AMC 電影院 (AMC) 2017 Q2 法說會逐字稿

Greetings, and welcome to the AMC Entertainment Second Quarter 2017 Conference Call. (Operator Instructions) As a reminder, this conference is being recorded. I would now like to turn the conference over to your host, John Merriwether, Vice President, Investor Relations for AMC Entertainment. Thank you, Mr. Merriwether. Please go ahead.

各位好，歡迎參加 AMC Entertainment 2017 年第二季電話會議。(接線員指示) 提醒各位，本次會議將被錄音。現在我想把會議交給本次會議主持人——AMC Entertainment 投資人關係副總裁 John Merriwether。謝謝您，Merriwether 先生。請開始。

Thank you, Bob. Good morning, everyone. I'd like to welcome you to today's call and those of you listening on the webcast to AMC's Second Quarter 2017 Earnings Conference Call. With me here this morning is Adam Aron, our Chief Executive Officer and President; and Craig Ramsey, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer.

謝謝你，Bob。各位早安。我想歡迎各位參加今天的電話會議，也歡迎透過網路直播收聽的各位，參加 AMC 2017 年第二季財報電話會議。今天早上與我一同出席的有：我們的執行長兼總裁 Adam Aron，以及執行副總裁兼財務長 Craig Ramsey。

Before I turn the call over to Adam, let me remind everyone that some of the comments made by management during this conference call may contain forward-looking statements, which are based on management's current expectations. Numerous risks, uncertainties and other factors may cause actual results to differ materially from those that might be expressed today. Many of these risks and uncertainties are discussed in our public filings, including our most recently filed 10-K and 10-Q.

在我把電話會議交給 Adam 之前，先提醒各位，管理層在本次電話會議中所發表的部分評論可能包含前瞻性陳述，這些陳述係基於管理層目前的預期。眾多風險、不確定性及其他因素可能導致實際結果與今日所表達者出現重大差異。其中許多風險與不確定性已在我們的公開申報文件中討論，包括我們最近提交的 10-K 與 10-Q。

Several of the factors that will determine the company's future results are beyond the ability of the company to control or predict. In light of these uncertainties inherent in any forward-looking statements, listeners are cautioned to not place undue reliance on these statements. The company undertakes no obligation to revise or update any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information or future events.

決定公司未來業績的若干因素超出公司可控制或可預測的能力範圍。鑑於任何前瞻性陳述所固有的不確定性，提醒聽眾不要過度依賴這些陳述。公司不承擔修訂或更新任何前瞻性陳述之義務，無論係因新資訊或未來事件所致。

On this morning's call, we may reference measures such as adjusted EBITDA, adjusted EBITDA margin and constant currency, which are non-GAAP financial measures. For a full reconciliation of our non-GAAP measures to GAAP results, please see our second quarter earnings release issued earlier this morning.

在今天早上的電話會議中，我們可能會提及調整後 EBITDA、調整後 EBITDA 利潤率以及固定匯率等指標，這些均為非 GAAP 財務衡量指標。如需我們非 GAAP 指標與 GAAP 結果之完整調節表，請參閱我們今天稍早發布的第二季財報新聞稿。

In conjunction with our second quarter earnings release, we encourage you to review the CFO commentary for the second quarter of 2017 that we published on our website with the earnings release. After our prepared remarks, there will be a brief question-and-answer session. This morning's call is being recorded, and a webcast replay will be available on the Investor Relations section of our website at amctheatres.com.

配合我們的第二季財報新聞稿，我們也鼓勵各位查閱我們在網站上隨同財報新聞稿一併發布的 2017 年第二季 CFO 評論。在我們的準備發言結束後，將有一段簡短的問答環節。今天早上的電話會議將被錄音，網路直播重播將可於我們網站 amctheatres.com 的投資人關係專區取得。

With that, I'll turn the call over to Adam.

接下來，我把電話會議交給 Adam。

Thank you, John. Good morning, everyone. We do intend to cover a lot of ground on this call today. And as part of that effort, after my prepared comments, Craig and I will try to answer as many questions as you have as long as that takes. In an attempt to add more clarity and be more transparent, we will be discussing information and sharing our perspective on a wide array of topics that should be helpful to you as you think about AMC and better allowing you to further shape your own opinions about us.

謝謝你，John。各位早安。我們確實打算在今天的電話會議中涵蓋許多議題。作為其中一部分，在我準備好的評論之後，Craig 和我會盡可能回答各位的問題，時間允許的話就會一直回答下去。為了讓資訊更清楚並提高透明度，我們將討論多項資訊並分享我們對廣泛議題的觀點，這些內容應能在各位思考 AMC 時提供幫助，並讓各位更能形成對我們的看法。

As virtually all of you know, these week on Tuesday, after the market closed, AMC thought it appropriate to issue a preview of our disappointing results for the second quarter of 2017 in advance of the long-scheduled formal earnings announcement and quarterly earnings call planned for Monday of next week after the market close. We were every bit as much frustrated as you were that we were, therefore, precluded from talking with you directly over the past 2.5 days and, potentially, could not talk with you for another 3.5 days still to go to share more color on the quarter just completed and on the choices that we've made that we believe will enable us to deliver better numbers and to increase shareholder value in the years ahead. So we moved Monday afternoon call to today, Friday morning, and here we are.

如同幾乎各位都知道的，本週二在收盤後，AMC 認為有必要在原本早已排定、將於下週一收盤後發布正式財報公告並舉行季度財報電話會議之前，先行發布 2017 年第二季令人失望的業績預告。我們和各位一樣感到沮喪，因為因此在過去 2.5 天內我們無法直接與各位對話，而且在接下來仍可能還有 3.5 天無法與各位溝通，無法就剛結束的季度提供更多細節，也無法說明我們所做出的選擇——我們相信這些選擇將使我們在未來幾年交出更好的數字並提升股東價值。因此我們把原定週一下午的電話會議提前到今天週五早上，於是我們現在在這裡。

Also, on Tuesday, AMC filed an 8-K with the SEC that, for the first time, gives you pro forma information on each of the 4 movie circuits: AMC, Carmike, Odeon and Nordic, in U.S. GAAP, with purchase accounting applied quarter-by-quarter as if we had owned all 4 circuits on January 1, 2016. This will make it possible for you to make year-over-year comparisons with 2017 and future years, both for our domestic and for our international operations, having each quarter in 2016 and full year 2016 as a historical base case.

同樣在週二，AMC 向 SEC 提交了一份 8-K，首次以美國 GAAP 並採用購併會計，逐季提供四個影城營運體系（AMC、Carmike、Odeon 與 Nordic）的備考（pro forma）資訊，假設我們自 2016 年 1 月 1 日起即擁有這四個體系。這將使各位能以 2016 年各季度及 2016 全年作為歷史基準，對 2017 年及未來年度進行年對年比較，涵蓋我們的美國本土與國際業務。

Last night, we issued 2 more press releases related to returning monies to shareholders. One, declaring a $0.20 per share quarterly dividend payable in September. That is the same dividend we have previously been paying. But given our new low share price and marking to market using last night's closing price as the denominator, the AMC annualized dividend, based on last night's close, represents a 5.3% yield. While boards only formally declare dividends quarter-to-quarter, we expect to continue our current dividend in the future without change.

昨晚，我們又發布了兩則與回饋股東資金相關的新聞稿。第一則宣布每股 0.20 美元的季度股利，將於 9 月支付。這與我們先前支付的股利相同。但鑑於我們目前較低的股價，並以昨晚收盤價作為分母進行市價衡量，按昨晚收盤價計算的 AMC 年化股利殖利率為 5.3%。雖然董事會僅會按季正式宣告股利，但我們預期未來將維持目前股利水準不變。

The other release last night announced that the AMC board, at its meeting yesterday, has authorized the initiation of a $100 million share buyback program valid over the next 24 months. As we said in the release, our board and management thinks that there's a disconnect between the current share price, essentially now near an all-time trading low, and our ability looking forward over the next several years to generate increasing earnings.

昨晚的另一則新聞稿宣布，AMC 董事會在昨日會議中已核准啟動一項 1 億美元的庫藏股回購計畫，有效期為未來 24 個月。正如我們在新聞稿中所述，我們的董事會與管理層認為，目前股價——基本上接近歷史交易低點——與我們展望未來數年創造逐步增加盈餘的能力之間存在落差。

We're under no illusions that mere words they will be sufficient. We know it's only if we actually generate improving financial results that more of you will share our bullishness on AMC's future prospects. Still, the new buyback effort tangibly expresses the company's confidence in itself, and our view, that AMC shares represent a compelling investment. Importantly, we will not increase our debt leverage in doing so, but instead, we'll fund the buyback from having recently identified about $200 million in nonstrategic assets that we believe it may be possible to monetize, none of which include the NCM shares that we also are expecting to sell at some point or points.

我們並不天真地以為僅靠言語就足夠。我們知道，只有當我們實際產生改善的財務結果時，才會有更多人認同我們對 AMC 未來前景的樂觀看法。儘管如此，新的回購行動以具體方式表達了公司對自身的信心，以及我們認為 AMC 股票具備吸引力的投資價值。重要的是，我們不會因此提高負債槓桿；相反地，我們將以近期辨識出的約 2 億美元非策略性資產作為回購資金來源，我們相信這些資產有可能變現；其中不包含我們也預期在某個時間點或多個時間點出售的 NCM 持股。

In that same buyback release of last night, I also expressed my own personal confidence in AMC, and that in this upcoming trading window that begins next week and ends in late September, I again will be buying AMC shares in the open market using personal monies. Of course, I have to do so under the advice of counsel so as to properly follow the strict rules associated with my being aside the company's buyback program.

在昨晚同一則回購新聞稿中，我也表達了我個人對 AMC 的信心，並表示在下週開始、至 9 月下旬結束的下一個交易窗口期間，我將再次以個人資金在公開市場買進 AMC 股票。當然，我必須在法律顧問的建議下進行，以便妥善遵循我在公司回購計畫之外所需遵守的嚴格規則。

It is my current intention to purchase approximately $500,000 in AMC shares by end September. That is in addition to previously having invested $1.8 million in personal monies on shares purchased in the open market above and beyond receiving AMC share grants as part of my compensation. We do think and act like shareholders because we are shareholders.

我目前的意圖是在 9 月底前買進約 50 萬美元的 AMC 股票。這是在我先前已以個人資金投入 180 萬美元、於公開市場買進股票之上；此外，我也曾因薪酬而獲得 AMC 股票授予。我們的思考與行動都像股東，因為我們就是股東。

Which takes us to this morning's earnings press release announcing Q2 2017 financial results with total revenues of $1.2 billion, adjusted EBITDA of $135.8 million and a net loss of $176.5 million, which included a $203 million impairment charge related to our National CineMedia investment. These results are in line with the preliminary preview we issued just a couple of days back.

這就帶我們來到今天早上的財報新聞稿，公告2017年第二季財務結果：總營收12億美元、調整後EBITDA為1.358億美元，以及淨損1.765億美元，其中包含與我們對National CineMedia投資相關的2.03億美元減損費用。這些結果與我們就在幾天前發布的初步預告一致。

However, to say that we're disappointed in these results would be an understatement. The quarter was simply a bust for AMC and was so for 4 reasons. First, as you know, we took a $203 million pretax impairment charge on our 38 million owned shares of National CineMedia, a company AMC helped found more than a decade ago. Purchase accounting marked those shares to market back in 2012. And on May 4, 2017, when NCM issued a somewhat bleak earnings report, their value fell by more than 1/3 immediately in just a matter of days.

然而，若說我們對這些結果感到失望都還算輕描淡寫。對AMC而言，本季表現簡直是一場潰敗，原因有4點。第一，如各位所知，我們對所持有的3,800萬股National CineMedia（AMC在十多年前協助創立的公司）計提了2.03億美元的稅前減損費用。收購會計在2012年已將這些股份按市價重估。而在2017年5月4日，當NCM發布一份相對黯淡的財報後，其價值在短短幾天內立刻下跌超過1/3。

Putting this impairment charge in perspective, this write-off is about $2.20 per AMC share pretax, less, of course, after the tax benefits kicked in. So the real cost to an AMC shareholder is more in the range of about $1.50 per AMC share after tax. Still, we are far from happy about it, and we can talk more about NCM during Q&A, should you wish.

就這筆減損費用而言，換算後這次沖銷約相當於每股AMC股票2.20美元的稅前影響，當然在稅務利益生效後會更低。因此，對AMC股東而言，實際成本大約落在每股AMC股票稅後約1.50美元的範圍。即便如此，我們仍遠談不上滿意；若各位願意，我們也可以在問答環節進一步談談NCM。

Second reason. The domestic industry box office was weak in the second quarter. Industry demand for movie-going in the last 8 weeks of Q2 were down. Going into the quarter, expectations were high all around that the second quarter film slate would feed off the first quarter's momentum and drive the box office to well above last year's second quarter levels.

第二個原因。第二季美國本土產業票房疲弱。第二季最後8週的觀影需求下滑。進入本季前，市場普遍高度期待第二季片單能延續第一季動能，推動票房遠高於去年第二季水準。

Just to take us back in time, a few months, as you will recall, the Q1 2017 domestic industry box office was up 4.5% and an all-time record. And the month of April was up 4.0% in box office admissions, on an industry basis, also an all-time record. But the May domestic industry box office was down by an abysmal 10.7%. June was minus 2.8%. The quarter fizzled out. The North American box office, which includes Canada, therefore, was down approximately 3.3% for the second quarter. But AMC doesn't have any theaters in Canada, so it is far more relevant to us is that the United States industry box office actually declined by even more, down by 4.4%.

稍微把時間拉回幾個月，各位應該記得，2017年第一季美國本土產業票房成長4.5%，創下歷史新高。而4月在產業層面的票房入場人次也成長4.0%，同樣創下歷史新高。但5月美國本土產業票房卻以慘不忍睹的10.7%幅度下滑。6月為-2.8%。整個季度後繼乏力。因此，包含加拿大在內的北美票房在第二季約下滑3.3%。但AMC在加拿大沒有任何影城，所以對我們更相關的是：美國產業票房實際下滑幅度更大，下降4.4%。

As the movie theater business is a high fixed cost, low variable cost business, and that is true for AMC as well, when revenues rise, our margins rise even faster. But when revenues fall, similarly, our margins fall even faster. And revenues in the United States, on an industry basis in Q2, were falling.

由於電影放映業屬於高固定成本、低變動成本的商業模式，AMC亦然，當營收上升時，我們的利潤率上升得更快。但當營收下滑時，同樣地，我們的利潤率也會更快下滑。而第二季在美國，從產業角度來看，營收正在下滑。

Of course, we were pleased that our European box office was roaring hot to the good in Q2, up a double-digit percentage, and validating our view that a European diversification made great sense for AMC. Indeed, in Q2, the Odeon circuit's total revenues, movie admissions as well as food and beverage were up 11.9%, 11.9% up over the pro forma year-over-year 2016 base case, in constant currency. And total revenues in Scandinavia through Nordic were an especially strong 20.9% year-over-year.

當然，我們很高興看到第二季歐洲票房表現火熱、以兩位數百分比成長，印證了我們的看法：對AMC而言，歐洲多元化布局非常合理。確實，在第二季，Odeon院線的總營收、觀影入場人次以及餐飲收入，在固定匯率下，相較於2016年第二季的備考（pro forma）基準年對年成長11.9%，也就是成長11.9%。而透過Nordic在斯堪地那維亞的總營收年對年成長更是強勁，達20.9%。

On a constant currency basis, the international segment increased adjusted EBITDA by 47% year-over-year to $23.5 million compared to the pro forma results for the second quarter of 2016. It was a big percentage, but smaller dollars, because Q2, seasonally, is often the smallest quarter of the year in Europe.

以固定匯率計算，國際事業部門的調整後EBITDA年對年增加47%，達2,350萬美元，相較於2016年第二季的備考結果。百分比很大，但金額較小，因為就季節性而言，第二季在歐洲往往是一年中最小的季度。

We are so confident about our coming success in Europe, in part, because we've already started the renovation projects that are a crucial element in the investment thesis that took us across the Atlantic in the first place. At least 7 theaters in the United Kingdom, renovations and new-builds should be in service, featuring reclining seating, by the end of 2017 or before, and 30 more such theaters should be completed in 2018.

我們對未來在歐洲的成功充滿信心，部分原因在於，我們已開始推動翻新工程；這些工程是當初促使我們跨越大西洋投資論點中的關鍵要素。至少在英國，預計到2017年底或更早，將有7家影城完成翻新或新建並投入營運，並配備可躺式座椅；另外還有30家同類型影城預計在2018年完成。

We are well on our way in Europe to implementing our strategy that we are highly confident will generate growth. However, as good as Europe was in Q2, the United States represents about 4/5 of our business and Europe represents only about 1/5. So the gains in Europe were more than counterbalanced by the weak American results in Q2.

我們在歐洲正穩步推進我們深具信心、將帶來成長的策略落地。然而，即便第二季歐洲表現再好，美國仍約占我們業務的4/5，而歐洲僅約占1/5。因此，歐洲的成長被第二季美國疲弱的表現所抵銷，且抵銷幅度更大。

Reason 3 out of 4 in Q2, we had margin pressure. Like many of you, we expected a strong Q2. In fact, on May 8, we were on the phone with most of you doing our first quarter call and talking about the record January to April and with seemingly big titles coming out often over what was then the next 7 weeks. But as we all know now, those big titles simply did not deliver.

第二季四個原因中的第三個原因，是我們面臨利潤率壓力。和各位許多人一樣，我們原本預期第二季會很強勁。事實上，5月8日我們在電話上與多數各位進行第一季法說，談到1月至4月創紀錄的表現，以及當時看來在接下來7週將頻繁上映的重量級片單。但如今大家都知道，那些大片並未如預期帶來表現。

Realizing that, we moved to look at creative ways to strip out costs and raise revenues. Peak day price surcharges were released into over 100 of our theaters over Memorial Day weekend for all of the summer, for example. Some Carmike theaters were wholly reconcepted, from so-called sub-run houses to first-run theaters instead. We took open job positions in our corporate headquarters, and we left them unfilled. Those are just 3 ideas out of many, many, many. We formed task forces to find extraordinary ways of profit improvement, some through cost cutting, some through revenue generation. And those task forces found some $30 million of benefit that we believe will be realized within the year 2017, but most of the benefits from those initiatives will show up in July to December rather than show up in June.

意識到這點後，我們開始尋找具創意的方法來削減成本並提高營收。例如，在國殤日週末起，我們在超過100家影城推出尖峰日加價（peak day price surcharges），並將其延續至整個夏季。部分Carmike影城也被全面重新定位，從所謂的二輪戲院改為首輪戲院。我們在公司總部的部分職缺則暫不補人。這只是眾多、眾多、眾多措施中的3項。我們成立了專案小組，尋找非同尋常的獲利改善方式，有些透過成本削減，有些透過營收創造。這些小組找出了約3,000萬美元的效益，我們相信可在2017年內實現，但多數效益將在7月至12月顯現，而非在6月。

It's true that our total operating costs in Q2 were held flat year-over-year in the United States, but that also means that the substantial savings we had in film exhibition costs were all absorbed by and offset by higher operating cost. Part of that higher cost, ironically, was because we specifically chose to make certain theater upgrades, for example, installing Coke Freestyle machines, more PLF auditoriums, training our new staff during the very second quarter because it was billed to be a blockbuster quarter, rising revenues, rising margins, that seemingly illogical time when we could cover some additional costs. But that was not the case. A record April became a hard May in just a matter of a few days, and margin pressure immediately became evident.

確實，我們在美國的第二季總營運成本年對年持平，但這也意味著我們在影片放映成本上的可觀節省，全部被更高的營運成本所吸收並抵銷。諷刺的是，部分較高成本是因為我們刻意選擇進行某些影城升級，例如安裝Coke Freestyle機台、增加更多PLF影廳，以及在第二季就訓練新進員工，因為當時第二季被預期是爆款季度：營收上升、利潤率上升，在那個看似不合邏輯、卻能承擔一些額外成本的時間點。但事實並非如此。創紀錄的4月在短短幾天內就變成艱難的5月，利潤率壓力也立刻顯現。

And then there's the fourth reason that explains Q2. Our legacy AMC theaters, the so-called -- legacy theaters are those that were in the AMC circuit prior to the acquisition of Carmike. Our legacy AMC theaters were stars, outperforming the industry, but our acquired Carmike theaters, most of which were only just coming into our AMC brand existence and network during the second quarter, were not stars.

接著還有第四個原因，用以解釋第二季（Q2）。我們的既有 AMC 影城——所謂的「既有影城」是指在收購 Carmike 之前就已納入 AMC 影城版圖的影城。我們的既有 AMC 影城表現亮眼、優於產業，但我們收購而來的 Carmike 影城——其中多數在第二季才剛開始納入 AMC 品牌體系與網路——表現就不那麼出色。

In Q2, against that U.S. industry box office that was down 4.4%, admissions revenue at legacy AMC theaters, by contrast, were down only 3.1%: legacy AMC down 3.1%, overall industry down 4.4%. That means that the legacy AMC theaters admissions revenue decline was 29.6% favorable to the U.S. overall average decline. By contrast, the newly-acquired Carmike theaters had a revenue decline of 11.3%: down 3.1% at AMC, down 4.4% across the country, down 11.3% at the acquired Carmike theaters. Clearly, that's worse than both the U.S. average and the legacy AMC performance.

在第二季（Q2），在美國整體票房較去年同期下滑 4.4% 的情況下，相較之下，既有 AMC 影城的入場人次收入僅下滑 3.1%：既有 AMC 下滑 3.1%，整體產業下滑 4.4%。這表示既有 AMC 影城入場人次收入的下滑幅度，相對於美國整體平均下滑幅度，有 29.6% 的相對優勢。相較之下，新收購的 Carmike 影城收入下滑 11.3%：AMC 下滑 3.1%，全國下滑 4.4%，收購的 Carmike 影城下滑 11.3%。顯然，這比美國平均以及既有 AMC 的表現都更差。

This is exactly as it was in Q1 of 2017. Remember, Carmike was acquired on December 21, 2016. In Q1, industry box office was up 4.5%. Legacy AMC admissions revenues were up 6.2%, a growth rate that was 37.8% faster than the industry average. But also in Q1, the acquired Carmike theaters were well below the normal level of industry admissions nationally, a big difference in performance between the theaters we've had for a long time and the theaters we've just gotten our hands upon.

這與 2017 年第一季（Q1）的情況完全一致。請記得，Carmike 是在 2016 年 12 月 21 日完成收購。在第一季，產業票房成長 4.5%。既有 AMC 的入場人次收入成長 6.2%，其成長率比產業平均快 37.8%。但同樣在第一季，收購而來的 Carmike 影城表現遠低於全國產業入場人次的正常水準；也就是我們長期持有的影城與我們剛接手的影城之間，存在顯著的績效差異。

We can discuss what's going on at the theaters within the Carmike heritage in far greater detail with you during Q&A. We have a lot of insight as to what's driving the difference in the legacy AMC theaters and the Carmike theaters. We have cross-departmental teams established and in place, wholly focused on improving the state of play within the former [role] of Carmike. But it is true today, as it was on the first quarter call, when we told you that we thought it might take the better part of a year, perhaps well into 2018, to turn Carmike around.

我們可以在問答環節（Q&A）與各位更深入地討論 Carmike 系統內影城究竟發生了什麼。我們對於既有 AMC 影城與 Carmike 影城之間差異的驅動因素，有相當多的洞見。我們已建立並部署跨部門團隊，專注於改善原 Carmike 體系內的營運現況。但如同第一季電話會議時我們所說的，今天仍然如此：我們認為要扭轉 Carmike 的局面，可能需要將近一整年的時間，甚至可能要延續到 2018 年。

Enough for now about Q2. Let me turn to the full year 2017. We do not want to hit you all with another earnings surprise, ever I might add, but especially not now in 2017 when many of you are predicting, and for good reason, that the domestic industry box office for Q3 is going to be a challenged one. Many of you are predicting that it could be down by more than 15% year-over-year across the entire industry. Fortunately, in this quarter, Q3, we are ahead of the power curve on reducing costs because we started back in the May-June time period. And our diversification to Europe again comes at a time when things are looking big for European movie-going in Q3.

關於第二季（Q2）先談到這裡。接下來我談談 2017 全年。我們不希望再讓各位遭遇任何一次盈餘意外——我補充一句，永遠都不想——但尤其不是在 2017 年這個時間點，因為你們當中許多人（而且理由充分）預期第三季（Q3）美國國內產業票房將面臨挑戰。許多人預測整體產業年對年可能下滑超過 15%。所幸在本季，也就是第三季（Q3），我們在降成本方面已走在前面，因為我們早在 5–6 月期間就開始著手。而我們向歐洲的多元化布局，也正好發生在第三季（Q3）歐洲觀影市場看起來將有亮眼表現的時點。

And then Q3 will end, and we will have Q4. The fourth quarter looks to be as strong, if not stronger than Q3 looks to be challenging. One great title after another after another after another is coming to the marketplace in the fourth quarter of 2017.

接著第三季（Q3）結束後，就會進入第四季（Q4）。第四季看起來將會很強勁，甚至可能比第三季所面臨的挑戰還要更強。2017 年第四季將有一部又一部、接連不斷的強檔作品上映。

Now there's complexity of turning 4 circuits into 1. And this year, there are clearly big swings between strong quarters in the first and fourth quarters this year contrasted against rougher quarters in the second and the third quarters this year. So for clarity and transparency, for the first time ever, AMC on Tuesday in our release formally issued earnings guidance for 2017. AMC has not done that before and is not the norm amongst publicly listed theatrical exhibitors. And for now anyway, we don't expect to continue issuing guidance in future years. But for this unusual year, you now have our viewpoint laid on your table.

把 4 個院線整合成 1 個院線本身就很複雜。而今年第一季與第四季的強勁，與第二季與第三季的相對艱難形成了明顯的落差。因此，為了清楚與透明，AMC 週二在我們的新聞稿中，史無前例地正式發布了 2017 年的盈餘指引。AMC 過去從未這麼做，這在上市的戲院放映業者中也並非常態。而至少就目前而言，我們也不預期未來年度會持續發布指引。但在這個不尋常的年度，你們現在已能清楚看到我們的觀點。

At a time when getting it right between us is critical, you don't have to guess what we're thinking and we won't have to struggle with a wide array of predictions in a world of Reg FD where it's difficult for us to set the record straight.

在我們彼此「把事情做對」至關重要的時刻，你們不必猜測我們在想什麼，而我們也不必在 Reg FD 的環境下，面對各式各樣的預測而疲於應對——在那樣的環境中，我們很難出面把事情說清楚、釐清紀錄。

Now completely changing gears. Over the last 60 to 90 days, we've met with and spoken to numerous investors and analysts. Those interactions have been very enlightening to us, and we've learned so much and have a much better sense of what intrigues you and what concerns you about AMC. And again, on this call, unlike in any way we have tried to do so far, we're going to speak quite openly, hopefully, briefly, but quite directly to reflect on 7 issues and some misperceptions related to AMC that seemed to be of the highest interest to you.

現在我們完全換個話題。在過去 60 到 90 天裡，我們與許多投資人及分析師會面並交流。這些互動讓我們收穫良多，我們學到了很多，也更清楚你們對 AMC 感興趣的點，以及你們對 AMC 的疑慮所在。同樣在這通電話會議上，我們將以不同於以往任何方式的做法，盡可能坦率——希望簡短，但會相當直接——來回應 7 個議題，以及一些與 AMC 相關、看起來最受你們關注的誤解。

Number one, the long game. We have built a company with global scale of fabulous product and marketing activity that resonates. We're working our tails off to perform. Even so, the trauma of Q2 pains us and Q3 will be no picnic, although, thank goodness, Q4 appears that it might just wind up saving everyone's bacon for calendar 2017. But even so, you should know that we are ever so confident of the prospects for AMC to create and deliver shareholder returns as we look ahead. We know how important it is for AMC to deliver earnings in 2018 and 2019 and 2020 so that, one day, we will not have to again endure the agony of our stock's recent declines. At the end of the day, it'll be delivering those numbers that will win the game for us and for you as owners or potentials owners of our company.

第一，長期戰略。我們打造了一家具備全球規模的公司，擁有出色的產品與能引起共鳴的行銷活動。我們全力以赴、拼命在把績效做出來。即便如此，第二季（Q2）的衝擊仍讓我們感到痛苦，而第三季（Q3）也不會輕鬆；不過，謝天謝地，第四季（Q4）看起來可能會在 2017 年曆年最後關頭「救大家一命」。但即便如此，你們也應該知道，展望未來，我們對 AMC 創造並交付股東報酬的前景仍然非常有信心。我們知道 AMC 在 2018、2019 與 2020 年交出獲利有多重要，如此一來，終有一天，我們就不必再承受近期股價下跌的煎熬。歸根結底，能否交出那些數字，將決定我們以及你們——作為公司股東或潛在股東——能否贏得這場戰役。

Item two, reducing leverage. We said all along that while we were willing to lever up for the right reason, and did so in our view, we were also then committed to deleveraging back -- right back down, first, to 4x EBITDA and then all the way down to 3.5x EBITDA. We said this is a clear priority for AMC, realizing that an especially artful balance needed to be struck with many attractive reinvestment opportunities with high returns, especially in renovating theaters staring at us within our business.

第二項，降低槓桿。我們一直以來都說，雖然我們願意在正確的理由下提高槓桿，而且就我們的觀點確實如此做了，但我們也承諾之後要去槓桿——先降回 4 倍 EBITDA，接著一路降到 3.5 倍 EBITDA。我們表示這是 AMC 的明確優先事項，同時也理解必須在許多具吸引力、且報酬率高的再投資機會之間取得特別精巧的平衡，尤其是我們業務中那些迫切需要翻新的影城。

But in talking to so many of you in the last few months, we think some of you doubted that we meant it. We mean it. In recent weeks, not because of increased uses of capital but because estimates of our EBITDA have been lowered, simple math means that our leverage is rising modestly.

但在過去幾個月與你們當中許多人交流後，我們認為你們之中有些人懷疑我們是否是認真的。我們是認真的。近幾週，並非因為資本使用增加，而是因為我們的 EBITDA 估計值被下調，簡單的數學計算意味著我們的槓桿率正在小幅上升。

It is among our highest priorities to delever. That is one of the reasons we've identified some $400 million of nonstrategic assets, which includes those NCM shares, capable of being monetized in a reasonable time frame. As a result, we now expect that we will get down to 4.1x leverage by the end of 2019 and down to 3.5x leverage by the end of 2020, and nothing would make us happier than to see if we can beat these time tables.

去槓桿是我們最高優先事項之一。這也是我們已辨識出約 4 億美元非策略性資產的原因之一，其中包括那些 NCM 持股，可在合理的時間範圍內變現。因此，我們現在預期到 2019 年底槓桿率將降至 4.1 倍，到 2020 年底降至 3.5 倍；若能提前達成這些時程，沒有什麼會比這更讓我們高興。

Item three, acquisitions are paused. We are literally thrilled by the company that we've built over the past 1.5 years, and built it was in major part through acquisition. However, to acquire anything else of size right now would require us taking on more debt, which conflicts with our absolute need and desire to delever. And at the current share price, we simply cannot, will not use our stock as a currency. So for those of you who wonder, acquisition activity is on dead stop at the moment.

第三項，併購暫停。我們對過去 1.5 年所打造的公司感到無比振奮，而這個打造在很大程度上是透過併購完成的。然而，若此刻再收購任何具規模的標的，將需要我們承擔更多債務，這與我們去槓桿的絕對需求與意願相衝突。而以目前的股價，我們根本不能、也不會把股票當作交易貨幣。因此，對於那些在想的人，目前併購活動已完全停止。

We recognize that our plate is full with the 3 recent acquisitions and our focus and our energy is being concentrated on their continued integration and the deployment of our recliners and other growth initiatives at our newly-acquired theaters.

我們認知到，最近三筆收購已讓我們的工作量滿載，我們的專注與精力正集中在持續整合它們，以及在新收購的影城導入我們的躺椅座位與其他成長計畫。

Issue four, Wanda. Our major shareholder, Wanda, has over the past 5 years been an extraordinarily smart, supportive and responsible investor in AMC. I cannot say enough how sincere we are in saying how grateful we are for their professionalism, their intelligence and their friendship. However, AMC operates as a standalone company with its own balance sheet and its own management team. We fund billions of dollars of theater makeovers and acquisitions, and have done so without once needing to seek capital from Wanda.

第四個議題，萬達。我們的大股東萬達，在過去 5 年一直是 AMC 極其聰明、支持且負責任的投資人。我們由衷感謝他們的專業、智慧與友誼，怎麼說都不為過。然而，AMC 以獨立公司運作，擁有自己的資產負債表與管理團隊。我們為影城翻新與併購投入數十億美元資金，且從未需要向萬達尋求資本。

There has been so much misreporting and wild speculation in recent weeks. So I'd like to say this. As to the governance and self-sufficiency of AMC, by far, the most likely outcome is the status quo.

近幾週出現了大量錯誤報導與天馬行空的揣測。因此我想說明這一點。就 AMC 的治理與自給自足而言，到目前為止最可能的結果就是維持現狀。

Issue number five, the power of recliners. Why legacy AMC theaters been relatively so strong? There are many factors, including the consumer loyalty program, we introduced AMC Stubs, now with some 9.3 million member households, strong and growing at a brisk pace. But clearly, among the biggest reason of them all is that about 2/5 of legacy AMC theaters are equipped with recliner seating, far more recliner-equipped theaters than any of our major competitors.

第五個議題，躺椅座位的威力。為何傳統 AMC 影城表現相對如此強勁？原因很多，包括我們推出的消費者忠誠計畫 AMC Stubs，目前約有 930 萬個會員家庭，且以相當快的速度強勁成長。但顯然，其中最重要的原因之一是：傳統 AMC 影城約有五分之二配備躺椅座位，躺椅配置的影城數量遠多於任何主要競爭對手。

Recliner-equipped legacy AMC theaters in Q2 of 2017 saw admissions revenues up 5.1% when the national average for admissions revenue across the country was down 4.4%. Even more intriguing and enlightening, while the AMC recliner-equipped theaters saw admission revenue up 5.1% in Q2, AMC theaters not equipped with recliners saw admissions revenue down 8.3%. That's a 1,340 basis point spread between the recliner-equipped theaters and the non-recliner-equipped theaters, and that's all within the same family of theaters, all branded AMC, AMC DINE-IN or AMC Classic.

2017 年第二季，配備躺椅的傳統 AMC 影城入場收入成長 5.1%，而全國入場收入平均則下滑 4.4%。更耐人尋味且具啟發性的是：當 AMC 躺椅影城在第二季入場收入成長 5.1% 時，未配備躺椅的 AMC 影城入場收入卻下滑 8.3%。這代表躺椅影城與非躺椅影城之間相差 1,340 個基點，而且都在同一個影城家族內，品牌皆為 AMC、AMC DINE-IN 或 AMC Classic。

We've been saying for years that recliners are the secret sauce. Many of you believed us. But in listening to you in all these meetings and phone calls we've been having over the past many weeks, we can hear that some of you are doubters. And if you're not doubters in the U.S., then perhaps, you're skeptical for European deployment.

多年來我們一直說，躺椅座位是成功的關鍵配方。你們當中許多人相信我們。但在過去幾週我們進行的各種會議與電話中聽你們的意見，我們也聽得出來你們之中有些人仍然存疑。如果你們在美國市場不存疑，那麼或許你們對在歐洲的導入仍抱持懷疑。

So at a time when we think it's imperative that we reestablish with you our credibility, we are releasing today, on this call, the most granular data we have ever released on recliner seat performance. We feel that if you were sitting where we're sitting with access to all the data that we see, you'd be just as eager to reinvest in recliner seating renovations as we are. The results are so compelling in driving growth and returns.

因此，在我們認為必須與各位重新建立可信度的此刻，我們今天在這通電話會議上，公布我們迄今釋出過最細緻的躺椅座位表現數據。我們相信，如果你們坐在我們的位置、能看到我們所看到的全部數據，你們也會和我們一樣迫切想再次投資躺椅座位翻新。這些結果在推動成長與報酬方面極具說服力。

So we published a couple of slides with today's earnings call, and I direct you to Slide #1 now. This table shows the average theater's growth in attendance and operating cash flow in the 12 months right after renovation was completed compared to the 12 months just before the renovation started. You'll see it broken out year-by-year for each of the 6 different project years from when we did our first theater to the end of '16. And there's no cherry-picking going on. The methodology for this table is shown on Slide 2. The data in this table represents almost half of all our theaters renovated between 2011 and 2016, and they've been carefully chosen to best reflect all of the theaters. We did this by picking theaters from 3 different tranches. Those theaters that had higher growth, that had medium growth and even had lower growth arising immediately after the theater's renovation.

因此，我們在今天的財報電話會議中發布了幾張投影片，現在請看第 1 張。這個表格顯示：在翻新完成後的 12 個月內，平均影城的觀影人次與營運現金流的成長，並與翻新開始前的 12 個月相比。你會看到它按年度拆分，涵蓋我們從第一家影城到 2016 年底的 6 個不同專案年度。而且我們沒有挑選有利數據。此表的方法論在第 2 張投影片中說明。表中的數據代表我們在 2011 至 2016 年間翻新的所有影城中將近一半，並且經過審慎挑選，以最能反映整體影城狀況。我們是透過從 3 個不同批次中挑選影城來做到這點。這些影城包含翻新後立即出現較高成長、中等成長，甚至較低成長的案例。

On average, each of our renovated theaters, you can see it here, over the course of the last 6 years, saw attendance growth rising by 57% on average and operating cash flow going up by 225% on average. Even in the 3 most recent project years when some of you might think that the low-hanging fruit had already been plucked, average attendance was up 33% and operating cash flow was up 157% in the first year upon a theater's recliner facelift and redo.

平均而言，你們可以在這裡看到，在過去 6 年中，我們每一家完成翻新的影城，觀影人次平均成長 57%，營運現金流平均成長 225%。即使在最近 3 個專案年度——你們當中有些人可能認為容易摘取的果實已被摘完——在影城完成躺椅改裝與翻新後的第一年，平均觀影人次仍成長 33%，營運現金流成長 157%。

There are so many ways we're going to try to prove to you what we constantly see, what we've been saying to you for years now, that upgrading our theaters continues to generate immediate and sizable growth.

我們將用許多方式來向各位證明我們一直看到的、也多年來一直告訴你們的：升級我們的影城仍能立即且大幅地帶來成長。

Item six, maintenance CapEx, free cash flow and investment CapEx. When you look at our CapEx program, you need to know that only about $160 million of our annual capital expenditure outlays are for maintenance CapEx spending, which leaves hundreds of millions of dollars of free cash flow within AMC's business each year. The question is then, what's the way -- the best way to use those monies to maximize the returns for our shareholders?

第六項，維護性資本支出（maintenance CapEx）、自由現金流與投資性資本支出（investment CapEx）。當你檢視我們的資本支出計畫時，你需要知道，我們每年資本支出中只有約 1.6 億美元用於維護性 CapEx，這使 AMC 的業務每年仍可產生數億美元的自由現金流。接下來的問題是：要如何——以最佳方式運用這些資金，為股東最大化報酬？

There are many options. But we've been choosing to reinvest those monies back in our business optionally because there are such attractive financial returns available to us with theater renovations and the installation of recliner seats, as we just demonstrated. If at any time those attractive returns do not continue to materialize, and in any case, just a few years from now, once the most obvious returns in the virgin Odeon and the virgin Carmike circuits have been mined, we can nimbly reallocate free cash flow to uses other than reinvesting in our theaters in ways that are those that are produced the best creation of value for AMC shareholders.

有很多選項。但我們一直選擇把這些資金視情況再投資回我們的業務，因為如同我們剛才所展示的，影城翻新與安裝躺椅座椅能為我們帶來非常具吸引力的財務報酬。如果在任何時候這些具吸引力的報酬不再持續實現，而且無論如何，幾年之後，當在尚未開發的 Odeon 與尚未開發的 Carmike 影城線路中最明顯的報酬已被挖掘殆盡時，我們可以靈活地將自由現金流重新配置到除再投資影城之外的用途，以採取最能為 AMC 股東創造價值的方式。

Seven. We clearly said there's maintenance CapEx and there's investment CapEx, and they have -- and that their uses have been different and can be different. In fact, our investment capital expenditures are ample, no doubt about that. But right now, they are being prudently reduced. Realizing that the expected sale of NCM shares will likely to bring in some $100 million less cash than envisioned at the start of the year, we have reduced our 2017 CapEx spending by that same $100 million figure. We have accomplished these reductions after a disciplined approach to call through lesser-priority projects. It also demonstrates that should it be wise to reallocate capital to other missions, including as, but one example, a return to the monies to shareholders, AMC can turn on a dime to do so.

第七。我們已清楚說明有維護性資本支出（maintenance CapEx）與投資性資本支出（investment CapEx），而且它們——以及其用途——一直不同，也可以不同。事實上，我們的投資性資本支出相當充足，這點毋庸置疑。但目前我們正審慎地加以縮減。鑑於預期出售 NCM 股份可能帶來的現金將比年初設想少約 1 億美元，我們已將 2017 年的 CapEx 支出同樣下調 1 億美元。我們是在以嚴謹的方式逐一檢視並刪減較低優先順序專案後，完成這些縮減。這也顯示，若將資本重新配置到其他任務是明智之舉——例如把資金回饋給股東——AMC 也能迅速轉向、立即執行。

Our current CapEx guidance for calendar year 2017, including maintenance CapEx, but net of landlord contributions, which continue to be robust, is between $500 million and $550 million. For the first time today, we're also providing net CapEx guidance for calendar year 2018. We're expecting net CapEx for 2018 to be between $450 million and $500 million. Again, this reflects spending approximately $100 million less than we might otherwise have planned had the expected proceeds from NCM share sales been correspondingly higher.

我們目前對 2017 日曆年度的 CapEx 指引（包含維護性 CapEx，但扣除房東出資；房東出資仍然強勁）為 5 億至 5.5 億美元。今天我們也首次提供 2018 日曆年度的淨 CapEx 指引。我們預期 2018 年淨 CapEx 將介於 4.5 億至 5 億美元。同樣地，這反映出我們的支出約比原本可能規劃的少 1 億美元；若 NCM 股份出售的預期收益相應更高，我們原本可能會規劃更多支出。

That's it. Thank you for participating on this call. We hope that we've given you new and useful information and given you our perspective as to our thinking and our priorities in a clear and decisive way.

就到這裡。感謝各位參與本次電話會議。我們希望已以清楚且果斷的方式，提供各位新的、有用的資訊，並分享我們對思考方向與優先事項的觀點。

With that, operator, let's please turn to questions.

接下來，接線員，請進入提問環節。

(Operator Instructions) Our first question comes from the line of Eric Handler with MKM Partners.

(接線員指示) 我們的第一個問題來自 MKM Partners 的 Eric Handler。

I actually got 2 questions for you. First, let's look at your expenses in the second quarter. Your rent expense was about $200 million, and that's about a $17 million sequential increase from the first quarter. So was all of that attributable to Nordic? And is that a good go-forward number to use in subsequent quarters? And then along with that, it looks like the other line in G&A of $46 million, that's up about $12 million sequentially. And what accounted for that? Was that all Nordic or were -- there were some investment spending? Or what can you do with regards to that line? And then for my second question, when you look at $400 million of nonstrategic assets, so you've got National CineMedia, press reports have Open Road getting sold. I'm just curious, beyond that, are you considering any of the Carmike assets possibly selling some of those underperforming or maybe small market theaters? Or how are you getting to that $400 million number?

我其實有兩個問題。第一個，來看你們第二季的費用。你們的租金費用約 2 億美元，較第一季季增約 1,700 萬美元。所以這全部都歸因於 Nordic 嗎？而且這是否是後續季度可用的合理水準？另外，G&A 裡的其他項目為 4,600 萬美元，季增約 1,200 萬美元。這是由什麼造成的？那也全都是 Nordic 嗎，還是——有一些投資性支出？或者你們對這一項目有什麼可以做的？第二個問題，當你們提到 4 億美元的非策略性資產時，你們有 National CineMedia，媒體報導 Open Road 正在出售。我想了解的是，除此之外，你們是否也在考慮 Carmike 的某些資產，例如出售一些表現不佳或可能是小市場的影城？或者你們是如何得出 4 億美元這個數字的？

So thank you. I'll take the second question, and we'll get Craig on the numbers associated with your expense questions. On the monetizing of what we're calling nonstrategic assets, about half of it is the NCM shares. They -- I can neither confirm nor deny what was printed on The Wall Street Journal. But if it were to happen, that would obviously bring cash to the door. Similarly, I think many of you, especially those of you who also cover hospitality, appreciate the fact that being asset-light is a smart thing to do and that it's better to lease the real estate than own the real estate as a public company. It turns out that we found out that we've got about -- out of 650 theaters, we've got about 40 that we own which is under 10%. Depending upon how many of those we might sell and then lease back, so we would keep the theaters and not lose the screens, but we would sell the underlying real estate, that could bring in as much as $100 million or more. And then there are lots of other items that we found. Some of them are on the confidential side, and we're better off not to talk about them until we can figure out a way to most intelligently monetize them. But that gives you a couple of the biggest items, Eric.

謝謝。我先回答第二個問題，然後請 Craig 說明與你費用問題相關的數字。關於我們所稱的非策略性資產變現，其中約一半來自 NCM 的股份。對於《華爾街日報》所刊登的內容，我既不予證實也不予否認。但如果真的發生，那顯然會帶來現金入帳。同樣地，我想你們很多人——尤其也覆蓋旅宿業的各位——都明白採取輕資產（asset-light）模式是明智的，對一家上市公司而言，租賃不動產通常比持有不動產更好。結果我們發現，在 650 家影城中，我們自有的約有 40 家，低於 10%。視我們可能出售並回租（sell and lease back）的數量而定——也就是我們保留影城、不流失銀幕，但出售底層不動產——這可能帶來高達 1 億美元或更多的資金。此外，我們也發現了許多其他項目。其中一些屬於機密性質，在我們找出最明智的變現方式之前，暫時不便談論。但以上已提供你幾個最大的項目，Eric。

Okay. On the rent, the run rate, Eric, for the remaining 2 quarters is between 195 and 200 each quarter. So it is the impact of the final -- of bringing Nordic in to the -- to those results, and of course, we'll experience those fully in the last 2 quarters of the year. G&A is high, a little high in the second quarter due to some -- we had some onetime legal cost and some other consulting. But it's somewhere in the $37 million to $40 million is a good range for each quarter going forward, at least for the third and fourth quarter.

好的。關於租金的趨勢水準（run rate），Eric，接下來兩個季度每季介於 1.95 億到 2 億美元。所以這確實是把 Nordic 納入結果的影響，當然，我們會在今年最後兩個季度完整反映這些影響。第二季的 G&A 偏高、略高一些，是因為有一些——我們有一次性的法律費用以及其他顧問費用。但往後每季落在 3,700 萬到 4,000 萬美元是個不錯的區間，至少對第三季與第四季而言。

Okay. And then just as a quick follow-up then. As you look at the cost structure, are we pretty much -- to what extent are all those cost synergies reflected in the numbers? Or are there some cost synergies still left to go?

好的。那我再快速追問一下。當你們看成本結構時，目前數字在多大程度上已反映所有成本協同效益？或者還有一些成本協同效益尚未實現？

On the synergy side, there's more left to go. We had estimated about $35 million for Carmike and $10 million for the Odeon Nordic Circuit on a full run rate basis, so $45 million in total. As we're tracking it, it looks like our capture of the $35 million in 2017 will be somewhere in the range of $22 million to $26 million and most all of the 10 -- so we'll have more to -- that'll be in the full 2017 year. There'll be more of the Carmike remaining to pick up in the 2018 year, and then most of the Odeon falls into 2018.

就協同效益而言，還有更多尚待實現。我們估計 Carmike 在完整趨勢水準（full run rate）下約 3,500 萬美元，Odeon Nordic 線路約 1,000 萬美元，合計 4,500 萬美元。依我們目前追蹤，2017 年我們對 Carmike 的 3,500 萬美元協同效益捕捉，將落在約 2,200 萬到 2,600 萬美元的區間，而 1,000 萬美元中的大部分——因此我們還會有更多——這些將反映在 2017 全年。Carmike 剩餘的部分將在 2018 年再取得更多，而 Odeon 的大部分則落在 2018 年。

Our next question comes from the line of David Miller with Loop Capital Markets.

我們的下一個問題來自 Loop Capital Markets 的 David Miller。

Two questions. So what was the blended admissions revenue per screen in the second quarter? Clearly, Carmike was an issue, yet again, with admissions revenue per screen down 11.3%. I don't know, maybe I was wrong. I had thought that you guys had kind of ameliorated that problem intra-quarter? I'm just wondering why it's bringing numbers down yet again. What exactly is going on there, Adam? Is it a slate issue? Do you think it was a slate issue in the second quarter? What's going on operationally at the ex-Carmike stuff that you think that you can ameliorate this issue in the near term? And then I have a follow-up.

兩個問題。那麼第二季每銀幕的混合入場（票房）收入是多少？顯然，Carmike 又一次成了問題，因為每銀幕入場收入下滑了 11.3%。我不知道，也許是我錯了。我原本以為你們在季度進行中已經某種程度緩解了這個問題？我只是想知道為什麼它又再次把數字拉下來。Adam，那邊到底發生了什麼？是片單（上映片目）問題嗎？你覺得第二季是片單問題嗎？在前 Carmike 的那些資產在營運上到底出了什麼狀況，讓你認為短期內可以緩解這個問題？然後我還有一個追問。

Sure. Q2, it's such a -- I mean, I am sure as I was trying to say in my prepared remarks, Q2 was such a weird quarter. April was up 4% and a record April, and May is off 11% and horrible. So the theaters all -- so the theaters just performed so differently in April than they did in May. And then you have the vagaries of various titles, which, do -- some, as you know, play much better in AMC markets and some play much better in Carmike markets. And it's actually one of the reasons we found Carmike attractive, because we thought that across the whole of the circuit, no matter what was playing, it would be attractive to some part of our more national clientele. In terms of -- so that's why I think that what you're calling the intra-quarter performance look like it went left turn, right turn in the same quarter. That is how the whole quarter acted. But having said that, we mentioned this a little bit on the first quarter call, as we went back and looked, in 8 of the 12 months in '16, Carmike, as a circuit, had declining market share, including 3 of the past -- 3 of the 4 months between September and December, it had declining market share. When you look at what Carmike as a company did between April and December to modernize its circuit after it put itself under contract to be sold, it didn't do very much. And so the circuit essentially went on dead stop around April-ish of -- remember, we put them under contract in March, April-ish of '16, and we didn't get to change that until December of '16. What we found is that we've already gone through each of the several hundred Carmike theaters one by one with this -- across the top -- departmental team that I've told you about, and there are literally 6 different reasons that tend to come up most often as to what's going on in a particular theater. And the reasons are quite different from each other, and the solutions, therefore, are quite different from each other. I mentioned in a little comment about May that we've moved 5 Carmike theaters from sub-run to first-run, which means you can take the price up from $3 to $8 or $3 to $9, and lo and behold, it was successful. And so by July, we had moved 10 more Carmike theaters in -- from sub-run to first-run. So just that one issue fixes 15 of the Carmike theaters. I'll give you another. When Carmike was handed over to us on December 21, only 200,000 individuals from their loyalty program joined our loyalty program. Even though

當然。第二季，這真的是一個——我是說，我確定就像我在事先準備的發言中試著表達的，第二季是一個非常奇怪的季度。4 月成長 4%，而且是創紀錄的 4 月；但 5 月下滑 11%，非常糟。所以各家影城——所以影城在 4 月的表現和 5 月的表現差異非常大。再加上不同片名的各種不確定性；如你所知，有些片在 AMC 市場表現更好，有些片在 Carmike 市場表現更好。而這其實也是我們覺得 Carmike 有吸引力的原因之一，因為我們認為在整個院線範圍內，不管上映什麼片，對我們更全國性的客群中的某一部分都會有吸引力。就——所以我認為你所說的季度內表現，看起來像是在同一個季度裡先左轉、再右轉。整個季度就是這樣運作的。不過話說回來，我們在第一季電話會議上也稍微提到過：我們回頭看，2016 年 12 個月中有 8 個月，Carmike 作為一條院線的市占率是在下滑的；其中 9 月到 12 月的 4 個月裡，有 3 個月市占率下滑。當你看 Carmike 這家公司在 4 月到 12 月之間、在簽約出售之後為了讓院線現代化所做的事情，其實並不多。因此整個院線基本上在大約 4 月左右就停滯了——記得我們在 2016 年 3 月簽約，2016 年 4 月左右就差不多停住了，而我們直到 2016 年 12 月才有辦法去改變這種狀況。我們發現，我們已經把數百家 Carmike 影城逐一檢視過——由我跟你提過的那個跨部門高層團隊一起——而且確實有 6 個最常出現的原因，解釋某一家特定影城到底出了什麼狀況。而這些原因彼此差異很大，因此解決方案也彼此差異很大。我在談到 5 月時稍微提過，我們把 5 家 Carmike 影城從二輪片（sub-run）調整為首輪片（first-run），這代表票價可以從 3 美元提高到 8 美元或從 3 美元提高到 9 美元，而結果證明非常成功。因此到了 7 月，我們又把另外 10 家 Carmike 影城從二輪片調整為首輪片。所以光是這一個問題就能改善 15 家 Carmike 影城。我再舉另一個例子。Carmike 在 12 月 21 日交接給我們時，他們的會員忠誠計畫只有 20 萬人加入了我們的會員忠誠計畫。儘管

-- even though, at the same time, AMC has over 9 million people from our loyalty program coming -- stemming out of the -- by then, it would have been about 7 million in the loyalty program. So we've had to start the loyalty program essentially over from scratch. And I'm happy to report that we're like at 0.75 million now. We now have more members of the loyalty club, who enrolled in a Carmike theater in, whatever it is, 6 months, 7 months, than Carmike's had in years and years of operation of its loyalty program. But those are 2 examples of many and there are many. And it's going to take us a good year to essentially turn around Carmike. So I do think this is going to continue with us until '18. And Craig wanted to add something.

——儘管同一時間，AMC 的會員忠誠計畫有超過 900 萬人——追溯回去——到那時候大概是 700 萬會員。所以我們基本上必須從零開始重建忠誠計畫。我很高興可以回報，我們現在大約到 75 萬了。我們現在在 Carmike 影城註冊加入會員俱樂部的人數，在不管是 6 個月、7 個月的時間裡，就已經超過 Carmike 多年、多年營運其忠誠計畫所累積的會員數。但這只是眾多例子中的兩個，還有很多很多。而我們大概需要整整一年時間，才能實質上把 Carmike 扭轉過來。所以我確實認為這種情況會持續到 2018 年。Craig 也想補充一些。

Yes, David. The point I would make on the AMC circuit, as Adam talked about earlier, was tracking better than the industry, Carmike clearly didn't. One of the things that affected the Carmike results is there was less family-oriented product in the market. Certainly, last year with Jungle Book and Finding Dory, really played strong for them in the second quarter of '16. And you just didn't see that type of big-play, family-oriented tiles in 2017. So that had a pretty big impact on the Carmike circuit as well.

是的，David。我想就 AMC 院線補充的一點是，如 Adam 先前談到的，AMC 的表現追蹤上是優於產業的，但 Carmike 顯然不是。影響 Carmike 結果的其中一件事是，市場上家庭導向的片子比較少。當然，去年《與森林共舞》和《海底總動員2》在 2016 年第二季對他們的帶動非常強。而在 2017 年，你就沒有看到那種能大賣、且以家庭為導向的片名。所以這也對 Carmike 院線造成了相當大的影響。

Okay. And then just a follow-up, on PVOD right now, it just feels like this thing is going to die a slow death. I mean, there's just no consensus amongst the major studios on when the window would start. There's no consensus on which films are going to be involved. There's no consensus on what the pricing structure is going to look like, what the splits are. Disney has already said that it doesn't want to participate. Adam, in your discussions with your studio partners, do you feel like anyone else wants to opt out or may opt out? Or what does it feel like to you?

好的。然後再追問一下，關於目前的 PVOD，感覺這件事會慢慢走向消亡。我是說，各大影業公司對於上映窗口何時開始完全沒有共識。對於哪些電影會納入也沒有共識。對於定價結構會長什麼樣子、分潤怎麼分，也沒有共識。迪士尼已經表示不想參與。Adam，在你和片廠夥伴的討論中，你覺得還有其他人想要退出或可能退出嗎？或者你自己的感覺是怎樣？

Thank you. Thank you, David. So we had a series of investor meetings and lunches in mid-May, especially in New York and Boston, because we were so troubled that our share price was falling despite having released Q1 earnings where we beat The Street by 20%. And we literally, days and days, devoted to meeting with investors. Those conversations, from our perspective, were less about marketing the AMC story and they were more about trying to listen to the people we were meeting with to understand what was on their mind. And there is no doubt that was on their mind was PVOD, PVOD, PVOD. And it was driving investors bonkers that there was uncertainty on this topic and they didn't know it yet -- they didn't know the outcome. We took that quite seriously. And I requested emergency meetings with a lot of studio CEOs. And over the past 8 weeks, I personally have had one-on-one meetings with 5 different studio CEOs solely dedicated to the issue of PVOD. And I can tell you categorically, there is -- no one is close to resolution on this matter. There are not 2 studios who agree on what should be done. Obviously, we can't talk to our competitive movie theater circuits, so we don't. But there is -- as you just described, there is no industry consensus. This thing has been under discussion now since -- I've been at it since December of '15, so I'm in 18 months already. Based on the conversations I've had, if I had to make a bet or if I had to give you my assessment, I would say that the odds of whatever happening being good for exhibitors has a higher probability of happening than whatever happens being bad for exhibitors. Now that's a professional judgment based on this. And people change in their mind and do different things and say different things tomorrow than they said yesterday. But there is one thing, I think, I can say categorically. I do not expect that this issue is going to be resolved in 2017. And I don't think you're going to see PVOD occur in the United States in 2017. I say that with a caveat that, of course, I could be wrong. But that is our view based on being in the room over and over and over and taking this matter very seriously. So how it ends up? We will never know until -- "It ain't over until it's over," right, Yogi Berra said. But it's clearly not moving to a speedy implementation, which has been the fear of several people that we talked to a few months back.

謝謝。謝謝你，David。所以我們在5月中旬安排了一系列投資人會議與午餐，特別是在紐約與波士頓，因為我們非常困擾：儘管我們已公布第一季財報、較市場預期高出20%，股價卻仍在下跌。而我們確實一連好幾天都投入在與投資人會面。從我們的角度來看，那些對話與其說是在行銷AMC的故事，不如說更是在試著傾聽我們所見投資人的想法，了解他們在意什麼。毫無疑問，他們心裡想的就是PVOD、PVOD、PVOD。而這個議題的不確定性讓投資人抓狂，因為他們還不知道——他們不知道結果會是什麼。我們非常嚴肅地看待這件事。我也要求與多位片廠CEO召開緊急會議。在過去8週裡，我個人已與5位不同的片廠CEO進行一對一會談，而且都只聚焦在PVOD這個議題。我可以明確地告訴你：在這件事上——沒有人接近達成解決方案。沒有任何兩家片廠對該怎麼做有一致看法。顯然，我們無法與競爭的電影院線討論，所以我們也不會。但正如你剛才所描述的——整個產業並沒有共識。這件事從——我自2015年12月開始就一直在處理，所以到現在已經18個月了。根據我所進行的對話，如果要我下注或給你我的評估，我會說：不論最後發生什麼，對放映業者有利的機率，高於對放映業者不利的機率。這是基於上述情況所做的專業判斷。而人們會改變想法，明天做的事、說的話也可能跟昨天不同。但有一件事我想我可以斷言。我不預期這個議題會在2017年獲得解決。我也不認為你會在2017年看到PVOD在美國發生。我這麼說仍保留但書，當然，我也可能判斷錯誤。但這是我們的看法，基於我們一次又一次在會議室裡參與討論，並且非常嚴肅地看待此事。所以最後會怎麼收場？在——「不到結束就不算結束」，Yogi Berra不是這麼說的嗎。但很明顯，它並沒有朝著快速落地推進；而這正是幾個月前我們與一些人交談時，他們所擔心的情況。

Our next question comes from the line of Eric Wold, B. Riley.

下一個問題來自Eric Wold，B. Riley。

A couple of questions. One, I guess, Craig, I want try to connect the dots a little bit between kind of capital allocation with the CapEx plans, the buyback announcement. So I can understand you're cutting the CapEx guidance for this year basically by the amount of lost proceeds from NCMI and kind of making that similar comment into next year, especially given that the $200 million of incremental nonstrategic assets beyond NCMI, the timing of sale of those is always going to be uncertain and probably less near term. But kind of the decision process in it, too, if you move into next year and you can get the $200 million of non-NCMI proceeds and kind of see that come in, what is the thought between upping CapEx for next year versus doing a buyback, given what you can see as the returns from that and just how much you're praising the benefits of these recliner reseats and the long-term benefits that drives the company?

我有幾個問題。第一個，我想，Craig，我想把資本配置、資本支出（CapEx）計畫以及回購公告之間的關聯稍微串起來。所以我理解你們把今年的CapEx指引下調，基本上等同於NCMI帶來的處分收益流失的金額，並且對明年也做了類似的說法；尤其考量到除了NCMI之外，還有額外2億美元的非策略性資產，其出售時點一向不確定，而且可能更不會在短期內發生。但也想問一下你們的決策思路：如果進入明年，你們能取得那2億美元（非NCMI）的處分收益並看到資金進來，那在提高明年的CapEx與進行回購之間，你們如何取捨？畢竟你們看到的回報，以及你們一直在稱讚這些躺椅座椅改裝（recliner reseats）的效益與其對公司帶來的長期好處。

So I'm actually going to take that one because I've been associated with companies who bought back a lot of stock over the years. And both as a director and as a CEO, we did not announce this initiative to buy $100 million worth of stock lightly. And I grant you that I think I used the word artful. We have to have an artful balance between going after growth when we see projects in front of our eyes that can generate growth and increase our returns. But we are expecting to spend $450 million, $500 million. That's a serious chunk of change even it is reduced from what it might otherwise have been. I suspect that we will be investing more in our theaters than anyone else. But the artful balance is that there are 2 other things that we think are important for AMC to do. It's not just that we renovate theaters. We think it is extraordinarily important to delever. And so we will make sure that we do that as we outlined on this call. And we think it is also extremely important that, given how attractive the investment returns will be, in our opinion, if we can buy shares in AMC at the levels where they are trading now and where they traded at recently, we also think that we can get very compelling returns and very strong returns on investment by buying our stock. And so being smart in how you balance those 3 things, because they are conflicting objectives. But we do believe that we will succeed on all 3, that we will continue to renovate more theaters than anybody else, getting the growth returns from -- that we laid out on this call. It's just stunning what we see when we can get into the correct theater with the correct renovation and pull it off. But at the same time, we're going to get the buybacks accomplished. And at the same time, we're going to delever the business. Fortunately, we found some liquidity opportunities to fund it all because we found, as we said, $400 million of assets that we think we can sell.

這題我來回答，因為多年來我曾在一些大量回購股票的公司任職。無論是以董事或CEO的身分，我們都不是輕率地宣布這項回購1億美元股票的計畫。而且我承認，我想我用了「巧妙」這個詞。當我們眼前看到能帶來成長、提升報酬的專案時，我們必須在追求成長與其他目標之間取得巧妙的平衡。但我們預期將投入4.5億到5億美元。即使相較於原本可能的水準有所下調，這仍是一筆相當可觀的金額。我猜我們在戲院投資上的金額會高於任何其他同業。但所謂巧妙的平衡，是因為我們認為AMC還有另外兩件重要的事要做。不只是翻新戲院而已。我們認為降低槓桿（delever）極其重要。因此我們會如同本次電話會議所說明的，確保做到這一點。同時我們也認為非常重要的是：以我們的觀點，若能在目前以及近期的交易價位買進AMC股票，鑑於其投資報酬的吸引力，我們也能透過回購自家股票取得非常具吸引力、非常強勁的投資報酬。因此，如何聰明地在這三件事之間取得平衡，因為它們彼此是相互衝突的目標。但我們相信三者都能成功：我們會持續翻新比任何人更多的戲院，並取得我們在本次電話會議所闡述的成長報酬——當我們能進入合適的戲院、做出正確的翻新並把它落實時，我們所看到的成果令人震撼。但同時，我們也會完成回購。同時，我們也會降低公司的槓桿。幸運的是，我們找到了一些流動性機會來為這一切提供資金，因為如我們所說，我們找到了約4億美元、我們認為可以出售的資產。

Okay. On the CapEx, I guess, for this year and for next year, can we get a sense of what the, I guess, broad allocation is between legacy AMC, Carmike and Odeon? Is there a plan to shift more to Carmike to try to correct the ills that you're seeing there? Or is it better to push more towards legacy AMC, where you know that it's working?

好的。關於CapEx，我想問今年與明年之間，大致上在傳統AMC、Carmike與Odeon之間的分配比例大概是怎樣？是否有計畫把更多資本轉向Carmike，以修正你們在那裡看到的問題？或者把更多資本投入到傳統AMC更好，因為你們知道那邊的做法是有效的？

So there will be some legacy AMC theaters that get renovated, we're not stopping. But if you look at that chart that we gave you on the recliner seats, even though the returns are -- and these aren't -- this is not ROI percentage, this is actually literally growth in attendance and growth in operating cash flow. The numbers are currently stunning. But if you look back in the first year, they were even higher. And that's because when you do the first ones, if you have a brain in your head, you'd do the theater where you could think you're going to get the best return. And so we have 2 virgin circuits. I call them virgin circuits because they have no recliner seat auditoriums in any quantity. And so yes, we are moving monies from the AMC circuit to the Carmike circuit and the Odeon circuit because the biggest eye-popping returns may come out of the first theaters that we do in each of those circuits if we pick the right theaters. And so it is a strategy to go after the lowest-hanging fruit in the Carmike and Odeon circuits rather than chase the 173rd AMC theater, where there -- it may be a little harder. The other issue is that you've seen that some -- that recliner seat theaters outperform non-recliner seat theaters. And in buying Odeon and in buying Carmike, we thought that we could improve the performance of those circuits. And one of the ways we thought we could improve those circuits was by going to theaters that had high potential but weren't actually realizing their potential, renovate the theater and turn it in -- we'd give you a technical industry term, turn it from a pig to a superstar literally on the strength of a renovation. So yes, to answer your question, strategically we're not stopping the renovation of AMC-branded theaters. But we will move a lot of monies into the Carmike and Odeon circuits. With respect to the Carmike theaters, you should also remember that about 150 of them have already been rebranded as AMC theaters. So even though they came to us as Carmike theaters and we or you may describe them as legacy Carmike theaters or former Carmike theaters, to the consumer, they're actually AMC theaters now. And so the consumer is actually going to continue to see us renovating AMC theaters in quantity. And I can further say that the only theaters we're likely to renovate within the Carmike circuit would be those that are either in the AMC brand or the AMC DINE-IN brand, not the ones in the AMC Classic brand.

因此，會有一些既有的 AMC 影城會進行翻新，我們不會停止。但如果你看我們提供給你們那張關於躺椅座位的圖表，儘管回報是——而且這些不是——這不是 ROI 百分比，這其實是實打實的觀影人次成長與營運現金流成長。目前的數字非常驚人。但如果你回頭看第一年，數字甚至更高。那是因為當你做第一批時，只要腦袋清楚，你就會先挑你認為能拿到最佳回報的影城來做。因此我們有 2 個「處女」院線。我稱它們為處女院線，因為它們幾乎沒有任何數量的躺椅座位影廳。所以是的，我們正把資金從 AMC 院線移到 Carmike 院線與 Odeon 院線，因為如果我們挑對影城，在這些院線各自第一批翻新的影城，可能會帶來最令人瞠目結舌的回報。因此，策略上我們是去摘 Carmike 與 Odeon 院線中最低垂的果實，而不是去追第 173 家 AMC 影城；在那裡——可能會更難一些。另一個議題是，你也看到有些——配備躺椅座位的影城表現優於非躺椅座位的影城。而在收購 Odeon 與收購 Carmike 時，我們認為可以提升這些院線的表現。我們認為能改善這些院線的方法之一，是鎖定那些潛力很高但尚未真正發揮的影城，翻新影城並把它——用一個技術性的產業術語來說——僅靠翻新之力，就把它從一頭豬變成超級巨星。所以是的，回答你的問題，策略上我們不會停止翻新 AMC 品牌影城。但我們會把大量資金投入 Carmike 與 Odeon 院線。至於 Carmike 影城，你也應該記得其中約有 150 家已經重新品牌化為 AMC 影城。所以即使它們當初是以 Carmike 影城的身分加入我們，而我們或你們可能會把它們描述為既有 Carmike 影城或前 Carmike 影城，但對消費者而言，它們其實現在就是 AMC 影城。因此，消費者實際上仍會持續看到我們大量翻新 AMC 影城。我還可以進一步說，在 Carmike 院線中我們最可能翻新的影城，只會是那些屬於 AMC 品牌或 AMC DINE-IN 品牌的影城，而不是 AMC Classic 品牌的影城。

Our next question comes from the line of Ben -- Stan Meyers with Piper Jaffray.

我們的下一個問題來自 Piper Jaffray 的 Ben——Stan Meyers。

So I wanted to dig a little deeper into reseats. Obviously, your core legacy AMC has done extremely well. But then your non-reseated theaters weren't -- I guess, underperformed industry as well. Are you seeing that as a result of competition? I know many chains are -- your competitors are accelerating the reseats. Maybe you can talk to what is happening in those specific DMAs and maybe what's driving the underperformance of your core non-reseated AMC theaters.

我想更深入探討一下重新換座（reseats）。顯然，你們的核心既有 AMC 表現非常好。但你們那些尚未重新換座的影城——我想——表現也低於產業。你們是否認為這是競爭所致？我知道很多連鎖業者——你們的競爭對手正在加速進行重新換座。也許你可以談談在那些特定的 DMA（指定市場區域）發生了什麼，以及是什麼在驅動你們核心、未重新換座的 AMC 影城表現落後。

It's very similar to what we saw when we introduced the new theater format in 1995. We were the first. Ultimately, the industry copied the format, stadium seating. And the attendance gets redistributed as more new theaters came onboard. The same thing is happening here and we're seeing it as well. We were a first mover. And so what's happening to the portion of the circuit that is not improved, that hasn't been touched yet, is that they are competitively impacted by theaters that have been reseated by competitors in the local market. That's the primary factor. The performance of films is what it was and what it has been. What's changed is that there has been a reseated theater come into the market, thus the emphasis on continuing to reseat and where we can to be a first mover.

這和我們在 1995 年推出新影城格式時看到的情況非常相似。我們是第一個。最終，產業複製了這種格式——階梯式座位（stadium seating）。隨著更多新影城加入，觀影人次會被重新分配。同樣的事情現在也正在發生，我們也看到了。我們是先行者。因此，院線中尚未改善、尚未被動到的那一部分，會在當地市場受到競爭對手已完成重新換座的影城所影響。這是主要因素。影片的表現一如既往、也一直如此。改變的是：市場上出現了重新換座的影城，因此我們才強調要持續進行重新換座，並在可行之處成為先行者。

Our next question comes from the line of Chad Beynon with Macquarie.

我們的下一個問題來自 Macquarie 的 Chad Beynon。

Just one on the filing the other night, which was super helpful for us to understand the seasonality, particularly for the international business. Was there a reason why you weren't able to disclose this? Or did you kind of just gather the information? Just trying to get a better sense of why this was just kind of released when it was released. And then I have a follow-up.

我想問一個關於你們前幾晚提交的那份申報文件的問題；那對我們理解季節性非常有幫助，特別是國際業務。你們之前無法揭露這些資訊是有什麼原因嗎？還是你們只是後來才把資訊彙整起來？我只是想更清楚了解，為什麼這些內容會在那個時間點才被釋出。然後我還有一個追問。

Okay. Well, let me take a bit of a historical perspective here on what we provided to the market and start by saying there are 2 things at work in these underlying pro formas. One is purchase accounting. Any time you do an acquisition, you revalue the assets. That's typical of all this type of transactions. Second, in this case and unique to this case, is taking, in the case of Odeon, U.K. GAAP financial statements and recasting them into U.S. GAAP for every quarter and for the full year. And that's a considerable effort. Likewise, for Nordic, the restatement of their formally issued IFRS financial statement GAAP into U.S. GAAP. So you've got 2 things going on that took a considerable amount of work. The first pro forma that we put out back in October of 2016, we did put out a U.K. GAAP to U.S. GAAP version of the Odeon financial statements for the 2 quarters ended June 30, 2016. We filed Article 11 pro formas on Odeon on November 30. And that was again both purchase accounting and the reflection of the conversion from U.K. to U.S. GAAP. The November pro formas included 3 quarters ended September 30, 2016. We updated those pro formas in February of 2017, when we completed the Carmike acquisition. There was no GAAP restatement there. But certainly, with the pro forma of their financial results into those GAAP financials, and that was for 9 months ended 2016. And then we issued Odeon U.K. GAAP to U.S. GAAP and Carmike for the full 2016 year. We issued those pro formas on March 13, 2017. Now to your question, what happened with Nordic. Once again, we had to convert IFRS to U.S. GAAP and we had to do the purchase accounting. We received the reports from our -- the consultants we were using to make those GAAP conversions. And remember, the transaction closed on March 28, and we received the fair value accounting report from our consultants on June 30. So we then recast internally all of those pro forma statements. And it wasn't until Monday of this week that all of that work had gotten completed and gotten through the review by our accountants that looked at the quarterly financial statements that put us in a position to issue the full pro forma statements. So it was really a matter of getting the work done, recasting their GAAP to our GAAP, in the case of Nordic, having the experts that we use on the purchase accounting, getting their report, recasting it, having it reviewed. It was available to us on Monday and -- not available to us, it was available June 30. We worked it, it was available and scrubbed and reviewed and available for us to release on Monday. We did it as quickly as we possibly could.

好的。那我先從一點歷史角度來看我們向市場提供了什麼，並先說明在這些底層備考（pro forma）數字中有兩件事在運作。第一是收購會計（purchase accounting）。任何時候你做併購，都會對資產重新估值。這是此類交易的典型作法。第二點，在本案中且是本案特有的，是以 Odeon 為例，將英國 GAAP 財務報表在每一季以及全年都重編（recast）為美國 GAAP。而這是一項相當大的工作量。同樣地，對 Nordic 而言，是把其正式發布的 IFRS 財務報表準則重述（restatement）為美國 GAAP。所以你同時有兩件事在進行，且都需要相當多的工作。我們在 2016 年 10 月發布的第一份備考資料中，確實提供了 Odeon 截至 2016 年 6 月 30 日止兩個季度的英國 GAAP 轉美國 GAAP 版本財務報表。我們在 11 月 30 日就 Odeon 提交了第 11 條（Article 11）備考資料。那份同樣包含收購會計，以及反映從英國 GAAP 轉換為美國 GAAP。11 月的備考資料涵蓋截至 2016 年 9 月 30 日止三個季度。我們在 2017 年 2 月完成 Carmike 收購時更新了那些備考資料。那裡沒有 GAAP 重述。但當然，將其財務結果以備考方式納入那些 GAAP 財務報表中，涵蓋的是 2016 年截至 9 個月的期間。接著我們發布了 Odeon 英國 GAAP 轉美國 GAAP，以及 Carmike 的 2016 全年資料。我們在 2017 年 3 月 13 日發布了那些備考資料。現在回到你的問題，Nordic 發生了什麼。同樣地，我們必須把 IFRS 轉為美國 GAAP，也必須做收購會計。我們收到了我們所使用的顧問所出具的報告——他們負責進行那些 GAAP 轉換。請記得，交易在 3 月 28 日完成交割，而我們在 6 月 30 日收到顧問提供的公允價值會計（fair value accounting）報告。因此我們接著在內部把所有那些備考報表重新編製。直到本週一，所有工作才完成，並通過我們會計師對季度財務報表的審閱，使我們得以發布完整的備考報表。所以這真的就是把工作做完：把他們的 GAAP 重編成我們的 GAAP；以 Nordic 為例，還要等我們用於收購會計的專家出具報告、再重編、再審閱。它在週一對我們而言是可用的——不是對我們可用，它在 6 月 30 日就已可用。我們持續處理，並在週一之前完成清理（scrub）與審閱，讓我們可以在週一對外發布。我們已盡可能以最快速度完成。

Wow, great, okay. Craig, that's super helpful. And just sticking on that topic, I know when you guys originally had the Nordic conference call, you talked about some minority interest or JV theaters that would also maybe be confusing. Could you kind of flush that out if those are included in your annual guidance for 2017 or if the profits will come below the EBITDA line? And that's all for me.

哇，太好了，好的。Craig，這非常有幫助。同樣延續這個主題，我知道你們最初開 Nordic 的電話會議時，提到一些少數股權或合資（JV）影城，可能也會讓人困惑。你能否更詳細說明一下：這些是否已納入你們 2017 年的年度指引，或是其獲利會落在 EBITDA 線以下？我就這些，謝謝。

Sure. The statements that you're talking about are -- the entities that you're talking about are around -- it's about 50 theaters at Nordic. And these are theaters that we own 49%. They don't qualify for consolidation into our financial statements, so they're not included in our revenues and the expenses. But there is an equity in earnings, non-consolidation equity in earnings accounting. But those assets, it's very close to consolidation. We have representation on the board. We approve operating budgets. There are a number of other things that, in essence, give us control to where we feel that's appropriate to include them in our financials. And they add pretty significantly to our market share in those countries. In the case of Sweden, they take us from 70% to 90% market share; Finland, 65% to 70% -- 75%; and over 25% in Norway. So we think it's justified to include our share of adjusted EBITDA. You'll see that -- in the pro forma statements, you'll see that each quarter coming in as attributable EBITDA. And as we thought about the guidance that we gave, it's also included in the guidance that we gave.

當然。你提到的報表——你提到的那些實體——大約是 Nordic 的 50 家影城。這些影城我們持有 49%。它們不符合併入（consolidation）我們財務報表的條件，因此不會納入我們的營收與費用。但會以權益法認列收益，也就是非合併的權益法收益會計處理。不過這些資產其實非常接近可併表的狀態。我們在董事會有代表席次。我們核准營運預算。還有許多其他事項，本質上讓我們具備控制力，因此我們認為將其納入我們的財務資訊是適當的。而且它們對我們在那些國家的市占率提升相當顯著。以瑞典為例，會把我們的市占率從 70% 提升到 90%；芬蘭從 65% 提升到 70%——75%；挪威則超過 25%。因此我們認為把我們份額的調整後 EBITDA 納入是合理的。你會看到——在備考報表中，你會看到每一季都以可歸屬（attributable）的 EBITDA 方式呈現。而在我們思考所提供的指引時，也同樣把它納入了我們給出的指引之中。

Our next question comes from the line of Jason Bazinet with Citi.

我們的下一個問題來自 Citi 的 Jason Bazinet。

One, I'd like to go back to the buyback question. I think if I am doing the math right, the CapEx guidance that you gave was about $1 billion over 2 years and the maintenance portion over 2 years was about $400 million, so $600 million being allocated towards growth initiatives.

第一，我想回到庫藏股回購的問題。如果我算得沒錯，你們給的資本支出（CapEx）指引是兩年約 10 億美元，而兩年中的維護性支出部分約 4 億美元，所以有 6 億美元是分配到成長計畫上。

Maintenance will be $320 million -- no we said maintenance was $160 million so that's $320 million.

維護性支出會是 3.2 億美元——不，我們說維護性支出是 1.6 億美元，所以兩年合計是 3.2 億美元。

Okay, $320 million. So let's call it $700-ish million, $600 million, $700 million of capital married up against the $100 million 2-year buyback target. So let's call it $6, $7 of growth CapEx for $1 of buybacks. The reason that confuses me is that the -- maybe 5 years ago, when you guys first talked about these recliner reseats, you talked about 100% cash-on-cash return. I'm assuming that assumes that no competitor comes in and follows your efforts to do a recliner reseat, which I think would diminish those returns. And then your stock was 100%, it's what, $16 now. It wasn't that long ago when it was $32. So 100% cash-on-cash return. And the reason that's happened is because the market, the capital markets, have essentially taken the EBITDA miss and capitalized it at 7x EBITDA as if it's a permanent impairment as opposed a one-time undulation. So if I was on the board, I would be allocating $6 or 7 to my buyback for every $1 of growth CapEx. I'd almost do the mirror image of what you just articulated today. So if you could answer that, that would be helpful. My second question is -- yes, go ahead.

好的，3.2 億美元。那我們就算大概 7 億左右、6 億到 7 億美元的資本，對照兩年 1 億美元的回購目標。所以大概是每 1 美元回購，搭配 6 到 7 美元的成長型資本支出。讓我困惑的原因是——也許 5 年前，你們第一次談到這些躺椅（recliner）改裝換座時，你們提到現金對現金（cash-on-cash）報酬率是 100%。我假設那是建立在沒有競爭對手進來跟進你們做躺椅改裝的前提下；如果競爭對手跟進，我認為會降低那些報酬。然後你們的股價曾經是 100%——現在是多少，16 美元。不久之前還是 32 美元。所以是 100% 的現金對現金報酬率。而之所以會發生這種情況，是因為市場、資本市場，基本上把 EBITDA 的未達標（miss）用 7 倍 EBITDA 來資本化，彷彿那是永久性損害，而不是一次性的波動。所以如果我是董事會成員，我會把每 1 美元的成長型 CapEx，配置 6 或 7 美元去做回購。我幾乎會做出你們今天剛剛表述的鏡像配置。所以如果你能回答這點，會很有幫助。我的第二個問題是——對，請繼續。

Well, I'll let Craig give you the professional answer and I'm going to give you the flip CEO answer. It seems what happened is that the investment banker I use of choice is Citibank. And I got in a rip-roaring argument sometime over the past month saying, "Why don't we have a higher buyback program, even if we have to cut back CapEx to do it," and your own institution just given me hundreds of pages of paper and hours of reasons why we're doing it the right way. And the biggest argument against what you just said, because I was making the same arguments to your institution that you were just making to our institution, is that it's not enough just to buy back your stock, you also have to deliver growth. And when you have opportunities that are as attractive as we have to upgrade our theaters, we should take those opportunities. That's in a nutshell. Now listen, what's the more dignified CFO answer?

好吧，我先讓 Craig 給你專業的答案，我則給你一個比較不正經的 CEO 答案。看起來發生的情況是，我偏好的投資銀行是花旗銀行。而在過去一個月的某個時候，我跟他們吵得不可開交，說：「為什麼我們不把庫藏股計畫做大一點，就算必須縮減資本支出（CapEx）來做也行？」而你們自家機構給了我幾百頁文件、花了好幾個小時解釋為什麼我們現在的做法才是對的。而對你剛才所說最大的反駁是——因為我也用同樣的論點跟你們機構辯論、就像你剛才用同樣的論點跟我們機構說的一樣——光是回購自家股票還不夠，你還必須交出成長。而當我們有像升級影城這麼具吸引力的機會時，我們就應該把握這些機會。大致就是這樣。那麼，聽著，更體面的 CFO 答案是什麼？

I don't know if it's more dignified. Jason, the early returns were a 1-year payback. And as we've said, on an ongoing basis, we didn't expect them to stay because -- at those levels because we knew that others would...

我不知道那算不算更體面。Jason，早期的回報是一年回本。而且如同我們說過的，從長期來看，我們不預期它們會維持在——維持在那樣的水準，因為我們知道其他人會……

Come in, right?

會進來，對吧？

Would come in. And so what's happened is returns had declined. But they're still well above our threshold of 25%. And particularly when we look at, as Adam called them, the virgin territory or the highest opportunity that's available in our Carmike circuit and certainly in the Odeon, we don't expect 100% returns in those situation, because in certain of the Carmike markets, they've already had some reseats. And I think there will be fairly fast copy in Odeon as well going forward, but we'll have a first-mover advantage. So we're not thinking of 100% return, but we are thinking of certainly over the 25% return that's our basic investment threshold. We think that's also the case today and going forward for a stock buyback, the math that we do around it. Now as the price changes, our thinking will change. But as we see -- yes, go ahead.

會進來。所以發生的情況是，報酬率已經下滑。但仍然遠高於我們 25% 的門檻。尤其當我們看 Adam 所稱的「處女地」或在我們 Carmike 影城版圖中可取得的最高機會，當然在 Odeon 也是如此；在那些情況下我們不預期會有 100% 的報酬率，因為在 Carmike 的某些市場，他們已經做過一些座椅改裝。我認為未來在 Odeon 也會很快出現跟進者，但我們會有先行者優勢。因此我們不會以 100% 報酬率來思考，但我們確實認為會明顯高於 25% 這個基本投資門檻。我們也認為，今天以及未來對於股票回購也是如此——我們做的數學計算是這樣。當然，隨著股價變動，我們的想法也會改變。但就我們所看到的——對，請說。

No, that's my point. I mean, I have no idea when you had conversations with any banking team. But I would think that it wasn't at $15 or $16 a share. I mean, it was 2 days ago, you were trading in the low 20s. 2 months ago, you were trading in the mid-20s. So I'm just saying this is a dynamic situation. It strikes me as a very rare opportunity to buy back your stock at a low price. But it's up to you, I appreciate the color. Let me ask...

不，我的意思就是這個。我的意思是，我不知道你什麼時候跟任何銀行團隊談過。但我想那應該不是在每股 15 或 16 美元的時候。我是說，就在兩天前，你們還在 20 出頭交易。兩個月前，你們在 20 中段交易。所以我只是說，這是一個動態的情況。在我看來，能在低價回購自家股票是非常罕見的機會。但這取決於你們，我感謝你提供的背景。我再問……

Jason, I promise you, we were on the phone with the banking teams after the stock fell down to $15 a share. And by the way, it might have been at 11:00 at night because I -- it did catch our attention where our stock was trading.

Jason，我向你保證，在股價跌到每股 15 美元之後，我們就和銀行團隊通過電話了。而且順帶一提，可能是在晚上 11 點，因為——我們確實注意到我們的股票當時的交易價位。

This is our first buyback.

這是我們第一次做回購。

Not my first buyback.

不是我第一次做回購。

I know. But it's the company's first buyback, Jason. And there's always an opportunity to alter the program. But this is the first one. And so we said we thought it'd be appropriate, first step was $100 million.

我知道。但這是公司第一次做回購，Jason。而且永遠都有機會調整這個計畫。但這是第一次。所以我們說，我們認為第一步做 1 億美元是合適的。

And Craig said there's an opportunity. Obviously, he's right. He means there's an opportunity to upsize the program if that makes sense to do as we go down the road.

而 Craig 說有機會。顯然，他是對的。他的意思是，如果在未來推進過程中這樣做合理，我們有機會把計畫規模放大。

Okay, helpful. Let me ask a sort of a strange question. Have you ever been approached by a financial institution? Or have you ever asked a financial institution to essentially price some sort of derivative based on the box-office volatility such that if the box fell, the institution would pay you money? And if the box was ripping, you'd pay them money and there would be some fee associated with that, but it would sort of smooth out the volatility, similar to the merits of the Carmike acquisition that you cited earlier but doing it across whole circuit?

好，這很有幫助。我問一個有點奇怪的問題。你們是否曾被某家金融機構接觸過？或者你們是否曾要求某家金融機構，基本上針對票房波動去報價某種衍生性商品，讓你們在票房下滑時由該機構支付你們一筆錢？而如果票房大賣，你們就付錢給他們，並且會有某種費用，但它可以某種程度上平滑波動性，類似你們先前提到收購 Carmike 的好處，但把它套用到整個院線？

I will give the flippant CFO answer. I actually have a letter in my files from a company that years ago wanted to do exactly that. It's on their letterhead, I'll send it to you. It was Enron. I mean, I'm serious. I haven't been approached on that recently, but there -- I do you have that letter, and we didn't act on it. But I haven't had anyone inquire of recent.

我給你一個比較不正經的 CFO 答案。其實我檔案裡有一封信，是多年前有家公司想做的正是這件事。信上有他們的抬頭，我可以寄給你。那家公司是安隆（Enron）。我是認真的。最近沒有人就這件事來接觸我，但——我確實有那封信，而我們當時沒有採取行動。但近來沒有人詢問。

By the way, I love Citibank. And I wasn't trying give you or your bankers a hard time. Whether it's coming from you or them, we have gotten great advice from Citibank.

順帶一提，我很喜歡花旗銀行。我並不是想為難你或你們的銀行家。不論是你或他們提出的，我們都從花旗銀行得到很好的建議。

Ladies and gentlemen, our next question comes from line of Lawrence Dann-Fenwick with Crédit Suisse.

各位女士先生，我們的下一個問題來自 Crédit Suisse 的 Lawrence Dann-Fenwick。

Actually, it's Omar from Crédit Suisse. Just I've got 3 questions, a couple for Craig and one for Adam if possible. Craig, just want to clarify the comments you made about CapEx for next year. Were you saying that the reduction in CapEx that you've guided to, is that -- are you -- can you just kind of clarify whether or not that is in non-recliner investment? I just want to make sure that you aren't reducing recliner investment in 2017 and 2018. That's the first question. And second is on the $30 million of incremental EBITDA you're guiding to the rest of 2017. Could you just kind of say how much of that is revenue and how much of that is cost, and then how much of that will roll forward into 2018? That would be helpful. And then the last questions are for Adam. And that's on 2018 box office. I mean, Adam, you -- obviously, the slate this year is very strong, includes Star Wars at the end of this year. I'm just wondering what gives you confidence that 2018 will be up versus 2017, given that obviously you won't have a main Star Wars film, which could be, I don't know, 2% or 3% of the entire year in 2017 and why you won't have a step-down in U.S. domestic box office next year?

其實我是 Crédit Suisse 的 Omar。我有 3 個問題，如果可以的話，其中兩個問 Craig，一個問 Adam。Craig，我想釐清你對明年資本支出（CapEx）的評論。你是說你們所指引的 CapEx 下調，是——你能否釐清那是否發生在非躺椅（recliner）投資上？我只是想確認你們在 2017 和 2018 年並沒有減少躺椅投資。這是第一個問題。第二個問題是關於你們指引 2017 年剩餘期間增加的 3,000 萬美元 EBITDA。你能否大致說明其中有多少來自營收、有多少來自成本，以及其中有多少會延續到 2018 年？那會很有幫助。最後的問題是問 Adam。關於 2018 年票房。Adam，你——顯然今年片單非常強，包含今年底的《星際大戰》。我只是想知道，在 2018 年顯然不會有一部主要的《星際大戰》電影（在 2017 年可能占全年 2% 或 3%）的情況下，你為什麼有信心 2018 年會比 2017 年成長？以及為什麼你不認為明年美國國內票房會下滑？

Your first question was about how the -- what kind of a composition of the guidance. And we didn't give specific by-category guidance. We think the maintenance for next year will still be around the $160 million of the $450 million to $500 million. We're pushing out kind of some CapEx from all initiatives, whether it's our large format, some recliner and some food and beverage. So it's kind of pushing out. I'd say we are reducing some of the maintenance from a technology perspective and signage. We actually had some rebranding. It's probably a good portion of it, some rebranding in the Carmike circuit that we're pushing out. The other point I would say is that we are moving some U.S. recliner deployment and reallocating to Odeon and again the Carmike circuit because again we think that the return opportunity is better in those 2 situations versus what we originally thought. So it is kind of across the board. There is some recliner, but the biggest chunk, I guess, would be the branding piece.

你的第一個問題是關於——指引的構成是什麼樣的。而我們沒有提供按類別拆分的具體指引。我們認為明年的維護性支出仍將約為4.5億至5億美元中的1.6億美元左右。我們正在把各項計畫的一些資本支出（CapEx）往後遞延，不論是我們的大型影廳、部分躺椅座椅，或是餐飲。所以基本上是在往後推。我會說，我們在科技面與標示（signage）方面，正在降低部分維護性支出。我們其實做了一些品牌重塑。其中相當一部分，可能是我們在 Carmike 院線的部分品牌重塑支出正在往後遞延。另外一點是，我們正在把部分美國的躺椅座椅部署往後移，並重新配置到 Odeon，以及同樣配置到 Carmike 院線，因為我們認為在這兩種情況下的回報機會，比我們原先想的更好。所以這是全面性的。有一些是躺椅座椅，但最大的一塊，我想，會是品牌相關的部分。

With respect to the box office in '18, since people couldn't predict accurately in April what's going to happen in May of '17, I don't know that we can say with certainty that we know how '17 or '18 is going to do. But when you look at the titles that are coming out in the fourth quarter of '17, and it's far beyond Star Wars, even though Star Wars is Star Wars, it's the gift from heaven. But there are so many great movies coming out in the fourth quarter. We have to feel bullish about the fourth quarter. And hopefully, it will be big enough to match the weakness in the third quarter. For the people who do this for a living, whether it's the executives of studios with whom our people talk every day or our own people, we have a staff department of about 60 people who do all of our film buying, when we talk to them, they are very excited, both the people at studios and the experts here, on the whole array of titles that are coming out in '18. I haven't heard anybody tell me with absolute certainly whether '18 will be even with '17, ahead of '17 or slightly behind '17. And as I remind you, people in April couldn't accurately predict May. So I think some of this is going to turn out to be, as movies are released, are critics and consumers, excited and thrilled and delighted? Having said that, from what we see, '18 is going to be a very strong year.

關於2018年的票房，由於人們在2017年4月都無法準確預測2017年5月會發生什麼，我不確定我們能否有把握地說我們知道2017或2018會表現如何。但當你看2017年第四季即將上映的片單時，遠不只《星際大戰》，儘管《星際大戰》就是《星際大戰》，簡直是上天的禮物。但第四季還有非常多優秀的電影要上映。我們必須對第四季感到樂觀。並希望它的強度足以彌補第三季的疲弱。對於以此為業的人來說，不論是我們的人每天都在交流的各大製片廠高層，或是我們自己的人——我們有一個約60人的部門負責所有影片採購——當我們和他們談時，無論是片廠的人還是我們這裡的專家，對2018年將上映的整體片單都非常興奮。我沒有聽到任何人能百分之百肯定地告訴我，2018年會與2017年持平、超過2017年，或略低於2017年。而且我提醒你，大家在4月都無法準確預測5月。所以我認為其中一部分將取決於電影上映後，影評與消費者是否感到興奮、震撼與滿意。話雖如此，從我們看到的情況來看，2018年將會是非常強勁的一年。

There was a -- you also had a question about the $30 million. And I think we clarified it in the press release quote that...

另外——你也問到了那3,000萬美元。我想我們在新聞稿的引述中已經釐清了，那就是……

That it's $30 million for the year.

那是全年3,000萬美元。

It's $30 million this year in the last 6 months. And so there'd be another, we think, $30 million in the first half of next year, so...

今年是最後6個月3,000萬美元。因此我們認為明年上半年還會有另外3,000萬美元，所以……

Yes, I think his question was what percent of -- revenue versus cost.

是的，我想他的問題是——收入端與成本端各占多少百分比。

Yes, we didn't provide a lot of detail on that. But the largest percentage of it is on the cost side.

是的，我們沒有就此提供太多細節。但其中最大比例是在成本端。

Our next question comes from the line of Leo Kulp with RBC Capital Markets.

我們的下一個問題來自 RBC Capital Markets 的 Leo Kulp。

First one, as we look out, given your lower CapEx spending and continued Carmike issues, how should we think about your ability to close the performance gap relative to the U.S.? I mean, do you think the underperformance will continue for the foreseeable future? At what point does that change?

第一個問題，往前看，考量你們較低的資本支出（CapEx）以及 Carmike 持續存在的問題，我們應該如何看待你們相對於美國市場縮小績效差距的能力？我的意思是，你們認為這種落後表現會在可預見的未來持續嗎？什麼時候會改變？

Is this about on the former Carmike's [move]?

這是在問前 Carmike 的那部分（[move]）嗎？

Well, just I mean, in general, the relative domestic box-office performance, when do you think, as a whole, that will subside?

嗯，我的意思是，就整體而言，相對於美國本土票房表現的差距，你們認為什麼時候整體會趨緩？

Well, it's among the highest priorities for our marketing organization to get revenue in the Carmike theaters. And as I said, there have been many identified issues. And they got to be knocked down one at a time. And as we looked at the issues that were floating around the Carmike circuit, about 40% of the attendance issues in the Carmike circuit was because somebody came into town and put a recliner theater near a Carmike theater and Carmike never responded. And in an earlier answer to a question, we said that we're going to move some capital dollars into the Carmike circuit for those theaters that have been rebranded AMC and have the highest potential to benefit. Those projects kind of take 4 to 6 months so -- and they haven't really started yet. So that sounds like a first half '18 issue for the things that have to get solved that way. Another issue for Carmike is it had 2 of its biggest, most successful theaters that were closed for renovation. And the theaters were closed for over a year. And they're just coming back on stream this summer. So we're going to get a material bump theoretically by 2 of their biggest, strongest and best-performing theaters finally reopening and coming back online. And it's literally issue-by-issue. Do we have a loyalty club, an identified clientele for a theater? So if I had to forecast, we bought the company on December 21. It was probably about the end of May that all of their theaters have been rebranded into AMC and put in the AMC system. Can we turn this circuit around in 9 months? So is it January to March of '18? Or is it taking us 12 months and it's January to June of '18? Or does it taking us slightly longer than that? I don't know. But I'm hopeful that we can get it sorted out and turned in the first half of '18. And the first half of '18 starts 6 months from now. So it's clearly not going to happen in the third quarter because -- of this year because if the whole of the movie industry is challenged, that's not a time when you're going to -- with a lackluster demand, you're going to see a big turn in the performance of theaters that have been troubled. So I guess -- but I'll bet you all those Carmike theaters are going to be full when Star Wars is playing. So let's just say end of fourth quarter to second quarter of '18. And that's kind of the range when I would love to know that we're actually delivering better numbers.

嗯，讓 Carmike 影城的營收提升，是我們行銷組織的最高優先事項之一。而且如我所說，已經找出許多問題。而且必須一個一個解決。當我們檢視 Carmike 院線中各種問題時，Carmike 院線約40%的觀影人次問題，是因為有人在城裡於 Carmike 影城附近開了一家躺椅影城，而 Carmike 從未回應。在先前回答另一個問題時，我們說過，我們會把部分資本投入 Carmike 院線，針對那些已重新品牌為 AMC、且最有潛力受益的影城。這些專案大約需要4到6個月——而且其實還沒真正開始。所以聽起來，這會是2018年上半年、需要用這種方式解決的議題。Carmike 的另一個問題是，它有兩家最大、最成功的影城因整修而關閉。而這些影城關閉超過一年。它們今年夏天才剛要重新恢復營運。所以理論上，隨著他們兩家最大、最強、表現最好的影城終於重新開幕並回到營運，我們將獲得一個顯著的提升。而且真的是逐項問題處理。例如，我們是否有忠誠會員計畫、是否能為某家影城辨識出其客群？所以如果要我預測，我們是在12月21日收購這家公司。大概到5月底，他們所有影城都已重新品牌為 AMC，並納入 AMC 系統。我們能在9個月內扭轉這個院線嗎？也就是2018年1到3月？或者需要12個月，也就是2018年1到6月？或者會比那更久一點？我不知道。但我希望我們能在2018年上半年把它理順並扭轉。而2018年上半年從現在起是6個月後開始。所以很明顯不會在第三季發生——因為如果整個電影產業都面臨挑戰，在需求平淡的情況下，你不太可能看到那些原本表現不佳的影城出現大幅度的改善。所以我想——但我敢打賭，當《星際大戰》上映時，所有那些 Carmike 影城都會滿座。所以就先說，從第四季末到2018年第二季末。這大概就是我希望能看到我們實際交出更好數字的時間範圍。

Got it. And then thank you also for the recliner data, that year 1 attendance uplift is really impressive. But can you talk about the performance in subsequent years for the earlier tranches? Have you seen those performance declines as others have reseated against you?

了解。另外也謝謝你提供躺椅座椅的數據，第一年的出席率提升真的很驚人。但你能談談較早批次在後續年度的表現嗎？當其他人重新配置座位與你競爭時，你有看到那些表現下滑嗎？

Yes, because I want to put it in the release and somebody argued with me and said, "We're giving you too much data and it will confuse you because we're drowning you in data." The answer is that in the second and third year, it gets even better, not by much because you get the first big pop, then you get word of mouth. And then over time, you're able to raise price because more and more people know that it's there and it's wonderful and they've shifted their loyalty over. So by far, the biggest pop is in year 1. But in years 2 and 3, it doesn't weaken, it strengthens.

是的，因為我想把它放進新聞稿裡，但有人跟我爭辯說：「我們給你太多數據了，會把你搞糊塗，因為我們用數據把你淹沒了。」答案是：在第二年和第三年，表現甚至更好，只是幅度不大，因為第一年會先有一個很大的跳升，接著就會有口碑效應。然後隨著時間推移，你能夠提高票價，因為越來越多人知道那裡有這個體驗、很棒，而且他們已經把忠誠度轉移過來。所以到目前為止，最大的跳升是在第一年。但在第二年和第三年，它不會走弱，反而會增強。

Got it, okay. And then last question on my end. Can you talk about in your guidance of how you're thinking about the 4Q box office from a growth perspective? I think if you assume a 13% (sic) [15%] decline, it implies like a 9% increase in 4Q. Is that correct? And how should we think about downside to the guidance if the box office doesn't meet expectations?

了解，好。那我這邊最後一個問題。你能談談在你們的指引中，從成長角度你們如何看待第四季票房嗎？我想如果你假設下滑 13%（原文如此）[15%]，那就意味著第四季大概會增加 9%。這樣對嗎？如果票房未達預期，你們的指引在下行風險上我們該怎麼看？

Did you say that your third quarter estimate is down 13%?

你是說你對第三季的估計是下滑 13% 嗎？

15%.

15%。

15%? You're on the low side of the prognosticators. That doesn't mean you're wrong and they're right. I'm just telling you that your number puts you among the optimists for the third quarter.

15%？你的估計在預測者當中算偏低。這不代表你錯、他們對。我只是告訴你，你的數字讓你在第三季的看法屬於比較樂觀的一群。

So that would imply an even better 4Q number, I guess?

所以那就意味著第四季的數字會更好，我想？

Yes. And I was going to say that I think your fourth quarter number is also light. So I think you're more pessimistic. But I want to say I think you're light. I'm not saying based on what I know you're light. I'm saying amongst all the people who are predicting, I think your prediction for the fourth quarter is on the lighter end of that spectrum. So I think you're more bullish than others on the third quarter and you're more bearish on us than others on the fourth quarter. And if I had your job, I'd be a bear in the third quarter and a bull in the fourth quarter because just look at the movies that are coming out. And the fourth quarter has a lot of great titles.

是的。而且我本來要說，我覺得你對第四季的數字也偏輕。所以我覺得你更悲觀。但我想說的是，我覺得你偏輕。我不是說根據我所知道的你偏輕。我是說在所有做預測的人當中，我覺得你對第四季的預測落在那個區間較偏低的一端。所以你在第三季比別人更看多，而在第四季對我們比別人更看空。如果我做你的工作，我會在第三季看空、在第四季看多，因為看看即將上映的電影就知道了。而且第四季有很多很棒的片名。

Our next question comes from the line of Jim Goss with Barrington Research.

我們下一個問題來自 Barrington Research 的 Jim Goss。

A couple of quicker ones, I think. Do the -- I was wondering with Odeon, are you treating that as a self-funding entity? Or are you grouping it with the domestic product as well in terms of financing of reseating and that sort of thing?

我想問幾個比較快的。我在想，關於 Odeon，你們是把它當作自給自足的實體來看嗎？還是就融資重設座椅之類的事項而言，你們也把它和美國本土業務一起合併考量？

Yes, we are looking to them to generate the cash flow to fund their CapEx program.

是的，我們希望他們能產生現金流來支應他們的資本支出計畫。

Jim, because obviously until the tax code changes, you don't want to repatriate cash. So if we have sourced the cash from abroad, we get to keep the cash abroad.

Jim，因為很明顯在稅法改變之前，你不會想把現金匯回本國。所以如果我們的現金來源在海外，我們就能把現金留在海外。

Okay, excellent. And so none of this should affect what's going on there, given that the box office is doing pretty well in Europe right now?

好的，很棒。那麼鑑於目前歐洲票房表現相當不錯，這些事情應該不會影響那邊正在進行的狀況，對吧？

Yes.

是的。

The second thing, do the financial issues create any detour from any other strategies, whether they're the multiple PLFs or the food and beverage programs, or anything else?

第二件事，財務面的問題會不會讓其他策略有任何繞道或偏離，不管是多個 PLF、餐飲計畫，或其他任何事情？

Food and beverage programs are rolling out full-bore, full-speed ahead, June to October across the whole of the system with the AMC brand getting the full enchilada and the AMC Classic getting modified because they don't actually have enough space in the AMC Classic theaters to put some of the equipment you need for the full-blown menus. With respect to PLFs, we've been going at a breakneck speed. We were actually beating our contractual commitments to IMAX and Dolby. We may just be meeting our contractual commitments to IMAX and Dolby. But if you were asking, and I'm not talking about you personally, but if one was asking the question from Dolby, it may be a huge deal to Dolby whether they're at 100 or 110; from AMC's perspective, it's not a huge deal whether we have 100 or 110 PLF screens. So if the margin could -- could we -- I said food is not going to get pulled back at all. Is it possible that PLFs could slow? A tad, just a little bit. But talking about a good investment, we're getting 70% price premiums in our IMAX and Dolby Cinema auditoriums. So we have every incentive to continue to roll these things out. And as I said, we intend to live up to our contractual commitments to IMAX and Dolby to get there.

餐飲計畫正全力、全速推進，6 月到 10 月會在整個系統全面展開；AMC 品牌會上完整版本，而 AMC Classic 會做調整，因為 AMC Classic 影城實際上沒有足夠空間放置完整菜單所需的一些設備。至於 PLF，我們一直以極快的速度推進。我們其實一度超前履行對 IMAX 和 Dolby 的合約承諾。我們可能會改為剛好達成對 IMAX 和 Dolby 的合約承諾。但如果你問——我不是指你個人——但如果是 Dolby 來問，對 Dolby 來說是 100 還是 110 可能是大事；但從 AMC 的角度看，我們是 100 還是 110 個 PLF 銀幕並不是什麼大事。所以如果利潤率可能——我們能不能——我說過餐飲完全不會縮手。PLF 有可能放慢嗎？一點點，就一點點。但談到這是一項很好的投資，我們在 IMAX 和 Dolby Cinema 影廳拿到 70% 的票價溢價。所以我們有充分誘因持續推進這些佈建。而且如我所說，我們打算履行對 IMAX 和 Dolby 的合約承諾來達成目標。

Okay. And the last thing, just on the rebranding, is that sort of a positive, a neutral or even a negative initially as you do this...

好的。最後一件事，關於重新品牌化，當你們在做這件事時，一開始是偏正面、中性，甚至是負面嗎……

Which rebranding? Are we -- are you talking about the Carmike?

哪一個重新品牌化？你是——你在說 Carmike 嗎？

The Carmike to AMCs, yes.

是的，Carmike 轉成 AMC。

It's a positive because what we've seen -- and again, it talks to the operator that we bought. They had very low participation in their loyalty club. They had no self-capability for online ticketing to be sold. They didn't have automated box offices, kiosks in their theaters. For a huge percentage of the Carmike theaters, they didn't even have the Carmike name up on the exterior wall of the building. It might say something, a non-branded descriptive like Cinema 6. So I think as what we've seen is as we bring the AMC brand and the AMC marketing programs into the Carmike network, we are helping ourselves considerably.

這是正面的，因為我們看到——而且再次呼應我們收購的那家營運商——他們的會員忠誠計畫參與度非常低。他們沒有自建的線上售票能力。他們沒有自助售票的自動化票房系統，也沒有在影城內設置自助售票機（kiosk）。在很大比例的 Carmike 影城，他們甚至沒有把 Carmike 的名稱掛在建築外牆上。可能只寫一些非品牌的描述性名稱，例如 Cinema 6。所以我認為，我們看到的是：當我們把 AMC 品牌與 AMC 的行銷計畫導入 Carmike 網路時，我們對自己有相當大的幫助。

Our next question comes from the line of Mike Hickey with The Benchmark Company.

我們下一個問題來自 The Benchmark Company 的 Mike Hickey。

Curious on the recliners, obviously you shared a lot of data. I haven't got a chance to go through it. But do you have any specific conclusions, I guess, that, say, the attendance gains is more than just a share shift?

我對躺椅（recliners）很好奇，顯然你分享了很多數據。我還沒機會仔細看完。但你是否有任何具體結論？例如，我想問，出席人次（attendance）的提升是否不僅僅是市占率移轉（share shift）所致？

And I guess, with the backdrop this year that we had what was -- should be compelling product, obviously, we have, as an industry, I think domestically, a material contribution from recliners and enhanced food and beverage, and of course, we've seen weak attendance. So that sort of dislocation is somewhat troubling, so any thoughts would be great. And I have a follow-up.

而且我想，在今年這樣的背景下，我們原本——應該有很有吸引力的產品；顯然，從產業角度來看，我認為在美國國內市場，躺椅與升級的餐飲（food and beverage）帶來了實質貢獻，當然，我們也看到出席人次疲弱。所以這種落差（dislocation）有點令人擔憂，若你有任何看法會很有幫助。我還有一個追問。

Well, 4 of the past -- recliners started being installed in 2011. Four of past 5 years have been record domestic box office in the United States and Canada. January to March, then April, was record industry box office in domestic industry box office. So the industry has, in fact, until May, been getting people to pay more dollars to go see movies in the United States. And I've got to think that some of that is because we and -- I hate to give them credit, but our competitors, are making movie theaters nicer and the experience is something that's causing people to buy more of it. So I don't think it's all share steal, and remember, we don't just compete against ourselves, right? There are other forms of entertainment that are competing against the movie industry and movie theaters every day. And so to the extent that people are still buying tickets, and I have heard so many of the people who have jobs like the people on this phone call and I don't just mean the people asking the questions, but also the buy-side who have been more listeners on the call than questioners. Yes, there is something called Netflix, and there are things called televisions. And there are other things one can do with one's discretionary dollar like go out to dinner at a restaurant instead of going to a movie. I think moviemaking and movie-going has held up nicely, and I'm going to give you once stat that kind of blows me away. This year, 2017, AMC is going to sell more tickets for people to go to an AMC theater in the United States than all the tickets that are sold for all the NFL games, for all Major League Baseball games, for all National Hockey League games, for all National Basketball Association games across the entire country, all season long, all 4 major sports, by a factor of 2.5x. That makes me think we're doing a very good job competing for the discretionary dollar and getting people to go to the movies. And hopefully, as we look to fourth quarter, when we've got some great titles coming out of '17, of '18, of '19, of '20, as we continue to make movie theaters nicer, as we continue to upgrade the size of the consumer databases that we have so we can market movie-going to a lot of people a lot of times. On average, we're marketing about 80 times a year to the typical AMC Stubs member. A year ago, we had 2.5 million member households, now we have 9 million -- 9.3 million member households a year later. I think these things all bode well for continuing to drive record industry box office. And so -- but it's also true that there's going to be a lot of share steal going on within the industry, depending upon how the local market situations play out in terms of what theaters are renovated, near or far to others.

嗯，過去——躺椅是從2011年開始安裝的。過去5年中有4年，美國與加拿大的國內票房都創下紀錄。今年1到3月，然後4月，也都是國內產業票房的紀錄。所以事實上，直到5月之前，整個產業一直在讓人們願意花更多美元去美國看電影。我必須認為其中一部分原因是我們——我不太想給他們功勞，但我們的競爭對手——正在把電影院變得更舒適，這種體驗讓人們更願意購買。所以我不認為這全都是搶市占（share steal），而且請記得，我們不只是跟自己競爭，對吧？每天都有其他形式的娛樂在跟電影產業與電影院競爭。因此，只要人們仍在買票，而且我聽到很多像今天這通電話上的人——我不只是指提問的人，也包括買方（buy-side），他們在這通電話上更多是聽眾而非提問者——是的，有一種東西叫Netflix，也有一種東西叫電視。而且人們也可以把可支配所得（discretionary dollar）花在其他事情上，例如去餐廳吃飯，而不是去看電影。我認為電影製作與看電影的需求維持得相當不錯。我給你一個讓我很震撼的數據。今年，也就是2017年，AMC在美國賣出的、讓人們進AMC影城看電影的票數，將會是全美所有NFL比賽、所有MLB比賽、所有NHL比賽、所有NBA比賽——整個國家、整個賽季、四大職業運動——全部售出票數的2.5倍。這讓我覺得，我們在爭取可支配所得、讓人們走進電影院這件事上做得非常好。而且希望當我們展望第四季，當我們有一些很棒的片單在2017年、2018年、2019年、2020年陸續推出；當我們持續把電影院變得更舒適；當我們持續擴大我們的消費者資料庫規模，好讓我們能夠更頻繁地向更多人行銷看電影——平均而言，我們對典型的AMC Stubs會員一年行銷大約80次。一年前我們有250萬個會員家庭，一年後現在有900萬——930萬個會員家庭。我認為這些因素都對持續推動產業票房再創新高很有利。不過——同時也確實會有很多產業內的搶市占行為，取決於各地市場的情況如何發展，例如哪些影城被翻新、與其他影城距離遠近等。

Last question for me. Obviously, IMAX has been a great partner for you, a great partner for Wanda. And clearly, you have contractual obligations in terms of continuing to roll out. Just curious, I mean, obviously, before recliners, you would create primarily a premium movie-going experience by adding an IMAX screen, and after doing that, you would see a big lift in attendance, which, of course, makes sense because you're sharing in that ticket, an IMAX ticket with your partner, IMAX. Now it seems like, obviously, you've had great success in creating a premium moviegoer experience by adding recliners, food and beverage, alcohol, all the things that you have done so great. So I'm curious, is that move to recliners has sort of dislocated to the IMAX premium experience that moviegoers used to have? And as you think about longer-term, is POS be sort of more recliner and more centric with what people are choosing in terms of that recliner experience?

我最後一個問題。顯然，IMAX一直是你們很棒的合作夥伴，也是萬達很棒的合作夥伴。而且很明顯，你們在持續擴點（roll out）方面有合約義務。我只是好奇：在躺椅之前，你們主要是透過新增IMAX銀幕來打造高端的觀影體驗，而做了之後，你們會看到出席人次大幅提升；這當然合理，因為你們與合作夥伴IMAX共享IMAX票的票房收入。現在看起來，你們透過增加躺椅、餐飲、酒精飲品，以及你們做得很成功的各種措施，在打造高端觀影體驗方面也取得很大成功。所以我想問，轉向躺椅是否在某種程度上讓影迷過去所認知的IMAX高端體驗產生了位移（dislocated）？而從更長期來看，你們是否會讓POS更偏向躺椅、並以人們在躺椅體驗上的選擇作為更核心的配置？

Well, those are very good questions, and you're talking to the world's biggest fan of both IMAX and of Dolby Cinema. We've added a lot of POS within AMC over the past, whatever it is, 19 months that I've been here, and we'll continue to add a lot of POS. The -- when titles are right, seeing it in a wonderful IMAX experience or seeing it in a wonderful Dolby Cinema experience is very powerful for consumers. We're not only benefiting with attendance gains, we're benefiting in price gains. And as I said, we are, on average, getting about a 70%, 7-0, 70% price premium for people to see movies in either the IMAX or Dolby Cinema experience. All of our Dolby cinemas do already now have reclining seats, and we are testing at a couple of IMAX locations. We have 180, I think, IMAX locations now in the AMC system in the United States. We're testing some recliner seats to see how they will do in the IMAX format. And we're doing that test jointly with IMAX, and we're both watching closely to see how consumers respond. So I can't answer your question yet until we get the results of the recliner seat test, where we're doing it. It sure is popular in the Dolby auditoriums, we know that. But whether IMAX stays non-recliner or moves to recliner, and I'm sure that the -- our friends at IMAX, Rich Gelfond and Greg Foster, are going to have some strong opinions on the subject. I'd just remind you, it was only 2 weeks ago that Dunkirk opened up, and it opened up big in IMAX auditoriums. And IMAX just killed in terms of the market share of guests seeing Dunkirk doing so in an IMAX auditorium. Similarly, AMC outperformed on Dunkirk. So it may just be, as is often is the case, part of it's the theater -- the secret here is part of it's the theater and part of it's the movie. And that's why we are not only rooting for AMC to make great theaters and to have great partners like IMAX and Dolby Cinema, but we're also rooting for all the studio partners to give us great product because we succeed the best when they put fabulous product out in the marketplace that consumers want to see.

嗯，這些都是非常好的問題，而你現在是在跟全世界最喜歡IMAX與Dolby Cinema的人說話。在我來到這裡的過去——不管是19個月還是多少——我們在AMC新增了很多POS，而且我們會繼續新增很多POS。當片子合適時，在很棒的IMAX體驗或很棒的Dolby Cinema體驗中觀影，對消費者非常有吸引力。我們不僅在出席人次上受益，也在票價提升上受益。如我所說，平均而言，消費者在IMAX或Dolby Cinema體驗中看電影，我們能取得約70%（7-0，70%）的票價溢價（price premium）。我們所有的Dolby Cinema影廳現在都已經配有可躺式座椅，而我們也正在幾個IMAX據點進行測試。我想，我們在美國的AMC系統裡目前有180個IMAX據點。我們正在測試一些躺椅座位，看看在IMAX格式下表現如何。這項測試是與IMAX共同進行的，我們雙方都在密切觀察消費者的反應。所以在我們拿到正在進行的躺椅測試結果之前，我還無法回答你的問題。但我們知道，在Dolby影廳裡它確實非常受歡迎。至於IMAX會維持非躺椅，或轉向躺椅——我相信我們在IMAX的朋友Rich Gelfond與Greg Foster對此會有很強烈的看法。我也提醒你，就在兩週前《敦克爾克》上映，而且在IMAX影廳開出很大的票房。就觀眾選擇在IMAX影廳觀看《敦克爾克》的市占表現而言，IMAX表現非常亮眼。同樣地，AMC在《敦克爾克》上也表現優於同業。所以也許就像很多時候一樣，秘密在於：一部分是影城，一部分是電影。這也是為什麼我們不僅希望AMC打造很棒的影城、並擁有像IMAX與Dolby Cinema這樣優秀的合作夥伴，我們也希望所有片廠合作夥伴能提供很棒的內容，因為當他們把消費者想看的精彩作品投放到市場時，我們的成功會最大。

Our next question comes from the line of Kannan Venkat with Barclays.

我們的下一個問題來自巴克萊（Barclays）的 Kannan Venkat。

Adam, just a follow-up on Jason's question a little bit but from a different perspective, which is you mentioned during the call that there isn't a lot of visibility even a month ahead in the box office. But when you look at your leverage right now and you give us a leverage guidance out to 2020, why not focus more on reduction of leverage rather than the discretionary CapEx, [simply said], at this point of the cycle when you don't have too much visibility? And secondly, I have a question on one, and this may not be a fair question because it's more related to the liquidity situation there, but it does impact you. How much visibility do you have into the liquidity position at Wanda and how that might affect you, guys?

Adam，我想就 Jason 的問題再追問一下，但從不同角度來看：你在電話會議中提到，即使往前看一個月，票房能見度也不高。但當你看你們目前的槓桿水準，並且給到 2020 年的槓桿指引時，在這個景氣循環的階段、又缺乏太多能見度的情況下，為什麼不把重點更多放在降低槓桿，而不是可自由裁量的資本支出（CapEx）上，[簡單說]？第二個問題是，這可能不是個公平的問題，因為比較偏向那邊的流動性狀況，但確實會影響到你們。你們對萬達（Wanda）的流動性部位有多少能見度？以及這可能會如何影響你們？

Okay. So let's do the Wanda question first. I talk to Wanda as -- all the time. We just had a quarterly board meeting for a few days in Los Angeles, where Wanda was importantly represented. And I don't need to know what Wanda's liquidity is because in the 5 years that they've owned our company, they have not been a source of capital for AMC. We source all our own capital, equity and debt, on the strength of AMC's balance sheet and have been very successful in raising equity at good prices when we wanted to do so and been very successful in securing debt at favorable interest rates when we've wanted to do so. Turning to your other question, there was a really important phrase that you used in your question, and it was at this point in the cycle, which sort of implies that maybe we're coming to an end of a good time. If you look at the jobs report that came out this -- was it yesterday morning or this morning, the days have been blurring given what's been going on with us since earlier this week. The economy's roaring hot. If you look at movie-going in Europe right now, movie-going in Europe is roaring hot. When you look at the industry box office for 4 of the past 5 years through April of this year, records were being set. When we look ahead, we don't see a lot -- there are some good movies coming out in August and September. You should go see Kingfisher 2. It's going to be fabulous -- oh, excuse me. Kingsman 2. It's going to be fabulous. But the big -- the fourth quarter is going to look really good. So -- and meanwhile, the dollar is at an all-time high. And so I don't think we should accept the premise that this is a bad time in the cycle where movie-going is going to suddenly slow down. I think as we look ahead, we could be looking at many, many good years of movie-going, and that is certainly our hope. So we've tried to marry what we call the conflicting objectives of -- the conflicting objectives of still investing in our circuit to generate growth and increasing financial returns for our shareholders, the goal of buying back stock and the goal of delevering. And just on this very call, there has been a very smart person who has said we should delever more. There's been a very smart person who said we should buy back more shares. And there's been a very smart person who said we should be investing and going after that growth with higher CapEx investment. So it just goes to show you, it's not quite a science, it's a little bit of an art, about trying to optimize all 3 of those objectives in ways that work well symbiotically.

好的。那我們先回答萬達的問題。我一直都在和萬達溝通——經常聯繫。我們剛在洛杉磯開了為期幾天的季度董事會會議，萬達也有重要代表出席。而我其實不需要知道萬達的流動性狀況，因為在他們持有我們公司這 5 年裡，他們從未成為 AMC 的資金來源。我們所有資金——股權與債務——都依靠 AMC 資產負債表的實力自行籌措；在需要時，我們以不錯的價格成功募得股權資金；在需要時，也以有利的利率條件成功取得債務融資。回到你另一個問題，你在提問中用了非常重要的一句話：在這個景氣循環的階段（at this point in the cycle），這似乎暗示我們可能正接近一段好時光的尾聲。如果你看這——是昨天早上還是今天早上公布的就業報告？這幾天因為我們本週稍早以來發生的事情而變得有點模糊。經濟非常火熱。如果你看歐洲現在的觀影情況，歐洲的觀影也非常火熱。再看產業票房，截至今年 4 月，過去 5 年中的 4 年都在創下紀錄。展望未來，我們沒有看到太多——8 月和 9 月會有一些好電影上映。你應該去看《Kingfisher 2》，會非常精彩——哦，抱歉。《Kingsman 2》，會非常精彩。但重點是——第四季看起來會非常好。同時，美元也處於歷史高點。因此我不認為我們應該接受這個前提：現在是景氣循環中的壞時點，觀影需求會突然放緩。我認為往前看，我們可能還會迎來很多很多個觀影表現良好的年份，這當然也是我們的希望。所以我們試圖把我們所稱的相互衝突的目標結合起來——也就是：持續投資我們的院線以帶動成長、並為股東提高財務回報；回購股票的目標；以及去槓桿（降低槓桿）的目標。而就在這通電話會議上，有一位非常聰明的人說我們應該更積極去槓桿。也有一位非常聰明的人說我們應該回購更多股票。還有一位非常聰明的人說我們應該投資、追求成長，並提高資本支出投入。這也說明了，這不完全是一門科學，而更像是一門藝術：如何以能彼此相輔相成的方式，去最佳化這三個目標。

Fair point. Just one more follow-up. Could you just also help us with your tax situation, and when do you expect to be a cash tax player -- payer, sorry?

有道理。再追問一個問題。也請你們協助說明一下你們的稅務狀況，你們預期何時會開始成為需要支付現金所得稅的公司——付款方，抱歉？

Yes. There's about $500 million to $600 million of NOLs, cash taxes. Let me get to the right tab. I think probably get pushed out a year. Really, they're nominal, nominal really even end of 2020, right, at this point in time.

是的。大約有 5 億到 6 億美元的 NOL（淨營業損失結轉），關於現金稅。我看一下正確的頁籤。我想可能會往後推一年。實際上，到 2020 年底時也只是名目上的、非常少的金額，對吧，就目前而言。

And that assumes current tax rates. So if the current tax rate were to lower, because that's clearly a priority of the White House and the Congress, that means that the NOLs could go out even further.

而這是以目前稅率為前提。所以如果現行稅率下降——這顯然是白宮與國會的優先事項——那就代表 NOL 的使用年限可能還能再延後更久。

Yes. We do have some tax obligations related to state and local, but they stay fairly small and level and through 2020.

是的。我們確實有一些與州與地方相關的稅務義務，但金額一直相當小且平穩，並會延續到 2020 年。

Our next question comes from the line of Peter Padula (sic) [Vito Padula] with BlackRock.

我們的下一個問題來自貝萊德（BlackRock）的 Peter Padula（原文誤稱）[Vito Padula]。

I have just one very quick follow-up on the Q3, and apologies if it was covered before. Vis-à-vis, the $30 million reduction in costs and revenue enhancement initiative by the end of the year, I just was wondering whether you anticipate to achieve any of those and which proportion you expect to shift in the next quarter to mitigate like the softer box office, expectation.

我只有一個非常快速的、關於第三季（Q3）的追問，如果之前已經提過先說聲抱歉。關於年底前 3,000 萬美元的成本降低與營收提升計畫，我想請問你們是否預期能在下一季就實現其中一部分？以及你們預期有多少比例會在下一季反映，以抵銷較疲弱的票房預期？

We acted fairly quickly in the work to get positioned. It will affect, be early, beginning in August. It wasn't from the first day of the quarter. So there will be kind of pro rata over the next 5 months, the $30 million. We think it's fairly even though, so there will be some impact here in the third quarter and a little more in the fourth.

我們在相關工作上行動相當迅速，以便就位。影響會比較早，從 8 月開始。它不是從本季第一天就開始。因此在接下來 5 個月，這 3,000 萬美元會以某種按比例（pro rata）的方式反映。不過我們認為分布會相當平均，所以第三季會有一些影響，第四季會再多一些。

And would there be any costs associated with the implementation of these initiatives?

那在推動這些計畫的落地執行上，是否會產生任何相關成本？

No.

不會。

No. We're not laying -- we have no plans of laying anybody off that would cause severance payments or anything like that. This is literally where we can stop spending money. I'm just going to give you 2 examples. We have 50 open positions in our corporate headquarters that were budgeted and approved. And they are not currently filled, including because we have normal attrition and people leave, and generally, 2 months after somebody's left, there's somebody new sitting in their workstation. We're not going to fill any of those open positions unless we absolutely have to. So that's an example of saving some money, and that doesn't cost us any money. There are theaters that have a lot of showtimes. And if industry box office is down, pick whatever number you are estimating, you may not need to have as many showtimes. So if you don't need as many showtimes, instead of opening a movie theater at 11 in the morning, maybe you'll open it at 1 in the afternoon and you'll save 2 hours of electricity and 2 hours of air-conditioning. And some of the part-time workers who are staffing that movie theater, instead of reporting to work and punching in at 11, they will punch in at 1. So -- and the list of things that we're doing, it's pages and pages long, but -- so we can't give you all examples on the phone, but to answer your question exactly, no, we don't think we're driving any cost to save these costs.

不會。我們不會裁員——我們沒有任何裁員計畫，因此不會產生資遣費或類似支出。這基本上就是我們可以停止花錢的地方。我給你兩個例子。我們在公司總部有 50 個已編列預算且已核准的職缺。目前都還沒補上，其中也包括因正常流動有人離職，而通常在某人離職兩個月後，就會有新人坐到他的工位上。除非絕對必要，我們不會補這些空缺。這就是一個省錢的例子，而且不會讓我們多花任何錢。另外，有些影城的場次很多。如果產業票房下滑——不管你估的是哪個數字——你可能不需要那麼多場次。所以如果不需要那麼多場次，原本早上 11 點開門的影城，也許改成下午 1 點開門，就能省下 2 小時的用電與 2 小時的空調。而負責該影城的部分工時員工，也不必 11 點報到打卡，而是 1 點再打卡。所以——我們正在做的事情清單有一頁又一頁，但——我們不可能在電話上把所有例子都講完；不過就精準回答你的問題：不，我們不認為為了省下這些成本而會額外產生任何成本。

Our next question comes from the line of Ryan Sundby with William Blair.

我們的下一個問題來自 William Blair 的 Ryan Sundby。

Is there a risk that maybe Q4 is too overcrowded or too many titles and so that could maybe get people to shift some of their viewing into Q1 and that could maybe impact your guidance?

是否存在風險，也許第四季太過擁擠或片單太多，導致觀眾把部分觀影需求移到第一季，進而可能影響你們的指引？

There's always a risk, I guess. But we pick those guidance ranges very carefully because we do not want to go through in the fourth quarter what we just went through this week. So hopefully, we pick the guidance range well, and we're all going to find out together.

我想總是有風險的。但我們非常謹慎地選擇那些指引區間，因為我們不想在第四季再經歷一次我們這週剛經歷的情況。所以希望我們把指引區間選得很好，然後我們會一起拭目以待。

Okay. And then any thoughts on -- or color you can provide on why we're just seeing so much better performance in Canada and Europe, especially, Europe, I guess, without having recliners in place there? Just kind of surprising to see such a divergence between those markets and the U.S., so any color would be great.

好的。另外，對於——或者你能否補充一些背景，為什麼我們看到加拿大和歐洲的表現好得多，尤其是歐洲，我想，在那邊還沒有配置躺椅的情況下？看到這些市場與美國之間出現如此大的差異有點令人意外，所以任何補充說明都會很有幫助。

Well, let me talk about Canada first because there's a real easy answer for Canada. The huge movie last year was Captain America, which did not play well at all in Canada for obvious reasons. And so when they were comping Guardians of the Galaxy -- Wonder Woman against Captain America, it looked really good. We had a better performance with Captain America in the United States. So when we comp those movies, they didn't look as good year-over-year. That explains Canada. What seems to be explaining Europe is Europe was not all that strong last year. And especially -- no, I'm not saying -- Germany is not the only country, but Germany, last year, I believe, had a World Cup and nobody was going to movies in Germany and they're all watching the World Cup. Like, really, like I mean, in the double-digit, we're not going to movie theaters, we're watching our, what they would call, football and we would call soccer matches. There's no World Cup in Germany this year, so the German theaters are booming on a year-over-year basis. But literally, if you look at our performance in Europe, we're in 14 countries in Europe. And if I'm not mistaken, we are down in one and booming in 13. So across-the-board, it's Europe -- Europeans are going to the movies this summer.

好，我先談加拿大，因為加拿大的答案很簡單。去年最大的電影是《美國隊長》，由於眾所周知的原因，它在加拿大的表現完全不好。因此，當他們把《星際異攻隊》——《神力女超人》拿來和《美國隊長》做同比比較時，看起來就非常亮眼。我們在美國的《美國隊長》表現較好。所以當我們比較這些電影時，年對年看起來就沒那麼好。這解釋了加拿大的情況。至於歐洲，看起來的原因是歐洲去年本來就沒有那麼強。而且特別是——不，我不是說——德國不是唯一的國家，但我記得德國去年有世界盃，大家都不去看電影，都在看世界盃。真的，就像是兩位數的幅度，大家不去電影院，而是在看他們所謂的 football、我們稱為 soccer 的比賽。今年德國沒有世界盃，所以德國的戲院年對年表現大幅成長。但如果你看我們在歐洲的表現，我們在歐洲有 14 個國家。如果我沒記錯，我們只有 1 個國家下滑、13 個國家大幅成長。所以整體而言，歐洲——歐洲人今年夏天就是在看電影。

Our next question comes from the line of Alejandro Luciano with MFS.

我們的下一個問題來自 MFS 的 Alejandro Luciano。

I just had a couple of quick questions. First is with the $400 million that you announced of asset sales up, how much EBITDA do you lose because NCMI does pay dividends to you guys, and then you have integration payments that you make back. And then does that include kind of the DOJ theater divestments and again, EBITDA loss that once you sell those as well?

我有幾個很快的問題。第一個是，你們宣布約 4 億美元的資產出售後，因為 NCMI 會支付股利給你們，而你們也會回付整合款項，那麼你們會損失多少 EBITDA？另外，這是否包含司法部（DOJ）要求的戲院剝離？以及同樣地，一旦你們也出售那些資產，EBITDA 的損失是多少？

Well, that's -- the guidance includes our projection on -- certainly includes the effect of the divestitures as well as the effect of the NCM sales that we would have to take in here in the last part of this year. So it's in the guidance.

嗯——指引包含了我們對——當然也包含了剝離的影響，以及我們在今年最後一段期間必須在此反映的 NCM 出售影響。所以都已經反映在指引裡了。

Okay. And then just -- I know someone asked about cash taxes. So then what would be cash taxes for this year?

好的。另外——我知道有人問到現金稅。那麼今年的現金稅會是多少？

Less than $50 million.

少於 5,000 萬美元。

We're at the end of our time for today and have no further questions. I'd like to turn it back to management for closing comments.

我們今天的時間已到，沒有其他問題了。我想把時間交回管理層做結語。

If there's anybody still on this phone call because we've gone 2 full hours, thank you very much for the time and attention that you devote to AMC Entertainment. We'll see you at the movies.

如果還有人仍在線上，因為我們已經進行了整整兩個小時，非常感謝各位投入在 AMC Entertainment 的時間與關注。電影院見。

This concludes today's teleconference.

今天的電話會議到此結束。