你回顧上一次全球金融危機，以及危機後、股票的失落十年，那正是全球債券表現非常好的時期。所以我認為那個故事會很有吸引力。

And that said, we did see a slight pickup in U.S. retail sales even last quarter.

此外，我們確實看到即使在上一季，美國零售銷售也略有回升。

Our next question is coming from Craig Siegenthaler of Crédit Suisse.

下一個問題來自瑞士信貸（Crédit Suisse）的 Craig Siegenthaler。

How did Benefit Street's private credit funds perform in 2008 and 2009 in terms of realized losses?

Benefit Street 的私募信貸基金在 2008 年與 2009 年的已實現損失表現如何？

I'll let Rich take it and -- yes, sorry.

我讓 Rich 來回答——是的，抱歉。

Well, easy question to answer. We're exactly 10 years old. So we really started at the -- I think it was a couple of weeks right around the Lehman demise. So at Benefit Street, we don't have the crisis in our sphere.

嗯，這個問題很容易回答。我們剛好成立 10 年。所以我們其實是在——我想大概是雷曼倒閉前後的幾週開始的。因此在 Benefit Street，我們的範圍內沒有經歷那場危機。

And I think maybe it's important, just to point out -- and maybe Tom or Rich -- I think our first reaction was the same kind of question. Well, CLOs were a disaster in this -- during the global financial crisis. But again, when you really look at it and understand the difference, these are not mortgage-related CLOs, they're not CDOs. And actually, this asset class performed -- it was one of the top-performing fixed income classes during the global financial crisis.

我想也許重要的是指出——也許 Tom 或 Rich——我想我們的第一反應也是同樣的問題。嗯，CLO 在那——在全球金融危機期間是一場災難。但同樣地，當你真正去看並理解差異時，這些不是與房貸相關的 CLO，它們也不是 CDO。而且事實上，這個資產類別的表現——它是全球金融危機期間表現最好的固定收益類別之一。

And I think one thing I...

我想有一件事我……

So Tom, do you want to add anything on that or...

所以 Tom，你想就此補充什麼嗎，或是……

Sure. Yes, I mean, so from inception, we've had virtually 0 losses. Obviously, it's been a pretty favorable credit environment, but there are plenty of losses out there amongst our competitors. With respect to sort of what's going on in the broadly syndicated loan marketplace, CLOs, et cetera, if you look back to the actual returns of CLOs through the GFC, the returns are amazingly strong. Since then, the structures, CLO 2.0 have gotten stronger. We are very conservative in the way that we underwrite credit. And we believe that the CLO structures are going to be able to weather any foreseeable downturn in the marketplace and still be able to protect investors in those structures.

當然。是的，我的意思是，自成立以來，我們幾乎是 0 損失。顯然，這是一個相當有利的信貸環境，但我們的競爭對手之中仍有不少損失。至於廣義的銀團貸款市場、CLO 等等正在發生的事情，如果你回頭看 CLO 在全球金融危機期間的實際報酬，報酬強勁得令人驚訝。此後，結構（CLO 2.0）變得更強健。我們在信貸承作（underwrite）方面非常保守。我們相信 CLO 的結構將能承受市場上任何可預見的下行，並且仍能保護這些結構中的投資人。

Wait, we just had one -- Rich has one quick comment with...

等等，我們還有一個——Rich 有一個很快的補充……

Yes. Maybe embedded in the question is where we are in the cycle now. Clearly, the market is exhibiting a lot of late cycle behavior. If you look at our portfolios across our platform, you'll see a very different construct. Right now, in our private debt strategies where give or take 90% senior secured top of the capital structure, loan to values are across our platform, around 50%, in fact, in our most current fund, our flagship we're investing now -- excuse me, it's under 50%. So we've got a lot of dry powder. We think the portfolio is very defensive. As Tom mentioned, we've had a de minimis amount of losses since inception. And the point I made earlier about the -- that most of our capital is long-life capital mix, gives us the ability to make disciplined investment decisions during market downturns and not the -- subject to flows. So this is a fixed income business. Credits generally have limited upside and lots of downside. We're managing for that downturn and frankly are looking forward to it.

是的。也許這個問題隱含的是我們現在處於週期的哪個階段。很明顯，市場正呈現許多週期末段的行為。如果你看我們平台上的各個投資組合，你會看到非常不同的構成。目前，在我們的私募債務策略中，大約 90%（上下浮動）是資本結構最上層的優先擔保；我們平台的貸款價值比（LTV）大約在 50% 左右，事實上，在我們最新的基金、我們目前正在投資的旗艦基金——抱歉——是低於 50%。所以我們有大量乾粉（可用資金）。我們認為投資組合非常具防禦性。如 Tom 所提，自成立以來我們的損失金額微乎其微（de minimis）。而我先前提到的重點是——我們大部分資金是長久期資本的組合，這讓我們能在市場下行時做出有紀律的投資決策，而不會——受到資金流入流出的影響。所以這是一門固定收益的生意。信貸一般上行空間有限、下行風險很大。我們就是在為那個下行做管理，而且坦白說，我們也期待它的到來。

Very comprehensive. Just one quick follow-up. What is the appetite for another special dividend around year-end just given that tax repatriation is no longer a hurdle?

非常全面。我只有一個快速追問。考量到稅務匯回不再是障礙，年末前後再發放一次特別股利的意願如何？

Yes. I think, that's just one of the quivers and the arrows that we have to look at, and it's a board decision as is the regular dividend. And I don't think -- as Greg pointed out, nothing has really changed in our capital management policies or practices.

是的。我認為，那只是我們需要評估的眾多工具之一，而這和例行股利一樣，都是董事會的決策。而且我不認為——正如 Greg 指出的，我們的資本管理政策或作法其實沒有任何真正的改變。

So it would be under consideration and we'd get feedback on it as we usually do.

所以這會納入考量，我們也會像往常一樣就此取得回饋。

Our next question is coming from Ken Worthington of JPMorgan.

下一個問題來自摩根大通（JPMorgan）的 Ken Worthington。

So maybe first, what kind of balance sheet or liquidity risk does Franklin take here with this acquisition? Maybe to what extent does Franklin buy a balance sheet with Benefit Street with CLO tranches or other balance sheet investments in the Benefit Street funds? And then what sort of liquidity provisions do the products have here? And how confident is Franklin that it won't have to step up to provide customer liquidity should trading in the underlying investments dry up when customers look to redeem?

那麼也許先問，富蘭克林（Franklin）在這筆收購中承擔了哪些資產負債表或流動性風險？富蘭克林在多大程度上是透過 Benefit Street 買進一個資產負債表，例如持有 CLO 分層或 Benefit Street 基金中的其他資產負債表投資？另外，這些產品的流動性條款是什麼？當客戶想要贖回、而底層投資的交易流動性枯竭時，富蘭克林有多大把握不需要出面提供客戶流動性？

You sound like one of our board members. I think these are exactly the right questions to ask when looking at these types of investments. And we've done extensive due diligence around any potential liability or balance sheet issues. And really, again, the key here is the structure, where it's private equity-like fixed -- you have terms of 7 years with the private debt funds. There is no liquidity issue if somebody -- they're in there for 7 years. So you don't have a -- meet a daily redemption type of step-up that you could have in a '40 Act fund or any other vehicles that have daily liquidity. These are very much, whether it's the REIT or BDC, permanent capital. And so we really looked at that carefully. We looked at the liabilities, if there were any that related to these instruments in the GFC and really felt strongly that, that would -- that is not -- that hasn't been an issue certainly, even with the CLO side going through the GFC, where the management companies have had any liability or any kind of issue. And it's -- and also, the structure around the -- whether it's a partnership with the funds, we -- again, we don't have the balance sheet issues of having to put it on our balance sheet.

你聽起來像我們的一位董事會成員。我認為，在評估這類投資時，這些正是該問的問題。我們已就任何潛在負債或資產負債表議題做了非常廣泛的盡職調查。而且關鍵仍在於結構：它像私募股權式的固定——私募債基金的期限是 7 年。如果有人——他們是投入 7 年，所以不存在流動性問題。因此你不會像《1940 年法案》基金或其他提供每日流動性的載體那樣，面臨需要因應每日贖回而「出面支應」的情況。這些產品不論是 REIT 或 BDC，都屬於永久資本。所以我們確實非常仔細地檢視了這點。我們也回頭檢視了在全球金融危機（GFC）期間，是否有任何與這些工具相關的負債，並且非常有信心：那——那不是——這一直都不是問題；即便是 CLO 在 GFC 期間的表現，也沒有出現管理公司承擔任何責任或任何類型問題的情況。而且——另外，關於結構——不論是與基金的合夥架構，我們——再說一次，我們不會有必須把它放到我們資產負債表上的資產負債表問題。

Okay. And there's no investment in the Benefit Street funds at all, directly or indirectly?

好的。那麼你們完全沒有直接或間接投資 Benefit Street 的基金？

Yes, there will be. But it -- yes, but for us, it's -- that's something we modeled out and looked at -- it's a small percentage for the type of funds that we would normally do. And I think our view was that it wouldn't exceed -- if we hit all of our growth targets and assets grew and doubled in size, our maximum, at any one time, would be somewhere around $230 million, $240 million of capital. And we think that's a pretty good use of the $240 million, if that's where -- better than sitting in 2% treasuries.

會的。但是——是的，不過對我們而言——那是我們已經建模並評估過的；就我們通常會做的基金類型而言，那只是一個小比例。而且我們的看法是，即便達成所有成長目標、資產規模成長並翻倍，我們在任何一個時間點的上限大約會是 2.30 億到 2.40 億美元的資本。我們認為，如果是——與其放在 2% 的美國公債裡，這 2.40 億美元用在這裡是相當好的運用。

Okay, great. And then can you give us a little background on the seller here? So my -- I guess, my assumption is Providence is a seller here along with management. Maybe what's the history? And why are they selling if the outlook for the business is so good as you've represented? Why do they see now as the right time to be transferring a lot of the economics from them as the owners to you as the new owner?

好的，很好。接著你能否提供一些關於賣方的背景？所以我——我猜想 Providence 會和管理團隊一起作為賣方。也許能談談歷史沿革？以及如果你們所描述的業務前景如此良好，他們為什麼要賣？為什麼他們認為現在是把大量經濟利益從他們（作為原股東）轉移給你們（作為新股東）的適當時點？

Tom, do you want to take that one?

Tom，你要回答這題嗎？

Sure. Listen, Providence has been a great partner and they were with us from day 1. Our business has become larger and more complicated. We have capital needs and distribution needs that really couldn't be fulfilled by our existing partner. I mean, they're a sector-based private equity fund, really successful at what they do. And we determined jointly that it was probably the best time to start thinking about bringing in a partner for us for the long term that could really help us on sort of that pedigree, that global recognition, access to distribution, capital to seed new products, new teams, et cetera. And this was just a natural time to sort of do that given our growth and sort of how much our business is so different from what they do.

當然。聽著，Providence 一直是很棒的合作夥伴，從第一天起就與我們並肩。我們的業務變得更大、也更複雜。我們有資本需求與通路/配銷需求，這些確實無法由我們現有的合作夥伴來滿足。我的意思是，他們是一支以產業為主的私募股權基金，在他們擅長的領域非常成功。

Our next question is coming from Brian Bedell of Deutsche Bank.

下一個問題來自德意志銀行（Deutsche Bank）的 Brian Bedell。

Maybe to tie in a lot of the comments on Benefit Street and ask a couple of questions on it, financially, Ken, I think, you mentioned you thought, over the long term, this could be 5% to 10% accretive, I guess, just if that's GAAP or non-GAAP. And then you guys have sort of given us some good detail here on the structure in terms of the $683 million, that sort of -- that amount being half of the total consideration. But I think you also mentioned carry as a component of that. So just trying to get a sense of what -- if carry is a significant part of that versus actual cash laid out by Franklin. I think you also mentioned assets doubling over time in a 4- to 6-year time frame. So just wanted to, first of all, try to get a sense of that on the financial side, if that's tying in to the 5% to 10% accretion.

也許把你們對 Benefit Street 的許多評論串起來，我想就財務面問幾個問題。Ken，我記得你提到，長期來看這可能會帶來 5% 到 10% 的增益（accretive），我想確認那是依 GAAP 還是非 GAAP 口徑。另外，你們也就結構提供了一些不錯的細節：例如 6.83 億美元，這個金額大概是總對價的一半。但我也記得你提到「carry」也是其中一個組成。所以我想了解一下：carry 相對於富蘭克林實際支付的現金，是否占了相當重要的比重？我想你也提到，資產在 4 到 6 年的時間框架內會翻倍。所以首先想從財務面理解一下，這是否與 5% 到 10% 的增益相互呼應。

There's a lot there. Let's see where to begin on that. So first of all, just kind of a long-term endeavor here. We think -- what I was saying was that the team will -- they're participating in the majority of the carry. We -- and that is -- will align their interests. The deferred components, as I mentioned, go for 6 years, and that is why we're saying it's neutral in the beginning. But over time -- could you just -- could you repeat some of the questions? Or just -- repeat the questions.

這裡面資訊很多。我們看看從哪裡開始。首先，這是一個偏長期的投入。我剛才的意思是，團隊將參與大部分的 carry。而我們——這將使他們的利益一致。我提到的遞延組成部分為期 6 年，這也是我們說一開始是中性的原因。但隨著時間推進——你能不能——把一些問題再重複一次？或者——把問題再說一次。

Yes, yes, yes. Sure, yes, no worries. Yes, no worries. You're answering part of it. So as we go to the 4- to 6-year time frame that you sort of talked about and you also mentioned sort of a goal of assets doubling in time, it sounds like some of the incentive is going to be the retained carry by the teams and then some of the contingent consideration will be cash laid out like a typical earn-out structure. And is that coming into that 5% to 10% accretion? I guess, that 5% to 10%, do you see that as sort of not in 2020, but more like 4 to 5 years out?

可以，可以，可以。當然，沒問題。是的，沒問題。你已經回答到其中一部分了。所以在你提到的 4 到 6 年時間框架、以及資產規模隨時間翻倍的目標下，聽起來部分激勵會來自團隊保留的 carry，另外部分或有對價則會像典型的 earn-out 結構一樣以現金支付。那這些是否會反映在你提到的 5% 到 10% 增益裡？我想問的是，那 5% 到 10% 你們是否認為不是在 2020 年，而是更像在 4 到 5 年後才會實現？

I think yes, my time horizon was about 4 or 5 years and it included all of that in my numbers, and it was GAAP, as I mentioned. So if you backed out the noncash components, the accretion would be a lot higher than that.

我認為是的，我的時間跨度大約是 4 到 5 年，而且我在我的數字裡已經把那些都納入考量了，並且如我提到的，是依 GAAP（一般公認會計原則）。所以如果你把非現金的組成部分扣除掉，折價攤銷（accretion）會比那個數字高很多。

Right. And the answer -- did you give the amortization...

對。那答案——你有給出攤銷……

Sorry?

抱歉？

No, we said that's -- we'll give more details on those on the next quarter call, in and around it and...

沒有，我們是說那個——我們會在下一季的電話會議上，針對那些提供更多細節，並且在相關部分……

Yes, that makes sense. And then on the growth side...

是的，這很合理。然後在成長方面……

Yes, yes. So next quarter, when it closes, we'll give some more guidance on individual line items.

是的，是的。所以下一季，等交易完成後，我們會就各個單獨的科目提供更多指引。

Okay, that's great. And then, I guess, more broadly, just the cross-sell that this can, I guess, your sort of idea of -- to what extent you can sell this into your institutional channels, particularly on the insurance side, which clearly has a need for -- an increasing need for liquid credit. And I think you also mentioned retail product structures as well, although obviously, they would -- I would think they would have to be more liquid. But do you have plans on launching illiquid retail products?

好的，太好了。然後我想，更廣泛來說，關於這能帶來的交叉銷售——我想問你們的想法是：你們在多大程度上能把這個賣進你們的機構通路，特別是保險端，顯然那邊對——流動性信貸的需求正在增加。我想你們也提到零售產品結構，不過很明顯——我會認為它們必須更具流動性。但你們有計畫推出非流動性的零售產品嗎？

Yes. I think the -- those are absolutely all attractive prospects. And we have a team that calls on the general account insurance business. This will be a natural quick fit. It would also -- it's not that complicated of a story for, I think, a generalist institutional team to go out and at least talk about and see if like -- whether it's sovereign wealth fund where you have relationships around the globe. This is a natural category. And even -- my interest, it was interesting on why I felt like this category was one we had to look at, was just sitting on 2 endowment boards, and the consultant came in and said, "We're going to educate the board on private credit." I said, "Hmm, this is interesting." They're -- this is a category. And again, because it just fits so neatly into this rising rate and having more quality around it and the attractive yield you get by eliminating the bank, I think it is very attractive that way. And the retail side, the -- whether it's the high net worth side with fiduciaries an easy first introduction, but we've already seen interest from our traditional retail channel around whether you have an interval structure or a closed-end structure. I mean, those are all things we will explore right away, and we think that we can do that fairly quickly.

有。我認為——那些絕對都是很有吸引力的機會。而且我們有一個團隊專門拜訪一般帳戶（general account）的保險業務。這會是一個自然且快速契合的項目。另外——我認為對於一般型的機構銷售團隊而言，這也不是一個很複雜的故事，他們至少可以出去談一談，看看是否——例如你們在全球各地有關係的主權財富基金。這是一個很自然的類別。甚至——我之所以覺得這個類別是我們必須研究的，原因很有意思：我在兩個捐贈基金（endowment）董事會任職，顧問進來說：「我們要向董事會介紹私募信貸（private credit）。」我心想：「嗯，這很有意思。」他們——這是一個類別。再者，因為它非常貼合升息環境、品質更好，而且透過排除銀行所獲得的誘人收益率，我認為它在這方面非常有吸引力。至於零售端——不論是有受託人（fiduciaries）的高淨值端，作為第一個切入點很容易，但我們也已經看到傳統零售通路對於是否採用區間型（interval）結構或封閉式（closed-end）結構的興趣。我的意思是，這些都是我們會立刻探索的事情，而且我們認為可以相當快地做到。

That's great color. Just one on expenses, is the base that you're growing from, Ken, for the 2% to 3% growth for next year, is that expense base $2.16 billion? Do I have that right?

這些說明很有幫助。關於費用再問一個：Ken，你說明年成長 2% 到 3% 的基期，是從哪個費用基礎往上長？是 21.6 億美元那個費用基礎嗎？我理解得對嗎？

One moment.

請稍等。

Excluding the sales and distribution expense.

不包含銷售與通路費用。

Yes, I'm giving you the number excluding the sales and distribution and marketing line.

是的，我給你的數字是不包含銷售與通路以及行銷那一項。

It's $2.16 billion for fiscal '18, unless there's other onetimers in there?

2018 財年的話是 21.6 億美元，除非裡面還有其他一次性項目？

I'm not -- I think that's about right, but I think you should just verify that with Investor Relations later.

我不——我想大致是對的，但我認為你之後應該再跟投資人關係部確認一下。

And our next question is coming from Patrick Davitt of Autonomous Research.

下一個問題來自 Autonomous Research 的 Patrick Davitt。

Could you maybe just step back and give us an idea of the process for the BSP discussion's evolution, who went to who, was this investment banking-driven? And should we take this to indicate that there's a healthy pipeline of similar deals out there as you've kind of gone through these processes?

你們能否退一步，跟我們說明一下 BSP 討論演進的過程？是誰先找誰？這是投資銀行主導的嗎？另外，我們是否可以據此推論：在你們走過這些流程之後，市場上還有一條健康的、類似交易的管線？

I'm -- clarify the -- how did we -- oh, the BSP, I thought you said the BDC, okay.

我——澄清一下——我們是怎麼——喔，BSP，我剛以為你說的是 BDC，好，了解。

No, no, the BSP, sorry. Yes, yes. Like how did the process play out, yes?

不不，是 BSP，抱歉。是的，是的。像是流程怎麼走的，對嗎？

Yes. This was not an auction or a book or somebody going out and saying we want to sell to the highest bidder. This was a -- came from a relationship of one of our board members with Tom and introduced us and just thought this would be a very interesting fit because he's heard in our meetings how we want to continue to build our alternatives business, and he personally knew Tom and his team and knew Rich and David and just felt like this was the right cultural fit. These guys have a long history of working together. Our people knew many of their senior people going back to Merrill Lynch days and high yield and things. So I think that got us off to a good start in the discussions. And our first reaction, like many, were we late in the credit cycle, no. And the more we understood the business and the opportunities to benefit from any downturn with distressed and long-short and just the conservative nature of how they're running their business, we got very comfortable and very excited about it. And that's really how -- and that we did a lot of due diligence because it's a new area for us and for all the questions that were raised on this call, around capital, any future liabilities, all those things we wanted to be very careful about. So I think that's really how it came, but it was not a bidding process at all. And I think the point is we're -- we've said before, we're open to any deal that looks like it has quality people, a quality record and it's in an area that can grow. And I think that's -- we looked at this business and just feel like there can be some bumps like all credit areas have. But the middle market corporate business is one that it's hard for the banks to get back into and it's a big market and we think very attractive in this environment.

是的。這不是拍賣、也不是招標（book），也不是有人出去說我們要賣給出價最高的人。這是——源自我們一位董事與 Tom 的關係，他介紹我們認識，並且認為這會是一個非常有意思的契合，因為他在我們的會議中聽到我們想持續打造另類投資業務，而他本人認識 Tom 和他的團隊，也認識 Rich 和 David，並且覺得這在文化上很契合。這些人長期一起合作。我們的人也認識他們許多資深人士，可以追溯到美林（Merrill Lynch）時期，以及高收益等領域。所以我認為這讓我們的討論有了一個很好的起點。而我們的第一個反應，跟很多人一樣，是：我們是否已經處在信貸週期的後段？答案是否定的。我們越了解這個業務，以及在任何下行時透過困境投資（distressed）、多空（long-short）等方式受益的機會，再加上他們經營業務的保守性，我們就越感到安心，也越感到興奮。而這也就是——我們做了大量盡職調查，因為這對我們而言是新領域；而且針對這通電話會議上提出的所有問題，包含資本、任何未來負債等，我們都希望非常謹慎。所以我認為這就是它如何發生的，但完全不是競標流程。而重點是：我們——之前就說過，我們對任何交易都持開放態度，只要看起來有人才品質高、績效紀錄佳，而且是在能成長的領域。我想這就是——我們看這個業務，覺得像所有信貸領域一樣可能會有一些波動。但中型市場企業（middle market corporate）業務是銀行很難再回去做的；那是一個很大的市場，而且我們認為在這個環境下非常有吸引力。

Great, that's helpful. And then just a quick one. I may have missed this earlier. But could you give the weighted average tenure of the AUM? I imagine it's in the kind of 5- to 7-year range?

很好，這很有幫助。再快速問一個。我可能前面漏聽了。但你們能提供資產管理規模（AUM）的加權平均存續期間（tenure）嗎？我猜大概是在 5 到 7 年的區間？

It is, but that's really the private debt side. I think there's permanent as well. So maybe, Rich?

是的，但那主要是私募債（private debt）那一塊。我想也有永久資本（permanent）部分。所以也許，Rich？

Yes, each of our strategies is different. For private debt, our funds are long lock-up funds, generally 7 years. On the BDC and the mortgage REIT, those are permanent capital vehicles. They're publicly filed, they're not traded at the moment, but we're -- plan on listing those and just think of those as any permanent capital vehicle.

是的，我們每一個策略都不同。就私募債而言，我們的基金是長期鎖定（lock-up）的基金，一般是 7 年。至於 BDC 和房貸 REIT，那些是永久資本載體。它們已經公開申報，目前尚未交易，但我們——計畫將它們上市；你可以把它們視為任何永久資本載體。

Our next question is coming from Brennan Hawken of UBS.

我們的下一個問題來自瑞銀（UBS）的 Brennan Hawken。

Just a quick one. I don't think you touched on this, but when you spoke to your assumptions, this is for -- on the BSP transaction, when you spoke to your assumptions about year 2 accretion, can you let us know what credit trends are embedded within those assumptions?

我這邊只有一個簡短的問題。我想你們剛才沒有提到這點，但當你們談到你們的假設時，這是針對——在 BSP 這筆交易上，當你們談到對第 2 年增厚（accretion）的假設時，能否告訴我們這些假設中內含了哪些信用趨勢？

Yes. The assumptions are that there would be future fund launches that are consistent with past fund launches and growing slightly. So maybe like 1% or 2% or 3% growth in those funds, fund launches, and that was the major assumption driving revenue.

是的。我們的假設是，未來會有與過往基金發行一致、並且略為成長的基金推出。所以可能是 1% 或 2% 或 3% 的成長，體現在這些基金、基金發行上，而這是推動營收的主要假設。

Okay. And how...

好的。那……

But I think we looked at downside scenarios, but we didn't really -- for -- to say what does the credit world look like next year, I think the assumptions for those numbers are more where we are today more or less.

不過我想我們也看過下行情境，但我們並沒有真的——就——去描述明年信用環境會長什麼樣子；我認為這些數字的假設大致上是以我們今天所處的狀況為基礎。

Right. Okay, got it. And then given the fact that there's leverage used in these funds, can you give us an idea about what kind of loss tolerance there is before the earnings stream to Franklin would be impaired from some of these? And then given your response to Ken's question, I assume that means that Franklin is not going to be providing the leverage to these existing funds, but you made reference to maybe launching a few products that might be a bit more aligned with your -- the core business. And in those scenarios, would that be a situation where Franklin might be the provider of those -- of that leverage? Or are you guys staying away from that altogether?

了解。好，明白了。另外，鑑於這些基金使用了槓桿，你們能否讓我們了解一下，在什麼程度的損失容忍度之後，Franklin 從其中取得的獲利來源會受到影響？再者，根據你對 Ken 問題的回覆，我的理解是 Franklin 不會為這些既有基金提供槓桿，但你提到可能會推出幾個產品，會更貼近你們——核心業務。在那些情境下，Franklin 會不會成為那些——槓桿的提供者？還是你們會完全避免這件事？

We don't envision providing leverage.

我們不預期會提供槓桿。

Yes, I'd say that we have no plans in providing the leverage, and I'll have maybe Rich address the leverage.

是的，我會說我們沒有提供槓桿的計畫；至於槓桿部分，我請 Rich 來說明。

Yes. Our funds are relatively light leveraged certainly as compared to many of the peers in our spaces. Different funds -- or a little different. On the private debt side, we've -- and our BDC, we've run leverage of well under 1x, will vary throughout the cycle, but anywhere from 0.5 to 0.8. More recently, in our earlier vintages, it was actually substantially even lower than that. Our bilateral providers in private debt and some of our other products are the banks you would expect them to be, Wells, JPMorgan, Goldman Sachs, et cetera. In our commercial real estate business, we take advantage of warehouses and CLO financing on -- as a take-out to our warehouses. And again, those are bank lenders that we take advantage of. Across our platform, we enjoy a lot of relationships across the Street. Hopefully, that will even get better with our -- post-acquisition. But no, we don't envision doing anything on a lending basis with Franklin.

好的。我們的基金槓桿相對偏低，尤其是相較於我們領域中的許多同業。不同基金——會有些差異。在私募債務方面，我們——以及我們的 BDC——運用的槓桿遠低於 1 倍，會隨景氣循環而變動，但大約在 0.5 到 0.8 之間。更近期地看，在我們較早期的幾個批次（vintages）中，實際上槓桿還明顯更低。我們在私募債務以及其他一些產品中的雙邊融資提供者，都是你所預期的那些銀行：Wells、JPMorgan、Goldman Sachs 等等。在我們的商用不動產業務中，我們會運用倉儲融資（warehouse）以及 CLO 融資——作為倉儲融資的退出安排（take-out）。同樣地，這些也都是我們所使用的銀行放款人。在整個平台上，我們與華爾街各方都有很多合作關係。希望在我們——收購完成後，這些關係還能更進一步提升。但不，我們不預期會與 Franklin 以放款的方式做任何事情。

Our next question is coming from Dan Fannon of Jefferies.

我們的下一個問題來自 Jefferies 的 Dan Fannon。

I guess, Ken, given your accretion assumptions, are you thinking about going to a non-GAAP reporting on a go-forward basis? And then also, if you could just give us some context of what performance fees have looked like over the last previous couple of years for this business.

我想問一下，Ken，基於你們對增厚的假設，你們是否在考慮未來改採非 GAAP 的方式來做財務揭露？另外，如果可以的話，能否提供一些背景：過去這個業務在前幾年表現費（performance fees）大概是什麼樣的情況？

Well, regarding the non-GAAP disclosures, we will -- that will be part of our analysis. Let me -- when we get closer to closing on it. We haven't -- we analyze that every year frankly, and it just hasn't been material enough to make a compelling argument. This may change that, but we'll have to wait and see on that. In terms of performance fees, historically, it wasn't a significant part of our evaluation or our projections. And going forward, we don't include a significant part of performance fees when we were talking about the accretion calculation. So that's -- I think that's probably the essence of your question there.

關於非 GAAP 的揭露，我們會——把這納入分析。我想——等我們更接近交割時再看。坦白說我們每年都會分析這件事，但一直以來其重要性不足以形成有說服力的理由。這次可能會改變，但我們得再觀察。至於表現費，歷史上它並不是我們評估或預測中的重要部分。而往前看，在我們談增厚計算時，也沒有把表現費當作重要組成。所以——我想這大概就是你問題的核心。

And just -- performance fees, you need to put in context. This is not a private equity type structure and they're not -- they're more probable and less as far as upside. And maybe Tom, you could touch on that, just a little bit, on where that expectation is around the performance fee.

另外——表現費需要放在脈絡中理解。這不是私募股權那種結構，而且——就上行空間而言，它的機率更高、但幅度更小。也許 Tom 你可以稍微談一下，對表現費的預期大概落在哪裡。

Yes. Sure, Greg. Well, obviously, it's a function of the marketplace and the opportunities. I'd say that our -- when you think about performance fees for private debt vehicles, the debt product is very different than say the private equity product, whereby private equity, you can earn multiples of your investment, while in debt, you're lending money and the goal is to get your money back plus a reasonable return. And so we think about debt multiples or fund multiples or multiples of money being anywhere from about a 1.4 to a 1.7, potential outlier is out at 2x, if you're in a more sort of interesting credit environment than we are in today. And in terms of historicals, our -- we generated sort of market-leading returns in our debt vehicles, and we hope to be able to continue to do that.

好的。當然，Greg。嗯，這顯然取決於市場環境與機會。我會說，當你思考私募債務載體的表現費時，債務產品和私募股權產品非常不同；私募股權你可能賺到投資的數倍回報，而在債務裡，你是在放款，目標是拿回本金並獲得合理報酬。因此我們看待債務倍數、基金倍數或資金倍數，大約會落在 1.4 到 1.7 倍之間；若是在比目前更「有意思」的信用環境下，潛在的離群值可能會到 2 倍。就歷史表現而言，我們——在債務載體中創造了某種市場領先的報酬，我們希望能持續做到這點。

Great. And then just as a follow-up, in the core business, Ken, just thinking about the fee rate, it declined this quarter, I assume mostly because of mix. But I guess, as you think about next year and kind of the outlook for the next 12 months, how should we think about the fee rate?

很好。那再追問一下，在核心業務方面，Ken，談到費率（fee rate），本季有所下滑，我猜主要是因為組合（mix）。但我想問的是，當你展望明年、以及未來 12 個月的前景時，我們應該如何看待費率？

Yes. I think one of the factors was that the daily average assets under management, which a lot of the funds are calculated on, was lower than the straight monthly due to the volatility, and I think that was kind of a factor going -- that reduced it. Going forward, we're not seeing a significant -- we're not projecting a significant decrease in the effective fee rate over last -- over 2018.

是的。我想其中一個因素是，許多基金的費用是以每日平均管理資產（AUM）來計算；由於波動性，這個每日平均值低於單純的月度數字，我想這是導致——費率下降的一個因素。往前看，我們沒有看到顯著——我們也沒有預測有效費率相較於——2018 年會有顯著下降。

Our next question is coming from Alex Blostein of Goldman Sachs.

我們的下一個問題來自高盛（Goldman Sachs）的 Alex Blostein。

So the first one, I guess, on the deal, as you look out and you guys articulated this earlier, some of the potential revenue synergies with Franklin's distribution, as you kind of compare and contrast to some of the other deals you guys have made, whether it's K2 or some of the others, what's sort of different about this one from a distribution perspective? And I guess, what worked well versus what didn't work well in your prior experience that you could try to do something differently with this one?

第一個問題我想是關於這筆交易：當你們往前看，而且你們先前也提到一些可能的營收協同效益，來自 Franklin 的通路（distribution）；當你們把這筆交易與你們做過的其他交易相比，例如 K2 或其他案子，從通路角度來看，這一筆有什麼不同？另外，你們過去的經驗中，哪些做得好、哪些做得不夠好，而你們希望在這一筆上嘗試用不同方式來做？

Well, I think, this is a fairly simple story compared to -- like, a K2 is a little bit more complicated and a liquid alts, a fund of funds into a retail channel, and we've been very successful in fundraising that area. But there's been, I'd say, some headwinds institutionally that we knew about on the standard fund of funds business, so we've been kind of evolving that. But when I look at the amount we've raised in Europe and the U.S. in the K2 side and continue to be one of our areas of positive inflows and growth, I mean, I think that's done okay. I think this is just an easier story as far as getting out there and telling exactly what this team does and an asset class that may be relatively new but one that people can understand pretty quickly, what benefits it has and getting an adjustable rate with x return above where the market is. I think -- and I think institutions, you have -- the benefit of the lock-up is important too, the liquidity factor of getting that extra yield by having it held over a 7-year period or so. I think that's something institutions understand and can easily do. I think it's a little longer in the retail channel. But I just think this is more mainstream, I would say, than a more complex fund of funds type product of a K2. But again, I think as far as we look at the billions we've raised in retail with K2 and continue to do that, especially in this kind of market, where the other factor with the fund of funds and a lower vol product, in a straight up-rising market, it doesn't look that attractive. It starts to look attractive again in the kind of market we're seeing right now, and that -- it was the same in Europe. We saw a real pick-up in interest when we had some volatility a few quarters ago and now we're seeing more interest again.

嗯，我認為，和——比如說，K2 稍微更複雜一些，以及流動性另類投資、透過零售通路的基金中的基金相比，這算是一個相當簡單的故事，而我們在那個領域的募資也非常成功。但我會說，在機構端確實有一些我們早就知道的逆風，主要是在傳統的基金中的基金業務上，所以我們一直在逐步演進調整。不過當我看我們在歐洲和美國於 K2 這一塊所募集到的金額，而且它仍然是我們正向資金流入與成長的領域之一，我的意思是，我覺得表現還不錯。我認為這只是更容易對外說明、清楚講出這個團隊在做什麼的一個故事；而且這是一個可能相對較新的資產類別，但大家可以很快理解它的好處，以及如何在市場水準之上取得一個可調利率加上 X 的報酬。我想——而且我想對機構來說，你們——鎖定期的好處也很重要，也就是流動性因素：透過把資金持有大約 7 年左右來換取額外收益。我認為這是機構能理解、也能很容易做到的事情。我覺得在零售通路上需要的時間會稍微長一些。但我就是覺得，這比起 K2 那種更複雜的基金中的基金型產品來說，算是更主流一些。不過再說一次，當我們看我們在零售端透過 K2 募集到的數十億資金，而且仍在持續募資，尤其是在這種市場環境下——因為基金中的基金以及低波動產品的另一個因素是，在單邊上漲的市場裡，它看起來就沒那麼有吸引力。而在我們現在看到的這種市場裡，它又開始變得有吸引力——在歐洲也是一樣。幾個季度前出現一些波動時，我們看到興趣明顯回升，而現在我們又再次看到更多興趣。

And our team also sees an opportunity to expand the RIA relationship base through the BDC and the REIT products. So it was another -- they were excited about that.

而且我們的團隊也看到一個機會：透過 BDC 和 REIT 產品來擴大與 RIA 的合作關係基礎。所以這也是另一個——他們對此感到很興奮。

Got you. That's a helpful angle. So second question kind of for you just around expenses. So I just want to make sure I understand the message. So 2% to 3%, probably a little lower. So it sounds like you guys are aiming to do closer to maybe 1% to 2%, and tell me if that's not [a rack here] , but that's what it sounded like. I guess, taking a step back, if we are in a little bit more of a choppier market backdrop, let's just say, 0 beta, could expenses go down? Or do you guys think you still have a fair bit of investing you guys need to do to sort of drive expenses -- drop expenses in this kind of 1% to 2% range?

了解。這是一個很有幫助的切入點。那第二個問題想請教你，主要是關於費用。我只是想確認我理解你們傳達的訊息。所以是 2% 到 3%，可能還會再低一點。所以聽起來你們的目標是更接近大概 1% 到 2%；如果我理解不對請告訴我，但我聽起來是這樣。我想退一步問，如果我們處在一個更顛簸的市場背景下，假設是 0 beta，費用會不會下降？還是你們認為仍然需要投入相當多的投資，才能在這種 1% 到 2% 的區間內把費用——把費用降下來？

Yes, I think we can -- I think there's opportunities for expenses to go down, with the caveat that there's not a lot of what you might reference as low-hanging fruit. So the opportunities are there, but it's longer to identify and longer to execute, but we do think there's -- there are opportunities to reduce expenses and just -- there's some examples there. And looking at the strategic investments that we made, not just in the last year but the last 5 years, and just assessing them, are they successful? Should we be doing something different? There is the easy stuff like tamping down G&A expense. We have a large component of comp that's variable. And then just looking at our investment management distribution capabilities that maybe aren't operating at scale, can we be more efficient, increasing automation, increasing our global sourcing in low-cost jurisdictions, that's just to name a few, but there are clearly opportunities that we think can reduce expenses.

是的，我認為我們可以——我認為費用確實有下降的機會，但前提是，並沒有太多你可能會稱之為「唾手可得的果實」的項目。所以機會是存在的，但需要更長時間去辨識，也需要更長時間去執行；不過我們確實認為——確實有降低費用的機會，而且——也有一些例子。我們會回頭檢視我們做過的策略性投資，不只是過去一年，而是過去五年，並加以評估：它們成功嗎？我們是否應該做些不同的事情？也有一些比較容易的部分，例如壓低一般與行政（G&A）費用。我們的薪酬中有很大一部分是變動的。然後再看我們的投資管理與銷售通路能力，對於那些可能尚未達到規模化運作的部分，我們能否更有效率——提高自動化、在低成本司法管轄區提升全球採購/外包配置等，這只是舉幾個例子；但我們清楚認為確實存在可以降低費用的機會。

Our next question is coming from Mike Cyprys of Morgan Stanley.

下一個問題來自摩根士丹利（Morgan Stanley）的 Mike Cyprys。

Just hoping you could talk a little bit about the private equity JV in Asia, if you could talk about your new partner out there, how you're thinking about building out the business, what sort of goals, objectives do you have, how you're thinking about the opportunity set there and why start with fund of funds, which has fees on fees?

想請你談談亞洲的私募股權合資（JV）業務；如果可以的話，也請談談你們在那邊的新合作夥伴、你們如何思考把業務建置起來、你們有什麼樣的目標與目的、你們如何看待那邊的機會集合，以及為什麼從基金中的基金開始——那是「費上加費」的結構？

Well, I think, it's somebody who we admire who has built a very strong business with Asia Alts, and we've -- a local, Melissa Ma, who we've gotten to know and respect and somebody who has a very strong following. And I think if she was -- wanted to partner with us to build a broader-based PE, fund of funds, she brought the kind of people in that have that expertise and relationships and has the ability to go out and fund-raise without a lot of help from us to get started, I think that was all attractive, and willing to put her own capital into it, along with management, in doing really a JV that way. And I think it helps us get to know different segments of the institutional marketplace where they've historically been strong and introduce relationships as well as helping us with our nascent private equity effort in how we build out that business, having that expertise of somebody who's really dealt with some of -- all of the best ones over time in certain regions. So I think those were a lot of the reasons, along with -- it's another alternative capability and just -- I think it's just having the opportunity with the management team that we knew and not a real drag on our existing distribution system where we think it can be up and profitable pretty quickly.

嗯，我認為，這是一位我們很欽佩的人，她在亞洲另類投資（Asia Alts）建立了一個非常強的業務；而我們——一位在地的 Melissa Ma，我們逐漸認識並尊重她，她也擁有非常強的追隨者與口碑。而我認為，如果她——希望與我們合作來建立一個更廣泛的私募股權（PE）基金中的基金平台，她帶來了具備相關專業與人脈的團隊，也有能力在不需要我們太多協助的情況下就能開始對外募資；我認為這些都很有吸引力，而且她也願意與管理層一起投入自有資本，以這樣的方式真正做一個合資（JV）。我認為這也有助於我們更了解機構市場中不同的細分領域——他們過去在那些領域一直很強——並引介關係；同時也能在我們尚在起步的私募股權布局上提供協助，讓我們在建置這項業務時，能借重一位在某些區域長期與——所有最頂尖的機構合作過、具備深厚經驗的專家。所以我認為這些是很多原因；另外——這也是另一項另類投資能力，而且——我認為重點是我們有機會與我們熟悉的管理團隊合作，同時不會對我們既有的銷售通路系統造成實質拖累；我們認為它可以很快上線並且迅速達到獲利。

Great. And just as a follow-up question, if you could just talk a little about your solutions business. I know that's been a strategic priority of yours. And if you could just update us on how that's progressing, where we stand in terms of AUM, what's new in terms of hiring, new products, goals you have for that business looking out the next couple of years.

很好。另外作為追問，想請你也談談你們的解決方案（solutions）業務。我知道那一直是你們的策略重點。如果可以的話，請更新一下目前的進展、我們在資產管理規模（AUM）方面的位置、在人員招募上有哪些新動作、有哪些新產品，以及你們對這項業務在未來幾年的目標。

I think we're extremely excited about it, and we've made some great hires and 2 high-profile people that -- along with Ed and have built a lot of new products within there. And I think more importantly, immediately, we've seen the benefits with some of our -- the variable annuity changes where they may be looking for a lower-vol, equity-type product. We now can save some assets and move them into it as some of these ones wind down, and that's what they're looking for. And we've been able to do that in certain cases. It also allows us -- we've combined many of our different groups with risk premia and quantitative and systemic kind of quant, and we've been able to build our factor-based ETFs, which are doing extremely well on a relative basis. And our U.S. multi-factor one is up to $400-plus million, and that's really a benefit of having that capability within the solutions group. So it really has pulled a lot of pieces together. And I think the other part is just the ability to offer various types of sleeves that could be attractive in many of the different models that are out there. And as this -- the market evolves from a product-driven place to more of an outcome-oriented solutions base, is having specific solutions that can fit, whether it's a technology platform. Those are just getting more and more important as these technology platforms get in between the end investor and the adviser, and we've got to figure out ways to get on that shelf space and solutions really helps there. So I think we look at it as, we're fully staffed now. We've built the products and we're going out to market with them and we're -- I think the immediate benefit is really some of the ETF help but also just having different customized options available for some of the insurance relationships. We've seen this -- we've seen a direct benefit.

我認為我們對此感到非常興奮，而且我們也延攬了一些非常優秀的人才，以及兩位高知名度人士——他們與 Ed 一起在其中開發了許多新產品。而我認為更重要、也更立即的是，我們已在部分業務上看到效益——例如一些變額年金的調整，因為他們可能在尋找較低波動、偏股票型的產品。現在，當其中一些產品逐步到期（wind down）時，我們可以保留部分資產並將其轉入該產品，而這正是他們所需要的。而在某些情況下，我們已經能做到這一點。這也讓我們——我們已將多個不同團隊整合在一起，涵蓋風險溢酬、量化以及系統性量化等，並且得以打造我們的因子型 ETF，而其相對表現非常出色。我們的美國多因子 ETF 規模已達 4 億美元以上，這確實是解決方案團隊內部具備該能力所帶來的好處。所以它確實把許多拼圖整合在一起。我認為另一部分則是能夠提供各種不同類型的「配置分層（sleeves）」；在市面上許多不同模型中，這些都可能具有吸引力。隨著市場從以產品為導向，演變為更以結果為導向的解決方案模式，能夠提供可契合的特定解決方案——無論是配合科技平台——就變得非常重要。隨著這些科技平台介於終端投資人與理財顧問之間，這些因素只會愈來愈重要；我們必須想辦法進入那個「貨架空間（shelf space）」，而解決方案在這方面確實很有幫助。因此我認為我們的看法是：我們現在人力已完全到位。我們已打造好產品並正推向市場——我認為立即的效益主要來自 ETF 的助益，但同時也在於我們能為部分保險合作關係提供不同的客製化選項。我們已看到——我們已看到直接的效益。

Our next question is coming from Sean Peche of Ranmore.

下一個問題來自 Ranmore 的 Sean Peche。

Mr. Johnson, during the last call, you said Franklin was quite possibly the best buy out there, and I happen to agree with you. And with the share price some 10% lower, can I ask why the board hasn't been accelerating the rate of buybacks as the price has fallen or indeed even considering taking on debt to repurchase a substantial portion of the company at the current value, which looks to be around 5x normalized earnings, excluding cash and investments, especially given the change in value growth cycle, which looks to be underway?

Johnson 先生，在上次電話會議中，您說富蘭克林很可能是市場上最好的買進標的，而我也恰好同意您的看法。在股價又下跌約 10% 的情況下，我想請問為什麼董事會沒有在價格下跌時加快回購速度，甚至沒有考慮舉債，在目前的估值水準回購公司相當大一部分股份？目前看起來約為正常化盈餘的 5 倍（不含現金與投資），尤其考量到價值股成長循環的變化似乎正在展開？

Yes. No, all good, I think, points, and there's -- there are volume considerations and you can't just go out and buy. And I know that your next question would be, why don't you do a tender or something with debt. And I think those are all things we talk about and consider. And I guess I was wrong last quarter, if the stock's down 10%.

是的。不，這些我認為都是很好的觀點，而且——也有成交量方面的考量，你不能就這樣直接出去買。而我知道你下一個問題會是：那為什麼不做要約收購（tender）或用舉債之類的方式。我認為這些都是我們會討論並納入考量的事情。我想如果股價下跌了 10%，那我上季可能說錯了。

No, just early.

不，只是太早了。

But we are looking at all of that. And I think the management -- we and our board feel strongly that one of the strongest balance sheets is going to be a weapon for us for creating value over the long term and having options in -- as we enter a more uncertain period with a strong balance sheet is where we want to be. And capital is something that I think we -- again, as I've said, I think the high rating is attractive to institutional investors and not having debt on the balance sheet as an investment company, we think, is very important. And I'll let -- Ken wants to add anything.

但我們確實在檢視所有這些選項。我認為管理層——我們以及董事會都強烈認為：擁有最強健的資產負債表之一，將會是我們長期創造價值的武器；在我們進入更不確定的時期時，保持強健的資產負債表，能讓我們保有更多選擇，這正是我們希望處於的位置。而資本方面，我認為我們——再次如我所說，我認為高評等對機構投資人具有吸引力；作為一家投資公司，我們認為資產負債表上不背負負債是非常重要的。我讓——Ken 看看是否要補充。

Just that I think I'm sure you're aware that the board did increase the share repurchase last February, so...

只是我想你應該也知道，董事會在去年二月確實提高了股票回購額度，所以……

Yes. Look, I must commend you in how patient you've been because many of your peers who've been less patient have -- don't have the ability to take advantage of the low prices that are currently out there in the asset management space but I -- one doesn't want you to miss the opportunity. And perhaps as evidence of the growth value cycle having turned, I'd point out that Franklin Resources has substantially outperformed Amazon this month. But is the market right to be fearful of a substantial acquisition? Or should we expect more smaller bolt-on type acquisitions of the -- the type announced today?

是的。聽著，我必須稱讚你們的耐心，因為你們許多較缺乏耐心的同業——現在已沒有能力去把握資產管理產業目前出現的低價機會；但我——我們也不希望你們錯失這個機會。而作為價值成長循環可能已經轉向的證據，我想指出富蘭克林資源本月大幅跑贏亞馬遜。但市場是否有理由擔心會出現一筆重大的收購？或者我們應該預期更多像今天宣布的那種較小型的補強式（bolt-on）收購？

Yes. I mean, as I've said before, I think large acquisitions are very difficult. There's a lot of risk in them, I think, in just the brand and who you are as a firm. But I think, again, if the right situation came up where you think you can take out a lot of costs and create value, we're going to certainly look at that and be open to that. But I think, the -- as we've stated before, we're -- I think today, we're at over $40 billion in alternatives, we'd like to be bigger in that. So yes, if we think things -- if there's attractive other businesses to fit into that category, that's when we want to continue to grow. And part of the attractiveness of BSP is having the kind of people that are plugged into the Street and relationships and see different things come up that could be interesting for us. And I think that, that -- that Rich and Tom are builders and entered a lot of different areas, just starting at private credit. And that's the kind of talent, again, that I think when you have in the organization, you're going to get a lot of new looks at some new businesses and we're going continue to do that.

是的。我的意思是，如我之前所說，我認為大型收購非常困難。我認為其中有很多風險，尤其在品牌以及你作為一家公司的定位上。但我認為，再次強調，如果出現合適的情境，你認為可以大幅削減成本並創造價值，我們當然會評估並保持開放態度。但我認為——如我們先前所述——我們目前在另類投資的規模已超過 400 億美元，我們希望在這方面做得更大。所以是的，如果我們認為有具吸引力、可納入該類別的其他業務，那就是我們希望持續成長的方向。而 BSP 的吸引力之一，在於擁有那種與華爾街緊密連結的人才與人脈關係，能看到各種可能對我們有意思的機會出現。我認為，Rich 和 Tom 是建設者（builders），他們進入了許多不同領域，從私募信貸開始。而這類人才——再次強調——當你在組織內擁有這樣的人，你就會對一些新業務有更多新的視角，而我們也會持續這麼做。

Perhaps just one last question, has Franklin been approached by -- I know a number of large banks and financial services companies, Goldmans and the likes are looking at increasing their exposure in investment management. Has Franklin been approached in that regard?

也許最後一個問題：富蘭克林是否曾被接洽——我知道一些大型銀行與金融服務公司，例如高盛等，正尋求提高其在投資管理方面的曝險。富蘭克林是否曾在這方面被接洽？

Well, we wouldn't say. I mean, I think there's always conversations and things but we don't really talk about whether we've been approached or not, formally or informally.

嗯，我們不會說。我的意思是，我認為總是會有一些對話與接觸，但我們不會談論是否曾被接洽，不論是正式或非正式。

Our next question is coming from Robert Lee of KBW.

下一個問題來自 KBW 的 Robert Lee。

And I guess, I just had a question -- I guess, at the beginning of the call, Greg, you mentioned that you kind of felt you had kind of a lot of the structures built that you need at this point, and I know you talked about the solutions business. But can you maybe dive a little deeper into that? Were you referring primarily to kind of building at the CIP capability or there's some other businesses that we should be thinking about that now you feel you're in a better position to go out and accelerate marketing.

我想我只有一個問題——我想在電話會議一開始，Greg，你提到你覺得目前你們已經建立了在此階段所需要的許多架構，我也知道你談到了解決方案業務。但你能否再深入一點說明？你主要是指建立 CIP 的能力，還是還有其他我們應該關注的業務，使得你們現在覺得更有條件走出去加速行銷？

Well, I think it just allows you to leverage. When I look at our business and say you've got all these lines and you've got all this expertise in so many different places and having a group now that really interacts and has the kind of people at a level of experience that the rest of the CIOs respect and work with, it really -- it helps us in a lot of areas. It helps us just in how we communicate our views on where the markets are and tactical allocation views, where clients want to hear that. And part of our -- I think the difficulty we've had in delivering that as a firm has been that we were somewhat siloed, and are, and think that's important with investment teams to have independence, but we also have to have the ability to leverage and be tactical across these different groups to add outflow over time. I think that's what they're doing. And I think the customization that's out there, whether it's commingled trusts like you mentioned, whether it's separately managed accounts, these are all businesses now that we have more flexibility in addressing customized demands from clients and interest in whether it's a retirement income sleeve or an inflation-protected fixed income piece. We can do all that much more efficiently now. And having that, I think -- and even just the disparate pieces we had with quantitative and risk premia groups and AlphaParity now all under one group, it's just -- it's much better organized and I think simpler for the clients to kind of understand. So we just think that's going to be more and more important as we move from this product-driven brokerage world to more of a solutions, outcome and technology-driven world where they're going to be looking for specific tools to build the portfolio, and that's really what solutions allows you to do.

嗯，我認為這只是讓你能夠運用槓桿。當我看我們的業務並說你在這麼多不同的地方有所有這些產品線、也有這麼多專業能力，而現在有一個團隊真正彼此互動，並且擁有在經驗層級上能讓其他CIO尊重並願意合作的人才，這確實——在很多方面都幫助了我們。它也幫助我們更好地溝通我們對市場位置的看法，以及戰術性資產配置觀點，而客戶也希望聽到這些。而我們——我認為我們作為一家公司的交付難點之一在於，我們過去有些各自為政（現在也仍然如此），我認為投資團隊保持獨立性很重要，但我們也必須具備在這些不同團隊之間運用槓桿、進行戰術協同的能力，才能隨時間推進帶來更多資金流出（outflow）。我想這就是他們正在做的事。而且我認為市場上的客製化需求，不論是你提到的共同集合信託（commingled trusts），或是獨立管理帳戶（separately managed accounts），這些現在都是我們能更有彈性去回應客戶客製化需求與興趣的業務——不論是退休收入配置（sleeve）或是抗通膨的固定收益部位。我們現在都能更有效率地做到這些。而有了這些，我認為——甚至我們過去分散在量化與風險溢酬團隊以及AlphaParity的不同部分，現在都整合在同一個團隊之下，這就是——組織得更好，我認為對客戶而言也更容易理解。因此我們認為，當我們從以產品驅動的經紀世界，轉向更以解決方案、成果與科技驅動的世界時，這將變得愈來愈重要；屆時他們會尋找特定工具來建構投資組合，而這正是解決方案所能讓你做到的。

Our next question is coming from Brian Bedell of Deutsche Bank.

我們的下一個問題來自德意志銀行（Deutsche Bank）的Brian Bedell。

Really quick. Just -- Ken, I always ask you this, the cash balances of $6.8 billion, looks like that is net of everything. But what portion of that do you view as excess, excluding the working capital needs, which I think are still significant in overseas?

很快問一下。就是——Ken，我總是問你這個問題：現金餘額為68億美元，看起來這是扣除所有項目後的淨額。但其中有多少你視為超額（excess），排除營運資金需求（我認為海外的需求仍然相當可觀）？

We like to call it opportunistic capital.

我們喜歡把它稱為機會型資本（opportunistic capital）。

Or ammo.

或者彈藥。

Or ammo.

或者彈藥。

Yes, yes, even better.

是的，是的，更貼切。

And our current estimate is that, that number is between $3 billion and $4 billion.

而我們目前的估計是，那個數字介於30億到40億美元之間。

Okay. And then another one I usually ask you, but since you mentioned the cost saves [have an] ability to potentially reduce costs, the outsourcing of the some of the fund administration, you obviously -- we saw the Oppenheimer-Invesco deal. And a large part of that $475 million of cost saves they're getting is from outsourcing what has been internally done in Oppenheimer. Any consideration on your end for doing that? Or is that part of what you're thinking about for the potential to reduce cost? Or is that still a decision that's sort of in the distant future?

好的。然後再問一個我通常也會問你的問題：既然你提到節省成本（cost saves）有可能降低成本、以及將部分基金行政管理（fund administration）外包，你們顯然——我們看到Oppenheimer與Invesco的交易。他們所取得的4.75億美元節省成本中，很大一部分來自把原本在Oppenheimer內部完成的工作外包。你們這邊有沒有考慮這麼做？或者這是否就是你們在思考的、可能降低成本的一部分？還是說這仍然是一個相對遙遠未來才會做的決策？

It would -- no, it would absolutely be something that we would look at and -- as part of that exercise. So it was -- that was part of the laundry list that I went over. Having said that, I think it's important to keep in mind for us the low cost base that we have because of our presence in low-cost jurisdictions. So we need -- for an outsource provider, it needs to be global and it needs to be at a pretty cheap price for it to be compelling for us because of our low cost -- our low expense base and cost base.

會——不，我們絕對會把這當作我們會評估的事項之一——並且作為那項作業的一部分。所以——那確實是我剛才提到的那份長清單（laundry list）的一部分。不過，我認為重要的是要記住，對我們而言，我們之所以有較低的成本基礎，是因為我們在低成本司法管轄區（low-cost jurisdictions）有布局。因此我們需要——對外包服務提供者而言，它必須是全球性的，而且價格必須相當低廉，才會對我們具有吸引力，因為我們的低成本——我們的低費用基礎與成本基礎。

At this time, I would like to turn the floor back over to management for closing comments.

此時，我想把時間交還給管理層作結語。

Well, thank you for attending our call today, and thank you, Rich, for coming out here and Tom participating, and we are certainly excited about the future with Benefit Street Partners. Thank you.

好的，感謝各位今天參加我們的電話會議，也謝謝Rich特地來到這裡，以及Tom的參與；我們對與Benefit Street Partners合作的未來感到非常振奮。謝謝。

Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your participation. This concludes today's conference. You may disconnect your lines at this time, and have a wonderful day.

各位女士先生，感謝您的參與。今天的會議到此結束。您現在可以掛斷電話線，祝您有美好的一天。