2U Inc (TWOU) 2023 Q2 法說會逐字稿

Hello, and welcome to the 2U, Inc. Second Quarter 2023 Earnings Call. (Operator Instructions) I will now turn the conference over to Mr. Steve Virostek, Head of Investor Relations. Please go ahead.

您好，歡迎參加 2U, Inc. 2023 年第二季度收益電話會議。 （操作員指示）我現在將會議交給投資者關係主管 Steve Virostek 先生。請繼續。

Thank you, Sarah. Good afternoon, everyone, and welcome to 2U's Second Quarter 2023 Earnings Conference Call. Joining me on the call this afternoon are Chip Paucek, our Co-Founder and Chief Executive Officer; and Paul Lalljie, our Chief Financial Officer. Our earnings press release and slide presentation are available on the Investor Relations website, and a replay of this webcast will be made available later today. Following our prepared remarks, we will take questions.

謝謝你，莎拉。大家下午好，歡迎參加 2U 2023 年第二季度收益電話會議。今天下午與我一起參加電話會議的是我們的聯合創始人兼首席執行官 Chip Paucek；和我們的首席財務官 Paul Lalljie。我們的收益新聞稿和幻燈片演示可在投資者關係網站上獲取，今天晚些時候將重播該網絡廣播。在我們準備好的發言之後，我們將回答問題。

Statements made on this call will include forward-looking statements regarding our financial and operating results, plans and objectives for management for future operations, the implementation of our platform strategy, anticipated trends for learners and university partners, changes in laws, regulations and agency guidance for our industry and other matters. These statements are subject to risks, uncertainties and assumptions. Any forward-looking statements made on this call reflect our analysis as of today, and we have no plans or duty to update them. Please refer to the earnings press release and to the risk factors described in our documents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, including our annual report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2022 and other SEC filings for information on risks, uncertainties and assumptions that may cause our actual results to differ materially from those set forth in such statements.

本次電話會議的聲明將包括有關我們的財務和運營業績、未來運營管理計劃和目標、我們平台戰略的實施、學習者和大學合作夥伴的預期趨勢、法律、法規和機構指南變化的前瞻性聲明對於我們的行業和其他事務。這些陳述受到風險、不確定性和假設的影響。本次電話會議中所做的任何前瞻性陳述均反映了我們截至目前的分析，我們沒有計劃或義務對其進行更新。請參閱收益新聞稿以及我們向美國證券交易委員會提交的文件中描述的風險因素，包括我們截至 2022 年 12 月 31 日的 10-K 表格年度報告以及其他 SEC 文件，以了解風險信息，可能導致我們的實際結果與此類聲明中規定的結果存在重大差異的不確定性和假設。

In addition, during today's call, we will discuss non-GAAP financial measures, which we believe are useful as supplemental measures of 2U's performance. These non-GAAP measures should be considered in addition to and not a substitute for or in isolation from our GAAP results. You can find additional disclosures regarding these non-GAAP measures, including reconciliations with comparable GAAP results in our earnings press release and on the Investor Relations page of our website.

此外，在今天的電話會議中，我們將討論非 GAAP 財務指標，我們認為這些指標可作為 2U 業績的補充指標。這些非公認會計原則措施應作為我們公認會計原則結果的補充，而不是替代或獨立於我們的公認會計原則結果。您可以在我們的收益新聞稿和我們網站的投資者關係頁面上找到有關這些非公認會計原則衡量標準的其他披露信息，包括與可比公認會計原則結果的調節表。

So with that, let me hand the call to Chip.

那麼，讓我把電話轉給奇普。

Thanks, Steve. We had a strong Q2. Notably, we sustained double-digit EBITDA margins, continue to drive down costs and increased organic leads from the edX platform to 44%. We believe the business is moving strongly in the right direction due to our platform strategy. As a result, we're increasing our bottom-line guidance for the full year while reiterating our top line. We did have some revenue shift from Q2 to later in the year, something Paul will cover in detail.

謝謝，史蒂夫。我們的第二季度表現強勁。值得注意的是，我們維持了兩位數的 EBITDA 利潤率，繼續降低成本，並將 edX 平台的有機銷售線索增加到 44%。我們相信，由於我們的平台戰略，業務正在朝著正確的方向強勁發展。因此，我們提高了全年的利潤指導，同時重申了我們的營收。我們確實從第二季度到今年晚些時候發生了一些收入轉移，保羅將詳細介紹這一點。

I'll provide more color on our full year expectations in a moment. But first, I want to give some commentary on the edtech sector as a whole and our strategy. Edtech is critical to the future of society. The need for high-quality education is only increasing. Digital penetration is low and it's a massive global market. It's becoming more clear to me by the day that our strategy is the correct one to achieve preeminence in our space. We're the only company that can deliver outcomes at scale, outcomes because we built an apparatus that delivers the hard parts. Many of which are driven not just by tech but also by people.

我稍後將提供更多有關全年預期的信息。但首先，我想對整個教育科技行業和我們的戰略發表一些評論。教育科技對社會的未來至關重要。對高質量教育的需求只會不斷增加。數字化普及率較低，但全球市場巨大。我越來越清楚，我們的戰略是在我們的領域取得卓越地位的正確戰略。我們是唯一一家能夠大規模交付成果的公司，因為我們製造了一種能夠交付硬部件的設備。其中許多不僅由技術驅動，而且由人驅動。

And it's my belief that AI will only accelerate this differentiation. Everyone knows with edX acquisition, we moved to a platform strategy. This brings us closer to the consumer, lowers our costs and generates lots of new revenue synergy. To attack it properly, we reorganized our team, and we continue to do so actively. We believe this is creating long-term sustainable profitability.

我相信人工智能只會加速這種差異化。大家都知道，通過收購 edX，我們轉向了平台戰略。這使我們更貼近消費者，降低成本並產生大量新的收入協同效應。為了正確地應對這一問題，我們重組了我們的團隊，並且我們將繼續積極這樣做。我們相信這正在創造長期可持續的盈利能力。

Part of transitioning to a platform company involves rotating our offerings, adapting and growing our products by the day to be better suited to the long-term needs of our customers, both universities and students. Think of this rotation as us turning dials, creating greater emphasis on certain attributes that are critical to the long-term future of our platform.

向平台公司轉型的一部分包括輪換我們的產品、每天調整和發展我們的產品，以更好地滿足我們客戶（包括大學和學生）的長期需求。將這種輪換視為我們轉動刻度盤，更加重視對我們平台的長期未來至關重要的某些屬性。

As I see it, there are 5 keys to this rotation. First, we've been expanding from highly selective and expensive programs to those with greater access and affordability. You will see 2U continue to aggressively manage our portfolio to better suit the evolving needs of our customer base.

在我看來，這種輪換有 5 個關鍵。首先，我們一直在從高度選擇性和昂貴的項目擴展到那些更容易獲得和負擔得起的項目。您將看到 2U 繼續積極管理我們的產品組合，以更好地滿足客戶群不斷變化的需求。

Second, we're rotating and have been for some time now from degree to nondegree. In 2024 for the first time, we expect our Alternative Credentials will be larger than our Degree business. Our acquisitions of GetSmarter and Trilogy were critical here.

其次，我們正在從度數到非度數進行輪換，並且已經有一段時間了。到 2024 年，我們預計我們的替代證書業務將首次超過我們的學位業務。我們收購 GetSmarter 和 Trilogy 在這里至關重要。

Third, we're rotating from reaching consumers to serving enterprises and governments and therefore, gaining access to larger addressable market with an extremely efficient model. You'll see 2U continue to focus on growing the enterprise business with a series of offerings that make us unique in the space. Enterprise revenue grew 35% this quarter. We expect continued strong growth in the future.

第三，我們正在從服務消費者轉向服務企業和政府，從而以極其高效的模式進入更大的目標市場。您將看到 2U 繼續專注於發展企業業務，提供一系列使我們在該領域獨一無二的產品。本季度企業收入增長 35%。我們預計未來將持續強勁增長。

Fourth, we're rotating to more frequent purchases. We're doing a better job moving from single purchases to a subscription-based model. While in its infancy, we believe subscriptions, particularly for enterprise markets will be an increasingly important part of our business in 2024 and 2025.

第四，我們正在轉向更頻繁的購買。我們在從單一購買模式轉向基於訂閱的模式方面做得更好。雖然訂閱服務還處於起步階段，但我們相信，特別是企業市場的訂閱服務，將在 2024 年和 2025 年成為我們業務中越來越重要的一部分。

Fifth and finally, we're continuing to diversify the content base to include content created by industry leaders. Our content acquisition strategy is bearing incredible fruit, course launches on edX are up 56% year-over-year. The vast majority of these deals are very CapEx light, given that course build is not part of most of these launches.

第五，也是最後一點，我們將繼續使內容基礎多樣化，以納入行業領導者創建的內容。我們的內容獲取策略正在取得令人難以置信的成果，edX 上的課程發布量同比增長 56%。鑑於課程建設並不是大多數此類交易的一部分，因此絕大多數交易的資本支出都很輕。

To deliver this strategy, we must continuously evaluate our current portfolio of offerings and at times, exit programs that do not fit. We've managed our portfolio in this manner for a few years now, and we've discussed some of those in the past, and we'll continue rotating the dial towards evolving student needs. We've always been laser-focused on delivering offerings that drive a positive ROI for the student, the university and 2U. That's not changing at all. In fact, reexamining our programs regularly through portfolio management helps ensure that we continue to deliver on that promise.

為了實現這一戰略，我們必須不斷評估我們當前的產品組合，有時還要退出不適合的項目。我們以這種方式管理我們的作品集已經有幾年了，我們過去已經討論過其中的一些內容，我們將繼續根據不斷變化的學生需求進行調整。我們始終專注於提供能夠為學生、大學和 2U 帶來積極投資回報率的產品。這根本沒有改變。事實上，通過投資組合管理定期重新審查我們的計劃有助於確保我們繼續兌現這一承諾。

When managing our portfolio, we think about 4 key factors: one, the financial health of the program; two, efficient resource allocation; three, debt-to-earnings ratios of programs; and four, the strategic importance of the relationship with the partner. Proper portfolio management creates greater value for not just the students but ultimately for our shareholders.

在管理我們的投資組合時，我們會考慮 4 個關鍵因素：一是項目的財務狀況；二、高效的資源配置；三、方案的債盈率；第四，與合作夥伴關係的戰略重要性。適當的投資組合管理不僅為學生創造更大的價值，而且最終為我們的股東創造更大的價值。

Of note for the quarter, we expected to sunset some programs in Q2, which would have resulted in significant additional revenue in the quarter. These were pushed into the back half of the year. We're confident they will close, which makes us continue to feel very good about our full year expectations.

本季度值得注意的是，我們預計將在第二季度取消一些計劃，這將在本季度帶來大量額外收入。這些都被推遲到了下半年。我們相信他們會關閉，這讓我們繼續對全年的預期感到非常滿意。

Before I move on, I want to highlight 2 notable Degree developments. Our new signings are occurring at a pace that we've never seen before due to our recently unveiled flex revenue share model. We're seeing a radical increase in demand for this model. This is part of our previously discussed rotation, bringing in programs that meet a market need and have attractive pricing.

在繼續之前，我想強調兩個值得注意的學位發展。由於我們最近推出了靈活的收入分成模式，我們的新簽約正在以前所未有的速度進行。我們看到對該模型的需求急劇增加。這是我們之前討論的輪換的一部分，引入滿足市場需求並具有有吸引力的價格的計劃。

The new flex model offers the university a variety of revenue share-based bundles to select from and has been a home run. We've really never seen anything like this. It allows us to aggregate degrees on the platform and bring in new programs that are attractive to students, either because the cost is lower, better pathways exist into the programs or both. Also note, this model is very CapEx-light compared to our full bundle as course build is not typically purchased by the university. Note, universities generally prefer the core flex model plus paid marketing, netting out at 50%.

新的彈性模式為大學提供了多種基於收入分成的捆綁包可供選擇，並且取得了巨大的成功。我們真的從來沒有見過這樣的事情。它使我們能夠在平台上聚合學位，並引入對學生有吸引力的新課程，要么是因為成本更低，要么是因為課程存在更好的途徑，或者兩者兼而有之。另請注意，與我們的完整捆綁包相比，該模型的資本支出非常輕，因為大學通常不會購買課程構建。請注意，大學通常更喜歡核心彈性模式加上付費營銷，淨收益為 50%。

Demand for the flex model means we're ramping up launches. I'm pleased to announce that we're doubling our Degree cadence for 2024 launches from our previously announced target of 25 programs to at least 50 programs. You may remember that our largest ever launch year was 17 programs, 50 is really something and a 130% increase over our historic high.

對彈性型號的需求意味著我們正在加大發布力度。我很高興地宣布，我們將在 2024 年推出學位課程，將學位節奏加倍，從之前宣布的 25 個項目目標增加到至少 50 個項目。您可能還記得，我們有史以來最大的啟動年是 17 個項目，50 個項目確實很了不起，比我們的歷史最高點增加了 130%。

Universities clearly want revenue share deals and the current regulatory climate is not dissuading them. Universities have spoken out aggressively in support of revenue sharing. We're confident with our short- and long-term plans to navigate the regulatory environment properly.

大學顯然希望進行收入分成交易，而當前的監管環境並沒有阻止他們。大學已積極表示支持收入共享。我們對正確應對監管環境的短期和長期計劃充滿信心。

Regardless, we also wanted to create an option on our toolkit for a new model that isn't built on a revenue share for any schools that want -- that might not want revenue sharing. We're excited to announce our flat fee model. Our flat fee is an innovative, nonrevenue share-based model. In this model, we charge a simple flat fee for our standard services across the board based on the particular program and services we expect to provide. This flat fee would include a shorter-term contract of 3 to 5 years. Instead of a long-term revenue sharing model, 2U would price the program competitively to what might be available in the market to universities on a fee or revenue-share basis, doing it based on our proprietary formula and betting on ourselves for renewal upon success of the first term.

無論如何，我們還希望在我們的工具包上為新模型創建一個選項，該模型不是建立在任何想要收入共享的學校的基礎上的 - 可能不希望收入共享。我們很高興宣布我們的固定費用模式。我們的固定費用是一種創新的、非收入分成的模式。在這種模式中，我們根據我們期望提供的特定計劃和服務，對我們的標準服務收取簡單的固定費用。該固定費用包括 3 至 5 年的短期合同。 2U 不會採用長期的收入共享模式，而是以收費或收入共享的方式，以與市場上大學可能提供的項目相比具有競爭力的價格來定價，並根據我們專有的公式進行定價，並押注於我們自己在成功後續訂。第一項的。

We can do this because of the combo of our excellent operating history and our platform strategy. This flat fee will not suffer from the never-ending list of charges schools face in a fee-for-service relationship. One of the main positives for 2U is the flat fee revenue will be extremely predictable. It's a fixed, guaranteed fee. In addition, I think it will be very difficult for competitors to replicate. We have the track record to sell it, the operating history to price it and believe the response will be strong based on initial conversations.

我們之所以能夠做到這一點，是因為我們卓越的運營歷史和平台戰略的結合。這種固定費用不會受到學校在服務收費關係中面臨的永無休止的收費清單的影響。 2U 的主要優點之一是固定費用收入將非常可預測。這是固定的、有保證的費用。此外，我認為競爭對手將很難復制。我們有出售它的記錄，有定價的運營歷史，並相信根據初步對話，反應將會很強烈。

Also note, we believe this model will be profitable -- will be as profitable as our flex revenue share model, but will have a much smaller cash burn. To be crystal clear, we believe that revenue sharing will continue to be an important part of the ecosystem, and we think this flat fee fits nicely with our revenue-sharing models.

另請注意，我們相信這種模式將是有利可圖的——將與我們的靈活收入分成模式一樣有利可圖，但現金消耗要少得多。需要明確的是，我們相信收入分享將繼續成為生態系統的重要組成部分，並且我們認為這種固定費用非常適合我們的收入分享模式。

A few notable developments on our other product lines. Our boot camp business continues to grow and innovate, although we've seen some softening in the coding segment. We're in a bit of a tech recession in terms of jobs, so that is having some impact. Fortunately, the new AI boot camp is off to a great start. It's also notable that the boot camp business is generating great results in our enterprise segment.

我們其他產品線的一些值得注意的發展。儘管我們看到編碼領域出現了一些疲軟，但我們的訓練營業務仍在繼續增長和創新。就就業而言，我們正處於科技衰退期，因此這產生了一些影響。幸運的是，新的人工智能訓練營有了一個良好的開端。同樣值得注意的是，新手訓練營業務在我們的企業領域取得了巨大的成果。

Our exec ed business is really surging. We're successfully converting off the edX platform, and we're adding a ton of AI content. Exec ed is a real differentiator in our enterprise segment. It is cohort-based, boasting a 90-plus percent completion compared to typically completion rates in the teens at best for the competition.

我們的執行業務確實在蓬勃發展。我們成功地脫離了 edX 平台，並且添加了大量人工智能內容。 Exec ed 是我們企業領域真正的差異化因素。它以隊列為基礎，與通常在比賽中最好的青少年完成率相比，其完成率高達 90% 以上。

Finally, a few comments on the impact of AI. First, someone has to teach AI at scale. We are that company. I alluded to it earlier, but the pace of new AI content on the platform is excellent and will continue. Second, we believe implementing generative AI inside our business will be a huge positive for us and allow us to deepen our competitive moat. This is already evident through our implementation of the edX Xpert chatbot on our platform and our ChatGPT plug-in.

最後，關於人工智能影響的一些評論。首先，必須有人大規模教授人工智能。我們就是那家公司。我之前提到過，但該平台上新的人工智能內容的步伐非常好，並將繼續下去。其次，我們相信在我們的業務中實施生成式人工智能將對我們產生巨大的積極影響，並使我們能夠加深我們的競爭護城河。通過我們在平台上實施 edX Xpert 聊天機器人和 ChatGPT 插件，這一點已經顯而易見。

These tools are driving new user engagement on edX and eliminating some legacy support cost. But these tools are just the beginning. AI will actually allow us to build more efficiently on the durable mode 2U has around our product and service layer. Cohort-based instructor-led learning and other people-mediated experiences drive significantly higher completion rates. This is hard to build, but the results it drives are powerful. Our competition doesn't have these things, and it shows, compare the industry prof serv completion rate of low teens at best to our exec ed completion rate of over 90%.

這些工具正在推動 edX 上新用戶的參與，並消除一些遺留支持成本。但這些工具僅僅是開始。實際上，人工智能將使我們能夠在 2U 圍繞我們的產品和服務層的持久模式上更高效地構建。基於群組的講師指導學習和其他以人為媒介的體驗可顯著提高完成率。這很難構建，但它帶來的結果是強大的。我們的競爭對手沒有這些東西，而且它表明，將行業教授服務完成率充其量較低的青少年與我們超過 90% 的執行人員完成率進行比較。

AI will not replace our cohort-based learning or people learning from and with other people but strategic implementation of AI will create significantly greater efficiency in creating those interactions. The combination of people plus AI can bridge the uncanny valley and drive a greater durable moat around 2U. It can bring down our costs substantially and drive greater high-value human contact. We're at the early stages of unlocking the power of AI across our business and we're very, very excited about it.

人工智能不會取代我們基於隊列的學習或人們相互學習或與其他人一起學習，但人工智能的戰略實施將在創建這些互動方面顯著提高效率。人與人工智能的結合可以跨越恐怖谷並在 2U 周圍驅動更持久的護城河。它可以大幅降低我們的成本並推動更多高價值的人際接觸。我們正處於在整個業務中釋放人工智能力量的早期階段，我們對此感到非常非常興奮。

Finally, I want to highlight that we added an executive hire that will be critical to executing on our strategy, Aaron McCullough, our Chief Product Officer. He has an outstanding background in edtech in addition to stints at Uber, Walmart and other companies. Aaron will be critical in driving the next phase of our platform strategy.

最後，我想強調的是，我們增加了一位對執行我們的戰略至關重要的高管，他是我們的首席產品官 Aaron McCullough。除了在 Uber、沃爾瑪和其他公司工作過之外，他在教育科技領域也擁有出色的背景。亞倫將在推動我們平台戰略的下一階段發揮關鍵作用。

16 years into our journey, we've seen a lot. And we've also changed a lot, working around corners and ahead of the competition. We have more capabilities and a better product suite than anyone in our space. Our business and our team are conditioned to face the challenges of this new era. Paul will now take you through current results. Paul?

16年來，我們經歷了很多。我們也發生了很多變化，在競爭中處於領先地位。我們比我們這個領域的任何人都擁有更多的能力和更好的產品套件。我們的業務和團隊已經準備好面對這個新時代的挑戰。保羅現在將帶您了解當前的結果。保羅？

Thanks, Chip, and good afternoon, everyone. On our second quarter call of last year, I said that the long-term objective of our platform strategy is to drive sustainable, profitable growth and to set up the company to capitalize on the significant opportunity in front of us. A year later, here's where we are on a 12-month basis.

謝謝奇普，大家下午好。在去年第二季度的電話會議上，我說過，我們平台戰略的長期目標是推動可持續的盈利增長，並建立公司以利用我們面前的重大機遇。一年後，這是我們 12 個月的情況。

Adjusted EBITDA has grown [$17 million]. We reduced marketing and sales as a percentage of revenue by 9 percentage points and increased organic leads from the platform by 22 percentage points. All indicators of a healthier and more efficient business.

調整後 EBITDA 增長了 [1700 萬美元]。我們將營銷和銷售佔收入的比例降低了 9 個百分點，並將平台的有機銷售線索增加了 22 個百分點。所有指標都表明企業更健康、更高效。

Taking a closer look at results. Revenue for the quarter totaled $222.1 million, down 8% from a year ago, driven by a 9% decrease in full course equivalents or FCEs which totaled 76,300 for the quarter. Revenue from the Alternative Credential Segment totaled $102.6 million, an increase of 4% from the second quarter of 2022, primarily due to a 10% increase in FCEs while revenue per FCE decreased 8%.

仔細觀察結果。該季度的收入總計 2.221 億美元，比去年同期下降 8%，這是由於當季全日制課程或 FCE 總計 76,300 人減少了 9%。替代證書細分市場的收入總計 1.026 億美元，較 2022 年第二季度增長 4%，主要是由於 FCE 增長 10%，而每個 FCE 收入下降 8%。

Boot camp revenue increased on the strength of our cybersecurity offerings, offset by softness in our coding segment. Exec ed revenue increased due to stronger demand for our artificial intelligence courses. As Chip mentioned, enterprise continues to be a focus of ours and the numbers support that. Enterprise grew 35% and now has annualized bookings of almost $100 million. Degree Program Segment revenue decreased 16% to $119.5 million primarily driven by a 16% decrease in FCEs, reflecting the implementation of our new marketing framework last summer. Given the time from marketing spend to revenue, we are now seeing that impact.

由於我們的網絡安全產品的實力，新手訓練營的收入有所增加，但被我們編碼領域的疲軟所抵消。由於對我們的人工智能課程的需求強勁，執行收入有所增加。正如 Chip 提到的，企業仍然是我們關注的焦點，數字也證明了這一點。 Enterprise 增長了 35%，目前年預訂量接近 1 億美元。學位課程部門收入下降 16% 至 1.195 億美元，主要是由於 FCE 下降 16%，這反映出我們去年夏天實施了新的營銷框架。考慮到從營銷支出到收入的時間，我們現在已經看到了這種影響。

As part of our portfolio management efforts, in the second quarter, we expected to finalize agreements to sunset certain programs. However, these were pushed into the second half of the year. These agreements would have generated revenue in the Degree Program Segment in the second quarter. Now let's take a look at cost and expenses.

作為我們投資組合管理工作的一部分，我們預計將在第二季度敲定協議以取消某些計劃。不過，這些都被推遲到了下半年。這些協議將在第二季度為學位課程部門帶來收入。現在我們來看看成本和費用。

For the second quarter, operating expense totaled $378.2 million, up from $289.4 million in the second quarter of last year. This $88.8 million increase includes a noncash impairment charge in the current quarter of $134.1 million. Without the impairment charge, operating expense for the quarter decreased 16% from the second quarter of last year, reflecting efficiencies from our platform strategy. This decrease was primarily driven by a $13.9 million decline in paid marketing costs, a $13.1 million decrease in restructuring expense, an $11.1 million reduction in personnel and personnel-related expenses and a $4 million decline in depreciation and amortization expense.

第二季度運營費用總計 3.782 億美元，高於去年第二季度的 2.894 億美元。這 8880 萬美元的增長包括本季度 1.341 億美元的非現金減值費用。如果不考慮減值費用，本季度的運營費用比去年第二季度下降了 16%，反映了我們平台戰略的效率。這一下降主要是由於付費營銷成本減少 1,390 萬美元、重組費用減少 1,310 萬美元、人事及人事相關費用減少 1,110 萬美元以及折舊和攤銷費用減少 400 萬美元。

To elaborate on the noncash impairment charge based on our stock price decline and as a result, our market capitalization, we determined that a triggering event for an interim impairment analysis had occurred. This evaluation led to a $16.7 million write-down of certain goodwill assets and a $117.4 million reduction of intangible assets. Marketing and sales as a percent of revenue decreased to 43% from 48% in the second quarter of last year. This decrease was driven by a $13.9 million reduction in marketing spend on prospect generation.

為了根據我們的股價下跌以及由此產生的市值來詳細說明非現金減值費用，我們確定發生了中期減值分析的觸發事件。此次評估導致某些商譽資產減記 1,670 萬美元，無形資產減少 1.174 億美元。營銷和銷售佔收入的百分比從去年第二季度的 48% 下降至 43%。這一下降是由於潛在客戶開發營銷支出減少了 1,390 萬美元。

Removing noncash items, such as stock-based compensation and depreciation and amortization, marketing and sales expense as a percent of revenue declined to 39% in the second quarter, down from 44% in the same period last year. Stock-based compensation expense for the period totaled $11 million, down 51% from the prior year due to the combination of a significant reduction in equity awards granted and lower brand value. We ended the quarter with 3,314 full-time employees compared to 3,848 employees in the second quarter of last year.

剔除股票薪酬、折舊和攤銷等非現金項目後，第二季度營銷和銷售費用佔收入的比例下降至 39%，低於去年同期的 44%。由於授予的股權獎勵大幅減少和品牌價值下降，該期間的股票薪酬支出總計 1100 萬美元，比上年下降 51%。截至本季度末，我們有 3,314 名全職員工，而去年第二季度為 3,848 名。

Moving on to profitability. Net loss for the quarter totaled $173.7 million compared to a net loss of $62.9 million in the second quarter of last year, reflecting the $134.1 million of noncash impairment charge and partly offset by lower operating expense of $45.4 million and $4 million in higher interest expense.

轉向盈利。本季度淨虧損總計1.737 億美元，而去年第二季度的淨虧損為6290 萬美元，反映出1.341 億美元的非現金減值費用，部分被運營費用減少4540 萬美元和利息費用增加400 萬美元所抵消。

Adjusted EBITDA for the quarter totaled $21.8 million, a margin of 10% compared to a 9% margin for the same period last year. Adjusted EBITDA margin in the Degree segment was 28% for the quarter, flat compared to the second quarter of 2022. Adjusted EBITDA margin in the Alternative Credential Segment was a negative 11%, a 700 basis point improvement from the second quarter of 2022.

該季度調整後 EBITDA 總計 2180 萬美元，利潤率為 10%，而去年同期利潤率為 9%。本季度學位部門調整後 EBITDA 利潤率為 28%，與 2022 年第二季度持平。替代證書部門調整後 EBITDA 利潤率為負 11%，較 2022 年第二季度提高 700 個基點。

Now for a discussion of the balance sheet and cash flow statement. We ended the quarter with cash and cash equivalents of $66.7 million, a decrease of $42.6 million from the end of the first quarter.

現在討論資產負債表和現金流量表。本季度末，我們的現金和現金等價物為 6670 萬美元，比第一季度末減少 4260 萬美元。

As a reminder, the timing of payments from our university partners follow the academic calendar. As a result, accounts payable -- accounts receivable balance increased $14.5 million to $87.3 million from the first quarter. In addition, we ended the quarter with lower accounts payable and accrued expenses of $122 million, a $4.3 million decrease from the first quarter. For the trailing 12 months ended June 30, 2023, we generated $11.7 million of adjusted, unlevered free cash flow, a slight improvement over the same period last year.

請注意，我們的大學合作夥伴的付款時間遵循學術日曆。因此，應付賬款-應收賬款餘額從第一季度增加了 1,450 萬美元，達到 8,730 萬美元。此外，本季度結束時，我們的應付賬款和應計費用減少了 1.22 億美元，比第一季度減少了 430 萬美元。截至 2023 年 6 月 30 日的過去 12 個月，我們產生了 1,170 萬美元的調整後無槓桿自由現金流，比去年同期略有改善。

Now for a discussion of the 2023 guidance. As we enter the second half of the year, we remain focused on scaling our business, increasing adjusted EBITDA and continuing to build our competitive advantages as a platform company. We are reaffirming our 2023 revenue guidance to range from $985 million to $995 million, representing 3% growth at the midpoint. This guidance is primarily based on the following: the strength of contracts we have signed that are expected to generate revenue in the back half of the year, stronger expected second half growth led by enterprise, particularly our social impact programs and expected execution of portfolio management transactions in the back half of the year.

現在討論 2023 年指南。進入下半年，我們仍然專注於擴展業務、增加調整後的 EBITDA 並繼續打造我們作為平台公司的競爭優勢。我們重申 2023 年收入指引為 9.85 億美元至 9.95 億美元，中間值增長 3%。該指引主要基於以下因素：我們已簽署的合同的強度，預計將在下半年產生收入，企業主導的下半年預期增長更強勁，特別是我們的社會影響計劃和投資組合管理的預期執行下半年的交易情況。

During our first quarter earnings call, we said that revenue in the second half of 2023 would be approximately 10% more than the first half. However, due to a shift in revenue from the second quarter to the back half of the year, we now anticipate 15% increase in revenue for the back half of the year compared to the first half. Specifically, we expect our enterprise revenue to accelerate in the fourth quarter and our Degree segment to generate higher revenue due to the shift in revenue we just discussed.

在第一季度財報電話會議上，我們表示 2023 年下半年的收入將比上半年增長約 10%。但由於收入從第二季度轉移到下半年，我們現在預計下半年收入較上半年增長15%。具體來說，我們預計我們的企業收入將在第四季度加速，並且由於我們剛才討論的收入變化，我們的學位部門將產生更高的收入。

On adjusted EBITDA, we've demonstrated that we can be more deliberate on corporate spending, and we are seeing the benefits of our platform strategy, particularly with respect to paid marketing. As a result, we're increasing our adjusted EBITDA guidance to range from $160 million to $165 million or growth of approximately 30% at the midpoint of the revenue and adjusted EBITDA guidance ranges.

在調整後的 EBITDA 方面，我們已經證明我們可以更加審慎地對待企業支出，並且我們看到了我們平台策略的好處，特別是在付費營銷方面。因此，我們將調整後 EBITDA 指導範圍從 1.6 億美元提高到 1.65 億美元，即收入和調整後 EBITDA 指導範圍中點增長約 30%。

To conclude, our platform strategy is working. There are numerous indications of this, including the momentum in content velocity, the growth in organic leads, the significant marketing efficiencies, enterprise growth and the strong demand we're seeing for our flex Degree offerings. We are on track to meet and perhaps beat our 2023 financial goals while optimizing our degree portfolio and rolling out new program options for our partners. All of which is building a more competitively differentiated, resilient business for the future of education and positioning the company to deliver continued improvement in profitability and cash flows.

總而言之，我們的平台戰略正在發揮作用。有很多跡象表明這一點，包括內容速度的勢頭、有機潛在客戶的增長、顯著的營銷效率、企業增長以及我們看到的對彈性學位產品的強勁需求。我們有望實現甚至超越 2023 年的財務目標，同時優化我們的學位組合併為我們的合作夥伴推出新的項目選項。所有這些都為教育的未來打造更具競爭力、差異化、彈性的業務，並使公司能夠持續改善盈利能力和現金流。

With that, I'd like to turn the call to the operator for questions.

有了這個，我想把電話轉給接線員詢問問題。

(Operator Instructions) Your first question comes from the line of George Tong with Goldman Sachs.

（操作員說明）您的第一個問題來自高盛的George Tong。

You're doubling the cadence of your new Degree Program launches for 2024 from 25 initially to 50. Can you discuss the expected capital intensity of these new launches and the anticipated impact to free cash flow generation?

你們將在 2024 年將新學位項目啟動的節奏從最初的 25 個增加到 50 個。您能否討論一下這些新項目的預期資本強度以及對自由現金流生成的預期影響？

Yes. So George, the CapEx on all of these new offerings, not just the Degree side but also on the content velocity on the edX courses, they're all very, very CapEx light. The vast majority of them do not include course build. And on top of that, a decent portion of the launches are existing online programs that are already in the market as online programs. So there's a sort of double benefit there is they don't have the cash burn, and we get revenue more quickly. .

是的。所以喬治，所有這些新產品的資本支出，不僅是學位方面，還有 edX 課程的內容速度，它們的資本支出都非常非常輕。其中絕大多數不包括課程建設。最重要的是，發布的產品中很大一部分是現有的在線程序，這些程序已經作為在線程序投放市場。因此，這有一種雙重好處，那就是他們沒有現金消耗，而且我們可以更快地獲得收入。 。

So what's going on with pipeline is we've really never seen anything like it before. It's very positive. So we also like the financial characteristics. So rotating the business to programs that can meet a demand, you've got a sort of average tuition of somewhere close to half of what our historical average tuition would be. So we think that's also very positive for the sort of long-term future of the revenue in the Degree business.

所以管道正在發生的事情是我們以前從未見過類似的事情。這是非常積極的。所以我們也喜歡財務特徵。因此，將業務轉向能夠滿足需求的項目，你得到的平均學費接近我們歷史平均學費的一半。因此，我們認為這對於學位業務收入的長期未來也是非常積極的。

Got it. That's helpful. You also talked about the introduction of a flat fee model. Can you talk about which customers this new model would likely appeal to? And what the incremental revenue impact would be if you would expect any potential cannibalization from existing revenue streams? And if so, how to quantify that?

知道了。這很有幫助。您還談到了引入固定費用模式。您能談談這種新型號可能會吸引哪些客戶嗎？如果您預計現有收入流可能會被蠶食，那麼增量收入的影響會是什麼？如果是這樣，如何量化？

So I would say, just like when we announced the flex revenue share model, we had some folks wondering if that might negatively impact our existing clients. And we're pretty good at testing these things out and determining what the impact might be to our existing base. The reality is some clients -- some potential clients just don't want a revenue share model, and we're just trying to add something to our toolkit that allows us to expand out into the market and aggregate a larger number of degree programs. So there's obviously a shorter contract length. We're willing to bet on ourselves because of both our operating history, our track record in the space and our ability to, we believe, bet on ourselves to have a longer-term relationship in that flat fee.

所以我想說，就像我們宣布靈活收入分成模式時一樣，有些人想知道這是否會對我們現有的客戶產生負面影響。我們非常擅長測試這些東西並確定它們可能對我們現有的基礎產生什麼影響。現實情況是，一些客戶——一些潛在客戶只是不想要收入分成模式，而我們只是試圖在我們的工具包中添加一些東西，使我們能夠擴展到市場並聚合更多數量的學位課程。所以合同期限顯然較短。我們願意把賭注押在自己身上，因為我們的經營歷史、我們在該領域的業績記錄以及我們相信，我們有能力押注自己在固定費用方面建立長期合作關係。

The reality is this fee-for-service is not something that most university partners want, revenue sharing still extremely popular, as you can tell by our cadence but we do have a limited number of folks that don't want to revenue share and are interested in this notion of a flat fee. So we think we'll get some really solid additional pickup.

現實情況是，這種按服務收費並不是大多數大學合作夥伴想要的，收入分享仍然非常受歡迎，正如您從我們的節奏中可以看出的那樣，但我們確實有少數人不想分享收入，並且對固定費用的概念感興趣。所以我們認為我們會得到一些非常可靠的額外皮卡。

The reality is, we've had fee-for-service for some time and just hasn't been very popular. So we like the idea of having our full bundle in a flat fee that allows people -- gives us great predictability. That's a real positive. And ultimately, you have our ability to sort of bet on ourselves to go forward, but including that -- the full bundle in that flat fee and not having to sort of do a long list of individual fee-for-service components that gets at times onerous and expensive. So we're pretty excited about it, George. We think the response to the flex model has been stellar. And we'll have announcements related to the universities that are actually coming on board soon, but we are willing to say that at least 50 for next year.

現實情況是，我們實行按服務收費已經有一段時間了，只是還不太受歡迎。因此，我們喜歡以固定費用提供全套服務的想法，這樣人們就可以給我們帶來很大的可預測性。這是一個真正的積極因素。最終，我們有能力把賭注押在自己身上，繼續前進，但包括這一點——固定費用中的完整捆綁，而不必做一長串單獨的按服務付費的組件。時間繁重且昂貴。所以我們對此感到非常興奮，喬治。我們認為 Flex 模型的反響非常好。我們很快就會發布與實際加入的大學相關的公告，但我們願意說明年至少有 50 所大學。

The notable thing about that overall pipeline is when you look at the overall sort of aggregated pipeline, you've got a very large amount of long-term, steady-state revenue that should come into play from this pipeline. And we do like that in both cases, they get started faster because you don't have the big J curve.

關於整個管道的值得注意的事情是，當您查看聚合管道的總體類型時，您會從該管道中獲得大量長期穩定的收入。我們確實喜歡這兩種情況，它們啟動得更快，因為沒有大 J 曲線。

Your next question comes from the line of Jeff Silber with BMO Capital Markets.

您的下一個問題來自 BMO 資本市場的 Jeff Silber。

My first question probably is for Paul. In terms of your guidance, I know you mentioned the shift in revenue from the second quarter to the second half. One, can you quantify what that shift is? And again, I know there's some seasonality in the business, but you're looking for a pretty steep ramp up in the second half. Maybe if you can give us some color in terms of the cadence between 3Q and 4Q. That would be really helpful.

我的第一個問題可能是問保羅的。就您的指導而言，我知道您提到了收入從第二季度到下半年的轉變。第一，你能量化這種轉變是什麼嗎？再說一次，我知道該業務存在一些季節性，但您希望在下半年實現相當陡峭的增長。也許你能給我們一些有關 3Q 和 4Q 之間節奏的信息。這真的很有幫助。

So Jeff, as you know, with any type of forecast, we think of our plan on an annual basis. And we have several ways of achieving those numbers, whether it is around new launches, new customers that we sign, new contracts that we have in the pipeline. The shift from the second quarter to the second half of the year basically reflects now a third quarter that looks kind of similar to the third quarter -- to the second quarter, a third quarter that looks like the second quarter and then a fourth quarter that has the benefit of some enterprise contracts and some other contracts that we have on the Degree side of the house that brings the revenue back up and produces a significant growth on a year-over-year basis in the fourth quarter. But at the same time, allowing us to hit our guidance range that we had at the beginning of the year on our plan at the beginning of the year.

所以傑夫，正如你所知，對於任何類型的預測，我們都會每年考慮我們的計劃。我們有多種方法來實現這些數字，無論是新產品的推出、我們簽署的新客戶還是我們正在醞釀的新合同。從第二季度到下半年的轉變基本上反映了第三季度看起來與第三季度相似——到第二季度，第三季度看起來像第二季度，然後是第四季度受益於我們在學位方面的一些企業合同和其他一些合同，這些合同使收入回升，並在第四季度實現同比顯著增長。但與此同時，這使我們能夠達到年初計劃的指導範圍。

Most importantly, probably on the EBITDA side and the cash flow side of the equation, when we -- it is one of those areas that we have more control over. So we're probably a little bit playing a wait-and-see mode before we deliver everything we can on the EBITDA side of the equation, but that's one of the sides that we feel like we have visibility, we have control. And it's one of the sides that we have tremendous confidence in. And then what we're doing now is making sure that we can set the business up for a more resilient 2024, 2025. And those are the contracts that will come in and help us to deliver Q4 numbers.

最重要的是，可能在 EBITDA 方面和現金流方面，當我們——它是我們擁有更多控制權的領域之一。因此，在我們在 EBITDA 方面提供我們所能提供的一切之前，我們可能有點處於觀望狀態，但這是我們認為我們擁有可見性、我們擁有控制權的方面之一。這是我們充滿信心的方面之一。然後我們現在要做的就是確保我們能夠使業務在 2024 年、2025 年更具彈性。這些合同將有助於我們我們將提供第四季度的數據。

All right. That's great to hear. And then on the Degree Program side, it's great to hear about the accelerated launches for next year. I want to talk about the other side of the equation in terms of renewals. Can you remind us when your next renewals are coming up in your Degree programs? Are you having negotiations with those partners? Should we expect a different type of contract, maybe shifting out of revenue share to flat fee, et cetera?

好的。聽到這個消息我很高興。然後在學位項目方面，很高興聽到明年加速啟動。我想談談續約方面的另一面。您能提醒我們您的學位課程的下一次續籤時間是什麼時候嗎？您正在與這些合作夥伴進行談判嗎？我們是否應該期待一種不同類型的合同，也許將收入分成轉變為固定費用等等？

Yes, Jeff, I mean, we're continually pretty much never not in some kind of discussion or negotiation with our clients. We do have a very, very substantial percentage of the revenue locked. I'm going to -- I'll get the number for you before we're done with the questions. Existing contracts represent -- it's like greater than 90% of our revenue through -- nonetheless, it's -- we do feel very confident in the current client relationships and our ability to navigate new -- moving people to flex, in some cases.

是的，傑夫，我的意思是，我們幾乎從未停止與客戶進行某種討論或談判。我們確實鎖定了非常非常大比例的收入。在我們回答完問題之前，我會為您拿到電話號碼。現有合同代表——這就像我們超過 90% 的收入——儘管如此，我們確實對當前的客戶關係和我們駕馭新的能力非常有信心——在某些情況下促使人們靈活運用。

What's interesting about flex, as you might have heard me mention that in the case of flex, what people are really most interested in is the sort of core model plus marketing, which is very similar to our full bundle at this stage. So we don't have any renewals until I believe after 2026. I'm trying to verify that, the room.

Flex 的有趣之處在於，你可能聽我提到過，就 Flex 而言，人們真正最感興趣的是那種核心模型加營銷，這與我們現階段的完整捆綁非常相似。所以我們不會進行任何續約，我相信是在 2026 年之後。我正在嘗試驗證這一點，房間。

Yes, 2026, Chip.

是的，2026 年，奇普。

Thank you, Paul. So feeling really very positive about the existing client base. There are definitely some cases where you have current clients that have programs that exist already. And as you might imagine, if they exist already, doing them under the full revenue share bundle like what we've historically been known for doesn't make as much sense because the courses already exist and therefore, the cash to create those has already been in place. So we think flat fee just sort of opens up more opportunities, not just with new clients but at existing clients.

謝謝你，保羅。所以對現有的客戶群感到非常積極。在某些情況下，您當前的客戶肯定已經有程序。正如您可能想像的那樣，如果它們已經存在，那麼像我們歷史上所熟知的那樣，在全額收入分成捆綁下進行這些課程就沒有多大意義，因為課程已經存在，因此，創建這些課程的現金已經存在已就位。因此，我們認為固定費用只是為新客戶和現有客戶帶來了更多機會。

The reality is, you want to give them the options and I think if we keep giving them the options, we should see more and more degrees come on to the platform.

現實是，你想給他們選擇，我認為如果我們繼續給他們選擇，我們應該會看到越來越多的學位進入這個平台。

Your next question comes from the line of Ryan MacDonald with Needham & Company.

您的下一個問題來自 Needham & Company 的瑞安·麥克唐納 (Ryan MacDonald)。

Maybe to start, Chip and Paul, obviously, a common topic on the conversation was the idea of portfolio management and continuing to sort of evaluate the existing portfolio. Given the commentary that Alternative Credentials is expected to be larger in 2024, I'm curious beyond what you've talked about in sort of the shift of sunsetting programs in 2Q, 3Q. How many additional programs or what level of valuation are you undertaking to sunset additional programs as we go into 2024? And is that having a contributing factor on sort of the commentary around Alternative Credential exceeding Degrees next year?

也許首先，奇普和保羅，顯然，談話中的一個共同話題是投資組合管理和繼續評估現有投資組合的想法。考慮到替代證書預計將在 2024 年規模更大的評論，除了您所談論的第二季度、第三季度日落計劃的轉變之外，我很好奇。當我們進入 2024 年時，您將採取多少額外計劃或什麼水平的估值來取消額外計劃？這是否會對明年關於替代證書超過學位的評論產生影響？

Thank you, Ryan. No, the commentary related to Alt Credit, Degree, they are not really related. We tried to lay out the 4 criteria that we use to evaluate whether or not we want to continue with programs. And one is the financial health of the program, two is the overall partner relationship, three is the resource allocation, and 4 is the debt to earnings on various programs.

謝謝你，瑞安。不，與Alt Credit、Degree相關的評論，它們並沒有真正的相關性。我們試圖列出 4 個標準，用於評估我們是否要繼續實施該計劃。一是項目的財務健康狀況，二是整體合作夥伴關係，三是資源分配，四是各個項目的債務與收益之比。

So we've been doing this for some time now. We thought it was important to call it out so that people understand that this is like -- it's going to be an ongoing process of us gradually rotating the business to something that we think fits the long-term value more strongly both for students, probably most importantly but also for our shareholders.

我們這樣做已經有一段時間了。我們認為有必要大聲疾呼，讓人們明白這將是一個持續的過程，我們將逐步將業務轉向我們認為更適合學生長期價值的領域，也許最重要的是，也是為了我們的股東。

So overall, we feel like we've been able to do it historically with no student impact. I think that was the key. As we started doing these a couple of years ago, our biggest concern in how we handle them was making sure that students had a really good outcome and that our overall student outcomes didn't suffer during that process in any way. And honestly, we've gotten good at it. So we've gotten pretty good at a very smooth transition on these. We're obviously not going to talk about individual clients or individual contracts at all. It is multiple university partners and something that we think is important for us to continue to drive the long-term value with where the business is going.

總的來說，我們覺得我們歷史上一直能夠做到這一點，而不會影響學生。我認為這是關鍵。當我們幾年前開始這樣做時，我們對如何處理這些問題最關心的是確保學生取得真正好的成績，並且我們的整體學生成績在此過程中不會受到任何影響。老實說，我們已經做得很好了。因此，我們在這些方面的過渡非常順利。顯然我們根本不會談論個人客戶或個人合同。我們認為，與多個大學合作夥伴的合作對於我們繼續推動業務發展的長期價值非常重要。

Now what's interesting about it, Ryan, is that we've got so many launches coming in that we do think we're able to drive a really good sort of rotation to that kind of newer revenue in those cases that we think might be a more appropriate revenue mix for the platform.

瑞安，現在有趣的是，我們已經推出瞭如此多的產品，我們確實認為我們能夠在我們認為可能是一種新收入的情況下推動一種真正良好的輪換。為平台提供更合適的收入組合。

Yes. And Chip, if I may jump in for a second here, Ryan, at Investor Day, we talked about the mix of Degree versus Alt Credit on a long-term basis. In 2022, it was a 59-41 split. And then we talked about long-term 40-60 split. If you think of that rotation in steady state of the flex programs that are coming in and some of the newer models and the new revenue that will come in, you'll get back to a place where you're comparing apples-to-apples on a long-term basis. So that 40-60 split where Alt Credit becomes a larger portion of the business, it becomes really material as we go forward comparing apples-to-apples.

是的。 Chip，如果我可以插話一下，Ryan，在投資者日，我們討論了長期學位與替代信用的組合。 2022 年，雙方的比分是 59 比 41。然後我們討論了長期的 40-60 分割。如果你考慮到即將推出的彈性計劃、一些較新的型號以及即將到來的新收入的穩定狀態輪換，你就會回到一個進行同類比較的地方長期來看。因此，Alt Credit 成為業務的較大部分的 40-60 分割，當我們繼續進行同類比較時，它變得非常重要。

Super helpful color. I appreciate that. Maybe as a follow-up, Chip, we're seeing obviously in education, the continued growing of skills-based learning, skills-based hiring as a theme across sort of not only university institutions but also enterprise organizations. Given the rotational comment you made about adding more industry content partners to the platform. Is this sort of your strategy for how you'll be tackling more of this skills-based opportunity? And do you expect that to be more of a driver to the enterprise business or maybe an enhancer to the existing university relationships you have today?

超級有用的顏色。我很感激。也許作為後續行動，奇普，我們在教育領域明顯看到，基於技能的學習和基於技能的招聘的持續增長不僅成為大學機構而且企業組織的主題。鑑於您關於向平台添加更多行業內容合作夥伴的輪流評論。這是您應對更多基於技能的機會的策略嗎？您是否期望這更多地成為企業業務的驅動力，或者可能增強您目前擁有的現有大學關係？

Well, we definitely believe in university-backed credentials, feel very strongly that we continue to have the best portfolio of universities in the world, honestly, like and have -- in many ways, double down on our relationships with many of those schools. So Ryan, what I think is fascinating about the space right now is that you've got a lot of people sort of -- smaller companies that are failing and then larger companies that are kind of bailing out of the space, and we really like our -- where we sit in the market. I don't mean the stock market, I mean, the university market, we feel like our sort of overall strength is represented by that pipeline.

嗯，我們絕對相信大學支持的證書，我們強烈地認為我們繼續擁有世界上最好的大學組合，說實話，我們喜歡並且在很多方面都加倍加強了我們與其中許多學校的關係。所以瑞安，我認為現在這個領域令人著迷的是，有很多人——一些正在失敗的小公司，然後是一些正在逃離這個領域的大公司，我們真的很喜歡我們的——我們在市場中的地位。我指的不是股票市場，而是大學市場，我們覺得我們的整體實力是由這條管道代表的。

So we're certainly not getting away from university content. We think it's critical and our university partners are the best in the world, and we continue to work with them to provide them a greater sort of toolkit to do more content with us. That's part of the reason the content strategy is way up. Now with that said, industry-leading companies is also a big part of it. And in some cases, industry-leading individuals like Deepak Chopra.

所以我們當然不會放棄大學內容。我們認為這很重要，我們的大學合作夥伴是世界上最好的，我們將繼續與他們合作，為他們提供更好的工具包，以便與我們一起製作更多內容。這就是內容策略大幅提升的部分原因。話雖如此，行業領先的公司也是其中很大一部分。在某些情況下，像迪帕克喬普拉這樣的行業領先人士。

So like we do think the content overall will drive greater organic growth. We do think that's something that's a little misunderstood in terms of like, yes, overall, like our -- if you look at like 5 consecutive quarters of an improvement in both registered learners and learner prospects and 2 consecutive quarters of year-on-year growth in both of those categories regardless of what's going on overall with traffic, traffic overall is a little bit more of a vanity metric.

因此，我們確實認為內容總體上將推動更大的有機增長。我們確實認為這有點被誤解，是的，總體來說，就像我們的——如果你看看註冊學習者和學習者前景連續 5 個季度的改善以及連續 2 個季度同比的改善無論流量總體情況如何，這兩個類別的增長都更像是一個虛榮指標。

So we do think like we're bringing in the right people to the platform. To do that, we need both quality university content and quality industry content. So you've seen a big mix of both. If you look at our announcements, Tel Aviv University and IE University and then, of course, companies like Databricks and so we do think, overall, the story is and not or. It's not a pivot. It's a rotation.

因此，我們確實認為我們正在為該平台引入合適的人才。為此，我們需要優質的大學內容和優質的行業內容。所以你已經看到了兩者的巨大混合。如果你看看我們的公告，特拉維夫大學和 IE 大學，當然還有像 Databricks 這樣的公司，所以我們確實認為，總的來說，這個故事是或者不是。這不是一個支點。這是一個輪換。

And just one quick thing for the previous question, Jeff Silber, 95% of Degree revenue is under contract, which renew -- under contracts, which renew after 2026. So we still got quite a bit of runway in the existing portfolio. Sorry for not having that real time.

對於前一個問題，傑夫·西爾伯(Jeff Silber) 簡單說一下，95% 的Degree 收入是根據合同簽訂的，該合同會在2026 年之後續簽。因此，我們在現有的投資組合中仍然有相當多的空間。抱歉沒有那麼實時。

Your next question comes from the line of Josh Baer with Morgan Stanley.

你的下一個問題來自摩根士丹利的喬什·貝爾 (Josh Baer)。

I wanted to ask on Alt Credit still with the negative double-digit margins. I guess why isn't that business profitable today? And what are some of the drivers that will get it over to profitable?

我想問一下 Alt Credit 的利潤率仍然是負兩位數。我想為什麼今天這項業務沒有盈利？讓它實現盈利的驅動因素有哪些？

So Josh, a couple of things there. Number one, I think we are moving towards -- with the realignment that we did last year, we're looking at it on an annual basis to get the profitability. We're beginning to move in that direction. A lot of our leads that are coming off the platform is helping the exec ed business, is helping the boot camp business.

喬希，有幾件事。第一，我認為我們正在朝著——通過我們去年所做的調整，我們每年都會考慮它以獲得盈利能力。我們正開始朝這個方向前進。我們來自平台的許多領導正在幫助執行業務，正在幫助新兵訓練營業務。

We're also leveraging our student support organization across Degree and the Alternative Credential business. And then from an enterprise perspective, as enterprise grows and becomes a larger component of the revenue stream, we have a better flow through on enterprise, both from a contribution margin all the way down to an EBITDA level.

我們還利用我們的學生支持組織來開展學位和替代證書業務。然後從企業的角度來看，隨著企業的發展並成為收入流的更大組成部分，我們對企業有更好的流動，從邊際貢獻一直到 EBITDA 水平。

And then we are implementing lots of efficiencies within the back office to help us to be more efficient, whether it's the use of AI or the way we serve the students in that segment. Look, it's -- cost cutting is not a thing. It's about how do you efficiently change the way you operate and run a business. And we've begun to do that last year, and we're going to continue to do that, and we believe we can get there on a 12-month basis, particularly as we see the enterprise business continues to grow.

然後，我們在後台實施了大量的效率提高措施，以幫助我們提高效率，無論是人工智能的使用還是我們為該領域的學生提供服務的方式。看，削減成本不是問題。這是關於如何有效地改變經營和經營業務的方式。我們去年就開始這樣做，我們將繼續這樣做，我們相信我們可以在 12 個月內實現這一目標，特別是當我們看到企業業務持續增長時。

Great. And so the 12-month basis -- or I guess, could you just update on the timeline to get to profitable for that segment?

偉大的。那麼以 12 個月為基礎——或者我猜，您能否更新時間表以實現該細分市場的盈利？

At the beginning of this year, we said we hope to be there for the calendar year 2023, and we're still on track to do that. The 11% negative margin that you mentioned is a 700 basis point improvement on a year-over-year basis. And we expect the fourth quarter to be a material quarter, particularly in the Alternative Credential business, with enterprise being a significant growth driver in that quarter.

今年年初，我們表示希望在 2023 年實現這一目標，而且我們仍然有望實現這一目標。你提到的11%的負利潤率比去年同期提高了700個基點。我們預計第四季度將是重要的季度，特別是在替代證書業務方面，企業將成為該季度的重要增長動力。

Okay. So that's for the full year '23?

好的。那麼這是 23 年全年的情況嗎？

Full year '23.

23 年全年。

Not just Q4. Okay. Great. And then thinking ahead, like with the mix shift kind of toward Alt Cred, I mean how should we think about the impact to just the overall business margin profile coming from more Degree business, which has such great margins.

不僅僅是第四季度。好的。偉大的。然後向前思考，就像向 Alt Cred 的混合轉變一樣，我的意思是我們應該如何考慮來自更多學位業務的整體業務利潤率狀況的影響，這些業務具有如此巨大的利潤率。

Well, Josh, you did -- Paul, I'll let you answer that in a second. But you did hear us mention that we think the new flex model is quite attractive on a margin basis. The programs may not be quite as large as the programs that we've runway back in the day, 5, 10 years ago, but they're going to get quite attractive from a margin point of view.

好吧，喬什，你做到了——保羅，我稍後會讓你回答這個問題。但你確實聽到我們提到，我們認為新的柔性模型在利潤率的基礎上相當有吸引力。這些項目可能不像 5 年前、10 年前我們推出的項目那麼大，但從利潤的角度來看，它們將變得相當有吸引力。

Yes. So Josh, I mean, our long term -- our midterm and long-term numbers that we provided at Investor Day, midterm, we said EBITDA margin, 17% to 19%; this year with the guidance we just provided, that's roughly around 16%. We don't see anything changing with the mix, if not anything, it gets better because to some extent, the margins -- we have capital-light programs in the flex degrees. We're rotating into flex degrees or flat model or the flat fee model, and both of those have very similar margins at steady state to what we're rotating out of. So to some extent, it is the Alternative Credential business that really ramps up the margin as we go forward.

是的。所以喬希，我的意思是，我們的長期——我們在投資者日提供的中期和長期數據，中期，我們說 EBITDA 利潤率，17% 到 19%；今年根據我們剛剛提供的指導，大約為 16% 左右。我們沒有看到任何變化，如果沒有什麼變化，它會變得更好，因為在某種程度上，利潤 - 我們在彈性程度中有資本輕的計劃。我們正在轉向靈活度或固定模式或固定費用模式，這兩種模式在穩定狀態下的利潤率與我們正在轉向的模式非常相似。因此，在某種程度上，隨著我們的前進，替代憑證業務真正提高了利潤。

And keep in mind, we're at 16%. So to get between 17% and 19% for the midterm, it seems to be a shorter putt and then we have to focus on the long term of 24% to 26% in which are the numbers we provided at the Investor Day.

請記住，我們的比例是 16%。因此，要在中期獲得 17% 到 19% 的回報，這似乎是一個較短的推桿，然後我們必須關注 24% 到 26% 的長期回報，這是我們在投資者日提供的數字。

Clearly, over time, Alt Credit is becoming more and more important because the world wants it, like students and employers want this content. At the same time, our Degree business is very large and profitable and will continue to be so. Like we're not getting out of our Degree business in any manner. This is not a pivot. We actually really love what's happening on the Degree pipeline side. We think it's pretty well. We've never done more than 17. So it's investing in what we think will drive the right long-term benefit and great value for the students.

顯然，隨著時間的推移，另類信用變得越來越重要，因為世界想要它，就像學生和雇主想要這些內容一樣。與此同時，我們的學位業務非常龐大且盈利，並將繼續如此。就像我們不會以任何方式退出我們的學位業務一樣。這不是一個支點。我們實際上非常喜歡學位管道方面發生的事情。我們認為這很好。我們做過的項目從未超過 17 個。因此，我們正在投資於我們認為將為學生帶來正確的長期利益和巨大價值的項目。

(Operator Instructions) Your next question comes from the line of Stephen Sheldon with William Blair.

（操作員說明）您的下一個問題來自斯蒂芬·謝爾頓和威廉·布萊爾的對話。

You've got Pat McIlwee on for Stephen today. I have a couple of questions for you all. So first on the fixed fee model that you announced this quarter, I just wanted to ask if there had been any updates on the regulatory front related to oversight of OPMs? Or any update to how you feel positioned on that front that may have influenced or driven that decision?

今天請帕特·麥克伊爾威代替斯蒂芬。我有幾個問題想問大家。首先，關於您本季度宣布的固定費用模式，我只是想問一下，與 OPM 監管相關的監管方面是否有任何更新？或者您在這方面的感受是否有任何更新，可能會影響或推動該決定？

No. We -- as I mentioned in the prepared remarks, we feel like the flat fee model is just a way to offer an additional sort of toolkit to the university partners to drive value for them. There are some that don't want a revenue share that's not new. We feel very comfortable with where we are from a regulatory standpoint. And it's been extraordinarily clear from both universities and from ACE and others that support the industry, how important revenue sharing is sort of on an overwhelming basis. Sort of hard to overstate how much support there was for revenue share and really nothing has changed on that front. So we didn't announce flat fee because of a regulatory reason. We announced flat fee because we like it, to be honest. It's pretty good.

不。正如我在準備好的發言中提到的，我們認為固定費用模式只是向大學合作夥伴提供另一種工具包以為其創造價值的一種方式。有些人不想要收入分成，這並不是什麼新鮮事。從監管的角度來看，我們對自己的處境感到非常滿意。大學、ACE 和其他支持該行業的機構都非常清楚地表明，收入分享在某種程度上是多麼重要。很難誇大對收入分成的支持程度，而且在這方面實際上沒有任何改變。因此，由於監管原因，我們沒有宣布固定費用。說實話，我們宣布固定費用是因為我們喜歡它。這個很不錯。

Yes. Okay. Very clear. And then it sounds like you continue to focus on materially growing your enterprise business and you noted some encouraging indicators on that front this quarter. But can you just talk about what you've seen in terms of end market demand there and learning and development budgets in general?

是的。好的。非常清楚。聽起來您繼續專注於企業業務的實質性增長，並且您注意到本季度這方面的一些令人鼓舞的指標。但您能否談談您所看到的終端市場需求以及總體學習和發展預算？

What's interesting about the enterprise business is like there are multiple components to it that I think are very differentiated from what you've seen in the space. So you've got, first of all, incredibly high completion rate programs that are driven on a cohort basis to, whether it be mid-level execs or C-suite level and you're even able to configure some of these to the enterprise very specifically in a way that's become very attractive.

企業業務的有趣之處在於它有多個組件，我認為這些組件與您在該領域看到的非常不同。因此，首先，您擁有令人難以置信的高完成率計劃，這些計劃是在隊列基礎上推動的，無論是中層管理人員還是首席高管級別，您甚至可以為企業配置其中一些計劃非常具體地以一種變得非常有吸引力的方式。

And you've got boot camps where you've got people sort of fully reskilling folks. And we don't think anybody really can do this kind of stuff at scale the way we can. We passed something on the order of 55,000 graduates in that business. So for most people, it's sort of onesie, twosie, and we can really handle these things for the enterprise in both cases at scale.

還有新兵訓練營，人們可以在那裡進行全面的再培訓。我們認為沒有人能真正像我們一樣大規模地做這類事情。我們通過了大約 55,000 名該行業畢業生的項目。因此，對於大多數人來說，這有點像連體衣、雙人衣，我們確實可以在這兩種情況下為企業大規模處理這些事情。

Then separately, this is all very attractive both from a social impact standpoint, sort of tapping funding sources to once again move the dial at scale for local communities on tech reskilling and governments where in the case of government, it's a mix of all of the above. So you've got governments interested in purchasing both the individual exec ed courses, the subscription overall to edX, the boot camps themselves. So there's just a tremendous amount of opportunity for us there, and it's now getting to a nontrivial number. So you're looking at a run rate that is now a number that obviously, will matter more to this audience. When we've got a sort of big company and it's not as big of a number where folks haven't been paying attention to it, but we're paying a ton of attention to it because we think highly differentiated outcomes at scale is the way I would really think about it.

然後，單獨而言，從社會影響的角度來看，這一切都非常有吸引力，可以利用資金來源，再次大規模地推動當地社區的技術再培訓和政府的發展，就政府而言，它是所有多於。因此，政府有興趣購買個人高管課程、edX 整體訂閱以及訓練營本身。因此，我們那裡有大量的機會，而且現在已經達到了一個不小的數字。所以你現在看到的運行率顯然對這些觀眾來說更重要。當我們有一家大公司時，它的數量並不是那麼大，人們沒有註意到它，但我們對它給予了大量的關注，因為我們認為大規模的高度差異化的結果是我會認真考慮的。

It's like we can drive a really high outcome for people. And ultimately, that is really what matters, whether you're a single consumer or you're an enterprise. So where we're coming from right now, we see enterprise as a very significant '24 and '25 growth opportunity.

就好像我們可以為人們帶來非常高的成果。最終，無論您是單個消費者還是企業，這才是真正重要的。因此，我們現在認為企業是 24 世紀和 25 世紀非常重要的增長機會。

Your final question comes from the line of Jeff Meuler of Baird.

你的最後一個問題來自 Baird 的 Jeff Meuler。

Yes. Apologies if it's just me that's confused. But it's not -- I'm not understanding why sunsetting programs later than expected is causing revenue to be pushed out? Is this like early-break fees that you were expecting to be recognized in Q2 that you're now expecting to be recognized in the back half? Or just can you be any more clear on what the dynamic is that sunsetting later than expected pushes revenue up.

是的。抱歉，如果只有我感到困惑。但事實並非如此——我不明白為什麼推遲計劃會導致收入被推遲？這是否就像您預計在第二季度得到確認的提前終止費一樣，現在您預計會在下半年得到確認？或者您能否更清楚地了解晚於預期的日落會推高收入的動態是什麼。

Yes. So in certain cases, there's a contractual arrangement that we expected in the forecast. And in this particular case, it's moved into the back half of the year. It's that simple. So these are negotiated agreements, Jeff.

是的。因此，在某些情況下，會有我們在預測中預期的合同安排。在這個特殊情況下，它被移到了今年下半年。就是這麼簡單。所以這些都是談判達成的協議，傑夫。

With that dynamic and the rotation comments but also the new launch bullishness and target, do the midterm revenue growth targets, 8% to 10% CAGR from 2022 that you gave us at Investor Day? Do those still stand or any change?

有了這種動態和輪換評論，以及新推出的樂觀情緒和目標，您在投資者日給我們提供的中期收入增長目標（2022 年起 8% 至 10% 的複合年增長率）是否可行？這些仍然存在還是有變化？

Yes, we're not -- as of right now, we're not changing any update to our guidance at all. And we don't expect to change. I guess, we obviously don't in our Q2 call give a guide for 2024, but we like what we sit, Jeff. So this is -- we understand that the quarter impact is one that, of course, you're going to ask questions about we don't manage the business on the quarters, and we manage the business overall in a way that we think is best for the company and therefore, for the shareholders. And it's part of the reason that we feel comfortable with the annual guide, so shift but not a change.

是的，我們不會——截至目前，我們根本不會更改指南的任何更新。我們不期望改變。我想，我們顯然不會在第二季度電話會議中給出 2024 年的指南，但我們喜歡我們的立場，傑夫。所以這就是 - 我們知道季度影響是一個，當然，你會問我們不按季度管理業務的問題，我們以我們認為的方式管理整體業務對公司最有利，因此對股東也最有利。這也是我們對年度指南感到滿意的部分原因，因此要進行調整，而不是改變。

Were the contractual arrangements in place that the timing was moved. But the contractual arrangements for the sunset, were they in place at the time that you gave us the multiyear targets at the Investor Day in March?

如果合同安排到位，時間就會改變。但是，當您在三月份的投資者日向我們提供多年目標時，日落的合同安排是否已經到位？

Yes. I mean, Jeff, there's obviously a lot in a forecast. So there's a lot of puts and takes in the forecast. We've done this for some time. You might remember, Jeff, in particular, the Simmons undergrad program. That we talked with you in particular, quite a bit about. So the -- with Simmons on ground, that's an example upon where you did have a substantial impact in that current period. We've had some of these in the first 6 months of the year. We will continue to have them. So unfortunately, we had multiple universities in play on this, and it's a shift. But we feel very confident in our ability to manage them overall, and we like the mix that we're moving to.

是的。我的意思是，傑夫，預測顯然有很多內容。因此，預測中有很多變化。我們這樣做已經有一段時間了。傑夫，你可能還記得特別是西蒙斯本科項目。我們特別和你談了很多。所以，西蒙斯在場上，這是一個例子，說明你在當前時期確實產生了重大影響。今年前 6 個月我們已經經歷了其中一些。我們將繼續擁有它們。不幸的是，我們有多所大學在這方面發揮作用，這是一個轉變。但我們對整體管理它們的能力非常有信心，而且我們喜歡我們正在轉向的組合。

There are no further questions at this time. I will turn the call to Steve Virostek.

目前沒有其他問題。我會將電話轉給 Steve Virostek。

I just want to thank everybody for joining us today. And if you have follow-up questions, please give me a call or send me an e-mail. Thanks so much, and have a good day.

我只想感謝大家今天加入我們。如果您有後續問題，請給我打電話或給我發送電子郵件。非常感謝，祝你有美好的一天。

This concludes today's conference call. Thank you for joining. You may now disconnect your lines.

今天的電話會議到此結束。感謝您的加入。您現在可以斷開線路。